The 9/11 terrorist strikes are not only among the most impactful
events in modern history but also among the best-documented ones.
Professional news crews and NewYork City residents made live video
recordings as this terrible event unfolded, which were widely broadcasted.
We all have seen the footage of United Airlines Flight 175
crashing in the SouthTower of theWorldTrade Center from any possible
angle and were able to see how these impressive buildings collapsed
like a house of cards. But although the footage is objectively the
same, people appear to differ widely in what they are seeing in these
recordings. Many people see how a passenger plane that was hijacked
by suicide terrorists exploded upon collision, ultimately causing the
destruction of the Twin Towers. Many other people, however, see
direct evidence for controlled demolition: Not suicide terrorist but
the US government was responsible for the plane crash, and not the
impact of the plane but explosives that were hidden within the buildings
caused the destruction of theTwinTowers.
The allegations that the US government helped to cause 9/11 are
reflected in conspiracy theories that one can easily find on Internet
and social media. Large groups of concerned citizens – such as the
“9/11-for-truth” movement – made documentaries, published books
and articles, and organized rallies to convince the public that the US
1
psychology of
conspiracy theories
2 p sychology of conspiracy theories
government is withholding the truth about these events. Furthermore,
there are many different variants of 9/11 conspiracy theories.The
relatively “milder” variants propose that the US government
is merely an accessory, and for instance assume that public officials
knew that the terrorist strikes were coming yet deliberately failed to
prevent them. Other variants make allegations of a more active role
for the US government and propose that public officials directly organized
and carried out these attacks. These latter conspiracy theories
often portray the 9/11 strikes as a “false-flag operation” – an attack
that was designed to look as if it were carried out by other countries
or organizations in order to justify far-reaching actions such as war.
These false-flag 9/11 conspiracy theories are well known for claims
such as that the airplanes were remote-controlled, that explosives
caused the destruction of theTwinTowers, that the Pentagon was hit
by a rocket instead of a passenger plane, and so on.
Whether we believe in them or not, such conspiracy theories
surely are fascinating. Conspiracy theories appeal to a basic, dark fear
that we all are string puppets under the control of powerful, sinister,
and invisible forces. Conspiracy theories refer to hidden, secret, and
malignant organizations that influence our lives without us being
aware of it. Many conspiracy theories elicit a sense of “What if?”
among people: Can these theories be true, and what would that imply
for how we live our lives? Do we really understand the way that the
world operates, or have we been deceived all along? There is something
irresistibly mysterious, intriguing, but also frightening to a
credible conspiracy theory, and therefore conspiracy theories have
the potential to capture the attention of a broad audience.
Such widespread appeal can for instance be seen in the prominent
place that conspiracy theories have in popular culture. Many wellknown
blockbuster movies are based on the central idea of people
being deceived or threatened by a conspiracy of evil and hidden
forces. In The Truman Show, the lead character played by Jim Carrey is
unaware that his whole life actually is a popular reality show under
the control of a TV station. Everyone he knows – his friends, his
family, and even his wife – are part of the conspiracy designed to
p sychology of conspiracy th eories 3
trick him into believing that he leads a normal life.Another example,
which seems very different but is actually based on the same conspiratorial
principle, is The Matrix – a movie in which viewers are led
to believe that life as we know it is a virtual reality illusion that has
been deliberately pulled over our eyes. Human beings actually are
prisoners of a conspiracy of hostile and highly intelligent computers,
who utilize our life energy as efficient batteries.
What connects The Truman Show and The Matrix is that they portray
rather existential conspiracy theories, implying that our life in its
most minor details can be controlled by a conspiracy without our
knowledge. But there are also many movies that are based on more
common conspiracy theories, depicting how government agencies or
other organizations use excessive power to persecute citizens. Often
these conspiracies have highly advanced technology at their disposal,
which enables them to effectively track down their victims (e.g., Eagle
Eye, The Net, Enemy of the State). Personally I am a big fan of the Netflix
original series House of Cards, which describes how a corrupt politician
makes a career (all the way to becoming US president) through lies,
deception, bribery, intimidation, coercion, and even murder. These
movies and series all share a key element of many conspiracy theories,
which is a depiction of powerful people or institutions as evilminded,
dangerous, and largely operating in the shadows.
One factor that contributes to the widespread appeal of conspiracy
theories is the possibility that they might actually be true – and in
fact, conspiracies sometimes can and do occur.An infamous example
of a real conspiracy at the highest political level is the “Iran-Contra
affair”, which took place during the 1980s. US government officials
were found to have secretly facilitated the sale of weapons to Iran
(even though Iran was subject to an arms embargo) and then used the
profits to secretly fund the Contra Rebels in Nicaragua (even though
further funding of the Contras had been explicitly prohibited by Congress).
Another real conspiracy was the so-called Tuskegee-syphilis
experiment, in which scientists pretended to offer free health care to
African-American men. In reality, they studied the natural development
of untreated syphilis, involving 399 men who had syphilis but
4 p sy chology of c onspiracy theories
were unaware of their condition and 201 healthy men as a control
group. The experiment lasted for 40 years (1932 to 1972). During
this time, these men were never informed that they were taking part
in an experiment, nor were they informed about their actual medical
condition, and their illness was left untreated.As a result, many men
suffered the consequences of untreated syphilis, including death.
The Holocaust also was the result of a real conspiracy. While
Jews were already widely persecuted and killed in Nazi Germany
in the 1930s and early 1940s, initially the Nazis had hoped that
due to the hostile climate most Jews would leave the country voluntarily.This
did not happen on the scale desired by Hitler, however,
and in January 1942 a conspiracy of 15 high-ranked Nazis
and SS-officers secretly gathered in a villa at Wannsee near Berlin.
Although Hitler did not attend in person, the meeting had the
purpose of designing a concrete plan to carry out Hitler’s recent
orders – which boiled down to “physically exterminating” all of
the Jews in Europe.This meeting, commonly known as the “Wannsee
conference”, marked the beginning of the mass deportation
of Jews to Nazi death camps, where they were murdered in gas
chambers on an unprecedented scale. The Holocaust is now recognized
as one of the biggest tragedies in human history. Yet it
was not until 1947 that a legal prosecutor found evidence that the
Wannsee conference actually took place, by discovering the strictly
classified minutes of this secret meeting.
