Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986318
Judicial Review and Political Bias:
Moving from Consensual to Majoritarian Democracy∗
Nuno Garoupa
University of Illinois Urbana Champaign
Veronica Grembi
Catholic University of Milan
PRELIMINARY DRAFT
Abstract
Due to the collapse of the party system during the mid-nineties, Italy represents an
interesting case study to test the effects of a moving from a consensual to a majoritarian
democracy on judicial behavior at the level of the Constitutional Supreme Court.
Using a dataset of 779 main reviews (ricorsi in via principale) from 1985 to 2005, and
proposing new measures of political alignment within constitutional review, we analyze
the effect of a change in the political party system on judicial behavior. We preliminarily
find that the ruling of a majoritarian democracy tend to produce more political
aligned decisions than in a consensual democracy.
JEL codes: K0
Keywords: Electoral Rules, Party Systems, Judicial Behavior, Italian Constitutional
Court, Judicial Politics
∗
We thank Decio Coviello, Tommaso Nannicini, and the participants of the 2011 Italian Association of Law and Economics
Annual Meeting for their insightful comments. We also thank Andrea Di Miceli and Paola Bertoli for excellent research assistance.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986318
1 Introduction
Several theories compete to explain judicial decision-making: formalist theory, attitudinal
model, and various versions of agency theories.1
Formalists take the stance that judges
simply interpret and apply the constitution and the law in a conformist view of precedents.
Judges are largely guided by what the law says and abide by a strict legal authoritative
interpretation. Quite differently, the attitudinal model sees judicial preferences, with special
emphasis on ideology, as the main explanatory model (judges have a particular disposition and
decide accordingly). Finally, agency theorists recognize the importance of judicial preferences
but argue that they are implemented taking into account political and institutional realities
(judges are willing to sacrifice their disposition in order to achieve other relevant goals).
This large literature has made significant contributions to the understanding of judicial
behavior, both theoretically and empirically. Notwithstanding, this literature is largely US
based and tends to ignore relevant aspects of a more civil law oriented environment. There
is a growing empirical contribution investigating judicial behavior at the Supreme Court
outside the US, with notable applications in Europe2
and North America3
, in Asia4
, and in
Latin America.5
We propose a further empirical contribution to this literature, which exploits a shock to
the reference political system. Our tests allows us to check whether or not a move from a more
fuzzy to a deeper clear cut system of political alliances have any impact of judicial behavior
in terms of partisanship. Lijphart (1999) has proposed two models of democracy, consensual
and majoritarian.6
In the consensual model, there is no clear political polarization; politics
is fundamentally based on bargaining, compromise, and inclusiveness. In the majoritarian
model, political parties are strongly polarized; politics is settled on significant competition,
exclusivity, and straight opposition.7
Our hypothesis is that a majoritarian model polarizes
judicial behavior, creating a division within the judiciary that reflects the party system
(based on or organized around two coalitions). The consensual model, by contrast, favors
1
See, among others, Brenner and Spaeth (1988), Segal and Cover (1989), George and Epstein (1992),
Epstein and Knight (1998), Segal and Spaeth (2002), Hansford and Springgs II (2006), Lax and Cameron
(2007).
2
Schneider (2005), Vanberg (2005), Amaral Garcia et. al. (2009), Franck (2009 and 2010), Garoupa et.
al. (2013)
3
Tate and Sittiwong (1989), Alarie and Green (2008), Green and Alarie (2009)
4
Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2003), Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2006), Ginsburg (2003), Garoupa et. al.
(2011), Escresa and Garoupa (2012)
5
Chavez (2004), Helmke (2004), Iaryczower et. al. (2002 and 2006), Hilbink (2007), Kapiszewski and
Taylor (2008), Carroll and Tiede (2011).
6
Notice that in his classical book he considers the role of constitutional review. He establishes a correlation
between the degree of judicial review and constitutional flexibility which in turn is related to the party and
electoral systems. However, he simply assumes that constitutional review is performed by an independent
third party and does not recognize the possible relationship between party system and judicial behavior.
Ginsburg (2003) provides an identical discussion in the context of East Asia.
7
The political economy literature has long ago recognized the relationship between electoral rules (party
systems) and the behavior of political agents. See, among others Myerson (1993); Persson and Tabellini
(1999 and 2000); Lizzeri and Persico (2001); Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002).
1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986318
compromise and agreement within the judiciary.
