

Fig. 1. Near East, 4000–3000 B.C.

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|------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------|
| 1. Abu Salabikh | 8. Godin | 15. Kazane | 22. Ruberdheh |
| 2. Aruda | 9. Habuba Kabira | 16. Korucutepe | 23. Samsat |
| 3. Brak | 10. Hassek | 17. Kurban | 24. Sheikh Hassan |
| 4. Carchemish | 11. Hawa | 18. Leilan | 25. Susa |
| 5. Ergani Copper Mines | 12. Hamoukar | 19. Nineveh | 26. Tepecik |
| 6. Farrukhabad | 13. Jerablus Tahtani | 20. Norsuntepe | 27. Ur |
| 7. Gawra | 14. Karatut Mevku | 21. Qrayya | |

Colonies without Colonialism: A Trade Diaspora Model of Fourth Millennium B.C. Mesopotamian Enclaves in Anatolia

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It has become clear over the last two decades that many, if not most, early state societies in the Old and New World established colonies as one aspect of their overall expansionary dynamics, such as trade, alliance formation, or conquest.¹ Although colonies existed in a wide variety of ancient, non-Western, and precapitalist cultural contexts, archaeological interpretations of these systems have been heavily influenced by the structure of European colonialism in the sixteenth through twentieth century. The uncritical extension of the European colonialism model's assumptions of dominance and asymmetric relations to non-Western and precapitalist cases is especially evident in current interpretations of ancient Mesopotamian colonies. As early as 3700 B.C., the newly emergent Mesopotamian city-states of the Uruk period expanded into neighboring areas of Syria and southeast Anatolia. They established a series of settlements apparently intended to gain access to vital raw materials such as copper or lumber, in the world's earliest known network of colonies.² The Mesopotamian trade colonies are generally viewed as controlling, either formally or informally, the exchange system and, through that, the indigenous populations with whom they interacted.³ It is important to note that the arguments for Mesopotamian colonial dominance have been based on a heavily biased archaeological record. Although Uruk colonies in Syria and Anatolia have been excavated, until recently we knew almost nothing about either the dynamics of Mesopotamian and local interaction or the impact of this interregional trade system on the development of indigenous cultures in southeast Anatolia.

Excavations at the site of Hacinebi in the Euphrates River valley of southeast Anatolia investigate the organization of interaction between Mesopotamians and local peoples of Anatolia as a way to test the applicability of the colonial dominance model to prehistoric networks of interregional interaction. In 3700 B.C. a small Uruk trading enclave was established in the northeast corner of Hacinebi, more than 1,200 kilometers upstream from the Uruk homeland in southern Mesopotamia (fig. 1). The complex of material culture and available evidence for behavioral patterning strongly support the idea that an enclave of ethnically distinct Mesopotamians was present at the

site. Comparative analyses of material culture from the enclave and surrounding indigenous contexts suggest that the foreigners did not dominate their local Anatolian host community as might be expected under the assumptions of the European model of colonialist domination. Instead, the Uruk enclave was a socially and economically autonomous diaspora whose members raised their own food, produced their own crafts, and administered their own separate exchange system. Although they were in close contact (and may even have intermarried) with their Anatolian host community, the foreigners seem to have maintained a distinct social identity over an extended period of time. The encapsulated organization of the Mesopotamian enclave and the essential parity in its social relations with the Anatolian host community at Hacinebi are best explained in terms of the "trade diaspora" model developed by Abner Cohen in his analyses of commercial enclaves in modern West Africa.⁴ The Hacinebi data thus indicate that considerable variation exists in the organization of power relations and colonial-local economic interaction in ancient, non-Western colonial systems.

Colonialism and Colonies

To develop realistic models of organizational variation in ancient colonial systems and in their relations with indigenous societies, we need to emphasize the distinction between "colonialism" and "colonies." Colonialism is "the establishment and maintenance, for an extended time, of rule over an alien people that is separate from and subordinate to the ruling power."⁵ It is a form of unequal social relations between polities, and entails the idea of political, military, or economic dominance by intrusive foreign groups over local populations.⁶ Colonialism is not just an abstract concept, however; it is embedded in a culturally specific historical experience. In Western thought, the central defining case of colonialism is the expansion of early capitalist Europe by extending its control over the Americas, Africa, south Asia, and Southeast Asia from the sixteenth through the mid-twentieth century. The connection between colonialism and the last four centuries of Western history is so deeply rooted that a number of scholars in different disciplines have argued that the European colonial encounter continues to structure not only Western intellectual conceptions of other cultures, including the discipline of anthropology and the culture concept,⁷ but even the West's very definition of itself as a distinct entity.⁸ Colonialism is inextricably bound up with notions drawn from the European experience such as "domination of an alien minority, asserting racial and cultural superiority over a materially inferior native majority; contact between a machine oriented civilization with Christian origins, a powerful economy, and a rapid rhythm of life and a non-Christian civilization that lacks machines and is marked by a backward economy and a slow rhythm of life; and the imposition of the first civilization upon the second."⁹ This close connection of colonialism with the experience of the last four centuries of capitalist expansion makes it virtually impossible to apply this concept to the interregional interaction systems of ancient, non-Western,

or precapitalist societies without incorporating a whole set of a priori assumptions about inherently unequal power relationships derived from European domination over Asia, Africa, and the Americas.

In historians' usage, the traditional view of colonies is almost completely structured by the European experience. In one of the few attempts to develop a typology of colonies, M. I. Finley argues that we should continue to follow the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century usage, and restrict the term *colony* to only those implanted settlements characterized by (a) large-scale emigration from the homeland, (b) the appropriation of local lands through the subjugation of local peoples, (c) colonial control of the local labor force, or (d) formal political and economic control of the implanted settlement by the homeland or metropolis.¹⁰ Central to Finley's model is the idea, drawn from European colonialism, that the implanted settlements dominate indigenous peoples, who are seen as "technically backward, small scale in their political organization, incapable of concerted action, as compared with their European conquerors. Above all they were . . . hopelessly outclassed in their ability to apply force."¹¹ Inequality and domination are thus inherent in every level of the model, so that the newly founded settlements are seen as parts of a chain of domination and dependency where homelands control colonies, while the colonies in turn control the indigenous host communities around them. As a result, Finley excludes a number of important historical and ethnographic cases from his definition of colonies because they do not reflect foreign domination over local communities.¹²

Although it is highly explicit and theoretically grounded in its considerations of political economy, Finley's model is nevertheless overly restrictive. By his own admission, the definitional requirements of homeland control, mass emigration, and colonial domination of the indigenous host communities exclude the implanted settlements of the eighth to sixth century B.C.: Greeks, the Phoenicians, Hellenistic settlements in former Persian lands, the Crusades, the Venetian Romania, the Genoese trading stations, Uganda, the Gold Coast, the Congo, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast.¹³ The term *colony* is effectively limited to the international dominance relationships of European colonialism, and even then is restricted to a small number of European ventures such as the early stages of English and Spanish colonies in the Americas, and English or French "settler colonies" (*colonies de peuplement*) in Africa, for example, Kenya.