This book is about the psychology of conspiracy theories.There
are many different conspiracy theories that circle the Internet, some
of them plausible or at least theoretically possible (e.g., perhaps
secret service agencies sometimes do push the limits of what is
legally or morally acceptable, as the Snowden revelations suggest),
others are rather outlandish and highly unlikely to be true (e.g.,
the conspiracy theory that the earth is ruled by a race of alien lizards
disguised as humans). Furthermore, there are many examples
of actual conspiracy formation throughout history – ranging from
modern times (Angela Merkel’s mobile phone really was tapped by
the US secret service) to for instance the Roman Senate conspiracy
p sychology of conspirac y th eories 5
that killed Julius Caesar – and hence, not all conspiracy theories are
necessarily irrational. Despite all the differences among the conspiracy
theories that people endorse, in the present book I will argue
that people’s tendency to believe in conspiracy theories is rooted
in similar, recognizable, and predictable psychological processes.
what is a conspiracy theory?
Although various definitions of conspiracy theories exist, the one that
I favor is “the belief that a number of actors join together in secret
agreement, in order to achieve a hidden goal which is perceived to be
unlawful or malevolent”.1
This is a broad definition, and accordingly,
conspiracy theories can take many forms and emerge in many different
spheres of life. People can hold conspiracy theories about the government,
or governmental institutions (e.g., secret service agencies).
People can hold conspiracy theories about entire branches of industry
(e.g., the pharmaceutical industry) or about scientific research (e.g.,
climate change conspiracy theories). Employees on the work floor
also often hold conspiracy beliefs about their management, such as
beliefs that managers have a hidden agenda to pursue selfish goals.
Conspiracy theories may occur in sports (e.g., beliefs that the referee
was bribed by the opposing team).Also in their personal life, people
may hold conspiracy theories by thinking that others conspire against
them personally – although the latter, more personally oriented forms
of conspiracy theories are in scientific discourse regarded as examples
of “paranoia” and are qualitatively different from conspiracy beliefs
that make assumptions of how large groups of citizens are being
deceived by formal authorities.
To specify the definition of conspiracy theories further, I propose
that any belief needs to possess at least five critical ingredients in
order to qualify as a conspiracy theory.They are:
1 Patterns – Any conspiracy theory explains events by establishing
nonrandom connections between actions, objects, and people.
Put differently, a conspiracy theory assumes that the chain of
6 p sychology of conspiracy theories
incidents that caused a suspect event did not occur through
coincidence.
2 Agency – A conspiracy theory assumes that a suspect event was
caused on purpose by intelligent actors:There was a sophisticated
and detailed plan that was intentionally developed and carried out.
3 Coalitions – A conspiracy theory always involves a coalition or
group of multiple actors, usually but not necessarily humans
(examples of nonhuman conspiracy theories are The Matrix and
the “alien lizard” conspiracy theories). If one believes that a single
individual, a lone wolf, is responsible for a suspect event, this
belief is not a conspiracy theory – for the simple reason that it
does not involve a conspiracy.
4 Hostility – A conspiracy theory tends to assume the suspected
coalition to pursue goals that are evil, selfish, or otherwise not
in the public interest. Certainly people may sometimes suspect a
benevolent conspiracy, and benevolent conspiracies indeed do
exist (as adults we conspire every year to convince children of
the existence of Santa Claus). But in the present book, as well as
in other literature on this topic, the term “conspiracy theory” is
exclusive to conspiracies that are suspected to be hostile. Belief
in benevolent conspiracy theories is likely to be grounded in
different psychological processes than described in this book.
5 Continued secrecy – Conspiracy theories are about coalitions that
operate in secret. With “continued” secrecy, I mean that the
conspiracy has not yet been exposed by hard evidence, and hence
its assumed operations remain secret and uncertain. A conspiracy
that is exposed and hence proven true (e.g., the Wannsee conference)
is no longer a “theory”; instead, it is an established example
of actual conspiracy formation. Conspiracy theories are thus by
definition unproven.
These five qualities distinguish belief in conspiracy theories from
many other beliefs that people may hold.Take, for instance, the common
supernatural belief that it is possible to get into contact with the
souls of deceased relatives. Such belief in the existence of ghosts shares
p sychology of conspirac y th eories 7
at least two and arguably three of the key ingredients of conspiracy
beliefs, but not all five of them. Belief in ghosts involves patterns (i.e.,
it makes assumptions of how life after death develops in a nonrandom
fashion; furthermore, believing in ghosts is likely to influence how
one causally explains mysterious events in life) and it also involves
agency (i.e., the ghosts are typically assumed to have goals, emotions,
and desires, and they are for instance capable of communicating with
living people through a medium). Belief in ghosts does not require
“continued secrecy”, but one might say that there are at least parallels
with this ingredient, as ghost beliefs are also unproven, pertain
to invisible forces, and are characterized by mystery. But the coalition
and hostility elements are lacking, at least as necessary requirements
for this belief. Ghosts may be considered to be hostile, but they do
not necessarily need to be in order to believe in them. Furthermore,
one does not need to make the additional assumption that groups of
ghosts organize meetings to design plans of how to harm people. A
core aspect of conspiracy beliefs that makes them unique as compared
to other forms of belief is that such beliefs involve a secret and hostile
group of actors.
psychology of conspiracy theories
“Have you ever considered the possibility that our theories might be
true?”This is a question that I regularly get through email from Dutch
citizens who are active on conspiracy websites. Often these messages
have an angry tone, voiced by citizens who somehow feel offended by
my research on conspiracy theories and who seem keen on persuading
me that Ebola really was created in the lab, or that 9/11 really
was an inside job. These messages typically (and wrongly) assume
that if one studies the psychology of conspiracy theories, one necessarily
proposes that all the conspiracy theories that people believe are
invalid, or that people who believe in conspiracy theories are pathological.
I have two responses to these email senders.The first is that,
next time, they might wish to read the work of an academic more
carefully before sending such an angry email – if they would have
8 p sychology of conspiracy theories
done so, they would have found out that besides conspiracy theories
I also do research (and recently published a book) on the human tendency
towards cheating and corruption, which includes the question
why people sometimes actually conspire to pursue selfish ends.2
It is
well known that corruption – and hence,actual conspiracy formation –
is common, and I do not know of a single scientist who argues
otherwise.
But second, and more importantly, the psychology of conspiracy
theories is not a question of which conspiracy theories are true or
false – it is a question of who does or does not believe in them.
There are many conspiracy theories that can be considered irrational
in the face of logic or scientific evidence, and the fact that many
people nevertheless believe in them is good reason to study this
topic (more about that later). Furthermore, I am willing to submit
here that I am highly skeptical of some of the rather grandiose conspiracy
theories that circle the Internet. I find it highly implausible
that Ebola was created in the lab. Furthermore, I firmly believe that
9/11 was carried out by a group of 19 Al Qaeda suicide terrorists –
and this is not a conspiracy theory by the given definition, because
the evidence to support this claim is so overwhelming that it is safe
to say that the conspiracy of these 19 terrorists has been exposed
(i.e., there is no “continued secrecy”). Finally, while I consider it
possible that Lee Harvey Oswald received help from unknown others
while preparing to assassinate JFK (and hence that there may
have been a conspiracy), I consider it unlikely that this help came
from the CIA, the Russians, or the Cubans. But what I think about
these conspiracy theories is not the focus of this book.