Our hypothesis can be understood both by a selection effect as well as incentives which
reinforce each other. A majoritarian model induces the coalitions to select individuals that
are perceived to be loyal (by mere coincidence of preferences). These coalitions are also the
natural audience for the justices who can be potentially compensated at later stage by exhibiting
loyalty. Therefore, we expect to have political labels such as socialist or conservative
to describe judges. In a consensual model, appointments are likely to be more negotiated
within the stable coalition and result in individual who are perceived to be faithful to model
(that is, favor consensus over dissent). The absence of strong factions also shapes the natural
audience and possible rewards.
Notice we are not saying that judges are more or less politicized under one particular
model by comparison with the alternative model. In both models, consensual and majority,
they are likely to be equal responsive to political variables. The point is that the response
is revealed in different ways. In particular, we expect more explicit political alignment in a
majoritarian model than in a consensual model.
To investigate such hypothesis, we use a dataset on Italian Constitutional Court decisions
from 1985 to 2005, focusing on decisions concerning main reviews (ricorsi in via principale).
The Italian case is quite interesting since Italy was a consensual democracy until 1992 (with
a proportional electoral system and a multiparty arrangement stabilized around a stable
coalition of five parties that ruled since WWII) and emerged as a majoritarian democracy
after 1996 (with plurality rule for electing the parliament and two well defined coalitions that
alternated in power).
Our preliminary results provide significant support to our hypothesis. We detect more
political alignment between the decision of the Court and the political majority after 1996,
thus confirming a more polarized judicial behavior. Before 1992, we have no evidence of important
political divisions in the Court and the evidence seems to indicate a more consensual
judicial behavior.
2 The Institutional Framework
2.1 The Party System Break
The move from a First to a Second Republic took place in Italy without a formal constitutional
reform, rather it was due to a political scandal burnt out in spring 1992 which has
been called the Clean Hands (Mani Pulite) scandal. This scandal addressed a funding parties
system extremely expensive and as well outside the realm of legality, and hit to death the
coalition of parties at the government both at the national and the regional level.8
That
coalition, based on a proportional electoral rule system, has been defined by some political
scientists as a polarized pluralist systems [Sartori (1966 and 1976)], whereas others found it
a multiparty system with a dominant party [Lijpart (1999)] or an imperfect two-party system
[Galli (1966)]. Behind these definitions stands a system for which the electoral results
8
Italy is divided in 20 Regions, 5 of which are ruled under Special Statutes and 20 by Ordinary Statutes.
2
were almost irrelevant to determine the ruling government color, with a dominant party, the
Christian Democratic Party (DC), leading by itself for a certain period and from the very
end of the seventies governing through a system of alliances with the Socialist Party (PS),
the Republicans (PR), the Liberals (PL), and the Social Democrats (PSD), in the so-called
Penta-Party coalition. From the very origin of the First Republic, the Communist Party (PC)
was the main opponent party and, but for a few years between 1976 to 1979 (Government
of National Solidarity), the PC was never part of the central government.9
However, the
PC was more actively involved in leading regional governments, where it used to rule with
and without the support of the PS. As a consequences, the color of regional governments,
for instance, could change even during the same legislature period if the PS moved from an
alliance with the DC to an agreement with the PC (see Tables in the Appendix for further
details).
The 1992 earthquake stroke a worn-out political system in a moment of economic distress,
at the verge of which both the DC and the PC arrived after undergoing multiple
internal crises. In fact, in 1991 the PC disbanded and two new parties collected its members:
Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and Communist Refoundation (RC).10
The reason of
such choice was related more to the events shaking east European countries than to internal
Italian changes. The heirs of the PC were left out of from the scandals and in the period
immediately after the break they regained political support for that.
As reaction to both the economic crisis and the scandal upheaval, the Penta-Party coalition
(winners from 1992 national elections) sustaining technical governments until Italians
were called to vote again in 1994 with a new electoral rule, through with the 75% of the seats
in Parliament were assigned based on a majoritarian rule. A new political force came into
play with a center right coalition lead by Silvio Berlusconi, who managed to be nominated
head of the government for part of the new legislature. After internal disagreements to that
coalition, a new technical government was established although it was mainly supported by
the left wing parties.
It was only with the new elections in 1996 that a political stability was gained again and a
turnover between a right and a left coalition was established. Regional governments reached
a new balance pretty much in the same period, since their elections are dated around that
time, with exceptions due to Regions with Special Statutes (see Tables in the Appendix).
Figure 1 summarizes the time line from the First to the Second Republic, focusing on the
period analyzed in the empirical part.
