http://www.hts.org.za Open Access
HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies
ISSN: (Online) 2072-8050, (Print) 0259-9422
Page 1 of 8 Original Research
Authors:
Marno Retief1
Rantoa Letšosa1
Affiliations:
1
Faculty of Theology,
North-West University,
South Africa
Corresponding author:
Rantoa Letšosa,
rantoa.letsosa@nwu.ac.za
Dates:
Received: 18 July 2017
Accepted: 09 Dec. 2017
Published: 06 Mar. 2018
How to cite this article:
Retief, M. & Letšosa, R.,
2018, ‘Models of disability:
A brief overview’, HTS
Teologiese Studies/
Theological Studies 74(1),
a4738. https://doi.org/​
10.4102/hts.v74i1.4738
Copyright:
© 2018. The Authors.
Licensee: AOSIS. This work
is licensed under the
Creative Commons
Attribution License.
Introduction
Critical reflection on the importance of shaping disability-friendly – or disability-inclusive –
congregations has enjoyed increasing attention in the field of practical theology in recent years
(cf. Brock & Swinton 2012; Eiesland & Saliers 1998; Swinton 2000, 2001, 2011, 2012). Nevertheless,
we would be mistaken to assume that practical theology has been alone in drawing attention
to the needs and experiences of people with disabilities (hereafter PWDs). On the contrary,
the nascent academic discipline commonly referred to as disability theology is very much a
multidisciplinary affair, drawing on biblical studies, systematic theology, moral theology, church
history and practical theology, as well as disciplines outside the field of theology, such as sociology,
ethics, education, psychology and philosophy (Swinton 2011:275). Broadly defined, the term
‘disability theology’ denotes:
[The] attempt by disabled and non-disabled Christians to understand and interpret the gospel of Jesus
Christ, God, and humanity against the backdrop of the historical and contemporary experiences of people
with disabilities. It has come to refer to a variety of perspectives and methods designed to give voice to
the rich and diverse theological meanings of the human experience of disability. (Swinton 2011:274)
The development of disability theology is testimony to the fact that practical theologians and the
wider church community have taken serious notice of the realities and experiences of PWDs in
our time.
Even before the task of engaging in theological reflection from a disability perspective commences,
it is necessary that theologians acquaint themselves with the various models of disability that
shape people’s perceptions and ideas about PWDs. Such a preliminary assessment of various
models of disability is important, because, as Smart (2004:25–29) points out, such models serve a
number of important purposes:
•	 Models of disability provide definitions of disability.
•	 Models of disability provide explanations of causal attribution and responsibility attributions.
•	 Models of disability are based on (perceived) needs.
•	 Models guide the formulation and implementation of policy.
•	 Models of disability are not value neutral.
•	 Models of disability determine which academic disciplines study and learn about PWDs.
•	 Models of disability shape the self-identity of PWDs.
•	 Models of disability can cause prejudice and discrimination.
Guided by the principles of the interpretive task of practical theological investigation and
cognizant of the importance of models of disability in shaping perceptions regarding PWDs, this
Critical reflection on the importance of shaping disability-friendly – or disability-inclusive –
congregations has enjoyed increasing attention in the field of practical theology in recent years.
Moreover, the development of disability theology is a testament to the fact that practical
theologians and the wider church community have taken serious notice of the realities and
experiences of people with disabilities in our time. Nevertheless, even before the task of
engaging in theological reflection from a disability perspective commences, it is necessary that
theologians acquaint themselves with the various models of disability that shape people’s
perceptions and ideas about people with disabilities. Guided by the principles of the
interpretive task of practical theological investigation and cognizant of the importance of
models of disability in shaping perceptions regarding people with disabilities, this article
seeks to provide a brief overview of nine of the most dominant models of disability that are
prevalent in our time. We shall utilise the typological approach to theoretical analysis in order
to outline the basic characteristics of the various models.
Models of disability: A brief overview
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article seeks to provide a brief overview of nine of the most
dominant models of disability that are prevalent in our time.
