In: C. Daniel Batson, Patricia Schoenrade, W. Larry Ventis (1993). *Religion and the individual. A social-psychological perspective.* New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.. 293-330.

# 9

# *Brothers-and-Sisters or Sheep-and-Goats?*

In the previous two chapters we have considered the effects of religion on the inner life of the individual, on existential anxiety and openness to new information (Chapter 7), and on personal adjustment and mental health (Chapter 8). Now it is time to broaden our focus and consider the effects of religion on reactions to and actions toward other people. Our basic question in this chapter shall be: Does personal religion increase universal love and acceptance of others, especially others who are different from ourselves? Does it enable us to see all people, no matter how alien, as our brothers and sisters? In the next chapter we shall ask: Does personal religion increase concern and caring for others in need?

All major religions preach love and acceptance of others—all others. The acceptance is to be unconditional, not qualified by race, creed, sex, or color. As Tolstoy (1902/1987) put it:

> In all faiths man [used generically] is regarded as equally insignificant before the infinite; they therefore all include the concept of equality between men in the eyes of what is called God. . . . The acceptance of equality between all men is a necessary and fundamental characteristic of all religions. (p. 91)

Christianity in particular prides itself on its vision of universal love: "There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female"—and, we might add, there is no longer black and white—"for all of you are one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. 3:28 NRSV). To the degree that a religion enables its followers to adopt and live such a vision, then it is a very welcome antidote for the hatred, suspicion, stereotyping, and prejudice that poison our world.

One can certainly think of dramatic examples in which this vision seems to have been realized. Think of the many Christians who, at the risk of their own lives and the lives of their children, sheltered Jews from the Nazis during World War II. Why did they do it? In the words of one: "My mother was a model of Christian faith and love of neighbor." And another: "He [my father] taught me to love my neighbor—to consider him my equal whatever his nationality or religion. He taught me especially to be tolerant" (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, pp. 164–165). Think of freedom riders who faced insult, jail, beating, and even death to further racial justice in the southern United States during the early 1960s. Many were clergy, and many others said that religion was an important impetus for their action. Think of Catholic clergy who, at the risk of infection, voluntarily served as guinea pigs to test experimental AIDS vaccines in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

These examples are both heartwarming and encouraging. They suggest that Christianity—and by extension other religions as well—can be a powerful stimulus to loving acceptance of "all God's children." Noted historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1989) calls us to think again:

> As a historian, I confess to a certain amusement when I hear the Judeo-Christian tradition praised as the source of our concern for human rights. In fact, the great religious ages were notable for their indifference to human rights in the contemporary sense. They were notorious not only for acquiescence in poverty, inequality, exploitation, and oppression but for enthusiastic justifications of slavery, persecution, abandonment of small children, torture, genocide.
>
> Religion enshrined and vindicated hierarchy, authority, and inequality and had no compunction about murdering heretics and blasphemers. Till the end of the 18th century, torture was normal investigative procedure in the Roman Catholic church. . . . In Protestant America in the early 19th century, as Larry Hise points out in his book "Pro-Slavery: A History of the Defense of Slavery in America, 1701–1840," men of the cloth "wrote almost half of all the defenses of slavery published in America"; an appendix lists 275 ministers of the Gospel who piously proclaimed the Christian virtue of a system in which one man owned another as private property to be used as he pleased.
>
> Human rights is not a religious idea. It is a secular idea, the product of the last four centuries of Western history. (p. 26)

Clearly, at the same time that we can think of cases in which religion appears as a driving force for universal love, acceptance, and tolerance, we can also think of cases in which it appears as a force for self-righteousness, pious elitism, and cruel, inhuman behavior toward others from different countries, cultures, races, and religions. All too often, it seems, religion functions not as a prophetic voice, calling the faithful to shed their intolerance and bigotry, but as a mighty fortress of ingroup superiority, justifying rejection, oppression, and even destruction of those who are different.

There appears to be a tragic, unintended corollary to knowing that one is among God's elect. If some are the "elect," "sheep," "chosen people," "family of God," then others are the "damned," "goats," "outcasts," "infidels." Far from encouraging universal love and acceptance, such labels are likely to encourage rejection and intolerance. As Robert Brannon (1970) has noted, "Some critics of religion have gone so far as to charge that racial and ethnic intolerance is a natural extension of religious precepts" (p. 42). When one thinks back over the role of religion in Western civilization, as Schlesinger calls us to do, this charge does not seem nearly as extreme as Brannon implies. Examples in which religious institutions and doctrines have encouraged racial and ethnic intolerance come to mind at least as easily as examples in which religion has encouraged acceptance.

Thinking of extreme examples like these certainly sharpens the question of whether personal religion is a force that encourages love, acceptance, and tolerance, or encourages intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry. Yet when addressing so emotionally charged and value-laden a question, extreme examples produce little clarity. If we are to arrive at a meaningful understanding of the role of religion in discouraging or encouraging intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry, then we believe we must depart from William James's maxim of looking at extreme examples and look instead at the social attitudes and behavior of more typical religious individuals. And when we do, we cannot rely on anecdotes; we need objective, empirical evidence.

As it turns out, there is much empirical research concerning the effect of religion on intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry, more than on any other topic in psychology of religion except mental health. When evaluating the research on the religion-prejudice relationship, it is important to keep three points in mind. First, a variety of different measures of intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry have been used. These measures include ethnocentrism (the tendency to be suspicious and rejecting of members of outgroups), racism, anti-Semitism, and what might be called "other prejudice" (i.e., prejudice against any of a number of other ethnic or national groups, such as Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Orientals). Second, the research tends to focus on the relationship between religion and prejudice among white, middle-class Christians in the United States. This is both because of the accessibility of such individuals (most of the researchers have worked in the United States) and because prejudice within this group has been a major social problem over the past five decades.Third, the research is correlational. It does not actually assess the influence of religion on prejudice, only the relationship between the two. Any relationship found could result from the influence of prejudice on religion instead of the influence of religion on prejudice, or it could result from the influence of some third variable on each.

Reviewing the research on the relationship between religion and prejudice, we have come across more than eighty different findings based on over sixty different studies. Paralleling our presentation in Chapter 8, we shall not attempt to consider each of these studies in detail. Instead, we shall summarize the findings in tabular form, including line score tables that report the number of findings suggesting one or another relationship.[1]

## PREJUDICE AND AMOUNT OF RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT

When persons are more religious are they less prejudiced, more prejudiced, or is there no difference? Based on the existing research, an answer is all too clear. In spite of what the religions preach about universal brotherhood, the more religious an individual is, the *more* prejudiced he or she is likely to be. In early studies, for example, Allport and Kramer (1946) found that Protestant and Catholic students were more likely than those with no religious affiliation to be prejudiced against blacks. They also found that strong religious influence in the home correlated positively with racial prejudice. Rosenblith (1949) found a similar trend. In the authoritarian personality research, Adorno and his associates (1950) reported that both authoritarianism and ethnocentrism were higher among church attenders than among nonattenders. Kirkpatrick (1949) found that religious people had more punitive attitudes than nonreligious people toward criminals, delinquents, prostitutes, drug addicts, and those in need of psychiatric treatment. Stouffer (1955) demonstrated that among a representative sample of American church members, those who had attended church within the past month were more intolerant of nonconformists, socialists, and Communists than those who had not attended.

Rather than continue this litany, we refer you to Table 9.1, which summarizes forty-seven different findings relevant to the relationship between one or more of three indices of amount of religious involvement (church membership or attendance, positive attitudes toward religion, and orthodoxy or conservatism of religious beliefs) and one of four types of intolerance or prejudice (ethnocentrism, racial prejudice, anti-Semitism, and other prejudice). These findings were obtained across thirty-eight different studies conducted from 1940 to 1990. Table 9.2 presents a line score of these findings.

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[1] In the development of our summary tables we owe a large debt to Richard Gorsuch and Daniel Aleshire. In 1974, they published an extensive review of research on the religion-prejudice relationship, including several summary tables. We have relied heavily on their review in constructing our tables.

**Table 9.1** Summary of research examining the relationship between prejudice and amount of religious involvement

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Studies using church membership and/or attendance as measure of amount of religious involvement | | | | | |
| a. Using ethnocentrism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Sanford and Levinson (1948) | 1282 white, middle-class adults | California | California Ethnocentrism Scale | Positive | No significance tests reported |
| Rokeach (1960) | 278 college students | Michigan, New York | Ethnocentrism scale | Positive | $p < .05$ |
| Friedrichs (1960) | 280 male college students | New York | Revised Ethnocentrism scale | Positive | $r = .24, p < .01$ |
| Eisinga, Felling, and Peters (1990) | 1190 adults in a national survey | The Netherlands | Agreement with negative stereotypes of ethnic outgroups | Positive | $p < .001$ |
| b. Using racism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Merton (1940) | 522 college students | 5 universities | MacCrone's Negro Prejudice scale | Positive | $p < .05$ in both North and South |
| Turbeville and Hyde (1946) | 212 college students | Louisiana | Attitudes toward Negroes | Positive | No significance tests reported |
| Allport and Kramer (1946) | 437 college students | Northeastern U.S. | Attitudes toward minorities | Positive | $p < .05$; but students who said religion was positive influence on racial attitudes were in less prejudiced half of sample |

**Table 9.1** Summary of research examining the relationship between prejudice and amount of religious involvement (*Continued*)

