HOBBES EXCERPTS
The Citizen:
PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
io8
XVI. Of his government by
XVII. Of his government by
XVIII. Of those things into the kingdom of heaven
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the old covenant 309 the new covenant 329 whicfi are necessary for our entrance
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PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF A TRUE CITIZEN
LIBERTY
Of the State of Men Without Civil Society
1. The Introduction. 2. That the beginning of civil society is from mutual fear. 3. That men by nature are all equal. 4. Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth. 5. The discord arising from comparison of wits. 6. From the appetite many have to the same thing. 7. The definition of right. 8. A right to the end, gives a right to the means necessary to that end. 9. By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means which tend to his own preservation. 10. By nature all men have equal right to all things. 11. This right which all men have to all things, is unprofitable. 12. The state of men without civil society, is a mere state of war: the definitions of peace and war. 13. War is an adversary to man's preservation. 14. It is lawful for any man, by natural right, to compel another whom he hath gotten in his power, to give caution of his future obedience. 15. Nature dictates the seeking after peace.
1. The faculties of human nature may be reduced unto four kinds: bodily strength, experience, reason, passion. Taking the beginning of this following doctrine from these, we will declare, in the first place, what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bear towards each other, and whether, and by what fac-
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ness, and what are the
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for society, and |to| preserve them-iolence; then proceeding, we will
ulty they are born apt selves against mutual \
show what advice was necessary to be taken for this busi
conditions of society, or of human
nature.
of those men who have written
peace; that is to say (changing the words only), what are the fundamental laws oj 2. The greatest part aught concerning commonwealths, either suppose, or re-
:o believe, that man is a creature The Greeks call him Ccoov foundation they so build up the as if for the preservation of peace, mankind, there were nothing else ;n should agree to make certain
see actually a constituted society among men, a™ num. nvn4& of it, since we discern all desirous of congress and mutual correspondence, it may seem a wonderful kind
---- -        ■ 1 t--ii    _r   ti.;.   J„„i._:„„   „„„1, a
quire us or beg of us born  fit*  for society! ttoTutikov; and on this doctrine of civil society, and the government of necessary than that m
* Born fit. Since we now men, and none living out
of stupidity, to lay in the
Jlurv..u;,     „, ......_ very threshold of this doctrine such a
stumbling block before the reader, as to deny man to be born fit for society. Therefore I must riore plainly say, that it is true indeed, that to man by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as he is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live well. Wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling) desire to come together. But civil societies ars not mere meetings, but bonds, to the making whereof faith and compacts are necessary; the virtue whereof to children and fools, and the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany.its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens, that those, because they know not what society is, cannot enter into it; these, because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care not for it. Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in infi.ncy, are born unapt for society. Many also, perhaps most men, either through defect of mind or want of education, remain unfit duiing the whole course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human nature. Wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education. Furthermore, although man were born in such a condition as to desire it, it follows not, that he therefore were born fit to enter into it. For it is one thing tj desire, another to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride, will not stoop to equal conditions, withou: which there can be no society, do yet desire it.
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covenants and conditions together, which themselves should then call laws. Which axiom, though received by most, is yet certainly false; and an error proceeding from our too slight contemplation of human nature. For they who shall more narrowly look into the causes for which men come together, and delight in each other's company, shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen no otherwise, but by accident. For if by nature one man should love another, that is, as man, there could no reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man, as being equally man; or why he should rather frequent those, whose society affords him honour or profit. We do not therefore by nature seek society for its own sake, but that we may receive some honour or profit from it; these we desire primarily, that secondarily. How, by what advice, men do meet, will be best known by observing those things which they do when they are met. For if they meet for traffic, it is plain every man regards not his fellow, but his business; if to discharge some office, a certain market-friendship is begotten, which hath more of jealousy in it than true love, and whence factions sometimes may arise, but good will never; if for pleasure and recreation of mind, every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stir up laughter, whence he may, according to the nature of that which is ridiculous, by comparison of another man's defects and infirmities, pass the more current in his own opinion. And although this be sometimes innocent and without offence, yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the society, as their own vain glory. But for the most part, in these kind of meetings we wound the absent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examined, judged, condemned. Nay, it is very rare but some present receive a fling | as soon as | they part; so as his reason was not ill, who was wont always at parting to go out last. And these are indeed the true delights of society,
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carried
incident ;ood
the of
desires tie
them
unto which we are sions which are sad experience or gi many never happens, ters be dulled with which the discourse this subject, is but cold But if it so happen, in relating some stories one which concerns rest most greedily relate some wonder, have them; if not, thej say somewhat of others: if they meet .to men, so many would not only love not thei|r with hatred. So clear a little more narrowly congress ariseth either glory, whence the them either some same iuSoxiiiEiv, som^ with whom they have collected by reason will, good, honour, p contract society, in al the object of the will those who gather tog Now whatsoever either to the senses, or ure is either glory, ( self), or refers to g or conducing to hended   under the therefore is either folr
out
TO
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by nature, that is, by those paste all creatures, until either by precepts it so fall out, which in that the appetite of present mat-memory of things past: without most quick and nimble men on and hungry.
that being met they pass their time and one of them begins to tell l|imself; instantly every one of the to speak of himself too; if one rest will tell you miracles, if they will feign them. Lastly, that I may who pretend to be wiser than talk of philosophy, look, how many be esteemed masters, or else they fellows, but even persecute them is it by experience to all men who consider human affairs, that all free from mutual poverty, or from vain met endeavour to carry with or to leave behind them that esteem and honour with those, been conversant. The same is also of the definitions themselves of fitable. For when we voluntarily manner of society we look after that is, that which every one of , propounds to himself for good, good, is pleasant, and relates the mind. But all the mind's pleas-to have a good opinion of one's in the end; the rest are sensual, which may be all compre-word   conveniences.   All society gain, or for glory; that is, not
parties benefit
ether.
seeris
[or =;lory
sensuality
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so much for love of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves. But no society can be great or lasting, which begins from vain glory. Because that glory is like honour; if all men have it no man hath it, for they consist in comparison and precellence. Neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in myself; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without the help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be much furthered by mutual help; since yet those may be better'attained to by dominion than by the society of others, I hope no body will doubt, but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society. We must therefore resolve, that the original of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had towards each other, but in the mutual feart they had of each other.
3. The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass, that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security.
t The mutual fear. It is objected: it is so improbable that men should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid, they would not have endured each other's looks. They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted. I comprehend in this word fear, a certain foresight of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. They who go to sleep, shut their doors; they who travel, carry their swords with them, because they fear thieves. Kingdoms guard their coasts and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls; and all for fear of neighbouring kingdoms and towns. Even the strongest armies, and most accomplished for fight, yet sometimes parley for peace, as fearing each other's power, and lest they might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise; but for the most part, by arms and defensive weapons; whence it happens, that daring to come forth they know each other's spirits. But then if they fight, civil society ariseth from the victory; if they agree, from their agreement.
