Chapter	5
MORALITY:
THE	BAD	NEWS
IF	 YOU	 ARE	 LIKE	 MOST	 PEOPLE	 CONTEMPLATING	 scientism,	 it’s	 the	 persistent
questions	about	morality	and	mortality	that	grip	you,	not	trivial	topics	like	the
nature	 of	 reality,	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 universe,	 or	 the	 inevitability	 of	 natural
selection.
After	 all,	 the	 trouble	 most	 people	 have	 with	 atheism	 is	 that	 if	 they	 really
thought	there	were	no	God,	human	life	would	no	longer	have	any	value,	they
wouldn’t	have	much	reason	to	go	on	living,	and	even	less	reason	to	be	decent
people.	The	most	persistent	questions	atheists	get	asked	by	theists	are	these	two:
In	a	world	you	think	is	devoid	of	purpose,	why	do	you	bother	getting	up	in	the
morning?	And	in	such	a	world,	what	stops	you	from	cutting	all	the	moral	corners
you	can?	This	chapter	and	the	next	deal	with	the	second	question.	The	first	one,
about	the	meaning	of	our	lives,	we’ll	take	up	in	Chapter	9.
Scientism	seems	to	make	the	unavoidable	questions	about	morality	even	more
urgent.	In	a	world	where	physics	fixes	all	the	facts,	it’s	hard	to	see	how	there
could	be	room	for	moral	facts.	In	a	universe	headed	for	its	own	heat	death,	there
is	no	cosmic	value	to	human	life,	your	own	or	anyone	else’s.	Why	bother	to	be
good?
We	need	to	answer	these	questions.	But	we	should	also	worry	about	the	public
relations	nightmare	for	scientism	produced	by	the	answer	theists	try	to	foist	on
scientism.	The	militant	exponents	of	the	higher	superstitions	say	that	scientism
has	no	room	for	morality	and	can’t	even	condemn	the	wrongdoing	of	a	monster
like	 Hitler.	 Religious	 people	 especially	 argue	 that	 we	 cannot	 really	 have	 any
values—things	we	stand	up	for	just	because	they	are	right—and	that	we	are	not
to	be	trusted	to	be	good	when	we	can	get	away	with	something.	They	complain
that	 our	 worldview	 has	 no	 moral	 compass.	 These	 charges	 get	 redoubled	 once
theists	see	how	big	a	role	Darwinian	natural	selection	plays	in	scientism’s	view
of	 reality.	 Many	 of	 the	 most	 vocal	 people	 who	 have	 taken	 sides	 against	 this
scientific	 theory	 (for	 instance,	 the	 founders	 of	 the	 Discovery	 Institute,	 which
advocates	 “intelligent	 design”)	 have	 frankly	 done	 so	 because	 they	 think	 it’s
morally	 dangerous,	 not	 because	 it	 lacks	 evidence.	 If	 Darwinism	 is	 true,	 then
anything	goes!
You	might	think	that	we	have	to	resist	these	conclusions	or	else	we’ll	never	get
people	to	agree	with	us.	Most	people	really	do	accept	morality	as	a	constraint	on
their	 conduct.	 The	 few	 who	 might	 agree	 privately	 with	 Darwinism	 about
morality	won’t	do	so	publicly	because	of	the	deep	unpopularity	of	these	views.
“Anything	goes”	is	nihilism,	and	nihilism	has	a	bad	name.
There	is	good	news	and	bad	news.	The	bad	news	first:	We	need	to	face	the	fact
that	nihilism	is	true.	But	there	is	good	news	here,	too,	and	it’s	probably	good
enough	to	swamp	most	of	the	bad	news	about	nihilism.	The	good	news	is	that
almost	all	of	us,	no	matter	what	our	scientific,	scientistic,	or	theological	beliefs,
are	committed	to	the	same	basic	morality	and	values.	The	difference	between	the
vast	number	of	good	people	and	the	small	number	of	bad	ones	isn’t	a	matter	of
whether	they	believe	in	God	or	not.	It’s	a	difference	no	minister,	imam,	vicar,
priest,	or	rabbi	can	do	much	about.	Certainly,	telling	people	lies	about	what	will
happen	 to	 them	 after	 they	 die	 has	 never	 done	 much	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 of
morally	bad	people.	In	addition	to	not	working,	it	turns	out	not	to	be	necessary
either.	By	the	same	token,	adopting	nihilism	as	it	applies	to	morality	is	not	going
to	have	any	impact	on	anyone’s	conduct.	Including	ours.
There	is	really	one	bit	of	bad	news	that	remains	to	trouble	scientism.	We	have
to	acknowledge	(to	ourselves,	at	least)	that	many	questions	we	want	the	“right”
answers	to	just	don’t	have	any.	These	are	questions	about	the	morality	of	stem-
cell	research	or	abortion	or	affirmative	action	or	gay	marriage	or	our	obligations
to	future	generations.	Many	enlightened	people,	including	many	scientists,	think
that	reasonable	people	can	eventually	find	the	right	answers	to	such	questions.
Alas,	it	will	turn	out	that	all	anyone	can	really	find	are	the	answers	that	they	like.
The	same	goes	for	those	who	disagree	with	them.	Real	moral	disputes	can	be
ended	in	lots	of	ways:	by	voting,	by	decree,	by	fatigue	of	the	disputants,	by	the
force	 of	 example	 that	 changes	 social	 mores.	 But	 they	 can	 never	 really	 be
resolved	by	finding	the	correct	answers.	There	are	none.
WHO	ARE	YOU	CALLING	A	NIHILIST,	ANYWAY?
Nihilism	was	a	word	that	was	thrown	around	a	lot	in	the	nineteenth	century.	It
often	labeled	bomb-throwing	anarchists—think	of	Joseph	Conrad’s	Secret	Agent
and	people	like	Friedrich	Nietzsche	who	rejected	conventional	morality.	Today,
nobody	 uses	 the	 word	 much.	 We	 can	 use	 it	 for	 a	 label,	 though	 we	 need	 to
sharpen	it	up	a	bit,	given	the	misuses	to	which	it	has	also	been	put.