Drawing inspiration from Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture (1956)
and Dulles’ Models of the Church (1974), we shall utilise the
typological approach to theoretical analysis in order to
outline the basic characteristics of the models in question.
The moral and/or religious model:
Disability as an act of God
The moral/religious model of disability is the oldest model
of disability and is found in a number of religious traditions,
including the Judeo-Christian tradition (Pardeck & Murphy
2012:xvii). According to one of the primary forms of moral
and/or religious models of disability, disability should be
regarded as a punishment from God for a particular sin
or sins that may have been committed by the person with
disability. Henderson and Bryan (2011) offer a thorough
explanation of the moral and/or religious model of disability:
[S]ome people, if not many, believe that some disabilities are the
result of lack of adherence to social morality and religious
proclamations that warn against engaging in certain behavior.
To further explain this model, some beliefs are based upon the
assumption that some disabilities are the result of punishment
from an all-powerful entity. Furthermore, the belief is that
the punishment is for an act or acts of transgression against
prevailing moral and/or religious edicts. (p. 7)
McClure (2007:23) laments the devastating influence the
thinking characteristic of the moral and/or religious model
of disability has had on preaching, highlighting how some
forms of Bible interpretation exclude PWDs by directly or
indirectly equating ‘“blindness”, “lameness”, “deafness”,
“uncleanness” (chronic illness), mental illness (demonic
possession), and other forms of disability . . . with human sin,
evil, or spiritual ineptitude’.
Sometimes it is not only the individuals’ sin that is regarded
as a possible cause of their disability, but also any sin that
may have been committed by their parents and/or ancestors
(Henderson & Bryan 2011:7). Elaborating on the negative
impact of this model on the individual with disability and
his or her family, Rimmerman (2013:24) emphasises the
potentially destructive consequences of such a view, in the
sense that it may lead to entire families being excluded from
social participation in their local communities.
Another prominent form of the moral and/or religious
model of disability is the idea that disabilities are essentially
a test of faith or even salvific in nature. Niemann (2005:106)
offers a concise description of the conception of disability as
a test of faith, whereby ‘individuals and families are specially
selected by God to receive a disability and are given the
opportunity to redeem themselves through their endurance,
resilience, and piety’. Black (1996:26) points out that some
people conceive of passing the test of faith as receiving
physical healing. If the person does not experience the
physical healing of their disability, he or she is regarded as
having a lack of faith in God.
Black (1996:27) discusses an additional form of the
moral and/or religious model of disability, whereby the
challenges associated with disability are viewed as a Godgiven
opportunity for character development. Such an
understanding regards the development and deepening
of particular character traits (such as patience, courage
and perseverance) as the primary focus of God’s plan for
PWDs. Consequently, PWDs may be regarded as ‘blessed’, as
they have the opportunity to learn some important life
lessons that able-bodied people do not necessarily have the
opportunity to learn.
Sometimes the moral and/or religious model of disability
perpetuates the myth of disability as mysticism or some
kind of metaphysical blessing. According to the mysticism
perspective of disability, the fact that one of the senses of a
person is impaired inevitably heightens the functioning of
other senses of that person, as well as granting him or her
‘special abilities to perceive, reflect, transcend, be spiritual’
(Olkin 1999:25–26). From this perspective, ‘[I]ndividuals are
selected by God or a higher power to receive a disability
not as a curse or punishment but to demonstrate a special
purpose or calling’ (Niemann 2005:106).
Although the moral and/or religious model of disability is
no longer as prevalent as it was in in premodern times, the
basic philosophy underlying the model is still frequently
encountered in the way people reason when confronted
with illness or disability (cf. Henderson & Bryan 2011:7;
Rimmerman 2013:24). Moreover, there are certain cultures
where the moral and/or religious model of disability is still
the predominant view (Dunn 2015:10), especially ‘societies
dominated by religious or magical ways of thinking’
(Karna 1999:13). In such societies, PWDs are often severely
marginalised, even facing the prospect of abandonment or
infanticide (Anderson 2013:11).