This book focuses on the psychology of conspiracy theories, which
is the scientific study of why some people are more likely than others
to believe in conspiracy theories. Typical questions that are part
of the psychology of conspiracy theories are: What personality factors
determine whether someone believes or disbelieves conspiracy
theories? To what extent does belief in one conspiracy theory (e.g.,
about the pharmaceutical industry) predict the likelihood of believing
in a different conspiracy theory (e.g., JFK)? In what situations are
p sychology of conspiracy th eories 9
people more and in what situations are people less likely to believe
in conspiracy theories? And what are the consequences of conspiracy
theories for believers’ feelings and behaviors? To study these issues,
one does not need the conspiracy theory that is under investigation
to be necessarily false, nor does newly emerging evidence that an
actual conspiracy occurred compromise any of the conclusions that
are drawn in this research area.
Let me briefly illuminate this principle by drawing a comparison
with the psychology of religion. Many social scientists study religious
beliefs, and one typical finding in this research domain is that
religious people cling more strongly to their faith in unpredictable,
frightening situations. (I’m sure many readers recognize the desire to
say a little prayer when they are scared.)The theory behind this finding
is that people have a need to feel that they are to some extent in
control of their environment. Unpredictable situations make people
feel less in control, and as a consequence, people start relying more
strongly on external sources of control – such as God.3
Is it necessary
for this line of research to also prove or disprove – or at least make
assumptions of – the actual existence of God? My answer would be
a succinct “No”:The mere observation that people differ strongly in
their religiousness is sufficient to raise the legitimate question why
some people do, and others do not, entertain certain religious beliefs.
The finding that people are more religious in frightening situations
teaches us something about the psychological processes underlying
religion. For instance, one possible interpretation of these research
findings is that belief in God can be a source of comfort in scary situations.This
conclusion does not make any judgment of the question
whether God actually exists or not, nor does it imply a value judgment
for believers or nonbelievers.
The principle for the psychology of conspiracy theories is the
same: It is perfectly possible to study these beliefs without knowing
for sure whether certain specific conspiracy theories are true or
false.As a matter of fact, I know of one published research study that
examined belief in a conspiracy theory that later on did turn out to be
true.The study focused specifically on theWatergate affair. In 1972, a
10 psy chology of conspiracy theories
group of five men were caught burglarizing the Democratic National
Committee headquarters in the Watergate hotel, Washington, DC.
The burglary was part of a bigger scheme that involved influential
Republicans spying on the Democratic Party for political gain, which
included bugging the offices of Democratic opponents and other
abuses of power. Many high-ranking White House officials, including
President Nixon himself, initially denied any involvement after
the burglars were caught. In the investigation that followed, however,
the evidence increasingly suggested that Nixon actively tried to cover
up his personal involvement in the burglary and other illegal activities
associated with it. Eventually, the public release of tape recordings
that Nixon had of meetings held in his office supported his role in
a cover-up, leading him to resign his presidency on 9 August 1974.
Two academic researchers, Thomas Wright and Jack Arbuthnot,
conducted a study on how suspicious people were of the Watergate
affair as it unfolded.4
The study was conducted in May 1973 – which
was before the Senate hearings had taken place, before the Supreme
Court had ordered Nixon’s tape recordings to be made public, and
hence before the personal involvement of Nixon in theWatergate affair
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.At that point in time, the allegation
that President Nixon himself was an active player in the Watergate
scandal was still a “conspiracy theory” according to all the five
ingredients presented earlier. In their study, the researchers were particularly
interested in the factors that would predict how suspicious
people were of the possible role that Nixon might have played during
Watergate.They focused on interpersonal trust and tested if people who
have a structural tendency to distrust others would be more suspicious
of Nixon’s involvement.They also examined the role of political ideology
and tested whether Democrats or Republicans would be more
suspicious of Nixon.The results indicated that the stronger people distrust
others in their daily life, the more likely they were to perceive
a conspiracy involving Nixon. Also, Democrats were more likely than
Republicans to believe this conspiracy theory.
What followed is well known:Yes, it was true. Nixon actively tried
to cover up his role in Watergate and was personally involved in the
p sychology of conspiracy th eor ies 11
illegal extraction of sensitive information about his political opponents,
which he used to his political advantage. Nixon’s personal
involvement in the Watergate scandal no longer classifies as a “conspiracy
theory”, given that there is no continued secrecy anymore:
The conspiracy has been exposed, it is therefore no longer a “theory”,
andWatergate has become a textbook example of an actual conspiracy
that took place at the highest political level. Should we now abandon
Wright and Arbuthnot’s conclusions? Does the fact that this conspiracy
theory turned out true compromise their results in any way?
I do not think so. While few people dispute the role of Nixon in
Watergate nowadays, back in May 1973 this issue was still unproven
and subject to intense public debate.The research question ofWright
andArbuthnot was not whether this particular conspiracy theory was
true or false; the question was what personality and political factors
would predict citizens’ belief in it at a point in time when the
evidence for this theory was still inconclusive. The results that they
observed have been replicated by multiple researchers and in the
context of many other conspiracy theories. People who are inclined
to distrust other people are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories
than people who are inclined to trust other people. Furthermore,
people particularly believe in conspiracy theories about groups that
are ideologically dissimilar. Democrats therefore are more likely to
believe theories that involve a Republican conspiracy, and Republicans
are more likely to believe theories that involve a Democrat conspiracy.
These were the conclusions that followed from Wright and Arbuthnot’s
study, and these conclusions still hold today.
The psychology of conspiracy theories examines who believes or
disbelieves these theories instead of whether a certain conspiracy theory
is true or false. I have no more knowledge about the likelihood of
certain conspiracy theories than other citizens, nor do I have access to
classified government intelligence – and this is not necessary to study
the psychology of conspiracy theories. In the chapters that follow, I
will highlight situational and personality factors that predict how
susceptible people are to conspiracy theories. In the remainder of this
chapter, however, I will deal with two lingering issues regarding the
12 psy chology of conspiracy theories
psychology of conspiracy theories: Should we care about whether or
not people hold such beliefs, and should we pathologize people who
believe in conspiracy theories – including the relatively absurd ones?
should we care about
conspiracy theories?
Psychology offers a scientific approach that helps to objectively establish
what personality or situational factors determine belief or disbelief
in conspiracy theories. Now that we have established that this
approach implies that we are not trying to prove or disprove a particular
conspiracy theory, an important question becomes whether we
should care about conspiracy beliefs at all. If some conspiracy theories
can be true, is it not desirable that groups of citizens investigate
them? Should we consider conspiracy theories as a form of harmless
entertainment? Or can conspiracy theories actually be detrimental
to people’s lives and to society at large, and should we be concerned
about those beliefs?