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rosenblith (1949) | 861 college students | South Dakota | Attitudes toward Negroes and Indians | Positive for Catholics, no relationship for Protestants | $p < .05$ for Catholics; students who said religion was positive influence on attitudes toward minorities were in less prejudiced half of sample |
| Rosenblith (1957) | 239 college women (1952); 256 college students (1954) | Boston area | Attitudes toward Negroes | Positive in 1952 sample; negative in 1954 sample | No significance tests reported |
| Pettigrew (1959) | 78 small-town community residents | Southern U.S. | Anti-Negro scale | Positive | $p < .02$ |
| Pettigrew (1959) | 110 small-town community residents | Northern U.S. | Anti-Negro scale | No relationship | Nonsignificant negative correlation |
| Hadden (1963) | 261 college students | Wisconsin | Racial segregation | Positive | $r = .17, p = .05$ |
| c. Using anti-Semitism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Levinson and Sanford (1944) | 77 college males | California | Anti-Semitism scale | Positive | $p < .01$ |
| Rosenblith (1949) | 861 college students | South Dakota | Anti-Semitism scale | Positive | $p < .05$ |
| Pettigrew (1959) | 78 small-town community residents | Southern U.S. | Anti-Semitism scale | Nonsignificant positive relationship | $p < .18$ |
| Pettigrew (1959) | 110 small-town community residents | Northern U.S. | Anti-Semitism scale | No relationship | Nonsignificant negative correlation |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blum and Mann (1960) | 125 college students | New York | Anti-Semitism scale | Positive | $p < .05$ |
| d. Using other measures of prejudice |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kirkpatrick (1949) | 297 college students; 468 nonstudent adults | Minnesota | Attitudes toward criminals, delinquents, prostitutes, drug addicts, and mental patients | Positive | $p < .05$, comparing conservative versus liberal religious affiliation |
| Stouffer (1955) | 4933 adults | U.S.; national cross-section probability sample | Intolerance of noncomformists (socialists, atheists, Communists) | Positive | $p < .01$ |
| 2. Studies using strength of religious attitudes as measure of amount of religious involvement |  |  |  |  |  |
| a. Using ethnocentrism as measure of prejudice |  |  |  |  |  |
| Friedrichs (1960) | 280 male college students | New York | Revised Ethnocentrism scale | Positive | $r = .32, p < .01$ |
| Siegman (1962) | 43 male college students | University of North Carolina | Ethnocentrism scale | Positive | $r = .34, p < .05$ |
| Bagley (1970) | 200 adults | Holland | Attitudes toward nonwhite immigrants | Positive | No significance tests reported |
| Nias (1972) | 441 11- and 12-year-olds | England | Ethnocentrism factor | Negative | $r = -.36$ for males;<br>$r = -.19$ for females |
| Eisinga, Felling, and Peters (1990) | 1190 adults in a national survey | The Netherlands | Agreement with negative stereotypes of ethnic outgroups | Positive | $r = .25, p < .001$ |
| b. Using racism as measure of prejudice |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sanai (1952) | 250 college students | London | Racial prejudice | Positive | No significance tests reported |

**Table 9.1** Summary of research examining the relationship between prejudice and amount of religious involvement (*Continued*)

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kelly, Ferson, and Holtzman (1958) | 547 undergraduates | Texas | Desegregation scale | Positive | $r = .17, p < .05$ |
| Goldsen et al. (1960) | 2161 Protestants and Catholics | U.S., nationwide; 11 universities | Attitudes toward blacks | Positive | No significance tests reported |
| c. Using anti-Semitism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Evans (1952) | 169 students | Michigan | Anti-Semitism scale | No relationship | $r = -.14$ |
| d. Using other measures of prejudice | | | | | |
| Comrey and Newmeyer (1965) | 212 adults | Los Angeles | Opposition to social change and racial tolerance | Positive | $r = .31; p < .05$ |
| 3. Studies using orthodoxy or conservatism as measure of amount of religious involvement | | | | | |
| a. Using ethnocentrism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Gregory (1957) | 596 students and members of church and civic groups | California | Ethnocentrism scale | Positive | $r = .37, p < .05$ |
| Keedy (1958) | 138 college students | Southern U.S. | Ethnocentrism scale | Positive | $r = .35, p < .05$ |
| b. Using racism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| O'Reilly and O'Reilly (1954) | 212 Catholic students | Southern U.S. | Anti-Negro scale | Positive with orthodoxy | $p < .001$ |
| Garrison (1961) | 81 college women | Georgia | Racial prejudice | Positive with fundamentalism | $r = .53, p < .05$ |
| Salisbury (1962) | 340 students | Southern U.S. | Attitudes toward segregation | Positive | $p < .001$ |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Salisbury (1962) | 180 students | Northeastern U.S. | Attitudes toward segregation | No relationship | Nonsignificant positive correlation |
| Maranell (1967) | 182 college students | Southern U.S. | Anti-Negro scale | Positive with fundamentalism | $p < .05$ |
| Maranell (1967) | 177 college students | Midwestern U.S. | Anti-Negro scale | No clear relationship | |
| c. Using anti-Semitism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| O'Reilly and O'Reilly (1954) | 212 Catholic students | Southern U.S. | Anti-Semitism scale | Positive with orthodoxy | $p < .01$ |
| Maranell (1967) | 182 college students | Southern U.S. | Author-devised Anti-Semitism scale | Positive with fundamentalism | $p < .05$ |
| Maranell (1967) | 177 college students | Midwestern U.S. | Author-devised Anti-Semitism scale | No clear relationship | |
| Selznick and Steinberg (1969) | 1093 white adults | U.S., nationwide | Anti-Semitism scale | Positive with conservatism of belief | $p < .05$ |
| Kersten (1970) | 886 Lutheran laymen | Detroit | Anti-Semitism scale | Positive with conservatism of belief | $p < .01$ |
| d. Using other measures of prejudice | | | | | |
| Photiadis and Biggar (1962) | 300 church members | South Dakota | Bogardus Social Distance scale | No clear relationship | |
| Whitam (1962) | 101 adults | Indiana | Westie Social Distance scale | Positive with fundamentalism | $p < .05$ |
| Strommen (1967) | 2609 Lutheran youth | U.S., nationwide | Generalized prejudice scale | Negative with orthodoxy | $r = -.42, p < .01$ |
| Gorsuch and McFarland (1972) | 84 introductory psychology students | Nashville, Tenn. | General prejudice scale | Positive with fundamentalism | $r = .32, p < .05$ |
| Johnson (1987) | 371 adults in phone survey | "Middletown" (Muncie, Indiana) | Intolerance of person with AIDS at school and work | Positive with fundamentalism | $p < .01$ |

*Source:* Table based in part on Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974).

**Table 9.2** Line score on research examining the relationship between prejudice and amount of religious involvement

| | Index of religious involvement | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Membership or attendance | | | Religious attitudes | | | Orthodoxy or conservatism | | | Total | | |
| Index of prejudice | + | ? | − | + | ? | − | + | ? | − | + | ? | − |
| Ethnocentrism | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 1 |
| Racism | 6 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 13 | 4 | 0 |
| Anti-Semitism | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 0 |
| Other measures | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 16 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 4 | 1 | 37 | 8 | 2 |

*Note:* Column entries in the table indicate, first, the number of reports of a positive relationship between prejudice and amount of religious involvement (+); second, the number of reports of no relationship (?); and third, the number of reports of a negative relationship (−).

As was true for the studies on religion and mental health reviewed in Chapter 8, the uneven quality of research methods in the studies summarized in Table 9.1 precludes a formal meta-analysis, but one is not necessary to determine the direction of the relationship. All it takes is a brief look at Table 9.2 to see that the score is very lopsided. Overall, thirty-seven of the forty-seven findings show a positive relationship between amount of religious involvement and amount of prejudice. Eight findings show no clear relationship; most of these were conducted in the northern United States. Only two findings indicate a negative relationship; one of these tested preadolescents, and the other tested preadolescents and adolescents. Comparing either the columns or the rows in Table 9.2, one can see that the pattern of results is highly consistent regardless of how religion or prejudice is measured. The pattern is also highly consistent over the years.

If one were to compute the probability of obtaining evidence this strong for a positive relationship between being more religious and being more prejudiced when such a relationship really did not exist, it would not be noticeably different from your chances of winning the New York State lottery—provided that you never entered! The relationship can be taken as a fact. We seem to be presented with a clear, if unsettling, conclusion: At least among white, middle-class Christians in the United States, *religion is not associated with increased love and acceptance but with increased intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry.*

## PREJUDICE AND DIFFERENT WAYS OF BEING RELIGIOUS: THE EXTRINSIC-INTRINSIC DISTINCTION

You can well imagine the consternation among religious leaders as the evidence for a positive correlation between religion and prejudice began to pile up. Actually, the consternation was short-lived because several social psychologists pointed out a basic flaw in these studies, the inappropriateness of lumping together all white, middle-class people who identified themselves as Christians. Indeed, the early findings of a positive correlation between religion and prejudice were an important impetus for Gordon Allport and others to argue that it is not enough to measure whether or even to what degree a person is involved in religion; it is also necessary to measure how the person is religious.

In Chapter 6 we considered Allport's (1950) early distinction between immature and mature religion and his later distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religion. We also noted the distinction made by Adorno et al. (1950) between neutralized religion and taking religion seriously and Spilka's distinction between consensual and committed religion (Allen & Spilka, 1967). Each of these conceptions suggests two different ways of being religious, one in which religion is used as an extrinsic means to reach self-serving ends, another in which religion is taken seriously as an intrinsic end in itself. Allport, Adorno, and Spilka each insist that some such distinction is essential to understand the relationship between religion and prejudice; they claim that although extrinsic, means religion may encourage prejudice, intrinsic, end religion does not. In Allport's (1966) words: "Both prejudice and religion are subjective formulations within the personal life. One of these formulations (the extrinsic) is entirely compatible with prejudice; the other (the intrinsic) rules out enmity, contempt, and bigotry" (p. 456).