Figure 1
1985 → 1994
First Republic
Proportional system
− 1992 → 1996
Transition Period
Technical governments
− 1994 → 2005
Second Republic
Majoritarian system
9
Even during these years, when Italian institutions feared the treat of the terrorist Red Brigades, the PC
was not formally part of the central government but it rather supported it informally.
10
For further details on the Italian party system, see Bull and Newell (2005).
3
2.2 The Italian Constitutional Court
The Italian Constitutional Court was established in 1955, although contemplated since 1948
by the Italian Constitution after WWII.11
There are fifteen judges appointed by three different
political actors (President of the Republic, both Houses of Parliament, and judges) who
appoint five judges each. All of them are selected among active or retired judges, professors
of law, or lawyers with more than twenty years of professional experience, for nonrenewable
terms of nine years. Till 1992 the quota system used to select the Justices by the Parliament
was quite apparent and well consolidated/documented. After the 1996 national elections a
similar balance has been reestablished. However the political chaos originated by the clean
hands scandal provided a vacuum for the period between 1992 and 1994. The politicization of
the Italian Constitutional Court has been studied by political scientists and legal economists
[Guarnieri (2001); Breton and Fraschini (2003); Fiorino et. al. (2007); Pederzoli (2008);
Padovano (2009); and Dalla Pellegrina and Garoupa (2012)].
3 The Econometric Model
3.1 Model and Variables Definition
To test our main research question, we start defining the political affiliation of the petitioner,
the lawmaker, and the court for each analyzed decision of the Court. First, we construct
two dummies named respectively Petitioner and Lawmaker. Petitioner takes the value of
1 when: 1) the petitioner is the State/National Government and the Central Government
is ruled by the PentaParty till 1994 or it is ruled by the Right Wing Coalition after 1994,
or 2) the petitioner is a Regional Government and the Regional Government is ruled by the
PentaParty till the first regional election after the 1992 break or it is ruled by the Right
Wing Coalition after the first regional election after the 1992 break. To assign the color and
composition of the ruling Government we use the year of the court decision. Analogously, the
Lawmaker dummy is defined, but for year taken to define the national or regional legislature
coalitions which the year of the reviewed law enactment.
The court political affiliation (Court) cannot be defined in terms of categorical variables,
given we do not have the individual decisions. Therefore we opt for a continuous variable,
that takes values between 0 and 1, since it represents a share. We are measuring the share of
the Court aligned to the PentaParty from 1985 to 1993 and the share of the Court aligned
to the Right Wing coalition from 1994 to 2005. In order to produce such measure, we count
the number of aligned Justices out of the total number of Justices sitting in the Court for
each decisions. At this stage, the number of the so-called neutral Justices is included in
the denominator. Our measure allows us to weigh the marginal impact of a higher or lower
incidence of a clear alignment, which in turns could have an effect also on the decisions of
allegedly neutral Justices.
We then define the share of the Court aligned to the petitioner’s party (ali petitioner)
11
The law that defines its procedural rules was approved in 1953 and the Court started working in 1956.
4
and the share of the Court opposed to the petitioner’s party (ali opp petitioner). Since
we have already defined the petitioner’s party, ali petitioner is equal to the court political
affiliation as described above, when the petitioner dummy takes the value of 1, and to (1Court),
when Petitioner is zero. The reason is intuitive: if the petitioner is affiliated to
the PentaParty (before 1994) or to the Right Wing party (after 1994) the part of the Court
aligned to him/her is the share of Justices affiliated to the PentaParty (before 1994) or to the
Right Wing party (after 1994). Whereas if the petitioner does not belong to the PentaParty
or to the Right Wing, then it is the share of the Court not affiliated with the PentaParty or
to the Right Wing, which is aligned to the petitioner.
To define ali opp petitioner we take into account both the neutral Justices and that the
Justices appointed under the First Republic still ruling after the break. The FR Justices
will take some time to realign in the new Party system. Although it is unlike that they
will be neutral, overall it is not possible to set the moment in which they will be associable
to a new political affiliation. They previous affiliation, under the FR system, might not be
conclusive in terms of SR choice since we know that, for instance, several politicians from
the Christian Democrats party move in the Left Wing coalition, while others ended up in
the Right Wing together with many belonging to the Socialist Party. Hence, we generate
the share of the First Republic Justices (FRJugdes) and a share of the Neutral Justices
(Neutral), as usual out of the number of Justices composing the Court at the decision level.
