Selekční jazyky 2

Filozofická fakulta Masarykova Univerzity, Kabinet knihovnictví - Ústav české literatury a knihovnictví

jarní semestr 2006/2007

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2. nepovinný úkol
Termín odevzdání práce: 30.5.2007

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<u>ZADÁNÍ ÚKOLU</u>

1. Zvolte si libovolnou (podle svého zájmu) **oborovou bibliografickou nebo plnotextovou databázi**, volně přístupnou na internetu nebo přístupnou licencovaně v síti MU, popř. jinde. Uveďte **název, URL a krátkou charakteristiku** zvolené databáze.

2. Popište, jakým způsobem lze ve vybrané databázi **věcně vyhledávat**, tj.:
   - jaká **pole věcného popisu** databáze obsahuje
   - jaké jsou k dispozici **řízené slovníky**, jaký je jejich rozsah a struktura
   - jaká jsou **pravidla pro věcné vyhledávání** (a příp. prohlížení) v databázi

3. Vyberte si libovolné téma z oblasti, kterou pokrývá zvolená databáze, a formulujte **informační požadavek** tak, aby obsahoval minimálně **tři významově plnohodnotné výrazy**. (např. *dopink australských běžců, pojem informační ekonomie v díle Marca Porata, neonacistické symboly a hudba, středověké sekty ve Francii, ekologicky šetrné prostředky proti plísni bramborové, vliv morčat domácích na vznik alergií u dětí do 3 let, reflexe Dantova díla ve slovenské literatuře 19. století* apod. ***Pozn.:*** <u>**tato témata již nelze pro zpracování úkolu použít**</u>).

4. Na základě zvoleného informačního požadavku sestavte **informační dotaz**, který zodpovíte pomocí jednoho nebo více polí věcného popisu ve zvolené databázi.
   a. V případě, že informační dotaz bude generovat řádově stovky až tisíce dokumentů, pokuste se informační požadavek věcně zúžit (např. *dopink australských běžců* zužte na *dopink australských maratonců*). Pokud se ani po opakovaném zúžení věcného rozsahu požadavku nedoberete k množině záznamů, která bude obsahovat maximálně několik desítek záznamů (cca 10 až 30), omezte dotaz pomocí formálních kritérií (typ dokumentu, rok vydání apod.).
   b. V případě, že informační dotaz bude generovat méně než 5 dokumentů (tedy žádný až čtyři), pokuste se informační požadavek věcně rozšířit (např. *ekologicky šetrné prostředky proti plísni bramborové* rozšiřte na *prostředky proti plísni bramborové* nebo na *ekologicky šetrné prostředky proti plísním*). Pokud se ani po opakovaném rozšíření věcného rozsahu informačního požadavku nedoberete k minimálně pěti záznamům, je zřejmě chyba ve volbě informačního požadavku nebo formulaci informačního dotazu a je třeba zvolit jiné téma.

5. Uveďte případný komentář k vyhledaným záznamům a vyhledávání jako takovému.

6. Úkol bude obsahovat tyto položky:
   a. název, URL a krátkou charakteristiku zvolené databáze podle bodu 1

b. popis možností věcného vyhledávání podle bodu 2
c. informační požadavek podle bodu 3
d. informační dotazy podle bodu 4, včetně všech jejich úprav + počty vyhledaných záznamů
e. případný komentář podle bodu 5
f. vyhledané záznamy (jako příloha)

7. Soubor pojmenujte: [prijmeni]_ukolSJn2.doc (např. novak_SJn2.doc). Výsledek uložte do 30.5.2007 do Odevzdávárny v IS MU

PŘÍKLAD ŘEŠENÍ:
Pozn: databázi ani informační požadavek uvedené v tomto příkladu nelze při řešení úkolu použít.

1: Databáze:
Philosopher's Index, URL: http://bi.cuni.cz (interní přístup)
Bibliografická databáze z oblasti filozofie (etika, estetika, sociální filozofie, politická filozofie, epistemologie, metafyzika) a přilehlých oblastí (filozofie práva, náboženství, vědy, dějin, vzdělávání a jazyka) s retrospektivou od roku 1940, obsahuje záznamy článků z více než 300 odborných časopisů a záznamy monografií; větší část záznamů má abstrakty.

2: Možnosti věcného vyhledávání:
Databáze obsahuje tato pole věcného popisu:
  o DE descriptors
  o PS personal name as subject
  o SU subjects

Pole „DE descriptors" obsahuje deskriptory tezauru, ale přístup k tezauru samotnému není umožněn ideálně. Volba „Thesaurus" v databázi není aktivní, využít lze jen prohlížení rejstříku (Index), který obsahuje jen seznam jednotlivých lexikálních jednotek, a položku „Suggest" – po zapsání výrazu se objeví seznam deskriptorů, které jsou s daným výrazem v nějakém (zřejmě hierarchickém a asociativním) vztahu.

Pole „PS personal name as subject" obsahuje jméno osoby jako předmět a je zajímavé, že kromě rejstříku lze použít opět volbu „Suggest", která po zadání jména osoby vygeneruje seznam pojmů (deskriptorů), věcně spojených s dílem zadané osoby (např. zadání „Socrates" vygeneruje METAPHYSICS-, PHILOSOPHY-, DEATH-, KNOWLEDGE-, SOUL-, ETHICS-, VIRTUE-, DEFINITION-, DIALECTIC-, EDUCATION-).

Pole „SU subjects" se v záznamech nevyskytuje, je to vlastně pouze „virtuální" vyhledávácí pole, které sdružuje údaje z polí DE a PS.

Kromě už zmíněného rejstříku a volby „Suggest" lze v databázi věcně vyhledávat formulací dotazu v jednotlivých polích věcného popisu nebo pomocí sdruženého pole „Subject", které vyhledávání ve všech třech (ale vlastně dvou) polích věcného popisu. Používají se standardní znaky pro rozšiřování výrazů - * a ?, fráze se zapisují do uvozovek nebo lze využít spojovníku mezi slovy ve víceslovných deskriptorech (např. moral-philosophy).

3: Informační požadavek:
pojem intenze a extenze v díle Rudolfa Carnapa (tj. zajímá mě, jak na práce R. Carnapa o intenzi a extenzi reagovali jiní autoři)

4: Informační dotazy:

1. dotaz (10 záznamů – viz příloha č. 1): (exten?ion* and inten?ion*) in de and carnap* in ps

První dotaz nalezl poměrně relevantní záznamy. Protože mě však zajímají i dokumenty, ve kterých se píše nejen o intenzi a extenzi zároveň, ale i zvlášť, zkouším ještě další dotaz:

2. dotaz (46 záznamů – viz příloha č. 2): (exten?ion* or inten?ion*) in de and carnap* in ps

Druhým dotazem jsem ještě získal některé další relevantní záznamy, ale některé už neodpovídaly zcela mým požadavkům (nebyly pertinentní).