My argument is the latter: We should be concerned, because in
many cases conspiracy theories are irrational, yet they can do real
harm to real people. Let me first establish that I am not saying that
we should follow the leaders of our society – politicians, managers,
powerful media figures – without any criticism or scrutiny.A healthy
critical mind-set implies that we should carefully evaluate the actions
of those in power and express concern if we see bad policy or suspect
malpractice. Admittedly, sometimes there can be a thin line between
healthy skepticism versus destructive conspiracy theorizing. But a
critical mindset does not mean uncritically accepting any bizarre or
far-fetched conspiracy theory. While one can surely find examples
of actual conspiracy formation, the truth is that the vast majority
of conspiracy theories that citizens have endorsed throughout the
ages turned out to be false.5
My concern is particularly targeted at
the many conspiracy theories that defy logic, ignore scientific evidence,
or place blame on innocent people or groups – and in many
ways belief in such conspiracy theories can be damaging.What people
p sychology of conspiracy th eor ies 13
believe drives their behavior; and the more irrational these beliefs are,
the more irrational the behavior it produces.
At present the Internet is filled with misinformation about vaccines,
making many people reluctant to get themselves or their
children vaccinated. A lot of this misinformation is rooted in conspiracy
theories. One pertinent idea that many people within the
anti-vaccine movement have is that vaccines cause autism and that
the pharmaceutical industry conspires to keep the evidence for this
a secret.As a result, many people avoid vaccines, putting themselves,
their children, and others at unnecessary risk for dangerous and
avoidable illnesses. Scientific evidence shows no relationship whatsoever
between vaccines and autism. The discovery of vaccines has
been a major medical breakthrough that protects citizens from lifethreatening
illnesses, and we all have reason to be grateful for this
important scientific accomplishment.Any responsible parents should
make sure that their children get the appropriate vaccines at the right
time. It is belief in conspiracy theories that makes many parents
decide otherwise.
Conspiracy beliefs also influence voting behavior and can therefore
determine the outcomes of elections that shape society. In Chapter 5
I will illuminate that belief in conspiracy theories is associated with
a preference for relatively extreme political currents: radical socialist
parties at the left end of the political spectrum and anti-immigration
parties at the right end of the political spectrum. Donald Trump
became US president in the highly polarized 2016 US presidential
election, and I find it stunning how he managed to gather massive
support – enough for him to win the electoral college – by spreading
irrational conspiracy theories such as that climate change is a
hoax perpetrated by the Chinese or that there is a conspiracy to hide
evidence that Obama was not born in the US. What people believe
determines their behavior; and if a political candidate propagates conspiracy
theories that many people find appealing and plausible, voting
for that candidate becomes a viable option.
Conspiracy theories can sometimes determine the most impactful
choices at the highest political level. In 2002, former President
14 psy chology of conspiracy theories
George W. Bush literally said, “Right now, Iraq is expanding and
improving facilities that were used for the production of biological
weapons.” Another, comparable quote (from 2003) was: “Intelligence
gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that
the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most
lethal weapons ever devised.” Compare these quotes with the five
key ingredients of conspiracy theories:There are patterns (there is a
threat and Iraq is causing it), agency (Iraq is doing this on purpose),
a coalition (the Saddam Hussein administration), hostility (Iraq is
not developing these weapons out of friendship), and continued
secrecy (Iraq is concealing these weapons, and we have in fact never
seen them). The belief that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction
fits any definition of conspiracy theories that I am aware of –
and as history has taught us, it was a false belief. The uncomfortable
conclusion is that the national and international support that Bush
gathered to go to war against Iraq was based on an invalid conspiracy
theory. This is by no means an anomaly: Historians have noted that
most, if not all, wars that were fought in the past few centuries
involved widespread conspiracy theories about the enemy group at
both sides of the conflict.6
Conspiracy theories often are not a harmless pastime. They can be
damaging to people’s health, they can stimulate aggression towards
other people or groups, they can undermine necessary efforts to
solve the real problems that pose a threat to our existence (e.g.,
climate change conspiracy theories), they determine what political
leaders citizens vote for, and so on. There can be beneficial effects
of conspiracy theories as well, sometimes: Conspiracy theories can
improve transparency of leaders and open up a debate within society
about important topics. But most of the effects of conspiracy
theories are harmful: for believers, for their social environment,
and for society. This suggests good reason to study these beliefs:
Understanding the psychological roots of conspiracy theories might
ultimately help in finding ways to make citizens more critically
examine them – which is important for conspiracy theories that are
highly unlikely to be true.
p sychology of conspiracy th eor ies 15
is belief in conspiracy theories
pathological?
Passenger airplane engines often leave a condensation trail. These
cloud-like trails in the sky are caused by water particles in the
exhaust gases, which are quickly transformed into ice crystals due
to low temperatures at high altitudes. But so-called “chemtrail” conspiracy
theories assume an evil scheme behind these condensation
trails.According to chemtrail conspiracy theories, airplane condensation
trails are actually chemical or biological substances that an
evil conspiracy – usually the government – sprays over the population
in order to influence their behavior. For instance, one common
variant of the theory is that these chemicals keep the population
meek and docile, thereby allowing the government to carry out its
evil plans without having to fear for a revolution by a righteously
outraged crowd.
It is safe to say that this conspiracy theory is irrational. If passenger
planes would indeed be equipped with technology to spray chemicals,
airline technicians doing a routine check-up on a plane would
easily discover this. Furthermore, scientific measurements would
quickly detect the presence of strange, unknown, or harmful chemicals
in the atmosphere and would also be able to track down where
these chemicals come from. None of this has happened. Should we
consider belief in this irrational conspiracy theory as pathological?
Certainly it might be tempting to dismiss chemtrail believers as mentally
ill. But the evidence suggests otherwise. Or, let me put it this way:
If belief in such a relatively absurd conspiracy theory indicates pathology,
we would live in a highly pathological society. In a representative
sample conducted in the Netherlands in 2009, 3% of the Dutch
population believed in chemtrails.7
This may not seem like much, but
in a population of almost 17 million people, this boils down to more
than 500,000 people in a small country like the Netherlands alone.
These figures are hard to account for by pathology.