Niemann (2005:106) highlights the negative influence of the
moral and/or religious model of disability on theological
reflection: ‘Whether congenital or acquired, many theologies
have historically constructed disabilities to be a curse, one
often associated with the attribution of shame onto an
individual or family’. Most contemporary biblical scholars
and theologians reject the moral and/or religious model of
disability (cf. Creamer 2009; Yong 2007, 2011), although it is
still found – in some form or other – in some theological
circles (cf. Swartley 2012).
The medical model: Disability as
a disease
From the mid-1800s onwards, the medical (or biomedical)
model of disability began to gradually replace the moral
and/or religious model in lieu of significant advances in the
field of medical science. Olkin (1999) outlines the basic
characteristics of the medical model of disability:
Disability is seen as a medical problem that resides in the
individual. It is a defect in or failure of a bodily system and as
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such is inherently abnormal and pathological. The goals of
intervention are cure, amelioration of the physical condition
to the greatest extent possible, and rehabilitation (i.e., the
adjustment of the person with the disability to the condition and
to the environment). Persons with disabilities are expected to
avail themselves of the variety of services offered to them and to
spend time in the role of patient or learner being helped by
trained professionals. (p. 26)
The medical model of disability is sometimes also referred
to as the ‘personal tragedy’ model (Thomas & Woods
2003:15), because it defines disability in a fundamentally
negative way. Disability is regarded as objectively bad,
as a pitiable condition, ‘a personal tragedy for both the
individual and her family, something to be prevented and,
if possible, cured’ (Carlson 2010:5). As Carlson points out,
this negative conception of disability has contributed to
some of the questionable medical treatments performed on
PWDs, including, for example, involuntary sterilisation and
euthanasia.
According to the medical model, PWDs deviate from what
is normal. Terms such as ‘invalid’, ‘cripple’, ‘spastic’,
‘handicapped’ and ‘retarded’ are all derived from the medical
model (Creamer 2009:22). This approach to disability
reinforces the notion that PWDs are not comparable with
their able-bodied counterparts. As Johnstone (2012:16) avers,
‘The medical model of interpretation of disability projects
a dualism which tends to categorise the able-bodied as
somehow ‘better’ or superior to people with disabilities’.
Medical professionals who subscribe to the medical model
tend to treat people as problems to be solved, often failing to
take into account the various aspects related to the person’s
life as a whole (Thomas & Woods 2003:15). Kasser and Lytle
(2005:11) highlight the medical model’s exclusive focus
on the limitation(s) associated with a person’s disability,
which essentially ‘[disregards] environments that might
intensify or adversely affect a person’s functional abilities’.
Accordingly, the medical model tends to regard the person
with disability as the one who needs to change or be fixed,
not the conditions that might be contributing to the person’s
disability (Kasser & Lytle 2005:11).
The medical model of disability assigns tremendous power
to the medical professionals who diagnose people using
criteria such as the ones noted above, because the very
criteria being used for diagnosis have been developed from
the perspective of what is considered ‘normal’ in society
(Thomas & Woods 2003:15). Nevertheless, because many
PWDs will never experience a cure that eliminates their
disability, it is often the case that medical professionals who
adhere to the medical model will regard PWDs as failures
and an embarrassment (Pfeiffer 2003:100).
In his seminal sociological study of illness and the role of the
physician, Parsons (1951) insightfully described the basic
characteristics of the ‘sick role’ people are expected to play in
any social context where the medical model prevails:
The first of these is the exemption of the sick person from the
performance of certain of his normal social obligations. . . .
Secondly, the sick person is, in a very specific sense, also
exempted from a certain type of responsibility for his
own state . . . The third aspect of the sick role is the partial
character of its legitimation, hence the deprivation of a claim to
full legitimacy . . . Finally, fourth, being sick is also defined,
except for the mildest cases, as being ‘in need of help’.
(pp. 455–456)
For medical professionals who adhere to the medical model
of disability, PWDs should play the ‘sick role’ properly if they
desire to receive continued help and support. However,
Llewellyn, Agu and Mercer (2008:256) highlight the
shortcomings of the medical model’s ‘sick role’ approach,
especially in relation to the fact that many chronically ill
or disabled people do not consider themselves as sick.