5: komentář:
Vyhledané záznamy, které považuji za nejužitečnější, jsem označil v příloze č. 2 žlutě. Všechny záznamy jsou sice **relevantní** (odpovídají formulaci dotazu), ale jen ty označené jsou **pertinentní** (skutečně vyhovují mým informačním potřebám) – takových záznamů je 20.

PŘÍLOHY

Příloha č. 1

TI: "La logica del Tractatus y la construccion logica de Carnap" in El Programa de Carnap: Ciencia, lenguaje, filosofia, Cirera, Ramon (ed), 149-167
AU: Terricabras,-Josep-Maria
PB: Ed-Bronce : Barcelona, 1997
DE: EXTENSIONALITY-; INTENSIONALITY-; LOGIC-; MEANING-; OBSERVATION-; REFERENCE-; VIENNA-CIRCLE
PS: CARNAP-; WITTGENSTEIN
LA: English
DT: Contribution
PY: 1997
UD: 321
AN: 1653239

TI: Bedeutung: Grundzuge einer internalistischen Semantik
AU: Schweizer,-Herbert
PB: Haupt : Berne, 1991
AB: Seeking for an ontologically acceptable definition of "meaning", the author draws radical conclusions from the discussion of Carnapian coined semantics and Quine's critics against them. He offers arguments that suggest to challenge Quine's naturalism and holism both in semantics and philosophy of science and he opts for a strict model theoretic version of Carnap's internalism in formal semantics. The book contains a readable introduction into the theories of meaning of Frege, Carnap and Quine and deals with many semantical concepts and problems like meaning, synonymy, analyticity, intensions.
DE: EXTENSION-; INTENSION-; INTERNALISM-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; SEMANTICS-
PS: CARNAP-; FREGE-; QUINE
LA: English
DT: Monograph
PY: 1991
UD: 262
AN: 1229658

TI: SYNONYMITY AND THE THESIS OF INTENSIONALITY.
AU: BAKSI,-KALIPADA
SO: Indian-Philosophical-Quarterly. O 80; 8: 31-46
JN: Indian-Philosophical-Quarterly:-Journal-of-the-Department-of-Philosophy-University-of-Poona
IS: 0376-415X
AB: THIS PAPER IS A STUDY ON THE INTENSIONAL THESIS OF CARNAP AS CONTRASTED WITH THAT OF FREGE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER IT PROVIDES A SATISFACTORY BASIS OF 'SYNONYMITY' OF NATURAL EXPRESSIONS (WHICH THE EXTENSIONAL THESIS ALLEGEDLY FAILS TO PROVIDE). IT IS ARGUED THAT CARNAP FARES NO BETTER THAN FREGE AND THAT THE INTENSIONAL THESIS IS NO BETTER SUBSTITUTE FOR THE EXTENSIONAL ONE. THIS PAPER LAYS BARE SOME OF THE MISCONCEPTIONS THAT LED CARNAP TO FORMULATE HIS THEORY IN THE WAY HE DOES AND SUGGESTS A RADICALLY DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE ISSUES INVOLVED. IT CONCLUDES THAT SYNONYMITY BETWEEN EXPRESSIONS IS AN IDEAL LIMIT HARDLY ATTAINABLE IN NATURAL LANGUAGE.
DE: EPISTEMOLOGY-; EXTENSION-; INTENSIONALITY-; LANGUAGE-; SYNONYM-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1980
UD: 120
AN: 1109025

TI: SEMANTICAL QUESTIONS IN CARNAP'S INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
AU: SMOKLER,-HOWARD
SO: British-Journal-for-the-Philosophy-of-Science. JE 77; 28: 129-135
JN: British-Journal-for-the-Philosophy-of-Science
IS: 0007-0882
AB: CARNAP'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC HAS BEEN TO CLARIFY THE LOGICAL AND SEMANTICAL BASIS OF THAT LOGIC. IN CONFORMITY WITH HIS EXTENSIONALIST PROCLIVITIES HE HAS DESIGNED A SEMANTICS FOR INDUCTIVE LOGIC WHICH EXTENSIONALIZES VARIOUS SEMANTICAL CATEGORIES: MEANINGS, LANGUAGE-FORMS, ETC., AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. HE NO DOUBT HAS ALSO BEEN GUIDED BY THE CONSIDERATION THAT SUCH A SEMANTICS IS TECHNICALLY EASIER TO WORK WITH THAN AN INTENSIONALIST ONE. HE HAS BEEN LED TO A NUMBER OF CONCLUSIONS WHICH SEEM AT VARIANCE WITH COMMON SENSE AND SEMANTICAL THEORY: PROPOSITIONS ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THEIR EXTENSIONS AND ALSO WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING EVENTS. INFORMATION NORMALLY RELEVANT TO THE FORMULATION OF RATIONAL BELIEF IS EXCLUDED FROM EXPRESSION IN THE LANGUAGE OF INDUCTION. THEREFORE I WANT TO OFFER ARGUMENTS AGAINST CARNAP'S POSITIONS AND INVESTIGATE WHAT ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE PRESENT IN A SEMANTICAL THEORY MORE REALISTIC THAN CARNAP'S.
DE: EPISTEMOLOGY-; EXTENSIONALITY-; INDUCTION-; INTENSIONALITY-; LOGIC-; PREDICATION-; PROBABILITY-; RATIONALITY-; SCIENCE-; SEMANTICS-
PS: CARNAP-; QUINE
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1977
UD: 110
AN: 1056509

TI: INTENSIONAL CONCEPTS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE: THE RESULTS OF CARNAP'S BEHAVIORAL METHODOLOGY.
AU: PANAGIOTOU,-NANCY
SO: Dialogue-. O 72; 15: 1-7
JN: Dialogue:-Journal-of-Phi-Sigma-Tau
IS: 0012-2246
AB: CONCEPTS OF ANALYCITY AND SYNONYMY AS FOUND IN CARNAP'S INTENSIONAL SEMANTICAL SYSTEM FOR LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS ARE EXAMINED FOR APPLICABILITY TO PROBLEMS GROUNDED IN NATURAL LANGUAGE. APPLICABILITY HINGES UPON A METHOD OF DETERMINING INTENSION IN NATURAL LANGUAGE. CARNAP'S OWN BEHAVIORAL METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING INTENSION, AS REFINED BY KATZ' SEMANTICAL THEORY, IS SHOWN UNDER EXAMINATION TO YIELD ONLY INDECISIVE VARIETIES OF SYNONYMY IN NATURAL LANGUAGE WITH CORRESPONDING ANALYCITY. CARNAP HAS SHOWN A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR COMPLETE SYNONYMY, BUT HAS NOT SHOWN IT TO OCCUR.
DE: ANALYTICITY-; EXTENSION-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; KATZ,-J; QUINE-; WHITE,-M
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1972
UD: 060
AN: 1036586