Clearly this model will not do. Any typology that excludes this many archaeological and historical cases needlessly multiplies analytical categories, and impedes rather than helps us in our goal of understanding the dynamics of ancient colonies. What is needed is a definition of colonies that subsumes, but is not limited to, European colonialism. A more neutral use of the term *colony* simply refers to a specific form of settlement, without assuming the kind of dominance hierarchy inherent in the concept of European colonialism, and without specifying the nature of social relations between the settlement and surrounding communities. For purposes of cross-cultural comparison, I suggest that a colony can be most usefully defined as follows:

an implanted settlement established by one society in either uninhabited territory or the territory of another society. The implanted settlement is established for long-term residence by all or part of the population and is both spatially and socially distinguishable from the communities of a host society. The settlement onset is marked by a distinct formal corporate identity as a community with cultural/ritual, economic, military, or political ties to its homeland, but the homeland need not politically dominate the implanted settlement.

The corporate nature of the foreign community and its formalized ties with its homeland, and with its host community, are key elements that provide an important distinction between colonies and episodes of migration by individuals or families. Note also that this definition treats the nature of power relations between the colony and the host community, and between the colony and its homeland as open issues to be determined empirically, rather than assuming a priori that these are structured to fit in, as in the European colonialism model. By doing so, one is able to recognize the possibility that interregional interaction networks may be organized in a variety of ways; some colonies may dominate their host communities while others may not. The degree of homeland control over the colony is also something that may vary widely, even in the same colonial system, depending on local circumstances and power balances.¹⁴ This reformulated definition has several advantages. First, it encompasses the sixteenth- to twentieth-century European expansion while also allowing us to compare a wide variety of ancient, non-Western, and precapitalist networks of colonies within a single general framework. Second, the recognition of variation in power relationships forces us to investigate the dynamics of historically specific interactional situations (that is, how the nature of relations worked between a particular colony and its host communities), while also attempting to identify the broader scale structural determinants of these relationships.

Colonies as Diasporas

By dropping the dominance assumptions of European colonialism, it becomes possible to recognize that there are multiple potential modes of power relations among colonies, homelands, host communities, and the specialists who act as intermediaries among them. This conceptual shift then poses the challenge of how to best describe and explain this variation. One of the most useful theoretical frameworks for the study of cross-cultural interaction is the trade diaspora model, developed by Abner Cohen in his analysis of relations between ethnically distinct enclaves of Hausa traders and their Yoruba host communities in West Africa.¹⁵ Cohen defines trade diasporas as "interregional exchange networks composed of spatially dispersed specialized merchant groups which are culturally distinct, organizationally cohesive, and socially independent from their host communities while maintaining a high level of economic and social ties with related communities who define themselves in terms of the same general cultural identity."¹⁶

It is important to distinguish the very specific model of a trade diaspora from the more general notion in globalization studies of diasporas as transnational communities.¹⁷ Trade diasporas arise in situations where culturally distinct groups are engaged in challenging communication and transportation conditions, and where centralized state institutions are ineffectively providing participants with either physical or economic security in long-distance exchanges. One strategy through which these difficulties can be overcome is for traders from one cohesive ethnic group to control all or most of the stages of trade in specific commodities. To do so effectively, the group must organize itself as a corporate entity capable of political action that can deal with external pressure from their host community or trading partners, ensure unified group action for common causes, and establish channels of communication and cooperation with members of the same group in other parts of the exchange network.

Members of the trading group move into new areas, settle down in market or transport centers along major trade routes, and specialize in exchange while maintaining a separate cultural identity from their host community. The foreigners attempt to maintain a monopoly of their particular trade specialization; this allows them to function as intermediaries or cross-cultural brokers between their host community and the outside world. The shared identity among different diaspora communities provides the framework for the communication, credit, and reliability necessary for the orderly long-term functioning of the exchange system. To allow for this ease of interaction between widely separated communities, diaspora organization is stable at the group level, but allows for substantial mobility among its members. The group has its own political organization that maintains order within the group and coordinates with other diaspora groups to maintain the diaspora's identity and economic "turf" in dealing with host communities. Often, the maintenance of this distinct political organization requires some level of judicial autonomy and mutual assistance between diaspora members as well.

Organizational factors alone are insufficient to hold the group together. Trade diasporas strongly emphasize their distinctive cultural identity as well, defining themselves as a moral community that acts as a group to enforce the conformity of individual members of the group to shared values and principles. According to Cohen, "The creation of a trading diaspora requires the mobilization of a variety of types of social relationships, the utilization of different kinds of myths, beliefs, norms, values, and motives, and the employment of various types of pressure and of sanctions. These different elements which are employed in the development of the diaspora are so interdependent that they tend to be seen in terms of an integrated ideological scheme which is related to the basic problems of man, his place in society and in the universe."¹⁸

An ideology of this type is necessary to build and maintain the cohesion of the diaspora and its effectiveness as a trade network despite the centrifugal forces of spatial dispersion and competition from host communities or other trade diasporas. For this reason, many of the best known trade diasporas are

closely associated with "universal" civilizations or religions such as Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, or Judaism.¹⁹ In these kinds of interregional exchange systems, the most cohesive diaspora groups survive and prosper; groups that lose or lack a strong unifying ideology tend to fragment, lose the trade monopoly that is their *raison d'être*, and eventually merge with their host communities.²⁰

Difference is the essence of a trade diaspora. The group defines its membership and scope of action by emphasizing its distinctive identity and exclusiveness relative to its host community. This deliberate separation is necessary to strengthen the diaspora's corporate identity; it also insures the diaspora's survival by preventing outsiders from entering the group and breaking their trade monopoly. Although most commonly defined through an ideology of shared descent or origin, diaspora identity can also be expressed through a variety of linguistic, religious, or other cultural criteria in which relative importance can shift as needed in order to maximize group distinctiveness. The group maintains the integrity of the interregional exchange network by trying to be as different as possible from its host community while at the same time emphasizing a shared cultural identity with sister diaspora communities. The trade diaspora's ethnicity can be seen as a deliberately invented and consciously maintained social identity, such that the members of the group are culturally distinct not only from their host community but even, on occasion, from their community of origin (as is the case with the Hausa in Yoruba communities).²¹ Trade diasporas can be surprisingly long-lived as distinct ethnic communities. The extended maintenance of a separate cultural identity is especially likely to occur when it provides the diaspora with an economically advantageous trade link to its homeland.

Host communities allow diasporas to settle and accord them autonomy because the foreigners are useful to local rulers in several ways. In many agrarian or pastoral societies, exchange is viewed as a suspicious activity that is best left to outsiders or socially inferior groups within the polity.²² Sponsoring and taxing trade diasporas provides an easy way for rulers in the host community to increase their own wealth without having to go through the conflict inherent in restructuring power relationships within their own community.²³ It is because strangers to the trade diaspora lack strong social ties with the majority of the host community that they have little choice but to be dependent on and, therefore, loyal to the local rulers. The key point to note here is that the social position of the diaspora is closely tied to local politics—specifically the degree of sociopolitical complexity and the nature of factionalism or competition in the host community.

A trade diaspora can have a wide range of possible relationships with other diaspora nodes, with its homeland, and especially with its host community. The three most important points along the continuum of diaspora-host relations are as follows: (a) marginal status, (b) social autonomy, and (c) in the extreme case, the diaspora can dominate the host community.

