

American Pragmatism and Neo-Pragmatism in Its Affinities with European Philosophical Hermeneutics

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I would like to begin my paper by the attempt to depict certain common epistemological features between American pragmatic tradition and European philosophical hermeneutics, especially that of Hans-Georg Gadamer. H.-G. Gadamer's philosophy in its epistemological dimension is characterized by the fundamental critique of scientism, accompanied by the protest against the Cartesian primacy of the logical over the rhetorical and in accordance with hermeneutic tradition is oriented to the knowledge of individual in the concrete socio-cultural context - on the contrary to tendencies to emphasize abstract universals and principles. In this consequence we can say that both Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy and American pragmatism belong to the empiricist stream of modern philosophical thought. From that point of view Gadamer could agree with the opinion of William James that "empiricism lays the explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction".¹

H.-G. Gadamer's epistemology is from the historical point of view based on a complex critical reflection of the theories of understanding in the Romantic philosophical tradition. In this consequence it is interesting that especially William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty and Stanley Cavell - as Russell B. Goodman points out - identify their epistemological conceptions with what they call "the romantic" as opposed to the "classic-academic" type of imagination".²

Similarly we can speak about the common features in pragmatism and hermeneutical conception of experience. In the epistemological tradition of pragmatism (from W. James to R. Rorty) as well as that of contemporary hermeneutically oriented philosophical thought (M. Heidegger and H.-G. Gadamer) there is emphasized the deep, imaginative and projecting character of human experience which helps to overcome the theoretical foundation of experience on the processes of mere seeing, mirroring the world.³

Heidegger and especially Gadamer have analyzed the notion of lived experience in an obvious continuity with Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy of life (*Lebensphilosophie*). According to Dilthey, the process of understanding moves forward with the course of life itself and the

starting point of the process of understanding is an experience that in one sense cannot be repeated. In essence, this experience could be reduced to the lived experience ("*Erlebnis*"). *Erlebnis*, which expresses the intensity and wholeness of human experience, constitutes the basis upon which it is possible to apply the hermeneutic circle to the process of understanding.⁴ In the conception of H.-G. Gadamer which in many aspects issues from the tradition of Diltheyan *Lebensphilosophie* the process of understanding enables one to find the way to truth and simultaneously preserve, by means of "openness" for the other partner of communication, the stable coexistence between the interpreter and the object of interpretation.⁵

In the epistemology of William James (as a certain anticipation of modern hermeneutical conceptions) the notion of pure experience represents "the immediate flux of life", but such a flux concretely occurs in the form of the process characterized by the stable coexistence of the subject and object of knowledge: "Feeling, however dimly and subconsciously, all these things, your pulse of inner life is continuous with them, belongs to them and they to it. You can't identify it with either one of them rather than with the others."⁶

When we further compare the epistemological conceptions of W. James and H.-G. Gadamer, it is interesting that both philosophers validate these forms of experience which have been in the Romantic tradition ascribed to the influx of divine power. For instance Gadamer - analogically as James - is interested in the deep philosophical reflection on the religious experience. Both James and Gadamer examine the wide range of human experience and its spiritual dimension. But in a certain difference to James Gadamer puts stress mainly on the social function of religion and on its essential connection with art. Gadamer's reflection of religious experience helps him to overcome scientifically limited conception of knowledge and truth.⁷

From that point of view Gadamer - inspired by Heidegger's radical questioning - emphasizes the unity of the ethical and the epistemological dimension of truth. It provides him the theoretical starting point of his endeavour to rehabilitate practical philosophy based on the theoretical grounds of Christian tradition, Shaftesbury's conception of common sense and Husserl's theory of the lifeworld ("*Lebenswelt*").