TI: CARNAP'S ONTOLOGY AND CHALLENGES.
AU: SWEIGART,-JOHN
SO: Philosophy-of-Science. JA 63; 30: 71-80
JN: Philosophy-of-Science
IS: 0031-8248
AB: IN VARIOUS ARTICLES PROFESSOR R CARNAP EXAMINES THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS. I WANT TO APPRAISE HIS OWN POSITION AND RESPOND TO HIS CHALLENGES CONCERNING AN EXTENSIONALISTIC, INSTEAD OF AN INTENSIONALISTIC (SUCH AS HIS), METHOD OF ANALYSIS. CRITICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE LATTER ARE DEVELOPED FOR BOTH FORMALIZED LANGUAGES AND NATURAL LANGUAGE. DRAWING UPON CERTAIN STUDIES OF R M MARTIN AND N GOODMAN, PLUS SOME PREVIOUS WORK OF MY OWN, I THEN SHOW THAT THE VAGUENESSES AND CONFUSIONS OF EXCESSIVE ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS ACCOMPANYING INTENSIONALISM CAN BE AVOIDED BY EXTENSIONALISTIC APPROACHES IN WHICH INTEGRAL CONCEPTS CAN BE WELL DEFINED.
DE: ABSTRACT-ENTITY; EXTENSIONALITY-; INTENSIONALISM-;

LANGUAGE-; METAPHYSICS-; ONTOLOGY-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1963
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1010033

TI: PRAGMATICS AND INTENSION.
AU: MAYS,-W
SO: Australasian-Journal-of-Philosophy. MY 61; 39: 1-12
JN: Australasian-Journal-of-Philosophy
IS: 0004-8402
AB: THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT CARNAP TRIED TO MEET QUINE'S CRITICISMS OF HIS DEFINITIONS OF SYNONYMY AND ANALYTICITY BY "TESTING INTENSIONS PRAGMATICALLY." THE AUTHOR ACCUSES CARNAP OF PERPETUATING THE "SHARP" ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION. HE CONCLUDES THAT CARNAP IS MISTAKEN IN ARGUING AN ANALOGY BETWEEN MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE "WHICH MAY NOT HAVE A PRECISE REFERENTIAL FUNCTION." (STAFF)
DE: ANALYTICITY-; EXTENSION-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; PRAGMATICS-; PREDICATE-; SEMANTICS-; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; MAYS,-W
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1961
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1062910

TI: TOWARD A SYSTEMATIC PRAGMATICS.
AU: MARTIN,-RICHARD-MILTON
PB: NORTH-HOLLANDSCHE : AMSTERDAM, 1959
AB: IN THIS BOOK SEVERAL PRAGMATICAL THEORIES ARE EXPRESSED WITHIN A FORMALIZED META-LANGUAGE. THE POINT OF VIEW IS EXTENSIONAL. (BP, EDITED)
DE: ANALYTICITY-; ASSERTING-; EXTENSIONALITY-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; METALANGUAGE-; PERFORMATIVES-; PRAGMATICS-; PROJECTIBILITY-; RULE-; SEMANTICS-; TYPE-
PS: CARNAP-; GOODMAN,-N
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1959
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1072711

TI: CARNAP'S SEMANTICS.
AU: BLACK,-MAX
SO: Philosophical-Review. MY 49; 58: 257-264
JN: Philosophical-Review
IS: 0031-8108
DE: COMMITMENT-; EXTENSION-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; METALANGUAGE-; ONTOLOGY-; SEMANTICS-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1949
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1005928

TI: CONCERNING CARNAP'S DEFINITION OF 'EXTENSIONAL' AND 'INTENSIONAL'.
AU: BERGMANN,-GUSTAV
SO: Mind-. O 48; 57: 494-495
JN: Mind:-A-Quarterly-Review-of-Philosophy
IS: 0026-4423
DE: EXTENSION-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1948
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1061132

Příloha č. 2

TI: CONFIRMATION, INTENTION, AND LANGUAGE.
AU: PALMIERI,-L-E
SO: Methodos-.; 11: 33-40
JN: Methodos
DE: CONFIRMATION-; INTENTION-; SCIENCE-
PS: CARNAP-; HEMPEL
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1069512

TI: A Resurrection of Mates' Problem
AU: Elambooranan,-Sivakumar
SO: Journal-of-Indian-Council-of-Philosophical-Research. O-D 02; 19(4): 37-45
JN: Journal-of-Indian-Council-of-Philosophical-Research
IS: 0970-7794
DE: INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; SENTENCE-; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; MATES,-B
LA: English
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 2002
UD: 382
AN: 1717609

TI: "La logica del Tractatus y la construccion logica de Carnap" in El Programa de Carnap: Ciencia, lenguaje, filosofia, Cirera, Ramon (ed), 149-167
AU: Terricabras,-Josep-Maria
PB: Ed-Bronce : Barcelona, 1997
DE: EXTENSIONALITY-; INTENSIONALITY-; LOGIC-; MEANING-; OBSERVATION-; REFERENCE-; VIENNA-CIRCLE
PS: CARNAP-; WITTGENSTEIN
LA: English
DT: Contribution
PY: 1997
UD: 321
AN: 1653239

TI: Intentionality and the Myth of Pure Syntax
AU: Jacquette,-Dale
SO: Protosoziologie-. 1994; 6: 76-89
JN: Protosoziologie
IS: 0940-4147
AB: The assumption that it is possible to distinguish pure syntax from any semantic interpretation is common to contemporary extensionalist approaches to philosophy of language, mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. The origin of the term "pure syntax" is traced to Carnap's distinction between pure and applied syntax and semantics, and to formalist analyses of mathematical systems as uninterpreted token manipulating games. It is argued in opposition to this trend that syntax can never be purified entirely of semantics, that there can be no such thing as meaningless syntactical tokens or uninterpreted symbols, but that tokens must always be token and symbols always symbolize something. The implications of the myth of pure syntax in rule-structured and connectionist artificial intelligence, semantic network processing, and their philosophical-psychological rationales, are explored. The fact that rule-structured artificial intelligence in principle can simulate any connectionist model, and that rule-structured artificial intelligence presupposes the myth of pure syntax links the myth to traditional approaches and new paradigms in cognitive engineering.
DE: INTENTIONALITY-; LANGUAGE-; SEMANTICS-; SYNTAX-
PS: CARNAP
LA: English
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1994
UD: 294
AN: 1256625