In fact, chemtrail conspiracy theories have been endorsed by wellknown
public figures who show no sign of mental illness.One believer
16 psy chology of conspiracy theories
in chemtrail conspiracy theories was the deceased musical genius
Prince. He believed in a different variant of a chemtrail conspiracy
theory, namely the idea that these chemicals are sprayed specifically
over Black neighborhoods to harm African-American citizens and
cause them to aggress against one another. In an interview withTavis
Smiley in 2009, Prince explained how as a kid growing up in a Black
community he frequently saw these condensation trails in the sky and
then failed to understand why people around him suddenly became
aggressive. Later on, he started seeing a causal connection (patterns)
between the airplane trails and the aggression that emerged. Eventually,
Prince sang about chemtrails in his song “Dreamer”:
Praying that the police sirens pass you by at night?
While the helicopter circles and the theory’s getting deep
Think they’re spraying chemicals over the city while we sleep?
Naturally, the unexpected death of Prince also led to numerous conspiracy
theories. Many of them asserted that Prince was murdered for
telling the truth about chemtrails.
If already a sizable number of people believe a relatively absurd
theory like chemtrails, how common then are more mainstream conspiracy
theories, such those as about the pharmaceutical industry or
the 9/11 strikes? In a nationally representative sample of the US adult
population, citizens were asked to indicate their agreement with the
following statement: “[T]he Food and Drug Administration is deliberately
preventing the public from getting natural cures for cancer and
other diseases because of pressure from drug companies.” This is a
statement that we cannot exclude with the same level of confidence
as chemtrails, but still, it does assume an exceptionally evil mindset
among a large number of medical professionals (including thousands
of independent scientists and medical specialists around the world who
know a few things about the actual effectiveness of these natural cures
and are free to speak up). How many people believed this statement?
As it turned out, 37% agreed to this statement, and yet another 31%
was unsure (“neither agree nor disagree”). Only 32% of the sample
p sychology of conspiracy th eor ies 17
disagreed.8
As to the 9/11 strikes, in 2004 a Zogby poll revealed that
49% of NewYork City residents believed that US government officials
knew that the attacks were coming and deliberately failed to act; and
in a poll in 2006 drawn from the entire US population, 36% believed
that US officials either carried out the attacks or deliberately did nothing
to stop them.9
Conspiracy theories are far too widespread to dismiss belief in
them as pathological. They are a common part of people’s understanding
of the world, just as various other forms of belief are. Many
citizens believe that it is possible to predict the future from the lines in
one’s hand, or that the success of a newly formed romantic relationship
depends on how well the zodiac signs of the two partners match.
While these new age ideas are highly implausible in light of scientific
evidence as well, belief in these ideas also is not considered pathological.
Normal citizens, in all branches of society, endorse a variety
of implausible beliefs, which includes certain conspiracy theories. In
trying to understand the psychology of conspiracy theories, a wrong
point of departure therefore would be clinical psychology (i.e., the
study of mental illness). Instead, the psychology of conspiracy theories
is the domain of social psychology: the study of how ordinary
citizens think, feel, and act in their everyday life.
6
explaining and reducing
conspiracy theories
After an interview about conspiracy theories for the local journal of
my university, the journalist asked if I would mind having my picture
taken while wearing a tinfoil hat. Slightly off-guard, I agreed, and
considered it a good joke at the time (although admittedly I might
have reconsidered had I known that the picture would end up on the
journal’s front cover). But later on I thought more carefully about this
request, and realized that it reflects the stereotypical image that many
people have of conspiracy theorists: socially awkward individuals who
have lost all touch with reality and believe rather outrageous theories
such as that tinfoil hats would protect them from the radiation that
the government uses to manipulate their brains. Some of the theories
discussed in this book indeed are exceptionally bizarre, ranging from
alien lizards to chemtrails to hollow earth theories.
But these bizarre theories notwithstanding, such “tinfoil-hat”
characterizations do not do justice to the societal phenomenon of
conspiracy theories, nor to the people who believe in them. While
the number of citizens who believe conspiracy theories such as alien
lizards or chemtrails is surprisingly high, it still is a small minority
of the total population. More important is how widespread many
“mainstream” conspiracy theories are, such as that the 9/11 terrorist
strikes were an inside job, that climate change is a hoax, that the
82 explaining and red ucing conspiracy theori es
pharmaceutical industry spreads dangerous illnesses, and so on. One
does not need to be socially awkward or out of touch with reality to
believe these mainstream conspiracy theories. On the contrary, large
portions of normal, law-abiding, well-functioning citizens believe
these conspiracy theories. Furthermore, while conspiracy theories
are slightly more common in the lower educated segment of society,
they are by no means exclusive to this segment, as they also emerge
among high-profile managers, actors, scientists, lawyers, and even the
current US president,Trump. Conspiracy theories are a common part
of public discourse, and we do not need to go online to learn about
them, as we can also hear them in bars, at parties, on the streets, in
public transport, at the grocery store, and so on.
Why are conspiracy theories so widespread? In this final and
concluding chapter, I will first summarize the insights of the previous
chapters in an effort to understand conspiracy theories as a
common societal phenomenon. One of the main mistakes that one
can make in explaining conspiracy beliefs is to dismiss them as
pathological. Instead, my conclusion will be that conspiracy theories
emerge from regular and predictable psychological responses
to feelings of uncertainty and fear. After my conclusions about the
psychology of conspiracy theories, I will raise a few suggestions as
to what policy makers can do to reduce conspiracy theories among
the population.
why are conspiracy theories
widespread?
Negative emotions – particularly feelings of fear and uncertainty –
form a key causal factor to explain why conspiracy theories are prevalent
among large segments of the population.These negative emotions
explain why conspiracy theories flourish in the wake of societal crisis
situations.This includes both sudden crises such as terrorist strikes,
natural disasters, or the unexpected death of a public figure and ongoing
crises such as climate change, epidemics, or wars. But also in the
absence of an unambiguous and objectively real crisis event, negative
e xpl aining a nd redu cing conspiracy th eor ies 83
emotions can cause conspiracy theories. Uncertainty about the future,
feelings of alienation, fast-changing power structures in society, rapid
technological advancement, or a deep-rooted distrust towards formal
authorities can all stimulate conspiracy theories. Negative emotions
elicit sense-making processes in which people assume the worst,
increasing people’s suspicious feelings towards powerful, dissimilar,
or distrusted outgroups. These suspicious feelings can be dissected
in a range of more specific psychological processes that characterize
conspiracy theories and that can be summarized in terms of the following
three complementary insights.
insight 1: conspiracy theories are rooted in a
distortion of common and functional cognitive
processes, notably pattern perception and
agency detection
People perceive patterns and detect agency, and these are highly functional
properties of the human mind.Without our ability to perceive
patterns we would be unable to distinguish the good from the bad,the
healthy from the poisonous, or the safe from the dangerous. Pattern
perception is all about the human capacity for associative learning:
Through experience and observational learning we develop causal
theories about the world that often are correct and that enable us to
predict the consequences of our actions – such as that we might break
our leg if we jump off a high roof or that we might regret smoking
a cigarette while filling our car with gasoline. Furthermore, without
the ability to detect agency, people would be socially helpless.Agency
detection enables us to establish whether people performed certain
acts on purpose or not, and it helps us to predict the future behavior
of others by understanding their intentions. By correctly recognizing
agency we can tell when others are flirtatious, aggressive, or just accidentally
looking our way. Accurate agency detection also prevents us
from being terrified each time we see a strange shadow and makes us
able to estimate when a barking dog can be safely hugged or should
be approached with caution.