This stress on both practical and ethical dimension of human activity - resembling the pragmatist conceptions - is also based on Gadamer's analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's ethics in the first stage of development of his hermeneutical philosophy. In Gadamer's view both

Plato and Aristotle are ruled by the enduring urgency of the Socratic question of good. In his book *Platos dialektische Ethik* [Platos dialectical Ethics] (1931) Gadamer has analyzed the structural features of the Platonic dialogues, which are based on the principle of *Logos* that supersedes the subjective opinions of the discussion partners by the way of consensus, and thus enables a communicative appurtenance and inter-human solidarity.

American pragmatism and Continental hermeneutics aim to the unification of theory and practice, the epistemological and the ethical dimension of human life's reality. In this context it is interesting that *Lebenserfahrung* (life experience) represents one of the most important categories of H.-G. Gadamer's hermeneutics. Both the philosophy of W. James and that of H.-G. Gadamer is characterized by the critique of intellectualism according to which the relations within the world and social processes are based on "*actus purus* of Thought, Intellect, or Reason, all written with capitals and considered to mean something unutterably superior to any fact of sensibility whoever".⁸

There is - of course - a certain difference between James's and Gadamer's conception of experience. William James's view of human experience is psychological, he describes it in a form of a "spread", a "field" or mainly as a "stream". But Gadamer's basic concept of experience is more dialectical and mainly existential, he emphasizes these forms of experience (for instance the experience on the tragical character of our life projects) which cannot be verified by means of exact sciences. According to Gadamer the main paradigm of experience is that of history, art, and religion. The typical feature of experience is also its openness and connection with the finitude of human being which means the experience concerning our "painful failure".⁹ On the whole, however, we can say that Gadamer's conception of epistemology and experience is very close to "James's project of uniting empiricism with spiritualism." ¹⁰

According to my opinion it would be also effective to analyze and compare common features in H.-G. Gadamer's and R. Rorty's theories of understanding. From the epistemological point of view the common feature of their philosophies is based on the conception that both Gadamer's hermeneutical and Rorty's post-analytical philosophy cannot be considered only as a "method for attaining truth".¹¹ In his book *Wahrheit und Methode* (in a certain continuity with Heidegger's fundamental ontology) Gadamer places stress on the historical and dialogical dimension of understanding, which is also the most important property of a human being. Gadamer's thesis of a dialogical, historical and projecting character of understanding

stems from the theory that there is fundamental ontological connection between understanding and *speech events* ("*sprachliches Geschehen*").

Contrary to essentialism and in continuity with Gadamer's hermeneutics and the Romantic tradition Rorty emphasizes dialogical as well as creative, self-forming character of understanding which is therefore connected with the self-transformation of man by means of his edification stemming from the communicative activities, such as reading, or, for instance, dialogue within the community. Understanding is based on the process of constant forming and interrelated dialogue of various interpretations, regarded from the beginning as equal and legitimate.. Using the instigations of romanticism, Rorty emphasizes the self-forming nature of human mind, the creative character of which is enabled also by the fact that our thought is oriented not only to verified knowledge, but also to something "unknown, abnormal, revolutionary, poetical, metaphorical".¹²

Despite the affinities with the philosophical hermeneutics of H.-G. Gadamer, neo-pragmatical and withal post-analytical philosophy of Richard Rorty overlooks Gadamer's emphasis on *die Sache*. It is necessary to realize that in Gadamer's view (influenced obviously by Edmund Husserl's phenomenology) inquiry is always inquiry into a subject-matter and dialogues always remain the dialogues over *die Sache*.¹³ Therefore the process of understanding is characterized by Gadamer as *Tun der Sache selbst* even though in the context of tradition (*Überlieferung*).

In this consequence we ought to compare the socio-cultural dimension of Rorty's neo-pragmatic philosophical thought and his idea of edifying philosophy with the conceptions of tradition, culture and education (*Bildung*) in Gadamer's hermeneutics. Especially in the last chapter of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) Rorty has been influenced by Gadamer's theory of *Bildung* (which means education, self-formation). The author of *Wahrheit und Methode* emphasizes the notion of *Bildung* with its ethical and historical dimension against such conceptions of knowledge which ignore the problem of historical continuity, identity and moral integrity of human being. Gadamer argues that the notion of *Bildung* has been critically turned against such theories of education which were not able to grasp the substantial connection between its cognitive and ethical dimension. In Gadamer's view neglecting of this fact led to the inability of German culture and philosophy in 1930s to resist Nazism.