>
m 1
mitá
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For
For if we look on men full tie the frame of our humaili its strength, vigour, and and how easy a. matter it is kill the strongest: there is ing to his own strength, by nature above others, things one against the greatest things, namely, kill therefore among themselves equality we now discern, law.
4. All men in the state to hurt, but not proceeding equally to be condemned natural equality which is to others as he assumes to '. of a temperate man, and power. Another, supposin| have a license to do what and honour, as due to him gument of a fiery spirit from vain glory, and the fa strength; the other's from self, his liberty, and his violence.
5. Furthermore, since the the greatest discords whic from this contention. For in to contend against, but als approve of what a man sait cuse him of an error in tha in very many things to counted him a fool whom appear hence, that there ar^ between sects of the same
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grown, and consider how brit-body is, which perishing, all wisdom itself perisheth with it; even for the weakest man to itio reason why any man, trust-rould conceive himself made are equals, who can do equal but they who can do the can do equal things. All men are by nature equal; the in-liath its spring from the civil
nature have a desire and will from the same cause, neither one man, according to that among us, permits as much rimself; which is an argument one that rightly values his himself above others, will lists, and challenges respect before others; which is an ar-man's will to hurt ariseth se esteem he hath of his own necessity of defending him-goods,  against this man's
le
Tiis
the
combat of wits is the fiercest, 1 are, must necessarily arise this case it is not only odious ) not to consent. For not to ., is no less than tacitly to ac-thing which he speaketh: as dissent, is as much as if you ac-you dissent from. Which may no wars so sharply waged as religion, and factions of the
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same commonweal, where the contestation is either concerning doctrines or politic prudence. And since all the pleasure and jollity of the mind consists in this, even to get some, with whom comparing, it may find somewhat wherein to triumph and vaunt itself; it is impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutual scorn and contempt, either by laughter, or by words, or by gesture, or some sign or other; than which there is no greater vexation of mind, and than from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to do hurt.
6. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword.
7. Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do daily threaten each other withal, to have a care of one's self | is not a matter so scornfully to be looked upon, as if so be there had not been a power and will left in one I to have done otherwise. For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right. Neither by the word right is anything else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties according to right reason. Therefore the first foundation of natural right is this, that every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.
n6
8. But because it is to the end, if the right him, it follows, that serve himself, he must the means, and do all not preserve himself.
9. Now whether the and the action he is pe ervation of his life anql the right of nature, judge that it is contrc judge of mine own peri' what concerns me, by equal by nature, will I long to him. Therefor^ is, it is the right of is, whether it conduce
10. Nature hath g is, it was lawful for e\ ture,t or before such
must
natrre
to
iven
t In the\bare\state of any man does in the bare not that in such a state he nature; for injustice against in the state of nature there tion thus conceived, reader in the articles cases the difficulty of the I will contract this argi view. Every man hath rij seventh article. The same means which necessarily But those are the necessary by the ninth article. He to do all whatsoever he wherefore by the judgment either right or wrong, and bare state of nature, &c necessarily to his preservation dently believe so, he may
Bit
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n vain for a man to have a right to the necessary means be denied sn|ice every man hath a right to pre-also be allowed a right to use all \he actions, without -which he can-
means which he is about to use, rforming, be necessary to the pres-members or not, he himself, by be judge. I For say, another man ry to right reason that I should ..| Why now, because he judgeth of the same reason, because we are judge also of things which do be-it agrees with right reason, that that I judge of his opinion, that my preservation or not.
to every one a right to all; that ery man, in the bare state of na-time as men had engaged them-
nakire. This is thus to be understood: what state of nature, is injurious to no man; cannot offend God, or break the laws of men presupposeth human laws, such as are none. Now the truth of this proposi-sufficiently demonstrated to the mindful immediately foregoing; but because in certain conclusion makes us forget the premises, ;umei|it, and make it most evident to a single to protect himself, as appears by the n therefore hath a right to use all the conduce to this end, by the eighth article.
means which he shall judge to be such, therefore hath a right to make use of, and judge requisite for his preservation; of him that doth it, the thing done is therefore right. True it is therefore in the jf any man pretend somewhat to tend , which yet he himself doth not confi-offend against the laws of nature, as in the
shall
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selves by any covenants or bonds, to do what he would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use, and enjoy all what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever a man would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute towards his preservation (but we have already allowed him to be judge, in the foregoing article, whether it doth or not, insomuch as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteem so), and by the 7th article it appears that by the right of nature those things may be done, and must be had, which necessarily conduce to the protection of life and members, it follows, that in the state of nature, to have all, and do all, is lawful for all. And this is that which is meant by that common saying, nature hath given all to all. From whence we understand likewise, that in the state of nature profit is the measure of right.
11. But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right to all things. For the effects of this right are the same, almost, as if there had been no right at all. For although any man might say of every thing, this is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his neighbour, who having equal right and equal power, would pretend the same thing to be his.
12. If now to this natural proclivity of men, to hurt each other, which they derive from their passions, but chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves, you add, the right of all to all, wherewith one by right invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise perpetual jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a thing it
third chapter of this book is more at large declared. It hath been objected by some: if a son kill his father, doth he him no injury? I have answered, that a son cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of them to whom he | owes | his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely, either his father's or his mother's, or his that nourished him; as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter.
r
En
war.
But
so
with
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is to provide against tion to oppress and number, and no greai: that the natural stabp society, was a mere of all men against all time in which the wi clared, either by words termed peace.
13. But it is easily the preservation either a perpetual war is. because in regard of cannot be ended by queror is subject to counted a miracle, if close up his life of America are exampl other nations have deed are become civil fierce, short-lived, pleasure and beauty wont to bring with that it had been best which all things were himself. For every which is gctod for him of all against\all, which to be good for him. of each other we dition, and to get be war, it may not some helps.