Furthermore, the ‘sick role’ approach fails to take account of
the vital distinction between impairment and sickness. As
Llewellyn et al. (2008:256) note, ‘Many disabled people are
not sick, but have ongoing impairments that do not present
as daily health problems’.
The social model: Disability as a
socially constructed phenomenon
Inspired by the activism of the British disability
movement in the 1960s and the 1970s, the social model of
disability developed in reaction to the limitations of
the medical model of disability (D’Alessio 2011:44).
According to the social model (sometimes also referred
to as the minority model), it is society ‘which disables
people with impairments, and therefore any meaningful
solution must be directed at societal change rather than
individual adjustment and rehabilitation’ (Barnes,
Mercer & Shakespeare 2010:163). One of the most important
documents in the development of this approach is the
Union of the Physically Impaired against Segregation’s
(UPIAS) manifesto document, Fundamental Principles
of Disability (1976). Fundamental to the social model
of disability is the notion that disability is ultimately
a socially constructed phenomenon. UPIAS (1976)
emphasises the importance of this social dimension in its
definition of disability:
[D]isability is a situation, caused by social conditions, which
requires for its elimination, (a) that no one aspect such as
incomes, mobility or institutions is treated in isolation, (b) that
disabled people should, with the advice and help of others,
assume control over their own lives, and (c) that professionals,
experts and others who seek to help must be committed to
promoting such control by disabled people. (p. 3)
Oliver (1981:28), a disabled activist and lecturer, who also
coined the phrase ‘social model of disability’, stresses the
need to focus on the social aspects of disability, especially
how ‘the physical and social environment impose limitations
upon certain categories of people’.
UPIAS (1976) draws an important conceptual distinction
between the terms ‘impairment’ and ‘disability’. Impairment
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is defined as ‘lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a
defective limb, organ or mechanism of the body’, while
disability is defined as:
the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary
social organisation which takes no or little account of people
who have physical impairments and thus excludes them from
participation in the mainstream of social activities. (UPIAS 1976:14)
From this point of view, disability is a socially constructed
disadvantage, which is, in a very real sense, imposed on
PWDs, constituting ‘a particular form of social oppression’
(UPIAS 1976). Schipper (2006) explains the critical importance
of the distinction between impairment and disability in the
development of the social model, especially in terms of its
relevance to different cultures:
These definitions provided a theoretical underpinning for the
social model by making a clear distinction between social
disability and physical impairment. While an impairment is
universally constant (e.g. the inability to conceive children), the
extenttowhichthisimpairmenthassocial/politicalconsequences
shifts from culture to culture (i.e. the inability to conceive
children may be more ‘disabling’ in ancient Near Eastern cultures
than in industrialized Western ones). (p. 17)
UPIAS’ approach has subsequently been slightly amended
by those working in the disability community so that the
term ‘impairment’ is utilised in preference to the term
‘physical impairment’, which could be construed as excluding
sensory and intellectual disabilities (Barnes et al. 2010:163).
Social model theorists argue that the term ‘people with
disabilities’ is directly linked to the philosophy underlying
the medical model and therefore insist that the term ‘disabled
people’ better reflects the societal oppression that people with
impairments are faced with every day. As Purtell (2013:26)
observes, ‘[D]isabled people are people who are “disabled” by
the society they live in and by the impact of society’s structures
and attitudes’. Purtell illustrates the social model’s argument
about the utility of the term ‘disabled people’ by reference
to people with learning difficulties: ‘People with learning
difficulties are ‘disabled people’ whose impairment is their
learning difficulty: they are disabled by the social reactions
to it’ (2013:26). The social model is especially concerned with
addressing the ‘barriers to participation’ experienced by
PWDs as a result of various ableist social and environmental
factors in society (O’Connell, Finnerty & Egan 2008:15).
