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6

Dimensions of Individual Religion

"Are you religious?" You have probably been asked this question at one time or another. And it probably evoked some uncertainty and discomfort about how to answer because it can be doubled-barreled, much like the question "Are you an intellectual?" The problem is that there are different ways of being religious, and although you might be pleased and even honored to be considered religious in some ways, you would be ashamed and upset to be considered religious in others. For example, you might be pleased to be considered religious like the compassionate Good Samaritan but upset to be thought to be like the priest and Levite in the parable, recognized religious leaders who callously passed by on the other side.

TRUE VERSUS FALSE RELIGION

From the Perspective of Religious Traditions

In most religious traditions the major reason for identifying different ways of being religious is to distinguish between true and false religion. In the

Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, the prophets of the Old Testament sought to turn the people of Israel away from superficial religious practices and toward sincere devotion to the law of God. As James Dittes (1969) has observed, "The prophets distinguished between solemn assemblies and righteousness (Amos 5:21–24), between sacrifices and steadfast love, between burnt offerings and knowledge of God (Hosea 6:6)" (p. 618). Jesus also devoted much of his energy to railing against the falseness of the institutional religion of his day:

> The scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses's seat; therefore, do whatever they teach you and follow it; but do not do as they do, for they do not practice what they teach. They tie up heavy burdens, hard to bear, and lay them on the shoulders of others; but they themselves are unwilling to lift a finger to move them. They do all their deeds to be seen by others. . . . But woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you lock people out of the kingdom of heaven. For you do not go in yourselves, and when others are going in, you stop them. . . . Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you are like whitewashed tombs, which on the outside look beautiful, but inside they are full of the bones of the dead and of all kinds of filth. So you also on the outside look righteous to others, but inside you are full of hypocrisy and lawlessness. (Matt. 23:2–5, 13, 27–28 NRSV)

You would hardly want to say that you were religious, if being religious meant being like these scribes and Pharisees!

The distinction between true and false religion can also be found in more recent Christian theology. Danish existentialist Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) differentiated "official Christianity" from "the radical Christian." And in the twentieth century there has been an emphasis on "religionless Christianity"; Dietrich Bonhoeffer asked, "If religion is no more than the garment of Christianity . . . then what is a religionless Christianity?" (1953, p. 163), and Karl Barth (1956) spoke of "the revelation of God as the abolition of religion." Building on such ideas, it has become common in many Christian churches to make a distinction between "having faith" and "being religious" or between being a "true Christian" and only a "Sunday Christian."

Given this long-standing concern to distinguish between true and false religion, you are well advised to hesitate before saying that you are or are not religious. And there is a further reason for hesitation. As we noted in Chapter 1, a person who has no interest in formalized, institutional religion may have an intense interest in religious questions. How is this person to answer? He or she may reject not only the superficial commitment of the Sunday Christian but also the total devotion of the true Christian. And yet, this individual may be seriously attempting to deal with existential questions. Is he or she religious? Some would say yes, more truly religious than a person with strong, clear beliefs. Our answer depends on what we consider true religion to be.

No doubt, personal and institutional biases strongly influence our views

of what true religion is. If, for example, you have found some particular form of religion to be personally meaningful and satisfying, this form is likely to be labeled true religion, not only for yourself but also for others. Moreover, our biases are usually not limited to *what* a person believes; they extend to *how* the person believes as well, that is, to how dominant religious beliefs are in the person's life. If religion is a central, integrating value for you, you are likely to believe that it should be central and integrating for any truly religious individual, whether Christian, Jew, Buddhist, or Moslem. On the other hand, if you consider religion to be but one concern among many, all of which should be carefully orchestrated and harmonized, you are likely to view the totally committed individual as a fanatic who has lost perspective on what religion should be.

From the Perspective of Social-Psychological Research

Because personal and institutional biases often underlie the distinctions between true and false religion, the social psychologist is well advised to regard them with caution. At the same time, even though the value-laden labels "true" and "false" should be regarded skeptically, the psychologist should not overlook the possibility that the concern to distinguish true from false religion may reveal an aspect of personal religion that is real and important. It seems quite possible that there are different ways of being religious and that distinguishing among them may be of great importance in any attempt to understand the impact of religion on people's lives. For example, it may be that those who are devout in their adherence to religious beliefs are likely to show more love and concern for others in need, whereas those who are religious only in the nominal sense of being members of a local church and occasionally attending services are not likely to show increased concern. Testing hypotheses like this one will be our major concern in Part III of this book.

But before testing any hypotheses about the consequences of different ways of being religious, it is necessary to have a clear conception of these different ways. It is also necessary to have a means of detecting the different ways in human life. Arriving at a clear conception and means of detecting ways of being religious is the task before us in the present chapter.

The argument that we shall present in this chapter is somewhat controversial. We shall not simply adopt the most popular conception of different ways of being religious; we shall modify it with some ideas of our own. To make our reasons for doing this as clear as possible, we shall go into a bit more detail than in other chapters. In addition to looking closely at the popular conceptions of ways of being religious, we shall look closely at the techniques that have been developed to detect or measure these ways because, from a research standpoint, the conceptions cannot be understood independently of the techniques used to measure them. Then we shall relate the different ways to the model of religious experience discussed in Chapter 4, suggesting that different ways of being religious may be associated

with different types of cognitive restructuring in response to existential questions.

TWO WAYS OF BEING RELIGIOUS: EXTRINSIC VERSUS INTRINSIC

Among psychologists, Gordon Allport's distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religion is the most popular conception of ways of being religious. According to Allport, this distinction "helps us to separate churchgoers whose communal type of membership supports and serves other, nonreligious ends, from those for whom religion is an end in itself—a final, not instrumental, good" (1966, p. 454).

> While there are several varieties of extrinsic religious orientation, we may say they all point to a type of religion that is strictly utilitarian: useful for the self in granting safety, social standing, solace, and endorsement for one's chosen way of life. . . . By contrast, the intrinsic form of the religious sentiment regards faith as a supreme value in its own right. . . . A religious sentiment of this sort floods the whole life with motivation and meaning. Religion is no longer limited to single segments of self-interest. (Allport, 1966, p. 455)

The businessman we met in Chapter 1 who went to church only because it was "good for business" would typify an extrinsic orientation; he was using his religion as a means of self-serving ends.[1] The young student we met in Chapter 4 who found meaning and purpose on a mountainside in the Alps would typify an intrinsic orientation; his religion was an active, directing force, not just a tool used to reach self-serving ends.

As may be apparent, the extrinsic versus intrinsic distinction parallels the theological distinction between false and true religion, between the Sunday Christian and the true Christian. This parallel gives the distinction considerable intuitive appeal. But, in spite of this appeal and its popularity, we believe that the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction provides an inadequate conception of ways of being religious and that it should be modified. In order to explain why we think this, we need to look at the distinction more closely. First, let us trace its development.

Development of the Extrinsic Versus Intrinsic Distinction

As early as 1945, social psychologists began speaking of two different ways of being religious, one in which religion was used to justify self-centered

1 You may recall that in Chapter 1 we said that this businessman was not religious by our definition of religion. He still is not. More generally, Allport's extrinsic orientation is not religious by our definition because, although the extrinsically religious individual may display beliefs and behavior that we associate with religion, these beliefs and behavior are used for ends other than to deal with existential questions. In spite of this, we shall follow the convention established by Allport and speak of the extrinsic orientation as a way of being religious. But from our perspective, this orientation might be more appropriately called an *appearance* of being religious rather than a way.

ends, another in which religious commitments were carefully thought out and taken seriously as a major goal in life (see Allport & Kramer, 1946; Frenkel-Brunswik & Sanford, 1945). This distinction was maintained and amplified in the mammoth report on research into *The Authoritarian Personality,* published in 1950.

Neutralized religion versus taking religion seriously: The authoritarian personality research. The authoritarian personality research, a six-year project begun in 1944, had as a goal the identification of personality characteristics of individuals to whom Nazism might appeal. Interviews were conducted with hundreds of individuals, and questionnaires were developed to measure two major personality dimensions, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. *Authoritarianism* was defined by (1) a high regard for and tendency to acquiesce to authority, (2) adherence to conventional, middle-class values, (3) rigidity in thinking, and (4) need for clear structure. *Ethnocentrism* was a closely related concept defined by (1) in-group loyalty and (2) distrust and dislike for members of out-groups.

Questions about religion were included in both the interviews and questionnaires designed to measure authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. Theodore Adorno found in his analysis of the interview data that those who scored high on authoritarianism and ethnocentrism reported a high incidence of "neutralized" religion. Adorno described neutralized religion as an emasculation of the more profound claims of religion while preserving the doctrinal shell in a rather rigid and haphazard way. Individuals displaying this type of religion appeared to subordinate religion to self-centered aims, "to make use of religious ideas in order to gain some immediate practical advantage or to aid in the manipulation of other people" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 733).

Adorno also found that neutralized religion frequently correlated negatively with a second way of being religious. This second way involved a "personally experienced belief" that led the believer to "take religion seriously in a more internalized sense" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 731).

Similarly, in analyzing responses to one open-ended questionnaire item—"How important in your opinion are religion and the church?"—Nevitt Sanford found that some people distinguished between the church and "real" religion. He found that anti-Semitism—negative attitudes toward Jews—tended to correlate positively with the amount of importance attached to the church but not with importance attached to "real" religion.

Immature versus mature religion: Allport's early formulation. Also in 1950, Gordon Allport published his first major statement of a similar distinction; he differentiated immature and mature religion. In his earlier work on personality, Allport (1937) had suggested three attributes of a mature personality: (1) interest in ideals and values beyond immediate physical needs (what he called psychogenic values); (2) the ability to objectify oneself, including an ability to see oneself from others' point of view and to laugh at oneself; and (3) the possession of some unifying philosophy of life, although

it need not be religious in character, articulated in words, or entirely complete. Given this conception of maturity, Allport believed that religion might either enhance or inhibit it.