14..Fellows are got sent; by constraint, makes the conquered
enemy invading us with an inten-■uin, though he come with a small provision; it cannot be denied but of men, before they entered into and that not simply, but a war men. For what is war, but that same 11 of contesting by force is fully de-or deeds? The time remaining is
been
poor
man
And thick some
Y
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judged how disagreeable a thing to of mankind, or of each single man, it is perpetual in its own nature; the equality of those that strive, it victory. For in this state the con-much danger, as it were to be ac-any, even the most strong, should many years and old age. They es hereof, even in this present age: in former ages; which now in-and flourishing, but were then few, nasty, and | deprived | of all that life, which peace and society are them. Whosoever therefore holds, to have continued in that state in lawful for all men, he contradicts by natural necessity desires that nor is there any that esteems a war necessarily adheres to such a state, so it happens, that through fear it fit to rid ourselves of this con-fellows; that if there needs must it be against all men, nor without
of
en either by constraint, or by con-when after fight the conqueror serve him, either through fear of
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death, or by laying fetters on him; by consent, when men enter into society to help each other, both parties consenting without any constraint. But the conqueror may by right compel the conquered, or the strongest the weaker (as a man in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper years a child), unless he will choose to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For since the right of protecting ourselves according to our own wills, proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our equality, it is more consonant to reason, and more certain for our conservation, using the present advantage to secure ourselves by taking caution, than when they shall be full grown, and strong, and got out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power again by doubtful fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more absurd, than by discharging whom you already have weak in your power, to make him at once both an enemy and a strong one. From whence we may understand likewise as a corollary in the natural state of men, that a sure and irresistible power confers the right of dominion and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch, as the right of all things that can be done, adheres essentially and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.
15. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation, continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war, by reason of that equality of power, and other human faculties they are endued withal. Wherefore to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire out for auxiliaries of war, is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature; as shall be showed in the next chapter.
II
Of the Law of Nature Concerning Contracts
i. That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason. 2. That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend ourselves. 3. That the first special law of nature, is not to retain our right to all things. 4. What it is to quit our right: what to transfer it. 5. That in the transferring of our right, the will of him that receives it is necessarily required. 6. No words but those of the present tense, transfer any right. 7. Words of the future, if there be some other tokens to signify the will, are valid in the translation of right. 8. In matters of free gift, our right passeth not from us through any words of the future. 9. The definition of contract and compact. 10. In compacts, our right passeth from us through words of the future. 11. Compacts of mutual faith, in the state of nature are of no effect and vain; but not so in civil government. 12. That no man can make compacts with beasts, nor yef\ W<t*(-»-with God without revelation. 13. Nor yet make a vow to t'**. God. 14. That compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavour. 15. By what means we are freed from our compacts. 16. Thai -promises extorted through fear of death, in the state of nature are valid. 17. A later compact contradicting the former, is invalid. 18. A compact not to resist him that shall prejudice my body, is invalid. 19. A compact to accuse one's self, is invalid. 20. The definition of swearing. 21. That swearing is to be conceived in that f6rm which he useth that takes the oath. 22. An oath superadds nothing to the obligation which is made by compact. 25. An oath ought not to be. pressed, but where the breach of compacts may be kept private, or cannot be punished but from God himself.
1. All authors agree not concerning the definition of the natural law, who notwithstanding do very often make
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tUir
frorh
a<ti
use of this term in wherein we begin equivocation, is only for contrary disputes, somewhat is done ag it hence; because it ment of all the most declares not who shall learning of all nations, against the general tion is by no means to possible for any but such a law; for sure, comprehend all men therefore either do nou it is without their | joint excused. But to receive sents of them who in truth unreasonable, things in others, which the other side, they pub] condemn; and they say, than any speculatio more through hatred oi: love, or some/other pei son. And therefore it people often do those tention, | which those to be against the law that is done by right, we ought to judge repugnant to right certain truth collected ciples. But that | wrong against some law which, since it is no less
ainst was
those reason by
Therefore
thomas hobbes
writings. The method therefore definitions and exclusion of all proper to them who leave no place For the rest, if any man say that the law of nature, one proves done against the general agree-\|vise and learned nations: but this be the judge of the wisdom and Another hence, that it was done con|sent of all mankind; which defini-be admitted. For then it were im-chlildren and fools, to offend against under the notion of mankind, they rtually endued with reason. These ^ht against it, or if they do aught, accord,|and therefore ought to be the laws of nature from the con-oftlener break than observe them, is Besides, men condemn the same they approve in themselves; on licly commend what they privately delliver their opinions more by hear-in of their own; and they accord some object, through fear, hope, [turbation of mind, than true rea-to pass, that whole bodies of things | by general accord, or con-wlriters most willingly acknowledge f nature. But since all do grant, )[vhich is not done against reason, actions only wrong, which are that is, which contradict some right reasoning from true prin-jwhich is done, | we say it is done true reason is a certain law; a part of human nature than any
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other faculty or affection of the mind, is also termed natural. Therefore the law of nature, that I may define it, is the dictate of right reason,* conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.
2. But the first and fundamental law of nature is, that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to provide ourselves for helps of war. For we showed in the last article of the foregoing chapter, that this precept is the dictate of right reason; but that the dictates of right reason are natural laws, that hath been newly proved above. But this is the first, because the rest are derived from this, and they direct the ways either to peace or self-defence.
3. But one of the natural laws derived from this fundamental one is this: that the right of all men to all things ought not to be retained; hut that some certain rights ought to be transferred or relinquished. For if everyone should retain his right to all things, it must necessarily follow that some by right might invade, and others, by
* Right reason. By right reason in the natural state of men, I understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his, which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbours. I call it peculiar, because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme, that is, the civil law, is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this civil government, in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with his own, every man's own reason is to be accounted, not only the rule of his own actions, which are done at his own peril, but also for the measure of another man's reason, in such things as do concern him. I call it true, that is, concluding from true principles rightly framed, because that the whole breach of the laws of nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of those men, who see not those duties they are necessarily to perform towards others in order to their own conservation. But the principles of right reasoning about such like duties, are those which are explained in the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh articles of the first chapter.
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the same right, might For every man by his body, and the wards the protection follow. He therefore is, against the law of not part with his right
4. But he is said to solutely renounceth it, solutely renounceth it meet tokens declares, be lawful for him to he might have done, by some sufficient sigi other, that he is willing resist him, in going ance whereof he mig him. But that the not resisting, is veyed, he to whom he right to all; whence he the resisting right he whereof the other terly abolished, in the natural state of curity aricl freedom ment of his primitive shall sell or give away only from all right to others also.
5. But in the not only of him that cepts it. If either be would have given what accept of it, I have not my right, or conveyed
acts
to
that do
understood
could Whoso eve:
from
1:
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defend themselves against them, necessity endeavours to defend which he judgeth necessary to-of his body. Therefore war would against the reason of peace, that ijiature, whosoever he be, that doth
all things, part with his right, who either ab-or conveys it to another. He ab-who by some sufficient sign or he is willing that it shall never that again, which before by right tyut he conveys it to another, who or meet tokens declares to that it should be unlawful for him to to do somewhat in the perform-before with, right have resisted of right consists merely in by this, that before it was con-conveyed it, had even then also a could not give any new right; but had before he gave it, by reason not freely enjoy his rights, is ut-r therefore acquires some right men, he only procures himself se-just molestation in the enjoy-right. As for example, if any man farm, he utterly deprives himself t|his farm; but he does not so from
conveyance of right, the will is requisite conveys, but of him also that ac-! wanting, the right remains. For if I was mine to one who refused to therefore either simply renounced to any man. For the cause which
abcut it
conveyance
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moved me to part with it to this man, was in him only, not in others too.