TI: The New Intensionalism
AU: Katz,-Jerrold

AB: From the beginning of the linguistic turn in this century to the present, philosophical discussions of language have consistently assumed that intensionalism, the doctrine that expressions of natural language have sense as well as reference, can only be Fregean intensionalism. In earlier papers, I argued that this widespread assumption is false because there is another form of intensionalism fundamentally different from Frege's, and, further, that the failure to recognize such an alternative has led to the acceptance of criticisms of the intensionalist position which, in fact, are only criticisms of Fregean intensionalism. Since then I have come to think that the assumption is false for a different and deeper reason, namely, that the systematic semantics that Frege developed and that Carnap refurbished is not intensionalism at all. In this paper, I want to explain why I now think this. In the process, I hope to provide a new perspective on the linguistic turn in twentieth century philosophy and a new conception of the relation between the analytic and the necessary and a priori.
DE: INTENTIONALISM-; LANGUAGE-; NATURAL-LANGUAGE
PS: CARNAP-; FREGE
LA: English
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1992
UD: 271
AN: 1233609

TI: Bedeutung: Grundzuge einer internalistischen Semantik
AU: Schweizer,-Herbert
PB: Haupt : Berne, 1991
AB: Seeking for an ontologically acceptable definition of "meaning", the author draws radical conclusions from the discussion of Carnapian coined semantics and Quine's critics against them. He offers arguments that suggest to challenge Quine's naturalism and holism both in semantics and philosophy of science and he opts for a strict model theoretic version of Carnap's internalism in formal semantics. The book contains a readable introduction into the theories of meaning of Frege, Carnap and Quine and deals with many semantical concepts and problems like meaning, synonymy, analyticity, intensions.
DE: EXTENSION-; INTENSION-; INTERNALISM-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; SEMANTICS-
PS: CARNAP-; FREGE-; QUINE
LA: English
DT: Monograph
PY: 1991
UD: 262
AN: 1229658

TI: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS ON THE THEORY OF TYPES IN INTENSIONAL LOGIC.
AU: VANDERVEKEN,-DANIEL
SO: Erkenntnis-. JA 82; 17: 85-112
JN: Erkenntnis:-An-International-Journal-of-Analytic-Philosophy
IS: 0165-0106
AB: THE AIM OF THE PAPER IS TO DESCRIBE SOME PHILOSOPHICALLY SIGNIFICANT FORMAL DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST IN THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTENSIONAL LOGICS OF FREGE, CHURCH, RUSSELL, CARNAP, AND MONTAGUE. THESE FORMAL DIFFERENCES CONCERN MAINLY THE RELATION OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SENSES AND DENOTATIONS AND ENTER IN THE RECURSIVE DEFINITION OF THE SET OF ALL TYPES OF POSSIBLE SENSES AND DEFINITION OF EACH INTENSIONAL LOGIC. THEY ARE PHILOSOPHICALLY SIGNIFICANT IN THE SENSE THAT THEY EXPRESS VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS IN ONTOLOGY OR PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.
DE: INTENSIONAL-LOGIC; LOGIC-
PS: CARNAP-; CHURCH,-A; FREGE-; KAPLAN,-D; MONTAGUE,-R; RUSSELL
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1982
UD: 162
AN: 1105496

TI: SYNONYMITY AND THE THESIS OF INTENSIONALITY.
AU: BAKSI,-KALIPADA
AB: THIS PAPER IS A STUDY ON THE INTENSIONAL THESIS OF CARNAP AS CONTRASTED WITH THAT OF FREGE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER IT PROVIDES A SATISFACTORY BASIS OF 'SYNONYMITY' OF NATURAL EXPRESSIONS (WHICH THE EXTENSIONAL THESIS ALLEGEDLY FAILS TO PROVIDE). IT IS ARGUED THAT CARNAP FARES NO BETTER THAN FREGE AND THAT THE INTENSIONAL THESIS IS NO BETTER SUBSTITUTE FOR THE EXTENSIONAL ONE. THIS PAPER LAYS BARE SOME OF THE MISCONCEPTIONS THAT LED CARNAP TO FORMULATE HIS THEORY IN THE WAY HE DOES AND SUGGESTS A RADICALLY DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE ISSUES INVOLVED. IT CONCLUDES THAT SYNONYMITY BETWEEN EXPRESSIONS IS AN IDEAL LIMIT HARDLY ATTAINABLE IN NATURAL LANGUAGE.
DE: EPISTEMOLOGY-; EXTENSION-; INTENSIONALITY-; LANGUAGE-; SYNONYM-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1980
UD: 120
AN: 1109025

TI: THE THEORY OF SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION.
AU: KATZ,-JERROLD-J
SO: Erkenntnis-. JL 78; 13: 63-109
JN: Erkenntnis:-An-International-Journal-of-Analytic-Philosophy
IS: 0165-0106
DE: INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; PERLOCUTION-; REPRESENTATION-; SEMANTICS-; SYNTAX-; USE-
PS: CARNAP-; CHOMSKY,-N; DAVIDSON,-D; DONNELLAN,-K; FREGE-; GOODMAN,-N; GRICE,-H-P; HARMAN,-G; QUINE-; TARSKI
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1978
UD: 120
AN: 1060367

TI: SEMANTICAL QUESTIONS IN CARNAP'S INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
AU: SMOKLER,-HOWARD
SO: British-Journal-for-the-Philosophy-of-Science. JE 77; 28: 129-135
JN: British-Journal-for-the-Philosophy-of-Science
IS: 0007-0882
AB: CARNAP'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC HAS BEEN TO CLARIFY THE LOGICAL AND SEMANTICAL BASIS OF THAT LOGIC. IN CONFORMITY WITH HIS EXTENSIONALIST PROCLIVITIES HE HAS DESIGNED A SEMANTICS FOR INDUCTIVE LOGIC WHICH EXTENSIONALIZES VARIOUS SEMANTICAL CATEGORIES: MEANINGS, LANGUAGE-FORMS, ETC., AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. HE NO DOUBT HAS ALSO BEEN GUIDED BY THE CONSIDERATION THAT SUCH A SEMANTICS IS TECHNICALLY EASIER TO WORK WITH THAN AN INTENSIONALIST ONE. HE HAS BEEN LED TO A NUMBER OF CONCLUSIONS WHICH SEEM AT VARIANCE WITH COMMON SENSE AND SEMANTICAL THEORY: PROPOSITIONS ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THEIR EXTENSIONS AND ALSO WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING EVENTS. INFORMATION NORMALLY RELEVANT TO THE FORMULATION OF RATIONAL BELIEF IS EXCLUDED FROM EXPRESSION IN THE LANGUAGE OF INDUCTION. THEREFORE I WANT TO OFFER ARGUMENTS AGAINST CARNAP'S POSITIONS AND INVESTIGATE WHAT ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE PRESENT IN A SEMANTICAL THEORY MORE REALISTIC THAN CARNAP'S.
DE: EPISTEMOLOGY-; EXTENSIONALITY-; INDUCTION-; INTENSIONALITY-; LOGIC-; PREDICATION-; PROBABILITY-; RATIONALITY-; SCIENCE-; SEMANTICS-
PS: CARNAP-; QUINE
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1977
UD: 110