What	exactly	is	nihilism?	It’s	a	good	idea	to	start	with	what	it	isn’t.	Nihilism	is
not	moral	relativism.	It	doesn’t	hold	that	there	are	lots	of	equally	good	or	equally
right	moral	codes,	each	one	appropriate	to	its	particular	ethnic	group,	culture,
time	period,	or	ecological	niche.	Nihilism	doesn’t	agree	with	the	relativist	that
capital	punishment	is	okay	at	some	times	and	places	and	not	okay	at	other	ones.
It’s	 also	 not	 moral	 skepticism,	 forever	 unsure	 about	 which	 among	 competing
moral	 claims	 is	 right.	 Moral	 skepticism	 holds	 that	 capital	 punishment	 is
definitely	right	or	definitely	wrong,	but	alas	we	can’t	ever	know	which.
Nor	does	nihilism	claim	that	everything	is	permitted,	that	nothing	is	forbidden.
Still	less	does	it	hold	that	destructive	behavior	is	obligatory,	that	figurative	or
literal	bomb	throwing	is	good	or	makes	the	world	better	in	any	way	at	all.	These
are	 all	 charges	 made	 against	 nihilism,	 or	 at	 least	 they	 are	 often	 attributed	 to
people	the	establishment	wants	to	call	nihilists.	But	they	don’t	stick	to	nihilism,
or	at	least	not	to	our	brand.
These	charges	fail	because	nihilism	is	deeper	and	more	fundamental	than	any
moral	code.	Nihilism	is	not	in	competition	with	other	codes	of	moral	conduct
about	what	is	morally	permitted,	forbidden,	and	obligatory.	Nor	does	it	disagree
with	other	conceptions	of	value	or	goodness—what	is	good	or	the	best,	what	end
we	ought	to	seek	as	a	matter	of	morality.
Nihilism	 rejects	 the	 distinction	 between	 acts	 that	 are	 morally	 permitted,
morally	 forbidden,	 and	 morally	 required.	 Nihilism	 tells	 us	 not	 that	 we	 can’t
know	 which	 moral	 judgments	 are	 right,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 all	 wrong.	 More
exactly,	 it	 claims,	 they	 are	 all	 based	 on	 false,	 groundless	 presuppositions.
Nihilism	 says	 that	 the	 whole	 idea	 of	 “morally	 permissible”	 is	 untenable
nonsense.	 As	 such,	 it	 can	 hardly	 be	 accused	 of	 holding	 that	 “everything	 is
morally	permissible.”	That,	too,	is	untenable	nonsense.
Moreover,	nihilism	denies	that	there	is	really	any	such	thing	as	intrinsic	moral
value.	People	think	that	there	are	things	that	are	instrinsically	valuable,	not	just
as	 a	 means	 to	 something	 else:	 human	 life	 or	 the	 ecology	 of	 the	 planet	 or	 the
master	race	or	elevated	states	of	consciousness,	for	example.	But	nothing	can
have	 that	 sort	 of	 intrinsic	 value—the	 very	 kind	 of	 value	 morality	 requires.
Nihilism	 denies	 that	 there	 is	 anything	 at	 all	 that	 is	 good	 in	 itself	 or,	 for	 that
matter,	 bad	 in	 itself.	 Therefore,	 nihilism	 can’t	 be	 accused	 of	 advocating	 the
moral	goodness	of,	say,	political	violence	or	anything	else.
Even	correctly	understood,	there	seem	to	be	serious	reasons	to	abstain	from
nihilism	if	we	can.	Here	are	three:
First,	 nihilism	 can’t	 condemn	 Hitler,	 Stalin,	 Mao,	 Pol	 Pot,	 or	 those	 who
fomented	the	Armenian	genocide	or	the	Rwandan	one.	If	there	is	no	such	thing
as	“morally	forbidden,”	then	what	Mohamed	Atta	did	on	September	11,	2001,
was	not	morally	forbidden.	Of	course,	it	was	not	permitted	either.	But	still,	don’t
we	want	to	have	grounds	to	condemn	these	monsters?	Nihilism	seems	to	cut	that
ground	out	from	under	us.
Second,	if	we	admit	to	being	nihilists,	then	people	won’t	trust	us.	We	won’t	be
left	alone	when	there	is	loose	change	around.	We	won’t	be	relied	on	to	be	sure
small	children	stay	out	of	trouble.
Third,	and	worst	of	all,	if	nihilism	gets	any	traction,	society	will	be	destroyed.
We	will	find	ourselves	back	in	Thomas	Hobbes’s	famous	state	of	nature,	where
“the	 life	 of	 man	 is	 solitary,	 mean,	 nasty,	 brutish	 and	 short.”	 Surely,	 we	 don’t
want	to	be	nihilists	if	we	can	possibly	avoid	it.	(Or	at	least,	we	don’t	want	the
other	people	around	us	to	be	nihilists.)
Scientism	can’t	avoid	nihilism.	We	need	to	make	the	best	of	it.	For	our	own
self-respect,	we	need	to	show	that	nihilism	doesn’t	have	the	three	problems	just
mentioned—no	grounds	to	condemn	Hitler,	lots	of	reasons	for	other	people	to
distrust	us,	and	even	reasons	why	no	one	should	trust	anyone	else.	We	need	to	be
convinced	 that	 these	 unacceptable	 outcomes	 are	 not	 ones	 that	 atheism	 and
scientism	are	committed	to.	Such	outcomes	would	be	more	than	merely	a	public
relations	 nightmare	 for	 scientism.	 They	 might	 prevent	 us	 from	 swallowing
nihilism	ourselves,	and	that	would	start	unraveling	scientism.
To	 avoid	 these	 outcomes,	 people	 have	 been	 searching	 for	 scientifically
respectable	justification	of	morality	for	least	a	century	and	a	half.	The	trouble	is
that	over	the	same	150	years	or	so,	the	reasons	for	nihilism	have	continued	to
mount.	 Both	 the	 failure	 to	 find	 an	 ethics	 that	 everyone	 can	 agree	 on	 and	the
scientific	explanation	of	the	origin	and	persistence	of	moral	norms	have	made
nihilism	more	and	more	plausible	while	remaining	just	as	unappetizing.
PLATO’S	PROBLEM	FOR	SERMONIZING	ABOUT	MORALITY
The	 problem	 of	 justifying	 morality—any	 morality—is	 a	 serious	 one	 for
everybody—theist,	 atheist,	 agnostic.	 The	 difficulty	 of	 grounding	 ethics	 is	 one
Plato	wrote	about	in	his	very	first	Socratic	dialogue—the	Euthyphro.	Ever	since,
it’s	been	a	thorn	in	the	side	of	Sunday	sermon	writers.