6. But if there be no other token extant of our will either to quit or convey our right, but only words; those words must either relate to the present or time past; for if they be of the future only, they convey nothing. For example, he that speaks thus of the time to come, I will give tomorrow, declares openly that yet he hath not given it. So that all this day his right remains, and abides tomorrow too, unless in the interim he actually bestows it: for what is mine, remains mine till I have parted with it. But if I shall speak of the time present, suppose thus; I do give or have given you this to be received tomorrow. By these words is signified that I have already given it, and that his right to receive it tomorrow is conveyed to him by me today.
7. Nevertheless, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the will; if yet to words relating to the future there shall some other signs be added, they may become as valid as if they had been spoken of the present. If therefore,- as by reason of those other signs, it appear that he that speaks of the future, intends those words should be effectual toward the perfect transferring of his right, they ought to be valid. For the conveyance of right depends not on words, but, as hath been instanced in the fourth article, on the declaration of the will.
8. If any man convey some part of his right to another, and doth not this for some certain benefit received, or for some compact, a conveyance in this kind is called a gift or free donation. But in free donation, those words only oblige us, which signify the present or the time past; for if they respect the future, they oblige not as words, for the reason given in the foregoing article. It must needs therefore be, that the obligation arise from some other tokens of the will. But, because whatsoever is voluntarily done, is done for some good to him that wills it; there
as he to whom he desert. But he that can be said to have a and yet give seldom,
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can no other token be assigned of the will to give it, except some benefit either already received, or to be acquired. But it is supposed that no such benefit is acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to be a free gift. It remains therefore, that a mutual good turn without agreement be expected. But no sign can be given, that he, who used f rture words toward him who was in no sort engaged to return a benefit, should desire to have his words so understood as to oblige himself thereby. Nor is it suitable to reascn, that those who are easily inclined to do well to others, should be obliged by every promise, testifying their present good affection. And for this cause, a promiser in this ki id must be understood to have time to deliberate, and power to change that affection, as well made that promise, may alter his deliberates, is so far forth free, nor Iready given. But if he promise often, he ought to be condemned of levity, and be called not a dc nor, but doson.
9. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveying their rights, is called a contract. But in every contract, either both parties instantly perform what they contract for, insomuch as'there is no trust had from either to other; or the one performs, the other is trusted; or neither perform. Where both parties perform presently, there the
contract is ended as
there is credit given, either to one or both, there the party
trusted promiseth a promise is called a coy
by words signifying other's performance :'s
soon as it is performed. But where
:ter-performance; and this kind of venant.
10. But the covenant made by the party trusted with him who hath already performed, although the promise be made by words pointing at the future, doth no less transfer the right of f iture time, than if it had been made the present or time past. For the a most manifest sign that he so
understood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that
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he would certainly make performance also at the appointed time; and by this sign the party trusted knew himself to be thus understood; which because he hindered not, was an evident token of his will to perform. The promises therefore which are made for some benefit received, which are also covenants, are tokens of the will; that is, as in the foregoing section hath been declared, of the last act of deliberating, whereby the liberty of nonperformance is abolished, and by consequence are obligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there beginneth obligation.
11. But the covenants which are made in contract of mutual trust, neither party performing out of hand, if there ariset a just suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid. For he that first performs, by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their own advantage either by right or wrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath contracted. For it suits not with reason, that any man should perform first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his promise after; which, whether it be probable or not, he that doubts it must be judge of, as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter in the ninth article. Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature. But in a civil state, when there is a power which can compel both parties, he that hath contracted to perform first, must first perform; because, that since the other may be compelled, the cause which made him fear the other's non-performance, ceaseth.
12. But from this reason, that in all free gifts and compacts there is an acceptance of the conveyance of right
t Arise. For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either from somewhat done, or some other token of the will not to perform from the other part, it cannot be judged to be a just fear; for the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of it, being made.
manner
understandin
to
VOV'S
paot
128
required, it follows who doth not deck cannot compact with from them any speech and nant with God, or be forth as it appears hath substituted cert cept of such-like stead.
13. Those therefore state of nature, whers except, by most certa cept their vow or what they vow be not tied by their vow unlawful act. But if some law of nature, i which ties them. But ther to do it or not the openly declared an obligation by vow supposed not to be. any one is tied; and th
14. Covenants are der our deliberation, the will of the of him who things possible and compact obligeth though we often co seemed possible when terward appear to be from all obligation? promiseth a future, | in on condition that he
thomas hobbes
lhat no man can compact with him \e his acceptance. And therefore we beasts, neither can we give or take of right, by reason of their want of g. Neither can any man cove-obliged to him by vow; except so far him by Holy Scriptures, that he ain men who have authority to ac-and covenants, as being in God's
cont ractor. deliber jtes
to
do will
do vow in vain, who are in the they are not tied by any civil law, in revelation, the will of God to ac-, be made known to them. For if cohtrary to the law of nature, they are ; for no man is tied to perform an what is vowed be commanded by t is not their vow, but the law itself if he were free, before his vow, ei-it, his liberty remains; because that of the obliger is requisite to make ; which, in the case propounded, is Now I call him the obliger, to whom obliged, him who is tied. Tiade of such things only as fall un-For it can be no covenant without But the will is the last act wherefore they only concern come. No man, therefore, by his to an impossibility. But yet, /enant to do such things as then we promised them, which yet af-impossible, are we therefore freed 'he reason whereof is, that he who certainty I receives a present benefit, return another for it. For his will,
himself
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who performs the present benefit, hath simply before it for its object a certain good, [equally] valuable with the thing promised; but the thing itself not simply, but with condition if it could be done. But if it should so happen, that even this should prove impossible, why then he must perform as much as he can. Covenants, therefore, oblige us not to perform just the thing itself covenanted for, but our utmost endeavour; for this only is, the things themselves are not in our power.
15. We are freed from covenants two ways, either by performing, or by being forgiven. By performing, for beyond that we obliged not ourselves. By being forgiven, because he whom we obliged ourselves to, by forgiving is conceived to return to us that right which we passed over to him. For forgiving implies giving, that is, by the fourth article of this chapter, a conveyance of right to him to whom the gift is made.