AN: 1056509

TI: TWO THEORIES OF MEANING" IN "TRUTH AND MEANING: ESSAYS IN SEMANTICS", GARETH EVANS AND JOHN MCDOWELL (EDS), 138-161
AU: LOAR,-BRIAN
PB: Clarendon-Press : OXFORD, 1976
DE: INTENTION-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; PROPOSITION-; SEMANTICS-; TRUTH-
PS: CARNAP-; DAVIDSON,-D
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Contribution
PY: 1976
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1077940

TI: RUDOLF CARNAP, LOGICAL EMPIRICIST: MATERIALS AND PERSPECTIVES.
AU: HINTIKKA,-JAAKKO (ED)
PB: REIDEL : DORDRECHT, 1975
AB: THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS VOLUME CONTAIN CRITICISMS OF CARNAP'S WORKS AS WELL AS ARTICLES DEVELOPING FURTHER HIS IDEAS. (EDITED)
DE: ANALYTICITY-; BELIEF-; BIOGRAPHY-; INDUCTIVE-LOGIC; INTENSIONALITY-; LANGUAGE-; LOGICAL-EMPIRICISM; LOGICISM-; METAPHYSICS-; OBSERVATION-SENTENCE; PHILOSOPHY-; PROBABILITY-; SCIENCE-; THEORETICAL-CONCEPTS; WORLD-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1975
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1076155

TI: THE INTENTIONS OF INTENTIONALITY AND OTHER NEW MODELS FOR MODALITIES.
AU: HINTIKKA,-JAAKKO
PB: REIDEL : BOSTON, 1975
DE: BELIEVING-; CONCEPT-; EPISTEMIC-LOGIC; EPISTEMOLOGY-; FORMALIZATION-; IDENTIFICATION-; INTENSIONAL-LOGIC; INTENTIONALITY-; KNOWING-; LINGUISTICS-; LOGIC-; MODALITY-; OBJECT-; PERCEPTION-; PHENOMENOLOGY-; POSSIBLE-WORLD; QUANTIFICATION-; QUESTION-; SEMANTICS-
PS: CARNAP-; HUSSERL-; QUINE
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1975
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1019018

*TI: DISPOSITIONS AND REDUCTIONISM IN PSYCHOLOGY.
AU: OLSHEWSKY,-THOMAS-M
SO: Journal-for-the-Theory-of-Social-Behaviour. O 75; 5: 129-144
JN: Journal-for-the-Theory-of-Social-Behaviour
IS: 0021-8308
AB: 1) REDUCTIONISM IN PSYCHOLOGY IS NOT A SINGLE MOVE REGARDING A SINGLE CONCEPTUAL ISSUE, BUT IS RATHER A COMPLEX OF CONCERNS WITH A NETWORK OF CONCEPTUALLY INTERRELATED ISSUES. 2) REDUCTIONISTIC MOVES TEND TO EXPLICITLY RELY UPON OR IMPLICITLY PRESUPPOSE THE USE OF DISPOSITIONAL TERMS. 3) DISPOSITIONAL TERMS WILL NOT SERVE TO EFFECT REDUCTIONISTIC PROGRAMS BECAUSE THEY THEMSELVES REQUIRE MANY OF THE FEATURES THAT THOSE PROGRAMS REQUIRE EXCISING. 4) IF DISPOSITIONALS ARE NOT THEMSELVES LOGICALLY TIED TO INTENTIONALS, THEY AT LEAST BEAR A SUFFICIENT FAMILY RESEMBLANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN LOGICAL PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF INTENTIONALS AND MODALS. 5) IF DISPOSITIONALS AND INTENTIONALS DO NOT REQUIRE THE TELEOLOGICAL FRAME FROM WHICH THEY HISTORICALLY AROSE, THEN THEY AT LEAST REQUIRE SOME ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTING, NOT AN ELIMINATION.

DE: DISPOSITION-; INTENTION-; PSYCHOLOGY-; REDUCTIONISM-; SCIENCE-; SOCIAL-SCIENCES
PS: CARNAP-; HEMPEL-; RYLE,-G
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1975
UD: 100
AN: 1049029
*LHM: ABD103 http://www.nlk.cz/adr.asp?V=ABD103 - 96
BAA001 http://www.nlk.cz/adr.asp?V=BAA001 - 93 94 95 96 97 98

TI: THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INTENSIONAL LOGIC: PART 1.
AU: KAMP,-H
SO: Aristotelian-Society. 1975; Suppl 49: 21-44
JN: Aristotelian-Society:-Supplementary-Volume
IS: 0309-7013
DE: IDENTITY-; INTENSIONAL-LOGIC; INTUITION-; LOGIC-; MATHEMATICS-; METALOGIC-; MODEL-THEORY; NECESSITY-; POSSIBLE-WORLD; PROPERTY-; REALISM-; SEMANTICS-; TYPE-; VALIDITY-
PS: CARNAP-; CHURCH,-A; KRIPKE,-S; TARSKI
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1975
UD: 090
AN: 1047929

TI: REFERENCE TO THE NON-EXISTENT.
AU: DEELY,-JOHN-N
SO: Thomist-. AP 75; 39: 253-308
JN: Thomist:-A-Speculative-Quarterly-Review
IS: 0040-6325
DE: DEFINITE-DESCRIPTIONS; DENOTING-; EXISTENCE-; INTENTIONALITY-; METAPHYSICS-; NONBEING-; ONTOLOGY-; PHENOMENOLOGY-; REFERENCE-
PS: AQUINAS-; AYER-; BRADLEY-; BRENTANO-; CAJETAN-; CARNAP-; FREGE-; OSGOOD,-C; POINSOT,-J; QUINE-; RORTY,-R; RUSSELL-; WITTGENSTEIN
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1975
UD: 090
AN: 1047680

TI: MEANING POSTULATES AND SEMANTIC THEORY.
AU: KATZ,-JERROLD-J; NAGEL,-RICHARD-I
SO: Foundations-of-Language. MY 74; 11: 311-340
JN: Foundations-of-Language
IS: 0015-900X
AB: THIS PAPER CLAIMS THAT SEMANTIC THEORY OFFERS A BETTER APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF NATURAL LANGUAGES THAN SYSTEMS OF MEANING POSTULATES. WE TRY TO ESTABLISH THIS CLAIM BY SHOWING THAT CARNAPIAN SYSTEMS FAIL REASONABLE CONDITIONS OF ADEQUACY ON THEORIES OF NATURAL LANGUAGE, CONDITIONS THAT INTENSIONALISTS OUGHT TO FIND ACCEPTABLE. WE ALSO ARGUE THAT CHANGING THESE SYSTEMS SO THAT THEY NO LONGER FAIL SUCH CONDITIONS TRANSFORMS THEM INTO A SEMANTIC THEORY, SO THAT SUCH SYSTEMS MAY BE THOUGHT OF AS A FIRST APPROXIMATION TO A SEMANTIC THEORY.
DE: ANALYTICITY-; INTENSIONALISM-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; SEMANTICS-
PS: CARNAP-; QUINE
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1974
UD: 060
AN: 1043281

