8

DEEP DIVERSITY AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT

Believing Is Seeing

On January 9 in 1493, as his ship approached the coast of what is now South America, an entry in the journal of Christopher Columbus records that he "saw three mermaids, which rose well out of the sea; but they are not so beautiful as they are painted, though to some extent they have the form of a human face" (Bourne 1906, 218).[1]

Mermaids, those half–female, half–fish creatures of legend, have existed in maritime cultures at least since the time of the ancient Greeks. And Columbus would have been well schooled in such stories. What he actually saw was undoubtedly a family of manatees. The editor of Columbus's journals, Edward G. Bourne, provides a footnote, as if by way of exculpation, in which he explains:

> Their resemblance to human beings, when rising in the water, must have been very striking. They have small rounded heads, and cervical vertebrae which form a neck, enabling the animal to turn its head about. The fore limbs also, instead of being pectoral fins, have the character of the arm and hand of the higher mammalia.
>
> *(Bourne 1906, 218.n1)*[2]

What is more striking about the entry, though, is that Columbus saw what he believed, even as he struggled to believe what he saw. On such terms, the example illustrates the power of belief over perception. This is also one explanation for the kinds of disagreements rooted in cultural differences that strike us as intractable and so resistant to the power of argumentation to resolve them.

I introduced such disagreements in Chapter 3, and we have been tracking them since, although often as a peripheral concern. In that chapter, I introduced Stanley Fish's insight into the nature of the challenge involved with such disagreements. He believes, it will be recalled, that they stem from different belief structures that condition the way the world is seen: "What you believe is what you see is what you know is what you do is what you are" (Fish 1999a, 247). More of the text is worth considering here because it gives the rationale for this way of thinking.

Fish is talking about Milton's creation of oppositions in *Paradise Lost*: "Milton's motto is not "Seeing is believing" but "Believing is seeing"; and since what you see marks the boundaries of your knowledge, believing is also knowing; and since it is on the basis of what you know—whether what you know is that there is a God or that there isn't one—that you act, believing is acting. What you believe is what you see is what you know is what you do is what you are" (Fish 1999a, 247). So, on these terms, you cannot appreciate a belief system that is not your own.

This sums up the depth of the problem: it is not simply a matter of "seeing is believing," as we might expect, where the way the world appears to us determines what we come to believe (about the world, about ourselves, and so forth). Rather, people or groups come to see the world through the lenses of their belief sets. One important result of this divide is that we cannot take two groups back to a common underlying world in order to find shared understandings on which to build some kind of agreement. Their *worldviews* are—in the term favoured by the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, and that was introduced and defined in earlier chapters—incommensurable. That is, there is no common standard by which two systems can measure each other. They may engage in conversation, but what they say will not resonate with each other to a level that would count. Although they speak, like Wittgenstein's lion (but without the hypothetical),[3] they cannot be understood.

Recognizing Reasons

Fish is clear that the opposition he has in mind is between two ways of believing and not two ways of knowing, one based on evidence and reason, the other on belief. The problem's root is beneath this, while "on the level of epistemology both are the same" (245). What both cases lack is a first premise that the other could access.

It is to be noted that Fish's position shares affinities with Robert Fogelin's (1985) work on deep disagreements, although this is often overlooked. A common denominator—or assumption—in many of the critical responses to Fogelin (Levi 2000; Feldman 2005; Kock 2007) is that parties must somehow be able to *recognize evidence*, or reasons, or values, or issues. This connects nicely with our own interests in examining what counts as evidence in different jurisdictions,

the range of reasons across cultures. But Fogelin is insistent that in cases of deep disagreement what counts as evidence is itself in dispute. The argumentative standoff is so complete that there is no ground for any such recognition that what the other party takes as a reason is a "reason" in any shared sense. And the same holds for "value" and even "issue." Looking at the world from completely different belief sets would involve different understandings of how it is set up, operates, and is interpreted. That is what reference to a framework suggests. On the strictest reading of Fogelin's argument, such frameworks are impenetrable from the outside. We have, for both Fogelin and Fish, a conflict of rationalities without any reasonable means to resolve it. Thus, the only recourse for both thinkers is to unreasonable means (Fogelin 1985, 6–7; Fish 1999a, 255).