16. It is a usual question, whether compacts extorted from us through fear, do oblige or not. For example, if, to redeem my life from the power of a robber, I promise to pay him 100I. next day, and that I will do no act whereby to apprehend and bring him to justice: whether I am tied to keep promise or not. But though such a promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not to be accounted so because it proceedeth from fear. For then it would follow, that those promises which reduced men to a civil life, and by which laws were made, might likewise be of none effect (for it proceeds from fear of mutual slaughter, that one man submits himself to the dominion of another); and he should play the fool finely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his redemption. It holds universally true, that promises do oblige when there is some benefit received, and that to promise, and the thing promised, be lawful. But it is lawful, for the redemption of my life, both to promise and to give what I will of mine own to any man,
shall
130
even to a thief. Wfe proceeding from fes by virtue whereof, lawful.
17. Whosoever somewhat, and sha another, he maketh tract unlawful. For omit aught, who by another. Wherefore tracts, and what is He is therefore tied which is unlawful.
18. No man is ob to resist him who way hurt his body, high degree of fear, evil which is done fore by natural supposed he can do to this degree of vide for himself eitr no man is tied to im either with death or wounds, or some enough to bear Furthermore, he th faith only is the brought to punishm fettered or strongly that they seemed resistance by their thus: if I do it not al: thing, if thus: if I kill me, I will not first way, but there
are obliged, therefore, by promises r, except the civil law forbid them; :hat which is promised becomes un-
srall
to
nece ssi
thomas hobbes
contract with one to do or omit 1 after covenant the contrary with not the former, but the latter con-he hath no longer right to do or to former contracts hath conveyed it to he can convey no right by latter con-promised is promised without right, only to his first contract, to break
iged by any contracts whatsoever not offer to kill, wound, or any other For there is in every man a certain through which he apprehends that him to be the greatest; and there-ty he shuns it all he can, and it is 10 otherwise. When a man is arrived , we cannot expect but he will pro-er by flight or fight. Since therefore possibilities, they who are threatened is the greatest evil to nature), other bodily hurts, and are not stout are not obliged to endure them, t is tied by contract is trusted; for of contracts; but they who are ent, either capital or more gentle, are guarded; which is a most certain sign not sufficiently bound from non-cqntracts. It is one thing, if I promise the day appointed, kill me. Another it not, though you should offer to resist. All men, if need be, contract the need sometimes. This second way,
fear.
them
bond
do
15
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none; neither is it ever needful. For in the mere state of nature, if you have a mind to kill, that state itself affords you a right; insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will afterwards kill him. But in a civil state, where the right of life and death and of all corporal punishment is with the supreme, that same right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. Neither need the supreme himself contract with any man patiently to yield to his punishment; but only this, that no man offer to defend others from him. If in the state of nature, as between two realms, there should a contract be made on condition of killing if it were not performed, we must presuppose another contract of not killing before the appointed day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no performance, the right of war returns, that is an hostile state, in which all things are lawful, and therefore resistance also. Lastly, by the contract of not resisting, we are obliged, of two evils to make choice of that which seems the greater. For certain death is a greater evil than fighting. But of two evils it is impossible not to choose the least. By such a compact, therefore, we should be tied to impossibilities; which is contrary to the very nature of compacts.
19. Likewise no man is tied by any compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose damage he is like to procure himself a bitter life. Wherefore neither is a father obliged to bear witness against his son, nor a husband against his wife, nor a son against his father, nor any man against any one by whose means he hath his subsistence; for in vain is that testimony which is presumed to be corrupted from nature. But although no man be tied to accuse himself by any compact, yet in a public trial he may by torture be forced to make answer. But such answers are no testimony of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch as whether the party
132
te
their
tortured his answer not at all, whatsoever
20. Swearing is a the promiser declares less he perform his in the words themselves essence of an oath, equivalent, as with stroy the deceiver, as any let, but that an atory as promissory; with an oath, promis in some places it was their kings, that cuistom those kings took were therefore introduced eration of the diving dread of breaking fear men, from whose
21. Whence it fol in that form, which any man brought to not, and therefore light of nature it no man thinks he is or by any other name, cepts of his own proper, ines) the true religior;
22. By the definition that a bare contract we are sworn. For it oath relates to the d provoke, if the breach lawful; but it could not obligatory. Furlthermo mercy of God, obligi
nei may
thomas hobbes
true or false, or whether he answer he doth, he doth it by right, peech joined to a promise, whereby his renouncing of God's mercy, uncord. Which definition is contained which have in them the very to wit, so God help me, or other the Romans, do thou Jupiter so de-I slay this same beast. Neither is this c ath may as well sometimes be affirm-for he that confirms his affirmation sth that he speaks truth. But though the fashion for subjects to swear by took its original hence, that them divine honour. For oaths that by religion and consid-power, men might have a greater faiths, than that wherewith they eyes their actions may lie hid. ows that an oath must be conceived he useth who takes it; for in vain is swear by a God whom he believes ither fears him. For though by the be known that there is a God, yet :o swear by him in any other fashion, , than what is contained in the pre-, that is (as he who swears imag-
of an oath, we may understand obligeth no less, than that to which is the contract which binds us; the :vine punishment, which it could not of contract were not in itself un-not be unlawful, if the contract were re, he that renounceth the eth himself not to any punishment;
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because it is ever lawful to deprecate the punishment, howsoever provoked, and to enjoy God's pardon if it be granted. The only effect therefore of an oath is this: to cause men, who are naturally inclined to break all manner of faith, through fear of punishment to make the more conscience of their words and actions.
23. To exact an oath where the breach of contract, if any be made, cannot but be known, and where the party compacted withal wants not power to punish, is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto self-defence, and shows a mind desirous not so much to benefit itself, as to prejudice another. For an oath, out of the very form of swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of God's anger, that is to say, of him that is omnipotent, against those who therefore violate their faith, because they think that by their own strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is omniscient, against those who therefore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall see them.
DOMINION
V
Of the Causes and First Beginning of Civil Government
i. That the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace. 2. That the laws of nature, in the state of nature, are silent. 3. That the security of living according to the laws of nature, consists in the concord of many persons. 4. That the concord of many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace. 5. The reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm in concord only, and why not of men. 6. That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men. 7. What union is. 8. In union, the right of all men is conveyed to one. 9. What civil society is. 10. What a civil person is. 11. What it is to have the supreme power, and what to be a subject. 12. Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.