In Rorty's adequate interpretation the notion of *Bildung* is closely connected with the notion of effective-historical consciousness (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*) to characterize "the attitude interested not so much in what is there out in the world as in what we can get out of history for our own uses".¹⁴ It is also important - as Georgia Warnke points out - that according to Rorty Gadamer's account of tradition has "forced us to see the pragmatic basis of all inquiry".¹⁵

It is obvious that Rorty's idea of edifying philosophy was inspired above all by Gadamer's notion of *Bildung*. Rorty's theory of edifying philosophy is based on the conviction about the close and indivisible link among the epistemological, ethical and educational dimension of the real, profound philosophical view of reality. This conception is - according to my opinion - substantial and characteristic for both pragmatism and hermeneutical procedures of philosophical reflection.

In continuity with the traditions of American philosophy and European hermeneutics Rorty highly evaluates Romanticism, which is understood by him as the other name for the creative conception of reality. This Romantic tradition, tied with the emphasis on creative subject and with the conception of life as the work of art, ought to be connected - according to Rorty - with social reformism, the function of which is to develop the ideals of liberal democracy in present time. In his view there are certain common features between liberalism and pragmatism because "both are expressions of [...] the same suspicion of religion and metaphysics. Both can be traced back to some of the same historical causes (religious tolerance, constitutional democracy)".¹⁶

Rorty's stress on the aesthetical way of life, self-invention and conceptual novelty in the moral development of the human being led to Jürgen Habermas's critique, especially in his book *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures (Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen)*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1985). Habermas criticizes Rorty's but also Derrida's persuasion about hidden connection between the sphere of ethical and aesthetical as an antirational drive of unconstrained hedonism. In fact Habermas is critical to Romanticism which is - on the other side - very inspirative for Rorty. Certain elements of Romanticism endanger according to Habermas not only the tradition of subjective, but also communicative reason: "Dreams, phantasies, madness, orgiastic excitement, ecstasy - it is the aesthetic, body centered experiences of a decentered subjectivity that function as the placeholders for the other of reason."¹⁷

According to Habermas, aesthetic experience depends on its rational discursive structures even while purporting to oppose and transcend reason. "There is no escaping reason, because there is no escaping language and because language is essentially and necessarily rational."¹⁸ Language is the medium through which we live: "with any speech act, the speaker takes up a relation to something in the objective world, something in a common social world, and something in his own subjective world." [...] "Reason is by its very nature incarnated in contexts of communicative action and in structures of the lifeworld."¹⁹ This Habermas's claim is very close to Gadamer's opinion that "die Sprache ist die Sprache der Vernunft selbst." (WM 2. Auflage. 1965, p. 379) But poetic language is the paradigm of language by both Gadamer and Rorty.

However, against Habermas Rorty argues that it is not possible to derive rationally and universally oriented moral philosophy from the philosophy of language. There is nothing, for him, in the nature of language that could serve as a basis for justifying the superiority of liberal democracy. In his view, we should stop presenting the institutions of liberal Western societies as offering the rational solution to the problem of human coexistence, as the solution that other people will necessarily adopt when they cease being irrational.²⁰

In my view, when we deeply reflect and analyze the opinions mentioned above, we can agree with Richard Schusterman that "through such polemics, Habermas and Rorty project misleading dualism between reason and aesthetics that seems inconsistent with their own basic pragmatism".²¹

In connection with emphasis on creative personality and in accordance with proclaimed slogan about the priority of democracy to philosophy it is understandable that Rorty has rather critical attitude to French structuralist, post-structuralist, respectively post-modern philosophical thought. Emphasizing the notions of solidarity and the sense for community he cannot agree with Foucault's underestimating of subject and of his function in historical process. Rorty considers Michel Foucault to be "dispassionate observer of the present social order" who "affects to write from the point of view light-years away from the problems of contemporary society". He even reproaches him for "a lack of any identification with any social context, any communication".²² From the same point of view Rorty could agree with Lyotard's critique of Habermas that studies of communicative competence of a transhistorical subject are of little use in reinforcing our sense of identification with our community, but on the other hand he insists very strongly on the importance of that sense.