There is a void here when contrary positions are voiced, a situation, it will be recalled, that Marc Angenot christened "dialogues with the deaf" (2006). Angenot grounded his argument in a central empirical claim or insight: our attempts to persuade others invariably are unsuccessful. In spite of our efforts to engage in the social practice of exchanging good reasons, those reasons too often fail to have the uptake we expect.

Angenot's claim is a far more general one than those produced by Fogelin and Fish, and I have addressed that general claim earlier.[4] Here, we can consider some of the grounds for this deafness as suggested in Fish's follow-up essay to "Why We All Can't Just Get Along." In that subsequent text (Fish 1999b), he is responding to the objections of Father Richard Neuhaus (editor of the journal *First Things*, where the original paper appeared in 1996), one of which is that Fish pits reason against faith. Of course, he does not; his point was that both positions were grounded on faith. But that does not mean that reason cannot proceed from there; "both are reasoning" (1999b, 263), insists Fish, but in a different register.

As part of his reply, Neuhaus had asked: "In the course of reasoning cannot that first premise itself become the object of critical attention?" (Cited in Fish 1999b, 265). But Fish thinks not: "Spinning your wheels is what you would be doing if you were to bracket your first premise and make it the object of critical attention" (267). He illustrates his position by taking up the case of the reasonable Christian (no doubt with his correspondent in mind). Should a Christian experience any "reasonable" doubt, it would have to have been raised by concerns internal to the belief system and not between that and some other system (268). I emphasize "reasonable" here, because Fish adds the adjective to "doubt" so as to suggest a separate, internally consistent notion of reasonableness with its own modes of evidence. Doubt would not arise from an assertion of supposed "evidence" that supports a claim in another system. To emphasize the point, Fish observes: "It seems unnecessary to say so, but when you think a view wrong, you don't see what is seen by those who think it right—those who live and move and have their being within it" (269). And here we are back to the chain of connections with which we began, running from belief to being who we are.

Someone might object here, and say: "Well, you do see what is seen by those who think a view right, but not in the same way. So, it's a matter of interpretation." Fish seems to anticipate this when he goes on to dispute whether we understand others in the right sense of "understanding." In saying that a view is wrong, all we can really be saying is that we do not understand it from our perspective. (Recall the response of Luria and his co-experimenters to their subjects' "mistakes.") The utterances meet the requirements of grammar and appear meaningful, but they signify nothing.

Counter-Considerations

James Freeman (2012), reads Fish's attempts to construct a Miltonian argument through the lenses of the Toulmin model of argument (Toulmin 1958), invoking the language of warrants. But he also shows the dire consequences of the Miltonian position for other theories of argumentation such as (to mark two examples) pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 2010), where adversaries could never proceed to the argumentation stage; or Ralph Johnson's (2000) manifest rationality model, where reciprocal rationality is impossible between people who do not share the original position (Freeman 2012, 66). Freeman attempts to salvage the reputation of argumentation theory by challenging the idea that there can be warrants without backing, in Toulmin's sense.[5] The inclusion of backing means that warrants are subject to evidentiary support of different kinds (68). Still, Freeman's argument assumes that people who disagree will recognize that their opponents are providing backing in support of their warrants (69; 71).

Citing a 1996 version of the Fish paper, Freeman extracts the following:

> Evidence is never independent in the sense of being immediately perspicuous; evidence comes into view (or doesn't) in the light of some first premise or "essential axiom" that cannot itself be put to the test because the protocols of testing are established by its presumed authority.
>
> *(Fish, cited in Freeman 2012, 69)*

To this, Freeman responds:

> Is *this* true? Suppose one's experience leads to forming an inferential belief-habit expressible as a warrant. Suppose one meets another whose stock of inference habits does not include his warrant. If one presents the evidence or paradigm instances of the evidence which led to the forming of one's belief habit, why cannot the other appreciate that they constitute positive evidence for that warrant, and indeed may even constitute sufficient evidence for acceptance? How is some essential axiom necessary to recognize evidence *as* evidence?
>
> *(Freeman 2012, 69)*