> Most of the criticism of religion is directed to its immature forms. When immature it has not evolved beyond the level of impulsive self-gratification. Instead of dealing with psychogenic values it serves either a wish-fulfilling or soporific function for the self-centered interests. When immature it does not entail self-objectification, but remains unreflective, failing to provide a context of meaning in which the individual can locate himself, and with perspective judge the quality of his conduct. Finally, the immature sentiment is not really unifying in its effect upon the personality. Excluding, as it does, whole regions of experience, it is spasmodic, segmented, and even when fanatic in intensity, it is but partially integrative of the personality. . . .
>
> While we guard against overestimating the consistency and completeness of the mature religious sentiment, we may nonetheless list the attributes that mark if off from the immature sentiment. By comparison, the mature sentiment is (1) well differentiated; (2) dynamic in character in spite of its derivative nature; (3) productive of a consistent morality; (4) comprehensive; (5) integral; and (6) fundamentally heuristic. It will be seen that these criteria are nothing else than special applications in the religious sphere of the tests for maturity of personality: a widened range of interests, insight into oneself, and the development of an adequately embracing philosophy of life. (Allport, 1950, pp. 54, 57)

Mature religion is, then, characterized by complex, critical reflection on religious issues; it "is the outgrowth of many successive discriminations and continuous reorganization" (Allport, 1950, p. 59). At the same time that it provides direction to life as a "master-motive," it is flexible and responsive to new information, neither fanatic nor compulsive. It deals openly and honestly with "matters central to all existence," including the difficult questions of ethical responsibility and evil. It produces the ability to "act wholeheartedly even without absolute certainty. It can be sure without being cocksure" (Allport, 1950, p. 72).

In light of our analysis of religious experience in Chapter 4, Allport's conception of mature religion seems most interesting. Although it predates cognitive structure models of personality change (e.g., Harvey, Hunt, & Schroeder, 1961; Rokeach, 1960), it provides a clear description of an orientation toward religion that is the product of a highly complex cognitive organization for dealing with existential questions, an organization that has emerged from repeated creative changes in response to existential conflicts.

Unfortunately, in 1950 Allport offered no empirical means for identifying immature and mature religion. And without this, one is forced to rely on personal judgments, which are very subject to bias. Well aware of this problem, Allport and his students turned their attention to the development of an objective questionnaire that could identify and distinguish the two ways of being religious. This effort produced the currently popular extrinsic versus intrinsic distinction.

Extrinsic versus intrinsic religion: Allport's later formulation. In the process of developing an empirical measure of immature and mature religion, Allport's conception of these two ways of being religious changed. First, by the late 1950s he had dropped the heavily value-laden labels "immature" and "mature" and spoke instead of extrinsic and intrinsic religion (Allport, 1959). Second, the definitions of these new concepts were, perhaps necessarily, narrower than the definitions of immature and mature religion.

In his classic 1967 paper written with Michael Ross, Allport suggested that "the extrinsically motivated individual *uses* his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated *lives* his" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434). Allport and Ross expanded on this distinction as follows:

> *Extrinstic orientation.* Persons with this orientation are disposed to use religion for their own ends. The term is borrowed from axiology, to designate an interest that is held because it serves other, more ultimate interests. Extrinsic values are always instrumental and utilitarian. Persons with this orientation may find religion useful in a variety of ways—to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs. In theological terms the extrinsic type turns to God, but without turning away from self.
>
> *Intrinsic orientation.* Persons with this orientation find their master motive in religion. Other needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as of less ultimate significance, and they are, so far as possible, brought into harmony with the religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that he *lives* his religion. (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434)

These definitions maintain much of the flavor of Allport's earlier distinction between immature and mature religion, with one important difference. Compared with the concept of mature religion, there seems to be less emphasis in the notion of intrinsic religion on flexibility, skepticism, and resistance to absolutistic thinking, and more on religion as a master motive that is internalized and followed fully. This shift in emphasis is even more apparent when one looks at the questionnaire that Allport and Ross used to measure extrinsic and intrinsic religion.

The Religious Orientation Scale: An Empirical Measure of Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Religion

The scale. The questionnaire Allport and Ross used to measure extrinsic and intrinsic religion is called the Religious Orientation scale. Actually, the Religious Orientation scale consists of two scales, one designed to measure extrinsic religion and one to measure intrinsic religion. The items on each of these scales are presented in Table 6.1. Read the items over carefully to form your own impression of what each scale is measuring.

What does it measure? Now that you have had a chance to form your own impression, we can tell you that we doubt the Religious Orientation scale

Table 6.1 Items on the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales of the Religious Orientation scale used by Allport and Ross (1967)

Extrinsic scale

1. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life.
2. It doesn't matter so much what I believe so long as I lead a moral life.
3. The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection.
4. The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships.
5. What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike.
6. I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray.
7. Although I am a religious person I refuse to let religious considerations influence my everyday affairs.
8. A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial social activity.
9. Occasionally I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to protect my social and economic well-being.
10. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to establish a person in the community.
11. The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.

Intrinsic scale

1. It is important for me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and meditation.
2. If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church.
3. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
4. The prayers I say when I am alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as those said by me during services.
5. Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Divine Being.
6. I read literature about my faith (or church).
7. If I were to join a church group I would prefer to join a Bible study group rather than a social fellowship.
8. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.
9. Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life.

Note: For several items the wording has been changed slightly to permit responses on a nine-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (9). Allport and Ross limited responses to two categories, disagree or agree, or to a forced-choice between two alternatives, e.g., Bible study or social fellowship.

measures what it is supposed to. Consider the items in relation to Allport's concepts of extrinsic and intrinsic religion and his earlier concepts of immature and mature religion. The items used to measure the extrinsic orientation to religion seem fairly consistent with the concepts of extrinsic and immature religion; they suggest an approach in which the individual uses religion in a self-centered way to serve a range of other needs. But the relation of a number of items on the Intrinsic scale to the concept of intrinsic religion—and especially to the concept of mature religion—seems less clear. Consider such items as: "I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life"; "Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life"; "If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church." Although it is possible that

these statements would be strongly endorsed by a person whose religion was "mature" by Allport's 1950 definition, it is also possible that they would receive strong endorsement from a person who tended to identify with and accept religious dogma, authority figures, or institutions in a rigid, uncritical, and dependent fashion.

This possibility leads us to suggest that, as measured by the Religious Orientation scale, intrinsic religion may have at least as much in common with Erik Hoffer's (1951) concept of the "true believer" as with Allport's concept of mature religion. Hoffer defined the *true believer* as a person

> of fanatical faith who is ready to sacrifice his life for a holy cause. . . . The fanatic is convinced that the cause he holds on to is monolithic and eternal—a rock of ages. Still, his sense of security is derived from his passionate attachment and not from the excellence of his cause. The fanatic is not really a stickler to principle. He embraces a cause not primarily because of its justness and holiness but because of his desperate need for something to hold on to. (pp. x, 80)

Such a true believer is far removed from, even antithetical to, Allport's views of intrinsic and mature religion. Yet when we read through the Religious Orientation scale and try to imagine the responses of a religious true beilever, we find that such an individual would probably score very high on the Intrinsic scale.

There is considerable empirical evidence that lends support to this suggestion. It has been found that intrinsic items like those quoted above correlate positively with a tendency to see the world in terms of absolute, rigid categories (King & Hunt, 1975). There is also evidence that the Intrinsic scale as a whole correlates negatively with a measure of open-mindedness in pursuing religious questions, positively with at least some aspects of authoritarianism, and positively with a measure of agreement with the teachings of one's church (Kahoe, 1974, 1977; Kahoe & Meadow, 1977). Finally, it has been found by Gorsuch & McFarland (1972) that scores on a revised version of the Intrinsic scale (Hoge, 1972) correlate positively with responses to three items concerning orthodox religious involvement: (1) frequency of attendance at worship service ($r = .61$); (2) personal importance of religion ($r = .84$); and (3) belief that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the Living God ($r = .69$). These correlations underscore the close relationship between intrinsic religion and orthodox religious involvement; indeed, they suggest that one can get a good measure of what the Intrinsic scale measures simply by asking individuals how involved they are in religion and how strongly they hold orthodox beliefs.

Taken as a whole, these findings seem difficult to reconcile with Allport's concept of the intrinsic orientation; they seem even more difficult to reconcile with his earlier concept of mature religion. They lead us to conclude that in most samples the Intrinsic scale probably measures something other than what Allport intended; it probably measures intense, perhaps even rigid, devotion to orthodox religious beliefs and practices—or, using the

terminology of Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990), it probably measures "religious commitment."

The Religious Orientation scale has produced results other than those Allport intended in another way as well. Allport viewed the extrinsic and intrinsic orientations as distinct religious "types" or, at times, as opposite ends of a single continuum. Viewed in this way, if a person's religious orientation is intrinsic, it cannot be extrinsic; the two are mutually exclusive. But Allport and Ross (1967) found that those who scored high on the Extrinsic scale did not necessarily score low on the Intrinsic scale; the correlation between the scales was close to zero. Other studies using the Religious Orientation scale have typically found the same (see the review by Hunt & King, 1971), except within religiously conservative samples where moderate negative correlations appear (Donahue, 1985). These findings suggest that the Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales do not measure two distinct types of religious orientation, such that a person is one or the other; they instead measure two independent continuous dimensions. A given individual may be more or less concerned to maintain a devout adherence to his or her religion (measured by the Intrinsic scale) and at the same time may be more or less willing to admit the personal and social gains derived therefrom (measured by the Extrinsic scale).[2]

AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF TWO WAYS OF BEING RELIGIOUS: CONSENSUAL VERSUS COMMITTED

If the extrinsic versus intrinsic distinction as measured by the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales is inadequate, what other conceptions of ways of being religious have been proposed? The second most popular conception is the distinction between consensual and committed religion employed by Bernard Spilka and his associates. Allen and Spilka (1967) defined *committed religion*

2. The Intrinsic scale has also been criticized because individuals' responses to the different items on the scale do not always correlate highly with one another (Hunt & King, 1971). This criticism appears to have been adequately answered by Dean Hoge (1972). Hoge developed a revised version of the Intrinsic scale that has satisfactory inter-item correlations and, moreover, correlates well (r = .59) with judgments by ministers about whether respondents' orientation toward religion is extrinsic or intrinsic.

