

Chapter 3

GLOBAL APARTHEID AND
NORTH–SOUTH RELATIONSKey issues

- Is globalization fundamentally predicated on a form of spatial apartheid?
- What role did the Third World play during the Cold War? How did Third World states seek to resist Cold War divisions?
- Did the ending of the Cold War lead to a radical shift in North–South relations?
- What factors have shaped US–Latin American relations in the post–Cold War era?

The collapse of the Cold War (1989 onwards) focused attention once more on the structure of the global political economy and the possibilities of ameliorating divisions of wealth between North and South. The 1990s demonstrated, however, that these divisions between rich and poor are worsening and some of the most extreme pockets of poverty are now to be found within the former Soviet Union in places such as Armenia and Azerbaijan (Bradshaw and Stenning 2004). The *Human Development Report* published by the United Nations in 2003 makes for depressing reading: over 50 countries witnessed drops in national income over the 1990s, 30,000 children continue to die daily from preventable illnesses, the richest 1 per cent of the world's population now receives as much income as the poorest 57 per cent. Twenty-eight million people are thought to have contracted AIDS in Africa and over 13 million children died of diarrhoea (an utterly preventable illness which would reduce dramatically if access to clean water were secured) in the 1990s. Even allowing for a certain margin of error, these are unquestionably shocking statistics which demand to be addressed. How can the world can remain so incredibly divided within the North and between North and South more generally? (UN 2003).

It has been argued by many Third World writers, and progressive writers in the North such as Richard Falk, that the global political economy remains premised on a form of global apartheid. This presents a very different sense of globalization (with associated characteristics such as global homogeneity) because it is based on an assumption of fundamental inequality and difference rather than uniformity and mutual benefit. It also has implications for how we might understand geopolitics as a theory and practice.

The origin of the term 'apartheid' refers to a policy or system of segregation or discrimination on grounds of race and was introduced by the white minority regime in South Africa in 1948 (see In focus 3.1).

In focus 3.1: Apartheid South Africa

In 1948 the South African government under President D. F. Malan introduced a set of policies and practices which became known in Afrikaans as apartheid (separate development). Over the next 40 years, elaborate plans were constructed not only to identify different racial groups (whites, blacks, coloureds and Indians) but also to develop the South African economy and society along racial and ethnic lines. Politically, white South African citizens were the only category of people able to vote and participate in government. In terms of education, housing, social services and transport strict segregation was enforced. Marriage between 'black' and 'white' South Africans was forbidden and residential areas were demarcated by racial classification. This system of apartheid was condemned by many countries in the United Nations because it actively, and often violently, suppressed the basic human rights of black and other non-white peoples.

In 1990, the most famous political prisoner in the world, the black lawyer (and condemned terrorist) Nelson Mandela was released from detention in South Africa. Over the following years, the white minority government was forced to bow to domestic and international pressure to release hundreds of political prisoners, thereby beginning the process of dismantling apartheid as a prelude to constitutional change. In 1994, the first free and non-racial elections were held in South Africa with the result that Nelson Mandela became the first black president of the country. However, in spite of the formal ending of apartheid, profound inequalities remain between white and black South Africans. Under the leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), created in the aftermath of the 1994 elections, has attempted to expose the violent nature of apartheid to wider critical scrutiny. In 1999, Thabo Mbeki was elected as the second post-apartheid president of South Africa and Mandela remains a global icon of hope and humility.

We live in a world, as the American strategic thinker Thomas Schelling once noted, where one fifth of the world is rich and predominantly lighter-skinned and four-fifths are poor and darker-skinned. The richer peoples also enjoy an overwhelming military superiority and often seek to prevent the poorer folk (often formally colonized in the past) from 'penetrating' and/or 'swamping' their developed regions (see Schelling 1992). Military force combined with surveillance technologies continues to be used in order to prevent movement of 'economic refugees' and/or 'illegal migrants' from regions such as Latin America and North Africa to North America and Western Europe respectively. Unsurprisingly, various international commissions and reports such as the

UN-appointed South Commission have concluded that the unequal character of the global political economy had to be acknowledged and tackled:

While most people of the North are affluent, most of the people in the South are poor; while the economies of the North are generally strong and resilient, those of the South are mostly weak and defenceless; while the countries in the North are, by and large, in control of their destinies, those of the South are very vulnerable to external factors, lacking in functional sovereignty . . . And the position is worsening, not improving (South Commission 1990: 1–2).

Absolute poverty and lack of educational opportunities, especially for women and girls, have combined to ensure that millions of people in East Asian countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia and China have to survive on less than one US dollar a day. Rural and agricultural communities in the East and South Asian region were perceived to be particularly vulnerable to abject poverty. India, for example, has at least 350 million people living in extreme poverty. Non-governmental organizations have, however, often been critical of Northern-dominated international institutions such as the **World Bank (WB)**, the **World Trade Organization (WTO)** and the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** because of their failure to address village-scale development and urban slum regeneration (Desai and Imrie 1998). In contrast, large-scale projects such as dam construction have tended to dominate the funding profile of international financial agencies for the last 50 years. In the 1990s and beyond, World Bank and United Nations Development Programme reports on poverty and underdevelopment have tended to emphasize the significance of indigenous education spending, gender and infrastructure-led investment without ever considering how North–South relations might impinge upon the capacity of the South to invest in these particular sectors. Moreover, the continued presence of trade barriers and subsidy regimes in the North (such as the Common Agricultural Policy within the EU) perpetuates profound inequalities as the Global South is instructed by the IMF and WTO to ‘open up’ its economies to international flows of capital.

This chapter is founded upon a belief that Northern debates on global geopolitics (especially with the current concern for ‘global terror’) and the unequal impact of globalization have either neglected or marginalized the experiences of the South and now former members of the Soviet Union. The future of regions such as Africa, Asia and the Pacific in any new world order will depend upon the interaction of states co-existing within a globalized system of financial flows, social actors, militarization, markets, international organizations and unwanted ideas and threats. The position of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Malawi and Uganda is all the more precarious as it becomes evident that not even so-called Great Powers such as the USA can shape the international system to suit exclusively American needs. This discussion of the South during the post-Cold War era concludes that the North–South cleavage can only be tackled by the progressive strengthening of a global civil society bolstered by an agenda of demilitarization (see Chapter 5), cultural security, sustainable development, environmental protection (see Chapter 6), human rights (see Chapter 7) and global governance (see Walker 1988, Falk 1995).

