The German-Polish Pact of 1934 As a Factor in Shaping the Relations of Two Neighbour
Peoples
Author(s): W. J. Rose
Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), Vol. 13,
No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1934), pp. 792-814
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs
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THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF 1934 AS A
FACTOR IN SHAPING THE RELATIONS
OF TWO NEIGHBOUR PEOPLES1
By Dr. W. J. Rose
When your Committee did me the honour six weeks ago of
asking me to address the Institute on the German-Polish Pact of
Non-Aggression, my first impulse was to decline with thanks.
The reason was twofold : first, that the signing of this pact was
a political event of no small importance for Europe, and I am
not in any way competent on matters of international politics;
secondly, because I knew that I should have no access to the
press of the Powers most interested, nor time to consult it, in
order to know what everyone knows?or thinks he knows?about
the what and the why and the wherefore of the whole transaction.
On reflection I decided that there was one phase of the matter,
and a very important one, about which I do know something,
viz. the influence of the pact on the direct relations with one
another of two neighbour peoples?a theme that is not political
but social, cultural, economic; but has, of course, a close con?
nection with questions of State. I therefore consented to address
a meeting on this phase of the pact; and shall try in what follows
to avoid any references to, or commitments in respect of, either
the general and vexed question of European peace as such, or
the various possibilities of encouraging or jeopardising it that are
the proper sphere of inter-State relations. It may be that the
discussion that follows will lead us into these or kindred fields,
but I would ask the indulgence of all if I decline to enter them
in my paper.
I shall never forget the experience of that last Saturday
morning in January, when on the way to the provincial Library
in Katowice I met a friend, who thrust in front of me the morning
paper with the headline " Peace Pact with Berlin," and asked
me with a smile, " What do you make of that ? " To say that
I was taken aback would be to put it mildly. I will admit that,
1 Address given at Chatham House on June 25th, 1934, Major B. T. Reynolds,
M.C., R.A., in the Chair.
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NOV. I934] THE GERMAN-P0L1SH PACT OF I934 793
for reasons too long to enter into here, my first thought
" What will the Czechs say? ", and my own conjecture pr
later on to be the right one. My second was, " What will Fran
what will England say? ", and here again I foresaw more or
what has happened. Without pursuing this phase of the th
far, I should like to say one thing. It was natural that
reception given by other Powers to such an event?which
known to have startled the world?would be analysed on t
lines :
i. that Warsaw was able and willing to conclude such an agreem
with Berlin at all?something that can almost be said to revers
course of history; and
ii. that Warsaw?or any other capital in Europe?would do busi
and make contracts with the particular regime at present in p
in Berlin.
It must not be forgotten that for a century and a half (since
the Partitions) the Poles have, rightly or wrongly, had th
reputation of being the disturbers of European tranquillity, o
being troublesome folk who have used every opportunity of
unrest to get a hearing for their grievances. Out of this has
come a notion that as a people they have no will to peace, in
short, cannot live in harmony with their neighbours. This vie
I hold to be essentially unjust; but the injustice of it had to b
demonstrated openly to the world. The possibility of such a
demonstration came when Germany left the League, and it wa
accepted by Marshal Pilsudski and his advisers with the resu
we all know. I believe it is true to say that Poland gained by th
Pact of January 26th, 1934, precisely the things which he
Foreign Minister, Zaleski, had suggested nearly five years before
to Stresemann?only then to be ignored.
The surprise we all felt at the unexpected announcement o
the Pact need not have been so great if we had taken to hear
the succession of events of nearly a year previously. I sha
note only those directly relevant here :
i. the meeting of the Polish envoy in Berlin, p. Wistocki, with
Chancellor Hitler on May 2nd, 1933; on which occasion the latter
declared that Germany recognised a free and independent Poland an
was resolved to carry on " in the framework of the existing treaties ";
ii. the great peace address in Berlin of May 17th, in which the
Chancellor confirmed the will of his Government to cordial and con?
structive relations with all the Powers " on the basis of honour and
equal rights ";
iii. a remarkable statement made on May 27th by Hitler in
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794 international affairs [nov.
Konigsberg to the effect that " the N
any policy of change of frontiers at
iv. the meeting on November 15th,
Nazi victory at the polls, between the
envoy, p. Lipski, in which were ex
good-will between the neighbouring P
collaboration in the working out of
issues in dispute.
It may be assumed that most of
received, by a world grown rather sc
proverbial grain of salt; except th
to attract attention as coming r
Even this, however, was scarcely
actually, as we shall see below, it w
whole drama. What took place two
conclusion of the agreement decide
but in important respects the resu
making themselves seriously felt bef
to the world.
Just what did those documents involve? The following is
the text of the Pact translated from the German :
" The German and Polish Governments believe that the time has
come to initiate a new phase in the political relations of their t
countries on the path of direct understanding. They are theref
resolved by the following declaration to establish a basis for the guid
of these relations in the future.
" Both Governments start from the conviction that the security
and maintenance of a lasting peace between their countries is an
essential condition of peace in Europe. They have therefore decided
to base their mutual relations on the principles set down in the Pact
of Paris of August 27th, 1928, and only wish, so far as the relations
between Germany and Poland are concerned, to determine here how
to apply these principles more closely.
" Both Governments afhrm the view that no international obliga?
tions laid upon them by other Powers are to disturb the peaceful
course of their relations with one another. They neither run counter
to the present declaration nor are they altered by its provisions.
Both Governments affirm further that this declaration does not concern
such questions as according to international law must be considered
a domestic affair of either State.