Hoge's scale does not, however, answer the more basic criticism, that the Intrinsic scale actually measures intense devotion to orthodox religion. On the contrary, his scale provides additional evidence for this suggestion. First, scores on his scale correlate very highly with scores on Allport and Ross's Intrinsic scale (r = .86), indicating that the two measure the same underlying dimension. Second, a look at the items on Hoge's scale suggests even more strongly that this underlying dimension is devout orthodoxy. Not only does Hoge's scale employ several of the Allport and Ross "true believer" items (e.g., "I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life"; "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life"), but the items added to stabilize the scale are also ones likely to receive endorsement from a rigid, true believer: "One should seek God's guidance when making every important decision"; "My faith sometimes restricts my actions"; "Nothing is as important to me as serving God as best I know how." Thus, by providing a more internally consistent set of items, Hoge has revealed even more clearly that the Intrinsic scale measures devout—perhaps rigid—orthodoxy more than it measures the mature, flexible approach to religion that Allport set out to measure.

as a discerning, highly differentiated, candid, open, self-critical, abstract, and relational approach to religious questions. Moreover, for the committed individual, religion is a central value. They defined *consensual religion* as the opposite of each of these characteristics. To measure these two ways of being religious, Allen and Spilka used a complex multidimensional coding of interview responses.

Although Allen and Spilka did not explicitly make the comparison, one cannot help being struck by the similarity between their description of the characteristics of committed and consensual religion and Allport's (1950) earlier description of the characteristics of mature and immature religion. Indeed, with their multidimensional coding technique, Allen and Spilka may well have empirically identified Allport's concepts better than did Allport himself. Perhaps it is for this reason that James Dittes, in his major review of research in psychology of religion in 1969, indicated a preference for Spilka's consensual-committed distinction over Allport's extrinsic-intrinsic distinction.

But multidimensional coding of interview responses is difficult and cumbersome, so during the 1970s Spilka attempted to develop a more easily administered questionnaire measure of the consensual-committed distinction. In doing so, his distinction suffered a fate similar to Allport's. Much of the emphasis in the initial concept of committed religion on complexity, flexibility, and self-criticism was lost; more emphasis was placed on religion as a central value.

As a result, although Allen and Spilka (1967) found little relationship between their classification into consensual versus committed and a measure of Allport's extrinsic versus intrinsic distinction, studies during the 1970s found positive correlations between the questionnaire measures of consensual and committed religion on the one hand and extrinsic and intrinsic religion on the other. For example, in one study with a diverse sample of respondents, Spilka, Stout, Minton, and Sizemore (1977) reported positive correlations of .45 between their Consensual scale and the Allport and Ross Extrinsic scale and of .64 between their Committed scale and the Allport and Ross Intrinsic scale (see also Spilka, Read, Allen, & Dailey, 1968). When one looks more closely at the Committed scale, this high positive correlation with the Intrinsic scale is not surprising; seven of the nine items on Allport and Ross's Intrinsic scale are included in the fifteen items on Spilka's Committed scale.

Comparing the consensual-committed distinction as measured by questionnaire with the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction, Spilka concluded in 1977: "Recent work (Spilka & Minton, 1975; Spilka & Mullin, 1977) strongly implies that these forms of personal religion really represent different facets of the same phenomenon, and it is not inappropriate to refer to Intrinsic-Committed and Extrinsic-Consensual orientations" (Spilka, Stout, Minton, & Sizemore, 1977, p. 170). We would agree that as measured by questionnaire, the consensual-committed distinction is essentially the same as the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction. But because of the problems with the Intrin-

sic scale noted above, we find this development regrettable. The Committed scale, like the Intrinsic scale, seems to be primarily a measure of intense devotion to orthodox religious beliefs.

A THREE-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL RELIGION: AS MEANS, END, AND QUEST

In translating Allport's concept of mature religion into the empirically identifiable concepts of intrinsic or committed religion, some aspects of the initial concept were lost. Allport and Ross's Intrinsic scale and Spilka's Committed scale are primarily measures of single-minded commitment to religion and reliance on religion as a central, master motive in life. Single-mindedness and centrality were part of Allport's conception of mature religion, but they were not all. Mature religion also included a critical, open-ended approach to existential questions.

To be more specific, Allport's concept of mature religion included three characteristics that seem to be missing from the questionnaire measures of intrinsic or committed religion. First, Allport suggested that the mature religious sentiment is integrative in the sense of encouraging the individual to face complex problems like ethical responsibility and evil without reducing their complexity. Second, mature religion involves a readiness to doubt and be self-critical: "The mature religious sentiment is ordinarily fashioned in the workshop of doubt" (Allport, 1950, p. 73). In this regard, it seems reminiscent of the approach to religion proposed by the poet Tennyson: "There lives more faith in honest doubt, believe me, than in half your creeds." Third, there is an emphasis on incompleteness and tentativeness; the mature religious sentiment involves a continual search for more light on religious questions. As Walter Huston Clark (1958) said when summarizing Allport's concept of mature religion, "Maturity requires an admixture of humility and makes it possible for the true believer to absorb new points of view into his truth system and so to make his religious progress a genuine quest" (p. 247).

A Third Dimension: Religion as Quest

These characteristics of complexity, doubt, and tentativeness suggest a way of being religious that is very different from either the extrinsic or the intrinsic (at least as the latter is measured by the Intrinsic or Committed scale); they suggest an approach that involves honestly facing existential questions in all their complexity, while at the same time resisting clear-cut, pat answers. An individual who approaches religion in this way recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably never will know, the final truth about such matters. Still, the questions are deemed important, and however tentative and subject to change, answers are sought. There may or may not be a clear belief in a transcendent reality, but there is a transcendent, religious aspect to the individual's life. We shall call this open-ended, questioning approach *religion as quest.*

A number of writers, both theologians and psychologists, have suggested the importance of a quest dimension to religion. Perhaps the clearest theological statement comes from H. Richard Niebuhr. In *The Responsible Self* (1963) Niebuhr presented a picture of a religious individual who participates in an open-ended dialogue with his or her physical and social environment; existential questions are confronted, but definitive answers are not obtained or even expected (see also Batson, Beker, & Clark, 1973; Bonhoeffer, 1953; Gandhi, 1948; Rubenstein, 1965; Tillich, 1951, for similar views).

On the psychological side, Erich Fromm (1950) made a distinction between "authoritarian" and "humanistic" religion. Fromm suggested that often religion is borrowed from other people or social institutions. He believed that religion acquired in this way imposes tyrannical control over the native impulses of the individual; it is authoritarian. But sometimes religion is a product of creative forces within the individual; this kind of religion Fromm called humanistic. It involves the individual hammering out his or her own stance on religious questions, refusing to be dominated by the views advocated by the religious institutions of society. In a similar vein, Peter Bertocci (1958) spoke of "religion as creative insecurity," suggesting that "to flee from insecurity is to miss the whole point of being human, the whole point of religion" (p. ix).

From these authors and others (for example, Barron, 1968; Bergson, 1935; Maslow, 1964; Rugg, 1963) a picture begins to emerge of a dimension of personal religion that is quite different from either the extrinsic or the intrinsic dimension. To highlight the difference, compare the extrinsic religion of the businessman who attends church solely because "it's good for business" and the intrinsic religion of the affirmation "I *know* God exists; I talk to Him every day" with the quest approach to religion displayed by Siddhartha, Malcolm X, and Mahatma Gandhi.

Siddhartha searched for seven years before attaining the enlightenment that made him the Buddha. And even then he had not found the answer; he had found a path, a direction to go. Malcolm X was continually seeking a broader and deeper religious perspective. This search first led him to reject the Christianity of his childhood, a Christianity that he found personally dehumanizing and racially oppressive, to turn to Black Muslim teachings. But he did not uncritically embrace these teachings as the final, absolute answer. Rather, his trip to Mecca led him to reject as well the reverse racism that he saw in the Black Muslim movement and to turn to a new understanding of Islamic faith in terms of universal love and brotherhood.

Gandhi clearly displayed a quest orientation in his "experiments with Truth." In his own words,

> What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years—is self-realization, to see God face to face. . . . I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end. . . .

> I worship God as Truth only. I have not yet found Him, but I am seeking after Him. I am prepared to sacrifice the things dearest to me in pursuit of this quest. Even if the sacrifice demanded my very life, I hope I may be prepared to give it. But as long as I have not realized this Absolute Truth, so long must I hold by the relative truth as I have conceived it. That relative truth must, meanwhile, be my beacon, my shield and buckler. . . . The instruments for the quest of truth are as simple as they are difficult. They may appear quite impossible to an arrogant person, and quite possible to an innocent child. The seeker after truth should be humbler than the dust. The world crushes the dust under its feet, but the seeker after truth should be so humble himself that even the dust could crush him. Only then, and not till then, will he have a glimpse of truth. . . .
>
> I hope and pray that no one will regard [my] advice . . . as authoritative. [My] experiments . . . should be regarded as illustrations, in the light of which every one may carry on his own experiments according to his own inclinations and capacity. (Gandhi, 1948, pp. 4–7)

Although many writers have pointed to the existence of a quest dimension of personal religion, and although we can identify people whose religious experience seems to exemplify this quest, none of the writers have provided an efficient empirical method for measuring the quest dimension. Therefore, we have undertaken the task of developing questionnaire scales to measure it, as well as to measure two other dimensions—a *means* dimension, in which religion is a means to other self-serving ends, and an *end* dimension, in which religion is an ultimate end in itself. The means and end dimensions are based on our understanding of Allport's extrinsic-intrinsic distinction.[3]

To make our technique for measuring the means, end, and quest dimensions as clear as possible, we shall present it in some detail. Development and revision of this technique have been in progress since 1969. Because the presentation here includes the latest revisions, it differs somewhat from earlier presentations (e.g., Batson, 1971, 1976; Batson & Ventis, 1982).

