10

*Concern for Others
or Self-Concern?*

Some version of the Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you," is known in all major religions, East and West. The faithful are admonished to love neighbor as self. And who is your neighbor?

> Jesus replied, "A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell into the hands of robbers, who stripped him, beat him, and went away, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going down that road; and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan while traveling came near him; and when he saw him, he was moved with pity. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, having poured oil and wine on them. Then he put him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, and took care of him. The next day he took out two denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and said, 'Take care of him; and when I come back, I will repay

you whatever more you spend.' Which of these three, do you think, was a neighbor to the man who fell into the hands of the robbers?" (Luke 10:30–36 NRSV)

The answer is obvious.

There are even frequent admonitions to extend the scope of concern for others beyond strangers in need to enemies as well: "Love your enemies, and do good to those who hate you. . . . If you love those who love you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners love those who love them . . ." (Luke 6:27, 32 NRSV). Similarly, the Buddhist is taught in the *Sutta Nipata:*

> Just as with her own life
> a mother shields from hurt
> her own, her only, child—
> let all-embracing thoughts
> for all that lives be thine,
>
> An all-embracing love
> for all the universe
> in all its heights and depths
> and breadth—unstinted love,
> unmarred by hate within,
> not rousing enmity.

The universal compassion advocated in such teachings is often considered to be a defining feature of world religions, in contrast to tribal religions. In the words of Edwin Burtt (1957):

> A conviction of moral obligation toward all men, simply because they are men, is born. The wall that circumscribed sympathetic feeling and kept it within the tribe is broken down, and the sense of community is encouraged to open out beyond that limit; the idea takes root that we are essentially members of a society embracing all human beings on the same terms and in which therefore all men are brothers. This involves a radical and decisive transcendence of customary morality and of the attitudes which pervade it. (p. 108)

Such an impulse toward universal love is clearly manifest in the lives of deeply religious individuals like Albert Schweitzer, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mother Teresa.

William James speaks of the concern for others evoked by religion in three lectures on "Saintliness" in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). Among the features of saintliness, common across religious traditions, James lists:

> A shifting of the emotional center towards loving and harmonious affections, towards "yes, yes" and away from "no," where the claims of the non-ego are concerned. . . . The shifting of the emotional center brings . . . increase of charity, tenderness for fellow-creatures. (1902, p. 217)

> Religious rapture, moral enthusiasm, ontological wonder, cosmic emotion, are all unifying states of mind, in which the sand and grit of the selfhood incline to disappear, and tenderness to rule. . . . Like love or fear, the faith-

state is a natural psychic complex, and carries charity with it by organic consequence. (1902, p. 221)

To illustrate, James recounts a Buddhist legend:

> Where the future Buddha, incarnated as a hare, jumps into the fire to cook himself for a meal for a beggar—having previously shaken himself three times, so that none of the insects in his fur should perish with him. (1902, p. 224n)

But as is characteristic of James, his view of religious charity is not one-sided. Along with the virtue, he also sees excesses that leave us asking, what really is going on?

> Francis of Assisi kisses his lepers; Margaret Mary Alacoque, Francis Xavier, St. John of God, and others are said to have cleansed the sores and ulcers of their patients with their respective tongues; and the lives of such saints as Elizabeth of Hungary and Madame de Chantal are full of a sort of reveling in hospital purulence, disagreeable to read of, and which makes us admire and shudder at the same time. (1902, p. 225)

These last examples suggest an interesting, if troubling, possibility. Rather than the religious individual being concerned for others in need, these examples suggest that the religious individual may be self-concerned, concerned to show others, self, and God that he or she is the good, kind, caring—even heroic—person that his or her religion celebrates. Religious charity may be motivated more by concern to put a star in one's own crown than by concern to alleviate the suffering of those in need.

Now, you may ask, what difference does it make why the religious help others in need, as long as they do? The answer is that motives differ radically in their consequences. If my motive for helping others is actually to benefit myself by looking good, then my helping may be relatively insensitive to others' actual needs. On some occasions my help may be just what does the most good, but on other occasions I may engage in dramatic acts of self-sacrifice that may appear very helpful but do very little real good. What is the possible benefit for patients with sores to have them cleansed by my tongue rather than by normal washing? And on still other occasions, I may fail to respond to the needy at all because they or their needs do not fit my conception of how one responds in order to show compassion.

This latter possibility is clearly recognized in the parable of the Good Samaritan. At the same time that the parable extolls the compassion of the neighborly Samaritan, encouraging the faithful to go and do likewise, it condemns the piety of the priest and Levite, suggesting that it was their very religiousness that led them to pass by on the other side. The problem is not that the priest and Levite, or the legendary scribes and Pharisees of whom Jesus was so critical, never helped others in need. The problem is that their helping was limited to situations in which it would be recognized and applauded. They were quite ready to help the right person at the right time. But heaven help someone who had the wrong need at the wrong time, like

the man who fell into the hands of robbers on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. One can imagine the unhelpful priest and Levite looking with disdainful pity on this man; clearly, he was not the sort of riffraff with whom upstanding, moral pillars of the religious community like they should get involved. One can also imagine the priest and Levite among those who, when called to account for their actions, would say, "Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not take care of you?" (Matt. 25:44 NRSV). They would willingly have helped the right person, but they never saw that person in need; all they saw were the poor, lonely, downtrodden, and diseased.

Does religion produce increased concern for others in need and a desire to relieve those needs—altruistic motivation (Batson, 1991)—or does it produce increased self-concern and a desire to meet one's own need to appear good, kind, and caring—egoistic motivation? As was true at the beginning of Chapter 9, the extreme examples we have considered help sharpen the question, but they do not provide a clear answer. Once again, we must turn to empirical evidence if we are to learn how being religious relates to response to the needs of others.

RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION TO CARING ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

When we turn to the empirical evidence concerning the relationship of religion to caring for others in need, we find there is relatively little of it, far less than the evidence we reviewed in Chapters 8 and 9 concerning the effects of religion on mental health and on intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry. There would seem to be two historical reasons for this. First, early psychologists devoted most of their efforts to trying to understand and overcome problems in living—neurosis, psychosis, learning dysfunctions, and antisocial behavior. This focus on problems and on attempts to alleviate them was, perhaps, natural. When something does not work well it attracts our attention; when it works unusually well we are not likely to notice. Only in the last few decades have psychologists paid much attention to more positive aspects of human behavior, such as going out of one's way to help someone in need.

A second reason for the lack of attention to possible prosocial effects of religion is that many early psychologists shared Freud's negative view of religion; they believed that it had a pernicious influence on the human spirit and that this influence should be exposed. Such a belief led them to look for evidence of negative rather than positive effects of religion, and as the research summarized in the previous two chapters reveals, they had little difficulty finding it. Indeed, the negative evidence was so strong that psychologists more sympathetic to religion found themselves preoccupied with rebutting it; the hypothesis that religion increases concern for others was seldom even entertained. But this seems to be changing.

As we noted in Chapter 2, in his presidential address to the American

Psychological Association Donald Campbell (1975) suggested that religion is important to society because it inculcates more stringent moral standards, leading individuals to think not only of their own needs but also of the needs of others. Campbell was not the first president to suggest such a view. In his Farewell Address in 1797 George Washington declared:

> Religion and morality are indispensable supports. . . . These great pillars of human happiness [are the] firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. . . . A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion.

There are two steps in the argument proposed by Campbell and Washington: (1) Religion inculcates more stringent moral standards; and (2) as a result, it leads people to act with more concern for others. Such an argument is both plausible and popular, but is it sound? To answer this question, we need to examine the empirical evidence for each step. As in the previous two chapters, we shall present the evidence in summary tables.

MORAL STANDARDS AND AMOUNT OF RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT

The eleven studies summarized in Table 10.1 suggest that the first step is sound; being more religious does seem to lead a person to adhere to more stringent moral standards. Those who are more involved in religion more strongly espouse values that involve curbing personal desire and benefit in order to benefit others and society at large.

We should, however, note two qualifications on this conclusion. First, in several of the studies summarized in Table 10.1, a distinction is made between personal "sins" such as gambling, drinking, and premarital sex, and social "sins" such as stealing, lying, and cheating. The effect of religion on standards concerning personal sins appears to be considerably strongly than its effects on standards concerning social sins. This may be because the behaviors classed as social sins are generally considered more serious and so are more likely to be condemned by everyone.

The second qualification concerns the nature of the moral standards that the more religious adopt. If we look closely at the results summarized in Table 10.1, an interesting pattern emerges. The study by Eisenberg-Berg and Roth (1980) suggests that young children with religious training give more other-oriented and fewer self-centered reasons for helping. The study by Boehm (1962) suggests that children in religious (Catholic) schools are more sophisticated earlier in their thinking about moral issues than are children in state schools. But the study by Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) suggests that religious young adults are more likely to appeal to the conventional standards of society than to internalized moral principles when justifying their moral decisions.