" Both Governments declare their purpose to seek for direct under
standing in issues affecting their mutual relations, no matter w
their nature. Should there arise conflicts that cannot be settled in
this way, other peaceful means will be tried. Under no circumst
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF I934 795
will force be applied to settle points at issue. This guaran
based on such a principle, will make the task of both G
easier in seeking solutions of political, cultural and economic
" Both Governments are convinced that in this way th
between their States will proceed on fruitful lines; lead
establishing of a neighbourliness that will bring blessing
both their lands but on the other peoples of Europe.
" The present declaration will be ratified in Wars
necessary documents exchanged as soon as possible. It is
period of ten years. ..."
The fact is significant that the chief emphasis of
ment is on the achieving of a new basis of neighbourlin
two peoples who have for centuries been thought of as
?born enemies. And while a few months is too sh
spective over which to pass judgments, the view may b
that, whether in respect of the kind of results achieve
volume, we are faced with something that many w
miracle. The old order has changed, yielding plac
one; and I venture the remark that these results ou
judged on their own merits without regard to the qu
an uncertain one?what will to-morrow bring?
Time does not permit me to review the past of Polish
?better said, Polish-Prussian?relations. They have b
as bad as they could be, though it is not the case tha
Germans never were at peace in the lower Vistul
point from which relations became unmanageable is
the reign of Frederick the Great; and I shall risk the as
that throughout Prussia has been the aggressor.
mean that, whether in the case of the seizure of U
early in his career or of the First Partition of 1772
him the northern provinces, Frederick knew very w
counsellors with him, that they were incorporating into
tant Prussian State fundamentally non-German lands an
who in addition to being Slavs were Catholics, and so fo
reason were bound to be the beginning of troubles
been said a century earlier of the Polish King, by a
title, Jan Cas. Rex, that his initials I.C.R. meant rath
calamitatis regni, became true now for das Deutsche
the Prussian King as the villain of the piece. I shar
German view that no man who during his life mad
times on the German Empire can be magnified for e
national hero; and I regard the traditions of the asce
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796 international affairs [nov.
Prussia thus begun, and carried on a
as a misfortune for Central Europe an
themselves.
We all know how things came to a head in the famous
Kidturkampf of the 'seventies and 'eighties, in which Catholic
Germany was allied with the Poles against Prussian aggression;
and how right down to the World War the Centrum refused to
be identified with the major measures of repression {Ausnahmsgesetze)
enforced towards the Polish population of the Ostmarken
in respect of their native tongue and of expropriation in favour
of German colonisation. It was to be expect ed that the World
War and its outcome would not improve the relations between
the two peoples; the more so since then, as now and in fact
always, the German people has never known more than a fraction
of the truth, either in respect to their eastern neighbours or in
regard to the conditions obtaining on their eastern frontiers.
Had they been in possession of the facts they could never have
held the view that existed for a decade after the War, that the
new Polish State was only a temporary arrangement. They
would have known that in every single issue for the last fifty
years between the two peoples, not the Prussians but the Poles
have emerged the victors; and would long since have abandoned
their stereotyped attitude of superiority and scorn towards all
Slavs, which has done so much harm in our time.
May I assume that all present have read with care the
extremely valuable chapter at the beginning of the Survey of
International Affairs, 1932, dealing with North-Eastern Europe?
If anyone has not read it, then I commend it particularly on this
point. One of their greatest opportunities in post-War Europe
was missed by the Germans through their refusal to do the thing
from the start that Herr Hitler announced over a year ago. In
this they have shown themselves far less realists than could have
been expected of people who had the arch-example of their own
Bismarck before them.
I come now to the real issue of the paper, the specific examp
of improvement in the relations of these two peoples whic
have been privileged to observe during nearly two years
residence and study in Upper Silesia.
They fall into three parts :
1. the cessation of the Presshetze?the hostility campaign of t
newspapers on both sides of the new frontier, in which for obvio
reasons the German press has taken the lead;
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF 1934 797
2. the end of the tension in the frontier areas, amount
to an entente cordiale between the peoples;
3. the consideration of certain specific matters concern
Silesia alone, where the influence of the Pact has either not been felt
or has wrought surprises.
1. First, then, the campaign of agitaticn and ill-will : it was
inevitable that the very existence of a free and united Poland
should be resented by the peoples whose empires had to be
broken in order that the Poles might be free. The root of the
trouble lay not in any particular frontier but in the fact of the
new republic to the east of them, throbbing with national
traditions and aspirations, in the place of the colossus of Russia
that was at best a fine image with feet of clay. Those informed
on the subject will recall the dictum of Stenzel in 1837, " The
Prussian Monarchy and the Polish Republic cannot both exist ! ",
and the changes rung on the same theme during the following
half-century. Rubbed down into popular currency, this view
found expression in the press, over the wireless, on public platforms,
in pamphlet and cartoon, in one of the most widespread
and violent demands for " revision " (the dimensions of which
were variously stated according to the courage of the speaker and
the temper of his audience) that our time has known. One has
only to see a part of any collection of this propaganda material,
and to remember the facilities for reaching their public at the
disposal of agitators to-day, to realise how grave a menace this
was bound to be to the thus threatened Polish nation. For
reasons that will appear on reflection, the chief centre of a
was the area of Pomerania (dubbed the Corridor), thoug
plain statements were made on special occasions by men
position in respect of the lost districts of Upper Silesi
allusions were made even to the province of Poznani
Against all this campaign of protest and outcry the Poli
felt compelled to react?to keep up its end, so to spe
result was a most lamentable succession of years in whi
tively nothing good about Poland was learned by the great
of the press-reading German public, and all too little goo
Germany by the Poles in their turn. Notable excepti
exist, but they were not popular. Among the German ex
the Catholic papers stand out; and the single example o
Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung might be cited; in which F
Oskar von Soden pleaded again and again for a change of
towards a land and a people of whose place in Europe h
become convinced from years of observation on the
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798 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV.
