A TIME TO DEFINE: MAKING THE SPECIFIC
LEARNING DISABILITY DEFINITION
PRESCRIBE SPECIFIC LEARNING DISABILITY
Kenneth A. Kavale, Lucinda S. Spaulding, and Andrea P. Beam
Abstract. Unlike other special education categories defined in
U.S. law (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), the definition
of specific learning disability (SLD) has not changed since
first proposed in 1968. Thus, although the operational definition
of SLD has responded to new knowledge and understanding about
the construct, the formal definition has remained static for 40
years, creating a schism between theory and practice. Using concepts
gleaned from the scientific study of formal and operational
definitions as well as the history of another special education category
(i.e., mental retardation), in this article we demonstrate why
change in the SLD definition is necessary. Finally, we propose a
change in the SLD definition in federal regulations to redress the
disconnect between theory and practice and restore integrity to
the SLD field.
KENNETH A. KAVALE, Ph.D., Regent University.
LUCINDA S. SPAULDING, M.Ed., Regent University.
ANDREA P. BEAM, Ed.D., Regent University.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a
rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose
it to mean - neither more nor less."
- Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Giass
The field of specific learning disability (SLD) is
engaged in discussion about the best means of identifying
SLD. The problem related to SLD identification
is long-standing, and the 2004 Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) regulations were
aimed at enhancing identification by including a
response-to-intervention (RTI) process. Nevertheless,
although RTI is viewed as a means of "redefining" SLD
(Vaughn & Fuchs, 2003), technically, SLD is not being
redefined but rather re-operationalized.
For practice to proceed efficiently, "operational definitions"
are required, but such definitions should translate
the concepts described in the formal definitional
statement into tangible actions (Hempel, 1961). As a
scientific process, the formulation of operational definitions
should be based on fundamental principles, but
the SLD field has not rigorously followed the rules,
unintentionally leading to the development of spurious
operational definitions.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the
fragility of current SLD operational definitions and,
more important, the insubstantial nature of the current
formal definition of SLD.
Formal Definitions
Definitions may be defined in a variety of ways (see
Volume 32, Winter 2009 39
Robinson, 1954). For example, Spinoza (1949) suggested
that "the true idea [real definition] must agree with that
of which it is the idea {cum suo ideato)" (p. 42).
Accordingly, the focus is on the thing rather than on
words, which means that an SLD definition would be
about the thing SLD, not about the word (concept) SLD.
The goal is to capture essence (see Aristotle, circa 350
B.C.E./1989), but such real definitions cannot be
attained through the use of words, making them of only
theoretical interest.
Since it is customary to use words to define something,
most SLD definitions belong fo the class termed
nominal definition, whose goal is fo create a word-fhing
definition, which can be refined into word (stable linguistic
sign) - thing (referent of such a sign). One form
of nominal definition, termed lexical, is exemplified by
dictionary definitions representing the customary
meaning of a word af a particular time. However, such
definitions are often foo general and not rich in meaning.
For example, the lexical definition of disability
reads "the condition of being disabled" (MerriamWebsfer,
2008). This is not very helpful for understanding
disability because the definition does nof creafe
an unambiguous concept (see Kant, 1781/1998).
Definitions remain ambiguous because of the language
property termed fhe "arbitrariness of fhe sign," which is
best represented in the quote opening this paper
{Through the Looking Glass, Lewis Carroll, 1872/1984b).
The statement by Humpty-Dumpty illustrates the
impossibility of a completely nonarbifrary definition.
The arbitrary nature of any formal definition places it
in the class of definition termed sfipulafive, which
embodies the explicit and deliberate but arbitrary adoption
of a meaning relation among words (Robinson,
1954). Thus, sfipulative definitions explain the nature
of a phenomenon, not in the sense of what it really is,
but in the way it is conceived to be in different social,
political, and logical contexts. Consequently, in a stipulative
definition, words mean whatever a particular
group (or individual) chooses them to mean based upon
their own linguistic, cognitive, and philosophical premises
(Rantala, 1977). The primary difficulty lies in the
absence of a rational means for deciding which stipulative
definition is best; hence, stipulative definitions possess
only heuristic value with no implications about
validity (Robinson, 1954).
Although the IDEA definition of SLD has attained
consensus status (i.e., it is the most widely used), primarily
because of the significant influence of the federal
government (i.e., legislation and funding), it suffers
from the fundamental difficulty associated with all stipulative
definitions: They need not be true but only useful.