The ‘Third World’ and the Cold War

The invention of the ‘Third World’ by Western social scientists in the early 1950s coincided with the geographical extension of the systemic-ideological struggle between the two **superpowers**. It was perhaps no coincidence that new categories such as ‘First World’ and ‘Third World’ were being deployed at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were directly involved in supporting opposing sides in the Korean peninsula and at a moment when the USA was overthrowing the elected government of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953. Subsequent events in Korea, Vietnam and Central America were increasingly evaluated and judged within a narrative which stressed the significance of the ideological struggle between the superpowers. The geopolitical imagination of the Cold War was characterized by:

Geopolitical space [being] conceptualised as a three-fold partition of the world that relied upon the old distinction between traditional and modern and a new one between ideological and free. Actual places became meaningful as they were slotted into these geopolitical categories, regardless of their particular qualities (Agnew 1998: 111–12).

In the United States, successive administrations from Truman to Reagan adopted the geopolitical view that the ‘Third World’ had to be saved from the enduring evils of communism and totalitarianism. In some cases, this concern resulted in armed intervention in various parts of the world, ranging from the widespread carpet bombing of Cambodia in the 1970s to the dispatch of 20,000 marines to the Dominican Republic in 1965. Moreover, other countries such as Israel, Egypt, Taiwan and South Korea received extensive financial and military assistance from the 1950s onwards because the Soviet Union was considered to pose a threat. Taiwan, for example, derived 5–10 per cent of its national income from American financial aid in the 1950s (Ward 1997).

However, American commitments to the Third World were not geographically uniform. Throughout the Cold War, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean were considered to be highly significant whilst other regions such as West Africa were considered to be of lower geopolitical importance (see In focus 3.2).

This geographical variability has been noted in an analysis of the presidential State of the Union addresses between the 1940s and the 1980s (O’Loughlin and Grant 1990, cited in Agnew 1998: 116 and Fig. 3.1). In the early stages of the Cold War, presidents tended to stress the threat to the so-called rimland states which surrounded the Soviet Union and China. In the 1960s, attention tended to be focused on the two socialist states of Cuba and Vietnam. By the 1980s, however, Presidents Carter and Reagan were expressing concern for the Middle East, Southern Africa and Central America.

While the overall pattern of concern may not be surprising given the geopolitical contours of the Cold War, this analysis includes the consistently high priority given to Latin America and the Caribbean by American administrations. This concern for a neighbouring region was rarely benign, however. From 1945 onwards, American administrations developed a range of policies and strategies designed to protect Latin America from socialism and to promote American commercial and security interests. These included the creation of an inter-American security community (under the 1947 Rio Pact), which

In focus 3.2: US support for Israel and the Israeli–Palestine dispute

One of the most controversial elements of US geopolitical strategy during the Cold War was the financial and military support offered to Israel after its formation in 1948. Following the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which declared that a Jewish homeland should materialize, the British as the imperial power were forced to leave the region in the mid-1940s. Jewish terror gangs such as the Stern Gang were highly effective in securing the ousting of British forces.

After the 1948 Independence War, which witnessed the mass expulsion of Palestine Arabs, Israel consolidated its territorial presence armed with the Zionist slogan ‘A land with no people for people without land’. In 1967 following a war with Arab neighbours, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt and the Golan Heights in Syria. In 1982 it invaded and occupied South Lebanon. According to supporters of Israel, the USA (and France) was right to help Israel maintain its political existence given the experiences of the Jewish Holocaust and persistent hostility from surrounding Arab states. Israel remains an undeclared nuclear power and unlike its Arab neighbours, a parliamentary democracy.

For the critics of Israel and its support from the USA, this policy has allowed the country to ignore UN Resolution 242 (1967), which calls for a ‘just settlement’. Seven hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs were exiled into Jordan and millions more live in miserable conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinian terror groups targeted Western and Israeli individuals and the state apparatus as part of their campaign for international recognition. The Palestinian leadership continues to push for a full and final territorial settlement with Israel.

As part of the gradual improvement in relations between Israel and the Arab world, Egypt recognized Israel’s right to exist in 1982 and in return Israel left the Sinai Peninsula. The Oslo Peace Process (1993) and subsequent negotiations such as at Wye (1998) have been plagued by terrible violence as Israel seeks to consolidate its grip on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in response to Palestinian resistance known as the *Intifada*. Suicide bombers have targeted Israelis (often on commuter buses) and thus many Israelis support a repressive policy against the Palestinians. It is hoped that in 2005/6 an independent Palestine will exist in return for guarantees regarding Israel’s right to exist in the region. The prospects remain bleak, not least because it remains unclear whether both sides can agree on territorial boundaries, the control of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian exiles, and the fate of illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

involved mutual defence in the Americas and the provision of financial and military assistance through programmes such as Alliance in Progress in the 1960s.

In more extreme cases, however, the American military and intelligence agencies were prepared to undermine governments in the Latin American region considered to be leaning towards the political left. In 1954, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided rebels in Guatemala with funds, arms and combat training so that they




Figure 3.1 US–Soviet conflict: zones of most serious trouble, 1948–88

Source: Adapted from Nijman 1992

could successfully overthrow the reformist government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (Immerman 1982). In 1961 the CIA also encouraged rebels to attempt an overthrow of the socialist regime of Fidel Castro. The Kennedy administration of the time provided arms to Cuban rebels and promised US air support to encourage a coup against President Castro. In April 1961 a rebel force landed at the Bay of Pigs only to find that Castro’s military forces hopelessly outnumbered them. US air support never materialized and the subsequent failure of the so-called ‘Bay of Pigs’ venture was not only a crushing revelation of the limitations of American power but also contributed to the worsening relations between the superpowers over Cuba. The decision by the Soviet Union to place missile installations on Cuba precipitated one of the tensest moments of the Cold War when it appeared that the United States was prepared to launch military strikes against Cuba if the installation work continued. The crisis eventually ended when Soviet missile transporters were returned to their home bases and the Americans agreed to withdraw their Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

In the same year as the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Third World states came together as a political force. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 was an illustration of how some Third World states attempted to resist the international politics of the Cold War (Willetts 1978 and In focus 3.3).