The problem of our identification with community is closely linked with the philosophical reflection on the themes of tradition, national identity and the sense of Euro-American culture at the present time. It is not surprising in this context that Rorty emphasizes the great importance of tradition and of the consciousness of political and cultural continuity in the social life of North Atlantic civilization. His conceptions are at that point very close to the conceptions of tradition in contemporary European hermeneutics, mainly those of H.-G. Gadamer's. As far as Richard Rorty's conception of tradition is concerned, we especially cannot miss the influence of German hermeneutically oriented philosophy (M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer, J. Habermas). Rorty relates especially to Gadamer's hermeneutics by the high level of attention paid to the integrative function of interhuman relations. He also endeavours to synthesize the spiritual heritage of European hermeneutics and American pragmatism. This synthesis was successful owing to Rorty's ability to find their common feature in the sense for solidarity and dialogue, in historical attitude to social reality and in emphasizing the practical dimension of philosophy. Both Gadamer and Rorty strongly emphasize the historical role and moral authority of the institutions connected with the gradual formation of democratic political life.

There are, of course, also certain differences. H.-G. Gadamer, in contrast to R. Rorty, accents the importance of the spiritual heritage of Christianity in the life of Western society.²³ Rorty conceives tradition along with a critical analysis of, and profound reflection on, the contemporary situation of American society and its future prospects. He interprets tradition therefore as historical continuity with the spiritual heritage of those historical figures in the political and cultural life of United States who have embodied the ideals of democracy, justice and equality among the citizens, especially R. W. Emerson, A. Lincoln, and M. L. King.²⁴

In this connection, Rorty argues that we cannot escape the traditions to which we belong or "step outside our skins".²⁵ Nowadays, he even criticizes American Cultural Left for lacking a sense of tradition and national identity. He is aware of the fact that democracy is based on free and intensive communication, which cannot be realized without a specific contexture which links people speaking the same language, living in the same national tradition. From that point of view, he stresses one unifying language and rejects multiculturalism which, in his opinion, could lead to the creation of new ethnic and national ghettos in the USA.

Using this analogy, if we reflect on the problems concerning the current geopolitical orientation of the Czech Republic, it is necessary to take into account questions of national

identity and the danger of its loss. These dangers are caused not only by global problems, but in association with "the decline of public space in contemporary postmodern era when you cannot differentiate between higher and lower, value and interest, eternal and ephemeral".²⁶ The problem is very important in the specific historical situation in the Czech Republic, where, unfortunately, a sense for rational political discourse is lacking within political life. This discourse often has been substituted, especially in the first half of 1990s, with a pseudo-religious triumphalistic exaltation about the victory of good over evil, democracy over totalitarianism, market economy over socialism.

In Rorty's communitarianistic opinion there is no general superhistorical and theoretical ground reasoning the existence of democratic institutions. This problematique can be solved only from the historical point of view and with regard to concrete community in a certain stage of its historical development. It is also interesting that Rorty's communitarian views are in many aspects analogous to Gadamer's conceptions. In Gadamer's view for instance the category of solidarity (common sense) could be reflected adequately only from the historical point of view.