Because its status gives the IDEA definition of SLD
heuristic value, the unwarranted assumption that the
definition is veritable remains; it may be right or wrong.
As pointed out by Cruickshank (1976) some 30 years
ago, the consequences are found in the development of
a potentially false understanding of SLD because the
definition "is far from satisfactory. It served an important
purpose in 1963.... It was a term agreed upon then
by essentially all the leaders in the field. ... It is positive
in its connotation. ... In use, however, it has permitted
misinterpretations" (pp. 112-113).
SLD Definition
The IDEA (2004) definition of SLD - because of its
entrenchment in federal legislation - represents the
most influential stipulative definition of SLD. As
defined in IDEA (2004), fhe SLD definition reads as
follows:
In General - The term "specific learning disability"
means a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological
processes involved in understanding or
in using language, spoken or written, which disorder
may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to
listen, think, speak, wrife, spell, or do mathematical
calculations.
Disorders Included - Such term includes such conditions
as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal
brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental
aphasia.
Disorders Not Included - Such term does not
include a learning problem that is primarily the
result of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities, of
mental retardation, of emotional disturbance, or of
environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage.
(P.L. 108-466, Sec. 602[30])
The definition creates a concept with three major
points of agreement. First, a description of academic difficulties
associated with fundamental cognitive deficiencies
(i.e., understanding, using), which, in turn, are
related to deficits in basic psychological processes.
Second, a listing of conditions analogous to SLD that
were presumably added to enhance the description
found in the "In General" statement. Third, a statement
circumscribing SLD by excluding elements that may be
associated with learning problems but are not primary
to the SLD condition.
Although representing the definition of SLD, the
IDEA definition illustrates major shortcomings of stipulative
definitions. First, the "In General" clause is a
vague and cryptic description; the "specific" adjective
associated with learning disability is nebulous, leaving
only an obscure expression about general learning problems.
Second, the two other elements introduce even
less precision. Although SLD may be analogous to the
conditions listed in "Disorders Included," there is no
explanation about why this may be the case.
Learning Disability Quarterly 40
Additionally, many of the disorders included
are controversial and poorly defined themselves.
Consequently, a child experiencing academic problems
may be described as being like a child with SLD,
but without further verification, it becomes fact that
the child is SLD; in other words, the simile becomes the
metaphor (Smith & Polloway, 1979). The "Disorders
Not Included" statement excludes certain possibilities
but fails to indicate how any remaining possibility is
properly termed SLD. It seems unfortunate that the
only "specific" part of the definition is found in the
certainty about what SLD is not.
Although indeterminate about the SLD construct, the
IDEA definition has been the primary description since
first offered in 1968 by the National Advisory
Committee on Handicapped Children (NACHC, 1968)
and initially incorporated in Public Law 94-142 (The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act [1975]),
now IDEA. The almost universal acceptance of the federal
definition has deflected attention away from
attempts to enhance the unmodified formal definition.
Consequently, there has been little effort to enhance
the "truth value" of the SLD definition.
Operational Deflnitions
With no change in fhe formal definition, attention
was directed af improving practice through the use of
operational definitions that provide a process for the
identification and classification of concepts that have
been formally defined. According to the physicist Percy
Bridgman (1927), "in general, we mean by a concept
nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous
with the corresponding set of opérations" (p. 5).
For any concept, a set of operations defines its scientific
understanding and use and "to know these operations is
to understand the concept as fully as science requires"
(Kaplan, 1964, p. 40).
In reality, operational definitions represent only temporary
assumptions about a concept, which is subject to
change: "No concept can be defined once and for all:
every concept requires constant purging to keep it operationally
healthy" (Stevens, 1935, p. 527). However, the
change introduces imprecision because of difficulties
demonstrating how, for example, two different operations
define the same concept (Boring, 1945). Thus, it
cannot be assumed that the identical concept is assessed
under different circumstances (i.e., when different operations
are used) (Benjamin, 1955).
Although usually based on an empirical indicator
(e.g., test score), operational definitions are judged by
criteria other than statistical notions of reliability and
validity. Thus, operational definitions are judged by signißcance
(i.e., is it an authoritative marker of the concept?)
and meaningfulness (i.e., is it a rational and logical
marker of the concept?). Since there are no rules for
converting concepts to operational definitions, any
concept "operationally defined" may appear to be valid
(i.e., true) but be devoid of significance and meaningfulness
(Bergmann, 1961).