84 explaining and red ucing conspiracy theori es
Feelings of uncertainty and fear, however, cause an activation –
and frequently, an overactivation – of the human tendencies to
perceive patterns and detect agency. People sometimes perceive patterns
in what actually are coincidences, and feelings of fear and
uncertainty exacerbate such illusory pattern perception. Studies for
instance show that when people lack control, they not only start seeing
conspiracies, but they also start seeing patterns in other stimuli,
such as images in random noise, patterns in stock market information,
and superstition.1
Likewise, people frequently detect agency
where none exists, as indicated by the classic study by Heider and
Simmel in which all participants ascribed agency to simple geometric
figures on a screen. Feelings of fear and uncertainty stimulate the
human tendency to detect agency, which may result in conspiracy
theories, or in other beliefs that assume agency. For instance, under
conditions of fear and uncertainty, people believe more strongly in
personified, agentic gods.2
The cognitive processes underlying conspiracy theories hence are
not pathological; they are regular processes that our minds perform
continuously and that get more strongly activated as a response to
uncertainty and fear. In many situations, the relationship between
uncertainty and activation of these cognitive modules can be functional,
too:When there truly is danger, pattern perception and agency
detection help people to find out the nature of the threat and take
appropriate action. One reason why conspiracy theories are widespread
among regular citizens, therefore, is because they involve normal
and otherwise functional cognitive processes.
insight 2: conspiracy theories are rooted
in perceived intergroup conflict
Humans are social beings. People have a natural tendency to affiliate
with others and have a fundamental need to belong to social groups.
The power of this “need to belong” becomes apparent particularly
when people are excluded by others or by groups that they value – a
romantic breakup, a rejection by people previously considered to be
e xpla ining a nd reducing conspiracy th eor ies 85
friends, or a denial to attend a party that everyone else is invited to.
Such social exclusion ranks among the most aversive experiences in
life, which undermines self-esteem and lowers the feeling that one
belongs, that one is in control, and that life is meaningful. Social
exclusion hurts – in fact, neurological evidence suggests that experiencing
exclusion activates the same brain regions as experiencing
physical pain does.3
Why is social exclusion so painful? Because it is in
our nature to desire having meaningful social relationships with other
people, and social exclusion forms a threat to this desire. Instinctively
we have a need to connect ourselves to valuable others, and to proudly
call the resulting collective “we” and “us”.
But people do not connect themselves indiscriminately to all other
people. When there is a “we”, often there also will be a “they” – a
group of outsiders that is different from “us”. People continuously
categorize their social world into ingroups and outgroups, and their
own ingroups constitute an important part of their identity. As a
consequence, people tend to hold an inflated view of their ingroups
and, for instance, perceive their own groups as morally superior –
implying that different groups are morally inferior. Feelings of
uncertainty and fear increases the human tendency to categorize
people into “us” versus “them” and fuels intergroup conflict.4
Such intergroup conflict can take many forms and may escalate to
different degrees, ranging from an uncomfortable atmosphere at a
soccer match to bloody wars and genocide. But what most instances
of intergroup conflict share is that (1) people connect their own
identity more strongly to the ingroup and (2) people perceive the
outgroup as threatening.
Conspiracy theories are part and parcel of such perceived intergroup
conflict and reflect the mutually suspicious feelings that
emerge on both sides of the conflict. Specifically, research finds that
conspiracy theories are intimately linked with the two elements of
intergroup conflict. First, the more strongly people connect their
own identity to the ingroup, the more concerned they are when a
fellow ingroup member is harmed – and the more tempting it is to
come up with conspiratorial explanations blaming an antagonistic
86 explaining and red ucing conspiracy theori es
outgroup, particularly if the harm occurred under somewhat mysterious
circumstances. Second, the more threatening an outgroup
is considered to be – because the outgroup is more powerful,
more technologically advanced, carries negative stereotypes, or
because the outgroup outnumbers the ingroup – the more likely
people are to believe in theories stipulating that members of this
outgroup are conspiring against the ingroup. Combined, these
insights suggest that conspiracy theories reflect a motivation to
protect a valued ingroup from a potentially dangerous outgroup.
Also, the social processes underlying conspiracy theories therefore
are not pathological: Conspiracy theories result from the basic
human tendency to categorize the world into ingroups and outgroups
and from the corresponding desire to protect one’s ingroup from
powerful outgroups that might be dangerous. The suspicious feelings
that people often have about different groups do not have to
be irrational and actually can have a protective function: Sometimes
outgroups truly can be dangerous or deceptive and plan malevolent
actions against one’s ingroup. But as we have seen throughout this
book, people make many mistakes in this process and frequently see
conspiracies where there is unlikely to be one. In sum, there is an
intergroup dimension to conspiracy theories: Uncertainty and fear
stimulate conspiracy theories, particularly if there is a suspect outgroup
to blame for harm experienced by ingroup members.
insight 3: conspiracy theories are rooted
in strong ideologies
People have a moral perspective on the world, and evaluate the behavior
of themselves and others as morally “right” or “wrong”. These
moral judgments are closely related with people’s norms and values
and form the basis of people’s ideological beliefs of what a good
society should look like. Ideological beliefs are subjective, however,
and people often appreciate that others may hold a different view
on how to solve pressing societal issues.This ideological plurality is
reflected in the many different political opinions that citizens have, the
e xpla ining a nd redu cing conspiracy th eor ies 87
different political parties in parliament, and intense debates between
people about important topics such as climate change, poverty, and
public health. But sometimes, people endorse their ideological beliefs
with such zeal and conviction that alternative views appear unacceptable.
Their ideological beliefs do not seem subjective anymore but
appear to dictate an objective, undeniable truth. Such strong ideological
beliefs lead people to support extremist political movements or
religiously fundamentalist organizations.