In some cases, the rulers of the host community treat the trade diaspora as

a marginal or pariah group to be exploited at will. The foreign enclave's presence is only tolerated because of its usefulness to the host community. In these cases it is the host community that emphasizes the social separation of the diaspora group, defining the latter's autonomy more through restrictions than through rights. This marginal status was often characteristic of Jewish trade diasporas in medieval Europe,²⁴ Jains in India, or merchant groups in the Fulani-controlled Islamic state of Massina in the middle Niger region during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.²⁵ Although the Massina state reluctantly recognized the importance of exchange, it was seen as a low-status activity completely at odds with *Pulaaku*, the Fulani cultural ethos. As a result, virtually all exchange activities were carried out by non-Fulani such as the Dyula, Arabs, or Moors. These groups were tolerated but restricted in their activities, and were denied access to the state center at Massina.²⁶

The second form of diaspora status is that of protected autonomy within the host community. This can be gained through the explicit granting of autonomous political status by the local rulers, as in the case of the Chinese trade diaspora in Southeast Asia. The Chinese trade diaspora was able to gain a high degree of autonomy in its various Southeast Asian host communities by being financially useful to local ruling elites. The Chinese had been long-distance traders throughout Southeast Asia for centuries, trading Chinese porcelain, cotton goods, and silk in return for pepper, nutmeg, and cinnamon. Ties to the homeland played an important role in establishing the autonomy of the overseas Chinese. The maritime experience of Chinese long-distance merchants and their monopoly on access to Chinese ports and goods were powerful incentives to local elites in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. These merchants were extended numerous trading monopolies, tax concessions, and exemptions from unpaid labor. In addition, the Chinese traders usually occupied special quarters set aside for them by the local rulers. In return, the Chinese diaspora provided local rulers with exotic prestige goods and other economic benefits of exchange such as customs taxes and loans when needed.²⁷ Chinese diaspora groups forged close alliances with local rulers and played key roles in the financial and administrative hierarchies of their host polities as tax farmers or other state officials. This client-community status benefited the Chinese, who were able to occupy a profitable, protected socio-economic niche. At the same time, the local rulers gained new sources of income and a group of subordinates whose dependence insured their loyalty.²⁸ Thus, trade diasporas such as the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia gained autonomy through the commercial advantages accrued from their close ties to the Chinese mainland, coupled with a strategy of political alliances with powerful local patrons.

At the extreme end of the range of variation in the organization of inter-regional exchange is the fairly unusual situation in which the trade diaspora actually controls its host community. The classic examples of this are the European trading post empires in Africa and Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The European trade diasporas established mercantile enclaves

under their own military control while also using force to control the terms of trade with their host communities. This aggressive strategy was so successful that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the English in India and the Dutch in Indonesia had effectively transformed their militarized trade diasporas into actual territorial empires.²⁹

There is also a wide range of possible relationships among different nodes in the trade diaspora and between the diaspora and its homeland. One cannot assume that a foreign trading enclave represents a unified political entity controlled by its homeland or metropolis. For example, the Greek colonies in the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Black Sea during the later first millennium B.C. retained certain ideological ties with their mother cities, but were not necessarily dominated by them. At the same time, ties between colonies were weak or nonexistent, except in the broadest sense of a shared cultural identity. At the other end of the spectrum, diaspora nodes may be closely linked politically, as was the case in the Portuguese *Estado da India*, where the viceroy in Goa ruled over secondary diaspora nodes or colonies in Mozambique, Malacca, and Macao.

Given the extent of this variability in diaspora organization, and the degree to which it depends on the sociopolitical structure of the host communities, it should come as no surprise that trade diasporas do not remain static over time. Curtin points out that one of the most striking characteristics of trade diasporas is their tendency to work themselves out of business. Diasporas come into being because the differences between cultures in an interregional exchange network require the services of mediators. These middlemen become victims of their own success, however, and extended periods of mediation can reduce cross-cultural differences and hence the need for cross-cultural brokers.³⁰ When this happens, the diaspora loses its distinctive status as members of the host community take over the foreigners' position in the exchange network. At this point, several things can happen. In one common pattern, the trade diaspora can leave the host community and return to its homeland if the cultural ties between the two communities have remained sufficiently strong over time. This outcome was typical of medieval European trade diasporas, such as those connected with the Hanseatic League. These formal commercial enclaves were withdrawn from their host communities in places such as London by the end of the sixteenth century, as English merchants took over the trade. In a variation of this out-migration pattern, the trade diaspora may simply be expelled (regardless of whether they return to their ancestral home), as were the Indians from Uganda or the Jews from Spain.

In a second pattern, the trade diaspora may remain in the host community, but its members find new socioeconomic roles and remain as an ethnic minority. The classic example of this second pattern is the evolution of the Chinese trade diaspora in Southeast Asia from a protected community closely involved in international trade and local administration into a series of ethnic minorities involved in local exchange and manufacturing.³¹

In the third pattern, with the loss of its distinctive economic role, the trade diaspora can slowly disintegrate as a unique social group and be absorbed or assimilated into the host community.³²

The trade diaspora concept thus provides a framework that allows for a tremendous range of variation in the organization of interregional interaction, in the strategies pursued by foreign trading enclaves and host elites, and in the developmental trajectories of these networks. Once we recognize that these different possibilities exist, how do we link them to specific historical or archaeological cases? From the examples discussed above, different forms of power configurations—within and between homelands, enclaves, and host communities—appear to have a marked influence on the relationship between a trade diaspora and its host community.

The military, political, and economic power of the trade diaspora or its parent community plays a key role in structuring interregional reaction. This is, of course, most clearly evident in the dominance of the militarized European trade diasporas over their Asian and African host communities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By contrast, when the homeland polity is either weak or nonexistent, then there is far more opportunity for negotiation between hosts and diasporas in the organization of interaction within the network.

When the baggage of colonialism is removed from the concept of “colonies,” the latter emerge as highly flexible social entities in which organizational variability can best be understood through the trade diaspora model outlined above. The dominance relationships inherent in European colonialism apply to only a small subset of ethnohistorically documented relationships among colonies, homelands, and host communities in non-Western or precapitalist networks of interregional interaction. There is thus ample reason to believe that this kind of variability existed as well in the organization of colonies established by prehistoric state societies. Our task, then, is twofold: (a) to identify colonies in the archaeological record, and (b) to determine the organization of political and economic relations between these diasporas and their host communities, without assuming colonial dominance in advance.

The trade colonies established by early state societies can be considered as a particular kind of trade diaspora settlement. Both colonies and diasporas share a focus on trade and show tremendous variation in the forms of relations they can have with both their host communities and their homelands. The definitional differences between the colonies and diasporas mostly revolve around the degree of community cohesion or corporate identity and the extent to which the foreigners emphasize an ideology of distinctive cultural identity relative to the host population. I suggest here that for cross-cultural comparative purposes, however, trade colonies are most usefully seen as a territorially grounded form of trade diaspora settlement. Viewing exchange-oriented colonies as trade diasporas forces us to acknowledge in our models the potential for variation in relations among homelands, foreigners, and host communities. This flexibility is essential if we are to develop a general

comparative model of colonies that can encompass both ethnographic and archaeological cases.

The identification of trade colonies or trade diasporas in the archaeological record is surprisingly difficult, not least because it is closely related to the problematic issue of recognizing ethnicity through material culture. We can identify as colonies those archaeological sites in which architecture, site plan, material culture assemblage, and behavioral patterning are identical to those of another region, but are located as spatially discrete occupations surrounded by settlements of the local culture. One would expect colonies to be founded as completely new settlements on previously unoccupied land. Alternatively, if founded in association with a preexisting settlement, a colony should show sharp architectural and artifactual discontinuities with both earlier occupations and contemporaneous indigenous residential areas. Artifactual similarities to the homeland should reflect a broad complex of material culture used in a variety of contexts, rather than being limited to a single category such as ceramics.