Unlike notions in the physical sciences, SLD concepts
are generally ill defined in a scientific sense (see
Hempel, 1952). Consequently, the loose theoretical
structure possessed by SLD concepts means they are better
viewed as nonvalidated "ideas" and not "true" concepts
(see Carnap, 1956). To provide a tighter
conceptual structure, SLD concepts usually include open
terms that create "symbolic operations," which trace the
connections among theoretical ideas. Kaplan (1964)
warned, however, that the "criteria for the scientific usefulness
or even admissibility of such [symbolic] operations
are virtually impossible to formulate" (p. 42).
In reality, operational definitions provide a "functional
analysis" because "operational definitions are nof
analytic truths, but subject to empirical confirmation.
This suggests that they are not 'definitions' at all"
(Leahey, 1980, p. 138). Kerlinger (1973) noted that "An
operational definition is a sort of manual of instruction.
... If says, in effecf, "do such-and-such and in so-and-so
a manner" (p. 31). As such, creating operational definitions
cannof subsfifufe for the confinuing fheorefical
development of a concepfual sfrucfure. Although having
a role "in piloting nascent thought about a given
phenomenon, [operational definitions] cannof ultimately
replace the fruits of hard, rigorous thought"
(Green, 1992, p. 315).
The fragility of using operational definitions
unfounded in theory may be demonstrated by the
hypothetical Index of Specific Learning Disability
(ISLD) defined as:
ISLD = [(Red Blood Cell Count + Mental Age)/Weight (In oz)]
+ [Grade Level Achievement/Auditory Acuity (in Db)]
[Head Circumference + Words Read (per minute)] - 2.5
Clearly, it would be possible to ascertain a child's
ISLD. Equally clearly, the ILSD lacks significance and
meaningfulness. What expressive and consequential
markers of SLD are included? Although some elements
seem appropriate, others do not belong. We know a
good deal about SLD, and the ISLD does not seem to
"fit" with existing knowledge about SLD. Although the
ISLD possesses a certain a priori plausibility, even a cursory
analysis shows that it lacks a cohesive theoretical
foundation, quickly undermining plausibility.
Operational Definitions of SLD
Since 1977, the primary operational definition of
SLD has been found in the "discrepancy criterion."
First introduced in Bateman's (1965) definition, disVolume
32, Winter 2009 41
crepancy was formalized in federal regulations as a
"severe discrepancy" between ability and achieve-
ment:
(1) The child does not achieve commensurate with
his or her age and ability when provided with
appropriate educational experiences, and (2) the
child has a severe discrepancy between achievement
and intellectual ability in one or more areas
relating to communication skills and mathematics
abilities. (U.S. Office of Education [USOE], 1977, p.
65083)
The definition of discrepancy specifies a synonymous
meaning relation: "..." = df "...," which reads: (some
term) is definitionally equivalent to (some other
term[s]) (see Robinson, 1954). In the present case, "discrepancy"
= df ("difference between expected and
actual achievement") and is only definitionally equivalent
if the terms are mutually replaceable without altering
the truth value. The problem is the variability
associated with discrepancy methods that renders them
definitionally nonequivalent. For example, Kavale
(2002) described four approaches to discrepancy: gradelevel
deviation, expectancy formula, standard-score
difference, and regression formula. Although each
method defines the same concept ("discrepancy"), the
differences among the procedures used to calculate discrepancy
renders them nonequivalent.
These problems are compounded when different ability
(i.e., 10) and achievement measures are used to
"define" expected and actual achievement since they
also serve to reduce definitional equivalence and
change meaning. Thus, unless an operational definition
is applied in exactly the same way in every instance,
precision, as well as the ability to generalize outcomes,
is reduced. As suggested by Kaplan (1964), "Constancy
of meaning would depend on empirical constancies
which cannot always be anticipated" (p. 41).
Besides definitional equivalence, operational definitions
also require conceptual equivalence. Proffering
discrepancy as the operational definition of SLD suggests
that discrepancy is definitionally equivalent to
SLD (i.e., "discrepancy" = df "SLD"). Clearly, this is not
true; SLD is a far more complicated construct that is not
easily defined by a single feature (see Kavale & Nye,
1985-1986).