The social model of disability has had a profound influence
on how disability is understood in our time (Giddens
2006:282). The social model has played a crucial role in
shaping social policy vis-à-vis PWDs, not only in national
levels but also in international level. In the South African
context, the social model is reflected in the Integrated National
Disability Strategy (1997), as well as the Department of
Labour’s Code of Good Practice: Key Aspects on the Employment
of People with Disabilities (2002).
Within the field of disability theology, the theological models
of Block (2002) and Eiesland (1994) may be regarded as
variants of the social model of disability (Creamer 2006).
Block (2002:11) argues for a ‘theology of access’ and calls on
the church to challenge oppressive social and ecclesial
structures, ensuring ‘that people with disabilities take their
rightful place within the Christian community’. Block’s
(2002:122) reliance on the social model is evident when
she emphasises the church’s need to ‘search our community
with truth and face the serious reality that some of the
people of God have been systematically denied access to the
community’.
Eiesland (2002:10) is also in agreement with the central
argument of the social model when she declares, ‘Sadly,
rather than offering empowerment, the church has more
often supported societal structures and attitudes that have
treated people with disabilities as objects of pity and
paternalism’. Eiesland’s (2002) emphasis on the serious need
for social change is cogently articulated in her remarks about
‘disabling theology’:
The problem is a disabling theology that functionally denies
inclusion and justice for many of God’s children. Much of church
theology and practice – including the Bible itself – has often been
dangerous for persons with disabilities, who encounter prejudice,
hostility, and suspicion that cannot be dismissed simply as relics
of an unenlightened past. Christians today continue to interpret
and spin theologies in ways that reinforce negative stereotypes,
support social and environmental segregation, and mask the
lived realities of people with disabilities. (p. 10)
In order to develop a ‘liberating theology of disability’,
Eiesland (2002:10–12) insists on the need to critically
examine the Biblical foundation of disabling theology, and
subsequently the production of ‘a theology of disability,
emerging from the lives and even the bodies of those with
disabilities’.
Both Block’s and Eiesland’s approaches to the social model
of disability have been criticised (cf. Adam 2014; Creamer
2009). Creamer (2009:88–89) questions the utility of Block’s
approach once social and ecclesial injustices against PWDs
have been remedied, noting three points of concern. Firstly,
while the notion of an Accessible God imbues PWDs with a
sense of God’s solidarity with them, it fails to offer ‘clear
direction in terms of action, devotion, or even imagination’
(Creamer 2009:88). Secondly, Block’s image of an Accessible
God does not provide churches and able-bodied people
with a holistic approach: ‘This image demands justice and
inclusion but proposes little else about God or about human
life’. Thirdly, even in terms of its utility for developing an
inclusive community, Block’s approach ‘offers little that
would aid in the construction of an inclusive community’
(Creamer 2009:89). As for Eiesland’s notion of the Disabled
God, Adam (2014) questions to what extent such a metaphor
may offer a sense of eschatological hope for Christians with
disabilities:
[T]he eternal condition of the disabled God has yet to be narrated.
Humans and God could share disabilities eternally, but that
scenario does not relieve resurrected people of their disabilities.
(pp. 185–186)
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While a number of people in the disability community regard
the insights of the social model as liberating, Giddens
(2006:283) notes several points of critique that have been
noted against the social approach. Firstly, some argue that the
social model seemingly ignores the often painful realities
of impairment. As Shakespeare and Watson (in Giddens
2006:283) remark, ‘We are not just disabled people, we are
also people with impairments, and to pretend otherwise is
to ignore a major part of our biographies’. Secondly, while
many people accept the fact that they have impairments, they
prefer not to be referred to as ‘disabled’. Giddens (2006:284)
notes a recent survey of people claiming government benefits
that found fewer than half the people opted to describe
themselves as disabled. Lastly, medical sociologists are very
sceptical of the model, as they reject the social model’s
distinction between impairment and disability as artificial.
While acknowledging that the differentiation seems valid at
the surface, such a simplistic division collapses once one asks
the following question: ‘where does impairment end and
disability start?’