Robert Santley and his colleagues argue that the ethnic identity of the inhabitants in a colonial enclave should be expressed in material culture connected with two different levels of social inclusiveness—the enclave as a whole and the more restricted domestic level.³³ At the enclave-wide level, the identity of the foreigners is expressed and reinforced through public rituals; these are often centered on a ceremonial structure such as a church, temple, or mosque, where architecture generally incorporates the style or symbolic elements of the homeland. Common language, styles of dress, the wearing of particular badges or emblems, and burial customs are also enclave-wide ways to express the separate identity of foreigners. These practices are especially common because they provide highly visible identification of a person's ethnicity by others, both within and outside the group.³⁴

At the domestic level, the members of an enclave generally live together in a geographically contiguous area, distinct from other parts of the host community. In the households of the foreign enclave, ethnicity will be expressed in culinary practices. Food preferences, preparation procedures, and the material culture associated with these practices should differ from local patterns in the host community while resembling the cultural practices of the homeland (although one might also expect to see eventual convergences in foreign and local cuisines in long-term colonial situations). In addition, the distinctive ethnic identity of the foreigners will often be reflected by the use of raw materials or styles from the homeland in the paraphernalia used for household rituals.³⁵

It is important to consider alternative interpretations for the presence of foreign styles of material culture in the sites of a different culture, rather than automatically assuming that this material culture reflects the existence of a foreign enclave. The use of multiple criteria combined with contrastive patterning between the foreign and local assemblages is necessary to distinguish the actual presence of foreign settlers from (a) trade without a trade diaspora, or (b) emulation by groups of local elites who are simply adopting status-

related aspects of foreign material culture (through either importation or imitation). Trade, emulation, and the presence of trade colonies or diasporas should leave different archaeological signatures. If interaction is limited to trade without the presence of a foreign enclave, then we would expect to see only portable trade items in the local settlement; foreign public and residential architecture would be absent, as would be evidence for foreign food preferences in spatially discrete contexts. If interaction consists of local elite emulation of foreign styles, we would expect to see these imports or imitations limited to high-status households, while lower-status groups retained local customs. In most cases, the elite households would show a distinction between the emulation of foreign styles in public contexts and the retention of local styles in domestic life.³⁶ Diachronic analyses can also distinguish a colonial enclave from a case of elite emulation; in the latter case one would expect to see the gradual appearance of foreign styles in elite contexts, rather than the sudden appearance of a complete range of foreign material culture as the archaeological signature of a colony.

Mesopotamian Colonies: The Uruk Expansion (circa 3700–3100 B.C.)

The earliest archaeologically identifiable network of colonies was established in the Near East during the fourth millennium B.C. Urban-centered state societies developed in southern Mesopotamia during the Uruk period in the mid-fourth millennium B.C.³⁷ Almost immediately, the economic sphere of the Uruk polities expanded to form an extensive interaction network connecting the southern alluvium with the less urbanized polities in the neighboring highlands areas of the Zagros Mountains, north Syria, and southeast Anatolia (see fig. 1).³⁸ A number of sites in these areas have been identified as Uruk trading colonies, apparently established to control trade and communication routes while extracting metals, semi-precious stones, lumber, or other commodities from the resource-rich highland zones, in what is apparently the world's earliest known colonial system. Sites with characteristic Uruk architecture, ceramics, and administrative technology (that is, seals, sealings, bullae, tokens, and numerical tablets) were established in the key routes through the Iranian Zagros,³⁹ on the Tigris River in northern Mesopotamia,⁴⁰ across the Habur headwaters region,⁴¹ and up the Euphrates River into the Taurus highlands.⁴² The Uruk expansion into Syria and Anatolia seems to have begun in the Middle Uruk period, probably circa 3700 B.C.,⁴³ and reached its fullest extent in the Late Uruk.⁴⁴ For reasons that we do not really understand, the Uruk expansion seems to have ended fairly abruptly circa 3100 B.C. with the abandonment or destruction of Uruk settlements in Syria, Anatolia, and the Zagros.

The south Mesopotamian colonies are quite distinctive as intrusive sites, established in the midst of local Iranian, Syrian, and southeast Anatolian cultures. Several different forms of Uruk material culture occurring together—notably ceramics, architecture, and administrative technology—serve to identify the Mesopotamian implanted settlements while distinguishing them from




Fig. 2. Similarities in Uruk pottery, administrative technology, seal-design iconography, and public architecture, 4000–3000 B.C.

Left: artifacts from colonies such as Habuba Kabira, Qannas, and Jebel Aruda; *right:* artifacts from the southern Mesopotamian alluvium and the Susiana plain

contemporaneous local settlements.⁴⁵ Multiple criteria are necessary because ceramics alone are not a reliable indicator of ethnicity.⁴⁶

Sites identified as Uruk colonies have a full range of Mesopotamian ceramic forms representing a wide set of functions. Local and indigenous ceramics tend to be rare or absent from these sites or parts of sites. The sites with the full repertoire of Uruk ceramic forms also have distinctive Uruk domestic or public and ritual architecture. The south Mesopotamian tripartite “middle hall” house with keyhole-shaped hearths and an associated courtyard characterizes implanted Uruk settlements.⁴⁷ Wall cone mosaic decoration is a second architectural element characteristic of the Uruk.⁴⁸ Similarly, niched facade temples are a distinctive Mesopotamian type of public building.⁴⁹ A third distinctive feature of the Uruk-implanted settlements is the presence of south Mesopotamian administrative technology such as cylinder seals, bullae, tokens, and clay tablets with numerical inscriptions used to monitor the mobilization, transportation, storage, and disbursement of goods.⁵⁰

Based on these criteria, researchers have identified Uruk-implanted settlements at Godin in central western Iran;⁵¹ at Brak and Nineveh in northern Mesopotamia;⁵² and on the Syrian Euphrates at Qrayya, Habuba Kabira, and Jebel Aruda (fig. 2).⁵³ On the upper reaches of the Euphrates in Anatolia, excavations have identified Uruk implanted settlements at Hassek Höyük, and have suggested more tentatively that they may also be present at Samsat and Tepecik.⁵⁴

These colonies seem to have been established on the major trade and communications routes leading up toward the main source areas of copper, lumber, and semiprecious stones in the Taurus Mountains of eastern Anatolia and the Zagros Mountains of Iran. Interaction between Mesopotamians and local societies took three different—and occasionally overlapping—forms: exchange, emulation, and the establishment of actual Uruk settlements in the territories of indigenous polities. The degree to which any one of these three interactional forms might have predominated in a given region probably varied depending on local conditions. In the areas closest to southern Mesopotamia proper, colonies such as Habuba Kabira or Tell Sheikh Hassan were large fortified settlements that apparently used coercion in a short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful effort to exert economic control over the sparsely populated local Syrian communities.⁵⁵ In more distant regions with larger populations, Uruk settlements such as Godin V or Hacinebi took the form of small “outposts” or “way stations” located inside the preexisting towns of local polities.⁵⁶

In contrast with the apparent social isolation of the colonies at Habuba and Jebel Aruda, the large displays of local material culture in the Uruk outposts suggest that the latter interacted very closely with their host communities. We have no evidence to suggest that these outposts dominated local economies through asymmetric exchange or coercion. Instead, the small numbers and vulnerable position of the Mesopotamians at Godin and other outposts meant that they could only survive by remaining on good terms with


their more powerful indigenous neighbors. At the outermost edges of the Uruk interaction network, Mesopotamian material culture at sites such as Tepecik is so sparse that it becomes difficult to determine whether it reflects the actual presence of a Mesopotamian outpost or simply a process of emulation by a small subset of the local population.⁵⁷ These differences suggest that the organization of these settlements and the ways they interacted with their local neighbors varied markedly depending on a number of factors, most notably the distance from Mesopotamia, the size of the local population, and the degree of preexisting social complexity in the indigenous polities.⁵⁸