Feelings of fear and uncertainty stimulate such rigid, extreme ideological
beliefs.To some extent this assertion may seem paradoxical,
given that one characteristic of ideological extremism is an excessive
conviction in the objective correctness of one’s views. But extremism
tends to increase as a function of societal circumstances that elicit
uncertainty and fear, such as economic recessions, societal turmoil,
or the refugee crisis that the EU has seen recently. One psychological
theory to explain this paradox is that uncertainty and fear lead to a
process termed “compensatory conviction”: People compensate for
their uncertain feelings in one domain with increased certainty in
other domains, most often their ideological beliefs.5
Such compensatory
conviction as an explanation of extreme ideologies is consistent
with macro-political insights on extremism. Political scientist
Manus Midlarksy extensively studied the rise of extremist regimes
around the world in the 20th century and found support for a causal
role of the insecurities that citizens experience through what he calls
“ephemeral gains”.6
Specifically, the rise of extremism in societies is
typically preceded by, first, a short-lived period of prosperity (e.g.,
in terms of territory or economic growth), followed by a period of
critical losses.The societal unrest that these losses generate lead many
citizens to embrace extremist political movements that offer simple
political solutions to reverse the losses and reinstall the country’s previous
glory.
As we have seen in Chapter 5, people who endorse extreme ideologies
are more likely to believe conspiracy theories than people
who endorse moderate ideologies. The evidence for this emerges
from both historical sources (i.e., extremist regimes propagate more
88 explaining and red ucing conspiracy theori es
conspiracy theories than moderate, democratic governments), psychological
research (i.e., people who hold extreme ideological beliefs
are more likely to believe conspiracy theories than people who hold
moderate ideological beliefs), and qualitative research (i.e., underground
extremist groups are highly likely to propagate conspiracy
theories as part of their core ideology). The relationship between
extremism and conspiracy theories is at least partly connected with
the previous insight about intergroup conflict: Extreme ideologies
have a strong tendency to frame the world into a conflict between
“Us” versus “Them” (e.g., “Us” the people versus “Them” the corrupt
elites). But there is also more to it than that. Extreme beliefs
converge with conspiracy theories in offering clarity about the causes
of societal problems. Instead of appreciating the complexity of many
developments in society, extremist ideologies assert that societal problems
occur for simple reasons – for instance, because they are caused
deliberately by corrupt outgroups.
While radical and extremist ideologies have done much harm in
the past century, they are not a result of pathology. Extreme ideologies
can emerge when people have strong concerns about societal injustices
that they perceive and when they endorse their moral beliefs with
strong conviction. Furthermore, it should be noted that strong ideological
convictions have given humanity not only a lot of bad but also
a lot of good. Extremists typically are not stopped by highly agreeable
people who are willing to make compromises on everything, including
basic human rights. Instead, they are stopped by other extremists,
such as activists and organized political movements that draw a firm
line in the sand as to what is and is not morally acceptable. Strong
ideologies have been responsible for terrorism, oppression, and slavery,
but also for important societal change such as increased equality,
democracy, and constitutional protection of basic human rights. It was
not that long ago when favoring equal rights regardless of race was
considered an extremist ideological position (a case in point being the
apartheid system in South Africa, which ended in 1991). For better
or worse, one aspect of strong ideologies is conspiracy theories, most
often about groups holding opposite ideological beliefs.
e xpl aining a nd redu cing conspiracy th eor ies 89
These three complementary insights offer a straightforward explanation
of the prevalence of conspiracy theories. Why are conspiracy
theories widespread among normal citizens? Because conspiracy
theories are rooted in normal psychological processes that are amplified
by negative emotions. Situations that provoke uncertainty and
fear overactivate the otherwise functional cognitive processes of pattern
perception and agency detection; they also stimulate the human
tendency to categorize people into conflicting groups of “us” and
“them”; and they intensify people’s moral judgments, rendering
them more susceptible to extreme ideologies. Furthermore, actual
conspiracies can and do occur, making not all conspiracy theories
irrational to begin with. It can be functional to be suspicious of powerful
outgroups, even when people make a lot of mistakes in the
process. Being susceptible to conspiracy theories may be a natural
aspect of the human condition.
how can we reduce conspiracy theories?
Given the observation that real conspiracies sometimes occur, I feel
compelled to start a section on reducing conspiracy theories with a
clarification: Reducing conspiracy theories is not the same as promoting
gullibility among the public. It is also not an attempt to curb
efforts to reduce corruption, to suppress dissent among citizens, or
to excuse officials who actually commit corruption. Being a good
citizen means being a constructively critical citizen who follows the
actions of decision makers with great interest, and who speaks his or
her mind when seeing bad policy or actual integrity violations. But
as I have made clear throughout this book, many conspiracy theories
are simply irrational, and often harmful as well. It is irrational and
harmful to believe that pharmaceutical companies hide evidence that
vaccines cause autism. It is irrational and harmful to believe that climate
change is a hoax (perpetrated by the Chinese, corrupt scientists,
or others). Members of the public can contribute to good governance
with constructive criticism designed to improve policy, but they also
can undermine good governance with conspiracy theories that have
90 explaining and red ucing conspiracy theori es
no basis in reality and ignore the actual problems that society faces.
Reducing conspiracy theories does not mean ignoring actual corruption;
it means improving people’s capacity to recognize when
conspiratorial allegations are implausible.
A focus on irrational conspiracy theories would suggest that
increasing rationality and offering rational arguments may help
in reducing their appeal. This is indeed the case. Analytic thinking
reduces the tendency to believe conspiracy theories, and, consistently,
efforts to stimulate analytic thinking (e.g., education) are associated
with decreased conspiracy beliefs.7
Furthermore, offering rational
arguments can help the public to make an honest evaluation of the
plausibility or implausibility of a conspiracy theory. Many conspiracy
theories can appear persuasive at first by proffering a set of seemingly
rational arguments, sometimes even grounded in scientific claims.An
example is the 9/11 “melted steel” theory, which is based on the (scientifically
correct) insight that steel does not melt at the temperatures
produced by burning kerosene. Hence, so this theory proposes, it
follows that it is “scientifically impossible” that the fires that erupted
after the crash of the airplanes were the cause of the Twin Towers
collapsing. Instead, the towers must have been brought down by a
different cause – namely, through controlled demolition.
Arguments such as these can make conspiracy theories appealing
to a broad audience:After all, how else should we explain the collapse
of the towers if it cannot have been the kerosene fires? In an effort
to reduce conspiracy theories, it is important to inform the public
of what science actually has to say about these issues. Quite often
conspiracy theories appear plausible at first, only to turn implausible
if one adds only one crucial piece of extra information. Scientifically,
the “melted steel” theory is flawed because it proposes a half-truth:
Steel indeed does not melt at the temperatures produced by burning
kerosene, but this theory fails to add that steel does not have to melt
for the construction to collapse.The steel only needs to weaken up to
a certain point for this to happen – and steel weakens enormously at
the temperatures produced by burning kerosene, making it impossible
to carry the weight of all the floors on top of the construction.
e xpl aining a nd redu cing conspiracy th eor ies 91
The steel construction of the Twin Towers responded exactly how it
would be expected to respond to the plane crashes and the kerosene
fires that erupted on that fateful day: It collapsed.