Composed of states such as India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, it was hoped that the NAM would contest the geopolitical pressures of the superpowers. Non-alignment is not the same as neutrality because the latter is usually a condition which is recognized or guaranteed by other states. Non-alignment is concerned with developing an independent political space which is secure from superpower interference. The founders of the

In focus 3.3: The Tricontinental Conference

After a successful conference involving post-colonial states in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955, the 1966 Tricontinental Conference held in Havana was perhaps the most visible expression of militant Third World politics in the 1960s. Hosted by the socialist leader Fidel Castro, the conference attracted delegates from the three continents of Latin America including the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. The purpose of the conference was to consider the collective fate of newly independent nations in the midst of the Cold War. A journal called *Tricontinental* was founded, and published the writings of many well-known post-colonial writers and activists such as Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh. The aim of the conference and journal was not to produce one particular political and/or theoretical position but to promote the general aim of national/popular liberation and the material and cultural well being of all peoples. As Che Guevara noted in April 1967:

What is the role that we, the exploited people of the world, must play?

The contribution that falls to us, the exploited and backward of the world, is to eliminate the foundations sustaining imperialism: our oppressed nations, from which capital, raw materials and cheap labor (both workers and technicians) are extracted . . . sinking us into absolute dependence. The fundamental element of that strategic objective, then, will be the real liberation of the peoples.

Descriptions such as ‘tricontinental’ are not just geographical labels but they also serve to remind us that there are alternative viewpoints and knowledge systems about the state of the world. *Tricontinental* sought to change the values and terms under which we live.

Source: Young 2003: 17–18

NAM in 1961 tried to create a political forum in which common problems such as the building of a new state in the midst of the Cold War could be discussed. Over the years, the NAM met at intervals of over three to five years to consider the political and economic issues: Cairo 1964, Lusaka 1970, Algiers 1973, Colombo 1976, Havana 1979, New Delhi 1983, Harare 1986, Belgrade 1989, Bogota 1994, for example. South Africa joined the NAM in the same year that President Mandela was elected the country’s first black president in 1994. Although the NAM had no central headquarters, the group did co-ordinate activities on technical co-operation, development, disarmament and international security. Summit meetings were the major venues for debate and policy formulation (Singham and Hune 1986).

At the 1973 NAM Summit, the parties committed themselves to pursuing a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in order to reduce the North–South divide. This NAM Summit in conjunction with the raising of oil prices by OPEC in 1973 prompted discussion of the NIEO at the UN in 1974. Despite the high profile of the NIEO debates, the NAM never really enjoyed high-level political success because its members were divided on the ultimate objectives of non-alignment. Some countries

such as Cuba and Libya wanted the NAM to align itself more closely with the Eastern Bloc, whilst others argued that the movement should look to the West for political support. By the late 1970s, arguments for a NIEO had declined in political salience not least because the re-emergence of a Second Cold War had shifted the political agenda away from economic issues. With the ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the political significance of NAM largely disappeared. The organization continues to meet in order to discuss the politics of non-alignment (arguably in a context shaped by the US-led ‘war on terror’) in the early part of the twenty-first century.

These struggles for survival should not be underestimated given the scale and intensity of violence in many parts of the Third World (see In focus 3.4).

In South East Asia, for instance, over 600,000 local people died due to confrontations between rival American and Soviet-backed military forces between 1969 and 1975. Intelligence agencies such as the CIA also pursued an assassination programme,

In focus 3.4: Chile’s September 11th

The United States is not the only country to have suffered extreme cultural trauma associated with ‘September 11th’. Chile’s particular trauma occurred with the overthrow of the elected socialist government of Salvador Allende by a military coup on 11 September 1973. Supported by the CIA and American corporations such as ITT, the military *golpe de estado* was prompted by a fear amongst the Chilean military and business sectors that Allende’s socialist social and economic programmes would either ruin Chile’s economy and/or ensure that Chile became a client state of the Soviet Union. The Americans, already fearful of Castro’s Cuba in the Caribbean, were determined that socialism should not gain a foothold in Latin America. As former secretary of state Henry Kissinger once remarked, a country like Chile would not be allowed to ‘go Marxist’ just because ‘its people were irresponsible’ (Hitchens 2001: 55). On 11 September 1973, the presidential Palace in Santiago was stormed by Chilean armed forces under the leadership of General Augusto Pinochet and Allende was later killed. Pinochet assumed the political leadership of the country and governed Chile for the next seventeen years. As part of his determination to prevent any future ‘political Allendes’ he pursued a vicious campaign against any individual or group suspected of having left-wing leanings. It is estimated that at least 3,000 people were murdered by the military regime and in neighbouring Argentina the death toll was even higher as a military regime pursued its own ‘war of terror’ in the late 1970s.

Ironically, in December 1998 former president Pinochet was arrested in London for the purpose of facing charges from a Spanish court relating to mass murder and human rights abuses. He was eventually released by Britain on the grounds of severe ill health. Notwithstanding his escape from international justice, the episode did demonstrate that former heads of state no longer enjoy automatic immunity from prosecution.

Source: Hitchens 2001

'Operation Phoenix', against Vietcong supporters in the early 1970s. In other parts of the world, socialist and military regimes in Africa, Latin America and Asia strove to consolidate the powers of the state within a rapidly changing world economy. Socialist governments such as Mozambique and Angola were racked by civil wars and superpower intervention (in Southern Africa) in the 1970s. Over 1 million people are believed to have died between 1975 and the early 1990s in Mozambique alone (Sidaway and Simon 1993, Power 2003). International agencies such as the World Bank had to provide emergency financial aid in order to save these states from total collapse due to civil war which also destroyed the early achievements in health care and education provision.