recall only one prophetic appeal?from about
" Zehn Jahre Verzicht auf Ldrm und Pathos, zeh
Nebeneinanderlebens"; a thing that has no
hardly from the source and in the way he ex
I spent New Year's Day of this year in Vi
friends there has been for years a close stud
Polish impasse. (Note that this was three
Pact was announced !) He said to me at th
conference, " Do you know that in the past six
has sent me two hundred cuttings from the
every one of them full of fine things about
ordinary thing has happened. I couldn't
possible ! " Early in March I was in Cracow,
a former colleague of a conversation he had
between a Polish newspaper man from East
stein area) and friends. The latter were ask
Minority was faring there, and the answer was
better. Especially we journalists are in clo
colleagues by contrast are having a very ba
have orders now to tell precisely the opposite s
they told before in regard to everything Pol
What concerns us here is, of course, the poss
inherent in the new policy, the hope of an e
atmosphere in which people were living on
frontier, and of a more wholesome atmosphe
something good will be seen in and told abou
As a sample of this I have a special number
Zeitung, the organ of the big German intere
and the first of the two dailies there to fall in line with Hitler's
regime. It was published early in May and has on the front
page, side by side, the Black Eagle of the Deutsches Reich and the
White Eagle of the Republic of Poland, with this legend
underneath :
" Two States that are complements each of the other."
What a change ! Among a series of special articles dealing with
the prospects of more business cooperation between the two
Powers, two are written in Polish.
One word of comment on this change suffices. The power of
the press and of kindred agencies to-day is so great that, unles
they can be won for an idea or an ideal, the chances of realising
it are nil. Reversely, that for which the press and its kindred
agencies for dissemination of news and views declares has the
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF I934 799
best hopes of being translated into fact. We may lik
not, but in the case under consideration the change for t
has been enormous. It is fair to say that the Polish p
not been as ready to follow the orders from above, ha
as obedient as the German, the reason being that it h
demanded some measure of freedom of expression. Y
here there is little cause for complaint. I should also
no one fancies for a moment that no anti-Polish agitatio
ment exists in Germany since last November, and no ant
sentiment in Poland. Undoubtedly some of it is g
But the sting has been taken from it; its power for evil
broken. In this respect we are facing a new scene in
the first time " Poland is being shown to the German
?I quote the phrase used by Die Woche, which publis
series of numbers pictures and text about the land of th
that would have satisfied the most ardent of Polish p
2. We come to the Upper Silesian scene and the
brought in a much-disputed territory where exists t
population in Central Europe, and where, owing to
proportion of unemployment, a fertile field exists for the
makers. I asked a group of Polish friends of man
standing, who were gathered to say good-bye to us in th
week of May, what they saw about them that could
have come from the Pact. Like a shot came back the
" The excursion trains to Cracow ! " By this was m
taking of fortnightly Sunday excursions from German
the ancient capital and university centre of Poland, o
sights of Europe; a practice that had started last E
promised to give tens of thousands of Germans a loo
neighbours during the summer. A year ago such a th
have been unthinkable.
On the German side there are similar proofs of a new s
In Beuthen is to be found the only High School (Gymnas
with Polish as the language of instruction in the German
It had been opened in the fall of 1932, but only after long de
and in the teeth of much opposition from German Nation
The 150 boys there come from all parts of the Empire, so
far away as the Rhine itself. The permitting of such an in
tion in an exposed centre like Beuthen was felt by many Ger
to be a mistake, and the conditions under which the work went
on were difficult?to put it mildly. Even the charter had to be
renewed every half-year and the permission of residence granted
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800 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV.
to the professors, most of them Polish citiz
only for the same period. Under the new
began to function in German Upper Siles
province in its own right and with the C
saddle) from last July onwards, the liberties
to " the young gentlemen " have astonish
So too the general atmosphere in Germ
improved. Upper Silesia, by the way, has
of recruits for the Nazi formations, not a few
in Polish, since they understand almost n
people, who cannot in any way be fitted int
the Nazi party, the new epithet has been inv
Notably in the towns, but in general on all th
Poles are met with a welcome unknown b
this in anecdotes reveal the popular mi
argument.
A Polish traveller in the train to Breslau
ticket with the salute " Heil Hitler! " (pre
universal), at once replied as he produced
Pilsudski! " The official was taken aback
then rejoined " Heil both of them ! " An
two things, a certain freedom and sense o
hand that goes far everywhere to relieve
new mentality towards things Polish. It
the great gain has come.
The other incident, which happened at
one of my own university friends, was th
weeks of research that took him to different corners of German
Silesia and was astonished at the difference in the reception he
got everywhere. One sample touched him in more ways than
one. Sitting in a cafe he was approached, as all the world is
every day or oftener, by Nazi people with collecting boxes. In
this case it was a young fellow selling post-cards, the proceeds to
go to some good cause. As all outsiders (or non-Aryans !) do,
my friend remarked quietly that he was a foreigner and ought
to be excused. Six months ago that would have meant a bow
and being left in peace, but not so now. " You're a foreigner;
may I ask where from?" "From Poland." The collector
grinned all over. "From Poland? Why you should be the
first one to buy my cards now, after the peace pact ! " Here,
again, a volume of eloquence in the single sentence, and I can say
from experience, a volte-face from what existed before. By this
I do not mean that all Nazis everywhere have been hostile or
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF 1934 8oi
impolite to Poles. Their orders have been from the start
the limit of courtesy to all strangers. What I am concern
are the orders from above that have reversed the whole
of people to their neighbours, and those orders have not
vain, witness far and away the greatest change for
that I shall have to speak of, viz. the difference bet
spring weeks of 1933 in Polish Silesia and those of 193
I should explain that the German Minority in the area
after the plebiscite to Poland (a large part of which i
of Germanised or half-Germanised Poles) has dreaded for
the weeks that run from the date of the plebiscite, M
to the national holiday, May 3rd, as times when, chie
villages, they were exposed to ill-treatment of vario
This came, so they claim, mostly from the ranks of the I
the Veterans' groups that keep warm the memories of th
rections of 1919, 1920 and 1921, notably of the third
came shortly after the plebiscite itself. I should add
1926 there have been two dates added to extend this
March 19th and May I3th-i4th.1 The burden of their
to me has mostly been that during these times of cel
whether those of a group or of the nation as a whole
and violence were common, and damage to property
the person was sure to come of it.