In	the	Euthyphro,	 Plato	 invites	 us	 to	 identify	 our	 favorite	 moral	 norm—say,
“Thou	 shalt	 not	 commit	 abortion”	 or	 “Homosexual	 acts	 between	 consenting
adults	 are	 permissible.”	 Assume	 that	 this	 norm—either	 one—is	 approved,
sanctioned,	even	chosen	by	God.
Now,	Plato	says,	if	this	norm	is	both	the	morally	correct	one	and	also	the	one
chosen	for	us	by	God,	ask	yourself	the	following	question:	Is	it	correct	because	it
is	chosen	by	God,	or	is	it	chosen	by	God	because	it	is	correct?	It	has	to	be	one	or
the	other	if	religion	and	morality	 have	 anything	to	 do	with	 each	 other.	 It	just
can’t	be	a	coincidence	that	the	norm	is	both	the	right	one	and	chosen	for	us	by
God.	Theism	rules	out	coincidences	like	this.
Consider	the	first	alternative:	what	makes	the	norm	correct	is	that	God	chose	it.
If	 he	 had	 chosen	 the	 opposite	 one	 (a	 pro-choice	 or	 anti-gay	 norm),	 then	 the
opposite	one	would	be	the	morally	right	one.
Now	consider	the	second	alternative:	God	chose	the	pro-life	or	pro-gay	norm,
or	whatever	your	favorite	moral	norm	is,	because	it	is	the	right	one,	and	he	was
smart	enough	to	discern	that	fact	about	it.
Pretty	 much	 everybody,	 including	 the	 dyed-in-the-wool	 theists	 among	 us,
prefers	the	second	alternative.	No	one	wants	to	admit	that	our	most	cherished
moral	 norms	 are	 the	 right,	 correct,	 true	 morality	 solely	 because	 they	 were
dictated	 to	 us	 by	 God,	 even	 a	 benevolent,	 omniscient	 God.	 After	 all,	 he	 is
omniscient,	so	he	knows	which	norm	is	right;	and	he	is	benevolent,	so	he	will
choose	 the	 norm	 he	 knows	 to	 be	 morally	 best	 for	 us.	 If	 it’s	 just	 a	 matter	 of
whatever	he	says	goes,	then	he	could	have	made	the	opposite	norm	the	right	one
just	by	choosing	it.	That	can’t	be	right.
It	must	be	that	the	norms	God	imposes	on	us	were	ones	he	chose	because	they
are	the	right	ones.	Whatever	it	is	that	makes	them	right,	it’s	some	fact	about	the
norms,	 not	 some	 fact	 about	 God.	 But	 what	 is	 that	 fact	 about	 the	 right	 moral
norms	that	makes	them	right?	All	we	can	tell	so	far	is	that	it	was	some	fact	about
them	that	God	in	his	omniscient	wisdom	was	able	to	see.
Atheists	 and	 agnostics,	 too,	 will	 make	 common	 cause	 with	 the	 theists	 in
seeking	 this	 right-making	 property	 of	 any	 moral	 norm	 that	 we	 all	 share	 in
common	(and	there	are	many	such	norms).	Plato’s	argument	should	convince	us
all	that	finding	this	right-making	property	of	the	moral	norms	we	accept	is	an
urgent	task.
There	is	one	way	for	the	theist	to	avoid	this	task,	but	it’s	not	one	people	will
have	much	intellectual	respect	for.	The	theist	can	always	say	that	identifying	the
right-making	property	of	the	morally	right	norms	is	a	task	beyond	our	powers.
They	could	claim	that	it	is	beyond	the	powers	of	any	being	less	omniscient	than
God.	So,	we	had	better	just	take	his	word	for	what’s	morally	right.	We	ought
neither	question	it	nor	try	to	figure	out	what	the	right-making	fact	about	the	right
morality	is,	the	one	that	God	can	see	but	we	can’t.	This	is	a	blatant	dodge	that	all
but	the	least	inquisitive	theists	will	reject.	After	all,	morality	isn’t	rocket	science.
Why	are	its	grounds	beyond	the	ken	of	mortal	humans?
What	 does	 Plato’s	 problem	 for	 sermonizing	 about	 morality	 have	 to	 do	 with
scientism,	or	nihilism	for	that	matter?	Two	things.	First,	Plato’s	argument	shows
that	our	moral	norms	need	to	be	justified	and	that	religion	is	not	up	to	the	job.
Second,	it	turns	out	that	scientism	faces	a	coincidence	problem	just	like	the	one
troubling	the	theists.	No	theist	can	accept	that	it’s	just	a	coincidence	that	a	moral
norm	is	the	right	one	and	that	God	just	happened	to	choose	it	for	us.	One	of	these
two	things	must	explain	the	other.	Similarly,	scientism	is	going	to	be	faced	with
its	own	intolerable	coincidence.	But	unlike	theism,	it’s	going	to	have	a	solution:
nihilism.
Nihilism	maintains	that	there	isn’t	anything	that	makes	our	moral	norms	the
right	ones	or	anyone	else’s	norms	the	right	ones	either.	It	avoids	the	challenge
Plato	set	for	anyone	who	wants	to	reveal	morality’s	rightness.	Nihilism	instead
recognizes	that	Plato’s	challenge	can’t	be	met.	But	the	nihilist	doesn’t	need	to
deny	that	almost	all	people	share	the	same	core	moral	norms,	theists	and	nihilists
included.	 Ironically,	 almost	 everyone’s	 sharing	 a	 core	 morality	 is	 just	 what
nihilism	 needs	 to	 show	 that	 no	 morality	 can	 be	 justified.	 What’s	 more,	 the
reasons	 that	 make	 nihilism	 scientifically	 and	 scientistically	 unavoidable	 also
reveal	that	it	doesn’t	have	the	disturbing	features	scientistic	people	worry	about.
Public	relations	problem	solved.
TWO	EASY	STEPS	TO	NIHILISM
We	can	establish	the	truth	of	nihilism	by	substantiating	a	couple	of	premises:
•	First	premise:	All	cultures,	and	almost	everyone	in	them,	endorse	most	of
the	same	core	moral	principles	as	binding	on	everyone.