The Uruk Mesopotamian Presence at Hacinebi, Turkey

Although Uruk "colonies" and "outposts" in Syria and Anatolia have been excavated, we know almost nothing about the organization of this interregional trade system or its impact on the political, social, and economic systems of the indigenous cultures in southeast Anatolia. Excavations from 1992 to 1997 at Hacinebi Tepe in southeast Turkey document the effects of Uruk Mesopotamian commercial expansion on local Anatolian polities.⁵⁹ Hacinebi is the ideal site to elucidate this problem, since it is an indigenous settlement strategically located near the Uruk enclaves on the Euphrates River trade route, and shows clear signs of contact with Mesopotamia during the Late Chalcolithic period (circa 3700–3200 B.C.). The evidence for an apparent Mesopotamian trading enclave in one corner of this Anatolian settlement, approximately 1,200 kilometers upstream from the city of Uruk, provides a rare opportunity to examine the nature of interaction between diasporas and host communities in the world's earliest known network of colonies.

Hacinebi is a 3.3 hectare mound located on the bluffs overlooking the east bank of the Euphrates River in Sanliurfa province, southeast Turkey (see figs. 1, 3). The site lies near the head of the main north-south riverine trade route linking Mesopotamia and Anatolia; it also occupies a strategic location on what has historically been the major east-west river crossing point at Birecik. The mound of Hacinebi is situated on an easily defensible east-west-oriented spur, which drops steeply down to the river on the west, and into deep canyons to the north and south. The Tigris-Euphrates survey project conducted by Guillermo Algaze first discovered Hacinebi and identified its main occupation as Late Chalcolithic, comprising both local southeast Anatolian Amuq F/G⁶⁰ and south Mesopotamian Uruk ceramic forms.⁶¹ The only post-Chalcolithic ceramics noted at Hacinebi were Achaemenid-Hellenistic in date, circa fifth to second centuries B.C.

Excavations at Hacinebi have identified three main Late Chalcolithic occupation phases (fig. 4). Phases A and B1 date to the early fourth millennium B.C. and are characterized by local Anatolian chaff-tempered ceramics. Exposures of phase A and B1 occupations have found evidence of a possible fortification wall, monumental public architecture, large storage structures, long-distance exchange of copper and chlorite/steatite, on-site copper metallurgy, mortuary evidence for ascribed hierarchical social status, stamp seals,



Hacinebi Tepe—Late Chalcolithic Relative Chronology

	Hacinebi	Kurban	Atatürk Dam Reservoir	Arslantepe	Amuq	Leilan	Tabqa Dam Reservoir	Southern Mesopotamia
3000 B.C.	EB I burials (abandonment)	VIA	Hassek Karatut	VIA	G	IV	Habuba Kabira Jebel Aruda	Late Uruk
3500 B.C.	B2	VIB	VII	F	V		Sheikh Hassan ?	Middle Uruk
4000 B.C.	B1 A							

Fig. 3. Topographic map of main excavation areas at Hacinebi, 1992-97

Fig. 4. Chronology for Hacinebi and selected other sites, 3000-4000 B.C.

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


Fig. 5. Uruk Mesopotamian jar types, Hacinebi, 3700–3200 B.C.

and stamp seal impressions indicative of administrative activities.⁶² These finds are consistent with the evidence from other sites such as Arslantepe in pointing to a fairly high level of social complexity in the local Late Chalcolithic cultures of southeast Anatolia even before the period of intensive contact with Uruk Mesopotamia.⁶³

Late Chalcolithic phase B2 overlies phases A and B1, and shows complete stylistic continuity with them. In this later occupation, large concentrations of Uruk Mesopotamian material culture appear at Hacinebi. During phase B2 (circa 3700–3200 B.C.), a small Mesopotamian trading enclave seems to have been established in the northeast corner of this local Anatolian settlement. It is important to emphasize that the intrusive material neither replaces nor evolves out of the earlier Anatolian assemblage but instead appears alongside it as a second, parallel body of material culture. Two lines of evidence suggest that an Uruk Mesopotamian-implanted settlement was present at the site. First, the Mesopotamian artifacts are not just limited to ceramics but represent the full range of Uruk material culture used in both public and domestic contexts. Second, multiple classes of Uruk material culture occur in association with one another.

The full range of Uruk ceramic forms is present at Hacinebi. Stylistic analyses and radiocarbon dates both suggest that this material ranges from the Middle Uruk through the beginning of the Late Uruk period—circa 3700–3300 B.C.⁶⁴ Ceramic vessel form classes span the full range of functions, including those used for food preparation, serving, and storage. Predominant among these are beveled rim bowls, fine conical cups, crude conical cups, comb-incised strap-handled jars, low expanded-band rim jars, round rim jars, spouted jars, trays, and ladles (figs. 5, 6). Ware types and manufacturing techniques match southern Mesopotamian practices so that the majority of vessels are wheel-made, sand-tempered forms, while beveled rim bowls and trays are chaff tempered and manufactured by hand. The full range of Uruk forms of decoration are used, such as red slipping, appliqué bands, comb incision, and reserved slip. Finds of Uruk style kiln wasters and the preliminary results of instrumental neutron activation analysis all indicate that the Uruk style ceramics were manufactured on-site; the production of Uruk ceramics was contemporaneous with, but stylistically and technologically distinct from, the manufacture of the local Anatolian ceramic forms (fig. 7).

Uruk architecture is only indirectly attested at Hacinebi. No intact niched facade temples or middle room houses have been exposed as yet in phase B2 contexts; however, large numbers of ceramic wall cones—the uniquely Mesopotamian architectural decoration—have been found in trash deposits at the site (fig. 8).⁶⁵ Excavations in Mesopotamia proper and at colonies such as Habuba Kabira, Jebel Aruda, and Hassek Hüyük have shown that this architectural decoration was used on both public and domestic buildings in the Uruk period.⁶⁶

An additional form of distinctively Mesopotamian material culture at



Fig. 6. Uruk Mesopotamian beveled rim bowls and conical cups and bowls, Hacinebi, 3700-3200 B.C.




Fig. 7. Anatolian Late Chalcolithic jar types, Hacinebi, 3700–3200 B.C.

0 5cm



Fig. 8. Uruk Mesopotamian wall cones, Hacinebi, 3700-3200 B.C.

Fig. 9. Uruk Mesopotamian conical-headed copper pin, Hacinebi, 3700-3200 B.C.

Fig. 10. Uruk Mesopotamian ceramic sickle fragment, Hacinebi, 3700-3200 B.C.

Hacinebi is bitumen. Bitumen sources are common in southern Mesopotamia and the adjacent region of Khuzestan in southwest Iran, with one of the most widely used seepages at Hit on the Euphrates River. Bitumen was ubiquitous as a construction material, sealant, and raw material for a variety of functional or decorative objects in southern Mesopotamia, and has also been identified at Uruk colonies such as Habuba Kabira, Tell Sheikh Hassan, and Jerablus Tahtani.⁶⁷ Large amounts of this nonlocal petroleum-based raw material have also been found concentrated in phase B2 deposits associated with Uruk ceramics. Geochemical analyses have demonstrated that large amounts of the Hacinebi B2 bitumen derives from sources in the Uruk heartland of southern Mesopotamia and southwest Iran.⁶⁸ These clear interregional contrasts in bitumen availability and use raise the possibility that this material might have been either a trade good exported from Mesopotamia to southeast Anatolia, or else served as the packaging within which some other (as yet unidentified) trade good was transported.