From this reason Gadamer in his *Wahrheit und Methode* pays such a great attention to A. A. C. Shaftesbury's conception of common sense as the ability of communicative behaviour and the deep feeling of solidarity with the other participants in political dialogue. But this is explained by Gadamer (and by Habermas) in the framework of historical narrative about the rise of democratic institutions and the ways of life in England in the historical period of political compromise between the victors and the defeated after Glorious Revolution (1688).²⁷

The notion of *sensus communis* (*common sense*, shared sense) was perceived and elaborated on from a theoretical point of view by the English philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) as the special ability to obligation, social feeling, understanding and mutual agreement: "A public spirit can come only from a social feeling or sense of partnership with human kind".²⁸ Gadamer appreciates Shaftesbury's conception of a specific unity between the sphere of ethical and aesthetical - and this is also very close to Rorty's conceptions. In broader context it is also understandable that the narratives on democracy, dialogue, tolerance, solidarity and the persuasion that nobody has exclusive right to know the truth connects the philosophical thought of R. Rorty and H.-G. Gadamer.

At the end of this study I would like to point out to some motives uniting pragmatism with contemporary spiritually oriented hermeneutics (J. Lacan, J. Hillman, R. Bly, P. von Matt, M. Exner, R. Starý) . It is well known that W. James, influenced by Frederick C. Myers, has introduced to his philosophical and psychological thought the categories of subliminal consciousness and of subconscious self, used lately in the psychoanalysis of S. Freud: "The subconscious self is nowadays a well-credited psychological entity; and I believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required."²⁹

W. James - on the contrary to the influential opinion of German psychologist W. Wundt (*Grundriss der Psychologie*, Leipzig 1902, p. 248-251) - has legitimated the existence of the psychical processes which exist outside the primary consciousness. This has been very appreciated by the forerunner of the depth hermeneutics and the founder of analytical psychology Carl Gustav Jung. It is not surprising that in Jung's essay *Theoretische Überlegungen zum Wesen des Psychischen* we can find this important passage from W. James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*: "I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery, first made in 1886, that [...] there is not only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most important step forward because, unlike the other advances which psychology has made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of human nature."³⁰

Anticipating the conceptions of the deep hermeneutics W. James was convinced that "there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of."³¹ In this consequence we ought to realize that the philosophy and psychology of William James, especially his theoretical reflections from *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, have helped C. G. Jung to create a new, very inspirative paradigm of *psyché*. It might be argued that Jung's theories of collective unconsciousness and archetypes (with the central archetype of *Selbst* (Self)³² have been influenced by Gnostic and Neoplatonic conceptions of the soul, too, but these spiritually oriented philosophical ideas are characteristic for the Emersonian and Romantic tradition in American philosophy. In particular Jung's conception of *Selbst* (Self) - which represents the central archetype of order, as well as that of the totality of the spiritual life of human being - has been immensely inspired by W. James and his idea of wider self:

"we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and positively true as far as it goes."³³

Thus William James has inspired Jung's paradigm expressed in his primary archetypes of *Selbst* and *Individuation* - that coherent growth and self-transformation is central to the philosophical, religious and ethical life. In this context we can find therefore analogical features between Jung's theory of *Selbst* (Self) on one side and the stress on the self-improvement, identity and moral self-development of human personality in the ethical theories of W. James's followers on the other side (as one of many examples we can state for instance the concept of "growing, enlarging, liberated self" in John Dewey's ethics).³⁴ The use of the methodological procedures of the deep hermeneutics - whose founder C. G. Jung, as we have shown, was in his early philosophical and theoretical development in 1910s crucially influenced by W. James - enables to explain and deeply reflect the turn toward Romanticism and spiritualism in the contemporary neo-pragmatic philosophy (R. Rorty, H. Bloom, S. Cavell).

NOTES

¹ William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. The Writings of William James. A Comprehensive Edition. Edited, with an Introduction, by John J. McDermott. New York: Random House 1967, p. 195.

² Russell B. Goodman, *American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990, p. 60.

³ Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford (UK) - Cambridge (USA): B. Blackwell 1994, p. 144.

⁴ Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*. Band VII. Leipzig - Berlin 1927, pp. 198-218.

⁵ Hans-Georg Gadamer. *Wahrheit und Methode*. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1965, pp. 253-254.