Are Allport, Adorno, and Spilka right? To find out, it is necessary, first, to have some way of identifying extrinsic versus intrinsic religion. As we noted in Chapter 6, the most popular strategy has been to type individuals as extrinsic or intrinsic based on scores on the Allport and Ross (1967) Religious Orientation scale (or on some similar instrument). But another strategy has also been used. Gorsuch and McFarland (1972) noted that a fairly reliable index of the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religion can be obtained simply by asking people about the frequency of their involvement in religious activities. Individuals who are more religious in either an extrinsic or intrinsic way should, by definition, be more involved in religious activities than nonreligious individuals. But the extrinsically religious should limit their involvement to a moderate level because for them religion is subsumed under other, more important values and goals. The intrinsically religious, on the other hand, should be highly involved in religious activities because for them religion is the master motive in life. Consistent with this reasoning, among religious individuals more involvement is highly positively correlated with scores on Allport's Intrinsic scale but not with scores on his Extrinsic scale (Donahue, 1985; Gorsuch & McFarland, 1972).

This reasoning and evidence suggest a relatively simple, if somewhat crude, index of whether an individual is extrinsically or intrinsically religious—whether the individual is moderately or highly involved in religious activities. Accordingly, a number of researchers have compared three levels of involvement in religious activities: no or low involvement (e.g., less than four times a year), moderate involvement (e.g., less than weekly), and high involvement (e.g., at least weekly). These three levels have been assumed to identify the nonreligious, extrinsically religious, and intrinsically religious, respectively.

Equipped with these two ways of identifying extrinsic versus intrinsic religion, we can turn to the empirical research on the association between these different ways of being religious and prejudice. Table 9.3 summarizes forty-one findings obtained across thirty-two different studies conducted between 1949 and 1990. The first part of the table reports fourteen findings from twelve studies that used some form of questionnaire or interview data to classify religious individuals as extrinsic or intrinsic. The second part reports twenty-seven findings from twenty-three studies in which religious orientation was assessed by amount of religious activity broken either into low (L), moderate (M), and high (H), or into moderate (M) and high (H). A line score of findings is presented in Table 9.4.

Once again, the pattern of results across the studies is extremely clear, even clearer than it was for the relationship between amount of religious involvement and prejudice. As predicted by Allport and others, the way one is religious seems to make a great difference; individuals classified as intrinsically religious are consistently found to be less prejudiced than those classified as extrinsically religious. In all fourteen findings in the first three columns of Table 9.4, those classified as intrinsic scored lower on prejudice, however measured, than those classified as extrinsic. In twenty-five of the twenty-seven findings in the next three columns, those highly involved in religious activities scored lower on prejudice, however measured, than those only moderately involved.

Treating the extrinsic versus intrinsic distinction and the moderate versus high distinction as two different ways to compare the extrinsic and intrinsic orientations, we find that people classified as intrinsic scored lower on prejudice than people classified as extrinsic in thirty-nine of forty-one comparisons based on the results of thirty-two different studies. Moreover, one of the two studies that found no difference assessed attitudes toward political issues concerning minority rights, not prejudice (Rokeach, 1969b). The other assessed racial attitudes of white Catholics in the Florida panhandle who had recently migrated from northern United States and were members of an integrated church (Liu, 1961). Self-selection as a member of an integrated church in the Deep South could easily account for the lack of difference in this study. Overall, it is difficult to conceive of obtaining stronger evidence that the way one is religious affects the religion-prejudice relationship.

It seems clear that the earlier conclusion about a positive relationship between religious involvement and prejudice needs to be revised. Apparently, in studies measuring amount of involvement, the relatively low prejudice of the intrinsically religious minority was masked by the high prejudice of the extrinsically religious majority. When these different ways of being religious are taken into account, the more appropriate conclusion seems to be: *Although the extrinsically religious are high in intolerance and prejudice, the intrinsically religious are relatively low.*

**Table 9.3** Summary of research examining the relationship between prejudice and extrinsic versus intrinsic religion

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Studies using extrinsic (E) versus intrinsic (I) orientation (or related measure) to measure quality of religious involvement | | | | | |
| a. Using athnocentrism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Adorno et al. (1950) | 268 men, women, and students | U.S., West Coast | Ethnocentrism scale | E > I | No significance tests reported; using serious versus neutralized religion classification |
| b. Using racism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Feagin (1964) | 286 Southern Baptist church members | Texas and Oklahoma | Anti-Negro scale | E > I | $p < .001$ |
| Allen and Spilka (1967) | 497 college students | Colorado | Intolerance for national, ethnic or racial groups | E > I | $p < .01$; using committed versus consensual classification |
| Allport and Ross (1967) | 309 church members | U.S., North and South | Anti-Negro scale | E > I | $p < .01$ |
| Brannon (1970) | 81 church members | Atlanta | Leaving integrating church | E > I | $p < .05$ |
| Gray and Revelle (1974) | 125 college students | Pennsylvania | 10 scales measuring racial attitudes | E > I | Extrinsic religion correlated with prejudice, $p < .05$; intrinsic not correlated |
| Johnson (1977) | 1040 heads of households | North Central Illinois | Racial Intolerance; Social Distance | E > I | $p < .001$; intrinsic measured by religious importance scale |
| c. Using anti-Semitism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford (1945) | 76 female students | California | Anti-Semitism scale | E > I | No significance tests reported; deep versus utilitarian religion classification |

**Table 9.3** Summary of research examining the relationship between prejudice and extrinsic versus intrinsic religion (*Continued*)

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wilson (1960) | 207 adults and college students | Boston | Anti-Semitism scale | E > I | $p < .001$; extrinsic religion correlated .66 with prejudice |
| Allport and Ross (1967) | 309 church members | U.S., North and South | Anti-Jewish scale | E > I | $p < .05$ |
| d. Using other measures of prejudice | | | | | |
| Allport (1954) | 77 church members | Northeastern U.S. | General prejudice measure | E > I | No significance tests reported; institutional versus devout religion classification |
| Photiadis and Biggar (1962) | 300 church members | South Dakota | Bogardus Social Distance scale | E > I | $p < .01$ |
| Allport and Ross (1967) | 309 church members | U.S., North and South | Anti-Other scale; indirect prejudice measures | E > I | $p < .05$ |
| Tate and Miller (1971) | 97 United Methodist adults | U.S., nationwide | Rating value of equality | E > I | Difference not statistically reliable |
| 2. Studies using differentiated assessment of amount of religious activity (L = low—usually less than 4 times a year; M = moderate—usually less than weekly; H = high—usually at least weekly) to measure quality of religious involvement | | | | | |
| a. Using ethnocentrism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Sanford (1950) | 123 college females | California | Ethnocentrism scale | M > H > L | No significance tests reported |
| Shinert and Ford (1958) | 327 Catholic students | Unspecified | Ethnocentrism scale | M > H | $p < .01$ |
| Eisinga, Felling, and Peters (1990) | 1190 adults in a national survey | The Netherlands | Agreement with negative stereotypes of ethnic outgroups | M > H > L | Only extremes differed reliably by a Scheffé test ($p < .05$) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| b. Using racism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Kelley, Ferson, and Holtzman (1958) | 547 college students | Texas | Attitudes toward desegregation | M > H, L | $p < .05$ |
| Friedrichs (1959) | 112 residents of white, upper-middle-class suburb | New Jersey | Attitudes toward residential and school desegregation | M > L > H | No significance tests reported |
| Young, Benson, and Holtzman (1960) | 497 college students | Texas | Attitudes toward desegregation | M > H, L | $p < .05$ |
| Liu (1961) | 196 white Catholics from integrated church | Florida | Racial Attitude scale | No significant relationship | |
| Lenski (1963) | 481 adults | Detroit | Pro or con school integration | M > H | $p < .05$ |
| Ragan (1963) | 266 white Methodist church members | Los Angeles | Attitude toward Negro residential proximity | M > H | $p < .05$ |
| Williams (1964) | 950 white non-Jewish adults | Ohio, Georgia, and California | Attitudes toward Negroes | M > L > H | True of data as whole, but for Georgia group, M > L, H |
| Allport and Ross (1967) | 309 church members | U.S., North and South | Anti-Negro scale | M > H, L | No significance test reported |
| Young, Clore, and Holtzman (1968) | 578 college students | Texas | Attitudes toward desegregation | M > H > L | $p < .01$ |
| Rokeach (1969b) | 1400 adults in nationwide probability sample | U.S. | 14 items measuring attitudes toward minority rights | M, H > L | This pattern was observed for all items; it was statistically reliable for 8 |

**Table 9.3** Summary of research examining the relationship between prejudice and extrinsic versus intrinsic religion (*Continued*)

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hoge and Carroll (1973) | 858 United Methodist and Presbyterian church members | Philadelphia (N = 515); Atlanta (N = 343) | Antiblack scale | M > H, L | $p < .05$ |
| Johnson (1977) | 1040 heads of households | North Central Illinois | Racial Intolerance scale; Social Distance | M > H | $p < .05$ for racial intolerance; nonsignificant trend for social distance |
| c. Using anti-Semitism as measure of prejudice | | | | | |
| Parry (1949) | 612 community residents | Denver | Franzen Anti-Semitism Scale | M > H | $p < .03$ |
| Sanford (1950) | 123 college females | California | Anti-Semitism scale | M > H > L | $p < .05$ |
| Williams (1964) | 337 white non-Jewish adults | Georgia | Attitudes toward Jews | M > H > L | No significance test reported |
| Allport and Ross (1967) | 309 church members | U.S., North and South | Anti-Jewish scale | M > H, L | No significance test reported |
| Kersten (1970) | 886 Lutheran laymen | Detroit | Anti-Semitism scale | L, M > H | $p < .05$ |
| Hoge and Carroll (1973) | 858 United Methodist and Presbyterian church members | Philadelphia (N = 515); Atlanta (N = 343) | Anti-Semitism scale | M > H, L | $p < .05$ |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| d. Using other measures of prejudice |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rosenblum (1958) | 54 Presbyterian, 64 Episcopalian and 54 Jewish middle-class adults | California | Prejudice scale | L, M > H | $p < .01$ |
| Photiadis and Biggar (1962) | 300 church members | South Dakota | Bogardus Social Distance scale | M > H | $p < .01$ |
| Struening (1963) | 911 university faculty and staff | Midwest | Prejudice scale | M > L, H | $p < .01$ |
| Bagley (1970) | 1400 adults | England and Wales | Attitudes toward immigrants, ethnic groups | M, L > H | $p < .01$ |
| Campbell (1971) | 2945 white adults | 15 U.S. cities | General prejudice items | M > H, L | No significance tests reported |
| King and Hunt (1972) | 1356 church members | Dallas area | Generalized prejudice | M > H | $r = .14, p < .05$. Measure of church attendance compiled from 7 attitude items |

*Source:* Table based in part on Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974).