ali opp petitioner is a continuous variable defined by the petitioner color. If the petitioner is
aligned to the PentaParty or the Right Wing (Petitioner= 1) ali opp petitioner is the share
of the Court not aligned to the PentaParty or the Right Wing including the neutral Justices
(1-(Court+Neutral)) or including both the neutral Justices and the FR Justices share if the
decision year is after 1994 (1-(Court+Neutral+FRJugdes)). When the petitioner is not
aligned to the PentaParty or the Right Wing (Petitioner= 0), ali opp petitioner is equal to
the share of the Court aligned to the PentaParty or the Right Wing coalition including the
neutral Justices (Court+Neutral) or including both the neutral Justices and the FR Justices
if the decision year is after 1994 (Court+Neutral+FRJugdes).
We follow a similar approach to define the share of the Court aligned to the lawmaker’s
party (ali lawmaker) and the share of the Court opposed to the lawmaker’s party (ali opp lawmaker),
with the only difference being that we use the political affiliation of the lawmaker (Lawmaker).
Once defined the main variables of interest, and set the dependent variable (Const) equal
to a dummy equal to 1 if the Court declares the constitutionality of the reviewed law and 0
otherwise, we estimate the following model:
Constit = γr + λt + θ1Ali petitionerit + θ2Ali lawmakerit + (1)
θ3Ali opp petitionerit + θ3Ali opp lawmakerit +
αPetitionerit + βLawmakerit + τCourtit +
Zitω + Xitδ + εit
5
Where γr= Macro Areas Fixed Effects, λt= Year Fixed Effects, i= 1, 2...779 decisions,
and t= 1985...2005. Z is vector of variables, which weight for the Justices pre-Court working
background, and X is a vector of variables, which measure the court composition in terms
of its electoral bodies. Hence, Z includes the share career judges of the Court (Career) and
the share of law professors/legal scholars (Law), whereas X comprehends the proportion of
the Court appointed by both Houses of the Parliament (Parliament), by the President of
the Republic (President), and by the Magistracy (Magistracy).
Controlling for the petitioner, the lawmaker, and the court political alignment, the fixed
effects, X , and Z , a marginal increase in the alignment of the Court with the petitioner
should increase the probability of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the law. A similar
effect is expected to be driven by a marginal increase in the share of the court opposed to
the lawmaker. A reverse effect is expected when there is an increase in the proportion of
the Court aligned to the lawmaker or opposed to the petitioner (see Table 1 for a summary
of the expected effects). Basically, we are assuming that moving from the consensual to the
majoritarian democracy the described effects turn out to be more significant. In order to test
for this expectation, we run model 1 on 4 periods of interest: the First Republic period (1985-
1994), the First Republic without the transition period (1985-1992), the Second Republic
period (1994-2005), and the Second Republic without the transition period (1996-2005).
Table 1 about here
3.2 Robustness Checks
As robustness checks, we verify the consistency of our results under the following scenarios:
1. When there is a mixed political affiliation;
(a) For regional laws, when the lawmakers belong to different parties;
(b) For national laws, when the petitioners belong to different parties;
2. When there is alignment between the lawmaker and the petitioner;
3. The alignments concern the rapporteur and the president of the Court;
4. When the transition period is considered.
Once the legislator’ level comes into play, we construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
reviewed law is regional and 0 if it is national (reg law). Distinguishing between national
and regional legislations allows to check: 1) when the State is the petitioner against laws
promulgated by Regions which have different political colors, and 2) when Regions with
different political affiliations pool together as petitioners against a National Law. Both in
the first and in the second case we could expect that the Court’s decisions deal with a lower
political biased issue and therefore we might want to check if our results are consistent once
these decisions are dropped by the considered sample.
6
In addition to the mixed alignment checks, we construct a dummy to control for those
decisions for which the petitioner has the same affiliation of the lawmaker, which can be quite
the case during the First Republic (see Table 5).
We consider the case in which there is an alignment between the petitioner and the decision
Rapporteur (ali pet rapporteur) and the petitioner and the President of the Court
(ali pet president), as well as the alignment between the lawmaker and the decision Rapporteur
(ali law rapporteur) and the petitioner and the President of the Court (ali law president).
Finally, we check model 1 only on the transition period decisions (from 1992 to 1996).