The NAM succeeded in changing the often violent profile of North–South relations through its adoption of a campaign for a NIEO based on financial and technological transfers from North to South and through the promotion of peaceful co-operation between states (Thomas 1987, Halliday 1989). The initial impetus for a NIEO stemmed from the development at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the creation of the Group of 77 within the United Nations in 1964. The Group of 77 represented the poorest member states of the UN and was designed to bring Southern voting power to bear on Northern member states of the UN Security Council. The meetings of the UN General Assembly and the UNCTAD were used to raise the issue of unequal trading relations between North and South. Demands for a NIEO were based on a belief that radical change was needed in order to improve the condition of the South. Basic demands included: a new general system of preferences to enable the South to break into the manufacturing markets dominated by the North; a commitment from the North to devote at least 1 per cent of GDP to official aid; the cancellation of the 'Southern' debt; technology transfers to be executed; and the improvement of control and regulation of multinationals to prevent the exploitation of Southern resources and labour markets.

This was an ambitious agenda, which demanded radical reforms of the international economic order. It was also conservative in the sense that co-operation between states was still considered to be the best means of promoting economic development for the South within the capitalist world economy. However, it was also grounded on a belief that structural obstacles within the global political economy would have to be overturned. In the late 1970s, there appeared to be some evidence that the South was making progress and that even the UN-appointed Brandt Commission (named after the former German Chancellor Willy Brandt) recognized the significance of these inequalities between North and South. Furthermore, the South proved to be an effective negotiating bloc during the oil price rises crisis of 1973–4 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the 1970s and 1980s. The declaration of the ocean floors as common heritage (and therefore the property of the global community) was a considerable political success despite American and Northern opposition. However, fundamental change in the world economy was elusive in the 1980s as priorities changed and the onset of the Second Cold War ensured that Northern states were more concerned with rising superpower tension than North–South relations. By the time of the 1982 World Summit of Northern and Southern leaders in Mexico, it was

abundantly clear that Northern leaders such as President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher had no interest in meeting the demands of the NIEO.

The Northern states' apparent lack of interest in fundamental reform led Southern states and their commentators to talk of a so-called 'lost decade of development' (see Green 1995). Throughout the 1980s, the political and economic condition of many parts of the Third World began to worsen as economies collapsed in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America witnessed the long-term destabilization of Nicaragua and the 1989 invasion of Panama. The renewed geopolitical confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA had, therefore, dire consequences for the economic and political welfare of the Third World. Armed intervention in combination with rising debt burdens and public-service sector collapse prompted discussions of so-called 'failed states', a term first introduced in the 1980s to convey a sense of places where the basic mechanisms of governance had simply evaporated. For Mozambique, governance was increasingly determined by international bodies based in Washington DC rather than in the national capital of Maputo (see In focus 3.5).

In focus 3.5: Political conditionalities and the 'Washington Consensus'

In 1991 the United States, Britain and multilateral donors introduced so-called 'political conditionalities' for the purpose of securing 'good governance'. These demands were labelled the 'Washington Consensus' because they originated in the United States and US-based international institutions such as the IMF. In order to qualify for loans, countries had to, amongst other things, curb budget deficits, reduce public spending, protect property rights, liberalize trade, privatize state-owned corporations and promote foreign direct investment. The stipulations regarding 'good governance' were defined by the donors, and thus in conjunction with the 'economic conditionalities' attached to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), this could be seen as yet another attempt to undermine the sovereign authority of impoverished states in the Global South.

By the end of the Cold War, the NAM had lost its economic and political appeal because of the changing relationships between its members, the superpowers and the wider international community. The onset of the debt crisis in 1982 (see below) further compounded the South's inability to demand fundamental change in spite of the initial shock to the Northern financial community. Within the Southern coalition, collective demands for radical reform were also beginning to fragment as it became apparent that some states such as South Korea and Malaysia had enjoyed considerable success in terms of economic growth and rates of industrialization. For world-systems theorists, the growth of a Southern semi-periphery was a natural outcome in the sense that the world economy needed economic and political safety valves. It was therefore

in the North's interests that some Southern countries developed successfully whilst others remained underdeveloped. The rapid political changes of the 1980s induced some analysts and political leaders to argue that the South or the 'Third World' had effectively ended because of the diversity of experience in the regions. New times demanded new political programmes and new forms of analysis.

The end of the Third World?

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, increased attention has been paid to the intellectual utility of Cold War categories such as First and Third Worlds. It has been widely suggested that the term 'Third World' is no longer an appropriate label for the complex and varied regions of North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, South East Asia, South West Asia and the Pacific (Berger 1994, Ayoob 1995, Grant 1995, Haynes 1996). During the 1990s, critical observers in the North and South advanced three major objections to the concept of a Third World (Fig. 3.2).

The first could be described as a philosophical objection to the implicit assumption of three different worlds (Hosle 1992). The concept of a Third World erroneously implied that the lives of human beings in Africa, Asia and Latin America were entirely separate from those living in the First and Second worlds. As globalization theorists have stressed, all human beings live in one and only one interdependent world. The formation of an industrialized North and an underdeveloped South was intimately related rather than derived from separate economic and political processes. Moreover, the differentiation




Figure 3.2 Three worlds?

between First/Second/Third worlds implicitly assumed a value hierarchy where the first is considered superior to the third.

During the Cold War, the term 'Third World' had an apparent analytical value because it seemed to refer to states which not only shared a common colonial experience but were also intent on economic development. Mainstream development approaches in the United States ensured that such a categorization also implied that the Third World should be seeking to follow the example of the First World. Walter Rostow's manifesto for a non-communist approach to economic development, for example, assumed that there were five major stages of development, which would involve a substantial transformation in the cultural, economic and political life of developing nations (see Desai and Potter 2002). In the process, it was generally assumed that development would be a relatively uniform process for the Third World states regardless of their particular location and history. The division of the world into three separate spheres meant in practice that Western observers tended to neglect the interrelationships between these allegedly separate worlds.

The second point of objection is concerned with the ending of the Cold War. The concept of the Third World was developed in the 1950s by Northern social scientists to refer to a world dominated by the bloc politics of the Cold War. A tripartite division of the world made some sense in the 1960s when the world was characterized by a superpower confrontation and the emergence of newly independent nations in Africa and Asia. However, these circumstances changed radically and in alliance with the acceleration of political and economic globalization, the world has witnessed the rapid transformation of the earth's political geography. Some parts of the Third World have become highly developed while others have floundered. Until 1997–8, the so-called East Asian tigers of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand experienced some of the highest economic growth rates in the last twenty years (see In focus 3.6).