Relating these three findings to Lawrence Kohlberg's stage model of moral development described in Chapter 3, it appears that religion first

Table 10.1 Summary of research examining the relationship between moral standards and amount of religious involvement

Study	Sample population	Location	Measure of religion	Measure of moral standards	Relationship reported
Gorer (1955)	5000 (approx.) adults, nationwide sample	England	Frequency of church attendance and prayer	Judgment of various actions as immoral	Respondents who were more religious judged more actions wrong and judged them more wrong
Boehm (1962)	110 children (aged 6–9) attending Catholic schools; 112 attending state schools	Brooklyn, New York; Natick, Massachusetts	Attendance at Catholic or state school	Test of use of intent rather than result as basis for moral evaluation	More children in Catholic school distinguished between intent and result, and they did so younger
Middleton and Putney (1962)	554 undergraduates in social science classes	Florida State University; San Jose State College	Self-report of belief in God, frequency of church attendance, and importance of religion	Self-report of feeling of violation of own ethical standards if engaged in personal "sins" (e.g., gambling, smoking, drinking, sex) and social "sins" (e.g., stealing, lying, cheating)	For all 3 measures of religion, more religious were much more likely to view personal sins as violation of their standards and were less likely to report engaging in them; no reliable differences for social sins
Klinger, Albaum, and Hetherington (1964)	72 introductory psychology students	University of Wisconsin	Religious versus economic or political as highest value on Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey Survey of Values	Degree of condemnation of hypothetical parent who intentionally did not report some income in order to use the extra money to send child to college	Respondents whose highest value was religious most opposed the parent's behavior, although they were not significantly more opposed than those whose highest value was economic
Wright and Cox (1967)	2276 sixth form (i.e., secondary school students, aged 16–18)	England	Self-report of orthodoxy of belief and frequency of church attendance	Rating of wrongness of various behaviors (e.g., gambling, drunkenness, smoking, lying, stealing, premarital sex)	Respondents who were more religious adopted stricter moral stance on most behaviors, especially on personal as opposed to social "sins"

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Study	Sample	Location	Religion measure	Moral measure	Findings
Berkowitz and Lutterman (1968)	766 adults	Wisconsin	Church membership; contribution to religious organizations	Score on Berkowitz's Social Responsibility scale	Positive correlation for both measures of religious involvement
Haan, Smith and Block (1968)	Over 900 college students and Peace Corps volunteers	San Francisco Bay area	Religious affiliation; frequency of church attendance	Level of moral reasoning using Kohlberg's stages	Protestant and Catholic respondents were more likely to make moral judgments by appeal to social convention; agnostic, atheist, or areligious respondents were more likely to appeal to internalized principles; more frequent church attendance was associated with more reliance on social convention
Eisenberg-Berg and Roth (1980)	34 middle-class preschool children	Arizona	Parental report of amount of religious training	Style of prosocial moral reasoning	Religious training was positively related to more needs-oriented and less hedonistic moral reasoning ($p < .05$)
Morgan (1983)	1467 adults in national survey	U.S.	Frequency of prayer	Self-reported goodness, friendliness, and cooperativeness	Positive association ($p < .01$)
Woodrum (1988)	378 adults	U.S.	Frequency of church attendance and personal religious activity	Index of conservative moral attitudes (anti abortion, pornography, extramarital sex, and homosexuality; pro prayer in school)	Both religion measures were positively correlated with conservative moral attitudes ($rs = .45$ and $.44$, $ps < .0001$)
Cochran and Beeghley (1991)	Over 10,000 adults in national surveys	U.S.	Frequency of church attendance; strength of religious identification	Attitudes toward nonmarital sex (i.e., premarital, extramarital, and homosexual relations)	Religious involvement associated with more negative attitudes toward nonmarital, especially premarital, sex; effects strongest for members of conservative Protestant denominations

stimulates and then inhibits moral thinking. Recall that Kohlberg (1976) argued that appealing to conventional social standards (Level 2 morality) is a more sophisticated way of thinking about moral issues than appealing to self-benefits (Level 1) but less sophisticated than appealing to internalized principles (Level 3). The evidence from Table 10.1—especially the three studies just mentioned—suggests that, although religion may inculcate more stringent moral standards and less self-centered thought about moral issues in the child, by the time the child grows up, these standards may inhibit more sophisticated moral thinking. Religion may facilitate moral development up to the point of adherence to conventional moral standards and then retard development beyond that point.

HELPING BEHAVIOR AND AMOUNT OF RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT

Given that religion appears successful in inculcating more stringent moral standards, what about the second step in the argument? Do the faithful actually practice what they preach; do they show more loving concern for those in need?

The fifteen findings from fourteen studies summarized in Table 10.2 provide data relevant to this question. In each study, some measure of religious involvement was associated with some measure of compassionate helping of those in need. Table 10.2 is divided into two sections. In the first are nine findings from eight studies that employed either respondents' self-reports or ratings of the respondent by someone else to provide a measure of helping. In the second section are six studies that employed behavioral measures. We have separated these two types of studies, because we fear that studies of the first type might be contaminated by a desire for positive self-presentation. Paralleling the effect of desire for positive self-presentation on questionnaire reports of low prejudice discussed in Chapter 9, it seems likely that self-presentation could affect self-reports of high helpfulness because helpfulness is a desirable trait in our society. Even ratings of a person's helpfulness made by someone else appear to be subject to contamination by positive presentation; Dennis Krebs (1970) has noted that people who are rated as more likable and sociable tend also to be rated as more helpful, even when they are not. All of the studies in the second section of Table 10.2 used behavioral measures of helping; three involved a direct request for help, whereas three did not. The latter should be less subject to contamination by self-presentation than the former.

When we look at the results of the studies summarized in Table 10.2, we find a dramatic difference between those in the first and second sections. The nine findings from studies that used self-report or rating measures suggest that there is a positive, if rather weak, correlation between involvement in religion and helpfulness. The more religious are seen by both themselves and others as valuing helpfulness more and as being somewhat more helpful. Typical are the Gallup Poll results presented by Langford and Langford (1974): 58.7 percent of 526 respondents who reported having attended

Table 10.2 Summary of research examining the relationship between helping and amount of religious involvement

Study	Sample population	Location	Measure of religion	Measure of helping	Relationship reported
1. Studies using self-report ratings by self, peer, or researcher to measure helping					
Hartshorne and May (1929)	Children	U.S.	Frequency of church attendance	Various tests of service	Very slight tendency for frequent church attenders to score higher on service
Clark and Warner (1955)	72 well-known community members	Village in upper New York state	Church attendance	Average rating of person's kindness and honesty by 14 community members	Positive correlations for both kindness ($r = .41$) and honesty ($r = .64$)
Friedrichs (1960)	280 fraternity members	Columbia University, New York	Frequency of church attendance; belief in God	Rating of altruism by self and by others in fraternity; self-report of helpfulness in response to hypothetical need situations	Both church attendance and belief in God showed low positive correlations with self-report of helpfulness, $rs = .20$ and $.24$, $p < .01$, but neither were related to either self or other ratings of altruism
Cline and Richards (1965)	155 adults, male and female (72% Mormons)	Salt Lake City, Utah	Belief in God, religious activity, and importance of religion based on "depth" interview; self-report of religious involvement on questionnaire	Rating by "depth" interviewer as showing "love and compassion" for others and "being a Good Samaritan"	For males and females, belief in God was not related to either helpfulness rating; religious activity, importance of religion, and self-reported involvement were all positively related (rs ranging from .21 to .50)
Rokeach (1969a)	Nationwide survey of 1406 adults	U.S.	Religious affiliation; church attendance	Ranking "helpful" as important personal value	No significant relation with religious affiliation, but significant positive relation with church attendance

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Table 10.2 Summary of research examining the relationship between helping and amount of religious involvement (*Continued*)

Study	Sample population	Location	Measure of religion	Measure of helping	Relationship reported
Rokeach (1969a)	298 college students	Michigan	Church attendance; importance of religion	Ranking "helpful" as important personal value	Significant positive relation with both church attendance and importance of religion
Gallup Poll (Sept., 1973; see Langford and Langford, 1974)	Nationwide survey of adults	U.S.	Attending church during previous 7 days	Self-report of "taking concrete action on behalf of others"	59% of those who had attended said that they "almost always" did; only 31% of the nonattenders claimed this
Nelson and Dynes (1976)	482 male adults returning a mail questionnaire	Medium-sized city in southwestern U.S.	Self-report of regular prayer, church attendance, and regular involvement in religion	Self-report of helping through social service agencies	Significant but low positive correlations (most rs between .10 and .20); when correlations adjusted for helping *through* church as well as for income and age, they drop to close to 0
Zook, Koshmider, and Zehr (1982)	300 undergraduates at Mennonite colleges	Midwestern U.S.	Religiosity scale assessing religious activity and belief	Self-report of helpfulness and attitudes toward helping	More religious reported more helpfulness and more positive attitude toward helping ($p <$ .001)