Hempel (1952) described concept formation as a
process wherein a phenomenon is analyzed into elements
that are then grouped together and ultimately
assigned to a class. For example, the SLD concept puts
into a single class a particular set of children and is itself
analyzed into such elements as school failure, achievement
status, neuropsychological deficits, neurological
integrity, linguistic standing, and the like. The goal is to
create a "natural" class where "a significant concept so
groups or divides its subject-matter that it can enter into
many and important true propositions about the subject-matter
other than those which state the classification
itself" (Kaplan, 1964, p. 50).
By itself, discrepancy is not a natural class of SLD but
part of a larger array describing SLD. An operational definition
that equates SLD with discrepancy is thus
incomplete and ignores suggestions for more comprehensive
operational definitions (e.g., Flanagan, Ortiz,
Alfonso, & Mascólo, 2002; Kavale & Forness, 2000;
Shaw, CuUen, McGuire, & Brinkerhoff, 1995). Because
discrepancy has been the operational definition of SLD
for so long, it has created the false impression that the
two concepts are equivalent. When the possible variations
in the application of discrepancy are considered, it
is easy to see how the concept of SLD evolved differently
over time, serving only to exacerbate the heterogeneity
of the SLD population.
The Need for a New Formal Definition
The history of SLD has been well documented and
shows how the category fulfilled an important need in
special education (see Mercer & Hallahan, 2002;
Wiederholt, 1974). flowever, from the beginning, there
was recognition of the need for a definition that better
reflected the nature of SLD and was accepted for reasons
other than the influence of the federal government.
Thus, more than 35 years ago, McCarthy (1971) suggested
that, "The most important decision you will
make is that of definition - because your definition will
dictate for you the terminology to be used in your program,
the prevalence figure, your selection criteria, and
the appropriate remedial procedures" (p. 14). Yet, the
"problem of definition" continues as it has since 1969:
"I believe it is safe to say that in no other area of special
education has so much effort and controversy gone into
the refinement of a definition" (Kass, 1969, p. 241).
Ames (1977) suggested that the "problem of definition"
developed because "the term 'learning disabilities'
caught on and swept the country - long before we had
reached a really satisfactory definition of what it
means" (p. 328). Failure to resolve the SLD definition
controversy suggests that the definition has been "good
enough" for practice, but the price paid is found in the
failure to articulate a comprehensive understanding of
the SLD construct (Kavale & Forness, 1995).
The SLD condition was originally conceptualized as a
circumscribed entity affecting a small portion of the
school population experiencing academic difficulties
(see Kavale & Forness, 1985). Yet, because of incomplete
understanding, SLD soon transcended its boundaries
and became a catch-all classification for a general class
of learning problems. "Indeed all exceptional children
have learning problems. But these children are not
Learning Disabiiity Quarterly 42
children with a specific learning disability, that is, a learning
disability in one area when all other functions are
intact" (Kirk, 1976, p. 258). The name itself, SLD, soon
morphed into the more generic learning disabilities,
moving the construct away from being a particular condition
and leading to the inclusion of large numbers of
students who may or may not be SLD.
It appears that the more definitions of SLD change (at
least, theoretically), the more they stay the same. Why?
Although changes in the definition have been proposed,
they have never influenced the federal definition
and thus do not have the force of the law behind
them. For example, the National Joint Committee on
Learning Disabilities (NJCLD), a multidisciplinary
group of organizations concerned about SLD, raised
five specific points of contention with the federal definition.
They also issued a new SLD definition in 1981,
which was well received but exerted little influence.
Similarly, the Interagency Committee on Learning
Disabilities (ICLD), comprised of federal agencies,
issued a definition in 1987 that essentially endorsed
the NJCLD definition. In response, the NJCLD modified
its earlier definition, but again it did not impact
the federal definition.
If proposed definitional modifications are not incorporated
into the federal definition, efforts to improve
the definition are pointless. The failure to modify the
federal definition cannot be justified and means that
SLD will continue to lack "two critical scientific elements:
understanding - a clear and unobscured sense of
SLD - and explanation - a rational exposition of the reasons
why a particular student is SLD" (Kavale & Forness,
2000, p. 240).
When SLD was a new category (circa 1970), the original
federal definition (i.e., NACHC) worked well in
establishing the legitimacy of SLD, but deficiencies were
noted early on. The NJCLD was formed to remedy the
perceived deficiencies, yet their definition remains apart
because of the preeminence of the federal definition.
Why engage in efforts to improve the SLD definition if
they are continuously ignored?