All will remember that April of a year ago was a very
month in Central Europe. During the preceding w
mighty turnover had come in Germany, the Swa
triumphed, and popular exponents of the new order
claiming loudly the speedy realisation of all the majo
National Socialism, the reunion of all Germans, the re
lost territories, etc. This kind of thing could only m
violating of existing frontiers, and, with that, war.
weeks during March 1933, I had (for the only time d
past two years) a fear of attack on Poland. A month
had all passed over. Meantime the word got about
Polish Silesia?certainly pushed by agents?" Hitler
and the implication was " Be ready ! " A new version
old song was being sung, and sometimes openly,
" Polen hat uns Land gestohlen, etc."
Tons of pamphlets of the most inftammatory nature we
as they were being smuggled over the frontier. The
press of Polish Silesia was openly adopting Hitlerism.
1 The former, Marshal Pilsudski's name-day. The latter, the date
coup d'itat.
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802 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV.
No wonder the Silesian Poles were up in
every prospect of a return to the old Prussi
" Not while we are alive to prevent it." T
organised and unorganised resistance; the
driven from the open-air stalls; the Kattowitzer Zeitung
plant was surrounded by the populace; German meetings were
hindered; occasionally people talking in German in the trams
were insulted; there was window-breaking; there were cases of
people being beaten up. One thoroughly unfortunate incident
was the disturbing by a band of young irresponsibles of a Passion
play put on in the Catholic Church Hail in Orzegow, right on
the frontier, by the Young People's Union (among whom were
some of my personal friends), in which a number of those taking
part were hurt. (On investigating this three weeks later, I found
that there were reasons of a local nature for the outbreak,
not, of course, of the kind that would justify it in the least.
The unrest had already died down by May 2nd, 1933, the day
we returned from a month's visit to Yugoslavia, but the tension
in the air lasted right into the summer and found tragic expression
in a wretched encounter that took place in Giszowiec, right under
our noses, early in July. Two excursions, one Polish and one
German, chanced to meet on the highway just at dusk, and a free
fight ensued in which a number were wounded. One German
died of his wounds.
Apart from the political tension, two other factors enter in
all such happenings in Upper Silesia; the dense population, h
in truth a Volk ohne Raum, coupled with the high percentag
unemployment already prevailing for the third year, and
addition the fact of the roughness and downrightness (Heftigk
of the mining and foundry workman at any and every tim
especially if he has been drinking. This was the source of endle
trouble to the Prussian police a generation ago and is no n
thing consequent only on the change of boundary.
Over against this picture, of which numberless details co
be given, set the year 1934. More than one Minority Hausva
has said to me, " Such a spring we have never seen ! " I ha
reply, " What a Godsend the new order is ! But you can see
reason. No provocation, no reprisals ! " That does fairly su
up the situation. What the Upper Silesian wants is peac
chance to repair his losses, to build up his fortune, to secu
the future. Like the people of Alsace-Lorraine, where I ha
just been staying for three weeks, they dread nothing so much
the prospects of war. They object, above all, to the Gr
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF 1934 803
Powers fighting out their differences auf unseren Riicken.
know that from any and every war they have nothing
and everything to lose; they, in any case, will be the vi
Hence the relief and the satisfaction in Upper Silesia
the fateful spring months of 1934, in which for the first
years the populace tolerated German talking films in the ci
Quantum mutatus ab illo ! Not only all local German pap
perfect freedom, but all Reichsbldtter as well. And why ? C
because, by mutual arrangement, no celebrations were or
on either side of the frontier of the glorious (or inglo
plebiscite and insurrection days. That was the first gr
forward. Secondly, the Veterans' Reunion?the Insurg
Day?was quietly moved forward one day, to May 2nd,
it was not identified with the national holiday on the 3
action had incidentally another effect. It made possi
sharing of the Polish Opposition, that of Korfanty's p
the national celebrations in a way that had not been po
for years.
I cite these facts, some of them trifling in themselves, to show
with what a sense of relief and release the Upper Silesian people
have welcomed the assurance, contained in the Pact of January,
of a truce to recriminations and provocations, an end of mutual
maledictions and complaints, and a lead from the highest sources
towards the kind of Zusammenleben that is needful if neighbours
are to rise above the ethics of the jungle. Too long it looked as
if die hohe Politik was on the side of those who took the view that
Germans and Poles never have been friends and never can be.
At last we have an experiment based on the reverse con
that they can be friends; more, that no two peoples in
are more called upon by their very make-up and posit
collaborate than Germany and Poland, since no two ne
another economically more than they.
3. Let me now come to my third point, in which I sh
briefly at three or four specific matters connected w
relations of the two peoples in Upper Silesia, and shal
how far and with what fruitage they have been affecte
Pact. If our story has been one of affirmation up to now
perhaps be less satisfactory for the few minutes that r
confine myself to what I know best, and leave to other
discussion the noting of additional points.