⁶ *The Works of William James. A Pluralistic Universe*, ed. Frederick Burkhardt. Harvard University Press 1977, p. 129. See also: Patrick L. Bourgeois, Sandra B. Rosenthal, *Thematic studies in Phenomenology and Pragmatism*. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner Publishing Corporation 1983, p. 37.

- ⁷ H.-G. Gadamer, "Gadamer on Gadamer", in: *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, ed. with an introduction by Hugh J. Silverman. Routledge: New York and London 1991, p. 15.
- ⁸ William James, *The Principles of Psychology*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1981, p. 238.
- ⁹ H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1965, p. 496.
- ¹⁰ R. B. Goodman, *American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990, p. 65.
- ¹¹ R. Rorty: *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford (UK) and Cambridge (USA): B. Blackwell 1994, p. 357.
- ¹² Richard Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical Papers. Volume 2*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, p. 174.
- ¹³ Georgia Warnke, *Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason*. Stanford (California): Stanford University Press 1987, p. 146.
- ¹⁴ R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford (UK) and Cambridge (USA): B. Blackwell 1994 p. 359.
- ¹⁵ G. Warnke, *Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason*. Stanford (California): Stanford University Press 1987, p. 145.
- ¹⁶ Richard Rorty, "Response to Ernesto Laclau", in: *Deconstruction und Pragmatism*, ed. Chantal Mouffe. London and New York: Routledge 1996, p. 74.
- ¹⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures*. Translated by Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge (UK) and Oxford (UK) : Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers 1995, p. 306.
- ¹⁸ Richard Schusterman, *Practicing Philosophy. Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life*. New York and London: Routledge 1997, p. 117.
- ¹⁹ J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures*. Translated by Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge (UK) and Oxford (UK): Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers 1995, p. 313-314, 322.

²⁰ See Chantal Mouffe, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, and the Politics of Democracy", in: *Deconstruction und Pragmatism*, ed. Chantal Mouffe. London and New York: Routledge 1996, p. 4.

²¹ R. Schusterman, *Practicing Philosophy. Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life*. New York and London: Routledge 1997, p. 114.

²² R. Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical papers. Volume 2*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, p. 173.

²³ H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. 2. Auflage. J. C. B. Mohr. Tübingen 1965, p. 266.

²⁴ R. Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical papers. Volume 2*. Cambridge University Press 1994, p. 173-175. See also R. Rorty, "The Unpatriotic Academy", *The New York Times*. Sunday, February 13, 1994, p. 15.

²⁵ Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1982, p. XIX.

²⁶ Václav Bělohradský, "Kapitalismus glasnost' a perestrojka teprve čeká" [Capitalism has been only waiting for glasnost° and perestroika], in: *Právo*, November 6, 1997, supplement Salon, p. 3.

²⁷ H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1965, p. 16-23. See also Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*. 2. Auflage. Neuwied am Rhein und Berlin 1965, p. 69-78.

²⁸ Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times with a Collection of Letters*. Volume 1. Basel 1790, p. 90.

²⁹ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: Vintage Books. The Library of America 1990, p. 457.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 215. Carl Gustav Jung, "Theoretische Überlegungen zum Wesen des Psychischen", in: *Gesammelte Werke von C. G. Jung. Band 8. (Die Dynamik des Unbewussten)*. 2. Auflage. Olten und Freiburg in Breisgau: Walter Verlag AG 1971, p. 215. In my reflection concerning the affinities between W. James°s and C. G. Jung°s psychology I

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³¹ W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: Vintage Books. The Library of America 1990, p. 457

³² Carl Gustav Jung, "Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten". In: *Gesammelte Werke von C. G. Jung. Band 7. (Zwei Schriften über analytische Psychologie)*. 2. Auflage. Olten und Freiburg in Breisgau: Walter Verlag AG 1974, pp. 195-201, 263-269.

³³ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: Vintage Books. The Library of America 1990, p. 460.

³⁴ John Dewey, *Ethics*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press 1981, p. 307.