TI: INTENTIONALITY, MIND, AND LANGUAGE.
AU: MARRAS,-AUSONIO (ED)
PB: UNIV-OF-ILLINOIS-PR : LONDON, 1972

DE: BELIEVING-; DENOTING-; DESCRIPTION-; EPISTEMOLOGY-; INTENTIONALITY-; LANGUAGE-; MIND-; PHYSICALISM-; SENSE-; THOUGHT-
PS: BRENTANO-; CARNAP-; CHISHOLM,-R; FREGE-; MEINONG-; RUSSELL-; SELLARS,-W; WITTGENSTEIN
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1972
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1072027

TI: INTENSIONAL CONCEPTS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE: THE RESULTS OF CARNAP'S BEHAVIORAL METHODOLOGY.
AU: PANAGIOTOU,-NANCY
SO: Dialogue-. O 72; 15: 1-7
JN: Dialogue:-Journal-of-Phi-Sigma-Tau
IS: 0012-2246
AB: CONCEPTS OF ANALYCITY AND SYNONYMY AS FOUND IN CARNAP'S INTENSIONAL SEMANTICAL SYSTEM FOR LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS ARE EXAMINED FOR APPLICABILITY TO PROBLEMS GROUNDED IN NATURAL LANGUAGE. APPLICABILITY HINGES UPON A METHOD OF DETERMINING INTENSION IN NATURAL LANGUAGE. CARNAP'S OWN BEHAVIORAL METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING INTENSION, AS REFINED BY KATZ' SEMANTICAL THEORY, IS SHOWN UNDER EXAMINATION TO YIELD ONLY INDECISIVE VARIETIES OF SYNONYMY IN NATURAL LANGUAGE WITH CORRESPONDING ANALYCITY. CARNAP HAS SHOWN A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR COMPLETE SYNONYMY, BUT HAS NOT SHOWN IT TO OCCUR.
DE: ANALYTICITY-; EXTENSION-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; KATZ,-J; QUINE-; WHITE,-M
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1972
UD: 060
AN: 1036586

TI: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY.
AU: DONAGAN,-ALAN
SO: Philosophical-Review. JA 70; 79: 83-138
JN: Philosophical-Review
IS: 0031-8108
AB: THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES HOW 'THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY' (8 VOLS., ED. PAUL EDWARDS) TREATS OF CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA'S EDITORIAL POLICIES AND THEIR EXECUTION, SEVEN PRINCIPAL TOPICS ARE CONSIDERED: (1) THE LEGACY OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM; (2) THE A PRIORI AND THE ANALYTIC; (3) REALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH; (4) NEW CONCEPTIONS OF ONTOLOGY; (5) THE REVOLT AGAINST MIND-BODY DUALISM; (6) THE THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION; AND (7) RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICE.
DE: A-PRIORI; ACTION-; ANALYTIC-; CARTESIANISM-; CAUSE-; ENCYCLOPEDIA-; INTENTION-; MIND-; ONTOLOGY-; PHILOSOPHY-; RELIGION-; THEOLOGY-; TRUTH-
PS: CARNAP-; MOORE-; QUINE-; RYLE,-G; SHAFFER,-J; STRAWSON-; TARSKI-; TAYLOR,-R; WITTGENSTEIN
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1970
UD: 060
AN: 1028445

TI: CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY.
AU: LEWIS,-DAVID
PB: HARVARD-UNIV-PR : CAMBRIDGE, 1969
AB: SOCIAL CONVENTIONS ARE ANALYZED, ROUGHLY, AS REGULARITIES IN THE SOLUTION OF RECURRENT COORDINATION PROBLEMS--SITUATIONS OF INTERDEPENDENT DECISION IN WHICH COMMON INTEREST PREDOMINATES. AN EXAMPLE IS OUR REGULARITY OF DRIVING ON THE RIGHT: EACH DOES SO TO COORDINATE WITH HIS FELLOW DRIVERS, BUT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN JUST AS WELL OFF TO COORDINATE BY ALL DRIVING ON THE LEFT.

OTHER EXAMPLES ARE DISCUSSED; CONVENTIONS ARE CONTRASTED WITH OTHER SORTS OF REGULARITIES; CONVENTIONS GOVERNING SYSTEMS OF COMMUNICATION ARE SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION. IT IS SHOWN THAT THE LATTER CAN BE DESCRIBED AS CONVENTIONS TO BE TRUTHFUL WITH RESPECT TO A PARTICULAR ASSIGNMENT OF TRUTH CONDITIONS TO SENTENCES OR OTHER UNITS OF COMMUNICATION.
DE: ANALYTICITY-; BEHAVIOR-; COMMUNICATION-; CONVENTION-; CONVENTIONALISM-; DECISION-THEORY; GAME-THEORY; IMITATION-; INTENTION-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; POSSIBLE-WORLD; RULE-; SEMANTICS-; SOCIAL-CONTRACT; SPEAKER-; TRANSFORMATIONAL-GRAMMAR
PS: CARNAP-; GRICE,-H-P; QUINE
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1969
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1020133

TI: BELIEF, EXISTENCE, AND MEANING.
AU: MARTIN,-RICHARD-MILTON
PB: NEW-YORK-UNIV-PR : NY, 1969
DE: ACTION-; BELIEF-; EPISTEMOLOGY-; EVENT-; FACT-; INTENSIONALISM-; LOGICAL-FORM; ONTOLOGICAL-COMMITMENT; PROPOSITION-; REFERENCE-; SENSE-; THEORY-; VIRTUAL-CLASSES
PS: AJDUKIEWICZ-; CARNAP-; CHURCH,-A; FREGE-; QUINE-; RUSSELL
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1969
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1020002

TI: SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS: VARIATIONS ON KANTIAN THEMES.
AU: SELLARS,-WILFRID-STALKER
PB: HUMANITIES-PR : NY, 1968
DE: ADEQUATION-; APPEARANCE-; ETHICS-; FACT-; INTENTIONALITY-; MEANING-; METAPHYSICS-; MIND-; OBJECTIVITY-; REALISM-; REPRESENTATION-; SCIENTIFIC-; SENSIBILITY-; SPACE-; THEORY-; THING-IN-ITSELF; TIME-; TRUTH-; UNDERSTANDING-
PS: CARNAP-; CHISHOLM,-R; KANT-; TARSKI
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1968
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1019662