The collapse of 'Second World' federations such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has meant that some of the former Soviet republics such as Armenia and Azerbaijan are alleged to resemble Third World economies (see Bradshaw and Stenning 2004). More generally, a shift of geo-economic influence from the Euro-American realm towards the Asia-Pacific basin has meant that the political geography of the post-Cold War era is quite different from that of the 1950s and 1960s.

One major element of change in the political geography of the world economy has been the rising profile of China, which has been described as the next economic and political superpower after the USA and Japan. As early as 1975, the *Economist* magazine was predicting that China's expanding economy would be a major force in the world economy. To date, China's economy has grown at around 10 per cent per annum since 1991 and it now produces half the world's toys, two-thirds of its shoes and most of its bicycles and power tools. China is also the largest recipient of foreign investment after the USA. Economists estimate that China's GNP (Gross National Product) could exceed that of the United States (the largest economy at present) by the end of the twenty-first century. Since the 1990s, China has engaged in a massive programme of market reform and commercial development. There is little doubt that standards of living have improved for many Chinese people in terms of access to clean water, possession of

In focus 3.6: The 1997–8 Asian tiger crisis

In July 1997 the Thai currency, the baht, collapsed in the midst of a general economic downturn involving the largest Asian economy, Japan. Annual GDP growth for the South East and East Asian region in 1997–8 went into rapid decline as a loss of investor confidence meant that \$100 billion was withdrawn from South East Asian economies. Within a matter of months, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines suffered further reductions in economic growth as currencies collapsed and international financial confidence evaporated. Indonesia, despite an abundance of population and resources, had a debt of \$180 billion at the same time as it underwent a massive political upheaval with the overthrow of the authoritarian government of President Suharto. In Malaysia, the Mahathir government imposed capital controls during 1997–8 in an attempt to prevent international capital flight. In the Philippines, a weak government led by Joseph Estrada failed to prevent a large-scale reduction in GDP and the national currency, the peso, plunged to an all-time low while poverty levels increased markedly. Foreign exchange reserves of countries such as the Philippines were used in an attempt to halt the collapse in domestic currencies. Singapore was able to respond more effectively to the economic crisis than the Philippines because a stable national government was able to halt the substantial decline in the Singapore dollar and contraction of its export sector by raising interest rates and bolstering investor confidence. The IMF had to provide international financial credit for the region in order to assist its general economic recovery, although there remains considerable controversy over the wisdom of this intervention in the light of earlier IMF advice to ‘open up’ these economies to foreign direct investment.

consumer goods and better food and housing. However, the environmental and social costs have been high in terms of poor employment conditions for many workers, water shortages, environmental degradation due to industrial pollution and continued controversies over the state of human rights in the country including the disputed region of Tibet.

The final point of objection to the term ‘Third World’ concerns the elites within these states. The promotion of Third Worldism in the 1970s and 1980s disguised the fact that Third World elites (often Western-educated) were not always acting in the best interests of their own societies. Notorious political leaders such as former President Idi Amin of Uganda (trained at Britain’s elite military college, Sandhurst) stole millions of pounds and dollars from their governments and deposited the money in secret Swiss bank accounts. In the early 1970s Amin attempted to either kill or expel all the ethnic Asian Ugandans in a bid to ethnically cleanse Uganda of ‘foreign’ elements. In spite of its rich natural resources and exports such as coffee, Uganda is now one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world relative to the size of its economy. In the Central African Republic, the former self-styled ‘Emperor’ Bokassa spent \$20 million (equivalent to 25 per cent of the total GDP) on his coronation ceremony in 1977. In Zaire, former President Mobutu stole several billion US dollars

over a period of 20 years, which was derived from the country’s export in oil and diamonds (Reyntiens 1995). Categories such as ‘Third World’ effectively homogenized conditions within these parts of the world rather than exposing the enduring and contradictory complexities of these post-colonial societies. Within the socialist world of Third World states, high levels of violence directed against an internal population often overwhelmed appeals to equality and socialist forms of development. The ‘killing fields’ of Kampuchea (now Cambodia) in the 1970s are a chilling reminder of how a socialist regime led by the Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot participated in the massacre of 2 million people.

Far from ushering in a new global order based on uniform economic development and liberal democracy, the conditions of the Third World remain so varied that the standard social science categories such as ‘developing countries’ and the ‘periphery’ increasingly do not make sense for countries ranging from Cambodia to Yemen and from Singapore to Togo. Robert Gilpin noted in 1987 that the Third World ‘no longer exists as a meaningful entity’ (Gilpin 1987: 304). Rapid political change has, therefore, apparently called into question the capacity of mainstream concepts and theories to explain and interpret the world around us. As Cedric Grant has claimed:

Since the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, the scepticism as to the existence of the Third World has increased. This is because the term ‘Third World’ was derived in the context of a bipolar world as a label to differentiate the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia from the rival power blocs, the Western and the Soviet, which in their competition with each other had focused their attention on these newly independent nations. Even those who were inclined to agree that there was some substance to the concept of the Third World are now more ready to accept the contention that the global transformation which is occurring is rendering the concept anachronistic (Grant 1995: 567–8).

The actual delimitation of a ‘Third World’ during the Cold War deserves further elaboration because it touches upon some of the enduring controversies surrounding those countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America which have yet to achieve economic wealth comparable to that of Western European and North American states and Japan. In addressing these questions, this discussion will broach the intellectual and academic context which gave rise to the concept of a Third World. The purpose of this investigation is to demonstrate that the conceptual challenges posed by the concept of a Third World are far greater than a simple presentation of the changing political map in the post-Cold War era. In an era of increasing globalization, the advocacy of a concept such as the Third World could be used to promote a spurious impression of homogeneity, thereby reproducing an unhelpful distinction between a First and a Third World. On the other hand, the term ‘Third World’ can be useful in highlighting the persistent inequalities within the world system and the enduring aspirations of several billion people.

With any label such as ‘Third World’ or ‘Developing World’ or ‘Low Income World’ there are always inherent difficulties in representing either vast areas of the earth’s surface or complex socio-economic situations in terms of single categories (Barton 1997: 6).