Amending the SLD Definition
Much like the Founding Fathers provided a means
and a process for the U.S. Constitution to "change with
the times" through the process of amendments, the
legal definition of SLD should be amended as the field
gains greater knowledge about its basic nature. The
amendment process has served to strengthen the
Constitution and reflect certain realities. Special education
should take a page from the Founding Fathers'
playbook and engage in amending the SLD definition to
reflect the expansive SLD research base. Surely, 40 years
of research has produced valuable insight for enhancing
the SLD deflnition. When the NACHC (1968) deflnition
was incorporated into Public Law 94-142 (1975) essentially
unchanged, the primary reason was the conflicting
nature of SLD research at the time: "No one really
knows what a learning disability is" {Congressional
Record, 1975, H 7755).
After some 30 years, such a statement can no longer
be valid. With no substantive change in over 30 years,
it seems safe to say that the SLD definition has retreated
into obscurity. By failing to incorporate theoretical
advances, the present SLD definition has made the category
over-inclusive because of "the well-intentioned
tendency to accept under the LD rubric all persons who
have any potential claim of possessing this disabling
condition" (Senf, 1977, p. 538).
Definitional Perspective
The enduring debate about definition ignores the fact
that professionals have long viewed SLD as a viable classification
(see Tucker, Stevens, & Ysseldyke, 1983) and
possess implicit notions about what SLD represents
(Swanson & Christie, 1994). The SLD definition, however,
has become articulated in many different operational
definitions, creating a situation where little
consensus exists about the nature of the condition.
Consequently, SLD has lost its original meaning, creating
a scenario where "the definition of [SLD] is like the
definition of pornography: 'No one seems to be able to
agree on a definition, but everyone knows it when they
see it'" (McGrady, 1980, p. 510).
Returning to Through the Looking Glass (Carroll,
1872/1984b), after Humpty-Dumpty issued his statement
about meaning, Alice replied, "The question is,
whether you can make words mean so many different
things" (p. 124) to which, in turn, Humpty-Dumpty
rejoined, "The question is, which is to be the master that's
all" (p. 124). Thus, Humpty-Dumpty is attempting
to overcome ambiguity. Because meaning is shaped
by its social context, the goal is to create a definition
whose descriptive statement organizes knowledge into a
logical framework for ensuring common meaning in
future discourse. But such a scenario is predicated on
definitions being amenable to change. Hence, the failure
to modify the federal SLD definition must be viewed
as illogical and unconscionable.
When asked to solve several riddles, Alice (see Alice's
Adventures in Wonderland, Carroll, 1866/1984a, p. 98) is
admonished,
"Then you should say what you mean," the March
Hare went on.
"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least - at least I
mean what I say - that's the same thing you
know."
"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter.
Volume 32, Winter 2009 43
With no change in the formal definition, SLD continues
to become not the same thing (a hit). Willis and
Dumont (2006) asked, "Has Congress provided us with
a hetter definition, leading to more appropriate diagnosis
of SLD, or has the definition just gotten worse?"
(p. 907). The proper response appears to be the latter,
because no change means even further disconnect from
the original SLD construct. The lack of attention
directed at the SLD definition must cease if the field is
to recapture its status as a reliable entity in special education
rather than a battleground for new initiatives
(i.e., RTI) that have only minimal association with SLD
(Kavale, Kauffman, Bachmeier, & LeFever, 2008).
The Example of the Deßnition of Mental
Retardation
The field of mental retardation (MR) demonstrates
how a definition can change in response to accumulating
research. For the greater part of the 20th century,
the most widely used definitions were provided by the
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD) (2007) (formerly the American
Association on Mental Retardation [AAMR]). Beginning
in 1921, the predecessors of AAIDD began to publish
MR definitions that were predicated on criteria that Doll
(1941) considered essential for describing MR: (a) social
incompetence, (b) mental subnormality, (c) developmental
arrest, (d) obtains at maturity, (e) of constitutional
origin, and (f) essentially incurable.
The most sweeping changes, beginning in 1959, are
shown in Table 1.
Although MR definitions changed, two key elements
were retained: (a) low general intellectual functioning
and (b) problems in adaptive behavior. For example,
based on population IQ data (e.g., Wechsler, 1958), the
Table 1
Changes in the Definition
Author/Date
Heber (1959):
Heber (1961):
Grossman (1973/1977):
Grossman (1983):
Luckasson et al. (1992):
Luckasson et al. (2002):
of Mental Retardation Since 1959
Definition
Mental retardation refers to subaverage general intellectual functioning that
originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in
one or more of the following: (a) maturation, (b) learning, and (c) social
adjustment.