Other distinctively Mesopotamian forms of material culture found at Hacinebi include personal ornaments, artifacts associated with commercial activities, and subsistence-related technology. A conical headed copper pin found in Uruk deposits at Hacinebi has an exact parallel in the Uruk colony at Tell Sheikh Hassan⁶⁹ and at southern sites such as Tello and Susa (fig. 9).⁷⁰ Cruciform grooved stone weights, known from the Uruk colony at Habuba Kabira⁷¹ and Sheikh Hassan⁷² are also present at Hacinebi. Finally, two examples of high-fired clay sickles have been found at Hacinebi (fig. 10). These tools are characteristic of fourth-millennium southern Mesopotamian artifacts in the Ubaid, Uruk, and Jemdet Nasr periods,⁷³ and have never, to this author's knowledge, been attested at any local Late Chalcolithic Anatolian settlements.

The northeast area of Hacinebi has yielded evidence for distinctively Mesopotamian administrative (sealing) systems. Mesopotamian record-keeping technology is easily recognizable in its use of cylinder seals as opposed to the Anatolian use of stamp seal technology. Local Anatolian-style stamp seals and seal impressions are present at Hacinebi in the earlier phases A and B1 and continue in use in phase B2. Phase B2 deposits in the northeast area of Hacinebi have yielded an almost complete range of standard Uruk administrative artifacts including jar sealings, jar stoppers, hollow clay ball or bullae filled with tokens, and a clay tablet—all bearing Uruk cylinder seal impressions, and all found in association with Uruk ceramics (fig. 11).⁷⁴ These record-keeping devices are common both at southern Mesopotamian urban sites such as Uruk⁷⁵ and at Uruk colonies such as Habuba Kabira, Jebel Aruda, Tell Sheikh Hassan, and Hassek Hüyük.⁷⁶

Finally, behavioral patterning at Hacinebi is consistent with the artifactual evidence in matching the expected profile of a Mesopotamian colony. Animal bone remains can provide particularly strong evidence for the presence of a Mesopotamian enclave at Hacinebi, since food preferences and food preparation procedures are often very culture-specific.⁷⁷ The presence of such an

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


Fig. 11. Uruk Mesopotamian administrative technology, Hacinebi, 3700–3200 B.C.
A: unbaked clay tokens found in a cylinder seal-impressed hollow clay ball; B: two faces and cross-section of a cylinder seal-impressed hollow clay ball (seal designs at top right); C: cylinder seal-impressed tablet

enclave should be reflected by clear differences in food preferences, food preparation procedures, and possibly in butchery practices as well. Preliminary analyses show that major differences exist in the relative abundance of different animal species between those parts of Hacinebi with Uruk material culture and those where the local Anatolian assemblage predominates.⁷⁸ In Anatolian contexts caprids, mainly sheep and goats, form only about 50 percent of the sample. Pig is next in importance, at about 37 percent, and cattle third at 12 percent. This reflects a fairly diversified herding system. The unusually high proportion of pigs at Hacinebi is consistent with the pattern observed at other local Anatolian sites in the Euphrates valley. In a striking contrast to this pattern, Uruk contexts at Hacinebi show completely different food preferences; caprids form 85 percent of the sample, with only small amounts of pig and cattle present. This predominance of caprids fits very closely with what little is known about patterns of Uruk animal use at sites like Rubeidheh and Farrukhabad in southern Mesopotamia and Khuzestan, where caprids range from 80 to 96 percent of the faunal assemblages.⁷⁹ In short, the faunal remains associated with Mesopotamian material culture match closely with known Mesopotamian food preferences and differ markedly from the animal bones associated with Anatolian contexts.

Taken together, the distinctively Mesopotamian ceramic, architectural, administrative, and other forms of material culture used in both public and domestic contexts at Hacinebi are completely consistent with both general criteria for the identification of colonies in the archaeological record,⁸⁰ and with the specific complex of material characteristic of Uruk colonies and settlements in the southern Mesopotamian homeland.⁸¹

Archaeological Correlates of the Colonial-Dominance and Trade Diaspora Models

The full range of Uruk material culture is not only present at Hacinebi, where it occurs together in deposits that are contemporaneous with, but spatially separate from Anatolian local Late Chalcolithic phase B2 deposits. These contrasting distributions of material culture at Hacinebi allow us to examine the organization of economic and political relations between the Mesopotamian colony and its host community. We have already noted that the variation in power relations between a trade diaspora and its host community can result in three different patterns of interaction: (a) diaspora marginality, (b) diaspora social autonomy, and (c) diaspora domination over its host community. Given the complexity of Uruk state societies and the size of the Uruk network of colonies, it would appear highly unlikely that they formed a socially marginal diaspora dominated by local host polities. We are left with two main options. The Uruk colonies might have dominated their host communities in an asymmetric power relationship along the lines of the European colonialist or Immanuel Wallerstein's world system models.⁸² Alternatively, the Mesopotamian diaspora might have been a socially autonomous group, having an essential parity in economic and political relations with its Anatolian

host community.⁸³ These two modalities in diaspora-host power relations should have distinctive archaeological correlates at Hacinebi.

If the Uruk enclave controlled the host community at Hacinebi along the lines of the colonial dominance model, one would expect to see the following archaeological correlates:

1. There should be evidence for Mesopotamian control over an asymmetric exchange system, as seen in the pattern of circulation of goods and the predominance of Mesopotamian administrative systems;
2. There should be evidence for a net outflow of subsistence and craft goods from the local settlement to the foreign enclave; and
3. There should be a high degree of complementarity in economic activities and exchange between the Uruk and the local host communities.

By contrast, if the Uruk enclave were a socially autonomous trade diaspora, one would expect to see the following as archaeological correlates:

1. Symmetric exchange relations, with no evidence for exclusive Mesopotamian economic or political control. Administrative artifacts should show evidence for both Mesopotamian and local control over the production, circulation, and consumption of commodities, or in degree of economic specialization;
2. There should be an essential parity in flows of subsistence and craft goods between the two communities; and
3. The Mesopotamian enclave should be largely self-sufficient in food and craft production. This would appear as the duplication of economic activities in both Mesopotamian and local Anatolian contexts.

There is no evidence for warfare or competition between the Uruk and Anatolian portions of the site. The phase B2 settlement shows no signs of warfare, fortifications, armaments, violent deaths, or sudden destruction events. Instead, a long series of superimposed occupational phases indicates that the Mesopotamian presence at the site was both peaceful and long-lived—extending for three hundred, and possibly, as long as five hundred years.

The Organization of Mesopotamian-Anatolian Trade at Hacinebi

Some of the best evidence for the organization of Mesopotamian-Anatolian interaction at Hacinebi comes from comparisons between contemporaneous deposits with overwhelmingly Mesopotamian material culture and those with mainly or exclusively local Late Chalcolithic Anatolian artifactual inventories. The complex of material culture and available evidence for food preferences from the two types of contexts strongly support the idea that an enclave of ethnically distinct Mesopotamians was present at the site. There is no evidence, however, that the Mesopotamians dominated their Anatolian host community. Instead, comparative analyses of ceramics, chipped stone, fauna,

and record-keeping (administrative) artifacts from the Mesopotamian and local parts of Hacinebi suggest that the Uruk enclave was a socially and economically autonomous diaspora whose members raised their own food, produced their own crafts, and administered their own encapsulated exchange system.