**Table 9.4** Line score on research examining the relationship between prejudice and extrinsic versus intrinsic religion

| | Index of religious orientation | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Extrinsic vs. intrinsic | | | Moderate vs. high | | | | | |
| Index of prejudice | $E < I$ | $E = I$ | $E > I$ | $M < H$ | $M = H$ | $M > H$ | Total | | |
| Ethnocentrism | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Racism | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 16 |
| Anti-Semitism | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| Other measures | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Total | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 2 | 25 | 0 | 2 | 39 |

*Note:* Column entries in the table indicate, first, the number of reports that $E < I$ (extrinsic less prejudiced than intrinsic) or $M < H$ (moderate attenders less prejudiced than high attenders); second, the number of reports of no difference; and third, the number of reports that $E > I$ or $M > H$.

This revised conclusion has been and continues to be widely accepted and popular among psychologists of religion. We have already heard Allport's (1966) claim that extrinsic religion "is entirely compatible with prejudice," whereas intrinsic religion "rules out enmity, contempt, and bigotry" (p. 456). Similarly, Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974), after an extensive review of research up to the early 1970s concerning the relationship between religion and prejudice, concluded:

> The extrinsically-oriented person, i.e., one who supports religion for what he can get from it, tends to be prejudiced. On the other hand, a person who is intrinsically committed to his religious position, i.e., supports religion for the sake of religion itself, . . . tends to be less prejudiced. (p. 284)

In recent years, Donahue (1985), Spilka, Hood, and Gorsuch (1985), and Gorsuch (1988) have continued to affirm this highly popular revised conclusion. For example, Gorsuch (1988) succinctly states: "Those with an intrinsic orientation towards religion are relatively unprejudiced, whereas those with an extrinsic view are relatively prejudiced" (p. 212).

The question of the relationship between religion and prejudice seems to be neatly answered. Although being more religious correlates with being more intolerant and prejudiced, this is true only among those who have emasculated the more profound claims of their religion and are using it as an extrinsic means to self-serving ends. Those who take their religion seriously, dealing with it as an intrinsic end in itself, are not more intolerant. Even though there is no clear evidence that the intrinsically religious are less prejudiced than individuals not involved in religion at all—in the first part of Table 9.3, correlations of the Intrinsic scale with the prejudice measures are often close to zero; in the second part, high attenders are rarely less prejudiced than low—there is at least no clear evidence that they are more so. And they certainly appear less prejudiced than the large segment of the population that is involved in religion in a nominal, extrinsic way. Intrinsic religion may not actually be the depressant of intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry that Allport (1966) claimed, but at least it does not seem to be the stimulant that extrinsic religion is.

## DOUBTS

Perhaps because this revised conclusion regarding the religion-prejudice relationship has been far more satisfying to researchers interested in religion than was the original conclusion, it has seldom been questioned. We believe, however, that it should be. We have doubts both about the adequacy of the assessment of prejudice in the research summarized in Table 9.3 and about the adequacy of the assessment of extrinsic and intrinsic religion. Let us explain.

### THE PROBLEM OF SELF-PRESENTATION WHEN USING OVERT, QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES OF PREJUDICE

Concerning the assessment of prejudice, we worry about self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Presenting oneself as prejudiced or as a bigot is something that most people in the mainstream of contemporary society wish to avoid. There are side eddies of society where prejudice against certain groups is still overtly encouraged (e.g., against Jews among members of the American Nazi Party or against blacks among members of the Ku Klux Klan), but these are increasingly rare. To the extent that a person wishes to be seen as unprejudiced, we might expect this wish to affect his or her responses to interview questions or questionnaire items concerning prejudice. Consistent with this expectation, a number of social-psychological studies have provided evidence that individuals in contemporary American society show a strong tendency to adjust their responses when answering questions about prejudice; they attempt to appear less prejudiced than they actually are (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Sigall & Page, 1971; Silverman, 1974).

Evidence of this desire to present oneself as relatively free of prejudice raises serious doubts about the validity of the assessment of prejudice in the studies summarized in Table 9.3. In all but one of the studies summarized (the one exception is a study by Brannon, which we shall consider in more detail shortly), prejudice was measured by questionnaire, and the prejudice questionnaires tend to be quite transparent. Although none directly asks, "Are you a racist bigot?", many come close.

**Transparency of prejudice questionnaires.** To illustrate our concern, let us ask you to read the three hypothetical situations in Table 9.5 and imagine your responses to the questions posed. These situations and questions are from the prejudice questionnaires used in the classic study of religious orientation and prejudice by Allport and Ross (1967) and were described by them as "subtly worded." In spite of this description, we suspect that you had no difficulty identifying the low-prejudice responses. Similarly, we sus-

**Table 9.5** Sample items from the Harding and Schuman Prejudice scale used by Allport and Ross (1967) as a subtle measure of prejudice

1. A Negro girl who had just got a job in San Francisco was looking for a place to live in an all-white neighborhood. She went to see several people who had advertised rooms for rent, but all of them suggested she find a room in a Negro neighborhood instead. They were always pleasant to her, but said that renting to her would make it hard for them to rent their other rooms. Finally she found a landlady in the white neighborhood, Mrs. Williamson, who agreed to take her.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. If you had been Mrs. Williamson, would you have rented to the Negro girl? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |
| b. Should the other landladies in the neighborhood have been willing to rent to the Negro girl? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |
| c. Is it unfair to the white roomers to let a Negro move in? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |

2. In a large Western city there has been for many years an informal group called the Businessmen's Luncheon Club. None of the members is Jewish. Recently one of the members proposed they add to the group a Jew who was head buyer for one of the larger clothing stores. A majority of the members voted against this. The president of the club said: "I think Mr. Rothman is a fine person, but I don't think we should add him to the Luncheon Club. This has always been a small, closely knit private group; and if we took in Mr. Rothman we would soon need to admit every Jewish business man in town who wanted to join."

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. If you had been a member of the club, would you have objected to the president's statement? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |
| b. If the club does admit Jewish members, should it be a little more careful in picking them than in picking non-Jews? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |
| c. Should business and professional clubs admit members without paying attention to whether the new members are Jewish? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |

3. Mr. Ramirez, a Puerto Rican, was looking for an apartment in a New York City suburb. He went into a real estate office which had a list of apartments in the window, and asked about one of the places that was listed. The clerk told him that this apartment was in a private house in a white neighborhood, and the owner would not rent to Puerto Ricans. Also, the white neighbors would probably reject Puerto Ricans and make life unhappy for them. However, he suggested other apartments elsewhere at about the same rent which he thought would be just as satisfactory.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Should the owner of the house be willing to rent to Puerto Ricans, regardless of what the neighbors think? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |
| b. Should there be a law requiring landlords always to rent to the first one applying? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |
| c. Is it better to keep people such as Puerto Ricans in one section of a city, to avoid tensions and trouble? | YES | yes | ? | no | NO |

pect that research respondents—well aware of issues of prejudice and discrimination that have been so prominent over the past several decades—could easily detect the purpose of such questions and, if they wished to present themselves as free from prejudice, mark low-prejudice responses.

There have been attempts in recent years to overcome this self-presentation problem by developing more subtle "modern" or "symbolic" racism scales. Unfortunately, what is being measured by these scales still seems readily apparent, as indicated by the fact that scores on these scales are highly correlated with scores on earlier, blatant racism scales. A typical item from the Modern Racism scale (McConahay, 1986), for example, asks respondents to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights." We suspect modern respondents would have little difficulty detecting what is being measured by such an item and in knowing whether agreement or disagreement would make them look prejudiced. (See Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980, and Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, for further discussion of self-presentation problems with questionnaire measures of prejudice.)

**Self-presentation and intrinsic religion.** Adding to our concerns about the effects of self-presentation on the evidence summarized in Tables 9.3 and 9.4, there are several reasons to believe that individuals classified as intrinsically religious are likely to be more concerned to present themselves as tolerant and unprejudiced than are individuals classified as extrinsic. Let us mention just two of these reasons.

First, in the United States strong agreement with items assessing intrinsic religion (e.g., "I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life") may itself be motivated at least in part by a desire to present oneself in a positive light. This is because both personal religion and living one's beliefs are positively valued in American society. It is less clear that strong agreement with items assessing extrinsic religion (e.g., "Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life") places the respondent in a favorable light. Thus, high scores on the Intrinsic scale may reflect, at least in part, desire for positive self-presentation, whereas high scores on the Extrinsic scale probably do not.

Once again, there is evidence consistent with this suggestion. Several studies have found that individuals who report being highly devout and committed to their religion present themselves especially positively when asked about their behavior in other areas of life (Crandall & Gozali, 1969; Francis, Pearson, & Kay, 1983; McConahay, 1986). More directly relevant, Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) found a moderate positive correlation between scores on the Intrinsic scale and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale ($r = .36, p < .01$). To give you an idea of the kind of item on the Social Desirability scale, the first four are reproduced below. Responses are true or false. Except for reversed items, true responses are taken to reflect a concern to present oneself in a positive, socially desirable light because it is assumed that no one could be as conscientious and thoughtful as the items imply.

1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all candidates.
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
3. (reversed) It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.