TI: METAPHYSICS, REFERENCE, AND LANGUAGE.
AU: CORNMAN,-JAMES-W
PB: Yale-Univ-Pr : New Haven, 1966
AB: J W CORNMAN ARGUES THAT THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING WHAT, IF ANYTHING, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS REFER TO IS CENTRAL TO MOST TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS. CORNMAN EXAMINES THREE "LINGUISTIC" APPROACHES--"MEANING ANALYSIS," "EXPLICATION," AND "USE ANALYSIS"--AND REJECTS THESE AS WELL. HOWEVER, HE ARGUES THAT IF CERTAIN EXPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE GENERAL LOGICAL NATURE OF REFERRING EXPRESSIONS, IT IS POSSIBLE FOR "USE ANALYSIS" TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS TO THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEMS. (BP)
DE: BODY-; EXTERNAL-; INTENTIONALITY-; INTERNAL-; LANGUAGE-; METAPHYSICS-; MIND-; QUESTION-; REFERENCE-
PS: AYER-; CARNAP-; CHISHOLM,-R; FEIGL,-H; RUSSELL-; RYLE,-G; WITTGENSTEIN
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1966
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1021228

TI: BELIEF AND DISPOSITION.
AU: LEVI,-ISAAC; MORGENBESSER,-SIDNEY
SO: American-Philosophical-Quarterly. JL 64; 1: 221-232
JN: American-Philosophical-Quarterly
IS: 0003-0481
DE: BEHAVIORISM-; BELIEF-; DISPOSITION-; INTENTIONALITY-; METAPHYSICS-
PS: BRAITHWAITE,-R; CARNAP-; GOODMAN,-N; RYLE,-G; SCHEFFLER,-I
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1964
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1004167

TI: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP.
AU: SCHILPP,-PAUL-A (ED)
PB: OPEN-COURT : LA SALLE IL, 1963
AB: THE ESSAYS RANGE OVER THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF PROFESSOR CARNAP'S PHILOSOPHY: MEANING AND VERIFIABILITY, PHYSICALISM, UNITY OF SCIENCE, MODALITIES, SEMANTICS, LOGICAL TRUTH, ANALYTICITY, THE STATUS OF ABSTRACT ENTITIES, IDEAL LANGUAGE SYSTEMS, LOGICAL SYNTAX, REDUCTION SENTENCES, THE INDUCTIVE THEORY OF PROBABILITY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY, THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION, AND DEGREE OF CONFIRMATION. (BP)
DE: ABSTRACT-ENTITY; ANALYTICITY-; CONFIRMATION-; CONSTRUCTIONALISM-; DIALECTICAL-MATERIALISM; DISPOSITION-; EMPIRICAL-SCIENCE; EMPIRICISM-; GEOMETRY-; INDUCTION-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; LOGIC-; LOGICAL-EMPIRICISM; LOGICAL-TRUTH; MEANING-; MODAL-LOGIC; PRAGMATISM-; PROBABILITY-; REDUCTION-; SCIENCE-; SEMANTICS-; SYNTAX-; TWENTIETH-; VALUE-JUDGMENT; VERIFIABILITY-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1963
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1018845

TI: CARNAP'S ONTOLOGY AND CHALLENGES.
AU: SWEIGART,-JOHN
SO: Philosophy-of-Science. JA 63; 30: 71-80
JN: Philosophy-of-Science
IS: 0031-8248
AB: IN VARIOUS ARTICLES PROFESSOR R CARNAP EXAMINES THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS. I WANT TO APPRAISE HIS OWN POSITION AND RESPOND TO HIS CHALLENGES CONCERNING AN EXTENSIONALISTIC, INSTEAD OF AN INTENSIONALISTIC (SUCH AS HIS), METHOD OF ANALYSIS. CRITICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE LATTER ARE DEVELOPED FOR BOTH FORMALIZED LANGUAGES AND NATURAL LANGUAGE. DRAWING UPON CERTAIN STUDIES OF R M MARTIN AND N GOODMAN, PLUS SOME PREVIOUS WORK OF MY OWN, I THEN SHOW THAT THE VAGUENESSES AND CONFUSIONS OF EXCESSIVE ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS ACCOMPANYING INTENSIONALISM CAN BE AVOIDED BY EXTENSIONALISTIC APPROACHES IN WHICH INTEGRAL CONCEPTS CAN BE WELL DEFINED.
DE: ABSTRACT-ENTITY; EXTENSIONALITY-; INTENSIONALISM-; LANGUAGE-; METAPHYSICS-; ONTOLOGY-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1963
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1010033

TI: PRAGMATICS AND INTENSION.
AU: MAYS,-W
SO: Australasian-Journal-of-Philosophy. MY 61; 39: 1-12
JN: Australasian-Journal-of-Philosophy
IS: 0004-8402
AB: THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT CARNAP TRIED TO MEET QUINE'S CRITICISMS OF HIS DEFINITIONS OF SYNONYMY AND ANALYTICITY BY "TESTING INTENSIONS PRAGMATICALLY." THE AUTHOR ACCUSES CARNAP OF PERPETUATING THE "SHARP" ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION. HE CONCLUDES THAT CARNAP IS MISTAKEN IN ARGUING AN ANALOGY BETWEEN MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE "WHICH MAY NOT HAVE A PRECISE REFERENTIAL FUNCTION." (STAFF)
DE: ANALYTICITY-; EXTENSION-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; PRAGMATICS-; PREDICATE-; SEMANTICS-; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; MAYS,-W
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1961
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1062910

TI: WORD AND OBJECT.
AU: QUINE,-WILLARD-VAN-ORMAN
PB: TECHNOL-PR-OF-MIT : CAMBRIDGE MA, 1960
AB: THIS IS QUINE'S MOST AMBITIOUS SEMANTICAL UNDERTAKING IN WHICH CONCESSIONS TO THE MATERIAL OBJECT LANGUAGE ACCOMPANY A STIMULUS-BEHAVIORAL ACCOUNT OF VERBAL MEANING. HE FURTHER SHORES UP FAVORITE THESES OF THE PAST, INCLUDING DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF SYNONYMY CLAIMS AND THE ADVANTAGES FOR SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION OF FORMALIZING ORDINARY DISCOURSE. (RM)
DE: CHURCH-; INDETERMINACY-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; MODALITY-; NOMINALISM-; REFERENTIAL-OPACITY; SINGULAR-TERM; STIMULUS-; SYNONYMY-; TRANSLATION-
PS: CARNAP-; DAVIDSON,-D; FREGE-; GOODMAN,-N; RUSSELL-; STRAWSON
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1960
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1015771