Measuring the Means, End, and Quest Dimensions

In developing empirical measures of the means, end, and quest dimensions, we decided that we needed not only to add a measure of religion as a quest, but also to pin down more explicitly our assumptions about the means (extrinsic) and end (intrinsic) dimensions. In order to accomplish these aims, we developed four new questionnaire scales; three were combined into a Religious Life Inventory; the fourth was an Orthodoxy scale. We also employed the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales developed by Allport and Ross. Thus, to measure the three dimensions, we used six different scales: the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales and our four new scales.

3. An alternative approach would have been to develop a questionnaire that combined elements from Allport's intrinsic, end dimension and the quest dimension, creating a single scale to measure Allport's original concept of religious maturity. For an example of this alternative approach, see Dudley and Cruise (1990).

Four new religious orientation scales. The first new scale is called the External scale; it was designed to measure a component of the extrinsic, means dimension—the degree to which an individual's external social environment has influenced his or her personal religion. We assumed that religion that was a response to social influence would reflect an extrinsic, means orientation because it would presumably be motivated by a desire to gain the self-serving, extrinsic end of social approval. Accordingly, this scale included six items that assess the importance of authority figures and social institutions in shaping one's religious experience. In fact, our assumption that this scale would be associated with an extrinsic, means orientation has proved wrong. In most samples, higher scores on this scale are associated with higher scores on the Intrinsic rather than the Extrinsic scale, suggesting the importance of social influence in the development of strong, intrinsic devotion to religion as the master motive in life. The six items on the External scale are presented in the first section of Table 6.2.

The second new scale is called the Internal scale; it was designed to measure a component of the intrinsic, end dimension—the degree to which an individual's religion is a result of internal needs for certainty, strength, and direction. Building on Hoffer's (1951) understanding of the motives of the true believer, we assumed that these needs would reflect an intrinsic, end orientation because this orientation seems to be based on a need to find firm, clear answers to existential questions. Subsequent research has supported this assumption. The nine items on the Internal scale are presented in the second section of Table 6.2.

Perhaps the most important new scale is the Quest scale; it was designed to measure the basic component of the quest dimension—the degree to which an individual's religion involves an open-ended, responsive dialogue with existential questions raised by the contradictions and tragedies of life. The twelve items on this scale are presented in the third section of Table 6.2. These items were designed to address the three aspects of Allport's concept of mature religion that we found to be missing from the Intrinsic and Committed scales: readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity (Items 4, 8, 9, and 11); self-criticism and perception of religious doubts as positive (Items 3, 5, 7, and 12); and openness to change (Items 1, 2, 6, and 10).

The fourth new scale is called the Orthodoxy scale. It was patterned after an orthodoxy scale developed by Glock and Stark (1966) and was designed to measure belief in traditional religious doctrines. We assumed that such beliefs were an important component of the intrinsic, end dimension. Once again, subsequent research has supported this assumption. The twelve items on the Orthodoxy scale are presented in Table 6.3.

Traditional religious doctrines must, of course, be viewed from the perspective of some specific religious tradition. We chose to base our Orthodoxy scale on the Christian tradition because of its relative predominance in Western society. More precisely, the belief statements on the Orthodoxy scale come from American Protestantism. Although research suggests that

Table 6.2 Items on the External, Internal, and Quest scales of the Religious Life Inventory

External scale

1. The church has been very important for my religious development. (1)[a]
2. My minister (or youth director, camp counselor, etc.) has had a profound influence on my personal religious development. (7)
3. A major factor in my religious development has been the importance of religion for my parents. (15)
4. My religion serves to satisfy needs for fellowship and security. (21)
5. Certain people have served as "models" for my religious development. (26)
6. (−) Outside forces (other persons, church, etc.) have been relatively unimportant in my religious development. (34)[b]

Internal scale

1. My religious development is a natural response to our innate need for devotion to God. (4)
2. God's will should shape my life. (9)
3. It is necessary for me to have a religious belief. (12)
4. When it comes to religious questions, I feel driven to know the truth. (13)
5. (−) Religion is something I have never felt personally compelled to consider. (18)
6. (−) Whether I turn out to be religious or not doesn't make much difference to me. (24)
7. I have found it essential to have faith. (28)
8. I find it impossible to conceive of myself not being religious. (31)
9. (−) For me, religion has not been a "must." (35)

Quest scale

O 1. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change. (3)
O 2. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs. (5)
S 3. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties. (6)
R 4. I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning and purpose of my life. (8)
S 5. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious. (11)
? 6. (−) I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years. (16)
S 7. (−) I find religious doubts upsetting. (17)
R 8. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions in my world and in my relation to my world. (20)
R 9. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions. (25)
O 10. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing. (27)
R 11. God wasn't very important for me until I began to ask questions about the meaning of my own life. (30)
S 12. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers. (33)

Unscored buffer items

1. Wordly events cannot affect the eternal truths of my religion. (2)
2. On religious issues, I find the opinions of others irrelevant. (10)
3. I find my everyday experiences severely test my religious convictions. (14)
4. My religious development has emerged out of my growing sense of personal identity. (22)
5. My religion is a personal matter, independent of the influence of organized religion. (23)
6. It is important for me to learn about religion from those who know more about it than I do. (29)
7. The "me" of a few years back would be surprised at my present religious stance. (32)

[a]The number in parentheses indicates where the item appears among the thirty-five items on the Religious Life Inventory. All items are responded to on a nine-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (9).

[b]A minus sign preceding an item indicates that it is reversed in scoring (i.e., the number circled is subtracted from 10).

Table 6.3 Items on the Doctrinal Orthodoxy scale

1. I believe in the existence of a just and merciful personal God.
2. I believe God created the universe.
3. I believe God has a plan for the universe.
4. I believe Jesus Christ is the Divine Son of God.
5. I believe Jesus Christ was resurrected (raised from the dead).
6. I believe Jesus Christ is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament.
7. I believe one must accept Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior to be saved from sin.
8. I believe in the "second coming" (that Jesus Christ will one day return to judge and rule the world).
9. I believe in "original sin" (we are all born sinners).
10. I believe in life after death.
11. I believe there is a transcendent realm (an "other" world, not just this world in which we live).
12. I believe the Bible is the unique authority for God's will.

Note: All items are responded to on a nine-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (9).

the scale is appropriate for use with Catholics as well, at least American Catholics, it is clearly inappropriate for use with people whose religious tradition is not Christian. As would be expected, highly orthodox Jews, Moslems, and Buddhists score quite low. This restriction to a specific religious tradition seems unavoidable when one is measuring adherence to institutional beliefs, but it clearly limits the range of applicability of the measure and, as a result, the generality of the conclusions that can be drawn.

Combining these four scales with Allport and Ross's Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales, we expected to be able to measure each of the proposed three dimensions of being religious: as a means to some other end, as an end in itself, and as a quest. We expected Allport and Ross's Extrinsic scale to measure religion as a means. We expected Allport and Ross's Intrinsic scale and our External, Internal, and Orthodoxy scales to be highly correlated and to measure religion as an end. This expectation was based, first, on the finding that the External scale was associated with an intrinsic, end orientation rather than the extrinsic, means orientation, and second, on our belief that Allport and Ross's Intrinsic scale, contrary to their intent, measured devout allegiance to institutional religious orthodoxy. Finally, we expected our Quest scale to stand alone as a measure of religion as a quest.

Intercorrelation of the six religious orientation scales. Since 1969, various versions of these scales have been administered to numerous samples of undergraduates with at least a moderate interest in religion, as well as to several samples of seminary students and adult church members. Batson and Ventis (1982) presented mean scores (and standard deviations) on each of the scales for 258 undergraduates and for 67 seminarians, using an earlier six-item version of the Quest scale. They also presented correlations among the six scales for these undergraduates and seminarians. We shall present similar descriptive statistics for 424 undergraduates, using the latest

Table 6.4 Means and standard deviations on six religious orientation scales for 424 undergraduates interested in religion

Scales	Mean[a]	Standard deviation[a]
Extrinsic	4.54	1.04
Intrinsic	5.26	1.45
External	5.80	1.59
Internal	6.44	1.35
Quest	4.99	1.17
Orthodoxy	7.37	1.43

[a]All means and standard deviations are on nine-point response scales (1 = strongly disagree; 9 = strongly agree), having been adjusted for the number of items on each scale.

twelve-item version of the Quest scale presented in Table 6.2. Mean scores on each scale for the 424 undergraduates are presented in Table 6.4; so are the standard deviations. The correlations among the six scales for these undergraduates are presented in Table 6.5, including internal-consistency reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) on the diagonal.

The correlations in Table 6.5 reveal that the six scales relate to one another very much as expected. Allport and Ross's Intrinsic scale correlates positively with our External, Internal, and Orthodoxy scales, providing additional support for our suggestion that, contrary to Allport's intent, the Intrinsic scale measures devout—perhaps even rigid—adherence to orthodox beliefs. Neither the Extrinsic nor the Quest scale correlates highly with any of the other scales. This is as expected because the Extrinsic scale is the only one measuring the extrinsic, means dimension, and the Quest scale is the only one designed to measure the quest dimension.