Social model theorists have responded to critique such as the
above by pointing out that they neither deny the fact that
some forms of illness may have disabling consequences nor
do they deny the role of medical professionals in treating
various illnesses. For these theorists, the problem is that
medical professionals fail to distinguish between a person’s
illness and his or her disability.
The identity model: Disability as
an identity
Closely related to the social model of disability – yet with a
fundamental difference in emphasis – is the identity model
(or affirmation model) of disability. This model shares the
social model’s understanding that the experience of disability
is socially constructed, but differs to the extent that it ‘claims
disability as a positive identity’ (Brewer et al. 2012:5). Brewer
et al. (2012) offer the following illuminating definition, which
also explains how the identity model departs from the social
model’s approach:
Under the identity model, disability is a marker of membership
in a minority identity, much like gender or race . . . Under an
identity model, disability is primarily defined by a certain type
of experience in the world – a social and political experience of
the effects of a social system not designed with disabled people
in mind . . . [W]hile the identity model owes much to the social
model, it is less interested in the ways environments, policies,
and institutions disable people, and more interested in forging a
positive definition of disability identity based on experiences
and circumstances that have created a recognizable minority
group called ‘people with disabilities’. (p. 5)
Swain and French (2000:577–578) discuss a number of ways
in which the identity model of disability, which they term
‘the affirmation model’, shapes the identity of PWDs:
•	 An acknowledgement of the socially constructed
dimension of disability, especially as articulated by the
social model.
•	 Motivating PWDs to belong to a campaigning group,
which aids in the development of a collective identity.
•	 The collective expression of ‘frustration and anger’.
•	 A realisation that there is nothing wrong with PWDs
embracing an identity as ‘outsiders’, but PWDs should
have the right to be ‘insiders’ if they prefer.
•	 Group identity has inspired many PWDs to endeavour
for revolutionary ‘visions of change, often under the flags
of “civil rights” and “equal opportunities”’.
The identity model has influenced many in the disability
community, inspiring PWDs to adopt a positive self-image
that celebrates ‘disability pride’ (Darling & Heckert 2010:207).
As with the social model, the identity model is not without
its critics. One of the major points of critique against the
approach is that it seems to compel individuals to identify
with a specific group culture (Fraser 2003:26). A further point
of critique is that the identity model negates the struggle for
redistribution, failing to pay sufficient attention to the reality
of economic inequality faced by PWDs (Fraser 2003:24).
The human rights model: Disability
as a human rights issue
Another model that bears close affinity to the social model of
disability is the human rights model of disability. Although
some researchers treat the social model and the human rights
model as virtually synonymous, Degener (2017) highlights a
number of important differences between them. Firstly, while
the social model helps people to understand the underlying
social factors that shape our understanding of disability, the
human rights model moves beyond explanation, offering a
theoretical framework for disability policy that emphasises
the human dignity of PWDs (Degener 2017:43). Secondly, the
human rights model incorporates both first and second
generation human rights, in the sense that ‘it encompasses
both sets of human rights, civil and political as well as
economic, social and cultural rights’ (Degener 2017:44).
Thirdly, while the social model mostly fails to appreciate the
reality of pain and suffering in the lives of some PWDs,
the human rights model respects the fact that some PWDs are
indeed confronted by such challenging life situations and
argues that such factors should be taken into account in the
development of relevant social justice theories (Degener
2017:47). Fourthly, while the social model does not pay
adequate attention to the importance of identity politics, the
human rights model ‘offers room for minority and cultural
identification’ (Degener 2017:49). Fifthly, while the social
model is mostly critical of public health policies that advocate
the prevention of impairment, the human rights model
recognises the fact that properly formulated prevention
policy may be regarded as an instance of human rights
protection for PWDs (Degener 2017:52). Lastly, while the
social model can helpfully explain why so many PWDs are
living in poverty, the human rights model offers constructive
proposals for improving the life situation of PWDs (Degener
2017:54).