4 Descriptives Statistics and Results
4.1 Data
We collected the 779 main reviews (ricorsi in via principale) ruled by the SC from 1985 to
2005. When the multiple issues decided in the same sentence are considered we end up with
926 issues. Finally, we count for the fact that constitutional reviews might be filed by more
than one Region and that the Government could appeal to the SC against the laws approved
by different Regions although related to the same topic. This is why, as shown in Table 2,
once the regional level is included, we have a final dataset of 1,371 decisions. These decisions
concerned laws or legislative decrees both at the national and at the regional (or provincial)
level enacted from 1976 to 2005 as shown in Table 3.
Tables 2 and 3 about here
In Table 4 we report the composition of the Court in a dynamic setting, moving from the
First to the Second Republic. During the First Republic, it is apparent the overwhelming
majority of the PentaParty components of the Court, with a small opposition made by those
Justices elected among the Communist Party adherents. The heritage of the First Republic
is still an important element in the years after the break, as detected but the percentage of
FR Justices.12
As a matter of fact, a new Court majority (8 Justices out of 15) appointed
under the new party system has been established only in 1997, given that 2 Justices were
appointed in 1995, 5 in 1996, and 1 in 1997. A higher incidence of Justices affiliated to the
Left Wing coalition start to become apparent after 1996.
Table 4 about here
Table 5 presents descriptives statistics for the four periods of interest as previously defined.
Table 5 about here
12
There are 7 Justices nominated in the neighbor of the party system collapse: 1 in 1990 (Granata), 3 in
1991 (Guizzi, Mirabelli, and Vassalli), 1 in 1992 (Santuosso), and 2 in 1993 (Ruperto and Vari).
7
4.2 Results
We present results for model 1 in the four periods first excluding the shares of the court
opposed to the petitioner and the lawmaker (Table 6) and then including them (Table 7).
The very first evidence show an effect on the Court political partisanship related to the move
from the consensual to a majoritarjan democracy. Although this effect is not robust to the
full estimation of model 1.
Tables 6 and 7 about here
When the model is tested on sub-sets of decisions, grouped according to the national or
regional nature of the reviewed laws, it is apparent that the first effect detected in Table 6
is reaffirmed, robust to the full specification, only for those decisions dealing with national
legislation (see Table 9).
Tables 8 and 9 about here
Our results are robust to the the checks listed in subsection 3.2. In particular, there are
only 3 cases13
in which the State filed for the review of regional laws (lawmaker) when Regions
have different political colors, and as such they did not change the results. However, we count
128 decisions for which Regions of different political colors (petitioner) filed for the review
of State laws. Even when those are dropped, the results of model 1 stand unchanged. The
same results are confirmed even when controlling for ali pet rapporteur, ali law rapporteur,
ali pet president, and ali law president. Results of testing model 1 on the transition period
do not address any significant behaviors during that period.
5 Conclusive Remarks
Our paper addresses political partisanship in constitutional review, in particular, when moving
from a consensual to a majoritarian democracy (concepts that rely fundamentally on
different electoral rules). We study how these distinctions affect and influence judicial review.
In particular, we use a structural break in the Italian party system to evaluate changes
in the pattern of political bias exhibited by the constitutional judges. Our preliminary results
provide significant support against a formalist interpretation of judicial behavior. They also
seem to indicate more alignment in a majoritarian rather than in a consensual model.
13
Sentences n.119/1985; 162/2004; and 62/2005.