Again, he asks: could not the antagonists of the Milton case "agree on at least some statement if asked, agree on the evidence which might support it and that this evidence does support it?" (69). But this is the key point and what makes it so relevant to the current concerns, it is over the nature of evidence that the disagreement exists. And when Freeman writes: "If one presents the evidence or paradigm instances of the evidence which *led to the forming of one's belief habit*" (my italics), he is approaching the problem from a different direction than Fish. For Freeman, evidence is at the start of the sequence leading to belief; Fish places beliefs in the first position of the sequence.

The assumption that getting along just involves refocusing on another's terms while adjusting our own expectations is prevalent in the literature. We have met a number of exponents in earlier chapters. Representative of this general position, I believe, is Carlos Fraenkel's (2015) thoughtful advocacy of a "culture of debate." He can be seen to occupy the opposite end of the spectrum from Marc Angenot. Fraenkel conceives a "culture of debate" as a framework where diversity and disagreement can be transformed into a joint search for truth (2015, 150), and something that "gives us a chance to examine the beliefs and values we were brought up with and often take for granted" (xv). The emphasis is placed on the *culture* of debate, and he pursues this by conducting lectures and discussions across the globe, from Palestine to Brazil to the Mohawk territory in Canada. He explores questions about the nature of disagreement and whether, for example, "there's a colonialist drive in human nature" in a way that invokes the prospect of a "Mohawk Columbus," limited only by the absence of the necessary technology (115).[6]

There are fruitful insights into the differences that separate us in the interviews and discussions Fraenkel conducts, and there is an implicit recognition of the need to understand the views of others as, in Geertz's terms, "not other but otherwise" (Geertz 1988, 70). Ultimately, though, the resistance to cultural forces that we have seen in this book to exert a formidable power is perhaps too optimistic. Fraenkel writes, for example:

> It could be objected that the supposedly neutral space of reason and argument is not neutral at all, but an attempt to impose a secular, Western model of rationality on other cultural traditions . . . Such a claim is based on a distorted picture of what these cultural traditions look like . . . And Jews, Christians, and Muslims, as well as followers of Eastern religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, all developed rich philosophical literatures and traditions of debate. Al-Ghazali, for one, stresses the importance for Muslims learning the Aristotelian art of demonstration (*berhan* in Arabic, translating the Greek a*podeixis*) to make sure that their religious beliefs never contradict "reason" (*'aql*). If a demonstrated doctrine conflicts with the literal sense of the Quran, the Quran must be reconciled through interpretation (*ta' wil*).
>
> *(158)*

His point here is that the "space of reason and argument" *is* neutral, and shared. Readers of my earlier chapters will appreciate why I find this problematic. Indeed, the religions he identifies have all developed traditions of debate, just as we can see threads of argumentation and rhetorical expression at work in these traditions. But it is in the terms that such debates (and argumentation) are conducted that the differences emerge. Observing "Muslims learning the Aristotelian art of demonstration" is not helpful; it reflects one of the ways in which the "Western model of rationality" has influenced other cultural traditions. The exploration of the "logic" experiments in Chapter 2 illustrated why we should find it impossible to see a neural space of argument in operation.

Freeman and Fraenkel, proceeding from different perspectives and with different projects, offer counter-arguments to the cul-de-sacs of Fish and Fogelin. Each in his own way proposes a prospect for breaking the impasse. But each in his own way fails to appreciate the complexity of the problem they are confronting.

Leveraging the Roots of Disagreement

We learn little from dissent if we cannot leverage the roots of the disagreement. And if we cannot recognize evidence for what it is, then this is exactly the position we are in. Fish's challenge, like that of Fogelin, is over the nature of evidence, and this has been one of the focused threads of these investigations into the anthropology of argument: What *can* count as evidence? How is the range of reasons delimited? As we have seen, depending on when and where these questions are framed, the responses vary considerably. Fish and Fogelin pose these questions within the same system of rationality. But both also assume that evidence is relative to rational systems and that these systems do not share enough for "us" to recognize a common standard to evaluate them.

