Theses:

• Constitutional review in a country which is in permanent military emergency

Questions:

• Israel has no written constitution. Why is it so? What other specifics have impact upon constitutional review in Israel?
• Who benefits from the establishment of constitutional review in Israel (Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy)?
• What was changed by Bergman (1969) and Mizrahi (1995) cases?
• How has the Supreme Court of Israel gained such a strong position in spite of the absence of a written constitution and of the flexible nature of the Basic laws? Is this situation sustainable?
• What was the cause, according to Segev, of the Supreme Court's shift from “decided not to decide” approach to “decided to decide”?
• In which fields is the Israeli Supreme Court self-restrained and in which areas, on the other hand, activist?
• How many cases per year are decided by the Supreme Court? How does it influence the court's role and functioning?
• How were the judges of the Supreme court appointed till 2011? What amendments were adopted in Knesset in 2011 (Hirschl, Another chapter...)?

Compulsory reading:

• A. Barak, Human Rights in Israel. 39 Isr. L. Rev 12 (2006) or T. Kahana, M. Good, Human Rights in Israel (2008)
• Assaf Meydani and Shlomo Mizrahi, The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Parliament in Light of the Theory of Moves: the Case of Israel, Rationality and Society 2010 22: 55
• Ran Hirschl, Another chapter in Israel's constitutional wars, http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2011/11/another-chapter-in-israels.html
• H.C. 4676/94 Meatrael v. The Knesset of Israel, 50(5) P.D. 16 (1997)

Recommended reading:

• Joshua Segev, Who Needs A Constitution? In Defense of the Non-Decision Constitution-Making Tactic in Israel, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 409 (2006-2007)
• Rivka Weill, Sui Generis? The Hybrid Israeli Constitutional Experience, Working Paper (2009)