The term ‘Global South’ is preferred because it is a geographical reference to the southern hemisphere, which in spite of the inclusion of countries such as Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, is overwhelmingly the poorer hemispheric region of the world. The Brandt Commission acknowledged this feature in the early 1980s when it identified a North–South divide in reports on world development. The term ‘Global South’, therefore, is intended to highlight similar economic, environmental, social and political conditions whilst recognizing that Southern regions are complex and diverse (and that the populations of India and China live north of the equator!).

US–Latin American relations, debt burdens and the ending of the Cold War

The British geographer Doreen Massey employed the term ‘power-geometry’ to highlight the unequal and paradoxical nature of globalization (Massey 1991). On the one hand, Northern governments and financial commentators frequently depict the earth as a world of unfettered spaces, whilst on the other hand they also seek to control and regulate movement and flows within bounded spaces (see In focus 3.7).

The immigration controversies in the USA and Western Europe reveal the desire of rich countries to restrain the movement of poorer peoples while simultaneously demanding the free movement of capital and investment. In California in the 1990s, for instance, voters were debating Proposition 187, which set out to prevent illegal immigrants from accessing any form of public service such as health and welfare. Yet at the same time, these illegal immigrants provide services such as office cleaning and strawberry picking which the local populace was unwilling to perform because of poor pay and, in the case of soft-fruit harvesting, the ‘back-breaking’ nature of the work. These spatial inequalities ensure that the poorer regions of the world are held in place and invaded by the rich in terms of economic investment and political interference. For poorer regions such as Latin America, the ending of the Cold War has not radically changed the political-economic condition of the population. As a Mexican political

scientist has noted: ‘Latin America . . . finds itself in a sadly paradoxical bind. The end of the Cold War has brought greatly broadened geopolitical leeway, but economic globalization and ideological uniformity have rendered that at least partially meaningless’ (Castaneda 1994: 48).

Investigating the role of the South in the post-Cold War era is a necessary component of any critical evaluation of globalization. The South, as Jonathan Barton has argued, cannot be considered to be peripheral to such an investigation (see Barton 1997). In Nicaragua, a country caught up in the ideological and territorial struggles of the Cold War, per capita income has fallen in real terms as a result of economic pressure from the North, geopolitical destabilization by rebel forces and US military support of anti-government forces. In Guatemala, where 2 per cent of the population own 60–70 per cent of the most productive land, the ending of the Cold War did not lead to a transformation of land ownership. Moreover, the US invasion of Panama in 1989 reminded Central Americans that the sole remaining superpower has never been averse to violent intervention in the region when it wished to re-secure regional hegemony. The removal, with the help of 10,000 US troops and loud rock music (used to ‘bombard’ the presidential palace), of the country’s leader General Noriega (whom the US accused of condoning an extensive drugs trade), was ironic given the US’s previous support for the military leader. Other commentators have also pointed to the fact that the US was concerned about growing levels of Japanese investment in the Panamanian Isthmus and was thus anxious to restore its geopolitical authority over the area. The Panama invasion was a significant development as it was the first hostile post-Cold War incursion. As the Honduran newspaper *La Tiempo* noted in December 1989:

It was a coarse grotesque euphemism [Operation Just Cause: the code name for the American invasion], neither more nor less than an imperialist invasion of Panama . . . We live in a climate of aggression and disrespect . . . hurt by our poverty, our weakness, our naked dependence, the absolute submission of our feeble nations to the service of an implacable superpower. Latin America is in pain (cited in Chomsky 1991: 158).

The invasion of Panama coupled with massive destabilization of Central American governments by the superpowers contributed to the so-called ‘lost decade’ of development and social progress in the 1980s.

The failure to eradicate the debt burden of the Global South is probably the single most enduring inequality between North and South. In 1990 it was estimated that the total debt of the South/Third World had reached \$1.5 trillion dollars. In Latin America, the debt burden accounted for a substantial amount relative to total export earnings: Mexico \$85 billion, Brazil \$105 billion and Argentina \$61 billion (1998 figures). The most indebted continental region remains Sub-Saharan Africa when measured by total external debt in relation to the export of goods and services (Simon *et al.* 1995). Through a combination of factors including the rapid rise in lending by Northern banks and states in the late 1970s, Southern states accumulated substantial debts by the 1980s because of their incapacity to repay loans and grants. Global economic depression in the 1980s further contributed to this so-called lost decade of development for Latin

In focus 3.7: Two types of boundaries?

Advocates of hyper-globalization espouse a ‘borderless’ model of the world in which national borders should not impede the free movement of capital, trade and ideas. Northern states frequently condemn others, especially in the Global South, for preventing the free flow of trade and capital.

Alternatively, when it comes to the free movement of people, borders often take on a renewed significance. Proponents of ‘Fortress Europe’, for example, contend that people (often defined as illegal immigrants or economic migrants) cannot be allowed to cross borders in order to search for work. It appears acceptable for capital and trade to flow freely but not for people to move across borders.

America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The suspension of debt repayment by Mexico in August 1982 precipitated the biggest financial crisis in the history of the international financial system. Shortly afterwards, other states such as Brazil and Argentina suspended their debt-repayment schedules too.

Over a period of 15 years, the international community has promoted a range of debt-rescheduling packages for countries such as Mexico. With the assistance of the US, the Mexican government was instructed by the World Bank to follow an austerity package which sought to devalue the national currency and cut public spending in order to reduce the annual burdens on the Mexican treasury. However, after a decade of austerity the country was hit by further financial crises which led to the collapse of the peso, the withdrawal of foreign investment and a decline in economic growth. In 1998 the Mexican debt was estimated to be \$85 billion, at a time when a new debt-relief deal with the World Bank and IMF had been envisaged.

The recent experiences of Mexico have been repeated, admittedly in different ways, around the countries of the South. Attempts to structurally adjust debt-ridden economies have not been successful in promoting sustainable development or reducing poverty and hunger in the South. The idea of structural adjustment policies was to liberate extra monies for debt repayment through public-sector reductions in spending. This has not been effective in terms of building a more sustainable future for Southern societies because economic plans tended to emphasize reductions in consumption rather than investment for people in the future. In Latin America, the US has been actively involved in reducing debt levels (in a somewhat piecemeal fashion) because of the geographical and political-economic proximity of countries such as Mexico. It has been argued, for instance, that American plans to create a North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) depended, amongst other things, on Mexico's financial position being improved by the 1980s. Debt-relief plans for Mexico were implemented by the Reagan administration to increase confidence in the Mexican economy. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico later claimed that an 'economic miracle' had occurred between 1988 and 1994 because of the rise in foreign investment in the form of speculative capital.