The first thing that should be observed here is the apparently privileged position of the "us," as if we held the position of a "god's-eye" appraiser occupying that view from nowhere.[7] It is testimony to the seriousness of the problem that there is no such position. The problem is our problem and we are immersed in it with all the epistemic commitments that position suggests. When we look at the issue, we look at it from the perspective of one of those internally consistent reasonable systems. It just happens to be the dominant one, insofar as the traditions of Western thought and science have supplied it, corroborated it, and now depend upon it. When we look at other systems, if we do, we see the equivalent of what look to us like mermaids rising from the depths because that is all our system could suggest in the stories we have learned. When the advocate of a different system explains the evidence drawn from dreams, we recognize the explanation, but not the content; dreams are not a source for evidence. The question is whether, to recall Angenot's point, we are so deaf to the other's voice as to be incapable of learning to hear anything meaningful.

In earlier chapters, including the last, I have stressed how LuMing Mao (2003) challenges what might be called a "Western mindset" when different cultures are confronted. In one place, speaking of George Kennedy's (1998) work on comparative rhetoric, he asserts "Kennedy consistently uses a host of Western rhetorical terms like *judicial, deliberative*, and *epideictic* to make sense of those other traditions, even though the latter are distinctly different from the culture that produced these terms" (Mao 2003, 411). Elsewhere, we have seen that he writes "our own most fundamental frames of reference or *epistemes* . . . are often rooted in or influenced by such Western concepts as reason, truth, logic, communication, and selfhood" (Mao 2011, 67). We are now in a better position to extract value from these observations. The critique of Kennedy raises the serious question of whether (or how) we can read another tradition/system without using terms of reference from our own framework. What is lost if we are limited to translating other rhetorics in our terms? Rhetoric is a product of culture, and each culture expresses itself in its own way. Moreover, the second observation—claim really—is that concepts like "reason, truth, logic, communication, and selfhood" originate as Western concepts. Presumably, this is not to deny that others communicate and reason. Rather, their meanings and subsequent behaviours do not assimilate readily to our understandings of reason, truth, logic, communication, and selfhood.[8] Or, as I discussed it in Chapter 6, this is a recognition of the kind of imperialism (Roque 2015) that has gone on in logic and argumentation. If Western views are adopted, this can amount to a form—or extension—of colonization. Underneath them, or melded together with them, are practices that depend far more on, for example, an everyday reasoning based on experience than the abstractness of a formal logic.

Yet we know what it means for things to be meaningful, so there is the prospect of at least recognizing the appreciation of meaningfulness in others. I approach this challenge by looking at some cases that would seem to confirm Fish's reconfiguring of the "seeing is believing" commonplace, cases in which human experience is expressed differently, and thus not initially recognizable to every gaze.

The idea of the universal human (an idea that was explored in Chapter 4 and includes concepts like Perelman's universal audience) is further brought into question by problems such as those discussed here. Charles Willard (1989) observes that claims to universality are invitations to criticism, while "rationalities" presented as local have a "place in the sun" (Willard 1989, 167). Again, this reinforces the importance placed on the "local" in earlier chapters. Clifford Geertz—the source of those examinations of the local—notes, in a way that anticipates Fish, that the image of a constant human nature may be an illusion: what humans are depends on where they are and what they believe (Geertz 1973, 35). Instead of being enchanted by such illusions, Geertz argues, we must attend to "the informal logic of actual life" (17), immerse ourselves in

the particularities of human experience, and build from them, on their terms, an understanding of how differentness is not so much a problem to be overcome but the position from which we begin to move, on parallel tracks, towards engagement.

Can We Talk?