2. Studies using a behavioral measure of helping

Forbes, TeVault, and Gromoll (1971)	People in church doorway or parking lot after Sunday morning service	Medium-sized city in midwestern U.S.	Type of church: conservative versus liberal Protestant and Catholic	Mailing an addressed, unstamped "lost letter" dropped in church doorway or parking lot	No differences in rate of return (approximately 40% for each location), but more letters dropped outside conservative churches were returned unstamped with postage due

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Smith, Wheeler, and Diener (1975)	402 introductory psychology students	University of Washington, Seattle	Self-report on questionnaire as evangelical, other religious, nonreligious, or atheist	Volunteering 5 hours to work with profoundly retarded child	No reliable differences in rates of volunteering for different groups (overall, 16% volunteered)
Annis (1975)	68 introductory psychology students	Western Carolina University	Religious value score on Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey scale	Attempting to help after hearing a ladder fall, possibly injuring a young woman	No reliable difference between helpers and nonhelpers in religious value score
Annis (1976)	71 introductory psychology students	University of Mississippi	Self-report of orthodoxy, frequency of prayer, and frequency of church attendance; religious value score on Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey scale	Attempting to help after hearing a ladder fall, possibly injuring a young woman	No reliable differences in rate of helping as a result of any of the measures of religious involvement (overall, 48% attempted to help)
McKenna (1976)	Adults in clergy and nonclergy homes who answered telephone	Selected urban and rural settings in U.S.	Clergy versus nonclergy home	Calling garage for stranded female motorist who mistakenly called the home with her last dime	No reliable difference in rate of calling the garage from clergy and nonclergy homes; in the rural setting both rates were very high, so differences may have been obscured
Yinon and Sharon (1985)	53 men and 54 women in upper-middle-class apartment complex	Central Israel	Religious versus secular self-identification	Contribution of money to help a needy family	Religious individuals donated more money than secular individuals ($p < .002$), but difference reliable only when request came from a religious individual

church in the previous seven days said that they "almost always" took concrete action on behalf of others in need, whereas only 31.4 percent of 862 nonattenders said that they did. Statistically, this difference is overwhelmingly significant ($p < .0001$). Yet even though these self-reports suggest a strong desire on the part of the more religious to show greater concern and compassion, you may still wonder whether this desire is reflected in their behavior.

Your doubts appear well founded. For, when we turn to the results of the studies in the second section of Table 10.2, those that control for positive self-presentation by using behavioral measures, we find a very different pattern of results. Only one of the five studies in the second section provides evidence that the more religious are more helpful.[1]

The one positive finding comes from a study by Yinon and Sharon (1985). Among residents of an upper-middle-class apartment complex in central Israel, Yinon and Sharon found that those residents who had previously identified themselves as religious donated more money to help a needy family than did those residents who had previously identified themselves as secular. But this difference was statistically reliable only when the person soliciting the contribution wore a yarmulke, indicating that he was religious. In light of this qualification, Yinon and Sharon (1985) conclude that their results suggest "the behavior of the religious subjects was guided by the need for positive self-presentation" (p. 726). If their conclusion is correct, then the evidence in Table 10.2 seems even more consistent. This evidence strongly suggests that the more religious show no more active concern for others in need than do the less religious. The more religious only present themselves as more concerned.

It seems that the argument that religion promotes increased helping of others in need stumbles and falls on the second step. Although the highly religious have more stringent moral standards, they are no more likely than the less religious to help someone in need. The more religious may *see* themselves as more helpful and caring; they may even be seen this way by others. But when it comes to action, there is no evidence that they are—except when presented with a low-cost, direct request for help under conditions designed to heighten concern for positive self-presentation.

In Chapter 9 we found that increased religious involvement was associ-

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1. It is, of course, possible that no effects of religion on helping behavior were observed in these studies because the measures of helping were insensitive to differences. If, for example, a study were designed so that helping was extremely dangerous, almost no one would help, and if no one helped there would be no relationship between helping and any other factor, including religion. Conversely, if a study were designed so that helping was extremely easy, almost everyone would help, and once again there would be no relationship between helping and any other factor. Some reassurance that the helping measures used in these studies were sensitive is provided by two facts. First, the overall helping rate tended to be about 50 percent in most of the studies. Second, each of the helping measures has been used in other studies, and each has proved sensitive to differences in the rate of helping between different groups (see Batson & Weeks, 1991, for a review of other studies of helping behavior).

ated with more rather than less prejudice and discrimination; now we find that it is associated with no real increase in helpfulness. Of course, advocates of religion might point out that the evidence concerning the effects of religion on helping is not as discouraging as the evidence concerning the effects on prejudice; at least the evidence on helping does not show that religious involvement makes a person *less* helpful. But to rejoice at this lack of evidence for a clear detrimental effect would seem to be grasping at straws. There is, however, a more sound reason for not being discouraged by the evidence that involvement in religion does not increase helpfulness.

HELPING BEHAVIOR AND DIMENSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL RELIGION

When considering the effect of religion on prejudice in Chapter 9, we found that the initial conclusion of a positive relationship between amount of religious involvement and prejudice had to be revised because it failed to take account of the different dimensions of religion. That experience should make us cautious about hasty conclusions based on evidence that religious involvement is not associated with increased helping. Any conclusions need to take account of the ways the different dimensions might affect helping. Two such conclusions have been proposed.

First, paralleling his revised conclusion about the effects of the different dimensions on prejudice, Gordon Allport was quite clear about how he thought the extrinsic, means dimension and the intrinsic, end dimension would affect helping. Although extrinsic religion might lead a person to be self-centered, only looking out for Number One, intrinsic religion should lead a person to transcend self-centered needs and display true compassion and universal love. In Allport's own words, intrinsic religion "is oriented toward a unification of being, takes seriously the commandment of brotherhood, and strives to transcend all self-centered needs" (1966, p. 455). Second, paralleling our suggestion at the end of the previous chapter of a *revised* revised conclusion concerning the religion-prejudice relationship, Batson (1976) proposed a very different possibility than Allport; he proposed that the quest dimension relates to increased compassion, whereas the intrinsic, end dimension relates only to the desire to *appear* compassionate.

Which, if either, of these views is correct? Does the intrinsic, end dimension breed Good Samaritans, whose "neighbor" is whoever is in need, or does it breed scribes and Pharisees, who help only when they can make a show of their helpfulness to other people, to themselves, or to God? And what about the quest dimension? To sharpen these questions with a fanciful reflection, if someone had been administering questionnaires on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho, who—if anyone—would have scored unusually high on the intrinsic, end dimension? Who would have scored high on the quest dimension? Would it have been the Good Samaritan, or the priest and Levite? To decide, we must again look at the relevant empirical evidence.

SELF-REPORT EVIDENCE

First, let us look at the results of three studies using self-report measures of concern, compassion, and helpfulness. Tate and Miller (1971) administered Rokeach's (1969a) value survey and Allport and Ross's (1967) Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales to 236 United Methodist adults from three different geographical areas. They found that respondents who were classified as intrinsically religious (i.e., who scored above the mean on the Intrinsic scale and below the mean on the Extrinsic scale) considered the values *helpful, loving,* and *responsible* to be of greater personal importance than did respondents who were classified as extrinsically religious (i.e., who scored above the mean on the Extrinsic scale and below the mean on the Intrinsic scale). For the values *helpful* and *loving* the difference in ranking by the two groups was statistically reliable; for *responsible* it was not.

Watson, Hood, Morris, and Hall (1984) administered the Mehrabian and Epstein Empathy scale, a popular self-report questionnaire assessing general emotional sensitivity to and concern for the needs of others, and the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales to 180 undergraduates. Scores on the Intrinsic scale correlated positively with scores on the empathy scale ($r = .26, p < .01$); scores on the Extrinsic scale correlated negatively ($r = -.22, p < .01$). In a second study, Watson, Hood, and Morris (1985) administered Davis's Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), a more recent self-report empathy questionnaire designed as an improvement on the Mehrabian and Epstein scale, to 215 undergraduates. They also administered Maranell's Christian Altruism scale, a self-report questionnaire of the degree to which a person shows unselfish concern for the welfare of others. Finally, they administered all six of the religious orientation scales recommended in Chapter 6 as measures of the means, end, and quest dimensions. Scores on the Intrinsic scale correlated positively with scores on Davis's Empathic Concern scale ($r = .31, p < .001$) and the Christian Altruism scale ($r = .51, p < .001$). Scores on the Extrinsic scale correlated negatively with scores on the Empathic Concern scale ($r = -.24, p < .001$) and were not reliably related to scores on the Christian Altruism scale. Scores on the Quest scale were not reliably related to scores on either the Empathic Concern or Christian Altruism scales. Correlations for the End, Means, and Quest components were quite similar to the correlations for the Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Quest scales, respectively.