Combining the six scales through principal-components analysis to measure the means, end, and quest dimensions. In order to use these six scales to measure the three dimensions of individual religion—as a means, end, and quest—we employed principal-components analysis. Principal-components analysis is a form of factor analysis, a complex statistical technique

Table 6.5 Correlations among six religious orientation scales for 424 undergraduates interested in religion

Scales	Extrinsic	Intrinsic	External	Internal	Quest	Orthodoxy
Extrinsic	.72[a]	−.05	.03	−.12	.16	−.04
Intrinsic		.83	.59	.73	−.05	.55
External			.79	.62	−.17	.49
Internal				.84	−.22	.68
Quest					.78	−.25
Orthodoxy						.91

[a]Entries on the diagonal are internal-consistency reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha).

well beyond the scope of this book. Still, the basic function of principal-components analysis is easy to understand. Through comparison and contrast of different individuals' responses to the six scales, it is possible to detect the conceptual dimensions that underlie these responses, as well as how each of the scales relates to each of these underlying dimensions. The underlying dimensions are called *components*, and the relationship of a scale to a given component is called its *loading* on that component.

When responses to the six religious orientation scales were component analyzed, they produced three independent components, one corresponding to the means dimension, one to the end dimension, and one to the quest dimension. Accordingly, we named the components Religion as Means, Religion as End, and Religion as Quest. The loadings of each of the six scales on each component are presented in Table 6.6.

As can be seen in Table 6.6, the contribution of each of the scales to each component is very much as expected. The Religion-as-Means component is defined primarily by the Allport and Ross Extrinsic scale; the Religion-as-End component is defined primarily by four scales—Allport and Ross's Intrinsic scale and our External, Internal, and Orthodoxy scales; finally, the Religion-as-Quest component is defined primarily by our Quest scale.

Once one has determined the relationship between the scales and the underlying components, it is possible to compute scores for each individual on each of the three components. This is done by multiplying each individual's score on each scale (standardized) by a component-score coefficient and then summing these products. The three scores resulting from this computation reflect an individual's score relative to other individuals on each of the three components. These component scores, then, provide an empirical measure of the degree to which an individual orients toward religion in each of the three ways—as a means, end, and quest. And this was our goal. The component-score coefficients for the Means, End, and Quest components for the 424 undergraduates are presented in Table 6.7.

Table 6.6 Component loadings of six religious orientation scales for 424 undergraduates interested in religion

	Components		
Scales	Religion as Means	Religion as End	Religion as Quest
Extrinsic	.991*	−.023	.084
Intrinsic	−.068	.876*	.118
External	.106	.797*	−.086
Internal	−.115	.895*	−.120
Quest	.087	−.109	.975*
Orthodoxy	.003	.777*	−.253

Note: Principal-components analysis with a varimax rotation.
*Indicates highest component loading for each scale.

Table 6.7 Component-score coefficients for 424 undergraduates interested in religion

	Components		
Scales	Religion as Means	Religion as End	Religion as Quest
Extrinsic	.99	.02	−.07
Intrinsic	−.07	.34	.24
External	.13	.29	.00
Internal	−.08	.32	.01
Quest	−.06	.09	.96
Orthodoxy	.05	.26	−.16

Two characteristics of our three-dimensional measure of ways of being religious. Two characteristics of our approach to measuring these three ways of being religious should be emphasized. First, even though most researchers would agree that a person's orientation to religion need not be of one or another single type, the existing literature on different ways of being religious suggests that it is difficult to resist typological thinking. Researchers have often typed individuals as extrinsic *or* intrinsic (or, if they score high on both scales, as "indiscriminately proreligious" or, if they score low on both, as "indiscriminately antireligious"—see Allport & Ross, 1967), consensual *or* committed, end *or* quest. This practice of typing persists even though there is much evidence suggesting that it is inappropriate, at least when using the currently available questionnaire measures of religious orientation (see Hunt & King, 1971, for a review). In spite of attempts to justify typing (e.g., Donahue, 1985; Hood, 1978), we know of no clear evidence that the responses of people typed in one way or another cannot be explained by where these individuals score on one or another of the continuous dimensions. Fortunately, there are some recent signs that the practice of typing may be losing favor (Gorsuch, 1988; Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990).

In our approach, we have avoided typing. We have not classified religious individuals as being of a means type, end type, or quest type. Instead, we have measured the degree to which each individual's religion can be characterized in *each* of these ways. Each individual receives a score on each component, and each component is a continuous dimension. We believe that this shift from talking about types to talking about continuous dimensions is an important advantage of our approach.

Second, the three dimensions in our model are independent of one another. Consistent with standard practice, our principal-components analysis was carried out in such a way that each of the components is uncorrelated with the other two (in factor-analysis terms, an orthogonal rotation was employed). This means that, for example, if you score high on the Quest component you need not score low on either the Means or the End component. Indeed, how you score on one component says precisely nothing

about how you will score on the other two. The three are independent dimensions. You might score high on all three components, low on all three (if you are relatively nonreligious), or high on one or two and low on another.

These two points are important to keep in mind when considering the research reported in Part III of this book concerning the behavioral consequences of each of these ways of being religious. In Part III we shall *not* be considering how, for example, a quest-type person responds as opposed to an end-type person. We shall not, because we have not classified people into religious types. We shall instead consider how each of the three independent, continuous dimensions of personal religion relates to behavior.

A simplified procedure for obtaining scores on the means, end, and quest dimensions. We must admit that our technique for deriving scores on the means, end, and quest dimensions through the use of principal-components analysis is complex and cumbersome. Some of the complexity is necessary because the six religious orientation scales do not relate to one another in a simple fashion. Still, you may be disappointed not to be able to determine your own score on each of the three dimensions.

If so, then you may be interested to learn that some researchers have employed a simpler strategy for obtaining scores on the means, end, and quest dimensions. The three religious orientation scales that are conceptually most relevant to the three dimensions—the Extrinsic, Intrinsic, and Quest scales—are almost always highly associated with the Means, End, and Quest components, respectively (see the component loadings in Table 6.6), and only slightly correlated with one another. So scores on these three scales provide reasonably good approximations of scores on the three independent dimensions. In most cases, this simpler measurement strategy has produced results that closely parallel results based on component analysis.

We would encourage you to take a few minutes now to compute your own scores on the means, ends, and quest dimensions using this simplified procedure (the necessary steps are described in Table 6.8). Computing your own score on each dimension is probably the best way to gain an understanding of our three-dimensional model. In addition, when in Part III we consider the psychological consequences of these three dimensions, the discussion will have more personal relevance if you have some idea of your own score on each dimension. Of course, you should not take your scores too seriously because you are aware of the intent of the scales. Also, we have arranged the items in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 by scale, whereas normally they are intermixed.

Initial Discriminant Validity of Our Measure of the Means, End, and Quest Dimensions

To provide an initial check whether our three-dimensional analysis including religion as quest actually measured the open-ended search dimension in Allport's concept of mature religion in addition to the devout belief (end)

Table 6.8 Steps in a simplified procedure for obtaining scores on the means, end, and quest dimensions by computing scores on the Extrinsic, Intrinsic, and Quest scales

1. Each individual to be tested should consent to having his or her religious orientation measured.
2. After consent is obtained, have each individual respond to each item on each of the three key religious orientation scales—Extrinsic, Intrinsic, and Quest—using a nine-point response scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (9). Each individual should be encouraged to give the response that best reflects his or her own true opinion. There are, of course, no right or wrong answers; some people will agree and some disagree with each item.
3. To determine an individual's score on the Extrinsic, Intrinsic, and Quest scales, first reverse the individual's score on each item on the Quest scale preceded by a minus sign in Table 6.2. This is done by subtracting the marked response from 10. Each item now has a corrected response.
4. For each scale, add up the individual's corrected responses to all the items on the scale and divide the sum by the number of items on the scale to get an average response (AR). You will now have three scores, one for each scale.
5. These scores can be compared to the means for each scale in Table 6.4 to see if the individual's score is below or above the average on that scale.
6. For a more precise assessment, you can compute the individual's standard score (SS) on each scale. This is done by subtracting the mean (M) for each scale from the individual's average response (AR) obtained in Step 4 for that scale, then dividing the remainder by the standard deviation (SD) for that scale. Thus, SS = (AR − M)/SD. The means and standard deviations for each scale are reported in Table 6.4. (If you are computing scores for a sample of thirty or more individuals, scores can be standardized using means and standard deviations computed from that sample.) An individual's standard score on the Extrinsic, Intrinsic, and Quest scale will, in most cases, closely approximate that individual's score on the Means, End, and Quest dimensions. These standard scores for the entire sample will have a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 1.0. And, for a given dimension, scores below −1.0 (one standard deviation below the mean) are below the 16th percentile; scores below −2.0 are below the 3rd percentile. Scores above 1.0 are above the 84th percentile; scores above 2.0 are above the 97th percentile.

dimension tapped by the Intrinsic scale, we administered the six scales to individuals whom we thought should score especially high or low on the end and quest dimensions. This way, we could find out whether these individuals did. The individuals selected for initial comparison were fifteen Princeton University undergraduates who were members of one of two campus organizations. Eight were members of a nondenominational evangelical Christian group; for them, Christ was the answer. We expected that these individuals would score especially high on the end dimension and relatively low on the quest dimension. The other seven were members of a social service organization; they were involved in dealing with personal and social crises through work in local mental hospitals, hot-line organizations, or Big Brother programs. We expected that these individuals would score especially high on the quest dimension.

Even though these samples were quite small, making it more difficult to obtain statistically reliable differences, the predicted pattern of results was

found. Relative to a comparison sample of thirty-one Princeton undergraduates from Christian backgrounds not involved in either of these groups, the evangelicals scored significantly ($p < .05$) higher on the End component (and also, as it turned out, on the Means component) and significantly ($p < .05$) lower on the Quest component. The social service group scored significantly ($p < .05$) higher than the comparison sample on the Quest component. These results indicated that the End and Quest components could discriminate in a predictable fashion between individuals that one would expect to be especially high or low on these two dimensions of personal religion (see Batson, 1976, for a more detailed discussion of this validation study). Still, questions about the validity of the Quest scale have persisted.