Anthropological studies show us that reasons come in many forms, forms not necessarily baptised as such in the Western tradition. Through earlier chapters, we have understood "reasons" as expressions of meaningfulness, or simply sources of meaning. The experiments involving the "non-logical" subjects explored in Chapter 2 illustrate what happens when the standards of one system and the expectations that flow from it are imposed on people operating outside of that system. Such studies fall prey to the ethnocentrism that pervades the relevant literature in spite of warnings everywhere discouraging such assumptions. But those same experiments, approached from a different direction, teach us that the reasoning of others can be described in ways that make sense of them. Thick descriptions of responses render those responses as meaningful expressions of human experience in which reasons are understood in ways contrary to Western norms or different things are understood as reasons.

Case 1: Ancient Greece

Imagine an individual who, while openly committed to many of the institutions of his society, is deeply immersed in the full range of human experiences and draws his understandings, his reasons, from sources as diverse as dreams. He believes for example, that what occurs in dreams is relevant to events in waking life; that an event will not occur on a particular day because he dreamt it would not. In fact, his actions are generally guided by a voice that discourages him from pursuing certain courses of action, and he appeals frequently to this source to explain his behaviour. And his actions themselves serve as a further source of evidence, preferred over the expression of reasons in propositions.

This individual conveys all the signs of operating within a system of rationality different from our own. We tend not to extend credence to the promptings of dreams, are suspicious of people who hear voices, and we have a deeply ingrained preference for propositional claims over the example of actions. But these prejudices likely dissipate when we recognize the figure in question is the historical Socrates, as Plato (1997) describes him.

Awaiting execution, he tells his companion that he does not think the ship from Delos will arrive until the following day (no executions being permitted until the ship's arrival) because (for the reason that) he dreamt it to be so (*Crito* 43d–44a). The intuitive power of his inner voice, given authority in the *Apology* (40a) and elsewhere, that always tells Socrates 'no' and never 'yes', has

been variously explained in the literature, but all those explanations have difficulty reconciling the Socrates of the inner voice with the paragon of reason celebrated in the Western tradition. In truth, it has more in common with the kisceral mode of the multi-modal account of argumentation (Gilbert 1997) that was introduced in earlier chapters. And as a central part of the argument he provides in his defense in the *Apology*, he offers the jury as "powerful proof" not "mere words," but what they "honour more—actions" (*Apology* 32a). He then gives two autobiographical narratives of times he opposed wrongdoing in Athens, once during the democracy, and a second time during the tyranny.

It might be suggested, given Socrates' position in the history of Western thought, that we are able to access his system of rationality. But these are exactly the aspects of his character that we tend to overlook or that present commentators with the most difficulty. In fact, Socrates is a transitional character between the oral and the literate, and it is our prejudice in favour of the literate that brackets out the vestiges of the oral.

Case 2: Contemporary Canada

A very different example of difference emerges from the political arena, where a focus on differentness often distorts the underlying relationships, deflecting attention from the ways it is accommodated in practice. The case in question is that of Canada, specifically Québec's relationship to the rest of Canada. This is an example of what political theorist John Dryzek (2006) would call a "divided society": one that is "defined by mutually contradictory assertions of identity" (2006, 46). In the face of deep differences, Dryzek advocates a discursive democracy, where the deliberation and decision aspects of democracy are separated so that deliberation is located in an engagement of discourses in the public sphere (47). Here, the aim is to detach deliberation from identity in order to facilitate the power of persuasive discourse (57; 63). An example of what Dryzek's approach via discourses entails is captured in the practices of Martin Luther King Jr. On Dryzek's reading, King was able to separate white Americans from their identity by appealing to their emotional commitment to symbols like the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, leading to a change in the way dominant liberal discourse was understood (Dryzek 2006, 63). This way of detracting from identity to accomplish change through discourse effectively overcomes differences, achieving agreement in the political sphere.