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The cultural model: Disability
as culture
The cultural model of disability developed in the North
American context, where disability studies have been
approached in an interdisciplinary manner by a number of
scholars working in the social sciences and humanities
(cf. Michalko 2002; Titchkosky 2007). Junior and Schipper
(2013:23) outline the primary characteristics of the cultural
model, specifically in terms of how it differs from the medical
model and social model. While the medical model and the
social model each focus on only one factor in their approach
to disability, the cultural model focuses on a range of cultural
factors. Such factors may include medical and social factors
but are by no means limited to these factors. Accordingly, the
cultural approach does not seek to define disability in any
specific way but rather focuses on how different notions
of disability and non-disability operate in the context of a
specific culture.
The work of Snyder and Mitchell (2006) has played a critically
important role in shaping the theoretical contours of the
cultural approach to understand disability. Snyder and
Mitchell (2006) argue that particular ‘cultural locations of
disability’ have been created on behalf of PWDs, locations
where PWDs ‘find themselves deposited, often against their
will’. Some of these ‘cultural locations’ include:
nineteenth century charity systems; institutions for the
feebleminded during the eugenics period; the international
disability research industry; sheltered workshops for the
‘multi-handicapped’; medically based and documentary film
representations of disability; and current academic research
trends on disability. (p. 3)
The primary problem with these manufactured locations is
the modernist assumptions which underpin them, specifically
the strategy ‘to classify and pathologize human differences
(known today as disabilities) and then manage them through
various institutional locations’ (Snyder & Mitchell 2006:4–5).
Nevertheless, such artificial or manufactured locations of
disability knowledge should be distinguished from ‘more
authenticating cultural modes of disability knowledge’,
which are necessary and important ways of understanding
disability, for example, ‘the disability rights movement,
disability culture, the independent living movement, and
other experientially based organizations of disabled people’
(Snyder & Mitchell 2006:4).
The cultural model of disability is gaining increasing
acceptance in the disability community, especially through
its adoption by a number of deaf culture theorists (cf.
Holcomb 2013; Lewis 2007).
The charity model: Disability as
victimhood
According to the charity model, PWDs are victims of
circumstance who should be pitied. As Duyan (2007:71)
explains, ‘The Charity Model sees people with disabilities
as victims of their impairment. Their situation is tragic, and
they are suffering’. Able-bodied people should therefore
assist PWDs in whatever way possible, as ‘they need special
services, special institutions, etc., because they are different’
(Duyan 2007:71). In contrast with the moral and/or religious
model of disability, which has a largely negative view of
PWDs, the charity model seeks to act to the benefit of PWDs,
encouraging ‘humane treatment of persons with disabilities’
(Henderson & Bryan 2011:7–8).
Many people in the disability community regard the charity
model in a very negative light. The model is often seen as
depicting PWDs as helpless, depressed and dependent on
other people for care and protection, contributing to the
preservation of harmful stereotypes and misconceptions
about PWDs (Seale 2006:10).
The economic model: Disability as
a challenge to productivity
The economic model of disability approaches disability
from the viewpoint of economic analysis, focusing on ‘the
various disabling effects of an impairment on a person’s
capabilities, and in particular on labour and employment
capabilities’ (Armstrong, Noble & Rosenbaum 2006:151,
original emphasis). While the economic model insists on the
importance of ‘respect, accommodations, and civil rights to
people with disabilities’, such concerns are subservient to the
economic model’s estimation of a disabled person’s ability to
work and contribute to the economy (Smart 2004:37).
The economic model is often utilised by governments as a
basic point of reference for formulating disability policy
(Jordan 2008:193). In South Africa, the influence of the
economic model may be seen in the definition of disability
adopted by the Department of Labour’s Code of Good Practice:
Key Aspects on the Employment of People with Disabilities (2002):
People are considered as persons with disabilities who satisfy all
the criteria in the definition: (i) having a physical or mental
impairment; (ii) which is long term or recurring; and (iii) which
substantially limits their prospects of entry into or advancement
in employment. (Paragraph 5.1)
The economic model of disability has been criticised for
framing disability almost exclusively in terms of a cost–
benefit analysis, neglecting to take other important factors
into account (cf. Aylward, Cohen & Sawney 2013; Smart
2004). Such an economic focus may contribute to the
dehumanisation of the person with disability as someone
who is somehow ‘missing parts’ (Stone cited by Smart
2004:40).