8
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Tables
Table 1: Model Previsions
Dependent Ali petitioner Ali lawmaker Ali opp petitioner Ali opp lawmaker
Variable (if it increases) (if it increases) (if it increases) (if it increases)
Const 1 ↓ ↓
0 ↑ ↑
13
Table 2: Decisions According to the Decision Year
Year Decisions Decided Per Region
Issues Issues
1985 19 22 35
1986 16 19 35
1987 29 35 59
1988 106 121 148
1989 31 36 57
1990 46 53 70
1991 26 38 68
1992 32 45 84
1993 30 39 63
1994 44 58 77
1995 42 49 66
1996 25 29 33
1997 21 21 25
1998 11 14 23
1999 24 25 26
2000 26 31 37
2001 26 33 41
2002 12 14 30
2003 48 57 93
2004 80 87 168
2005 85 100 133
Total 779 926 1,371
14
Table 3: Decisions According to the Reviewed Law Year
Year Decisions Decided Issues Per Region Issues
Tot. NL RL Tot. NL RL Tot. NL RL
1976 6 0 6 8 0 8 9 0 9
1977 12 3 9 13 3 10 14 3 11
1978 13 7 6 16 9 7 19 12 7
1979 6 0 6 7 0 7 7 0 7
1980 10 3 7 11 3 8 14 6 8
1981 24 13 11 28 15 13 41 28 23
1982 20 11 9 21 12 9 27 18 9
1983 11 4 7 13 6 7 19 12 7
1984 13 11 2 16 14 2 36 34 2
1985 17 10 7 19 12 7 34 25 9
1986 20 9 11 23 10 13 29 16 13
1987 15 6 9 18 8 10 25 15 10
1988 26 7 19 30 9 21 36 15 21
1989 41 17 24 50 21 29 81 52 29
1990 34 13 21 40 18 22 58 36 22
1991 34 25 9 49 36 13 94 81 13
1992 33 21 12 46 29 17 73 56 17
1993 34 17 17 45 23 22 64 42 22
1994 34 12 22 44 16 28 62 34 28
1995 40 8 32 43 9 34 48 14 34
1996 35 13 22 39 16 23 52 26 26
1997 33 9 24 41 16 25 50 24 26
1998 27 14 13 30 17 13 37 24 13
1999 15 12 3 18 15 3 22 19 3
2000 10 5 5 13 6 7 22 15 7
2001 22 14 8 23 15 8 39 31 8
2002 75 33 42 84 36 48 133 84 49
2003 66 39 27 73 44 29 127 88 39
2004 48 25 23 59 34 25 94 69 25
2005 3 0 3 4 0 4 5 0 5
Total 777* 924* 1,371
Notes: *= the total numbers differ from the issues reviewed per year since two decisions
concern regional laws promulgated in different years. They count in the regional level
analysis. Tot.= Total; NL= National Laws; RL= Regional Laws.
15
Table 4: Court Composition
Year %PP %Opponent % Neutral %FR %Right %Left
1985 0.71 0.07 0.21 . . .
1986 0.70 0.09 0.21 . . .
1987 0.66 0.15 0.19 . . .
1988 0.66 0.13 0.21 . . .
1989 0.66 0.13 0.20 . . .
1990 0.66 0.14 0.20 . . .
1991 0.54 0.16 0.30 . . .
1992 0.61 0.13 0.26 . . .
1993 0.64 0.15 0.21 . . .
1994 0.09 0.02 0.26 0.63 0.00 0.00
1995 . . 0.32 0.58 0.00 0.10
1996 . . 0.30 0.46 0.05 0.19
1997 . . 0.30 0.23 0.09 0.38
1998 . . 0.28 0.22 0.12 0.38
1999 . . 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.40
2000 . . 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.52
2001 . . 0.20 0.00 0.16 0.62
2002 . . 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.73
2003 . . 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.71
2004 . . 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.71
2005 . . 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67
Notes: %PP= Share of the PentaParty Judges; %Opponent= Share of Communist
Judges; %Neutral= Share of Neutral Judges; %FR= Share of Judges appointed during
the First Republic; %Right= Share of Right Wing Judges; %Left= Share of Left
Wing Judges.
16
Table 5: Descriptives for the 4 periods
FR FR SR SR
no transition no transition
Ali petitioner 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57
(0.14) (0.14) (0.33) (0.27)
Ali lawmaker 0.60 0.60 0.43 0.50
(0.11) (0.11) (0.33) (0.28)
Ali opp petitioner 0.36 0.35 0.51 0.50
(0.34) (0.34) (0.27) (0.19)
Ali opp lawmaker 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.38
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.20)
Petitioner 0.69 0.70 0.38 0.37
(0.46) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48)
Lawmaker 0.89 0.89 0.63 0.59
(0.31) (0.31) (0.49) (0.48)
Court 0.64 0.64 0.19 0.24
(0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.10)
Neutral 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.12)
Career 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.33
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Law 0.47 0.47 0.60 0.62
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Parliament 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.29
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07)
President 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.36
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Magistracy 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.33
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Petitioner=Lawmaker 0.59 0.59 0.31 0.30
(0.49) (0.49) (0.46) (0.46)
Regional Law 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.36
(0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48)
Notes: Standard Deviations in brackets. FR= First Republic period (1985-1994), FR no
transition= First Republic without the transition period (1985-1992), SR= Second Republic
period (1994-2005), and SR no transition= Second Republic without the transition
period (1996-2005).