•	Second	premise:	The	core	moral	principles	have	significant	consequences
for	humans’	biological	fitness—for	our	survival	and	reproduction.
Justifying	the	first	premise	is	easier	than	it	looks.	It	looks	hard	because	few
moral	 norms	 seem	 universal;	 most	 disagree	 somewhere	 or	 other.	 Some	 moral
values	 seem	 incommensurable	 with	 each	 other—we	 don’t	 even	 know	 how	 to
compare	 them,	 let	 alone	 reconcile	 them.	 Moral	 norms	 are	 accepted	 in	 some
localities	but	not	in	others:	some	cultures	permit	plural	marriage,	while	others
prohibit	it;	some	require	revenge	taking	and	honor	killing,	while	others	forbid
these	acts.	Adultery,	divorce,	abortion,	and	homosexual	relations	go	in	and	out	of
moral	fashion.	At	first	glance,	it	looks	like	there	is	a	lot	of	moral	disagreement.
It’s	 enough	 to	 make	 some	 anthropologists	 into	 moral	 relativists	 (moral	 codes
bind	only	within	their	cultures).	It	makes	some	philosophers	into	moral	skeptics
(there	may	be	an	absolute	moral	truth,	but	we	can’t	be	certain	or	don’t	know
what	it	is).
On	the	other	hand,	in	human	culture	there	has	long	been	a	sustained	effort	to
identify	a	core	morality—one	shared	by	the	major	religions,	one	that	cuts	across
political	differences	and	diverse	legal	codes.	It	is	a	core	morality	that	has	held
constant	or	been	refined	over	historical	epochs.	Soon	after	the	founding	of	the
United	Nations	in	the	late	1940s,	there	was	enough	consensus	on	core	morality
that	it	was	enshrined	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights.	Roughly	the
same	core	morality	has	been	written	into	many	more	international	conventions
on	rights	and	liberties	that	have	been	adopted	by	varying	coalitions	of	nations
ever	since.	Even	countries	that	decline	to	be	parties	to	these	treaties	have	at	least
paid	 lip	 service	 to	 most	 of	 the	 norms	 they	 enshrine.	 These	 agreements	 don’t
prove	that	there	is	a	core	morality,	but	they’re	good	evidence	that	most	people
think	there	is.
Thus,	there	is	long-standing	evidence	for	the	existence	of	core	morality	in	the
overlap	of	ethical	agreement	by	the	major	religions	and	in	the	lip	service	paid	by
international	agreements.	But	wait,	there’s	more.	Neuroscience,	in	particular	the
techniques	of	fMRI	(functioning	magnetic	resonance	imaging	of	brain	activity),
increasingly	shows	that	people’s	brains	react	the	same	way	to	ethical	problems
across	 cultures.	 This	 is	 just	 what	 the	 existence	 of	 core	 morality	 leads	 us	 to
expect.	If	you	are	really	worried	about	whether	there	is	a	core	morality,	you	can
jump	to	the	next	chapter,	in	which	its	existence	is	established	beyond	scientistic
(if	not	scientific)	doubt,	and	then	come	back.
At	 the	 base	 of	 the	 diverse	 moral	 codes	 out	 there	 in	 the	 world,	 there	 are
fundamental	principles	endorsed	in	all	cultures	at	all	times.	The	difficulty	lies	in
actually	 identifying	 the	 norms	 that	 compose	 this	 core	 morality.	 What	 is	 the
difficulty?	These	almost	universally	agreed-on	norms	are	so	obvious	that	they
are	easy	to	miss	when	we	set	about	trying	to	identify	them.	Instead	we	think	of
interesting	norms	such	as	“Thou	shalt	not	kill”	and	immediately	realize	that	each
of	us	buys	into	a	slightly	different	and	highly	qualified	version	of	the	norm.	For
some	 of	 us,	 “Thou	 shalt	 not	 kill”	 excludes	 and	 excuses	 self-defense,	 military
activity,	 perhaps	 capital	 punishment,	 euthanasia,	 other	 cases	 of	 mercy	 killing,
and	killing	other	great	apes,	primates,	mammals,	and	so	forth.	When	we	consider
how	pacifists,	opponents	of	capital	punishment,	proponents	of	euthanasia,	and	so
many	 others	 disagree	 on	 some	 or	 all	 of	 these	 qualifications,	 it’s	 tempting	 to
conclude	that	there	is	no	core	morality	we	all	share,	or	else	it’s	too	thin	to	have
any	impact	on	conduct.
A	more	accurate	way	to	think	about	core	morality	begins	by	recognizing	those
norms	that	no	one	has	ever	bothered	to	formulate	because	they	never	come	into
dispute.	 They	 might	 even	 be	 difficult	 to	 formulate	 if	 they	 cover	 every
contingency	and	exclude	all	exceptions.	If	we	set	out	to	express	them,	we	might
start	out	with	candidates	like	these:
Don’t	cause	gratuitous	pain	to	a	newborn	baby,	especially	your	own.
Protect	your	children.
If	someone	does	something	nice	to	you,	then,	other	things	being	equal,	you
should	return	the	favor	if	you	can.
Other	things	being	equal,	people	should	be	treated	the	same	way.
On	the	whole,	people’s	being	better	off	is	morally	preferable	to	their	being
worse	off.
Beyond	a	certain	point,	self-interest	becomes	selfishness.
If	you	earn	something,	you	have	a	right	to	it.
It’s	 permissible	 to	 restrict	 complete	 strangers’	 access	 to	 your	 personal
possessions.
It’s	okay	to	punish	people	who	intentionally	do	wrong.
It’s	wrong	to	punish	the	innocent.
Some	of	these	norms	are	so	obvious	that	we	are	inclined	to	say	that	they	are
indisputably	true	because	of	the	meaning	of	the	words	in	them:	having	a	right	to
something	 is	 part	 of	 what	 we	 mean	 by	 the	 words	 “earn	 it.”	 Other	 norms	 are
vague	 and	 hard	 to	 apply:	 when	 exactly	 are	 “other	 things	 equal”?	 And	 some
norms	could	easily	conflict	with	each	other	when	applied:	would	you	really	treat
your	 children	 and	 other	 people	 the	 same?	 This	 shows	 how	 difficult	 it	 is	 to
actually	 tease	 out	 the	 norms	 we	 live	 by,	 to	 list	 all	 their	 explicit	 exceptions,
establish	 their	 priorities	 over	 other	 norms,	 and	 show	 how	 they	 are	 to	 be
reconciled	when	they	come	into	conflict.	Almost	certainly,	the	actual	norms	we
live	by	but	can’t	state	will	be	somewhat	vague,	will	have	a	list	of	exceptions	we
can’t	complete,	and	will	conflict	with	other	equally	important	norms.	But	most
of	the	time,	none	of	these	problems	arise	to	bedevil	the	application	of	the	norms
of	core	morality.