Mental retardation refers to subaverage general intellectual functioning that
originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in
adaptive behavior.
Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage intellectual functions
existing concurrently with defects in adaptive behavior and manifested during
the developmental period.
Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning resulting in, or associated with, concurrent impairments in adaptive
behavior and manifested during the developmental period.
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing
concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable
adapting skills areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills,
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure,
and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.
Mental retardation is a disability characterized by significant limitations in both
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social,
and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18.
Learning Disabiiity Quarterly 44
upper IQ level for MR had historically been set at ahout
70, hut the 1959 and 1961 (Heher) definitions made MR
a more inclusive concept hy setting the IQ celling at
ahout 85. The more liheral IQ criterion was challenged,
for example, hecause it created the possihility of significantly
increasing the MR population (i.e., four times the
numher with a helow-70 IQ criterion) (Garfield &
Wittson, 1960). Consequently, the new 1973 and 1977
(Grossman) definitions hecame more exclusive with an
IQ cut-off set at 70 (i.e., 2 standard deviations [SD]
helow the mean) effectively removing the "horderline".
group (i.e., IQ of ahout 70 to 85) from MR consideration
(Claussen, 1972h). In 1977, Grossman introduced the
possihility of using clinical judgment in MR diagnosis.
In essence, the 2 SD helow the mean criterion was no
longer viewed as a rigid marker hecause "impairments
in intellectual functioning must co-exist with deficits in
adaptive hehavior" (Grossman, 1977, p. 12).
The 1961 (Heher) definition was the first to formally
incorporate the concept of "adaptive hehavior," which
refers to an individual's ahility to deal effectively with
social demands and expectations. Because of the significant
measurement prohlems associated with the adaptive
hehavior criterion, however, Clausen (1967,1972a)
argued for a strictly psychometric definition and the
elimination of an adaptive hehavior criterion because it
was not as reliahle and valid as intelligence (IQ).
Despite the criticism, Grossman (1973) maintained
that limitations in the measurement of adaptive hehavior
did not nullify the concept or its inclusion in the
definition of MR.
The 1992 (Luckasson et al.) definition represented
perhaps the most radical departure in the way MR had
heen defined. The definition stressed the interaction
among three major dimensions: an individual's capabilities
(intelligence and adaptive behavior), the environment
in which the individual functions (home,
school/work, community), and the need for varying
levels of support, which eliminated levels of MR hased
on IQ (mild, moderate, severe, and profound). The
revised system was hased on needed levels of support
(intermittent, limited, extensive, pervasive) as a function
of the different adaptive skill areas. The intent was
to replace an emphasis on intellectual deficits with a
system that explained functional limitations in terms
of the degree of support required to achieve life growth
and development.
The "needed levels of support" concept moved the
definition from a foundation based on science to one
based on ideas about service Qacobson & Mulick,
1992). Concerns about the definition were wide ranging
(e.g., Borthwick-Duffy, 1994; Gresham, MacMillan,
& Siperstein, 1995; MacMillan, Gresham, & Siperstein,
1993), leading Greenspan (1997) to suggest that the
problems with the definition resulted from a failure to
(a) retain a focus on the science of MR, (h) capitalize on
advances in classification science, and (c) prevent political
influence from hecoming too overt.
The general sentiment was that such a radical fix was
not necessary and "that the AAMR manual should he
declared an honorahle mistake and given a decent
burial" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 179). Nevertheless, AAMR
admitted no mistakes and puhlished the 10th edition
of its manual in 2002, which essentially endorsed the
1992 definition (see Luckasson et al., 2002). The dehate
ahout MR definition has not ahated, however, and
"one can only hope that the creative process which
has heen unleashed hy the prohlems with the AAMR
definition will produce something worthwhile"
(Greenspan, 1997, p. 179).
Deflning SLD
It is useful to contrast the continuing action associated
with the MR definition with the inaction surrounding
the SLD definition; it is clearly a case of
something versus nothing. Because of its type (i.e., stipulative),
a definition of MR or SLD is going to he
"accepted," indicating little ahout its adequacy in capturing
the nature of the condition. Which definition
(SLD or MR) is more likely to he an adequate description?