First, I will deal with the matter of the Geneva Convention
and its agencies, whose mission in Upper Silesia is, under the
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804 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV.
settlement, to run another three years. I
points.
For some time the view has been growing among the Poles
that the Convention is a serious obstacle to the normal develop?
ment of their administration in the areas assigned to them in
1921. In particular do they object to the Mixed Commission
and its work under President Calonder. One hears less criticism
of the Tribunal and of the services of Dr. Kaeckenbeeck. The
Germans too have not been satisfied for years with the
obtained from the Convention, and have, of course, by
withdrawal from the League shown their disapproval of
workings in every form. Some people in Upper Silesia a
proclaimed last autumn that now they were through with G
and that the costly machinery maintained to help them coul
disposed of. This was said to be the only legal and m
conclusion to be drawn.
No such thing has happened. Both heads of the agen
mentioned have said to me that they were perfectly read
pack their trunks and leave the land the moment they felt as
that the two peoples on the spot could settle the various k
of outstanding differences on fair lines without the help of a
third party. But both felt, and in my judgment rightly,
the onus of proof was on them, and the time had not yet come
such radical action. From the wide field of issues arising I
pick only one, that of the disputes coming before the Minorit
Bureaux on either side of the line, as an example of the progr
made under the new order.
It is known that from the start both Powers have accepted the
view that much more should and must be done to settle out?
standing differences at home without carrying them to
international forum or judgment-seat. In respect of the Ge
Minority in Poland?whose complaints and petitions have
the Upper Silesian scene constantly before the attention o
world since 1927?I can report the views of both the pa
concerned?Dr. Ulitz, executive of the Volksbund, as the sp
man of the Minority on the one hand, and Dr. Korowicz, e
for the Wojewodstwo and Head of the Minorities Office o
Polish side, on the other hand?that a quite new era has b
entered upon. In Dr. Ulitz's words to me early in May,
last the Minorities Bureau has come to be the thing it should
been from the start." Dr. Korowicz put it thus : " Our Ge
leaders are convincing themselves that when they come to
to us frankly and with the wish to settle things in the b
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF 1934 805
way for all parties concerned, they will never go away
handed."
What has actually been happening since Easter is this : ev
ten days the German Volksbund people, as representatives of t
Minority in Polish Silesia, meet the Minorities Office of
province to consider all cases that have not been settled ot
wise. This kind of thing never happened before, all conta
being by correspondence. The result has been the handlin
the course of each month of more issues than could be dealt with
previously in half a year, and a marked diminution of the numbe
of petitions or complaints sent on to the Mixed Commission
Along with this there has developed a new relationship betwee
the people in office on both sides, who say things about one
another that were certainly not said three or five years ago
They now feel that they are partners in an enterprise instead of
opponents in a duel that honour bids them fight to the death.
There are two special fields in which this new modus viven
must make itself felt, that of education and that of employment
in industry. With the first issue, that of Minority schools an
their maintenance, Upper Silesia has been troubled since 192
I refer you to Professor Toynbee's Survey of International Affair
for the facts and the solution offered in the great dispute ov
" the Maurer children." With the second issue, that of the j
and thus of daily bread for wife and children, we enter on t
thing that has been the most vital matter at issue in this high
industrialised area ever since the world depression began
make itself felt three to four years ago.
To go into their history here even in outline would requir
far too much time, and is impossible though it would be mos
instructive. I shall only note one fact in respect to the schoo
children and show its implications. Last year the number of
registrations of transfer from the State (Polish) schools to th
Minority schools was considerably higher than the year befor
An analysis of the figures according to locality showed that quite
large numbers came from villages where it was notorious tha
you could not find German families with a searchlight. It h
been proved up to the hilt that much of this was due to the fact
that the Volksbund has greatly extended its social welfare wo
(with the use of funds coming from Berlin amounting to million
of marks yearly), which means that unemployed workmen whose
" dole is so small that they cannot keep their families on it
join the Volksbund in order to get (usually) as much more p
week or per month from that source and so manage somehow to
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806 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV.
make ends meet. The price of this is that t
children to the Minority schools.
The same thing happened this spring at the
and there are several things about this tha
the German point of view it is good politics?
so?but on their own admission it is bad p
Schulverein people last August about the regi
point of view, and was told that they had o
since hundreds of children were thrust on their hands to be
admitted to their private schools who had been two or even
years in school and were well on with their work?but i
Polish language. They were now put by their parents, a
age of nine or eleven, in a German school and expected i
way to " find " themselves in a language most of them
nothing of whatever !
I said that many thought of it as good politics?this year
are not so sure. The number of registered members of
Volksbund has gone up 33J per cent. since last autumn,
from about 30,000 to around 40,000. I made bold to ask
Ulitz early in May whether he was gratified at the fact o
He at once shot me a glance and said he was not. He wen
to tell me, what I knew already, that a halt had been cal
that for two months no more members were to be admitted.
The reason for the rise is clear : the unemployment situatio
not better; 40 per cent. of all workers on the dole, and it wa
most cases a matter of loaves and fishes ! The Volksbund knows
very well that the people who come in to-day because of har
times will be gone the moment a job comes along. Such peop
not only do not pull their weight, but they are a serious burde
in the boat.