17
Table 6: Results: Model
VARIABLES FR FR SR SR
no transition no transition
ali petitioner -0.04 -0.05 -0.33 -0.68**
(-0.13) (-0.18) (-1.57) (-2.09)
ali lawmaker 0.23 0.86 -0.03 -0.37
(0.28) (0.95) (-0.13) (-1.02)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 631 555 566 446
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -375.69 -327.83 -351.49 -270.55
Notes: Declaration of constitutionality is the dependent variable. Control variables are
Petitioner, Lawmaker, Court, Career, Parliament, and President. Marginal effects
reported. FR= First Republic period (1985-1994), FR no transition= First Republic
without the transition period (1985-1992), SR= Second Republic period (1994-2005), and
SR no transition= Second Republic without the transition period (1996-2005). Robust zstatistics
clustered at the case level in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
18
Table 7: Results: Model with Opponents
VARIABLES FR FR SR SR
no transition no transition
ali petitioner -0.30 -0.41 -0.34 -0.52
(-0.83) (-1.00) (-0.89) (-1.37)
ali lawmaker 0.18 0.62 -0.10 -0.31
(0.19) (0.60) (-0.22) (-0.58)
ali opp petitioner -1.12 -1.27 -0.01 -0.22
(-1.57) (-1.51) (-0.04) (-0.84)
ali opp lawmaker -0.50 -0.77 0.04 -0.04
(-0.41) (-0.56) (0.19) (-0.17)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 631 555 566 446
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -374.59 -326.69 -351.46 -270.09
Notes: Declaration of constitutionality is the dependent variable. Control variables are
Petitioner, Lawmaker, Court, Career, Parliament, and President. Marginal effects
reported. FR= First Republic period (1985-1994), FR no transition= First Republic
without the transition period (1985-1992), SR= Second Republic period (1994-2005), and
SR no transition= Second Republic without the transition period (1996-2005). Robust zstatistics
clustered at the case level in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
19
Table 8: Results: Only Regional Laws
VARIABLES FR FR SR SR
no transition no transition
ali petitioner -0.04 -0.11 -0.40 -0.55
(-0.15) (-0.31) (-0.77) (-1.06)
ali lawmaker -0.83 -1.23 -0.05 0.32
(-0.71) (-0.68) (-0.07) (0.36)
ali opp petitioner -0.05 -0.18 0.23 0.09
(-0.09) (-0.25) (1.08) (0.25)
ali opp lawmaker -1.02 -1.93 -0.25 -0.06
(-0.46) (-0.70) (-0.77) (-0.18)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 425 364 338 279
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -243.03 -207.84 -194.91 -152.79
Notes: Declaration of constitutionality is the dependent variable. Control variables are
Petitioner, Lawmaker, Court, Career, Parliament, and President. Marginal effects
reported. FR= First Republic period (1985-1994), FR no transition= First Republic
without the transition period (1985-1992), SR= Second Republic period (1994-2005), and
SR no transition= Second Republic without the transition period (1996-2005). Robust zstatistics
clustered at the case level in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
20
Table 9: Results: Only National Laws
VARIABLES FR FR SR SR
no transition no transition
ali petitioner 0.34 -0.43 -2.19** -2.63**
(0.18) (-0.21) (-2.09) (-2.31)
ali lawmaker 0.78 1.41 1.09 0.41
(0.65) (1.16) (1.23) (0.44)
ali opp petitioner -0.27 -0.94 -0.18 -0.10
(-0.10) (-0.35) (-0.22) (-0.12)
ali opp lawmaker -1.29 -1.07 -0.44 -0.56
(-0.68) (-0.59) (-1.08) (-1.37)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 206 188 226 165
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -123.66 -111.06 -127.67 -89.14
Notes: Declaration of constitutionality is the dependent variable. Control variables are
Petitioner, Lawmaker, Court, Career, Parliament, and President. Marginal effects
reported. FR= First Republic period (1985-1994), FR no transition= First Republic
without the transition period (1985-1992), SR= Second Republic period (1994-2005), and
SR no transition= Second Republic without the transition period (1996-2005). Robust zstatistics
clustered at the case level in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
21
Appendix
Table A1: National Elections
Date Winning Coalition Government Coalition
June 20, 1976 NS NS
June 3, 1979 PP PP
June 26, 1983 PP PP
June 14, 1987 PP PP
April 4, 1992 PP
June 28, 1992 to Amato
April 28, 1993
April 28, 1993 to Ciampi
May 10, 1994
March 27, 1994 R
May 10, 1994 to Berlusconi
January 17, 1995
January 17, 1995 to Dini
May 17, 1996 L
April 21, 1996 L L
May 13, 2001 R R
Notes: PP= PentaParty Coalition; L=Left Wing Coalition; R= Right Wing Coalition.