There is little douht that, with 90 years worth of
effort hehind it, the MR definition provides a hetter rep-
resentation.
It is time for the SLD definition to hecome a hetter representation
by reflecting a "richer" description of SLD.
We helieve the "original" definition was not "wrong"
hut limited in its depiction of what SLD "looks like."
Thus, the federal definition needs to be "cleaned up"
and, as suggested by Hammill (1990), it is time to cease
"writing or talking about definitions instead of presenting
and discussing a definition that [the SLD field]
helieve can he supported" (p. 83). In heeding Samuel
Johnson's dictum, "Nothing will ever he attempted
if all possihle ohjections must he first overcome" (http://
quotes.liherty-tree.ca/quotes_hy/dr.+samuel+johnson),
we offer a definition of SLD as follows:
Specific learning disahility refers to heterogeneous
clusters of disorders that significantly impede the
normal progress of academic achievement in 2%-
3% of the school population. The lack of progress
is exhihited in school performance that remains
helow expectation for chronological and mental
ages, even when provided with high-quality
instruction. The primary manifestation of the failure
to progress is significant underachievement in
a basic skill area (i.e., reading, math, writing) that
is not associated with insufficient educational,
interpersonal, cultural/familial, and/or sociolinVolume
32, Winter 2009 45
guistic experiences. The primary severe abilityachievement
discrepancy is coincident with
deficits in linguistic competence (receptive and/or
expressive), cognitive functioning (e.g., problem
solving, thinking abilities, maturation), neuropsychological
processes (e.g., perception, attention,
memory), or any combination of such contributing
deficits that are presumed to originate from central
nervous system dysfunction. The specific learning
disability is a discrete condition differentiated from
generalized learning failure by average or above
(> 90) cognitive ability and a learning skill profile
exhibiting significant scatter indicating areas of
strength and weakness. The major specific learning
disability may be accompanied by secondary learning
difficulties that also may be considered when
planning the more intensive, individualized special
education instruction directed at the primary
problem.
At the most fundamental level, the proposed definition
was guided by questions posited by Luckasson and
Reeve (2001) for defining MR: (a) Does this definition
indicate the boundaries of the term? (b) Does this definition
indicate the class of things to which it belongs?
(c) Does this definition define what something is, not
what it is not? and (d) Is this definition consistent with
the desired theoretical framework? The proposed definition
is not a radical departure from the existing one but
provides more description about the nature of SLD.
Although it is outside the province of this article to
fully explain the thinking behind it, we believe the proposed
definition provides an example of a "richer"
description of SLD that can be readily translated into an
operational definition providing more confidence in
the validity of a diagnosis of SLD.
CONCLUSION
"Everything that needs to be said has already
been said. But since no one was listening, everything
must be said again."
- André Gide
The SLD definition should reflect the best thinking
about the SLD construct. Presently, this does not appear
to be the case, since no change in definition has
occurred in 40 years. Surely, four decades of inquiry
have produced insights into the nature of SLD that
should have engendered some modifications in the definition.
In fact, efforts to enhance the SLD definition
have been attempted but have been ignored, as evidenced
by the same definition being authorized in federal
law since 1975.
The status quo with respect to definition has created
problems for the field, most noticeably related to the
fundamental activity of identifying SLD. With no
change in definition, an attitude developed suggesting
that "no one knows what an SLD is." Consequently, the
focus shifted to the operational definitions of SLD necessary
for the practical purpose of identification.
Currently, operational definitions of SLD have either
not worked well or have worked too well. The basic difficulty
is found in the fact that the operational definitions
of SLD have been, in essence, developed "out of
thin air." When the nature of definition, both formal
and operational, is understood, efforts in SLD fail to
meet rigorous scientific and philosophical standards.
Hence, there has been an enduring "SLD problem."
The major means to resolve the "SLD problem" is to
redress the source: the formal definition. The field needs
a definition that reflects its best understanding of the
SLD construct. Our proposal is only an example, and we
are certain better efforts can be achieved. The point is
that a new definition must be forthcoming. The refusal
to modify the formal SLD definition must cease, and
efforts at engendering those modifications must no
longer be viewed as simply academic exercises. If the
SLD field is to regain its integrity, the SLD definition
must change soon.
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Please address correspondence regarding this article to: Lucinda
Spaulding, Regent University, 1000 Regent University Drive,
Virginia Beach, VA 23464; e-mail: lucispa@regent.edu
Learning Disability Quarterly 48