One other remark : realists among the Poles say, " W
worry ? If the Germans want to help us take care of our u
ployed, so much the better." Others say, " No, we dare not
that view but must find means to stop this traffic in loyaltie
All the time the local authorities are in trouble, caught be
two fires, since their Silesian citizens object to any conces
to the Minority; while the orders from Warsaw, which se
matter as a part of the whole problem of better relations
Germany, are the exact reverse?give the Minority every
possible; in any case avoid scenes ! So difficult was Dr.
zynski's position last summer in this respect that he had to m
very serious representations in person in the capital, poin
out that one could not go beyond a certain point without
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF 1934 807
voking riots. I note this in order to show that all that
before and along with the Pact has not necessarily made ever
in Upper Silesia easier.
As for the other point, that of unemployment, it may b
at once that the Pact has not yet been able?one doubts w
it will be able?in any way to affect what is going on. P
nutshell there has been in progress for a year a serious red
of personnel in industry, and the axe has fallen chiefly wh
had not fallen up till now, in the " black coat-white collar
i.e. among those who work with their heads and not wi
hands in the business and management of industry. No
just here that, even twelve years after the boundary settle
the Germans number as high as 70 per cent. of those em
in some of the big plants. A fairly large portion of th
German citizens, having opted for the Reich, and so are
view of the seriousness of the labour market, to be " burde
foreigners." (These would have to go anyway in 193
result " the axe " has hit them in the same way as it h
manual workers two or even three years ago, and a great
has resulted. For this kind of thing there is no other na
tragedy : but the charge that these men are being r
because they are " Minority " (in the case of those w
Polish citizens), or " foreigners," is by no means true
extent that has been alleged. Isolated cases certainly do
but one can hardly blame the Poles for taking the positi
is conceded to-day the world round, that we must look afte
own kith and kin first. With the rights or wrongs of th
issue we shall not deal here, but only register the fact
new relation existing between the Powers has done noth
relieve the lot of those thus thrust out on a cold and rather
cruel world.
It is this fact in part that has given rise to the view more tha
once stated in the past months, that both German and Polish
Minorities are being sacrificed in the interest of the new peac
The phrase used by Deputy Graebe on the Polish side, wir werden
geopfert, has become common parlance, and some Poles on th
German side share this attitude. By it is meant the conviction
that whereas Berlin and Warsaw (especially the former) lent
willing ear before to the complaints of their fellow-countrymen
across the frontier, they no longer do so. Minorities have bee
the fashion for years in Central Europe, but at least in this ar
their prospects for the future are no longer rosy. This is bein
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808 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV.
feared in a concrete way by the people n
Polish-Silesian industry, who feel that th
support in Berlin as they would have had
The fear of thus being the goat is a w
justifies a brief examination here. There i
ground for it, and no one need be surprised.
price, and there will be those who pay un
settlement. But it may be doubt ed whether
in which the German Minority now finds
the result of an accumulation of causes ex
It is certainly a fact that all the blunders m
towards Poland since the War have left their marks on the
scattered three-quarters of a million Germans living in all co
of the Vistula republic. I shall note only one sample,
1933, and as seen in Upper Silesia.
You will recall how I spoke of the promise circulated o
Polish side over a year ago, " Hitler kommt! " This was in
nothing new, but there was fresh point to it in view of the k
ideas of the Nazi party in respect to Kulturgemeinschaft,
gemeinschaft and Schicksalsgemeinschaft?the corner-ston
reunited brotherhood of all Germans. Unfortunately the sum
came, while Hitler did not. Nor did the things that were hap
ing look like an earnest of his coming. Life went on as b
and in November came the crash of such hopes of a tur
At last it was clear that Hitler was not coming; the 200,000
people who might have welcomed him saw that they had been
duped. This was only the last of a series of disillusionments
during a decade, but it filled up the cup. The German Minority
in Upper Silesia had been split almost from the moment the
Nazis came into power into those " for " and those " against " ;
the latter being chiefly the Catholics (cf. the Centrum in the
Reich). From now on any hope of healing the breach was gone.
On the first Sunday of January the spiritual leader of the Deutsche
Christliche Volkspartei?Dr. Edward Pant, Senator in Warsaw
?made his famous declaration, comparable in its way to that
of Luther at Worms, " Here I stand, I can do no other ! " The
man who for a decade had been editor of the most-read German
paper in the land, but had been forced out in the fall, began to
publish a few weeks later a modest weekly Der Deutsche in Polent
without any money, but with the resolve to save what could
be saved of Germandom as a genuine Minority in Poland, that
was to be neither dependent for its financial backing on Berlin,
nor subject in respect of its ideas and ideals to Berlin. In a long
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF 1934 809
talk I had with him early in May, I put the question blun
whether the Minority was being sacrificed by the P
admitted that there was some truth in the view, but
plainly that the positively tragic situation of the Min
the result of other forces, notably of the worst possible
during a decade. The major defects of this leadership
to its complete subjection to the wishes of German gover
and its being made a tool for political ends. He then
what he has since written in his weekly, of how when
1933 the leaders of the various German groups in Po
together in Lodz to take counsel in view of the new r
Berlin, every last man was agreed that the National
victory in the Reich spelt blue ruin for the German
notably in Poland. Nevertheless, when the same men
two months later in Warsaw, every man had recanted
lined up with the Hitler party, himself alone except
me," he said to them, " it is a matter of principle, of life p
and of my hope of salvation." That was the beginnin
breach, and things have got worse rather than bet
time can show us what the upshot will be.
In conclusion, one general remark that does indeed
on the field of politics. I give you the view of a frien
been a constant observer on the spot of Central Eu
conditions, one of the shrewdest minds I know.
" The Pact is another example of the impatience that is growing
at the policy of round table conferences with a large number of Powers
represented, in which action is made difficult because every representa?
tive is afraid that anything done may some day be used as a precedent
to be quoted against him when he does not want it.
" The Pact is a tender plant and needs to be nourished with care.