More Questions about the Validity of the Quest Scale

Perhaps because the concept of religion as quest challenges an exclusively positive view of Allport's highly popular concept of intrinsic religion, a number of questions have been raised in recent years about the validity of the Quest scale. Critics have asked: Is not the Quest scale really a measure of agnosticism, of anti-orthodoxy, or sophomoric religious doubt, or of religious conflict? Indeed, is it a measure of anything religious at all?

Before adopting the Quest scale as the key measure of a third dimension of individual religion that is independent of the means (extrinsic) and end (intrinsic) dimensions, it is important to address these questions about the scale's validity. We need to know whether the Quest scale measures something other than is measured by the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales, and if so, what.

Virtually every one of the over fifty studies conducted to date using the Quest scale has found low correlations between it and the Extrinsic and the Intrinsic scales. Correlations with the Extrinsic scale are typically in the .00 to .25 range; correlations with the Intrinsic scale are typically in the −.10 to .10 range. Moreover, virtually every one of the approximately thirty studies that has included a principal-components analysis of the six religious orientation scales has found that these three scales load clearly and distinctly on three separate, independent components: Means (Extrinsic), End (Intrinsic), and Quest. Therefore, there seems little question that the Quest scale is measuring something different from the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales. Questions remain, however, about what the something different measured by the Quest scale really is.

Does the Quest Scale measure anything religious? In 1985 Michael Donahue expressed concern that the Quest scale might not measure a religious dimension at all, let alone the intended religious dimension. In Donahue's words, "Means, end, and quest are certainly three separate, orthogonal, replicable dimensions, but they may not all be dimensions of religiousness" (1985, p. 413). He suggested that "until some group of individuals reasonably identifiable as religious can be demonstrated to have higher *Q* [Quest]

scores than another group, it seems invalid to call this a measure of religiousness" (1985, p. 413).

Comparing seminarians to undergraduates. We can only assume that when making this statement, Donahue was unconvinced by the initial validity study already described and had overlooked the scores on the Quest scale reported by Batson and Ventis (1982, p. 155) not only for undergraduates with at least a moderate interest in religion but also for seminarians. Assuming that the seminarians, who were Princeton Theological Seminary students training for the Presbyterian ministry, are "reasonably identifiable as religious," then their significantly higher mean on the Quest scale (6.67) relative to the undergraduates (5.15; $p < .001$) would seem to meet Donahue's criterion for concluding that the Quest scale is a valid measure of something religious.

Comparing members of a charismatic Bible study to members of a traditional Bible study. Further evidence that the Quest scale measures something religious comes from a validation study by Ferriani and Batson (1990). They compared scores on the six religious orientation scales of two quite different interdenominational Bible study groups. One was a traditional group (9 men, 17 women; 25 Protestant, 1 Catholic); the other was a nontraditional, charismatic group (17 men, 15 women; 28 Protestant, 4 Catholic). The nontraditional group placed emphasis on religion as a shared search; some members spoke in tongues, and some prayed with hands raised.

Members of both groups reported a very high interest in religion; means were 7.96 and 8.06 for the traditional and nontraditional groups, respectively, on a 1 *(not at all)* to 9 *(extremely)* response scale. Both groups also reported very frequent participation in religious activities; means were 5.35 and 5.43 for the traditional and nontraditional groups, respectively, on a 1 *(never)* to 6 *(more than once a day)* response scale.

The two groups differed significantly on only one of the six religious orientation scales. As would be expected if the Quest scale measured a dimension of religiousness concerned with an open-ended search without exclusive reliance on traditional answers, the mean score on the Quest scale was higher for the members of the nontraditional, charismatic Bible study group (5.45) than for members of the traditional Bible study group (4.46; $p < .001$).

In light of the undergraduate versus seminarian comparison and the traditional versus charismatic Bible study comparison, it seems clear that certain groups of individuals reasonably identifiable as religious can be demonstrated to have higher Quest scores than another group. So, following Donahue's (1985) logic, it seems appropriate to accept the Quest scale as a measure of a third dimension of personal religion, independent of the means (extrinsic) and end (intrinsic) dimensions. Is, however, this third dimension the one intended? Several alternatives have been suggested.

Does the Quest scale measure agnosticism or sophomoric doubt? Allowing that the Quest scale might measure something religious, but doubting that it measured what was intended, Donahue (1985) suggested a second possibility: The Quest scale "might best be characterized as an agnosticism scale" (p. 413). Donahue admitted that "persons with mature and differentiated religious orientations might agree with [Quest] items," but, he argued, "so might iconoclasts who sophomorically and reflexively respond 'why' to every answer given" (p. 413). Donahue suggested that the Quest scale may simply be picking up agnosticism or sophomoric doubt, especially since so many of the studies employing the Quest scale have used college freshmen and sophomores as participants.

One can certainly imagine agnostics who would score high on the Quest scale. Apparently, however, there are many orthodox believers who do too. Correlations between scores on this scale and scores on the Orthodoxy scale are typically in the .00 to −.20 range. If the Quest scale is actually measuring agnosticism with regard to orthodox beliefs, this correlation should be strongly negative. So, if the Quest scale is measuring agnosticism, it is doing a very bad job.

One can also imagine sophomoric doubters who would score high on the Quest scale. Apparently, however, there are many who are not sophomores who do too. If, as Donahue (1985) suggested, the Quest scale is actually measuring sophomoric doubt, then we would expect scores on the scale to drop as the sophomores "wise up" and mature. We would not, for example, expect the Princeton Theological Seminary students, who were not only older but who presumably also took their religion rather seriously, to score significantly higher than freshmen and sophomore undergraduates on the Quest scale, but—as already noted—they did.

Nor would we expect studies of adult church members to produce means on the Quest scale quite similar to those of undergraduates, but they typically have. Batson and Ventis (1982) reported a mean Quest score of 5.15 for undergraduates. Similarly, Acklin (1984) reported a mean of 5.00 for 120 adults ranging from 15 to over 60 years old; Finney and Malony (1985) reported a mean of 5.20 for 50 Presbyterian adult church members; Walters (1980) reported a mean of 5.12 for 223 volunteer teachers of religion in the archdiocese of Detroit (96 percent were laity). Sampling age cohorts from teens to over 60, both Acklin (1984) and McFarland (1990b) found that adults had scores as high as undergraduates' scores on the Quest scale at least up to age 50, and McFarland found scores that were slightly higher for respondents in their 60s. Thus, we find little evidence of the decline in Quest scores after age 20 that Donahue's (1985) sophomoric-doubt interpretation of the Quest scale would lead us to expect. If the Quest scale is measuring only sophomoric doubt, then we have some very old sophomores—including some over 60 years of age. The Quest scores of post-college samples leave the sophomoric-doubt explanation of what the Quest scale measures very much in doubt.

Does the Quest scale measure religious conflict? Taking a different tack, Spilka, Kojetin, and McIntosh (1985) suggested that what is being measured by the Quest scale "may be religious conflict with anxiety" (p. 440). Kojetin, McIntosh, Bridges, and Spilka (1987) claimed some empirical support for this possibility. They administered religious orientation measures and Funk's (1955) religious conflict scale to three different samples: undergraduates (104), Methodist seminary students (49), and United Church of Christ adults (85). In each sample, scores on the Quest scale correlated positively ($p < .01$) with scores on the religious conflict scale.

More recently, however, Kojetin (1988) has made a distinction between "religious doubt or confusion and an active questioning or seeking" (p. 3). On the basis of factor analyses of six Quest scale items and a number of Funk's religious conflict scale items, Kojetin presented two small scales: a six-item Doubt and Confusion scale and a five-item Active Questioning scale. Interestingly, the Doubt and Confusion scale, which was described as having the flavor of troubling or upsetting doubt, contained *no* items from the Quest scale; all were from the religious conflict scale. The Active Questioning scale contained three of the six Quest items.

It seems, then, that as Kojetin and his colleagues have pursued the possibility that the Quest scale is measuring only religious conflict, they have produced a negative answer. Although individuals scoring higher on the Quest scale are likely to experience—or at least to report experiencing—more religious conflict, this conflict is not what the Quest scale is measuring; the Quest items load on a different factor. Just as children's ages and their heights are correlated but not the same thing, so, it seems, the Quest scale and religious conflict are correlated but not the same thing. Rather than measuring conflict per se, the Quest scale seems to be measuring a more active search in which doubts are viewed as positive and not simply as a threat. To find that the Quest scale is associated with, but not the same as, religious conflict is entirely consistent with the conception of the quest dimension presented earlier in this chapter.

Does the Quest scale measure what was intended? Having reviewed the major claims suggesting that the Quest scale is measuring something other than was intended, the evidence seems surprisingly supportive of the possibility that this scale is actually measuring something close to what it was designed to measure. Seminarians and members of a nontraditional, charismatic Bible study score high on the Quest scale relative to undergraduates and other adults. Quest scale scores have at most a weak negative correlation with measures of intensity of orthodox belief (see Table 6.5). Until at least about age 50, adults do not score noticeably lower on the Quest scale than do undergraduates. Quest scores correlate with religious conflict scores, but they seem to reflect conflict that is part of active seeking, not just troubled doubt and confusion. Thus, not only do we have evidence that this scale is measuring a third dimension of personal religion independent of the means (extrinsic) and end (intrinsic) dimensions, but we also have evidence

that this dimension incorporates aspects of the three basic components of the quest orientation: (1) readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity, (2) self-criticism and perception of religious doubts as positive, and (3) openness to change. (For a more detailed discussion of validity and reliability of the Quest scale, see Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a, b.)

RELATIONSHIP OF THE THREE DIMENSIONS TO RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Having presented our three-dimensional conception of ways of being religious, and having presented evidence for the validity of the Quest scale used to measure the new dimension, we can now consider how these three ways of being religious might relate to the analysis of religious experience presented in Chapter 4. If, as was suggested in Chapter 4, a person's present religious orientation emerges from a process of cognitive restructuring in response to existential questions, then it seems reasonable that different kinds of restructuring would lie behind development along the means, end, and quest dimensions. Speculate with us about the relationships of these three religious dimensions to religious experience.