If scores on these self-report measures of helpful values, empathic concern, and selfless altruism can be taken as valid indices of a person's concern for others in need, then the results of these three studies argue persuasively for Allport's view of the effect on helping others of the different religious dimensions. The more intrinsically religious claim that they place high value on being helpful and loving, that they feel more compassion for others in need, and that they show more selfless concern for the welfare of others; the more extrinsically religious are less likely to make these claims. Individ-

uals scoring relatively high on the quest dimension do not report more (or less) compassion than individuals scoring low.

If, however, scores on these self-report measures indicate how respondents would like to be seen by self and others, rather than how they actually are, then these results do not support Allport's view. Instead, they are entirely consistent with Batson's (1976) suggestion that the intrinsic, end dimension is associated with an increased desire to *appear* compassionate, whereas the quest dimension is not.

By themselves, then, these self-reports are consistent with either of the competing views. Clearly, we need to move beyond self-report measures to consider how the different religious dimensions relate to actual helping behavior. If we find that any of the dimensions relate to helping behavior, then we shall need to take our analysis a step further to consider whether this behavior is motivated by concern for the welfare of the person in need or by the helper's self-concern to appear kind and caring.

BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE

Martin Bolt (1982) reported two studies in which scores on the Allport and Ross (1967) Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales were correlated with the amount of help offered in response to specific requests. Bolt included no measure of the quest dimension in these studies. In Study 1, two different requests for help were made during the course of the semester to 124 students in an introductory psychology class at Calvin College in Michigan. The first request was for volunteers to record the required course readings on audio-tape for blind students who might enroll in the course in the future. The second was for volunteers to serve as uncompensated participants in psychology department research during the next semester. Scores on the Intrinsic scale had low but statistically significant positive correlations with volunteering in response to these requests ($rs = .23$ and $.29$, $ps < .01$). Scores on the Extrinsic scale had low but significant negative correlations ($rs = -.24$ and $-.25$, $ps < .01$).

In Study 2, fifty-two introductory psychology students were asked to complete a brief survey to help an upper-level psychology major finish a research project for another course. Once again, scores on the Intrinsic scale correlated positively with agreeing to help ($r = .29$, $p < .05$); scores on the Extrinsic scale correlated negatively ($r = -.30$, $p < .05$).

Results of these two studies indicate that intrinsic religion does indeed correlate positively with actual helping behavior, not just with self-reports. Extrinsic religion, on the other hand, correlates negatively. These findings enable us to ask about motivation: Why do the more intrinsically religious help more? Is it out of increased concern for the welfare of those in need, as the more intrinsically religious claim? Or is it out of increased self-concern to present themselves as kind, caring people?

Helping in Bolt's two studies involved a relatively low-cost response to a

direct request from a relatively high-status person. This kind of help certainly could be the result of concern for those in need, but it could also be the result of a desire to gain the pat on the back or warm feeling inside that comes from showing oneself to be a kind, caring person. Allport's view predicts the former; Batson's view predicts the latter. Batson's view predicts that it is the quest dimension, not the intrinsic, end dimension, that is associated with greater concern for others in need. How can we know which, if either, of these two views is right? Obviously, it is not easy, but there is some relevant evidence from a series of six rather complex studies that assess the nature of the motivation to help associated with the different dimensions of individual religion.

NATURE OF THE MOTIVATION TO HELP ASSOCIATED WITH THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL RELIGION

The first three of these studies assess whether helping associated with the different religious dimensions is a response to the expressed needs of the suffering individual or to a personal need to appear helpful. The last three studies more explicitly explore the degree to which this helping is motivated by concern for the person in need—altruistic motivation—or by self-concern.

RESPONDING TO THE VICTIM'S NEEDS OR TO ONE'S OWN NEEDS?

From Jerusalem to Jericho: Darley and Batson. The first study was conducted by Darley and Batson (1973). In it, sixty-seven Princeton Theological Seminary students completed the six religious orientation scales used to measure the means, end, and quest dimensions. Subsequently, forty of these seminarians participated in an experiment in which they were confronted with a young man in possible need. The need situation was modeled after the one in the parable of the Good Samaritan; the young man was somewhat shabbily dressed and was slumped, coughing and groaning, in a doorway in an alley through which each of the seminarians passed. For each seminarian, both whether he offered the young man help, and, if so, the kind of help he offered was recorded.

Sixteen (40 percent) of the forty seminarians stopped to offer aid. None of the three religious dimensions predicted who would stop. Only a situational factor, the degree to which the seminarians were in a hurry, was a significant predictor.

Among those who did stop, however, the dimensions of religion seemed to have an effect on the *kind* of help offered. A coding of kinds of helping had been developed in advance. But, at the suggestion of the confederate acting the part of the young man in distress, a category had been added. This category included helpers who persisted with efforts to help even after receiving assurances from the young man that he was all right, that he had

already taken medication, that he just needed to rest for a few minutes, and, finally, that he wished to be left alone. (The young man had been instructed to provide these assurances because another seminarian was being sent into the alley every fifteen minutes, and the young man needed to return to his position to be ready.)

When helping responses were dichotomized between this added category and all less persistent forms of helping, an interesting pattern emerged. The intrinsic, end dimension correlated positively with this persistent helping ($r = .43, p < .12$), whereas the quest dimension correlated negatively ($r = -.54, p < .05$). The difference between these two correlations was highly significant ($p < .01$).

What did the persistent form of helping mean? Darley and Batson suggested that it seemed to be a response more to the helper's own personal need to be helpful than to the expressed needs of the young man. When the more devout, intrinsically religious seminarians encountered the young man in possible need, it seemed to trigger a preprogrammed response (e.g., taking him for coffee, to the infirmary, or praying for his welfare), and this response was little modified by his statements about his needs. In contrast, the tentative helping associated with higher scores on the quest dimension seemed more attuned to the young man's statement that he was all right and, ultimately, wished to be left alone. It seemed less a response to a personal need to be helpful and more to the expressed needs of the young man.

But, as Darley and Batson were aware, this interpretation of their results was entirely after the fact. Perhaps, as some other researchers have suggested (e.g., Gorsuch, 1988; Watson, Hood, & Morris, 1985), the more persistent help associated with the intrinsic, end dimension reflected more genuine caring and concern, whereas the tentative forms of help associated with the quest dimension reflected relatively weak caring. Perhaps at the first obstacle those scoring relatively high on the quest dimension abandoned their halfhearted efforts to help, whereas those scoring high on the intrinsic, end dimension persevered. Clearly, we need more evidence.

Perception of need in Elmdale: Batson. Batson (1976) reported a small study that provided some additional evidence consistent with Darley and Batson's interpretation of their results. This study included male Princeton University undergraduates involved in two campus organizations with different religious orientations—eight from an evangelical group that scored high on the intrinsic, end dimension and seven from a social service organization that scored high on the quest dimension. As noted in Chapter 6, these samples were used to validate the distinction between the end and quest dimensions.

After the validation study, each of these fifteen undergraduates participated in an experiment designed to assess the degree to which they were willing to accept the expressed need of a person seeking help as the person's true need. In the experiment, each undergraduate was asked to adopt the

hypothetical role of a lay referral counselor in a voluntary referral agency in a town called Elmdale. Then each was given background information and heard a tape recording of excerpts from the referral interview for six male clients. In their interviews all six clients said that they felt their social situation was the source of the problem, and they expressed hope that something could be done to change the situation. After hearing each client discuss his problem, the undergraduates were asked to fill out a referral form on which they indicated where they thought the client's problem lay, with the client as a person or with his social situation.

Paralleling Darley and Batson's (1973) results, the quest dimension correlated significantly more positively ($p < .05$) with a situational perception of clients' problems ($r = .36$), the perception that the clients themselves expressed, than did the intrinsic, end dimension ($r = -.19$). In interpreting the results of this study, it should be emphasized that the undergraduates were not called on to provide any actual help. So, although the results were generally consistent with the suggestion of Darley and Batson that the quest dimension is associated with more sensitivity to the expressed needs of persons seeking help, whereas the intrinsic, end dimension is not, the results were far from conclusive.

Help that is or is not wanted: Batson and Gray. Somewhat clearer evidence comes from a quasi-experimental study by Batson and Gray (1981). In this study, sixty female undergraduates at the University of Kansas were confronted with a lonely young woman who said either that she wanted help or that she did not. Batson and Gray reasoned that attempts to help the young woman when she said that she did not want it would indicate helping that was a response to a personal need to be helpful rather than to the young woman's expressed need.

The research was introduced to participants as a study of how one person forms an initial impression of another. Each participant was led to believe that she would be getting acquainted with another female undergraduate, Janet Armstrong, by exchanging three notes. After exchanging the notes, the participant would be asked to report her impression of Janet, whom she would never see. In fact, Janet was a fictitious person and her notes, written in advance, were designed to present her as a person suffering from loneliness.