Subsequent research (e.g., Watson, Morris, Foster, & Hood, 1986) has also typically found a positive correlation between the Intrinsic scale and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale, although of a lower magnitude than the correlation found by Batson et al. (1978). Based on the research to date, the true correlation between these two scales seems to be around .20. In contrast, correlations of the Extrinsic scale with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale are typically either close to zero or low negative.[2]

Second, as already noted, all major religions in our society condemn prejudice and bigotry. Given that their religious community provides an especially important reference group for the devout, intrinsically religious (Brown, 1987; also see Chapter 7), individuals so classified should be especially motivated to live up to the community's standards by presenting themselves as free from prejudice and bigotry. One way to do so would be to circle the easily discernible "right" responses on a prejudice questionnaire.

**An alternative explanation.** If self-presentation concerns lead individuals classified as intrinsically religious to present themselves as free from prejudice to a greater extent than individuals classified as extrinsic, then the result would be precisely the pattern found in Tables 9.3 and 9.4, *even if*

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[2] Interpretation of the correlation between the Intrinsic and Social Desirability scales has been the subject of some controversy. Watson et al. (1986) suggested that the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (SDS) is not an appropriate measure of social desirability to use with intrinsically religious individuals because "over half of the SDS items have content relevant to religion and religious belief" (p. 228), which "could put the intrinsic . . . subject at a selective disadvantage" (p. 227).

Leak and Fish (1989) have challenged this suggestion on both logical and empirical grounds. Empirically, Leak and Fish found statistically significant ($p < .05$) positive correlations between the Intrinsic scale and both subscales of the Paulhus (1984) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR), an instrument proposed as an improvement on the Marlowe-Crowne and incorporating separate subscales to assess concern for public and private self-presentation. Correlations were .23 for the public Impression Management subscale; .27 for the private Self-Deception subscale; and .30 for the total BIDR. Additionally, Leak and Fish found near-zero correlations between the Intrinsic scale and subject-rated religious relevance of the items of both BIDR subscales, using a rating procedure modeled after that of Watson et al. (1986). Overall, the research to date seems generally consistent with the suggestion that individuals scoring higher on measures of intrinsic religion are more concerned to present themselves in a positive light, especially but not exclusively on issues related to their religious beliefs.

*there were no difference between the groups in prejudice.* The former would appear less prejudiced than the latter. Yet the personal transformation that Allport (1966) and others have claimed is associated with intrinsic religion—and that forms the basis for the highly popular revised conclusion concerning the religion-prejudice relationship—would have reached only to the hand that marks the questionnaire, not to the heart.[3]

## THE PROBLEM OF TYPING RATHER THAN USING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ASSESSMENT OF PERSONAL RELIGION

Concerning the assessment of personal religion, the comparisons in Tables 9.3 and 9.4 are based on Allport's original bipolar conception of extrinsic and intrinsic religion. As you may recall from Chapter 6, Allport originally assumed that these two ways of being religious were mutually exclusive types. To make an extrinsic versus intrinsic comparison, he and other researchers have classified as extrinsic those individuals who scored above the median of the sample on the Extrinsic scale and below the median on the Intrinsic scale. Conversely, they have classified as intrinsic those individuals who scored below the median on the Extrinsic scale and above the median on the Intrinsic scale. But, as you may also recall, this assumption of mutually exclusive types ran into problems early on, when Allport and Ross (1967) found that the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales were not measuring opposite ends of the same continuum, as had been assumed, but were measuring two independent dimensions of personal religion.

If scores on the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales are uncorrelated, as they are in most samples, the extrinsic versus intrinsic classification involves an inappropriate confounding of the two dimensions. Attributes associated

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[3] When one begins to entertain the possibility that the relationship between intrinsic religion and low prejudice could be an artifact of self-presentation, one discovers that there are a number of pieces of evidence consistent with it. First, in the classic and frequently cited study by Allport and Ross (1967), there were actually wide differences in the relationship between the intrinsic-extrinsic classification and prejudice across the six different church groups studied (Baptists and Catholics from Massachusetts, Lutherans from New York, Methodists from Tennessee, Nazarenes from South Carolina, and Presbyterians from Pennsylvania). Considering only racial prejudice, correlations between prejudice and being classified as intrinsic rather than extrinsic ranged from −.39 for the Massachusetts Baptists to +.24 for the Tennessee Methodists. That is, for the latter group there was a marginally significant tendency for those classified as intrinsic to score *higher* on the prejudice measure than those classified as extrinsic. A nonsignificant positive correlation (.12) was also found for the Pennsylvania Presbyterians.

This wide variation between regional and denominational groups is hard to explain if one assumes that intrinsic religion leads to reduced prejudice. But it is easy to explain if one assumes that the different church groups had different norms for desirable responses and that members of these groups were conforming to these norms. Expression of devout religion and little prejudice might have been desirable among the Baptist, Catholic, and Nazarene samples; in contrast, those members of the Methodist and Presbyterian samples who were more educated and so more likely to be concerned about displaying nonprejudicial attitudes might also have been concerned to present themselves as not unduly fanatical and pious in their orientation to religion.

Evidence for the effect of religious group norms on the religion-prejudice relationship is even clearer in a study by Strickland and Weddell (1972). They administered Allport and Ross's with extrinsic religion, such as relatively high prejudice, might be a result either of the people classified as extrinsic scoring relatively high on the Extrinsic scale or of these people scoring relatively low on the Intrinsic scale. Attributes associated with intrinsic religion, such as relatively low prejudice, might be a result either of the people classified as intrinsic scoring relatively high on the Intrinsic scale or of these people scoring relatively low on the Extrinsic scale.

Rather than a bipolar classification into extrinsic versus intrinsic, we recommend measuring different ways of being religious through use of the three-dimensional model presented in Chapter 6. This model includes two independent dimensions, means and end, that correspond conceptually to Allport's (1966) extrinsic and intrinsic orientations (and are measured principally by the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales); it also includes a third dimension, independent of either of the other two, the quest dimension (measured principally by the Quest scale). This third dimension concerns the degree to which the individual seeks to face religious issues—such as issues of personal mortality or meaning in life—in all their complexity, while at the same time resisting clear-cut, pat answers.

## A NEW LOOK AT THE RELIGION-PREJUDICE RELATIONSHIP USING NEW RESEARCH STRATEGIES

These doubts about the revised conclusion concerning the religion-prejudice relationship surfaced in the late 1970s. Since then, several researchers have used one of two different strategies to take a new look at the relationship between prejudice and different ways of being religious. One strategy still involves using questionnaires to assess prejudice, but assessing prejudice that the respondents' religious community does not clearly proscribe or condemn, such as prejudice against nonwhites by Afrikaners in South Africa or prejudice against homosexuals or Communists by members of mainline churches in the United States. The second strategy involves assessing a religiously proscribed prejudice, such as racial prejudice by members

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Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales and a sixty-item form of the Multifactor Racial Attitude Inventory (Woodmansee & Cook, 1967) to forty-seven Baptists and forty-six Unitarians in suburban Atlanta. For the Baptist sample they found, as Allport and Ross had found, that individuals classified as intrinsic were less prejudiced than either those classified as extrinsic or as indiscriminantly proreligious. But they found that the Unitarians, over 80 percent of whom were classified as extrinsic, were significantly less prejudiced than the Baptists ($p < .005$). Once again, these results are not consistent with the view that intrinsic religion leads to reduced prejudice, but they are entirely consistent with the view that different group norms lead to different patterns of socially desirable responses and respondents present themselves accordingly. Among Unitarians the most socially desirable pattern would likely involve appearing relatively independent of traditional religion and opposing zealous piety or fanaticism; at the same time, it would involve placing high value on liberal social views, including an abhorrence of racial prejudice and discrimination. Among Baptists, on the other hand, the most socially desirable pattern would likely be to place high value on religious devotion and orthodoxy and, by the mid-1960s, to show at least moderate support for racial tolerance as well.

of mainline churches in the United States, but doing so using covert, behavioral measures of prejudice, not questionnaires. Although relatively few studies of each type have been conducted, the results are, once again, remarkably consistent.

### QUESTIONNAIRE MEASUREMENT OF PREJUDICES NOT CLEARLY PROSCRIBED

To organize the available evidence on the relationship between the three different religious dimensions and prejudice when the prejudice is not clearly proscribed by the respondents' religious community, we have constructed a separate summary table for each of the three dimensions, as well as a line score table that presents in one place the pattern of findings for each of the three dimensions. Table 9.6 summarizes eight findings from five different studies using a questionnaire to assess the relationship of the extrinsic, means dimension to some nonproscribed prejudice; Table 9.7 summarizes nine findings from six studies of the intrinsic, end dimension; and Table 9.8 summarizes seven findings from five studies of the quest dimension. Note that most studies appear in all three tables; in all, only six different studies are reviewed.

Table 9.9 presents the line score for the twenty-four findings obtained in these six different studies. A plus sign in Table 9.9 denotes a positive relationship between a given dimension of personal religion and some measure of nonproscribed prejudice; a minus sign denotes a negative relationship; and a question mark, no clear relationship. The nonproscribed prejudices assessed include prejudice against Rastafarians by Seventh-Day Adventists in the Virgin Islands (Griffin, Gorsuch, & Davis, 1987); prejudice against homosexuals by university students in the United States (Herek, 1987); prejudice against homosexuals and Communists by undergraduate and adult members of mainline churches in the United States (McFarland, 1989, 1990a); social distance from various ethnic minorities among university students in Venezuela (Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988); and social distance from nonwhites among Afrikaners (Snook & Gorsuch, 1985).