Amato, Ciampi, and Dini Governments are regarded as technocrats’ government. However,
they were supported by specific political coalitions. NS= National Solidarity (Solidarieta’
Nazionale). From 1976 to 1979 a broad coalition was at the national government,
which included an informal participation also of the Communist Party. A broader national
government coalition was pushed by the Seventies Red Brigate terrostic treat. Source:
Italian Ministry of the Interior.
22
Table A2: Regional Elections: Ordinary Statute Regions
Regions 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005-
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Abruzzo PP PP PP PP L R L
Basilicata PP PP PP PP L L L
Calabria PP PP PP PP R R L
Campania PP PP PP PP R L L
Emilia Romagna NPP NPP NPP NPP L L L
Lazio NPP NPP/PP PP PP L R L
Liguria NPP PP PP PP L R L
Lombardia PP PP PP PP R R R
Marche PP/NPP NPP NPP NPP L L R
Molise PP PP PP PP L R* R*
Piemonte PP PP PP NPP L L R
Puglia PP PP PP PP R R L
Toscana NPP NPP NPP NPP L L L
Umbria NPP NPP NPP NPP L L L
Veneto PP PP PP PP R R R
Notes: PP= PentaParty Coalition; NPP= No PentaParty Coalition, which includes the
Communist Party; L=Left Wing Coalition; R= Right Wing Coalition. In some cases the
presence of in the ruling coalition of the Communist Party depends on the alliances policy
of the Socialist Party: this is why we can have that during a same legislature there is shift
from NPP to PP or viceversa. R∗=Elections in Molise were held in 2001 and 2006 rather
than 2000 and 2005. The election dates were for all on: June 15, 1975; June 8, 1980; May
12, 1985; May 6, 1990; April 23, 1995; April 16, 2000. Source: Italian Ministry of the
Interior.
23
Table A3: Regional Elections: Special Statute Regions
Regions 1973- 1978- 1983- 1988- 1993- 1998- 2003-
1978- 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2006
Friuli Venezia Giulia PP PP PP PP R R L
Valle d’Aosta PP AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT
Trentino Alto Adige AUT AUT AUT AUT L L L
Bolzano AUT AUT AUT AUT L L L
Trento PP PP PP PP L L L
1974- 1979- 1984- 1989- 1994- 1999- 2004-
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
Sardegna PP PP PP PP R R L
1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Sicilia PP PP PP PP R R
Notes: PP= PentaParty Coalition; L=Left Wing Coalition; R= Right Wing Coalition;
AUT=Regional Parties connected to territorial and linguistic concerns. In Friuli Venezia
Giulia and Valle D’Aosta elections took place on June 25, 1978; June 26, 1983; June 26,
1988; June 6, 1993; May 31, 1998, and June 8, 2003. In Trentino Alto Adige elections
took place on November 11, 1978; November 20, 1983; November 20, 1988; November
21, 1993, November 22, 1998; and October 26, 2003. Bolzano and Trento are the two
autonomous provinces in Trentino Alto Adige. Source: Italian Ministry of the Interior.
24
Table A4: Regional Governments during the National Transition Period
Regions 1992 1993 1994 1995
Abruzzo PP PP L L
Basilicata PP PP PP PP
Calabria PP PP L L/R
Campania PP PP PP PP
Emilia Romagna NPP NPP NPP NPP
Lazio NPP NPP/PP PP PP
Liguria NPP PP PP/L L
Lombardia PP PP L R
Marche PP/NPP NPP NPP NPP
Molise PP PP PP PP
Piemonte PP PP PP/L L/L
Puglia PP PP PP PP
Toscana NPP NPP NPP NPP
Umbria NPP NPP NPP NPP
Veneto PP PP/L L/R R
Friuli Venezia Giulia PP PP/R L/R L*
Valle d’Aosta AUT AUT AUT AUT
Trentino Alto Adige AUT L L L
Bolzano AUT L L L
Trento PP PP/L L L
Sardegna PP PP PP/R R
Sicilia PP/NPP NPP NPP NPP
Notes: PP= PentaParty Coalition; NPP= No PentaParty Coalition, which includes
the Communist Party; L=Left Wing Coalition; R= Right Wing Coalition; AUT= Autonomous
Parties. Source: Italian Ministry of the Interior and regional websites. *= till
1998.
25