In her first note, Janet hinted that she had found it difficult to adjust to college life, especially since she was so far from her home in Camden, Ohio. In her second note, Janet confessed that she was extremely lonely; she concluded the note by saying, "I'll bet there are some days when I don't say more than a couple dozen words to anybody. Really, I guess I've shared more with you in these two notes than with anyone else since I've been here."

In her third note, Janet went on to observe that it might help if she knew someone with whom she could get together and talk. In the help-wanted condition she said:

I've often thought, if I could just look forward to getting together with some-one—not for anything special, just coffee or a movie or something. That would sure make things better. Sitting here, I've even wondered if you'd be willing to get together a couple of times over the next few weeks.

In the help-not-wanted condition the note included this same passage, but it was followed immediately by an expression of desire to work through the problem on her own:

> . . . But then I thought that that would be a cop out. I think what I really need is to get my own head straight about being alone in a new place. If I don't deal with this problem on my own now, I'll just have to face it again later.

The note each participant wrote in response to Janet's third note provided the measure of helping. If it included an explicit attempt to get together with Janet (e.g., "As soon as this study is over, why don't you wait for me by the elevator?"), it was considered a helping response. If it did not include any explicit attempt to get together, it was considered not helping.

Data were also collected on participants' self-report ratings of their own helpfulness and concern for others. This was done by having each participant complete a self-perception questionnaire before the get-acquainted conversation began. Consistent with the results of other studies using self-report measures, it was expected that scores on the intrinsic, end dimension would correlate positively with self-reported helpfulness and concern, whereas scores on the quest dimension would not.

The results of this study were quite consistent with Darley and Batson's (1973) suggestion that the helping associated with the intrinsic, end dimension is motivated by a personal need to be helpful, whereas the helping associated with the quest dimension is motivated by a desire to relieve the expressed needs of the other person. First consider the self-reports. Across all participants, scores on the intrinsic, end dimension were positively correlated with self-reports of greater helpfulness ($r = .28$, $p < .05$) and concern ($r = .35$, $p < .01$), suggesting a desire to be helpful, or at least to appear helpful. Scores on the quest dimension did not correlate reliably with these self-reports.

Turning to helping behavior, a very different pattern appeared, as can be seen from the summary correlations presented in Table 10.3. Scores on the extrinsic, means dimension were unrelated to helping when Janet wanted help and were negatively related to helping when she did not. Scores on the intrinsic, end dimension were moderately positively related to helping in both experimental conditions. Pooled across conditions, this association was statistically reliable ($r = .27$, $p < .02$). It seems, then, that this dimension was associated with an inclination to help in response to Janet's appeal, but the association was just as strong when Janet said that she did not want help as when she said that she did. This is the pattern of correlations expected if the motivation for helping was to meet a personal need to be helpful rather than to meet Janet's expressed needs. In contrast, scores on the quest dimension were positively associated with helping when Janet

Table 10.3 Association between dimensions of personal religion and helping when help is wanted or not wanted

Dimension of personal religion	Victim's desire regarding help		z-score testing difference in correlations in the conditions
	Help wanted	Help not wanted	
Extrinsic, means	−.00	−.38**	1.47
Intrinsic, end	.24	.27	−.08
Quest	.37**	−.32*	2.69***

Source: Adapted from Batson and Gray (1981).
Note: n = 30 for each experimental condition.
*$p < .05$, one-tailed; **$p < .025$, one-tailed; ***$p < .01$, one-tailed.

said that she wanted help ($r = .37$, $p < .05$) but negatively associated when she said that she did not ($r = −.32$, $p < .09$). The difference between these correlations was highly significant ($p < .01$), suggesting motivation to respond to Janet's expressed needs.[2]

MOTIVATED BY CONCERN FOR OTHERS OR SELF-CONCERN?

Three recent studies have sought to move beyond the issue of response to the victim's expressed needs in order to examine more directly the nature of the motivation to help associated with each of the three dimensions of individual religion. Is the motivation altruistic or egoistic?

Volunteering but not qualifying to help: Batson et al. (Study 1). Two of these studies were reported by Batson, Oleson, Weeks, Healy, Reeves, Jen-

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2. Reviewing the evidence from the studies by Darley and Batson (1973), Batson (1976), and Batson and Gray (1981), Gorsuch (1988) has suggested that this evidence should be dismissed:

> Batson heavily weights [the] *lack* of a statistically significant relationship between aggregated religious scores [the religious orientation questionnaires] and a specific behavior. However, given the aggregation principle . . . , we must reconsider those studies. One seldom finds that any aggregated variable relates to an individual behavior, because the level of aggregation is inappropriate. Hence all studies comparing a religiousness scale to an individual behavior must be discounted, and cannot be used to suggest that the intrinsically motivated person says one thing and lives another. (p. 214)

What is one to think of Gorsuch's suggestion? It is true that the association of an aggregated questionnaire measure with an individual behavior—such as helping in a particular situation—is likely to be lower than the association with an aggregate behavior. This is the aggregation principle to which Gorsuch refers. Yet we can only assume that when he invoked this principle as a basis for dismissing studies assessing the relationship between the different dimensions of personal religion and helping behavior, either Gorsuch had not looked carefully at the results of those studies or he confused those studies with the studies examining the relationship

nings, and Brown (1989). In the first, undergraduate participants were provided with an opportunity to help under conditions in which, even if they volunteered to help, they would be allowed to do so only if they met a certain performance standard on a qualifying task.

How might introducing a qualifying task disentangle possible motives for helping? An example illustrates the logic. Imagine a young man who wants to appear helpful by volunteering to serve as a bone-marrow donor but who also wants to avoid the discomfort of this rather painful procedure. He should be relieved and quite content if, after having volunteered, a blood-type mismatch disqualifies him as a possible donor. He has displayed his helpfulness because, after all, "It's the thought that counts." Better yet, he has done so without incurring the cost of helping. If, however, this young man is motivated by concern for the other's welfare, the blood-type mismatch should not cause relief and contentment but disappointment; it prevents him from meeting the other's need.

In the bone-marrow example, qualifying to help is entirely out of the potential helper's control; blood types either match or they do not. But now imagine a slightly different situation in which, rather than potential helpers simply learning that they are or are not eligible, they learn that they must perform a task requiring effort in order to qualify to help. In such a situation, how hard a potential helper tries on the qualifying task should give us a basis for inferring whether he or she is motivated by concern for the other's welfare (which requires qualifying) or by concern to appear kind, caring, and helpful (which does not). This should be true, however, only when the qualifying standard is difficult enough that failure can be attributed to the task and not to lack of effort. When the qualifying standard is easy, a person cannot appear helpful without qualifying.

Building on this logic, if the intrinsic, end dimension is associated with motivation to help based on concern for the other's welfare, as Allport claimed, then when the qualifying standard is easy, there might be no rela-

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between amount of religious involvement and helping behavior (summarized in the second section of Table 10.2). For, in his criticism and dismissal Gorsuch ignores the fact that in each study assessing the relationship of the religious dimensions to helping (but not in the ones in the second section of Table 10.2) there *are* statistically significant relationships between the measures of one or more of the religious dimensions and the individual behavior in question: the kind of helping, the perception of need, or helping that is desired or undesired. Moreover, Gorsuch ignores the evidence of difference in the direction of the relationships for the different dimensions. In key conditions of each study, the intrinsic, end dimension relates to the individual behavior measured in one direction, whereas the quest dimension relates in the other direction. The aggregation principle to which Gorsuch appeals suggests that the true relationships of the religious dimensions to helping may be stronger than observed, but this principle provides no basis for assuming that the direction of the relationship is the *reverse* of what is observed.

In sum, Gorsuch's observations about aggregation actually suggest that the results of these studies should be given more weight rather than less. Because these studies found statistically significant effects using an individual behavior, they would seem to provide especially strong evidence for the view that the intrinsic, end dimension is associated with helping in order to respond to a personal need to appear helpful, whereas the quest dimension is associated with helping that is responsive to the expressed needs of the suffering individual.

tionship to performance on the qualifying task because even those scoring low on this dimension may expend some effort to look good. But when the standard is difficult, low scorers would no longer need to work hard; they could gracefully take a dive. In contrast, high scorers should work even harder in an effort to reach their ultimate goal of relieving the needy person's distress. This pattern should produce a positive correlation between measures of intrinsic religion and performance on the qualifying task when the qualifying standard is difficult.

If, however, the intrinsic, end dimension is associated with helping motivated by a desire to look good, as Batson claimed, then when the qualifying standard is difficult, there should be a positive correlation of measures of the intrinsic, end dimension with volunteering to help but not with performance on the qualifying task. By volunteering to help and then not trying especially hard to qualify, high scorers on the intrinsic, end dimension would be able to reach the goal of appearing helpful without incurring the cost of actually having to help. Batson's view also suggests that measures of the quest dimension should have a positive correlation with performance on the qualifying task when the standard is difficult.