Too much need not be expected of it. But the possibilities are those
of a new era in the relations of long hostile neighbours."
For myself, I see no reason why this should not be true.
Summary of Discussion.
Question : Would the lecturer say something as to the present
position of the Jews in Upper Silesia ? Is it the case that Polish Jews
are receiving the same improved treatment that the Poles are receiving,
and is it possible that the idea of a Pole becoming a Kulturdeut?
scher will also make it possible for a non-Aryan Jew to become a
Kultur deutscher ?
Also, what likelihood is there of the Geneva Convention being
renewed for a further period?
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8l0 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV.
Mr. Wickham Steed said that in the west o
were all ignorant, it had been assumed that in
Poland, Herr Hitler had not only the welfa
The assumption had been that Hitler probably
or indicated possible conditions : that thes
absolutely rejected by the Polish negotiators,
conditions at least was that if Hitler should f
offensive against the Dollfuss policy in Austr
that perhaps the offensive might be successfu
interest in the matter directly or indirectly.
one of the conditions. Ought it to be assum
condition not be fulfiiled, as time went on Her
him would not feel that they had paid for somet
received ?
Quite recently he had received an impres
than an impression?of the sort of feeling tha
among Herr Hitler's more moderate oppon
on very good authority by someone who met
German Chancellor, during his visit to London
point upon which Dr. Bruning spoke with passion
of the Hitler-Polish Pact, and that he felt tha
of German interests ever to have assented by
that the Corridor could be left even for ten y
protest.
He thought we could all agree with the lecturer that, whatever
the motive might have been, whatever calculation there might have
been on one side or the other, the fact that the agreement had been
made was of enormous value in international relations, not only locally
in East Central Europe as between Poland and Germany, but as a
proof of the great change that might be wrought when two nations tried
to live in a neighbourly fashion.
He was very glad that the lecturer quoted the Rhein-Mainische
Volkszeitung and the articles by Freiherr Oskar von Soden. He had
a vivid recollection of the one appearing on the ioth November, 1932,
in which Baron von Soden, as a prominent member of the Centre Party,
made an impassioned appeal to his leader, Dr. Bruning, to try as a
Christian gentleman to see if Christian methods could not do something
to improve Polono-German relations. There had certainly been since
1925, to his knowledge, attempts on the part of Poland to promote
exactly this neighbourly relationship. He preferred not to mention
dates, but attempts to encourage a Polish-German commercial treaty
were going on for years. He remembered the former Polish Minister
in Brussels, Monsieur Filipowicz, proposing, as a general solution of the
difficulties between Poland and Germany, that there should be, first,
a commercial treaty, and, second, a demilitarised zone along the whole
frontier including the Corridor, and at the same time a territorial
guarantee by Poland to Germany of the political integrity of East
Prussia. It was turned down with contempt. He remembered that
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF 1934 8ll
M. Zaleski telegraphed to him personally for publication a
some similar suggestion which he published in Februa
was treated at once by the press of Dr. Briining as a villa
of Polish propaganda. He knew Zaleski pretty well as an h
and he did not think it was merely a political move.
Linked with this matter there was the question of Lith
of Latvia; there was also the future of East Prussia.
One or two persons made an attempt some two or three years ago,
not under the auspices of this Institute though they were allowed to
meet in this building, to get at the facts of the Polish-German quarrel
impartially but with a special reference to the Corridor in the first
instance. They decided to admit propaganda from both sides, but to
verify the statements made in that propaganda. They decided to
work only on pre-War German documents, which had at that time
been suppressed in Germany, but of which copies were available in
London; and they decided to ask the German and Polish Governments
for official statements of their respective cases, not in order to accept
them, but to compare them with the results of their own inquiries.
Within a very few weeks they had an official Polish statement, and on
examination it proved to be fairly near what they thought the truth.
Neither by hook nor by crook, nor begging, nor pressure, could they
ever extract any statement from the German Government.
Mr. Wickham Steed had asked a prominent member of the " Steel
Helmets " why this was and why they could not get anything from
Berlin. He looked at me with a contemptuous smile and said, " Do
you think we are such imbeciles as to give our case away in advance ? "
I said, " The Poles are doing so. Are you not running the risk that
others may suspect you have no case to give away? " On that point
I imagined they were pretty near the truth, for the German Govern?
ment would not let its own experts loose to give them their views.
Yet there had been this wonderful change. What could it be?
Looking at it from a broad European point of view, and not merely
from the very interesting and very important local point of view,
was it an attempt on the part of Hitler to lessen the cordiality between
Moscow and Warsaw ? Was it an attempt to give the Poles an oppor?
tunity, which he could imagine they would have been very glad to
accept, to show they were not satellites of France? Was it also an
attempt, or at least an opening for the Poles, which he imagined they
would have accepted with equal gladness, to say to Europe and the
United States, and British Pacifists in particular, " Aha, you have
been saying for years past that there could be no peace in Europe till
that wretched Corridor is done away with. We will not take any
responsibility for it " ? Then suddenly the Polish Corridor was put
to sleep for ten years, and Poland made a long nose at the rest of
Europe and said, " Now think of other things ! "
The appeal of that point of view would have been very potent;
but they wanted something a little beyond it. The difficulty was the
difficulty of judging both the promise and the good faith of the Hitler
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8l2 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV.
regime itself. He would be very glad if the
both in Poland and in Germany, could give
his Polish friends thought of the future. He had
an idea of the great local relief that was felt, an
that had accrued to the frontier population
peoples. But there still remained the big not
the future.
Dr. Rose said that the great issue that Mr. Steed had raised was
one that he had refused to deal with in his paper, but he would be glad
to make a comment or two and perhaps even venture into the field
that Mr. Steed had opened up, which was a very enticing one.