The Canadian example retains difference in a tension of mutual accommodation. But it requires a special kind of relationship, as Charles Taylor (1993) explains. Taylor promotes two kinds of diversity: first-level diversity and second-level or "deep" diversity (1993, 182–3). The first involves the kind of identity that Dryzek eschews, where significant differences in culture, outlook and background are bridged by a common idea of belonging to Canada. But left

out of the equation are Indigenous communities, for whom the "way of being Canadian is not accommodated by first-level diversity" (182). To overcome this exclusion requires attention to deep diversity, "in which a plurality of ways of belonging would also be acknowledged and accepted" (183). So, Taylor explains:

> Someone of, say, Italian extraction in Toronto or Ukrainian extraction in Edmonton might indeed feel Canadian as a bearer of individual rights in a multicultural mosaic. His or her belonging would not "pass through" some other community, although the ethnic identity might be important to him or her in various ways. But this person might nevertheless accept that a Québécois or a Cree or a Déné might belong to a very different way, that these persons were Canadian through being members of their national communities.

> *(183)*

The challenge, as Taylor seems to allow, is managing deep diversity at the same time as a sense of unity.[9] First-level diversity stresses the commonality, building on the metaphor of bridging; deep or second-level diversity stresses the differences, building on the metaphor of the mosaic.

This case of "accommodated difference" through deep diversity is distinct from the kinds of examples that have engaged me in this book, from encounter rhetorics to deep disagreements, and seems far from the radical divergences captured in Fish's reframing of the seeing is believing commonplace. But are such cases really so far apart? To explore this question, I want to turn to the nature of diversity *within* individuals and pursue the parallels found there.

Forms of Life and Deep Diversity

A complete picture of the human reasoner involves processes of the mind and body, reason and emotion, in all their intricate interaction. The model of the sterile reasoner devoid of emotional reactions, from Socrates (well, not Socrates any more; maybe Sherlock Holmes) to Spock, is a fiction. At times, perhaps, it is a necessary fiction when the focus of attention is on the power of deduction in human reasoning, but it is no less a fiction.

Not surprisingly, a turn to human experience with its intricate web of connections that characterize a life has been a popular move for philosophers engaging the problems associated with radical difference, incommensurability, and noncomparability.[10] It is such a return that Fogelin invites with his reference to "a form of life" in his account of deep disagreements.

Yet Fogelin is ambivalent in his remarks: speaking of the source of deep disagreements, he notes that what we find are not isolated propositions, but "a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models,

styles of acting and thinking), if I may use the phrase, a form of life" (1985, 6). But he then proceeds:

> I think that the notion of a form of life is dangerous, especially when used in the singular. We do better to say that a person participates in a variety of forms of life that overlap and crisscross in a variety of ways. Some of these forms of life have little to do with others. This explains why we can enter into discussions and reasonable arguments over a range of subjects with a person who believes, as we think, things that are perfectly mad.
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> *(6)*

Fogelin's point—as he proceeds to clarify it—is that we can still trust such a person on other subjects. But the larger point recognized here, and that he does not develop, is that human lives are sites or projects of diversity. Setting aside whether what is at issue here are multiple "forms of life," what we can recognize is that the kinds of inner conflicts we so routinely experience are the results of clashing beliefs and commitments. In the closing sections, I want to consider the nature and implications of this deep diversity.

The shift to the agent, the one who holds the beliefs and so forth of Fish's chain, is a shift to preliminaries. It poses the challenge that in order to understand others we must first understand ourselves. That understanding may be a serious challenge in itself and is certainly a discussion that warrants far more than could be extended to it here. All that matters, perhaps, is that we appreciate the ways in which differentness and problems of comparability of values are assimilated in, and comprise natural features of, the living of lives. Taylor observes (and this is an observation we can now support) that stating questions in terms of extreme positions, either no diversity or complete diversity, is problematic. In particular, for him, it ignores dimensions of the ethical life (Taylor 1997, 171).

Human lives are strained by experiences of inner conflict as we continuously struggle to reconcile values to which we give different weight at different times. Consider another example: A young woman both sees the merit of reducing government subsidies during times of austerity, tracking this to decisions she has made throughout her life, decisions that have reflected the value of fiscal responsibility, while at the same time disagreeing with the reduction of government subsidies because of the consequences she sees for the disadvantaged arising from it, a disagreement which also flows naturally from past decisions and the high value she has always placed on charitable action. These reactions are irreconcilable on any common level. Both reactions speak to aspects of her character threaded together in her life. And we all experience such deep diversity of conflicts almost routinely, developing various strategies to manage them.