To test these competing predictions, Batson et al. (1989, Study 1) provided forty-six undergraduates with an opportunity to help under conditions in which, even if they volunteered to help, they would be allowed to do so only if they met a certain performance standard on a qualifying task. Ostensibly, the study concerned evaluation of an innovative helping program designed to assist individuals with high medical expenses. This program involved individuals taking part in walkathons, earning donations from local corporations for those in need. As part of the evaluation, participants read a description of one client of the program, Billy, a 7-year-old with a rare genetic disorder that prevented him from having contact with anyone outside his immediate family. Participants were then given an opportunity to volunteer to take part in a walkathon, earning contributions to help Billy get very expensive medication that would enable him to go back to school and play with his friends.

Before being given the opportunity to volunteer, participants read about the qualifying task, a fitness test used to determine who was eligible to participate in a walkathon. Participants read that only those individuals who passed the qualifying task could take part in a walkathon, even if they volunteered. The qualifying task involved stepping up onto a stone block and off again as many times as was comfortable in thirty seconds. Participants were not told what level of performance was necessary to qualify, but they were told about the difficulty of qualifying. Participants in the easy qualifying-standard condition read that the standard was "moderately stringent," that 60 percent of young adults (including college students) qualify. Participants in the difficult qualifying-standard condition read that the standard was "extremely stringent," that only 15 percent of young adults qualify. It was assumed that participants in the easy-standard condition would have some difficulty justifying to themselves and others a failure to qualify;

Table 10.4 Association between dimensions of
personal religion and helping when
qualifying is easy or difficult

Dimension of personal religion	Difficulty of qualifying standard	
	Easy ($n = 24$)	Difficult ($n = 22$)
Extrinsic, means	−.39*	−.33
Intrinsic, end	−.02	.50**
Quest	−.12	.03

Source: Adapted from Batson et al. (1989, Study 1).
*$p < .05$, one-tailed; **$p < .01$, one-tailed.

those in the difficult-standard condition would not. The difficult-standard
condition provided a relatively safe opportunity to volunteer because it was
unlikely that one would have to follow through.

Results of this study are summarized in Tables 10.4 and 10.5. Table 10.4
presents correlations of the three religious dimensions with helping in the
two experimental conditions; Table 10.5 presents correlations with perfor-
mance on the qualifying task. As you can see, the extrinsic, means dimension
correlated negatively with helping Billy in both easy and difficult qualifying-
standard conditions (overall $r = −.37, p < .01$), and in neither experimen-
tal condition was this dimension associated with performance on the quali-
fying task among either helpers or nonhelpers. These associations suggested
that the extrinsic, means dimension was associated with decreased motiva-
tion to help.

The intrinsic, end dimension was significantly positively correlated with
volunteering to help only when participants were informed that the stan-
dard was difficult, and so the likelihood of actually having to help was low ($r
= .50, p < .01$). Moreover, among the volunteers in the difficult-standard
condition, the intrinsic, end dimension did not correlate positively with try-
ing harder on the qualifying task; it correlated nonsignificantly negatively

Table 10.5 Association between dimensions of personal religion and performance
on qualifying task for helpers and nonhelpers when standard is easy or
difficult

Dimension of personal religion	Difficulty of qualifying standard			
	Easy (n = 24)		Difficult (n = 22)	
	Helpers ($n = 13$)	Nonhelpers ($n = 11$)	Helpers ($n = 14$)	Nonhelpers ($n = 8$)
Extrinsic, means	−.29	.04	−.03	−.20
Intrinsic, end	−.12	.17	−.24	.69*
Quest	−.28	−.13	.51*	−.18

Source: Adapted from Batson et al. (1989, Study 1).
*$p < .05$, one-tailed.

($r = -.24$). The intrinsic, end dimension correlated positively with trying harder in the difficult-standard condition only among participants who had *not* volunteered to help ($r = .69, p < .05$). This pattern of results suggested that the motivation to help associated with the intrinsic, end dimension was not directed toward meeting Billy's need; it was directed toward meeting a personal need to appear helpful without having to follow through.

The quest dimension was not correlated with helping in either experimental condition, suggesting that this dimension was not associated with either an increase or a decrease in the overall amount of motivation to help. Among those who volunteered to help in the difficult qualifying-standard condition, however, scores on the quest dimension were positively correlated with performance on the qualifying task ($r = .51, p < .05$). This pattern of correlations suggested an association between the quest dimension and the *nature* but not the *amount* of motivation to help. The motivation of high scorers on the quest dimension appeared to be directed more toward the goal of benefiting Billy because, when they thought it would be especially difficult to qualify to help, they worked even harder to do so. They did not seem content to use the difficulty of the standard as an excuse for not having to help.

Using the inaction of others to justify not helping: Batson et al. (Study 2).
In their second study, Batson et al. (1989) provided another way for participants to justify not helping and still save face. The purpose of this study was to test a variant on Batson's claim that intrinsic religion is associated with the desire to appear helpful; the variant is that intrinsic religion is associated not with gaining the social and self-rewards of appearing helpful but with avoiding the social and self-punishments of appearing unhelpful. Accordingly, rather than enabling some participants to get the benefits of looking kind and caring without having to incur the cost of actually helping, in this study some participants could avoid the threat of looking bad even if they did not help.

Batson et al. (1989) reasoned that one way to provide justification for not helping was to draw on the power of social norms and reference groups that we discussed in Chapter 2. They did this by presenting individuals confronted with a request for help with information about how previously asked peers had responded to the request. If most peers had helped, then the individuals could anticipate looking bad if they did not help too (high social pressure). If, however, most peers had not helped, then the individuals could also decline without looking bad (low social pressure).

Building on this logic, if the intrinsic, end dimension is associated with motivation to help based on concern for the other's welfare, as Allport claimed, then even though there might be no correlation with helping when social pressure to help is high, there should be a positive correlation between measures of intrinsic, end religion and helping when social pressure is low. When pressure is high, even those scoring low on intrinsic, end religion may help in order to avoid looking bad. But when pressure is low,

low scorers no longer need to help to save face. High scorers should still help because that is the only way for them to reach the goal of relieving the needy person's distress. This pattern of helping should produce a positive correlation between measures of intrinsic, end religion and helping when pressure is low.

If, however, intrinsic, end religion is associated with motivation to avoid looking bad, as the variant on Batson's view claimed, then there should be a positive correlation between measures of this dimension and helping when pressure is high. There should not be a positive correlation when pressure is low.

If the quest dimension is associated with motivation to meet the expressed needs of the victim, as Batson claimed, then even though there might not be a positive correlation when pressure is high, there should be a positive correlation between measures of this dimension and helping when pressure is low.

Batson et al. (1989, Study 2) tested these predictions by giving sixty female undergraduates at the University of Kansas the chance to volunteer time to help Katie Banks, a senior at the university who was struggling to support her younger brother and sister after the tragic death of her parents in an automobile accident. For some of the research participants, social pressure to help was high; for others, it was low. Pressure was manipulated by having participants indicate whether they wished to help on a pledge form that included spaces for the names and responses of eight people. The first seven spaces were already filled, ostensibly by previous participants. In the high-pressure condition, five of the seven previous participants had volunteered to help; in the low-pressure condition, only two of seven had volunteered.

Results of this study are summarized in Table 10.6. As you can see, scores on the extrinsic, means dimension were negatively correlated with helping in the low-pressure condition ($r = -.41, p < .025$), suggesting that the relatively weak motivation to help associated with higher scores on this dimension found in previous studies is directed toward the self-serving goal of avoiding looking bad, in one's own eyes or in the eyes of others.

Table 10.6 Association between dimensions of personal religion and helping when pressure to help is high or low

Dimension of personal religion	Pressure to help	
	High pressure ($n = 24$)	Low pressure ($n = 22$)
Extrinsic, means	.05	−.41**
Intrinsic, end	.00	.10
Quest	.13	.36*

Source: Adapted from Batsom et al. (1989, Study 2).
*$p < .05$, one-tailed; **$p < .025$, one-tailed.

Scores on the intrinsic, end dimension failed to correlate significantly with helping in either condition, providing no clear evidence of either motivation to avoid looking bad or motivation to relieve the needy individual's suffering. The pressure manipulation used in this study was not designed to detect motivation to look good, so, in combination with the results of the preceding study, the results of this study suggested that the motivation to help associated with intrinsic, end religion is most likely directed toward obtaining the self-benefits of looking good.

Only measures of the quest dimension were significantly positively correlated with helping in the low-pressure condition ($r = .36, p < .05$). This correlation is the one we would expect if this dimension of personal religion is associated with motivation to relieve the needy person's suffering, not motivation to help in order to avoid looking bad. Results of this and the preceding study appear to lay to rest the suggestion of Gorsuch (1988) and Watson, Hood, and Morris (1985) that the quest dimension is simply associated with halfhearted helping.

Thoughts associated with helping: Batson and Flory. Batson and Flory (1990) used a very different technique to assess the nature of the motivation to help associated with the different religious dimensions. They used a Stroop task to identify the goal-relevant cognitions associated with this helping.