With regard to Lithuania and Latvia, the getting rid of the constant
recrimination and agitation about the existing order, and that shouting
for revision which kept five hundred miles of a frontier on tenterhooks,
was bound to have a good effect on the Baltic area, as it had on Upper
Silesia in a general way. That applied, of course, also to Dantzig,
about which he could only speak from hearsay, and to East Prussia.
Lithuania had been the bone of contention; it was a kind of political
football for years after the World War. No one has regretted that
more than the Poles, who because of the Vilna business were thought
to be in the wrong.
With regard to the position of the Jews, he had spent May and
June of last year on the German side of the frontier?during the period
of transition from the Centrum to the Nazi regime. He had made it
his business to foster contacts with the four major groups of society :
the German Catholics, the German Protestants, the Poles and the
Jews. He had heard terrible things from some Jews there. Frankly,
he could say that while the chances of a Pole being a Kulturdeutscher
might be fairly good (some of the Poles doubted it), the chances of a
Jew were nil. One of his Jewish friends had said to him, " Hitler has
done in fifteen days what Pilsudski could not get done in fifteen years
?got every Jew in Upper Silesia on the side of Poland."
It was a fact that among the most loyal members of the German
minority in Polish Silesia were the Jews who had never been anything
else but Germans, the people who controlled most of the business.
He was not speaking of the Jews who had come in from without.
What had happened had settled the minds of these people, who up to
then had been loyal Germans, members of the Minority, sharing the
burdens of everything. They saw what was going on just across the
the frontier and thanked God they were in Poland.
As to the Geneva Convention, he was not a prophet, but he did
not think the Geneva Convention would be prolonged. If the spirit
and the letter of the Pact developed on the lines that responsible
people hoped they would on both sides of the frontier?he was not
speaking of the authorities in Berlin or Warsaw because he knew very
little about them?the Geneva Convention would not be necessary.
He thought that certain things in the Geneva Convention would be
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1934] THE GERMAN-POLISH PACT OF I934 813
prolonged to meet the needs of a peculiar situation about whic
writing a book, but he did not think that the Convention
likely to be prolonged, partly because both parties to it w
" fed up " with certain clauses, certain phrases, of it, and
that it was a big financial burden. The fifteen-year peri
suffice to adjust everything, since with the exception of t
issues the adjustments had long since been made. He had a
or two to make in his book that might help just to make
would be a rather serious break.
Mr. Steed had referred to the fact that the Pact got no kind
response in Germany. Opinions expressed in Upper Silesia were o
all kinds. One man shrugged his shoulders, another smiled, and so
Everyone had his own view about it. Most of them took the view
that it was the best possible thing under the circumstances. It co
not do any harm ; it might help. They were not always much dispo
to take it seriously. Some were disposed to regard it as a mistak
He had found plenty of people who thought that not a Pact but t
very opposite was the thing needful.
He would just like to say two things. Those who had follow
the situation knew that Roman Dmowski was no friend of Germa
The head of the National Democratic party, he had always felt t
the only hope of Poland was the best possible relations with Rus
and that Germany was the Erbfeind. Yet Dmowski said to one
his (the speaker's) acquaintances at Easter-time : "I would not hav
made the Pact for choice; but I am convinced that we shall have it
for ten years, and that at the end of ten years it will be renewed."
There was one of the most experienced minds of Central Europe expressing
itself in respect to what had happened. A member of the diplomatic
corps in Warsaw said to a very highly placed Churchman, with whom
he had a long conference shortly before leaving Poland over a month
ago, something like this : "I should like you to know that after this
Pact, provided it stands for a number of years, the Germans will not
get a hearing in the world if they say they have to recover this or that.
It has been proved that they can do without it."
As to the question of population pressure, a matter that had not
been touched on, no one knew what the future would bring, but at
the moment the Polish State with 32,000,000 people was bringing as
many children into the world as the German State with 64,000,000.
In other words, the Polish birth-rate was twice that of the German
people. He did not know that it was a good thing; Poland had more
people than she knew what to do with. But in the Lower Vistula
area there were two Polish children being born in these days for every
one German. He drew attention to this factor. Further, although a
great deal had been heard in the last years about the Drang nach Osten
in Germany, it had been a political thing, and artificial. The popula?
tion of Eastern Germany that could get out of it had got out of it?
westward. That was the major trouble, and the fault was that of the
Junkers and their treatment of their tenants and work-people. Youth
No. 6.?VOL. XIII. F F
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814 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [NOV. I934
had run away to the Rhineland, and who took its pla
gdnger, i.e. the seasonal labourers from Russia or Po
A further point : from the direction in which the N
party was moving?and he spoke with a very inadeq
of their literature?it seemed to him that they had l
moment all thought of political frontiers and revi
ablest Poles he had heard speaking on that subject sa
they wanted to but because they had to." They had
their whole emphasis was going to be for years on a
during which time they hoped to recover from the blo
of various kinds, and more or less rehabilitate culturall
fellow-Germans of whom twenty-five millions lived ou
He had a pet theory?that in the case of Italy on t
in the case of Germany, a notable change had come s
neither of these peoples was yet fully conscious of. B
had what one might fairly call ramshackle empires to t
before the War. They had not yet learned that sin
neighbours were something entirely different, viz. soli
economically still poor national States : Yugoslavia
and Poland on the other.
In conclusion, he suspected that for some time at least the
would help on what he fancied was in part achieved, viz. a com
Verzicht on the part of the Reich, a rejection of policies that in
changes of political frontiers, with a tremendous stress on cul
spiritual, intellectual and other forces.
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