The subsequent financial crisis in Mexico in the mid-1990s sparked off a wave of protests against structural adjustment and debt burden. In January 1994 a guerrilla uprising by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in the southern state of Chiapas coincided with Mexico's formal entry into the North American Free Trade Association (see Chapter 8 for more details). Such expressions of dissent and resistance were perhaps unsurprising given the accumulating evidence that **structural adjustment programmes** (SAPs) and free-market reform packages were worsening the social and economic condition of the poor, rural inhabitants and the plight of women and children. Levels of inequality and opportunity have worsened in reformed economies such as Mexico. The current president, Vicente Fox, continues to press ahead with 'reforming' the Mexican economy (as part of international and regional pressures from the IMF and the US and NAFTA respectively), assisted by political support from the United States despite worsening social polarization (see In focus 3.8).

In focus 3.8: The collapse of Argentina?

In Argentina, the application of a SAP in combination with a high debt burden led to widespread rioting and political meltdown in 2001–2. Ironically, former Argentine president, Carlos Menem, had been acclaimed for the successful economic transformation in the 1990s when the local currency (the peso) was pegged to the US dollar, inflation was controlled and a widespread privatization programme was initiated. Within two years of his leaving political office, Argentina was plunged into turmoil as foreign debt reached \$130 billion and unemployment was over 20 per cent. The IMF, backed by the US government, demanded that the Argentine government radically reduce public expenditure and ensure that spending actually matched revenue collection in the form of public taxation. With cuts in expenditure on education, health, unemployment benefit and social security, millions of Argentine citizens found that essential social services were reduced and many public-sector workers were simply not paid.

All sectors of Argentine society were affected and many middle-class public-sector professionals such as doctors and academics engaged in widespread public protests that led to the collapse of the Argentine political system. Within the space of two months in 2001–2, Argentina had five different presidents. The Italian and Spanish embassies in Buenos Aires were besieged as many middle-class Argentines with second passports sought to escape the economic and political crisis. An extraordinary intellectual and financial flight occurred and the long-term prospects for the country (the sixth richest in the world in 1900) remain bleak.

Southern views on development, world politics and the debt crisis

For the last fifty years, official development policies have tried to promote development through the political and economic transformation of states in the South (see Escobar 1995, Rist 1997). It could be argued that, by any conventional indicator of development, these policies have failed. In 1997 it was recorded that in 19 countries per capita income had fallen below the 1960 figure. Poverty and hunger continue to affect vast areas of the world including ethnic minorities, the disabled and the elderly in the North. Over 1 billion people still do not have access to clean water supplies and it has been estimated that in terms of global income distribution, well over three-quarters of total income is owned or enjoyed by the richest quarter of the global population (UN 2003). In that sense, World Bank figures for GDP (which do not consider patterns of distribution) tell us little about the lives of people living in slums, nor do they remind us that far more people have died from disease and hunger than the 187 million people who perished through wars and conflict in the last century (Hobsbawm 1997).

There is a lengthy if neglected tradition concerned with the actual conditions of the South within the global political economy (Galeano 1973, Love 1980). 'Southern'

views of international politics have been constructed on a more general account of the centre–periphery relationship within the world economy. These accounts are ‘Southern’ in the sense that the writers hail from Latin America, Africa and Asia rather than the Euro–American world. In the 1950s, for example, the economic writer Raul Prebisch, an Argentine economist working at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, proposed that the North and the workings of the capitalist world economy were restraining the industrialization of the South. He argued that the South’s dependence on the production of primary products for the North coupled with the consumption of goods manufactured in the North was inherently disadvantageous to the South. In the long term, trading conditions force the South to derive ever more credit from primary exports in order to retain purchasing power. Unlike manufactured goods and services, primary products do not provide much scope for innovation and increased profitability. For many Southern states, therefore, there is little alternative than to retain their economic and political position in a Northern-dominated international economic order.

In the 1960s, new writers such as A. G. Frank and E. Cardoso (a former president of Brazil) directed the focus of analysis towards class relations and patterns of exploitation. One of the key areas of debate was the extent to which Southern capitalists and governments were junior partners in a global system of exploitation and domination. In his path-breaking analysis *Capitalism and Under-Development in Latin America* (1971), Gunder Frank presented a detailed account of the systematic underdevelopment of the South. In essence, Frank claimed not only that the promise of economic development for the South was inherently false but also that the South was actually participating in its own underdevelopment. The structural constraints on the South were such that economic development was always likely to be minimal and precarious because of the Northern domination of the world economic order. These kinds of ideas, though later criticized for their economic and political assumptions about class, the state and the world economy, were emblematic of a wider concern for the condition of the South. The demands for a NIEO in the 1970s could be attributed to the work of structuralists such as Frank and Cardoso.

Although these accounts of the global political economy have been criticized over the years, the dependency writings contributed to a rather different series of perspectives on international relations. For much of the post-war period, the disciplines of geopolitics and international relations have been resolutely Anglo-American in the sense that most of the Northern-based writers were concerned with either the North and/or the international system per se. Following from this body of literature, **world-systems theorists** such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Peter Taylor argued that social and political relations between the North and South need to be considered within a longer time frame of an evolving capitalist world economy (Wallerstein 1980, Taylor and Flint 2000). The conditions of the Global South in the twenty-first century, therefore, have to be investigated as part of a longer historical process. Governments in post-colonial Africa and Asia have tried to secure their vulnerable national territories and economies in the face of weak state sovereignty. During the Cold War, for example, many nations of the Third World experienced direct interference and military intervention

from outside powers seeking to undermine a particular regime. The human cost of these interventions was very high as nations such as Mozambique and Angola were destabilized with dire consequences for civilians, particularly women and children.