The	next	step	in	understanding	moral	disagreement	involves	recognizing	that
such	disagreements	almost	always	result	from	the	combination	of	core	morality
with	different	factual	beliefs.	When	you	combine	the	uncontroversial	norms	of
the	moral	core	with	some	of	the	wild	and	crazy	beliefs	people	have	about	nature,
human	nature,	and	especially	the	supernatural,	you	get	the	ethical	disagreements
that	are	so	familiar	to	cultural	anthropology.	For	example,	Europeans	may	deem
female	genital	cutting	and/or	infibulation	to	be	mutilation	and	a	violation	of	the
core	moral	principle	that	forbids	torturing	infants	for	no	reason	at	all.	West	and
East	 African	 Muslims	 and	 Animists	 will	 reject	 the	 condemnation,	 even	 while
embracing	the	same	core	morality.	They	hold	that	doing	these	things	is	essential
to	young	girls’	welfare.	In	their	local	environments,	some	genital	cutting	makes
them	attractive	to	potential	future	husbands;	some	sewing	up	protects	them	from
rape.	The	disagreement	here	turns	on	a	disagreement	about	factual	beliefs,	not
core	morality.
Even	Nazis	thought	themselves	to	share	core	morality	with	others,	including
the	millions	they	annihilated,	as	the	historian	Claudia	Koontz	documents	in	The
Nazi	Conscience.	Outside	of	the	psychopaths	among	them,	Nazis	were	right	to
think	that	to	a	large	extent	they	shared	our	core	morality.	It	was	their	wildly	false
factual	beliefs	about	Jews,	Roma,	gays,	and	Communist	Commissars,	combined
with	a	moral	core	they	shared	with	others,	that	led	to	the	moral	catastrophe	of	the
Third	Reich.	You	may	be	tempted	to	reply	that	it	couldn’t	be	that	the	Nazis	just
got	 their	 facts	 wrong,	 since	 there	 was	 no	 way	 to	 convince	 them	 they	 were
mistaken.	 You	 can’t	 reason	 with	 such	 people;	 you	 just	 have	 to	 confine	 them.
True	enough.	But	that	shows	how	difficult	it	is	to	pry	apart	factual	beliefs	from
moral	 norms,	 values,	 and	 the	 emotions	 that	 get	 harnessed	 to	 them.	 It’s	 what
makes	for	the	appearance	of	incommensurability	of	values	we	so	often	come	up
against.
In	any	case,	the	argument	that	we’re	developing	here	doesn’t	require	that	every
part	of	the	core	morality	of	every	culture,	no	matter	how	different	the	cultures,
be	 exactly	 the	 same.	 What	 we	 really	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a
substantial	overlap	between	the	moral	cores	of	all	human	cultures.	The	principles
in	the	overlapping	core	are	among	the	most	important	ones	for	regulating	human
conduct.	They	are	the	ones	we’d	“go	to	the	mat	for,”	the	ones	that	are	justified	if
any	moral	norms	are	justified.	But	as	noted,	they	are	also	the	ones	that	occasion
the	 least	 argument,	 even	 across	 different	 cultures,	 and	 so	 hardly	 ever	 get
explicitly	articulated.
Along	 with	 everyone	 else,	 the	 most	 scientistic	 among	 us	 accept	 these	 core
principles	as	binding.	Such	norms	reveal	their	force	on	us	by	making	our	widely
agreed-on	moral	judgments	somehow	feel	correct,	right,	true,	and	enforceable	on
everyone	else.	And	when	we	are	completely	honest	with	ourselves	and	others,
we	really	do	sincerely	endorse	some	moral	rules	we	can’t	fully	state	as	being
right,	correct,	true,	or	binding	on	everyone.	Scientism	is	not	going	to	require	that
we	give	up	that	feeling	or	withdraw	the	sincerity	of	the	endorsement.	In	a	fight
with	these	emotionally	driven	commitments,	they’ll	win	every	time,	for	reasons
that	 will	 become	 clear	 in	 Chapter	 6.	 But	 scientism	 does	 recognize	 that
emotionally	driven	commitment	is	no	sign	of	the	correctness,	rightness,	or	truth
of	what	we	are	emotionally	committed	to.	As	we’ll	see,	add	that	recognition	to
science’s	 explanation	 of	 where	 the	 shared	 norms	 come	 from,	 and	 you	 get
nihilism.
The	 second	 premise	 we	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 is	 that	 core	 morality,	 the
fundamental	 moral	 norms	 we	agree	 on,	 has	 serious	 consequences	 for	 survival
and	reproduction.	This	will	be	especially	true	when	those	norms	get	harnessed
together	 with	 local	 beliefs	 under	 local	 conditions.	 The	 connection	 between
morality	and	sex	is	so	strong,	in	fact,	that	each	may	be	the	first	word	you	think
of	when	you	hear	the	other.	The	connection	makes	for	a	lot	of	good	jokes.	(Did
you	 hear	 the	 one	 about	 Moses	 descending	 from	 Sinai	 with	 the	 two	 tablets
bearing	the	ten	commandments?	“I	have	good	news	and	I	have	bad	news,”	he
says.	 The	 children	 of	 Israel	 ask,	 “What’s	 the	 good	 news?”	 Moses	 replies,	 “I
argued	 him	 down	 from	 38.”	 They	 ask,	 “And	 the	 bad	 news?”	 Moses	 replies,
“Adultery	is	still	one	of	them.”)
The	 idea	 that	 the	 moral	 core	 has	 huge	 consequences	 for	 survival	 and
reproduction	 should	 not	 be	 controversial.	 Any	 long-standing	 norm	 (and	 the
behavior	it	mandates)	must	have	been	heavily	influenced	by	natural	selection.