Some Speculations

First, development along the means (extrinsic) dimension should involve little change in an individual's religious cognitive structures because such development does not require that existential questions be seriously confronted at all. The appearance of religion is important, but only as a means to other ends. Therefore, creative religious experience should not be a prerequisite for relatively high scores on this dimension.

In contrast, development along either the end or quest dimensions should involve religious cognitive restructuring. The structural change for the two dimensions should, however, be very different. Development along the end (intrinsic) dimension seems likely to reflect a dramatic change in the person's reality, the emergence of a new vision. But this new vision may not involve an increase in the complexity and flexibility of the person's religious cognitive structures. To the extent that the end dimension reflects devout "true belief," the new vision is likely to be one that provides clear, final answers, and may even be adhered to in a rigid, absolutistic fashion. The person is likely to believe that he or she now knows the Truth about religion, the Truth that sets one free. There is no need to consider new information or points of view. Restructuring of this kind is only partly creative; it may enable the individual to deal positively with existential questions, but it may also inhibit further development in the way he or she deals with these questions. It may reflect religious growth but restrict the chance for future religious growth.

Development along the quest dimension should also reflect creative cog-

nitive restructuring in the religious domain, but restructuring that is less complete and more open to future change. The new vision is likely to be seen only "through a glass darkly"; there should be less sense of having had *an* experience because tension and a push toward further insight remain. As a result, the new vision should be expansive rather than restricting; it should allow the individual to see existential questions from a variety of perspectives. There should be an interest in and openness to new information and points of view. As Allport suggested when describing the mature religious individual, the open-ended search that characterizes the quest orientation should be "the outgrowth of many successive discriminations and continuous reorganization" (1950, p. 59).

In considering development along each of the three dimensions, it is important to remember that the dimensions are independent and unrelated. Development involves movement in a three-dimensional space, and development along one dimension may or may not be accompanied by development along another dimension. It is, for example, possible for a person to develop along the end (intrinsic) dimension through a dramatic religious experience that floods his or her life with meaning and provides a master motive in life. At the same time, this experience may be viewed critically and seen as only a partial grasp on the Truth—one important step in an ongoing quest. In this case, there would be simultaneous positive movement on both the end and quest dimensions. Alternatively, it is possible for such an experience to be viewed as The Answer, embraced with certainty and foreclosing further inquiry. In this case, there would be positive movement on the end dimension and negative movement on the quest dimension.

Do Means, End, and Quest Religion Form a Developmental Sequence?

Our analysis here is quite different from several recent stage models that have proposed a developmental ordering of the three ways of being religious—means, end, and quest. These models, which are based on treating the three ways of being religious as types rather than independent dimensions, attempt to specify which type is least and which is most mature. For example, Kahoe and Meadow (1981) proposed a means (extrinsic) followed by end (intrinsic) followed by quest developmental sequence. Hood (1985) proposed a means (extrinsic) followed by quest followed by end (intrinsic) sequence, although he noted that Clark (1958) put end (intrinsic) first, followed by means (extrinsic). Soon, we suspect, researchers will have proposed all six of the logical permutations for arranging these three ways of being religious.

We remain skeptical about all attempts to specify a developmental sequence of these three ways of being religious, because we remain skeptical about the practice of typing on which these attempts rest. Moreover, although it may turn out that over the life span there is a typical pattern of movement through the three-dimensional space of ways of being religious,

we know of no good evidence that this is true. To provide good evidence of a typical pattern, it is necessary to conduct longitudinal studies in which the same individuals' scores on all three religious orientation dimensions are measured at a number of points in time. To our knowledge, no such studies have been done.

Hypotheses Based on Our Speculations

In light of our speculations about the way religious experience might relate to development along each of the three dimensions, we wish to propose two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that higher scores on the intrinsic, end dimension will correlate positively with the presence of one or more dramatic and personally definitive religious experiences in a person's life, whereas higher scores on the means and quest dimensions will not. The means dimension might even correlate negatively with such experience. Second, we hypothesize that higher scores on the quest dimension will correlate positively with the presence of relatively complex cognitive structures for dealing with existential questions, whereas higher scores on the means and end dimensions will not. The end dimension might even correlate negatively with complexity in dealing with existential questions because, to the degree that this dimension reflects ready, absolute answers to such questions, higher scores may undercut even the complexity that existed before one "saw the light."

Empirical Evidence

Is there any empirical evidence to support these two hypotheses? Unfortunately, there is little evidence that is even relevant. We know of only three lines of research, one relevant to the first hypothesis and two to the second.

Intrinsic religion and religious experience: Hood. Concerning the first hypothesis, Ralph Hood (1970, 1972; Hood, Morris, & Watson, 1990) has presented data suggesting that individuals who report having had more religious experiences similar to those presented at the beginning of Chapter 4 are more likely to be classified as intrinsic rather than extrinsic using the Allport and Ross scales ($p < .001$). (Hood did not include any measure of the quest dimension in his research.) This finding is quite consistent with our first hypothesis. It should, however, be noted that Hood's results were based on typing of individuals as either intrinsic or extrinsic (or both or neither); therefore, individuals classified as reflecting one orientation not only scored high (above the fiftieth percentile) on that orientation but also scored low (below the fiftieth percentile) on the other. Hood did not report how the Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales themselves related to frequency of religious experience. This omission is regrettable because Hood found little correlation between the Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales, suggesting that they

were measuring two independent dimensions and so should have been considered separately.

Response to crisis in belief: Barron. Turning to our second hypothesis, Frank Barron (1968) reported an interesting study of how people respond to an existential crisis, or, as he called it, a "crisis in belief":

> The crisis in belief is often a time of categorical repudiation or total acceptance, of radical change or of rigid stasis. It is no exaggeration to say that it is a time of the greatest psychological danger, in which the integrity of the self is challenged, and in which old selves die and new selves are born. (p. 148)

Barron conducted intensive interviews twenty-five years after their graduation with fifty alumnae of a college for women. The women selected for interviews had each undergone a period of serious religious doubt and skepticism—a crisis in belief—while in college. Barron did not administer any of the scales for measuring dimensions of individual religion that we have described. Based on his interviews he did, however, make a distinction between three different ways of dealing with the crisis in belief. One response was to reject religion and embrace atheism or agnosticism. A second was to return to traditional religious beliefs. The third response Barron called "believing for oneself"; it involved developing one's own religious beilefs and values through a process of thoughtful, critical reflection. The second response seems to reflect Allport's intrinsic and our end orientation; the third seems to reflect our quest orientation.

Of those employing either the first or second solution to their crisis of belief, Barron observed:

> Speaking as a psychologist, what I find primarily . . . in both these ways of resolving the crisis in belief (i.e, in the atheistic resolution and in the repudiation of a transitory atheism in favor of a return to religion) is an acceptance of emotional polarities as being genuine oppositions which necessitate a choice between them. . . . Essentially what I think we have observed in these crises is not resolution at all, in the sense of establishment of a higher-level integration, but rather perpetuation of the conflict through acceptance of polarities as real, and deferment of the decision to a later point in life. (1968, p. 159)

In contrast, Barron observed that the group that dealt with the crisis by "believing for oneself" seemed to display more ego strength, a personality characteristic he had previously found to be a predictor of creative thinking in response to both intellectual and personal problems. Barron summarized the personality characteristics of members of this group as follows:

> It is noteworthy that in some ways the subjects who hold to a personally evolved religious belief are similar to the group of atheists and agnostics, while in other ways they are distinctly different. The ways in which they are similar are in their relatively high valuation of the thinking processes and of intellectual achievement, and in the absence of ethnocentrism or authoritar-

> ianism in their make-up; the ways in which they are different are in their robust psychological health, their genuine independence, originality, and growth-orientation, and in their relatively high degree of desire for positions of community leadership and status, as contrasted with the degree of social isolation and preference for going-it-alone which marked the radically skeptical group. (1968, p. 168)

Barron's conclusions would appear to be entirely consistent with our suggestion that the more critical, open-ended quest orientation correlates positively with the presence of relatively complex cognitive structures for dealing with religious questions, whereas the end (intrinsic) orientation does not. (Barron did not have a category reflecting a means or extrinsic orientation.) One must be cautious, however, about placing much weight on Barron's conclusions because they are based on highly subjective interviews. Further, the link between his categories of ways of dealing with crises of belief and our end and quest orientations is only inferred; it has not been demonstrated empirically.

Cognitive complexity in the religious domain: Batson and Raynor-Prince. The study with the most direct relevance to our second hypothesis is one by Batson and Raynor-Prince (1983). They administered the six religious orientation scales in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 to thirty-five undergraduates interested in religion, providing a direct measure of the means, end, and quest dimensions (they used an earlier six-item version of the Quest scale). To measure complexity of the cognitive structures for dealing with existential questions, they used a technique similar to that developed by Batson (1971) and described in Chapter 4: The undergraduates wrote paragraphs in response to four sentence stems that presented them with existential conflicts ("When I am trying to decide whether to do something that may be morally wrong . . ."; "When I consider my own death . . ."; "When questions about the purpose of my life arise . . ."; "When someone challenges my beliefs about God . . .").

Each paragraph was scored for cognitive complexity independently by two judges, employing the scoring system for paragraph completions developed by Schroder and his associates (Phares & Schroder, 1969). Then an overall complexity score was obtained by summing the scores for each of the four paragraphs. Higher complexity scores reflected greater differentiation and integration based on six criteria: (1) tolerance of ambiguity and conflict; (2) openness to alternative points of view and to new information; (3) ability to incorporate apparently disparate views within a larger synthetic view; (4) avoidance of compartmentalized, rigid thought; (5) recognition of the fallibility of one's own understanding; and (6) appreciation of the diverse functions served by different points of view. It was not *what* the person believed but the underlying cognitive complexity implied by the response that was scored. To give you some understanding of this scoring procedure, examples of relatively low- and high-complexity responses to two of the sentence stems are presented in Table 6.9.