1. It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the breach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem. Whence we
l66
the
invasion
can
tl at one, natural
may understand, that understood, do not ins practice; and consequent caution had from the every man that same pr: such means as either he right to all things, or the for the fulfilling of the pared in mind to embrace
2. It is a |fond| saying, of war, and it is a true civil, but also of the ferred not to the mind, chap. iii. art. 27. And we against all men; such as though in the war of mean was wont to be there was a manner of economy, which they which was neither against so standing), nor void of with valour, not with away the rest, to spare plough, and every Which yet is not so to be| do thus by the law of their own glory herein, might be suspected guilty
3. Since therefore the essary for the preservation ercise of the natural law worth the considering security. For this matter but that each man provicfe the invasion of one on gerous, as either of theni
observed
called
cruelty, lile,
instrument
nature
thomas hobbes
natural laws, though well fcntly secure any man in their y, that as long as there is no of others, there remains to mitive right of self-defence by or will make use of, that is, a right of war. And it is sufficient natural law, that a man be preface when it may be had.
all laws are silent in the time not only if we speak of the laws, provided they be rebut to the actions of men, by ijnean such a war, as is of all men is the mere state of nature; al-nation against nation, a certain And therefore in old time, iving, and as it were a certain Ar)<7TpiKr)v; living by rapine; the law of nature (things then glory to those who exercised it Their custom was, taking and abstain from oxen fit for serviceable to husbandry, taken, as if they were bound to ; but that they had regard to lest by too much cruelty they of fear.
ejxercise of the natural law is nec-of peace, and that for the ex-jecurity is no less necessary; it is that is which affords such a nothing else can be imagined, himself of such meet helps, as other may be rendered so dan-may think it better to refrain
what
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than to meddle. But first, it is plain that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure, and heartens the enemy to attack us. It is therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained, that the number of them who conspire in a mutual assistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the enemy's party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory.
4. Furthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on self-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compass this, but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done; because that, divided in their opinions, they will be a hinderance to each other; or if they agree well enough to some one action, through hope of victory, spoil, or revenge, yet afterward, through diversity of wits and counsels, or emulation and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so torn and rent, as they will neither give mutual help nor desire peace, except they be constrained to it by some common fear. Whence it follows that the consent of many (which consists in this only, as we have already defined in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions to the same end and the common good), that is to say, that the society proceeding from mutual help only, yields not that security which they seek for, who meet and agree in the exercise of the above-named laws of nature; but that somewhat else must be done, that those who Have once consented for the common good to peace and mutual help, may by fear be restrained lest afterwards they again dissent, when their private interest shall appear discrepant from the common good.
5. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls politic, not man only, but divers others, as the ant, the
contract consenting,
that Yet
because
168
bee, &c.; which, tho4 which they may withstanding by eschewing the same to a common end, unto any seditions civil government, anc termed political; sent, or many wills necessary in civil go\ that in those creatures their consent of minqls of anything more to serve peace among clination. But among among them there is ment; among beasts envy, out of which a among beasts no such of bees, and the like desire the common from their private, good, which hath joyment, more tha Thirdly, those defect, or think the) their commonweals; many who, supposin deavour to innovate, divers ways; which Fourthly, these brute the use of their other, yet want they essarily required to good is represented than in truth it is.
net
n
creatures
is
voice
thomas hobbes
gh they be destitute of reason, by and submit to government, not-that is to say, ensuing or things, they so direct their actions their meetings are not obnoxious is not their gathering together a therefore those animals not to be their government is only a con-cjoncurring in one object, not (as is ernment) one will. It is very true, living only by sense and appetite, is so durable, as there is no need sjecure it, and by consequence to pre-them, than barely their natural in-men the case is otherwise. For, first, a contestation of honour and prefer-there is none: whence hatred and ifise sedition and war, is among men; matter. Next, the natural appetite creatures, is conformable; and they pod, which among them differs not But man scarce esteems anything somewhat of eminence in the en-that which others do possess, which are void of reason, see no see none, in the administration of jut in a multitude of men there are themselves wiser than others, en-and divers innovators innovate a mere distraction and civil war. creatures, howsoever they may have to signify their affections to each that same art of words which is nec-those motions in the mind, whereby it as being better, and evil as worse the tongue of man is a trumpet
to But
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of war and sedition: and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered and lightened, and confounded whole Greece itself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harm; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellows. But those men are of most trouble to the republic, who have most leisure to be idle; for they use not to contend for public places, before they have gotten the victory over hunger and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutal creatures is natural; that of men by compact only, that is to say, artificial. It is therefore no matter of wonder, if somewhat more be needful for men to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent or contracted society, without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through fear of punishment, doth not suffice to make up that security, which is requisite to the exercise of natural justice.
6. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that, in those necessary matters which concern peace and self-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be done, unless every man will so subject his will to some other one, to wit, either man or council, that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in general, and of every one in particular. Now the gathering together of many men, who deliberate of what is to be done or not to be done for the common good of all men, is that which I call a council.
7. This submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one man or one council, is then made, when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that one man or council, to which he hath submitted himself; that is, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength against
170
right of defendin called union. But council, which is
thomas hobbes
any others whatsoever; for he is supposed still to retain a
g himself against violence: and this is we understand that to be the will of the the will of the major part of those men of whom the council consists.
8. But though i:he will itself be not voluntary, but only the beginning of voluntary actions (for we will not to will, but to act); and literefore falls least of all under deliberation and compact; yet he who submits his will to the will of another, conveys to that other the right of his strength and faculties. Insamuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted, hath so much power, as by the terror of it he can conform the wills of particular men unto unity and concord.
9. Now union thus made is called a city or civil society; and also a civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one person; and by the word one, it is to be known and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own rights and properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all of them together (if we except hio, whose will stands for the will of all), is to be accounted the city. A city therefore (that we may define it), is one person, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.
10. But although every city be a civil person, yet every civil person is not a city; for it may happen that many citizens, by the permission of the city, may join together in one person, for the doing of certain things. These now will be civil persons; as the companies of merchants, and many other convents. But cities they are not, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the company simply and in all things, but in certain things only determined by the city, and on such terms as it is
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lawful for any one of them to contend in judgment against the body itself of the sodality; which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the city. Such like societies, therefore, are civil persons subordinate to the city.
11. In every city, that man or council to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will so as hath been declared, is said to have the supreme power, or chief command, or dominion. Which power and right of commanding consists in this, that each citizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to that man or council; which to have done, because no man can transfer his power in a natural manner, is nothing else than to have parted with his right of resisting. Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil person, is called the subject of him who hath the chief command.
12. By what hath been said, it is sufficiently showed in what manner and by what degrees many natural persons, through desire of preserving themselves and by mutual fear, have grown together into a civil person, whom we have called a city. But they who submit themselves to another for fear, either submit to him whom they fear, or some other whom they confide in for protection. They act according to the first manner, who are vanquished in war, that they may not be slain; they according to the second, who are not yet overcome, that they may not be overcome. The first manner receives its beginning from natural power, and may be called the natural beginning of a city; the latter from the council and constitution of those who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence it is that there are two kinds of cities: the one natural, such as is the paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which may be also called political. In the first, the lord acquires to himself such citizens as he will; in the other, the citizens by their own wills appoint
172
a lord over themselves, company of men, endued But we will speak, in t by institution; and next,
the of
thomas hobbes
whether he be one man or one with the command in chief, first place, of a city political or a city natural.