The limits model: Disability as
embodied experience
According to the limits model of disability – a distinctly
theological model of disability developed by Creamer
(2009) – disability is best understood with reference to the
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notions of embodiment and ‘limitness’. Firstly, with regard
to understanding the concept of embodiment, Creamer
(2009:57), along with embodiment theologians such as
McFague (1993), argues that the reality of the human body
should be taken seriously when engaging in theology. From
this point of view, the reality of embodied experience must be
regarded as an important source for engaging in theology
(Creamer 2009:57). Creamer (2009:56) emphasises that such
theological reflection focuses on ‘all that is written on, of,
or by the body, going far beyond sensory experiences to
include science, politics, economics, media, and many other
concerns of postmodern life’. Moreover, such an approach
has particular significance for how the issue of disability is
approached, especially when considered in the context of
what Creamer (2009:96) calls ‘limit-ness’.
According to the limits model, it is important that people
accept the fact that all human beings experience some level
of limitation in their everyday lives (Creamer 2009:109).
Moreover, such limits are experienced to varying degrees
during all the phases of our life (Creamer 2009:118). Rather
than being something foreign to human experience, limits are
as a matter of fact ‘a common, indeed quite unsurprising,
aspect of being human’ (Creamer 2009:31). Indeed, Creamer
(2009:96,116) prefers to utilise the neologism ‘limit-ness’ – as
opposed to the terms ‘limitation’ or ‘limitedness’ – in order
to emphasise that ‘human limits need not (and perhaps
ought not) be seen as negative or as something that is not
or that cannot be done’, but rather as ‘an important part of
being human’. Furthermore, as people experience ‘various
formations’ of embodiment, ‘disabled embodiment’ is one of
those formations of embodiment (Creamer 2009:32).
The limits model of disability has profound implications
for how disability is understood. Firstly, it seeks to avoid
categorisation such as ‘disabled’, ‘able-bodied’, ‘abnormal
body’ or ‘normal body’, preferring to focus on ‘a web of
related experiences’ that recognises – for example – that a
person who is legally blind might have more in common
with someone who wears glasses than someone who uses
wheelchair (Creamer 2009:31).
Secondly, because the limits model emphasises that ‘limits
are an unsurprising aspect of being human’ (Creamer
2009:93), it guards against overdetermining the situation of
PWDs vis-à-vis the wider population (Mawson 2013:410). As
Creamer (2009) points out:
This model also highlights that limits go far beyond those
labelled as part of the province of disability, and shows that some
limits are viewed as more normal (I cannot fly) than others
(I cannot run). (p. 96)
Lastly, while acknowledging the social model’s key insight
that disability is primarily social in nature, the limits model
departs from the social model by allowing for the viewpoint
that not ‘all limits are necessarily “normal” or even “good”’
(Creamer 2009:109). Mawson (2013:411) further explains this
aspect of the limits model, noting how embodied experience
puts things in different perspective by ‘recognizing that some
of us may wish to strive to overcome certain limits, that is,
without suggesting that limitedness itself is simply something
that should be overcome’.
Conclusion
This article has outlined nine models of disability that
continue to impact the way in which people conceive of
PWDs. While these are by no means the only models of
disability that may be encountered in our time, they are the
most dominant models of disability today. Any theologian
who wishes to engage in theology from a disability
perspective will do well by first engaging in some critical
self-examination to determine the extent to which one or
more of the above models of disability influence their
thinking about PWDs. Once the theologian is clear about
which model(s) of disability shapes his or her thinking, he or
she may commence the creative process of constructing a
disability theology that is Christ-centred, biblically rooted
and relevant to the lives of PWDs.
Acknowledgements
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no financial or personal
relationships which may have inappropriately influenced
them in writing this article.
Authors’ contributions
M.R. and R.L. equally contributed to the research and writing
of this article.
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