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Additional evidence for the effect of group norms on the religion-prejudice relationship is provided by a study done by Friedrichs (1971; see also Johnson, 1977). In his 1959 study of attitudes toward open housing in suburban New Jersey, Friedrichs had found that church members were more prejudiced than nonmembers and that moderate attenders were more prejudiced than either frequent attenders or infrequent attenders. In a follow-up study six years later, however, after vigorous efforts by local clergy and others in the community to counteract prejudice among the churchgoers, he found quite different results. Church members were now less prejudiced than nonmembers, and moderate attenders were less prejudiced than either frequent or infrequent attenders. Friedrichs concluded, "There is not an inevitable correlation between church-going and prejudice: Where tolerant attitudes on specific issues are made clear norms for church-goers, church-goers expressed these norms to interviewers" (1971, p. 154). Of course, we may wonder whether respondents' assurances to an interviewer that they would not object to a black family moving into their neighborhood reflected their true attitude or what they had learned was the right response. It seems likely that the church members, especially moderate attenders, became aware of the "wrongness" of their earlier responses, and in the follow-up study were careful to get the answers right.

**Table 9.6** Summary of research examining the relationship between nonproscribed prejudice and the extrinsic, means dimension

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Griffin, Gorsuch, and Davis (1987) | 190 West Indian black attenders of Seventh-Day Adventist church (English speaking) | St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands | Ratings of vignettes disallowing basic constitutional and human rights to Rastafarians | Extrinsic scale not related to prejudice against Rastafarians ($r = -.01$) |
| Herek (1987) | 126 white (non-Hispanic) students at four U.S. universities | California; Milwaukee; Boston | Adapted Symbolic Racism scale; Attitudes Toward Lesbians scale; Attitudes Toward Gay Men scale | Extrinsic scale correlated positively with racial prejudice ($r = .24$, $p < .01$) but not related to prejudice against lesbians ($r = -.06$) or gay men ($r = -.07$) |
| Ponton and Gorsuch (1988) | 275 university students (Spanish speaking) | Caracus, Venezuela | Culturally adapted version of Bogardus Social Distance scale, measuring preferred social distance from 8 ethnic groups (Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Americans, Colombians, Peruvians, and Chileans) | Extrinsic scale correlated positively with preferred social distance when correlations with religious affiliation, parents' nationality, and SES were partialed out ($p < .05$) |
| McFarland (1989) | 173 white undergraduates with at least a moderate interest in religion | Western Kentucky University | Scales measuring discriminatory attitudes toward blacks, women, homosexuals, and Communists | Extrinsic scale correlated positively with discriminatory attitudes toward blacks ($p < .02$); not reliably related to discriminatory attitudes toward other 3 groups |
| McFarland (1990a) | 470 active adult Christians (ages from 20s to 60s) | Kentucky and Tennessee | Scales measuring discriminatory attitudes toward blacks, women, homosexuals, and Communists | Extrinsic scale not reliably related to discriminatory attitudes toward any of the 4 groups |

**Table 9.7** Summary of research examining the relationship between nonproscribed prejudice and the intrinsic, end dimension

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Snook and Gorsuch (1985) | 94 Afrikaner and 135 English high school students | South Africa | Modified version of Spangenberg and Nel Social Distance scale | Batson Internal scale correlated positively with preferred social distance from nonwhites among Afrikaners ($r = .21$, $p < .05$); no relation among English |
| Griffin, Gorsuch, and Davis (1987) | 190 West Indian black attenders of Seventh-Day Adventist Church (English speaking) | St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands | Ratings of vignettes disallowing basic constitutional and human rights to Rastafarians | Intrinsic scale correlated positively with prejudice against Rastafarians ($r = .23$, $p < .01$) |
| Herek (1987) | 126 white (non-Hispanic students) at four U.S. universities | California; Milwaukee; Boston | Adapted Symbolic Racism scale; Attitudes Toward Lesbians scale; Attitudes Toward Gay Men scale | Intrinsic scale not related to racial prejudice but was positively correlated with prejudice against lesbians ($r = .24$, $p < .01$) and gay men ($r = .18$, $p < .05$) |
| Ponton and Gorsuch (1988) | 275 university students (Spanish speaking) | Caracas, Venezuela | Culturally adapted version of Bogardus Social Distance scale, measuring preferred social distance from 8 ethnic groups (Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Americans, Colombians, Peruvians, and Chileans) | Intrinsic scale correlated negatively with preferred social distance when correlations with religious affiliation, parents' nationality, and SES were partialed out ($p < .01$) |
| McFarland (1989) | 173 white undergraduates with at least a moderate interest in religion | Western Kentucky University | Scales measuring discriminatory attitudes toward blacks, women, homosexuals, and Communists | Intrinsic scale not reliably related to discriminatory attitudes toward blacks and women, but positively correlated with discriminatory attitudes toward homosexuals and Communists ($p < .05$) |
| McFarland (1990a) | 470 active adult Christians (ages from 20s to 60s) | Kentucky and Tennessee | Scales measuring discriminatory attitudes toward blacks, women, homosexuals, and Communists | Intrinsic scale not reliably related to discriminatory attitudes toward blacks and women, but positively correlated with discriminatory attitudes toward homosexuals and Communists ($p < .01$) |

**Table 9.8** Summary of research examining the relationship between nonproscribed prejudice and the quest dimension

| Study | Sample population | Location | Prejudice measure | Relationship reported |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Snook and Gorsuch (1985) | 94 Afrikaner and 135 English high school students | South Africa | Modified version of Spangenberg and Nel Social Distance scale | Quest scale correlated negatively with preferred social distance from nonwhites for both Afrikaners ($r = -.21, p < .05$) and English ($r = -.17, p < .05$) |
| Griffin, Gorsuch, and Davis (1987) | 190 West Indian black attenders of Seventh-Day Adventist church (English speaking) | St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands | Ratings of vignettes disallowing basic constitutional and human rights to Rastafarians | Quest scale not reliably related to prejudice against Rastafarians ($r = -.08$) |
| Ponton and Gorsuch (1988) | 275 university students (Spanish speaking) | Caracas, Venezuela | Culturally adapted version of Bogardus Social Distance scale, measuring preferred social distance from 8 ethnic groups (Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Americans, Colombians, Peruvians, and Chileans) | Quest scale not reliably related to preferred social distance |
| McFarland (1989) | 173 white undergraduates with at least a moderate interest in religion | Western Kentucky University | Scales measuring discriminatory attitudes toward blacks, women, homosexuals, and Communists | Quest scale correlated negatively with discriminatory attitudes toward all 4 groups ($p < .05$) |
| McFarland (1990a) | 470 active adult Christians (ages from 20s to 60s) | Kentucky and Tennessee | Scales measuring discriminatory attitudes toward blacks, women, homosexuals, and Communists | Quest scale correlated negatively with discriminatory attitudes toward all 4 groups ($p$s from $< .10$ to $< .001$) |

**Table 9.9** Line score summary of research examining the relationships between three dimensions of personal religion and prejudices not clearly proscribed by respondents' religious community (twenty-four findings from six different studies, 1985–1990)

| Dimension of personal religion | Nature of association | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | + | ? | – |
| Extrinsic | 1 | 7 | 0 |
| Intrinsic | 8 | 0 | 1 |
| Quest | 0 | 2 | 5 |

*Note:* Column entries in the table indicate, first, the number of reports of a positive correlation between measures of each dimension of personal religion and some nonproscribed prejudice; second, the number of reports of no reliable correlation; and third, the number of reports of a negative correlation.

The line score in Table 9.9 is extremely interesting. The patterns of association for the extrinsic, means dimension, and the intrinsic, end dimension exactly reverse the patterns of association for these dimensions summarized in Table 9.4 for proscribed prejudice (e.g., racial prejudice). For nonproscribed prejudice, the extrinsic, means dimension shows no clear relationship to prejudice in seven of eight findings; the intrinsic, end dimension shows a positive relationship to prejudice in eight of nine findings. Only the quest dimension shows evidence of a negative relation to prejudice when the prejudice is not clearly proscribed by the religious community (five of seven findings).

Three comments should be made about the studies summarized in Tables 9.6, 9.7, and 9.8, and the line score in Table 9.9. First, two of the studies reviewed assessed prejudice against women by male and female members of mainline churches in the United States (McFarland, 1989, 1990a). Given that these studies were both conducted in the late 1980s, we have considered this a proscribed prejudice and not included findings for it in these tables. The validity of this assumption is supported by the tendency in these studies for correlations with prejudice against women to pattern much like correlations for prejudice against blacks. If, however, you wish to consider prejudice against women nonproscribed, then add two no-relation findings to the extrinsic, means row in Table 9.9, two no-relation findings to the intrinsic, end row, and two negative-correlation findings to the quest row. These additions do not substantially change the overall pattern.

Second, the one outlier in the extrinsic row, the one outlier in the intrinsic row, and one of the two no-relation findings in the quest row all come from a single study by Ponton and Gorsuch (1988). This study assessed the preferred social distance from various ethnic minorities by Spanish-speaking university students in Caracas, Venezuela. The ethnic minorities were Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Americans, Canadians, Colombians, Peruvians, and Chileans. Given that social contact with at least some of these groups might have been positively desired rather than merely tolerated, it seems doubtful that the social distance measure in this study was a valid measure of prejudice. If this study is excluded from Tables 9.6 through 9.9, as it probably should be, then the pattern of correlations becomes even clearer.

Finally, it is worth noting that four of the six studies summarized in the line score in Table 9.9 also included questionnaire measure of a proscribed prejudice—racial prejudice in the United States or among English high school students in South Africa (Herek, 1987; McFarland, 1989, 1990; Snook & Gorsuch, 1985). Correlations of the measures of racial prejudice with the extrinsic, means dimension and the intrinsic, end dimension were much the same as in the earlier studies summarized in Table 9.3 and in the line score in Table 9.4. The extrinsic, means dimension correlated positively with proscribed prejudice against blacks in two of three findings (no relation in the third); the intrinsic, end dimension was not reliably correlated with proscribed prejudice against blacks in four of four findings.