Ceramics. Preliminary analyses of ceramics from the Uruk and local contexts show remarkable contrasts.⁸⁴ The Uruk and local contexts are generally trash deposits; that is, not in situ. The differences between the two contemporaneous sets of deposits indicate, however, that in at least some parts of the site, Uruk and local Anatolian ceramics were being used and then discarded separately.

A more detailed look shows that the differences go beyond the simple difference in cultural affiliation. The forms and dimensions of the ceramics also show clear contrasts in the functions or activities represented in the Uruk and Anatolian assemblages. In the Uruk deposits, over 90 percent of the ceramics are bowls—mainly beveled rim bowls. The Uruk bowls are not only more numerous, they are also much smaller than the Anatolian bowls. Most Uruk bowls have rim diameters between 8 and 22 centimeters, while most local bowls range from 25 to 40 centimeters. By contrast, the ceramic assemblage from the Local Anatolian deposits is much more evenly divided among bowls, jars, and the distinctive local “casserole” cooking vessels.

We can also see other important functional differences between the two samples. Cooking vessels, mainly casseroles, form about 21 percent of the ceramics in the Anatolian contexts. By contrast, local casseroles and Uruk strap-handled cooking pots together form less than 1 percent of the ceramics in the Uruk contexts. In short, the percentages of vessel forms and dimensions suggest that the Anatolian ceramics are a typical domestic assemblage used for food preparation, serving, and storage. Although storage and food preparation are represented in the Uruk deposits, the predominance of beveled rim bowls suggests that in addition to normal domestic activities some kind of highly specialized function was also taking place.

Bitumen. The presence and processing of bitumen, a petroleum-based raw material, points to additional differences between the Uruk and Anatolian parts of the site. As noted above bitumen occurs frequently at Uruk sites in southern Mesopotamia. At Hacinebi, bitumen occurs most frequently in association with Uruk material culture. Bitumen occurs in the three main forms that follow: as residues on ceramics (predominantly on Uruk forms), blocks, and shaped pieces—representing production debris, bulk storage, and finished products. All forms are far more common in Uruk contexts. Some of the bitumen residues on ceramics may reflect the use of this material as a waterproof sealant. The dribble patterns and locations of bitumen on many beveled rim bowls and in the spouts of conical cups suggest, however, that blocks of solid bitumen were being melted down and poured as an industrial activity in

the midden in the Uruk contexts. There is no evidence for this activity in the Anatolian contexts. Chemical analyses of the bitumen by Dr. Jacques Connan of the French Elf Aquitaine Petroleum company,⁸⁵ and by Mark Schwartz of Northwestern University,⁸⁶ suggest that the Hacinebi bitumen is chemically identical to the bitumen from the Uruk colony at Habuba Kabira, and that both groups of samples are consistent with the composition of bitumen sources in the two main Uruk heartland areas of southern Mesopotamia and southwestern Iran. If this is correct, then the Hacinebi bitumen is the earliest Uruk trade good to be found in Anatolia.

In short, the ceramic and bitumen evidence suggest that the Mesopotamian enclave was engaged in some specialized activities that were not practiced by the local Anatolian host community. These differences should not, however, mask the overall pattern of two parallel economies in the Mesopotamian and Anatolian communities. A variety of artifact classes show that the people who generated the trash in Uruk and local contexts were engaged in similar types of activities, suggesting low levels of intracommunity exchange, and a high degree of socioeconomic autonomy in the Uruk enclave. This autonomy can be seen in the encapsulated nature of craft production, subsistence, and exchange-related administrative activities.

Chipped Stone Tool Production and Use. Patterns of chipped stone tool production and use suggest that the Uruk enclave at Hacinebi was characterized by a high degree of economic autonomy in both craft production and subsistence.⁸⁷ These show some interesting similarities and differences when compared to lithic use in the Anatolian areas of Hacinebi. Uruk deposits show clear evidence for stone tool manufacturing. The frequency of secondary flakes with large areas of cortex reflects early stages in the manufacture of large "Canaanite blades" made from a distinctive medium-banded cream-and-tan chert. The presence of this raw material and of secondary flakes in local Late Chalcolithic deposits as well suggests that blade tool manufacture took place concurrently in both Uruk and Anatolian parts of the site. Stone tool forms in the Uruk and Anatolian midden deposits suggest that both parts of the site were engaged in agricultural production. Many of the Canaanite blades show traces of bitumen hafting in the typical locations for sickle blades. Similarly, silica gloss, or "sickle sheen," is present on at least some blades from both areas. This is important because it suggests that the people who generated the midden in the Uruk contexts at Hacinebi were harvesting cereals. This stands in marked contrast to the Uruk colony of Habuba Kabira in Syria, where Dietrich Sürenhagen has suggested that the Uruk colonists were supplied with food by the local population.⁸⁸

The same forms of stone tools were produced by both the Mesopotamian and Anatolian communities, Canaanite blades and simple blades from contexts with Mesopotamian material culture match the dimensions of these tool types in the Mesopotamian homeland while being significantly smaller than Canaanite and simple blades from Anatolian contexts.⁸⁹ These differences

are consistent with ethnically specific contrasts in technological style between Mesopotamians and Anatolians at Hacinebi.⁹⁰

Overall, the lithic evidence suggests three conclusions. First, both Anatolians and Mesopotamians at Hacinebi had access to the same raw materials. Second, both the Uruk and Anatolian areas were independently manufacturing parallel tool forms, although there may have been some ethnically distinctive differences in the technological styles they used to make particular blade types. Finally, both the Uruk and local areas were engaged in agricultural production.

Other Crafts. Other craft activities were also practiced in parallel by the Uruk and Mesopotamian communities. Ceramic spindle whorls are present in both areas, suggesting that both groups were weaving their own textiles.⁹¹ Similarly, finds of Uruk-style kiln wasters indicate that the foreign enclave was manufacturing its own pottery, following southern Mesopotamian technological practices and stylistic conventions. A few minor variations have been noted in the ways that stylistic motifs were combined on Uruk ceramics at Hacinebi, perhaps reflecting the relative isolation of Uruk potters at Hacinebi from their homeland 1,200 kilometers to the south. Thus basic craft goods such as stone tools, ceramics, and textiles were all produced in parallel by both the Uruk and Anatolian communities. Spindle whorl styles show no differences between Uruk and local contexts.⁹²

Administrative Technology. The Uruk administrative technology of cylinder seal use coexists with, but is separate from, the local stamp seals and sealings (see figs. 11, 12). Unused sealing clays are found in both Uruk and local contexts, confirming that each group monitored the movement of commodities. The two sealing systems differ in technology, iconography, function, and pathways of economic circulation. The Mesopotamian record-keeping system used cylinder seals, which were rolled over the wet clay sealing medium to produce a long, narrow continuous band of repeating images. Mesopotamian motifs stressed animal processions or work scenes depicting laborers engaged in agricultural or craft production. Uruk cylinder seals were impressed on hollow clay balls or bullae; on tablets; on mushroom-shaped clay jar stoppers; and, most frequently, on clay sealings affixed to the rim or exterior of ceramic vessels (fig. 12).

By contrast, the Anatolian system consisted of rectangular or round stamp seals, which created a single image each time the seal was pressed into the wet clay sealing. Anatolian seals almost always depicted lions and caprids in chase or hunt scenes.⁹³ The two systems were used for completely different functions. Anatolian stamp seal impressions at Hacinebi are found on sealings affixed to wooden boxes, packets of reed matting, leather bags, and cloth sacks; they never appear on ceramic vessels, tablets, jar stoppers, or bullae (fig. 13).