TI: ARE PROPERTIES MEANINGS?
AU: WOLTERSTORFF,-NICHOLAS
SO: Journal-of-Philosophy. AP 60; 57: 277-280
JN: Journal-of-Philosophy
IS: 0022-362X
AB: AGAINST QUINE AND CARNAP, THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THE IDENTITY OF PROPERTIES AND ATTRIBUTES IS NOT DETERMINED BY THE MEANINGS OF TERMS. IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE, THEN, PROPERTIES AND ATTRIBUTES ARE NOT INTENSIONAL ENTITIES; THEY ARE INTENSIONAL ONLY IF AN INTENSIONAL ENTITY IS ONE WHOSE IDENTITY IS NOT DETERMINED BY THE ENTITY OR ENTITIES WHICH POSSESS IT. (STAFF)
DE: IDENTITY-; INTENSIONALITY-; LOGIC-; MEANING-; METAPHYSICS-; PROPERTY-
PS: CARNAP-; QUINE
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1960
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1003656

TI: TOWARD A SYSTEMATIC PRAGMATICS.
AU: MARTIN,-RICHARD-MILTON
PB: NORTH-HOLLANDSCHE : AMSTERDAM, 1959
AB: IN THIS BOOK SEVERAL PRAGMATICAL THEORIES ARE EXPRESSED WITHIN A FORMALIZED META-LANGUAGE. THE POINT OF VIEW IS EXTENSIONAL. (BP, EDITED)
DE: ANALYTICITY-; ASSERTING-; EXTENSIONALITY-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; METALANGUAGE-; PERFORMATIVES-; PRAGMATICS-; PROJECTIBILITY-; RULE-; SEMANTICS-; TYPE-
PS: CARNAP-; GOODMAN,-N
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1959
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1072711

TI: THE MEANING OF TRAIT CONCEPTS.
AU: DE-GROOT,-A-D
SO: Synthese-. 1956-58; 10: 461-470
JN: Synthese:-An-International-Journal-for-Epistemology,-Methodology-and-Philosophy-of-Science
IS: 0039-7857
DE: ACCEPTANCE-; EQUIVALENCE-; INTENSIONAL-ISOMORPHISM; LANGUAGE-; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; MATES,-B
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1958
UD: 002; (RI2)
AN: 1064248

TI: THE NATURE OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY.
AU: MORRISON,-PAUL-GUERRANT
SO: Tulane-Studies-in-Philosophy. 1958; 7: 91-110
JN: Tulane-Studies-in-Philosophy
IS: 0082-6766
DE: ANALYSIS-; CONCEPT-; CONCEPTUAL-SCHEME; FACT-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; PHILOSOPHY-; PROPOSITION-; RELATION-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1958
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1010520

TI: A NOTE ON CARNAP'S MEANING ANALYSIS.
AU: CHISHOLM,-RODERICK-M
SO: Philosophical-Studies. 1955; 6: 87-88
JN: Philosophical-Studies:-An-International-Journal-for-Philosophy-in-the-Analytic-Tradition
IS: 0031-8116
DE: BELIEF-; DEFINITION-; INTENSION-; LANGUAGE-; PRAGMATICS-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1955
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1010848

TI: BELIEF, SYNONYMITY, AND ANALYSIS.
AU: PAP,-ARTHUR
SO: Philosophical-Studies. 1955; 6: 11-14
JN: Philosophical-Studies:-An-International-Journal-for-Philosophy-in-the-Analytic-Tradition
IS: 0031-8116
DE: ANALYSIS-; BELIEF-; IDENTITY-; INTENSIONALITY-; ISOMORPHISM-; LANGUAGE-; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; MATES,-B
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1955
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1010835

TI: INTENSIONAL ISOMORPHISM AND IDENTITY OF BELIEF.
AU: CHURCH,-ALONZO
SO: Philosophical-Studies. 1954; 5: 65-72
JN: Philosophical-Studies:-An-International-Journal-for-Philosophy-in-the-Analytic-Tradition
IS: 0031-8116
DE: BELIEF-; IDENTITY-; INTENSIONALITY-; ISOMORPHISM-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; MATES,-B
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1954
UD: 001; (RIP)

AN: 1010827

TI: FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW: 9 LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.
AU: QUINE,-WILLARD-VAN-ORMAN
PB: HARVARD-UNIV-PR : CAMBRIDGE, 1953
AB: MOST OF THESE LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS DEAL WITH SEMANTICS AND RELATED AREAS, AND HAVE BEEN REWRITTEN FROM ARTICLES IN SEVEN DIFFERENT JOURNALS. AMONG THEM IS "NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR MATHEMATICAL LOGIC," WHICH FIRST APPEARED IN 1937, AND TO WHICH SOME SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS HAVE BEEN ADDED. A BIBLIOGRAPHY IS INCLUDED FOR REFERENCE. (BP)
DE: ABSTRACT-ENTITY; ANALYTICITY-; CHURCH-; DESCRIPTION-; EXTENSIONALITY-; IDENTITY-; LOGIC-; LOGICAL-POSITIVISM; METAMATHEMATICS-; MODALITY-; NAME-; ONTOLOGY-; QUANTIFICATION-; REFERENTIAL-OPACITY; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP-; FREGE-; RUSSELL
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1953
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1016791

TI: MEANING AND INTERPRETATION: LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNION OF THE UNIV OF CALIFORNIA, 1948-1949.
AU: ANONYMOUS
PB: UNIV-OF-CALIF-PR : BERKELEY, 1950
DE: AESTHETICS-; CATEGORY-; FACT-; INDUBITABILITY-; INTENTION-; INTERPRETATION-; KNOWLEDGE-; LANGUAGE-; MEANING-; METAPHYSICS-; MODAL-LOGIC; NECESSITY-; PHILOSOPHY-; PROPOSITION-; SYNONYM-; TRUTH-
PS: AQUINAS-; CARNAP-; PEPPER,-S
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Monograph
PY: 1950
UD: 001; (RIP)
AN: 1021010

TI: A NOTE ON CARNAP'S "TRUTH AND CONFIRMATION".
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JN: Philosophical-Studies:-An-International-Journal-for-Philosophy-in-the-Analytic-Tradition
IS: 0031-8116
DE: EQUIVALENCE-; EXTENSIONALITY-; KNOWLEDGE-; LOGIC-; TRUE-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1950
UD: 001; (RIP)
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IS: 0031-8248
DE: INTENSIONAL-ISOMORPHISM; LANGUAGE-; LOGIC-; PARADOX-OF-ANALYSIS; SYNONYMY-
PS: CARNAP
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
PY: 1949
UD: 001; (RIP)
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TI: CARNAP'S SEMANTICS.
AU: BLACK,-MAX

TI: CONCERNING CARNAP'S DEFINITION OF 'EXTENSIONAL' AND 'INTENSIONAL'.

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PB: ALLEN-and-UNWIN : LONDON, 1940
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