We value incomparable goods, even where there is no common register to weigh them and decide for one over another. We give particular weight to a

good here, but not there; now, but not later. Much depends on how lines of significance are woven through our lives, rising to the surface in relation to each other, interacting at important moments. And this diversity is part of a fractured whole that constitutes a life. This situation mirrors the external clash of values in different frameworks.

Moreover, too much analysis conforms comfortably to the dictates of linear rationality isolating actions into points in a sequence and failing to treat them as issuing from lives in which values and beliefs are integrated in complex webs. Is a life something we "lead" or "pursue," or something we accumulate, amassing experiences that encourage dispositions to act? Are we out ahead of ourselves like a Sartrean ego, gathering a self only on reflection; or do we follow on behind, monitoring alternatives and choosing the ways forward? In either case, there is a sense of directional movement but one that is only experienced in the moment, as lives remain susceptible to the kairotic (Taylor 1997, 180). The unifying force that gathers or monitors is what manages this diversity. For Taylor, "the intuition of diversity of goods needs to be balanced with the unity of life" (183).

The diversities in the makeup of individual lives are mirrored in the larger world, with its clashing values, where we assume that frameworks have unity, assigning them a static nature. Hence, we view diversity as arising *between* frameworks. In fact, we should be interested first in diversity that arises *within* them. Fish allows for this in his image of the "reasonable" doubter. Where Taylor finds "deep diversity" in the Canadian mosaic, we have found it treated as a frequent and pernicious feature of cultures and systems of beliefs.

Frameworks support lives, and not vice versa, providing the contexts in which they are lived and giving the decisions and actions that flow from them the stamp of rationality. Does the same type of fractured coherence that characterizes a framework apply also to an individual life? Steven Lukes (1997) introduces a valuable distinction between sacred values (which may be secular or religious) that are partial and concrete, and those that are impartial and abstract (Lukes 1997, 188). The impartial are the problematic ones, in part because they are not connected to a way of life. There is an element of the universal (or at least the objective) rearing its head again here. The partial values, on the other hand, favour a way of life. The distinction is of worth here because it brings into question the impartial itself, whether it is sought through experiments of disinterest (choosing behind a veil of ignorance) or mandated by constructs of a theory (sacrificing our own good for the utility of the majority).

For Fish, the search for the impartial, for foundational standards that will connect frameworks, is doomed to fail. But how would he fare with the partial, where choice arises in diversity? Does he assume that operating within a system provides the coherence for the agency to function? Lives are partial to certain values at certain times, they change and grow, and the systems that support them need to support this evolution. So, they are always open to revision, to alternatives. They feed off of otherness.

On a deeper level, it is strange that Stanley Fish should read things as he does. I refer here to his reconfiguring of the causal chain reflected in the popular "seeing is believing." For Fish, we recall, the causal series begins with belief and proceeds to perception, knowledge, action, and identity. But our discussion has progressed toward a different conclusion: that the causal chain itself is the misconception. It is not just that there remains a commitment to linear rationality; that's to be expected. Rather, the elements of the alleged chain are parts of an integrated whole, centered by the self as experienced across the qualities of life. Human lives are complex affairs, and part of that complexity is the interweaving of perception with belief, and with knowledge and action, and with emotion and identity, none of which has any primacy in a series of causal influence.

Conclusion

Diversity is not something to be overcome, but to be managed. For Fogelin, a "form of life" is a system of mutually supporting propositions, and we participate in multiple forms of life, overlapping and crisscrossing. There are two claims at work here, and they don't fit well together, because the second challenges the first. And so, we might suggest, following on the preceding investigation, that a "form of life" is a system of managed diversity, where propositions that disagree are reconciled in a dispositional nature governed by a force of character that ultimately can give coherence to our actions and make of our life a thread that connects past choices into meaningful narratives and gives some predictability to future action. This is a complex structure, and more than I have defended here. My principal concern has been to challenge Fish's causal sequence and reframe deep disagreements in terms of deep diversities. It is not a matter of whether seeing (perception) or belief is the first step in a causal series; it is a question of whether any such series is ultimately plausible. The interrelation of perception, belief, knowledge, action, and identity in individual lives suggests the problem is not as Fish explains it.