Table 6.9 Examples of paragraph completion responses indicating low and high complexity in dealing with existential questions

When trying to decide whether to do something that may be morally wrong . . .

. . . it usually bothers me to even think of the bad consequences, but I still go on with it. (Low complexity)

. . . I turn to the Lord for help. Usually if there's a possibility it may be morally wrong I try not to do it. I ask the Lord to give me strength to overcome temptations to do things that I feel are unpleasing in His righteous and just sight. (Low complexity)

. . . I may encounter certain conflicts. It is hard to decide about certain things—if they are worth the danger, if they may be morally wrong. Such as stealing to save a person's life—it could be a tough question. (High complexity)

. . . I give it quite a bit of thought. How I feel about it, how I might feel afterwards, what my true feelings are. Does it hurt anyone else? Can I accept the consequences? Basically, I think about it inside and out. (High complexity)

When I consider my own death . . .

. . . I have no fear. I know some day I will die. And when I do, I know I will have eternity. (Low complexity)

. . . I know there is nothing I can do about it when the time comes. (Low complexity)

. . . I am scared and curious at the same time. It is something to fear, but on the other hand, it is as natural as birth. I feel my fear is only because I'm young and not ready to die, but someday I will accept it and be willing to die. (High complexity)

. . . I am not too concerned. Death is inevitable and natural. It may hold a few surprises but I like surprises. It should be fun to find out, but I'm in no rush. (High complexity)

Source: Adapted from Batson and Raynor-Prince (1983).

Based on our hypothesis about the relationship between the three dimensions of personal religion and the complexity of one's cognitive structures for dealing with existential questions, we would expect that scores on the quest dimension should correlate positively with higher complexity, whereas scores on the other two dimensions should not. Scores on the end dimension might even correlate negatively with complexity.

Column 1 of Table 6.10 presents the correlations between the measures of religious orientation—the six scales and the Means, End, and Quest components—and complexity in dealing with the existential conflicts. As expected, the Quest component correlated significantly in a positive direction ($p < .01$); the End component correlated marginally significantly in a negative direction ($p < .06$); and there was no clear relationship for the Means component. The six religious orientation scales related in a similar way to complexity in dealing with the existential conflicts; there was a positive correlation with the Quest scale and a negative correlation with two scales that load highly on the End component, the Intrinsic and Orthodoxy scales.

For two reasons, it does not seem possible to dismiss these results as being a product of general differences in cognitive complexity. First, the same pattern of effects remained when differences in complexity in dealing with interpersonal conflicts were removed through the use of partial correlations (see Column 2 of Table 6.10). Second, Spilka, Kojetin, and McIntosh (1985) and Watson, Morris, and Hood (1988, 1989a) have presented

Table 6.10 Correlations of six religious orientation scales and the means, end, and quest dimensions with cognitive complexity in dealing with existential questions

Measures of religious orientation	Religious cognitive complexity	Religious cognitive complexity independent of general interpersonal cognitive complexity
Religious orientation scales		
Extrinsic	−.07	.04
Intrinsic	−.25	−.30*
External	−.11	−.11
Internal	−.08	−.13
Quest	.37*	.30*
Orthodoxy	−.41**	−.37*
Religious orientation dimensions		
Religion as means	−.13	−.01
Religion as end	−.27	−.28
Religion as quest	.46**	.37*

Source: Adapted from Batson and Raynor-Prince (1983).
Note: Correlations in first column are partial correlations adjusting for sex differences; correlations in second column are partial correlations adjusting for sex differences and general interpersonal cognitive complexity. $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$, one-tailed.

evidence that the Quest scale is not positively associated with cognitive complexity outside the religious domain.

In sum, the results of this study seem entirely consistent with our second hypothesis, that the quest dimension relates to higher complexity of thought about existential questions, whereas the means (extrinsic) and end (intrinsic) dimensions do not. If anything, the end dimension seems to be associated with reduced complexity in one's thinking about existential questions.

Implications. In Chapter 4 we presented some evidence that higher complexity in dealing with existential questions is the product of religious experiences that involve creative cognitive restructuring, that is, experiences that include elements reflecting stages of the creative process. Now we find that cognitive complexity in dealing with existential questions correlates positively with higher scores on the quest dimension. These relationships suggest that higher scores on the quest dimension reflect a religious development that includes more experiences involving creative cognitive restructuring. In contrast, higher scores on the intrinsic, end dimension may reflect less creative religious development. There is evidence that the end (intrinsic) dimension is associated with dramatic religious experiences that involve cognitive restructuring. But this restructuring is not associated with the increased cognitive complexity that is a hallmark of the creative process. If anything, it seems to be associated with greater reliance on absolutistic answers.

Having noted these possible relationships between the relative creativity of a person's religious experience and development along the various dimensions of personal religion, three points must be emphasized. First and most obviously, more empirical evidence is needed. Second, the inferences drawn from the available evidence are only suggestive. The inference in the previous paragraph concerning the quest dimension was of the following type: A relates to B and B relates to C; therefore, A relates to C. Although such an inference *may* be correct, it is not necessarily so. Therefore, our suggestion that higher scores on the quest dimension reflect more creative religious development, whereas higher scores on the other two dimensions do not, is quite tentative. Rather than a firm conclusion, it is a possibility to be pursued in further research.

Third, even if it turns out that higher scores on the quest dimension relate to more creative religious experience, whereas higher scores on the intrinsic, end dimension relate to less, these relationships should not be considered a basis for acceptance of the quest dimension as a "good" or "true" way to be religious or for indictment of the end (intrinsic) dimension as a "bad" or "false" way to be religious. One must consider not only the origin of these religious dimensions but also their consequences. Even if, for example, those scoring higher on the end dimension display more rigid dependence on orthodox religious answers and less open, critical reflection on existential questions, it is possible that these characteristics are necessary prices one must pay to obtain certain other personal and social benefits that this way of being religious provides. Such a possibility should, of course, be considered empirically, not simply speculated on from our armchairs. Empirical assessment of the personal and social consequences of all three dimensions of personal religion discussed in this chapter—means, end, and quest—is the task that lies before us in Part III of this book.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Are you religious? Answering is difficult because we have suggested that there are at least three distinct ways of being religious—as a means, an end, and a quest. You may be very religious in one or another of these ways but not at all religious in some other.

Our three-dimensional analysis of ways of being religious was proposed to correct an omission in the currently popular two-dimensional analyses of Allport (extrinsic versus intrinsic) and Spilka (consensual versus committed). A re-examination of Allport's earlier and more comprehensive discussion of immature and mature religion revealed that embedded within the concept of mature religion were two distinct and apparently independent dimensions of personal religion—the *end (intrinsic, committed) dimension,* which concerns degree of devout commitment to traditional religious beliefs and practices, and the *quest dimension,* which concerns degree of open-ended, critical struggle with existential questions. Further, we found that Allport's concept of immature religion was not the polar opposite of

either end or quest religion but a third distinct and independent dimension—the *means (extrinsic, consensual) dimension,* which concerns the degree to which one uses religion as a means to other, self-serving ends. Finally, we emphasized that rather than thinking of these ways of being religious as distinct types, it is more appropriate to think of them as three independent continuous dimensions, each uncorrelated with the other two. Together, they provide a three-dimensional framework on which the fabric of religious life is woven. As you religious? A separate and potentially different answer can be given for each of these three dimensions of personal religion.

Turning to the kind of religious experience that lies behind development along each of these three dimensions, we hypothesized, first, that higher scores on the end dimension will be associated with dramatic experiences that involve clear-cut transformations of one's religious reality as one attempts to deal with existential questions, whereas higher scores on the means and quest dimensions will not. These transformations are not, however, likely to increase—they may even reduce—the complexity of the cognitive structures for dealing with existential questions; they may reflect absolutistic and uncritical reliance on traditional, orthodox doctrines and practice. We hypothesized, second, that higher scores on the quest dimension are a result of more creative transformations in one's religious reality, transformations that increase the complexity of the cognitive structures, lead to skepticism of absolute answers, and encourage critical and flexible thinking about existential questions. Although the empirical evidence relevant to these hypotheses is very meager, the evidence that exists supports each.

Many psychologists of religion, following Allport, have assumed that the end (intrinsic) orientation defines "true" religion, at least from a psychological perspective. Our analysis suggests that such a conclusion is premature. Indeed, our analysis may seem to suggest a very different conclusion, that the quest orientation defines true religion. But to draw any conclusion about a true or even better way of being religious would be to misunderstand our analysis. Far from allowing us to identify true religion, our analysis suggests renewed caution about making any evaluative comparisons among the different ways of being religious.

Remember: The different ways that we have identified are independent dimensions, not types. It makes no more sense to ask whether one dimension is best in this three-dimensional space than it does to ask whether depth is best in the three-dimensional space of height, width, and depth. The dimensions are independent, unrelated, and not interchangeable. One can ask which dimension correlates more strongly with some other variable (such as devoutness of belief, cognitive complexity, self-esteem, racial prejudice, or helping behavior), just as one can ask which physical dimension correlates more strongly with some other variable (such as visibility). Whether, however, one considers a stronger correlation good, bad, or indifferent depends entirely on whether one considers the other variable good, bad, or indifferent.

We do well also to remember that both the end and quest dimensions reflect some characteritics of Allport's (1950) concept of mature religion, but neither includes all. Even if intrinsic, end religion restricts one's ability to deal creatively with existential questions, it may still provide other benefits, both to the believer and to society. Indeed, it may provide more benefits than does quest religion. The openness, flexibility, and skepticism that appear to characterize the quest dimension may carry with them a lack of personal direction and peace of mind.

Before we draw any conclusions about which dimensions of individual religion, if any, we wish to promote and develop, we must look at the role of each in the life of the individual. We must judge their psychological value, as William James (1902) said, "by their fruits." This is our task in the next four chapters.