The Stroop task, named for its inventor (Stroop, 1938), is an ingenious method of assessing what a person is thinking about at a given moment. When we see a printed word, we automatically read it. Even if we are asked to respond to some feature of the word, such as naming the color of ink in which it is printed, the meaning of the word is nevertheless processed. And, if the meaning of the word is related to thoughts that are salient at the time, this relation will interfere with naming the color, so our response time will be slower—or, said another way, our color-naming latency will be greater. For example, our color-naming latency for the word *steak* will be greater when we are hungry than when we are not. Taking advantage of this cognitive interference effect, the Stroop task seeks to determine what is on people's minds by asking them to name as quickly as possible the color of the ink in which a word (or other visual stimulus whose meaning might be associated with their thoughts) appears.

Employing the Stroop procedure, Batson and Flory (1990) had research participants first listen to a brief pilot radio broadcast that presented the need of Katie Banks, the young woman who was attempting to care for her younger brother and sister and prevent them being put up for adoption after the tragic death of her parents in an automobile accident. Next, participants learned that in a few minutes they would have a chance to volunteer time to help Katie. It was suggested that they think about what they wanted to do before deciding. In the interim, they performed a Stroop task.

The Stroop task was presented as a reaction-time measure of the effect of the pilot radio broadcast on thoughts. Participants had previously been

told that they would be shown a series of words, some relevant to possible thoughts after hearing the broadcast, others not. Different words would appear in different colors. For each word, participants assigned to the test group would say as quickly as possible whether it was relevant to their thoughts; participants assigned to the control group would say as quickly as possible the color in which the word was printed. It was explained, "Responses of people in the control group will provide a baseline needed to interpret the responses of people in the test group. Therefore it is important that you do your best no matter to which group you have been assigned." All participants were informed that they had (ostensibly randomly) been assigned to the control group; their task would be to name the color (red, blue, green, or brown) in which each word appeared. (Mention of the test group made it plausible not only that the reaction-time measure be taken but also that some of the words be relevant to thoughts evoked by the broadcast.)

Participants were then shown reward-relevant words *(nice, merit, honor, praise)*, punishment-relevant words *(duty, guilt, shame, punish)*, victim-relevant words *(care, needy, adopt, tragic)*, and neutral words *(pair, clean, extra, smooth)*, and they named as quickly as possible the color of the ink. (The words were intermixed, and both order and pairing with color were counterbalanced.) After they finished the Stroop task, participants were given a form on which to indicate whether they wished to help Katie and, if so, how much time they wished to volunteer.

Batson and Flory (1990) reasoned that if the motivation to help associated with a given religious dimension is directed toward the self-serving goal of looking good by doing the right thing, then helping by high scorers on this dimension should be positively correlated with increased color-naming latency for reward-relevant words on the Stroop task. If the motivation is directed toward the self-serving goal of avoiding looking bad, then helping by high scorers should be positively correlated with increased color-naming latency for guilt-relevant words. If the motivation is directed toward the goal of reducing the young woman's need, then helping by high scorers should be correlated with increased color-naming latency for victim-relevant words.

Results indicated that the helping of high scorers on the extrinsic, means dimension was not reliably related to color-naming latency for any of the three types of words. (To correct for individual differences in general reaction time, all latencies were adjusted for latency to name the color of the neutral words.)

Helping of high scorers on the intrinsic, end dimension was associated with thoughts of the rewards for looking good ($r = .55$, $p < .01$); it was also nonsignificantly positively correlated with thoughts about the victim ($r = .36$). This latter correlation was not, however, independent of the correlation with thoughts of looking good ($r_{partial} = -.05$), suggesting that attention to the victim's need was only instrumental to reaching the ultimate goal of gaining the self-rewards for doing a good deed. Controlling for associations

with the reward-relevant and victim-relevant words, color-naming latency for the punishment-relevant words was negatively correlated with helping among individuals scoring high on the intrinsic, end dimension ($r_{partial}$ = $-.47$, $p < .03$). This correlation suggested that thoughts about looking bad were more salient for those high scorers who were *less* likely to help, indicating that these thoughts were not a motivator of helping but were triggered by deciding not to help. None of these associations appeared among individuals scoring low on the intrinsic, end dimension.

Helping by high scorers on the quest dimension was nonsignificantly positively correlated with color-naming latency for the victim-relevant words ($r = .24$), and this correlation appeared to be independent of correlations for the reward-relevant or punishment-relevant words. This correlation suggested that the helping of individuals scoring high on the quest dimension might reflect concern for Katie's welfare, but the evidence was weak. It did not contradict Batson's claim that the quest dimension is associated with helping directed to meeting the expressed needs of the victim, but it did not provide clear support for that claim either.

IMPLICATIONS

Looking back over the results of this series of six studies, what implications can we draw about the nature of the motivation to help associated with the different dimensions of individual religion? Specifically, what implications can we draw about Allport's claim that although extrinsic religion might lead to self-centered concern for Number One, and therefore reduced and self-serving motivation to help others in need, intrinsic religion should lead a person to transcend self-centered needs and display true compassion and universal love? What implications can we draw about Batson's competing claim that the intrinsic, end dimension relates not to genuine concern for the other's welfare but to a self-serving desire to appear concerned, whereas the quest dimension relates to genuine concern?

Prosocial motivation and extrinsic religion. The evidence suggests that the first part of Allport's claim is right. In study after study, extrinsic religion is not associated with an increase in helping; if anything, it is associated with a decrease. Moreover, the results of Study 2 by Batson et al. (1989) suggest that the weak motivation to help associated with this dimension is directed not toward concern for the needy person's welfare but toward the self-serving goal of avoiding looking bad. This dimension correlated with helping only when everyone else was helping.

Prosocial motivation and intrinsic religion. The evidence suggests that the more important and controversial second part of Allport's claim—that intrinsic religion evokes true compassion—is wrong. There is evidence that higher scorers on the intrinsic, end dimension report being more compassionate, caring, and helpful (Tate & Miller, 1971; Watson, Hood, & Morris,

1985; Watson, Hood, Morris, & Hall, 1984); there is also evidence that they help more in response to direct, low-cost requests (Bolt, 1982). But Darley and Batson (1973), Batson (1976), and Batson and Gray (1981) each found that responses associated with the intrinsic, end dimension were relatively insensitive to the expressed needs of suffering individuals. The responses appeared to be directed instead toward meeting the helper's own need to be helpful.

Focusing more directly on underlying motives, the combined results of the two studies by Batson et al. (1989) suggest that, although the intrinsic, end dimension can at times be associated with increased helping, this helping is not motivated by altruistic concern for the other person's welfare but by egoistic concern to look good, presenting oneself as a good, kind, caring person. Adding further support to this suggestion, Batson and Flory (1990) found that the helping of individuals scoring high on the intrinsic, end dimension was positively correlated with the salience of thoughts about the personal rewards of helping, thoughts associated with the words *nice, merit, honor,* and *praise.*

These results are hard to reconcile with Allport's claim about the increased selfless concern for others evoked by intrinsic religion. They are far more consistent with Batson's claim that the intrinsic, end dimension of personal religion is associated with increased self-concern—self-concern to gain the rewards of seeing oneself and being seen as concerned. We are reminded of the concern for appearances for which Jesus castigated the scribes and Pharisees.

Prosocial motivation and quest religion. What about the second part of Batson's claim? Is the quest dimension associated with genuine compassion? The answer to this question is not yet clear. Although there is no clear evidence that this dimension is associated with an increase in the *amount* of motivation to help, there is considerable evidence that this dimension is associated with a change in the *nature* of the motivation to help. But what is the character of this change? Is the motivation altruistic?

Darley and Batson (1973) and Batson and Gray (1981) found that this dimension was associated with helping that appeared more responsive to the expressed needs of the suffering individual; Batson (1976) found that this dimension was associated with adopting the suffering individual's perception of the need. These findings suggest that the quest dimension may be associated with increased concern for others' welfare, as Batson claimed. Also consistent with this view were the results of the two studies reported by Batson et al. (1989). In Study 1, although this dimension was not associated with an increased amount of helping, it was associated with trying harder to qualify to help in the difficult-standard condition. In Study 2, scores on the quest dimension were associated with increased helping in the low-pressure condition.

But there is also some evidence that calls this conclusion into question. First, scores on measures of the quest dimension are not positively corre-

lated with reports of increased feelings of sympathy or compassion for people in need, either as a general disposition (Watson, Hood, & Morris, 1985; Watson, Hood, Morris, & Hall, 1984) or in response to specific needs (Batson, Schoenrade, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1984). If anything, the quest dimension seems to be associated with reduced feelings of sympathy and compassion. Second, in the Batson and Flory (1990) study the correlation between helping and color-naming latency for the victim-relevant words among individuals scoring high on the quest dimension, although positive, was not statistically reliable.