This	 will	 be	 true	 whether	 the	 behavior	 or	 its	 guiding	 norm	 is	 genetically
inherited,	 like	 caring	 for	 your	 offspring,	 or	 culturally	 inherited,	 like	 marriage
rules.	 That	 means	that	 the	 moral	 codes	 people	endorse	today	 almost	 certainly
must	 have	 been	 selected	 for	 in	 a	 long	 course	 of	 blind	 variation	 and
environmental	 filtration.	 Because	 they	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 survival	 and
reproduction,	our	core	moral	norms	must	have	been	passed	through	a	selective
process	that	filtered	out	many	competing	variations	over	the	course	of	a	history
that	goes	back	beyond	Homo	erectus	to	our	mammalian	ancestors.
Natural	 selection	 can’t	 have	 been	 neutral	 on	 the	 core	 moralities	 of	 evolving
human	 lineages.	 Whether	 biological	 or	 cultural,	 natural	 selection	 was
relentlessly	 moving	 through	 the	 design	 space	 of	 alternative	 ways	 of	 treating
other	 people,	 animals,	 and	 the	 human	 environment.	 What	 was	 that	 process
selecting	 for?	 As	 with	 selection	 for	 everything	 else,	 the	 environment	 was
filtering	 out	 variations	 in	 core	 morality	 that	 did	 not	 enhance	 hominin
reproductive	success	well	enough	to	survive	as	parts	of	core	morality.	(You’ll
find	 much	 more	 on	 how	 Darwinian	 processes	 operate	 in	 cultural	 evolution	 in
Chapter	11.)
There	is	good	reason	to	think	that	there	is	a	moral	core	that	is	almost	universal
to	 almost	 all	 humans.	 Among	 competing	 core	 moralities,	 it	 was	 the	 one	 that
somehow	came	closest	to	maximizing	the	average	fitness	of	our	ancestors	over	a
long	 enough	 period	 that	 it	 became	 almost	 universal.	 For	 all	 we	 know,	 the
environment	to	which	our	core	morality	constitutes	an	adaptation	is	still	with	us.
Let’s	hope	so,	at	any	rate,	since	core	morality	is	almost	surely	locked	in	by	now.
If	you	are	in	any	doubt	about	this	point,	you	are	in	good	company.	Or	rather,
you	 were	 until	 the	 last	 50	 years	 of	 research	 in	 behavioral	 biology,	 cognitive
social	psychology,	evolutionary	game	theory,	and	paleoanthropology.	Until	the
recent	 past,	 no	 one	 thought	 that	 core	 morality	 was	 selected	 for.	 Now	 science
knows	better.	If	you	are	in	doubt	about	this	matter,	the	next	chapter	shows	how
natural	selection	made	core	morality	inevitable.	It’s	the	key	to	taking	the	sting
out	of	the	unavoidable	nihilism	that	this	chapter	is	about	to	establish.
IF	CORE	MORALITY	IS	AN	ADAPTATION,
IT	MUST	BE	GOOD	FOR	US.
SO	WHY	NIHILISM?
Grant	the	two	premises—moral	norms	make	a	difference	to	fitness	and	there	is	a
universal	core	morality.	Then	the	road	to	nihilism	becomes	a	one-way	street	for
science	and	for	scientism.
The	core	morality	almost	everyone	shares	is	the	correct	one,	right?	This	core
morality	was	selected	for,	right?	Question:	Is	the	correctness	of	core	morality
and	 its	 fitness	 a	 coincidence?	 Impossible.	 A	 million	 years	 or	 more	 of	 natural
selection	ends	up	giving	us	all	roughly	the	same	core	morality,	and	it’s	just	an
accident	 that	 it	 gave	 us	 the	 right	 one,	 too?	 Can’t	 be.	 That’s	 too	 much	 of	 a
coincidence.
Remember	 Plato’s	 problem.	 God	 gave	 us	 core	 morality,	 and	 he	 gave	 us	 the
right	core	morality.	Coincidence?	No.	There	are	only	two	options	for	the	theist.
Either	what	makes	core	morality	right	is	just	the	fact	that	God	gave	it	to	us,	or
God	gave	it	to	us	because	it	is	the	right	one.
Of	course,	there	is	no	God,	but	science	faces	a	very	similar	problem.	Natural
selection	gave	us	morality,	and	it	gave	us	the	right	morality,	it	seems.	So,	how
did	that	happen?	The	question	can’t	be	avoided.	We	can’t	take	seriously	the	idea
that	 core	 morality	 is	 both	 correct	 and	 fitness	 maximizing	 and	 then	 claim	 that
these	two	facts	have	nothing	to	do	with	each	other.	That’s	about	as	plausible	as
the	idea	that	sex	is	fun	and	sex	results	in	reproduction,	but	these	two	facts	have
nothing	to	do	with	each	other.
Is	 natural	 selection	 so	 smart	 that	 it	 was	 able	 to	 filter	 out	 all	 the	 wrong,
incorrect,	false	core	moralities	and	end	up	with	the	only	one	that	just	happens	to
be	true?	Or	is	it	the	other	way	around:	Natural	selection	filtered	out	all	but	one
core	morality,	and	winning	the	race	is	what	made	the	last	surviving	core	morality
the	right,	correct,	true	one.
Which	is	it?
It	can’t	be	either	one.	The	only	way	out	of	the	puzzle	is	nihilism.	Our	core
morality	isn’t	true,	right,	correct,	and	neither	is	any	other.	Nature	just	seduced	us
into	thinking	it’s	right.	It	did	that	because	that	made	core	morality	work	better;
our	believing	in	its	truth	increases	our	individual	genetic	fitness.
Consider	the	second	alternative	first:	Natural	selection	filtered	out	all	the	other
variant	core	moralities,	leaving	just	one	core	morality,	ours.	It	won	the	race,	and
that’s	what	made	the	last	surviving	core	morality,	our	core	morality,	the	right,
correct,	 true	 one.	 This	 makes	 the	 rightness,	 correctness,	 truth	 of	 our	 core
morality	a	result	of	its	evolutionary	fitness.	But	how	could	this	possibly	be	the
answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	 what	 makes	 our	 core	 morality	 right?	 There	 doesn’t
seem	 to	 be	 anything	 in	 itself	 morally	 right	 about	 having	 lots	 of	 kids,	 or
grandchildren,	 or	 great	 grandchildren,	 or	 even	 doing	 things	 that	 make	 having
kids	more	likely.	But	this	is	all	the	evolutionary	fitness	of	anything	comes	to.