Answers to radical differences between frameworks also involve an expansion of our sense of reason(s), that is, an openness to the range of experiences that influence human decisions. We are reason-giving creatures, creating dispositions that form us and confound us, making the diverse reactions of our lives inevitable. But what we give as reasons varies across forms of life and the cultures that support them. Socrates' voice is as valid for him (and operates as powerfully in his reasoning) as a scientist's appeal to the way fossil fuels break down in the atmosphere. Preferring one source over another makes sense according to the context; dismissing one source out of hand is the kind of prejudicial response that feeds the flames of deep disagreement.

One solution (but it is not a solution if there is nothing to solve; so, one direction, then) is not seeking a one-size-fits-all set of standards, because that

inevitably would involve its imposition on some of the values of others. What Edward Said (2000a) described as "the problematic of the observer" (300) is such an obstacle to all cross-cultural studies that it threatens to be impassable. And the lessons from anthropology here (Carpenter 1972, 188–91) demand that we recognize the enormous damage that ensues (to *all* involved) when standards are imposed.

More than this tendency to impose has been the equally deleterious consequence of robbing reason of its diverse expression by essentially silencing the voices that did not conform to the expectations of Western frameworks. Instead, the coercions of colonizing (in its widest sense) ideas has replaced, cuckoo-like, the fertile eggs of the colonized with those brought from elsewhere, and then required them to be raised as if they were indigenous. The assumptions of universalizing reason have fuelled this, but we have seen in earlier chapters the effects of the resulting ill-fit.

We can focus on framework propositions and belief systems. That gets us so far. But from the perspective of argumentation, frameworks and systems are only the hollow husks in which and between which the real dynamics, the lived encounters, ensue. Argumentation is at its heart a human activity; we should never lose sight of this. The study of argumentation begins with the human and ends with the human. It explains our nature as much as it forms the ways that nature is expressed in the world. The roots of disagreement are not frameworks or causal series, but human agents and their diverse commitments.

Notes

1. See "Collection of the First Voyage" Document No. AJ-062. Wisconsin Historical Society Digital Library and Archives. www.americanjourneys.org/pdf/AJ-062. pdf. Retrieved Sept. 18, 2018.
2. Or, consider the same phenomenon on a different register, the case of Arthur Conan Doyle, whose firm belief in the supernatural meant he had no hesitation in conferring authenticity on a photograph depicting a young girl surrounded by fairies.
3. "If a lion could speak, we could not understand him" (Wittgenstein 1953, IIxi, 223). In the same section Wittgenstein notes, apropos the discussion here, "one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not *understand* the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them." Fogelin's (1985) position on deep disagreements is influenced by Wittgenstein's observations.
4. See the discussion of Angenot's work in Chapter 3.
5. Toulmin's (1958) model of argument involves a set of features that include warrants that support data for a conclusion and backing for those warrants.
6. A counter-factual experiment on par with novelist Christopher Evans (1993) of Aztec warships sailing up the Thames and pyramids erected across London.
7. The problems specific to argumentation theory that are associated with this view have been detailed elsewhere, particularly by Hamblin (1970, 242). See also, Tindale (2004, Chapter 5) on the construction of "objective" views.

8. See, for example, Clifford Geertz's (1983) examination of "person" in three different cultures as a "vehicle by means of which to examine this whole question of how to go about poking into another people's turn of mind" (59).
9. Interestingly, Dryzek identifies Canada as a positive example of the kind of discursive democratic engagement in a semi-public sphere that he advocates (2006, 64). But his focus is on disagreements between Anglophones and Francophones and he does not bring in the Indigenous consideration. In a similar vein, Fraenkel judges his "culture of debate" to be opposed to multiculturalism, because the latter advocates "that we should *equally* value beliefs and values that differ from our own" (2015, 177).
10. The latter is most strongly advocated by Chang (1997), who distinguishes noncomparability from incomparability. This is not a distinction I will pursue here.

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