Northern debates over globalization have been intensely concerned with the erosion of state sovereignty and transboundary political and economic flows. In the South, experiences of this kind have been routine (since the fifteenth century) in terms of the undermining of state jurisdiction and the penetration of Western influences into national cultures. Mohammed Ayoob and Caroline Thomas have argued that the economic dimensions of national security such as access to secure systems of food, health, money and trade are major concerns for Southern states (Thomas 1987, Ayoob 1995). No wonder then that governments of the South have often been staunch supporters of the principle of non-intervention, mindful of the fact that the international system is not based on the premise of equal and self-determining sovereign states (see Chapter 7). States such as the USA have been far better equipped to deal with the demands of international politics and globalization, whereas others such as Sudan and Mozambique might best be described as quasi-states in the sense that their continued existence and legitimacy have more often than not been derived from international relations rather than internal support (Sidaway 2002). Recent debates over human rights, societal security and humanitarian intervention in the 1990s had substantial implications for the South and its capacity to prevent further erosion of the right of Southern states to conduct their own affairs. Perhaps we should talk of in-dependence rather than independence.

It has become apparent that a number of pressing issues confronting the South and South–North relations have still not been resolved in a satisfactory manner: the political and economic consequences of development, gender and human rights, environmental protection, debt reduction and the protection of ethnic and religious minorities (Haynes 2002). At the same time, mainstream development approaches have failed to tackle the underlying structural causes of poverty, hunger, disease and chronic indebtedness. Major international conferences and meetings such as the 1992 Rio Summit, the 1995 Conference on Socio-Economic Development, the 2002 World Summit in Johannesburg and the 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun have tended to reaffirm a public commitment by the North to the promotion of free trade, market integration and liberal democratic governance, but for ‘Southern’ critics and NGOs, these forums do not confront the profound inequalities of the global political economic system. The 2003 WTO meeting collapsed because states such as India, China and Brazil complained that the US and Europe were not prepared to end subsidies to domestic farmers. Moreover, Southern critics have expressed anger at Northern critics who blame Southern population increase for global environmental change rather than acknowledging the massive consumption of raw materials by the North.

In contrast, attention in the South has focused on promoting local forms of development which stress local needs, self-reliance, ecological sustainability and community survival. Southern NGOs in alliance with Northern NGOs and progressive commentators have called for new forms of development strategies. Local groups such as the Chipko movement in India and the rubber tappers’ movement in Brazil have been lauded for their campaigns to protect access to their environments and resources. Other

groups in Guatemala and Ecuador have highlighted the importance of land reform in these countries, where the vast majority have no means of growing their own crops and developing sustainable lifestyles. South Korean farmers have protested against the unregulated flows of American-subsidized rice, which has had a devastating impact on local farming incomes. For the poor of the South, sustainable development is a fiction when rich minorities control most of the fertile agricultural land, leaving the poor in places such as Brazil (where 1 per cent of the population owns 48 per cent of the land) and Zimbabwe (where 2 per cent claim 60 per cent of the land) to exploit fragile uplands and/or rain forests in order to meet their needs.

Conclusions

In the South, the recent transition towards market-based economies and liberal democracies has often been fraught. For one of the poorest countries in the world, Mozambique, the transition from a socialist developmental project to capitalism has been deeply problematic given the state of the country after 20 years of civil war and external intervention. Mozambique's economic and political condition remains parlous even with the ending of the civil war in the early 1990s and recent elections. The destruction of basic education and health provision provides a grim reminder of the profound differences between North and South. Although forms of entrepreneurship and private-sector growth occur in Maputo, the majority of the population remains impoverished and unwanted by South Africa, which constructed an electrified boundary fence in order to prevent illegal migration from the state. 'Fortress South Africa' co-exists uneasily with the apparently unregulated flows of refugees and migrants from southern Africa.

In terms of globalization and geopolitics, this chapter on North–South relations disturbs simplistic assumptions about a world divided (in the form of global apartheid) into an impoverished South and a rich North. The architecture of division is more complex, as some parts of the North are as disadvantaged and socially excluded as the South. While Los Angeles is the second largest 'Mexican' city, the movement of immigrants continues to blur the spatial and imaginative boundaries between the North and South. The mortality rates for Afro-American children in the United States are as horrendous as in many parts of the Global South. Likewise, some of the elites found in Southern cities such as Mumbai and Sao Paulo would compare favourably with their Northern counterparts in London, New York and Tokyo regarding access to consumer goods and lifestyles.

However, these words of caution should not disguise the fact that profound economic and political divisions between North and South will persist well into this century, notwithstanding changes in particular countries and economies such as the East Asian tigers. For some sceptical commentators, the prospects for the Third World appear bleak because of four major factors: a reduction in aid and investment from the North to the South, a rise in racism and anti-immigration politics in the North, an increased tendency by powerful states to pressurize the South over debt rescheduling and trade access, and a reluctance on the part of the North to dismantle subsidy regimes which offer over \$300

billion a year to Northern farmers alone. By way of contrast, the G8 offered only \$8 billion in aid to Africa in 2001–2. For many commentators in the South, the current penchant for securing 'market access' to the world economy will ensure that Northern states continue to exploit the vulnerable and poorer zones. Although the rationale for the Cold War may have disappeared, the forces of economic globalization and supra-national capitalism will ensure that the power-geometries of North–South relations remain unequal and fractured.

Key questions

- What do geographical labels such as *global apartheid* suggest about the nature of globalization?
- Why have inequalities worsened between the North and the Global South?
- Why is capital supposed to flow freely and people not?
- What was the purpose of the Non-Aligned Movement? Does it still matter in a post-Cold War era?
- Why did the September 2003 WTO meeting end in apparently abject failure?

Further reading

For very good summaries of North–South relations and the Cold War see F. Halliday, *Cold War, Third World* (London, Verso, 1989), C. Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (Brighton, Harvester, 1987). On non-alignment see P. Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (London, Pinter, 1978) and A. Singham and S. Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignment* (London, Zed, 1986). On development see A. Escobar, *Encountering Development* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), G. Rist, *History of Development* (London, Zed, 1997) and D. Simon and K. Dodds (eds.), *Rethinking Geographies of Development*, special issue of *Third World Quarterly* 19 (4) 1998. On the condition of the former Soviet Union see M. Bradshaw and A. Stenning (eds.), *East Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (Harlow, Pearson Education, 2004).

Websites

Non-Aligned Movement www.nam.gov.org
 Oxfam www.Oxfam.org.uk
 UNDP www.undp.org