Most telling of all, a comparison of the administrative artifacts with the distribution of other classes of material culture reveals very low levels of



Fig. 12. Uruk Mesopotamian jar stoppers. Hacinebi, 3700-3200 B.C.
A, B: top views of two jar stoppers; C, D: top and side views showing the shape of the vessel necks; E, F: obverse and reverse views of two jar stoppers showing the impressions of the string and textiles used to cover the vessel mouth before the clay sealing was affixed

interaction among the Uruk and local spheres of exchange. This is important, because if Anatolians were delivering supplies as trade goods or tribute to the Mesopotamians, then we would expect to see the discarded local stamp sealings in Uruk Mesopotamian contexts. This is not the case; instead, Uruk-style cylinder-sealed artifacts used for record-keeping occur exclusively with Uruk-style ceramics, while local style stamp-sealed administrative artifacts are found almost always with local Anatolian ceramics. Out of more than one hundred local stamp seal impressions, only two have ever been found in deposits with Uruk ceramics and administrative technology. These few cases of Anatolian sealings in Uruk deposits are important because they confirm the contemporaneity of the two record-keeping systems while emphasizing that those systems were used to seal different goods that moved in separate economic spheres. The distribution of sealings suggests the operation of two autonomous, minimally interacting administrative systems monitoring separate sets of economic transactions, rather than the kinds of commodity flows to be expected if the Uruk colony were exercising political or economic dominance over its Anatolian host community.

Faunal Remains. The colonial domination model would imply that the local people supplied foreigners with meat; by contrast, if the autonomous diaspora model applies to Hacinebi, we would expect to see signs that the Uruk enclave had subsistence autonomy and raised its own animals. Analyses of body part distributions provide an effective means of determining whether the Uruk enclave was provisioned with animals. Generally, when a sheep or goat is butchered, the head and feet bones are removed and discarded. The body parts with the most meat on them are the forelimb and hindlimb. If the people in the Uruk enclave were receiving meat from elsewhere, then we would expect to see many limb bones, but very few head or foot bones. Since all of the main body parts are present, however, and since there is no clear predominance of the meat-rich limb bones, the available evidence suggests that the people on both the Uruk and local contexts were raising and butchering their own animals, and were not being provided with meat from any other part of the site.

Discussion and Conclusion

The spatial-functional analyses of material culture patterning at Hacinebi allow us to reconstruct several major aspects of identity and political economy in the interregional interaction network that linked the early complex societies of Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Syria, and Iran in the fourth millennium B.C. The data presented here are most consistent with the interpretation that (a) an ethnically distinct colony of Mesopotamians was, in fact, present at Hacinebi; and that (b) this colony was an autonomous trade diaspora that did not dominate the indigenous complex society with which it interacted. The heuristic value of the trade diaspora model as a way to conceptualize the relations between the Mesopotamians and their host community in the fourth millennium B.C. Near East suggests that this theoretical framework can be



Fig. 13. Anatolian Late Chalcolithic administrative technology, Hacinebi, 3700-3200 B.C.

A-F: stamp seal impressions from unbaked clay container sealings; G: face and cross-section of a square stamp seal, with seal impression

used cross-culturally in a more general model of variability in power relations within the networks that link homelands, colonies, host communities, and the specialist intermediaries who circulate among them.

A full range of Uruk Mesopotamian material culture is concentrated heavily in the northeast corner of the phase B2 settlement at Hacinebi. Two sets of criteria were proposed as ways to identify colonies as a general phenomenon,⁹⁴ and specifically, Uruk colonies,⁹⁵ in the archaeological record. The Hacinebi data meet both sets of criteria quite closely. The relatively sudden appearance of Mesopotamian material culture and the fact that it is apparently not limited to elite contexts all argue against an interpretation of this patterning as reflecting local elite emulation of Mesopotamian styles in material culture. One of the strongest arguments against the emulation model is the faunal evidence for distinctively Mesopotamian food preferences in contexts with Mesopotamian material culture, while Anatolian food preferences predominate in contexts with local Anatolian artifact assemblages. The most parsimonious interpretation of the Hacinebi evidence is that it represents the presence of a small group of ethnically distinct south Mesopotamians in one corner of this Syro-Anatolian settlement.

Spatial-functional comparisons of ceramics, lithics, fauna, and small finds between contexts with Mesopotamian material culture and those characterized by local Anatolian assemblages were used to evaluate whether the relationship between the Uruk colony at Hacinebi and its host community conformed to the inequalities expected under the European colonialist dominance model or the more symmetric power relationships of the autonomous trade diaspora model. The two models were tested by examining the degree of asymmetry in the exchange system, as seen in the pattern of circulation of goods, and the distribution of administrative or record-keeping artifacts. There was no evidence to suggest that the Anatolian host community supplied the Mesopotamian enclave with foodstuffs and craft goods either as trade items or as a tribute or taxation. The faunal and archaeobotanical evidence suggest that each group farmed its own crops and raised its own animals. In addition, each group produced its own stone tools, ceramics, and textiles.

Most telling of all is the distribution of the seal impressions as evidence for control over the storage, circulation, and consumption of goods. Each group maintained its own distinctive record-keeping system—the Mesopotamians using cylinder seals, while the local people relied on stamp seals. In an asymmetric system dominated by the Mesopotamians, one would expect to see large amounts of Anatolian stamp sealings in contexts with Uruk material culture, indicating that the local population was delivering commodities to the foreign enclave. Instead, the local stamp seals appear almost exclusively with Anatolian material culture, while the Uruk cylinder seal-impressed administrative artifacts occur only in Mesopotamian assemblages. We know that the two assemblages are contemporaneous by radiocarbon dating and by the presence of “cross-overs”—small numbers of Uruk shards in local contexts and vice versa. The

observed patterning, therefore, cannot be explained as being due to chronological differences.

The coexistence of both local and Uruk administrative artifacts suggests that both groups exercised some degree of control over the production, circulation, and consumption of commodities. The contrasting distributions of administrative artifacts indicate that the two communities had fairly autonomous economic and administrative spheres, operating in parallel and rarely interacting. There is no evidence for a net outflow of subsistence and craft goods from the local settlement to the foreign enclave. The Mesopotamian and Anatolian communities produced, exchanged, and consumed goods within their own encapsulated social domain. While some exchange no doubt took place between the two groups, the distribution patterns of administrative artifacts suggest that these exchanges were small scale and symmetric, rather than the large scale unequal transfers of commodities or preciosities as would be expected if applying the European colonialist dominance model. Finally, the lithic and faunal evidence that the Mesopotamian enclave was largely self-sufficient in food and craft production strongly suggests that the foreigners were an autonomous diaspora rather than a dominant colonial elite.

These two autonomous communities appear to have had a peaceful coexistence. There is no evidence for fortifications, warfare, or sudden violent destruction in any part of the phase B2 settlement at Hacinebi. Given the apparent small size of the Uruk community and the lack of evidence for either warfare or domination, it seems clear that the Mesopotamians were there at the sufferance of the local elites. Overall, the Uruk colonial enclave at Hacinebi best fits a model of an autonomous diaspora community, rather than a group of politically dominant foreigners, as would be expected in the European colonialist model. As this case study demonstrates, once we disentangle the more general social phenomenon of "colonies" from the highly specific European political-economical phenomenon of "colonialism," it becomes possible to generate more realistic models of cross-cultural interaction.

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