The	 first	 alternative	 is	 the	 explanation	 for	 the	 correlation	 that	 we’d	 like	 to
accept:	 core	 morality	 is	 the	 right,	 binding,	 correct,	 true	 one	 and	 that	 is	 why
humans	have	been	selected	for	detecting	that	it	is	the	right	core	morality.	But
natural	 selection	 couldn’t	 have	 been	 discerning	 enough	 to	 pick	 out	 the	 core
morality	that	was	independently	the	right,	true,	or	correct	one.	There	are	several
reasons	it	had	little	chance	of	doing	so.
First,	there	is	lots	of	evidence	that	natural	selection	is	not	very	good	at	picking
out	true	beliefs,	especially	scientific	ones.	Natural	selection	shaped	our	brain	to
seek	stories	with	plots.	The	result	was,	as	we	have	been	arguing	since	Chapter	1,
the	greatest	impediment	to	finding	the	truth	about	reality.	The	difficulty	that	even
atheists	 have	 understanding	 and	 accepting	 the	 right	 answers	 to	 the	 persistent
questions	 shows	 how	 pervasively	 natural	 selection	 has	 obstructed	 true	 beliefs
about	reality.
Mother	 Nature’s	 methods	 of	 foisting	 false	 beliefs	 on	 us	 were	 so	 subtle	 they
have	only	recently	begun	to	be	detected.	By	the	sixteenth	century,	some	people
were	beginning	to	think	about	reality	the	right	 way.	 But	 natural	selection	 had
long	before	structured	the	brain	to	make	science	difficult.	As	we’ll	see	in	later
chapters,	 the	 brain	 was	 selected	 for	 taking	 all	 sorts	 of	 shortcuts	 in	 reasoning.
That	was	adaptive	in	a	hostile	world,	but	it	makes	valid	logical	reasoning,	and
especially	 statistical	 inference,	 difficult.	 Without	 the	 ability	 to	 reason	 from
evidence,	getting	things	right	is	a	matter	of	good	luck	at	best.
Second,	there	is	strong	evidence	that	natural	selection	produces	lots	of	false	but
useful	beliefs.	Just	think	about	religion,	any	religion.	Every	one	of	them	is	chock
full	of	false	beliefs.	We	won’t	shake	any	of	them.	There	are	so	many,	they	are	so
long-lasting,	 that	 false	 religious	 beliefs	 must	 have	 conferred	 lots	 of	 adaptive
advantages	on	believers.	For	example,	it’s	widely	thought	that	religious	beliefs
are	among	the	devices	that	enforce	niceness	within	social	groups.	The	hypothesis
that	organized	religion	has	adaptive	functions	for	people	and	groups	is	backed	up
by	a	fair	amount	of	evolutionary	human	biology.	It	couldn’t	have	done	so	except
through	 the	 false	 beliefs	 it	 inculcates.	 Of	 course,	 all	 the	 religious	 beliefs	 that
natural	 selection	 foisted	 on	 people	 made	 acquiring	 scientific	 truths	 about	 the
world	much	more	difficult.
There	is	a	third	reason	to	doubt	that	natural	selection	arranged	for	us	to	acquire
the	true	morality.	It	is	really	good	at	producing	and	enforcing	norms	that	you	and
I	 think	 are	 immoral.	 It	 often	 selects	 for	 norms	 that	 we	 believe	 to	 be	 morally
wrong,	incorrect,	and	false.	In	fact,	a	good	part	of	the	arguments	against	many	of
these	“immoral”	beliefs	rests	on	the	fact	that	natural	selection	can	explain	why
people	still	mistakenly	hold	them.
There	are	lots	of	moral	values	and	ethical	norms	that	enlightened	people	reject
but	which	Mother	Nature	has	strongly	selected	for.	Racism	and	xenophobia	are
optimally	 adapted	 to	 maximize	 the	 representation	 of	 your	 genes	 in	 the	 next
generation,	 instead	 of	 some	 stranger’s	 genes.	 Consider	 the	 almost	 universal
patriarchal	norms	of	female	subordination.	They	are	all	the	result	of	Darwinian
processes.	We	understand	why	natural	selection	makes	the	males	of	almost	any
mammalian	 species	 bigger	 than	 the	 females:	 male	 competition	 for	 access	 to
females	selects	for	the	biggest,	strongest	males	and	so	makes	males	on	average
bigger	 than	 females.	 The	 greater	 the	 male-male	 competition,	 the	 greater	 the
male-female	size	difference.	We	also	know	that	in	general,	there	will	be	selection
for	individuals	who	are	bigger	and	stronger	and	therefore	impose	their	will	on
those	 who	 are	 weaker—especially	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 maximizing	 the
representation	 of	 their	 genes	 in	 the	 next	 generation.	 But	 just	 because	 the
patriarchy	is	an	inevitable	outcome	of	natural	selection	is	no	reason	to	think	it	is
right,	correct,	or	true.
In	fact,	once	we	see	that	sexism	is	the	result	of	natural	selection’s	search	for
solutions	to	the	universal	design	problem	of	leaving	the	most	viable	and	fertile
offspring,	some	of	us	are	on	the	way	to	rejecting	its	norms.	We	can	now	explain
away	sexism	as	a	natural	prejudice	that	enlightened	people	can	see	right	through.
In	 different	 environments,	 natural	 selection	 has	 produced	 other	 arrangements;
consider,	for	example,	the	social	insects,	where	the	top	of	the	hierarchy	is	always
a	female.
Natural	 selection	 sometimes	 selects	 for	 false	 beliefs	 and	 sometimes	 even
selects	against	the	acquisition	of	true	beliefs.	It	sometimes	selects	for	norms	we
reject	 as	 morally	 wrong.	 Therefore,	 it	 can’t	 be	 a	 process	 that’s	 reliable	 for
providing	 us	 with	 what	 we	 consider	 correct	 moral	 beliefs.	 The	 fact	 that	 our
moral	core	is	the	result	of	a	long	process	of	natural	selection	is	no	reason	to	think
that	our	moral	core	is	right,	true,	or	correct.