But besides rationality, I suspect that interventions designed to
reduce conspiracy theories are particularly likely to be effective when
they target the primary cause of conspiracy beliefs: Fear and uncertainty.
If one manages to transform widespread pessimism into optimism,
irrational conspiracy theories will decrease among the public.
As these aversive feelings are closely coupled with feeling out of control,
I propose that likewise making people feel in control reduces
conspiracy theories. Put differently, people need to experience a
sense of empowerment in order to become less suspicious: to feel that
they can influence their own destiny and that they have a say in the
decisions that affect them. Indeed, one study finds that having participants
remember a time in their life when they felt completely in
control reduced conspiracy theories as compared to a neutral baseline
condition.8
The insight that empowering people reduces conspiracy theories
has implications for what leaders can do to make their followers less
suspicious. One basic insight from the leadership literature is that
people can govern with different leadership styles, and these styles
differ in terms of how much they empower their followers by involving
them in decisions. In a study among employees in various organizations
that I carried out together with organizational psychologist
Reinout de Vries, we examined the question how different leadership
styles would predict organizational conspiracy beliefs (that is,
employees’ beliefs about managers conspiring in secret to pursue evil
goals).We specifically looked at four different and frequently occurring
leadership styles.These four styles differed in whether they were
destructive or constructive.9
The destructive leadership styles that we investigated were despotic
leadership and laissez-faire leadership. Despotic leadership
means being an authoritarian leader who is harsh towards followers
and does not easily accept criticism. Laissez-faire leadership essentially
means a lack of leadership, as these leaders do not intervene
92 explaining and red ucing conspiracy theori es
until absolutely necessary.The constructive leadership styles that we
investigated were charismatic leadership and participative leadership.
Charismatic leaders inspire followers to make the organization’s
goals their own goals and instill the feeling among employees that
their work matters. Participative leaders, in turn, include followers
in decision-making processes by asking for their opinions about the
decisions to be made that affect them all.
The results indicated that both the destructive leadership styles
predicted stronger conspiracy beliefs among employees, which was
due to increased feelings of insecurity about their jobs. Despotic
leaders made people feel insecure, as these leaders do not appear
concerned with the well-being or interests of followers. Likewise,
laissez-faire leaders made people feel insecure, as it is difficult for
people to get a sense of how much the leader values them if the leader
is never around. If the goal is to reduce conspiracy theories, being
destructive as a leader – through either active or passive means – is not
the answer. Of the more constructive leadership styles, we found that
charismatic leadership was unrelated to conspiracy beliefs. Charismatic
leadership may influence people in many ways, often positively
(e.g., it increases their motivation to exert effort for the collective),
but it does not influence the probability that they believe conspiracy
theories: People are equally likely to endorse conspiracy theories that
involve charismatic or noncharismatic leaders.
There was one leadership style that did predict reduced belief in
conspiracy theories, however, and that was the participative leadership
style. Leaders who give their followers a voice when important
decisions need to be made and who take the input and opinions of
followers seriously in their management tasks elicited less conspiracy
theories than nonparticipative leaders.The reason is that these leaders
empower their followers: Followers feel that they can be part of
important decision-making processes and that their opinions matter.
In fact, it is not necessary for people to always get their way to experience
these empowering effects of participative leadership. If people
are included in decision-making process, they also have a better sense
of the complexity of the decision to be made and to appreciate that
e xpl aining a nd redu cing conspiracy th eor ies 93
differences in opinion may exist on what the next steps should be.
People can accept an unfavorable decision quite well provided that
they believe the preceding decision-making procedure was fair. For
people to feel empowered they first and foremost need to feel taken
seriously and to feel like a respected member of their community.
This can be achieved by leaders who make genuine efforts to listen
to them and take their interests into account.
The essence of participative leadership is to utilize basic principles
of procedural justice in decision making: to make decisions using
procedures that followers consider to be fair. The effects of procedural
justice on how people respond to decision-making authorities
are well documented, and by and large this area of research finds
that if people consider procedures to be fair they more easily accept
subsequent decisions (even if they disagree with them), experience
more positive emotions, feel more respected by authorities, and trust
authorities more. Procedural justice thus more generally improves
the quality of the relationship between leaders and followers, and
this is largely due to people’s feelings of empowerment, which are
stimulated by authorities who grant them a voice in important decisions,
who take them seriously, and who regard them as a full-fledged
member of their community. As a consequence, procedural justice
may be a powerful tool to reduce conspiracy theories.
Providing people with voice in decision-making processes is only
one possible way to improve the perceived fairness of decision-making
procedures, but there are also other aspects of procedural justice that I
would expect to be conducive in reducing conspiracy theories. Besides
voice, procedural justice criteria that seem relevant in particular for
conspiracy theories are transparency and accountability. Many conspiracy
theories originate from beliefs about what authorities discuss
in secret and the ulterior motives that they have to endorse certain
policies. Increased transparency and accountability are likely to reduce
such suspicious thoughts by providing the public with insights into
the difficult dilemmas that authorities often face and the reasons
why authorities endorsed a certain course of action over alternative
possibilities. In that sense, transparency and accountability also
94 explaining and red ucing conspiracy theori es
empower the public because they enable people to honestly and critically
evaluate policy and to hold leaders accountable for their actions
in a more constructive fashion than through conspiracy theories.
To reduce conspiracy theories,one can hence combine interventions
that promote rationality with interventions that reduce uncertainty and
fear. I would specifically advocate a combination of carefully analyzing
widespread conspiracy theories through rational arguments and a
full assessment of the available evidence, along with procedural justice
interventions that empower people and make them part of important
decision-making processes.While these interventions may fail to persuade
a relatively small group of people that is strongly invested in the
belief that the world is governed by evil conspiracies, they are likely to
persuade a much bigger majority that is susceptible to both conspiratorial
and nonconspiratorial explanations of impactful societal events.
to conclude
Conspiracy theories are not endemic to our modern era – they have
occurred throughout human history. People have always experienced
uncertainty and fear in response to possible danger, and, as a means
of effectively coping with these aversive feelings, people become vigilant
to the possible conspiratorial activities of powerful, and possibly
hostile, other groups. Such vigilance is not pathological: It is a natural
defense mechanism that involves regular psychological processes.
Conspiracy theories therefore are common and will continue to be in
the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the fact that some conspiracy theories
are common does not make them true or rational.At present the
world is facing serious challenges that require responsible solutions
but that are also frequent targets of conspiracy theories – including
populism, climate change, intergroup conflict, public health, poverty,
immigration, unemployment, public governance, and so on. I therefore
hope that the insights about the psychology of conspiracy theories
that are offered here may contribute to a less paranoid society.