Measures of the quest dimension were not included in any of the studies summarized in Table 9.3, and so we could not include the quest dimension in the line score in Table 9.4. Therefore, it is of particular interest to note that in the studies summarized in Table 9.8, the Quest scale was negatively correlated with proscribed prejudice—racial prejudice in the United States—in three findings. As in all of the questionnaire-based research on the religion-prejudice relationship, these three correlations were not especially large (*r*s ranging from $-.10$ to $-.30$), but they were all reliably different from zero.

In sum, although the extrinsic, means dimension is related positively to questionnaire measures of a wide range of proscribed prejudices (see Tables 9.3 and 9.4), it generally relates close to zero to questionnaire measures of nonproscribed prejudice (see Tables 9.6 and 9.9). Why might this be? One possibility is that, whereas higher scores on the intrinsic, end dimension are associated with both knowledge and acceptance of the teachings of one's religious community about right and wrong prejudices, higher scores on the extrinsic, means dimension are associated with knowledge but not acceptance (and possibly rejection) of these teachings.

More importantly, it appears that the association between the intrinsic, end dimension and relatively low prejudice is not a general one; it is limited to prejudices that are clearly proscribed by the respondent's religious community (see Tables 9.3 and 9.4 versus Tables 9.7 and 9.9). Apparently, the intrinsic believer is not generally free from enmity, contempt, and bigotry, as Allport (1966) claimed, but instead is conforming to the "right" tolerances and the "right" prejudices as defined by the formal and informal teachings of his or her religious community.

This suggestion is further supported by the finding in three of the studies summarized in Table 9.7 (Herek, 1987; McFarland, 1989, 1990a) that the positive relation of (1) the intrinsic, end dimension to (2) nonproscribed prejudice may be accounted for by the positive association of both *1* and *2* to devout, orthodox beliefs. To the degree that people value their religion intrinsically, wholeheartedly embracing what is taught, they are more likely to report being tolerant of those their religious community tells them they should tolerate and being intolerant of those the community tells them they should not tolerate. At best, the personal transformation produced by their religion seems circumscribed.

We must, however, question even this circumscribed transformation. The evidence we have reviewed thus far suggests that the extrinsic, means dimension correlates positively with questionnaire measures of a clearly proscribed prejudice, racial prejudice; neither the intrinsic, end dimension nor the quest dimension does. The intrinsic, end dimension shows either no relationship or a weak negative relationship to questionnaire measures of racial prejudice; the quest dimension shows a weak-to-moderate negative relationship. But does the tolerance reported on these racial prejudice questionnaires reflect an internalization of the values of the religious community, or only presentation of oneself as exemplifying these values (Jones & Pittman, 1982)? To answer this question, it is necessary to move beyond overt, questionnaire assessment of racial prejudice to examine the relation of the three religious dimensions to racial prejudice using more covert, behavioral measures. This is the second strategy used to take a new look at the religion-prejudice relationship.

### COVERT, BEHAVIORAL MEASUREMENT OF RACIAL PREJUDICE

Assessing prejudice through the use of behavioral measures is almost always more difficult and more time-consuming than administering a prejudice questionnaire. But behavioral measures can have two important advantages. First, the response required can be made more costly to the respondent; second, the relevance of the response to prejudice can often be masked, making the measurement unobtrusive, or covert.

If, for example, I state on a questionnaire that race would make no difference in my choice of a roommate, I need not fear that the statement will actually affect my roommate assignment. The statement carries no behavioral consequences, and so no cost. But what if I make the same statement on an application form from the housing office? Now it carries behavioral consequences and cost.

Not surprisingly, people's responses differ dramatically in these two situations, as Silverman (1974) cleverly demonstrated. He found that white incoming college freshmen reported little concern about the race of their future roommate on an attitude questionnaire; they seemed quite colorblind. But other incoming freshmen from the same group, responding to the same question on a housing office application, reported a definite preference for a white rather than a black roommate. This experiment is one of those clearly demonstrating the importance of moving beyond exclusive reliance on cost-free questionnaire measures of proscribed prejudice.

In Silverman's (1974) experiment, not only did the application form involve potential cost, but it also provided an unobtrusive measure; respondents thought their housing assignment, not prejudice, was at issue. Costs may at times override the motivation to present oneself in a socially desirable light even on obtrusive behavioral measures, but it is preferable to make the measures unobtrusive, or covert (Crosby et al., 1980). With a little imagination, this can usually be done.

Over the past two decades, development of covert, behavioral measures has been one of the major contributions of social psychology to the study of prejudice (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, for a number of examples). Unfortunately, this strategy has rarely been employed in studies of the religion-prejudice relationship. We know of only three studies that have examined the relationship between one or more of the religious dimensions and prejudice using covert, behavioral measures. All three studies focus on racial prejudice.

**When integration comes: Brannon (1970).** Robert Brannon (1970) administered the Extrinsic and Intrinsic scales to eighty-one white members of a small Protestant church in the southern United States. The church had recently decided to racially integrate, and, as an index of prejudice, Brannon noted whether each individual remained a member of the now-integrated church, showing racial tolerance, or left to join a new, splinter church that vowed to remain segregated. Brannon reported that those who remained with the old church scored significantly higher on the Intrinsic scale and significantly lower on the Extrinsic scale than did those who left, suggesting that the intrinsic, end dimension was negatively associated and the extrinsic, means dimension positively associated with racial prejudice, assessed behaviorally.

Unfortunately, there was an important confound in this study that clouds interpretation of the results. As previously noted, scores on the Intrinsic scale tend to be associated with greater overall religious activity, including church involvement. It is possible that the more intrinsic members stayed with the old church because of this attachment, not because they were more racially tolerant. To disentangle this confound, one would need to compare Brannon's results with results in a situation in which the old church remained segregated and the new splinter church integrated. As far as we know, this comparison has never been made.

**Selecting an interviewer: Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978).** Adapting Silverman's (1974) strategy for covert, behavioral assessment of prejudice, Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) placed fifty-one white undergraduates with at least a moderate interest in religion in a situation where their expressed readiness to interact with a black individual would have behavioral consequences. This was done by telling the undergraduates that later in the study they would be interviewed in depth about their religious views. The undergraduates were given the opportunity to indicate how much they would like each of the available interviewers to interview them. As a basis for their judgment, they were provided information sheets describing each interviewer. Though differing in particulars, each sheet described a well-rounded college graduate, interested in religion, who had grown up in a middle-class Protestant church (Congregational, Lutheran, Methodist, or Presbyterian). Clipped to each information sheet was a photograph. The photographs revealed that one interviewer was white, the other black.

Interviewers were always the same sex as the undergraduate, were nicely dressed and groomed, and had a friendly smile. In order to equalize information about interviewers other than race, information sheets and photographs were counterbalanced. The photograph of the black interviewer was clipped to one information sheet for some undergraduates; it was clipped to a different sheet for others. In addition, photographs of two different individuals were used in each condition. Some male undergraduates saw one black male; some saw another black male, and so on. This was done to ensure that differences across conditions were not the result of idiosyncratic characteristics of particular individuals.

After reading the information sheets, the undergraduates were asked to rate how much they would like each interviewer to interview them. A difference score was created by subtracting the rating of the black interviewer from the rating of the white. Relative preference for the white over the black interviewer on this difference score reflected a preference to interact with one person rather than another solely on the basis of race, providing an index of racial prejudice.

To permit direct comparison of results using this behavioral measure with results using a questionnaire measure of prejudice, Batson et al. (1978) also administered the racial prejudice questionnaire used by Allport and Ross (1967); a sample item from this questionnaire was presented in Table 9.5 (Item 1). Finally, the three dimensions of individual religion were assessed using the six religious orientation scales familiar to you from Chapter 6.

Results of this study are summarized in Table 9.10. As you can see, cor-

**Table 9.10** Association between dimensions of personal religion and overt versus covert measures of racial prejudice

| | Measure of racial prejudice | |
|---|---|---|
| Dimension of personal religion | Overt (questionnaire) | Covert (interview preference) |
| Extrinsic, means | .18 | .17 |
| Intrinsic, end | −.35* | .26 |
| Quest | −.34* | −.16 |

*Source:* Adapted from Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978).
*$p < .05$, two-tailed.

relations between the religious dimensions and the questionnaire measure of racial prejudice were much as in previous research. The correlation for the extrinsic, means dimension was low positive ($r = .18$, ns); the correlations for the intrinsic, end dimension and quest dimension were both negative ($rs = -.35$ and $-.34$, $ps < .05$).

For the extrinsic, means dimension and for the quest dimension, the correlations with racial prejudice using the behavioral measure did not differ from those using the questionnaire measure. But for the intrinsic, end dimension, there was a clear difference. Using the behavioral measure, the correlation with racial prejudice became significantly more positive ($r = .26$; $z = 3.21$, $p < .005$).

These results were consistent with the suggestion that the intrinsic, end dimension is associated more with a desire to avoid *appearing* racially prejudiced than with a genuine reduction of prejudice. Using the overt, questionnaire measure, this dimension had a significant negative association with racial prejudice; using the covert, behavioral measure, however, the association was nonsignificantly positive. Only the quest dimension appeared to be associated with a genuine reduction of prejudice; it was negatively associated with both the overt and covert measures of prejudice, although the latter association was weak.

**Choosing with whom to sit: Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, and Pych (1986).** Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979) introduced a new technique known as *attributional ambiguity* for detecting prejudicial attitudes that people wish to conceal. They demonstrated the usefulness of this technique in two studies assessing prejudice against the physically handicapped. In each study, participants chose where they would sit to watch a movie: either with a handicapped person or with a nonhandicapped person. In the low-attributional–ambiguity condition, participants had been told that the same movie was being shown in both locations; in the high-attributional–ambiguity condition, they had been told that the movies were different. Snyder et al. (1979) found, as they had predicted, that people avoided a handicapped person more often if the decision to do so was also a decision between two different movies, allowing the avoidance to masquerade as a movie preference.

Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, and Pych (1986) used this attributional-ambiguity technique to assess the religion-prejudice relationship. They had forty-four white undergraduates with at least a moderate interest in religion first complete a battery of questionnaires, including the Extrinsic, Intrinsic, and Quest scales. At a later experimental session, these undergraduates participated individually in what was ostensibly a study of factors that affect liking for movies. As part of this study, they were given a choice of whether to watch a movie being shown in "Theater A" or "Theater B." There was already a person (a confederate the same sex as the subject) sitting in each theater; one person was black, the other white. Choosing to sit in the theater with the white person rather than the black person was the measure of racial prejudice.

Attributional ambiguity for the seating choice was manipulated by varying whether participants had been told that the movies being shown in the two theaters were the same (overt racial prejudice condition) or different (covert racial prejudice condition). Pairing of confederate with movie, of confederate with theater, of movie with theater, and of theater with side of room were all counterbalanced.

Results of this study are summarized in Table 9.11. As you can see, they are generally consistent with the results of the Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) study. For the extrinsic, means dimension, there was no reliable correlation with preference for sitting with the white person in either condition. For the intrinsic, end dimension, the correlation with choosing to sit with the white person was significantly negative in the overt condition ($r = -.52$, $p < .05$) but near zero in the covert condition ($r = -.08$). For the quest dimension, the correlation was near zero in the overt condition ($r = -.10$) and significantly negative in the covert condition ($r = -.45$, $p < .05$).

As in the Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) study, then, the intrinsic, end dimension correlated negatively with an overt measure of racial prejudice. But this significant negative correlation disappeared when the measure was covert, when choosing to sit with the white person could masquerade as a movie preference. The pattern of behavior associated with devout, intrinsic religion in these two studies is strikingly reminiscent of what Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) have called "aversive racism"; that is, the pattern suggests a concern on the part of the intrinsically religious not to be seen by others, or by themselves, as prejudiced, although "the underlying negative portions of their attitudes are expressed, but in subtle, rationalizable ways" (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, p. 62).

Only the quest dimension had a significant negative correlation with the covert measure of prejudice in this study. To check the pattern of choices underlying this negative correlation, Batson et al. (1986) performed median splits on the Quest scale in each attributional-ambiguity condition. Among

**Table 9.11** Association between dimensions of personal religion and overt versus covert measures of racial prejudice

| | Measure of racial prejudice | |
|---|---|---|
| Dimension of personal religion | Overt (same movie) | Covert (different movie) |
| Extrinsic, means | −.21 | −.01 |
| Intrinsic, end | −.52* | −.08 |
| Quest | −.10 | −.45* |

*Source:* Adapted from Batson et al. (1986).
*Note:* Because of the somewhat atypical component structure found in this study, results are reported for the Extrinsic, Intrinsic, and Quest scales, rather than for the Means, End, and Quest components.
$^*p < .05$, two-tailed.

participants scoring above the median, the proportions of participants choosing to sit with the white person were .44 and .46 in the overt and covert prejudice conditions, respectively; among participants scoring below the median, the proportions were .75 and .71. Thus, high scorers on the quest dimension showed no preference for black or white persons in either condition, whereas low scorers showed a preference for sitting with the white person ($z = 2.13, p < .04$; observed proportions tested for difference from .50 across experimental conditions).

Similar median splits on the Intrinsic scale revealed that, among participants scoring above the median, the proportions choosing to sit with the white person were .25 and .54 in the overt and covert prejudice conditions, respectively; among participants scoring below the median, the proportions were .89 and .64. Thus, high-intrinsic participants showed a preference for sitting with the black person in the overt condition, in which choice to sit with the white person might appear prejudicial, but not in the covert condition.

Although this pattern of proportions is quite consistent with the suggestion that high scorers on the Intrinsic scale are concerned not to appear prejudiced, it is also consistent with a quite different explanation, suggested by Richard Gorsuch (personal communication, November 1983). Perhaps high-intrinsic participants in the overt condition chose to sit with the black person out of (1) a heightened sensitivity for his or her feelings and (2) a desire to witness to the experimenter about the value of black people. Because of the attributional ambiguity in the covert condition, high-intrinsic participants in that condition may not have been as concerned about what their seating choice would indicate to others about the value of black people. In that condition these participants could express their own feelings, which were quite without prejudice, leading them to show no clear preference for either black or white persons.

This "affirmative-action" alternative explanation seems to fit nicely the responses of the high-intrinsic participants in the study, but it does not seem to fit the responses of the high-intrinsic participants in the previous study by Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978). The procedure of that study should have provided participants an opportunity to witness for affirmative action by indicating a preference for being interviewed by a black person. Yet in that study, higher scorers on the Intrinsic scale were no less likely to show a preference for being interviewed by a white person than were low scorers; indeed, they were slightly *more* likely to do so. Nor does it seem possible to reconcile this affirmative-action explanation with the evidence summarized in Table 9.7, indicating that the intrinsic, end dimension correlates positively with prejudices that are not proscribed by the religious community.

These observations illustrate a general principle about the relationship between empirical data and explanation in science. Ruling out alternative explanations is a major reason for testing the same predictions in different studies using different procedures; all studies in which the predictions have been tested should be considered as a set, not in isolation from one another.

When the affirmative-action explanation is viewed in this context, its truth seems doubtful.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Does religion promote universal love and acceptance, allowing the faithful to see all others, no matter how alien, as brothers and sisters? Or does it promote intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry? We have traveled a long and winding path in our pursuit of an answer to these questions, but we believe that we have gotten somewhere. First, we found much research suggesting a positive correlation between being religious and being prejudiced. Then we found much research suggesting that this was only true for those persons who use their religion as an extrinsic means to self-serving ends. Among religious individuals, those who orient to religion as an intrinsic end in itself almost invariably score lower on questionnaire measures of proscribed prejudice (e.g., racial prejudice) than do the extrinsically religious, although the intrinsically religious rarely score lower on these measures than nonreligious individuals. In sum, neither of these two religious dimensions appears to promote tolerance and acceptance. But at least the devout, sincere belief of high scorers on the intrinsic, end dimension does not appear to be a stimulant of prejudice.

Although these results have led to a more comforting revised conclusion concerning the relationship between religion and prejudice, we expressed doubts. In virtually every study of the relationship between religion and proscribed prejudice, prejudice has been measured by self-report questionnaires. Measuring prejudice in this way opens the door wide for individuals who wish to present themselves as unprejudiced to do so. And there is reason to suspect that individuals scoring high on measures of intrinsic, end religion might wish to do so.

The few studies to date that have attempted to avoid this self-presentation problem, by either (1) assessing forms of prejudice that are not proscribed by respondents' religious community or (2) using covert, behavioral measures of prejudice, suggest a *revised* revised conclusion: *The extrinsic, means dimension is related to increased prejudice, but only when prejudice is proscribed. The quest dimension is related to decreased prejudice, both proscribed and not. The intrinsic, end dimension is related to the appearance of relatively low proscribed prejudice, but only the appearance. It is related to increased prejudice when the prejudice is not proscribed by the religious community.* This is a far more complex answer than we were seeking when we first asked whether religion discourages or encourages intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry; it is, however, the answer to which we believe the existing evidence points. Of course, future research may cause us to rethink matters yet again.

In the interim, we must take issue with earlier reviews (e.g., Donahue, 1985; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974) and caution against concluding that intrinsic religion is an antidote for prejudice. We find it remarkable that this conclusion persists in the face of the evidence we have reviewed, yet persist it does. We believe the evidence indicates that the devout, sincere belief of the intrinsically religious changes the manifestation of prejudice, making it more covert. But prejudice remains, appearing in subtle ways reminiscent of the "aversive racism" described by Gaertner and Dovidio (1986).

Our interpretation of the intrinsic religion–prejudice relationship may, however, be too pessimistic. Patricia Devine (1989) has recently proposed a "dissociation model of prejudice" that suggests a more optimistic interpretation of the evidence we have reviewed concerning the relationship of devout, intrinsic religion to racial prejudice. Perhaps, stimulated by their religious beliefs and role models, the intrinsically religious are in the process of being resocialized away from prejudice, but the resocialization or dissociation process is not complete. Like trying to break a bad habit, they slip back into their old ways when their new, unprejudicial thoughts and behaviors are not consciously activated by salient cues (such as being asked to complete a prejudice questionnaire or act in a way that might appear overtly prejudicial). If this interpretation is correct, then increasing the salience of the antiprejudice norm of the religious community—consciousness-raising—may lead to reduced prejudice by the more intrinsically religious even in covert behavior, not just on questionnaires.

Once again, we have doubts. This dissociation analysis rests on the assumption that the norm of the religious community is to eschew prejudice and discrimination, that the religious community teaches—to paraphrase McConahay (1986)—"The truly religious can't be racists and racists can't be truly religious." We wonder whether this is the norm. True, every major religion teaches tolerance, and every major denomination is on record opposing racial prejudice and discrimination. Yet we have doubts about the norm when we see a headline that reads, "Sunday morning at 11 remains most segregated hour of week" (*Atlanta Constitutuion,* August 9, 1987). We suspect that in many cases the intrinsic believer, attending to the practice of the religious community as well as to the preaching, is being resocialized to a very different, more hypocritical norm: "The truly religious can't *look* racist." If so, then perhaps the resocialization process is complete. And even if it is not, increased salience of the norm will not reduce subtle, covert prejudice.

The possibility that the open-ended, quest dimension actually is associated with reduced prejudice seems more promising. This dimension generally correlates negatively with measures of both proscribed and nonproscribed prejudice, especially when prejudice is measured covertly. It remains unclear at this point, however, whether the quest dimension should get causal credit for its association with reduced prejudice or vice versa, or whether high quest scores and reduced prejudice are both expressions of a general personal disposition toward openness and tolerance. Until we have an answer to this question, it seems premature to suggest that the quest dimension is a *source* of increased acceptance and tolerance. It may only be a symptom.