VI
Of the Right of Him, Whether Council or One Man Only, Who Hath the Supreme Power in the City
i. There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil society, nor any action to which they have not under seal consented. 2. The right of the greater number consenting, is the beginning of a city. 3. That every man retains a right to protect himself according to his own free will, so long as there is no sufficient regard had to his security. 4. That a coercive power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice is. 6. That the sword of justice belongs to him, who hath the chief command. 7. That the sword of war belongs to him also. 8. All judicature belongs to him too. 9. The legislative power is his only. 10. The naming of magistrates and other officers of the city belongs to him. 11. Also the examination of all doctrines. 12. Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable. 13. That the command his citizens have granted is absolute, and what proportion of obedience is due to him. 14. That the laws of the city bind him not. 15. That no man can challenge a propriety to anything against his will. 16. By the laws of the city only we come to know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury is. 17. The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there should not be any one endued with | an absolute power. 18. The marks of supreme authority. 19. If a city be compared with a man, he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city, as the human soul is in relation to the man. 20. That the supreme command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents, by whose compacts it was first constituted.
174
i. We must men, gathering ciety, is; namely, men, whereof each judgment concern: n And though by have his own right is mine, the other,
thomas hobbes
consider, first of all, what a multitude* of themselves of their own free wills into so-that it is not any one body, but many one hath his own will and his peculiar all things that may be proposed, particular contracts each single map may and propriety, so as one may say this that is his; yet will there not be any-
ITie
may
* Multitude, &c. citizens almost wholly ence which is between ruled. For such is the of citizens not only command; but in dive clearly enough explained many against those thi fore it seemed good to tion, to add these few By multitude, becau than one: so as a The same word, because thing; namely, one ___ be understood to have several; and therefore attributed to it. acquire right, convey it be every one apart, promises, compacts, ri tude is no natural persdm with another, that the major part of them, comes one person. Fox do voluntary actions, quiring and transferring called the people, than thus. When we say the anything, it is understood acts by the will of one. be done but in an a done by a multitude will of that man or ass by a subjected people; not proceeding from who are citizens and
doctrine of the power of a city over its depends on the understanding of the differ-a multitude of men ruling, and a multitude nature of a city, that a multitude or company have command, but may also be subject to se senses. Which difference I did believe was in the first article; but by the objections of i^igs which follow, I discern otherwise. Where-me, to the end I might make a fuller explica-■ things.
se it is a collective word, we understand more of men is the same with many men. it is of the singular number, signifies one But in neither sense can a multitude one will given to it by nature, but to|either|a neither is any one action whatsoever to be a multitude cannot promise, contract, ight, act, have, possess, and the like, unless " man by man; so as there must be as many ;hts, and actions, as men. Wherefore a multi-. But if the same multitude do contract one will of one man, or the agreeing wills of the be received for the will of all; then it be-it is endued with a will, and therefore can such as are commanding, making laws, ac-of right, and so forth; and it is oftener the multitude. We must therefore distinguish people or multitude wills, commands, or doth that the city which commands, wills and or the concurring wills of more; which cannot ssjembly. But as oft as anything is said to be if men, whether great or small, without the embly of men, that is understood to be done that is, by many single citizens together; and will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, ibjects, but not a city.
multitude
mi ltitude.
Whe refore
shall
one
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thing of which the whole multitude, as a person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, this is mine, more than another's. Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as its I own; I but if all or more of them do agree, it will not be an action, but as many actions as men. For although in some great sedition, it is commonly said, that the people of that city have taken up arms; yet is it true of those only who are in arms, or who consent to them. For the city, which is one person, cannot take up arms against itself. Whatsoever, therefore, is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any help to the things that were done by it, must be judged to have done nothing. Besides, in a multitude not yet reduced into one person, in that manner as hath been said, there remains that same state of nature in which all things belong to all men; and there is no place for meum and tuum, which is called dominion and propriety, by reason that that security is not yet extant, which we have declared above to be necessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws.
2. Next, we must consider that every one of the multitude, by whose means there may be a beginning to make up the city, must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the assembly, that be received for the will of all, which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise there will be no will at all of a multitude of men, whose wills and votes differ so variously. Now, if any one will not consent, the rest, notwithstanding, shall among themselves constitute the city without him. Whence it will come to pass, that the city retains its primitive right against the dissenter; that is, the right of war, as against an enemy.
3. But because we said in the foregoing chapter, the sixth article, that there was required to the security of
assembly
may th =m
themselves
176
men, not only the their wills in such defence; and that of a city consisted; of those things wh stated in an tained in the will essary to peace anc necessary to peace, against the violenqe that is, that he long as he doth together safe from hurt or injuriously comes not within be no just cause of men submit no man is supposed or to have quitted was a care had of h
4. It is not enoi|i one of those who covenant with the steal, not to kill, pravity of human perience too well ishment) men are of their promises, curity, not by co: is then sufficient punishments a prove a greater evil it. For all men, by a to them appears to
5. Now, the rig be given to any
ppointed
be
thomas hobbes
ir consent, but also the subjection of things as were necessary to peace and that union and subjection the nature we must discern now in this place, out ich may be propounded, discussed, and of men, all whose wills are con-of the major part, what things are nec-common defence. But first of all, it is that a man be so far forth protected of others, that he may live securely; have no just cause to fear others, so no injury. Indeed, to make men al-' mutual harms, so as they cannot be killed, is impossible; and, therefore, deliberation. But care may be had, there fear; for security is the end wherefore to others; which if it be not had, to have submitted himself to aught, lis right to all things, before that there security.
gh to obtain this security, that every are now growing up into a city, do rest, either by words or writing, not to ;ind to observe the like laws; for the osition is manifest to all, and by ex-|nown how little (removing the pun-ept to their duties through conscience We must therefore provide for our se-m pacts, but by punishments; and there provision made, when there are so great for every injury, as apparently it to have done it, than not to have done necessity of nature, choose that which the less evil.
of punishing is then understood to , when every man contracts not to
1;
:ht
one.
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assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this right, the sword of justice. But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer.
6. Because, therefore, for the security of particular men, and, by consequence, for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of using the sword for punishment be transferred to some man or council; that man or council is necessarily understood by right to have the supreme power in the city. For he that by right punisheth at his own discretion, by right compels all men to all things which he himself wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.