Scientism	 looks	 like	 it	 faces	 a	 worse	 problem	 than	 the	 one	 Plato	 posed	 for
theism.	At	least	the	theist	can	admit	that	there	must	be	something	that	makes	our
moral	 core	 the	 right	 one;	 otherwise	 God	 would	 not	 have	 given	 it	 to	 us.	 The
theist’s	problem	is	to	figure	out	what	that	right-making	property	is.	Faced	with
the	widespread	belief	that	the	moral	core	is	correct	and	faced	with	the	fact	that	it
was	 given	 to	 us	 by	 natural	 selection,	 scientism	 has	 to	 choose:	 did	 our	 moral
code’s	correctness	cause	its	selection,	or	did	its	selection	make	it	the	right	moral
core?	As	we’ve	seen,	scientism	can’t	take	either	option.
Scientism	cannot	explain	the	fact	that	when	it	comes	to	the	moral	core,	fitness
and	correctness	seem	to	go	together.	But	neither	can	it	tolerate	the	unexplained
coincidence.	There	is	only	one	alternative.	We	have	to	give	up	correctness.	We
have	to	accept	that	core	morality	was	selected	for,	but	we	have	to	give	up	the
idea	that	core	morality	is	true	in	any	sense.	Of	course,	obeying	core	morality	is
convenient	 for	 getting	 our	 genes	 copied	 in	 the	 next	 generation,	 useful	 for
enhancing	our	fitness,	a	good	thing	to	believe	if	all	you	care	about	is	leaving	a
lot	 of	 offspring.	 If	 core	 morality	 is	 convenient,	 useful,	 good	 for	 any	 fitness-
maximizing	 creature	 in	 an	 environment	 like	 ours	 to	 believe,	 then	 it	 doesn’t
matter	whether	it	is	really	true,	correct,	or	right.	If	the	 environment	 had	 been
very	different,	another	moral	core	would	have	been	selected	for,	perhaps	even
the	dog-eat-dog	morality	Herbert	Spencer	advocated	under	the	mistaken	label	of
social	Darwinism.	But	it	wouldn’t	have	been	made	right,	correct,	or	true	by	its
fitness	in	that	environment.
SCIENTISM	STARTS	WITH	the	idea	that	the	physical	facts	fix	all	the	facts,	including
the	biological	ones.	These	in	turn	have	to	fix	the	human	facts—the	facts	about
us,	our	psychology,	and	our	morality.	After	all,	we	are	biological	creatures,	the
result	of	a	biological	process	that	Darwin	discovered	but	that	the	physical	facts
ordained.	As	we	have	just	seen,	the	biological	facts	can’t	guarantee	that	our	core
morality	(or	any	other	one,	for	that	matter)	is	the	right,	true,	or	correct	one.	If	the
biological	facts	can’t	do	it,	then	nothing	can.	No	moral	core	is	right,	correct,	true.
That’s	nihilism.	And	we	have	to	accept	it.
Most	 people	 want	 to	 avoid	 nihilism	 if	 they	 can.	 And	 that	 includes	 a	 lot	 of
people	 otherwise	 happy	 to	 accept	 scientism.	 Anti-nihilists,	 scientistic	 and
otherwise,	 may	 challenge	 the	 two	 premises	 of	 this	 chapter’s	 argument	 for
nihilism:	 the	 notion	 that	 there	 is	 a	 core	 morality	 and	 the	 idea	 that	 it	 made	 a
difference	 for	 survival	 and	 reproduction.	 The	 irony	 is	 that	 together	 these	 two
premises,	whose	truth	implies	nihilism,	also	take	the	sting	out	of	it.	The	next
chapter	sketches	enough	of	what	science	now	knows	about	human	evolution	to
underwrite	both	premises	and	so	make	them	unavoidable	for	scientism.	At	the
same	time,	it	shows	that	nihilism	is	nothing	to	worry	about.
Chapter	6
THE	GOOD	NEWS:
NICE	NIHILISM
TO	NAIL	DOWN	NIHILISM,	WE	NEED	TO	BE	VERY	confident	about	how	and	why	core
morality	is	adaptive.	We	need	to	show	why	over	the	course	of	3.5	billion	years,
relentless	 selection	 for	 fitness-maximizing	 creatures	 should	 have	 produced
people	with	an	almost	universal	commitment	to	a	core	morality.	For	evolutionary
biology,	this	is	the	problem	from	heaven.	Or	at	least	it’s	the	reason	why	more
people	prefer	God’s	dominion	to	Darwin’s	hell	of	cutthroat	competition.
For	a	long	time	after	Darwin	wrote	On	the	Origin	of	Species,	the	existence	of
core	 morality	 made	 Darwinian	 natural	 selection	 apparently	 irrelevant	 to
humanity’s	history,	its	prehistory,	or	its	natural	history	for	that	matter.	No	one
gave	natural	selection	a	chance	to	explain	how	our	core	moral	code	is	possible,
let	 alone	 actual.	 On	 the	 surface,	 core	 morality	 looks	 harmful	 to	 individual
fitness.	 Think	 about	 all	 the	 cooperation,	 sharing,	 and	 self-sacrifice	 it	 enjoins.
Consider	 its	 commitment	 to	 fairness,	 justice,	 equality,	 and	 other	 norms	 that
obstruct	looking	out	for	number	one	and	number	one’s	offspring.
For	over	100	years,	Darwin’s	own	difficulty	explaining	how	core	morality	is
even	a	possible	result	of	natural	selection	was	the	single	greatest	obstacle	to	his
influence	in	the	social	and	behavioral	sciences.	Except	for	some	racist	kooks,	no
one	 took	 Darwin	 seriously	 in	 sociology,	 politics,	 economics,	 anthropology,
psychology,	or	history.
All	 that	 has	 now	 changed.	 In	 the	 last	 45	 years	 or	 so,	 we	 have	 come	 to
understand	how	natural	selection	gave	us	core	morality.	It	turns	out	that	doing	so
was	 integral	 and	 essential	 to	 the	 only	 adaptation	 that	 could	 have	 ensured	 our
survival	 as	 a	 species.	 In	 fact,	 the	 adaptation	 that	 core	 morality	 constitutes
enabled	 us	 to	 break	 out	 of	 that	 evolutionary	 bottleneck	 to	 which	 we	 were