The weakness of this correlation could easily be due to chance variation, but both it and the apparent lack of relation to reports of sympathy and compassion raise the possibility that the quest dimension is not associated with a shift from self-concern toward an increased altruistic concern for individuals in need but with a shift from self-concern toward some other goal. What other goal? Possibly, the goal of upholding some general moral principle, such as a principle of fairness or justice.

Consistent with this possibility, Cheuvront and Ventis (1982) and Sapp and his colleagues (Sapp & Gladding, 1986; Sapp & Jones, 1986) have repeatedly found positive correlations (typically from .30 to .50) between scores on measures of the quest dimension and principled scores on Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT), the objective measure of Kohlberg's principled morality discussed in Chapter 3. (Correlations for the extrinsic, means dimension are typically close to zero; those for the intrinsic, end dimension are typically negative—ranging from −.20 to −.40.) If a person comes to adopt a moral principle like justice as a guide for action, as higher scorers on the quest dimension apparently do, then this person may be motivated to rectify any situation that violates this principle. An innocent person in need violates this principle. So, relieving this person's suffering may not be the ultimate goal of helping; it may be only an instrumental means to reach the ultimate goal of upholding the principle. In the helping situations used in the studies we have described, pursuit of the impersonal goal of upholding moral principles would produce the same pattern of results predicted if the quest dimension evoked increased compassion for the person in need—the pattern that has been observed.

Because of this last possibility, it seems premature to conclude that the studies we have reviewed provide clear evidence for the second part of Batson's claim, that the quest dimension is related to genuine compassion for others in need. The studies do suggest that the quest dimension is not associated with motivation to help in order to look good or to avoid looking bad, but future research must determine whether the ultimate goal is to enhance the other person's welfare—altruistic motivation—or to uphold one or more moral principles. It may be that those high in quest religion have taken to heart Immanuel Kant's (1785/1889) admonition that we should love our neighbor as ourselves "not from inclination, but from duty" (sec. 1, par. 12).

To return to our fanciful question about who on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho would have scored high on which dimensions of religion, the pop-

ular view in psychology of religion has long been that the Good Samaritan would have scored high on the intrinsic, end dimension. In light of our review of the available evidence, however, we doubt this view. Instead, we suspect that, had someone been nearby handing out questionnaires, the priest and Levite, who for all their appearance of goodness did nothing, would have been the ones to score high on the intrinsic, end dimension. In contrast, the Samaritan might well have scored high on the quest dimension.

A Qualification: Institutional Versus Individual Response to Others' Needs

As we noted in Chapter 6, the intrinsic, end dimension is closely associated with high involvement in institutional religion. Does the research we have reviewed imply, then, that active involvement in institutional religion does not lead to more helping of the poor, sick, and downtrodden? Not at all, for two reasons. First, helping through institutional channels is precisely the sort of high-visibility helping with which the research suggests the intrinsic, end dimension is associated. Second, the research we have reviewed concerns the way a person responds as an individual. Although individual response to others in need is clearly covered by religious teachings like the parable of the Good Samaritan, needs in our society are often dealt with at an institutional rather than individual level. And religious institutions have long been among the most likely to respond, whether with Thanksgiving and Christmas baskets for the poor, visits to the sick and elderly, or financial contributions to one or another defense or relief fund.

Given that religious institutions are an important channel for meeting needs in our society, we seem to be faced with an interesting dilemma. The sensitivity to and apparent concern for the expressed needs of others shown by those scoring higher on the quest dimension seems a desirable form of individual response. But, if anything, those scoring higher on this dimension are less likely to be involved in institutional religion. Thus, they are less likely to participate in this important channel for institutional response to others' needs.

In contrast, the relative insensitivity to the wishes of individuals in apparent need and the concern to appear helpful more than actually to help shown by those scoring higher on the intrinsic, end dimension seem less desirable forms of individual response. But those scoring higher on this dimension are more likely to be involved in religious institutions (Gorsuch & McFarland, 1972) and in helping others through these institutions (Benson, Dehority, Garman, Hanson, Hochschwender, Lebold, Rohr, & Sullivan, 1980; Bolt, Pyne, & Shoemaker, 1984; Nelson & Dynes, 1976). Paralleling the apparent insensitivity of the more intrinsically religious to the expressed wishes of Janet in the Batson and Gray (1981) study, the help that religious institutions provide may not always be sensitive to the wishes of the needy, yet it is doubtful whether those in need, or society at large, would be better off without it.

Still, to recognize that the needy benefit from the institutional response

of the intrinsically religious does not resolve the dilemma; this only sharpens it. For we may take our fanciful reflection on the parable of the Good Samaritan a step further and ask: Even if we were to learn that the priest and Levite passed by on the other side because they were taking contributions from the Temple in Jerusalem to an orphanage down the road, would we excuse their insensitivity to the needs of the man who fell among thieves?

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Our examination in this chapter of the effects of religion on concern for others in need has led us to conclusions quite similar to those reached in Chapter 9 concerning the effects of religion on intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry. In that chapter we found, first, that there was much research that suggested a positive correlation between being religious and being prejudiced. But then we found that there was also much research suggesting that this was only true for those persons who use their religion as an extrinsic means to self-serving ends. Those who orient to religion as an intrinsic end in itself almost invariably score lower on measures of prejudice than the extrinsically religious; they do not appear to be more prejudiced than non-religious individuals.

Although this pattern of results presented a rather comforting view of the relationship between religion and antisocial attitudes and behavior, we found that it could not be accepted. For in virtually every study of the relationship between religion and prejudice, prejudice has been measured by self-report questionnaires. Measuring prejudice in this way opens the door wide for individuals who wish to present themselves as good to adjust their responses so as to appear less prejudiced than they actually are.

When we turned to more recent research designed to control for self-presentation, we found that the negative relationship between scores on the intrinsic, end dimension and prejudice disappeared; indeed, the relationship seemed to be positive for nonproscribed prejudices. These results led us to suggest that there was no clear evidence that those scoring high on the intrinsic, end dimension were less prejudiced than those scoring low on this dimension, or indeed than those scoring high on the extrinsic, means dimension. There was only clear evidence that those scoring high on the intrinsic, end dimension *present* themselves as less prejudiced. Finally, research suggested that those scoring high on the quest dimension were less prejudiced than those scoring low even when self-presentation was controlled.

In the present chapter, we shifted focus to the relationship of religion to compassion and caring for others in need, the sort of caring exemplified by the Good Samaritan. Paralleling findings in the previous chapter, we first found that religious involvement is associated with more stringent moral standards and with seeing oneself and being seen by others as more concerned for the welfare of people in need. But when confronted with someone in need, individuals who are more religious are not any more helpful

sures. This concern for action rather than appearance reminded us of the behavior of the unpretentious Samaritan.

Faced with this general pattern of results, we believe it is time to suggest a general conclusion concerning the social consequences of the end and quest dimensions: *The quest dimension is related to reduced intolerance and increased sensitivity to the needs of others, whereas the intrinsic, end dimension is related to the appearance of these social benefits.* This conclusion is very much at odds with the currently popular view suggested by Gordon Allport that the devout, intrinsic, end dimension reduces intolerance and increases compassion, allowing the individual to transcend all self-centered needs and live his or her religion. But we found that, when examined carefully and critically, the empirical evidence does not support this popular view. Instead, the evidence supports the conclusion we have stated.

Having stated this conclusion, we immediately need to add an important qualifier. We noted that the relevant research and this conclusion focus on the consequences of the religious dimensions for individual, not institutional, response. Intrinsic, end religion, not quest religion, is associated with more involvement in religious institutions. Therefore, we may expect the more intrinsically religious to contribute more to the help that religious institutions provide to those in need. Although we may question the motivation associated with the intrinsic, end dimension and applaud the motivation associated with the quest dimension, the importance of the response of religious institutions in meeting the needs of the downtrodden in society should not be ignored. And when we allow for institutional response, we find ourselves faced with what would seem to be an irresolvable dilemma between the more laudable action at the individual level associated with the quest dimension and the more laudable action at the institutional level associated with the intrinsic, end dimension.

With this chapter we complete our look at theory and research relevant to understanding the sources, nature, and consequences of individual religion. But our task is not done. Now we need to consider the broader implications of our social-psychological analysis. In the final chapter we shall attempt to do this, addressing a fundamental question: Is religion, or at least some form of religion, on our side as individuals and as a society, or is religion our enemy?

acceptable, nor is it associated with increased responsiveness to the needs of others. This discrepancy between appearance and action reminded us of the behavior of the priest and Levite in the parable of the Good Samaritan, or of the scribes and Pharisees against whom Jesus railed.

Third, there is evidence that the quest dimension is associated with increased tolerance and sensitivity to the needs of others. Even though higher scores on the quest dimension are not associated with self-reports of greater helpfulness and concern, they relate both to increased tolerance of oppressed minorities and outgroups and to increased sensitivity to others' needs. Importantly, these relationships are found using behavioral mea-

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