7. But in vain do they worship peace at home, who cannot defend themselves against foreigners; neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against foreigners, whose forces are not united. And therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars, that there be some one council or one man, who hath the right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many citizens, in all dangers and on all occasions, as shall be needful for common defence against the certain number and strength of the enemy; and again, as often as he shall find it expedient, to make peace with them. We must understand, therefore, that particular citizens have conveyed their whole right of war and peace unto some one man or council; and that this right, which we may call the sword of war, belongs to the same man or council, to whom the sword of justice belongs. For no man can by right compel citizens to take up arms and be at the expenses of war, but he who by right can punish him who doth not obey. Both swords therefore, as well this of war as that of justice, even by the constitution itself of a city and essentially do belong to the chief command.
8. But because the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own
com
another.
to
178 -
will, it follows, tha to the same party; and the power of be done. For in va not execute his the power of power of the sword an officer. All jud; him who hath the supreme authority
9. Furthermore, duceth to peace, appease them bein bred from hence, cerning meum and unprofitable, good the like; which judgment: it belon some common rule; licly, by which his, what another's what dishonest, what is to be done course of life. But called the civil laws commands of him city. And the civil nothing else but the authority in the ci of his citizens.
10. Furthermore, of war and peace, one man or one magistrates; and mon defence, that of controversies,
thomas hobbes
■: the judgment of its right use pertains or if the power of judging were in one, executing in another, nothing would n would he give judgment, who could mands; or, if he executed them by he himself is not said to have the , but that other, to whom he is only ment therefore, in a city, belongs to swords; that is, to him who hath the
every
eveiy
what
5 ince it no less, nay, it much more con-prevent brawls from arising than to g risen; and that all controversies are that the opinions of men differ con-tuum, just and unjust, profitable and and evil, honest and dishonest, and man esteems according to his own gs to the same chief power to make for all men, and to declare them pub-man may know what may be called what just, what unjust, what honest, good, what evil; that is summarily, what to be avoided in our common those <jriles and measure^ are usually , or the laws of the city, as being the who hath the supreme power in the laws (that we may define them) are commands of him who hath the chief y, for direction of the future actions
since the affairs of the city, both those (tannot possibly be all administered by council without officers and subordinate it appertaineth to peace and com-tjhey to whom it belongs justly to judge tcp search into neighbouring councils,
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prudently to wage war,.and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the city, should also rightly exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and in peace.
'11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the will of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good and evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by which they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the laws of the city, that is, the commands of that man or council to whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawful to resist him, or that a less punishment remains for him that denies, than him that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of natural death, another forbid it under pain of eternal death, and both by their own right, it will follow that the citizens, although innocent, are not only by right punishable, but that the city itself is altogether dissolved. For no man can serve two masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey for fear of temporal death. It follows therefore that this one, whether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme power, have also this right; that he both judge what opinionst and
t Judge what opinions, &c. There is scarce any principle, neither in the worship of God nor human sciences, from whence there may not spring dissensions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to them-
i8o
not
doctrines are enemies them to be taught.
12. Last of all, from zen hath submitted his command in the city, so against him; it follows be done by him who For as he who hath him naturally, so neither by right hath not sufficient
13. It is most manifest every perfect city, that use his faculties at his of himself, or where th eluded; there is a suprjeme than which cannot by
unto peace, and also that he forbid
this consideration, that each citi-will to his who hath the supreme as he may not employ his strength manifestly, that whatsoever shall commands, must not be punished, power enough, cannot punish can he punish him by right, who power.
by what hath been said, that in is, where no citizen hath right to own discretion for the preservation right of the private sword is ex-power in some one, greater right be conferred by men, or
such
selves, will needs appear sions cannot be hindered by the exercise of the supretne to the public peace. Of not spoken in this place, jects being tainted, they vei to the city, and that by rig fight against chief princes whether directly and openly require obedience to be supreme authority is commi power which many, living chief head of the Church of out of that Church, bishop; and last of all, on that liberl pretence of religion, do cha was there ever in the Christian from, or was nourished by doctrines, whether they be 1 . if they be repugnant, the pejwer do here attribute to the ci who grants not to the city long to its peace and defen which I have already recital essarily, that the examination such or not, must be referred the supreme authority
from
these The: erily
giv;n
thomas hobbes
to all others. But though such dissen-arising, yet may they be restrained power, that they prove no hindrance kinds of opinions, therefore, I have re are certain doctrines wherewith sub-believe that obedience may be refused : tit they may, nay ought, to oppose and and dignities. Such are those which, or more obscurely and by consequence, to others beside them to whom the ted. I deny not but this reflects on that inder other government, ascribe to the Rome, and also on that which elsewhere, require in their's to be given to them; which the lower sort of citizens, under lenge to themselves. For what civil war world, which did not either grow this root? The judgment therefore of :pugnant to civil obedience or not, and of prohibiting them to be taught, I authority. For since there is no man he judgment of those things which be-e, and it is manifest that the opinions do relate to its peace; it follows nec-of those opinions, whether they be to the city; that is, to him who hath
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greater than which no mortal man can have over himself. But that power, greater than which cannot by men be conveyed on a man, we call absolute.t For whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the city, that he can,
$ Absolute. A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion, and the citizens oppose it not. For, in the gathering together of many men, they acknowledge the face of a city; and even the unskilful understand, that matters there are ruled by council. Yet monarchy is no less a city than democracy; and absolute kings have their counsellors, from whom they will take advice, and suffer their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided but not recalled. But it appears not to most men, how a city is contained in the person of a king. And therefore they object against absolute command: first, that if any man had such a right, the condition of the citizens would be miserable. For thus they think; he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts it his only happiness, that he is not already spoiled and killed. But why should he do thus? Not because he can; for unless he have a mind to it, he will not do it. Will he, to please one or some few, spoil all the rest? First, though by right, that is, without injury to them, he may do it, yet can he not do it justly, that is, without breach of the natural laws and injury against God. And therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which princes take. Next, if he could justly do it, or that he made no account of his oath, yet appears there no reason why he should desire it, since he finds no good in it. But it cannot be denied, but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly. But grant then, that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute, but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the injuries of others; which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? For he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to oppress all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that human affairs cannot be without some inconvenience. And this inconvenience itself is in the citizens, not in the government. For if men could rale themselves, every man by his own command, that is to say, could they live according to the laws of nature, there would" be no need at all of a city, nor of a common coercive power. Secondly, they object, that there is no dominion in the Christian world absolute. Which, indeed, is not true; for all monarchies, and all other states, are so. For although they who have the chief command, do not all those things they would, and what they know profitable to the city; the reason of that is, not the defect of right in them, but the consideration of their citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform their duties without the hazard of the city. Wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their right; and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their right.
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES