American Pragmatism and Neo-Pragmatism in Its Affinities with European Philosophical Hermeneutics

 Jaroslav Hroch


    I would like to begin my paper by the attempt to depict certain common epistemological features
between American pragmatic tradition and European philosophical hermeneutics, especially that of
Hans-Georg Gadamer. H.-G. Gadamer´s philosophy in its epistemological dimension is characterized by
the fundamental critique of scientism, accompanied by the protest against the Cartesian primacy of
the logical over the rhetorical and in accordance with hermeneutic tradition is oriented to the
knowledge of individual in the concrete socio-cultural context - on the contrary to the tendencies
to emphasize abstract universals and principles. In this consequence we can say that both Gadamer´s
hermeneutical philosophy and American pragmatism belong to the empiricist stream of modern
philosophical thought. From that point of view Gadamer could agree with the opinion of William
James that "empiricism lays the explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and
treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction".1

       H.-G. Gadamer´s epistemology is from the historical point of view based on a complex
critical reflection of the theories of understanding in the Romantic philosophical tradition. In
this consequence it is interesting that especially William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty and
Stanley Cavell - as Russell B. Goodman points out - identify their epistemological conceptions with
what they call "the romantic” as opposed to the “classic-academic” type of imagination".2

      Similarly we can speak about the common features in pragmatic and hermeneutical conception of
experience. In the epistemological tradition of pragmatism (from W. James to R. Rorty) as well as
that of contemporary hermeneutically oriented philosophical thought (M. Heidegger and H.-G.
Gadamer) there is emphasized the deep, imaginative and projecting character of human experience
which helps to overcome the theoretical foundation of experience on the processes of mere seeing,
mirroring the world.3

      Heidegger and especially Gadamer have analyzed the notion of lived experience in an obvious
continuity with Wilhelm Dilthey´s philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie). According to Dilthey, the
process of understanding moves forward with the course of life itself and the starting point of the
process of understanding is an experience that in one sense cannot be repeated. In essence, this
experience could be reduced to the lived experience ("Erlebnis"). Erlebnis, which expresses the
intensity and wholeness of human experience, constitutes the basis upon which it is possible to
apply the hermeneutic circle to the process of understanding.4  In the conception of H.-G. Gadamer
which in many aspects issues from the tradition of Diltheyan  Lebensphilosophie the process of
understanding enables one to find the way to truth and simultaneously preserve, by means of
"openness" for the other partner of communication, the stable coexistence between the interpreter
and the object of interpretation.5

      In the epistemology of William James (as a certain anticipation of modern hermeneutical
conceptions) the notion of pure experience represents "the immediate flux of life", but such a flux
concretely occurs in the form of the process characterized by the stable coexistence of the subject
and object of knowledge: "Feeling, however dimly and subconsciously, all these things, your pulse
of inner life is continuous with them, belongs to them and they to it. You cannot identify it with
either one of them rather than with the others."6

        When we further compare the epistemological conceptions of W. James and H.-G. Gadamer, it
is interesting that both philosophers validate these forms of experience which have been in the
Romantic tradition ascribed to the influx of divine power. For instance Gadamer - analogically as
James - is interested in the deep philosophical reflection on the religious experience. Both James
and Gadamer examine the wide range of human experience and its spiritual dimension. But in a
certain difference to James Gadamer puts stress mainly on the social function of religion and on
its essential connection with art. Gadamer´s reflection of religious experience helps him to
overcome scientifically limited conception of knowledge and truth.7

       From that point of view Gadamer - inspired by Heidegger´s radical questioning - emphasizes
the unity of the ethical and the epistemological dimension of truth. It provides him the
theoretical starting point of his endeavour to rehabilitate practical philosophy based on the
theoretical grounds of Christian tradition, Shaftesbury°s conception of common sense and Husserl´s
theory of the lifeworld ("Lebenswelt").

        This stress on both practical and ethical dimension of human activity - resembling the
pragmatist conceptions - is also based on Gadamer´s analysis of Platos and Aristotle´s ethics in
the first stage of development of his hermeneutical philosophy. In Gadamer´s view both Plato and
Aristotle are ruled by the enduring urgency of the Socratic question of good. In his book Platos
dialektische Ethik [Platos dialectical Ethics] (1931) Gadamer has analyzed the structural features
of the Platonic dialogues, which are based on the principle of Logos that supersedes the subjective
opinions of the discussion partners by the way of consensus, and thus enables a communicative
appurtenance and inter-human solidarity.

        American pragmatism and Continental hermeneutics aim to the unification of theory and
practice, the epistemological and the ethical dimension of human life. In this context it is
interesting that Lebenserfahrung (life experience) represents one of the most important categories
of H.-G. Gadamer´s  hermeneutics.   Both the philosophy of W. James and that of H.-G. Gadamer is
characterized by the critique of intelectualism according to which the relations within the world
and social processes are based on "actus purus of Thought, Intellect, or Reason, all written with
capitals and considered to mean something unutterably superior to any fact of sensibility
whoever".8

       There is - of course - a certain difference between James´s and Gadamer´s conception of
experience. William James´s view of human experience is psychological, he describes it in a form of
a "spread", a "field" or mainly as a "stream". But Gadamer´s basic concept of experience is more
dialectical and mainly existential, he emphasizes these forms of experience (for instance the
experience on the tragic character of our life projects) which cannot be verified by means of exact
sciences. According to Gadamer the main paradigma of experience is that of history, art, and
religion. The typical feature of experience is also its openness and connection with the finitude
of human being which means the experience concerning our "painful failure".9 On the whole, however,
we can say that Gadamer´s conception of epistemology and experience is very close to "James´s
project of uniting empiricism with spiritualism”. 10

       According to my opinion it would be also effective to analyze and compare common features in
H.-G. Gadamer´s and R. Rorty´s theories of understanding. From the epistemological point of view
the common feature of their philosophies is based on the conception that both Gadamer´s
hermeneutical and Rorty´s post-analytical philosophy cannot be considered only as a "method for
attaining truth".11   In his book Wahrheit und Methode (in a certain continuity with Heidegger's
fundamental ontology) Gadamer places stress on the historical and dialogical dimension of
understanding, which is also the most important property of a human being. Gadamer's thesis of a
dialogical, historical and projecting character of understanding stemms from the theory that there
is fundamental ontological connection between understanding and speech events  ("sprachliches
Geschehen").

 ´   Contrary to essentialism and in continuity with Gadamers hermeneutics and the Romantic
tradition Rorty emphasizes dialogical as well as creative, self-forming character of understanding
which is therefore connected with the self-transformation of man by means of his edification
stemming from the communicative activities, such as reading, or, for instance, dialogue within the
community. Understanding is based on the process of constant forming and interrelated dialogue of
various interpretations, regarded from the beginning as equal and legitimate.. Using the
instigations of romanticism, Rorty emphasizes the self-forming nature of human mind, the creative
character of which is enabled also by the fact that our thought is oriented not only to verified
knowledge, but also to something "unknown, abnormal, revolutionary, poetical, metaforical".12

      Despite these affinities with the philosophical hermeneutics of H.-G. Gadamer, neo-pragmatic
and post-analytical philosophy of Richard Rorty overlooks Gadamer´s emphasis on die Sache. It is
necessary to realize that in Gadamer´s view (influenced obviously by Edmund Husserl´s
phenomenology) inquiry is always inquiry into a subject-matter and dialogues always remain the
dialogues over die Sache.13 Therefore the process of understanding is characterized by Gadamer as
Tun der Sache selbst even though in the context of tradition (Überlieferung).

       In this consequence we ought to compare the socio-cultural dimension of Rorty´s
neo-pragmatic philosophical thought and his idea of edifying philosophy with the conceptions of
tradition, culture and education (Bildung) in Gadamer´s hermeneutics. Especially in the last
chapter of his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty has been influenced by
Gadamer´s theory of Bildung (which means education, self-formation). The author of Wahrheit und
Methode emphasizes the notion of Bildung with its ethical and historical dimension against such
conceptions of knowledge which ignore the problem of historical continuity, identity and moral
integrity of human being. Gadamer argues that the notion of Bildung has been critically turned
against such theories of education which were not able to grasp the substantial connection between
its cognitive and ethical dimension. In Gadamer´s view neglecting of this fact led to the unability
of German culture and philosophy in 1930s to resist Nazism.

       In Rorty´s adequate interpretation the notion of Bildung is closely connected with the
notion of effective-historical consciousness (wirkungsgeschtliches Bewusstsein) to characterize
"the attitude interested not so much in what is there out in the world as in what we can get out of
history for our own uses". 14 It is also important - as Georgia Warnke points out - that according
to Rorty Gadamer´s account of tradition has "forced us to see the pragmatic basis of all
inquiry".15

       It is obvious that Rorty´s idea of edifying philosophy was inspired above all by Gadamer´s
notion of Bildung. Rorty´s theory of edifying philosophy is based on the conviction about the close
and indivisible link among the epistemological, ethical and educational dimension of the real,
profound philosophical view of reality. This conception is - according to my opinion - substantial
and characteristic for both pragmatic and hermeneutic procedures of philosophical reflection.

      In continuity with the traditions of American philosophy and European hermeneutics Rorty
highly evaluates Romanticism, which is understood by him as the other name for the creative
conception of reality. This Romantic tradition, tied with the emphasis on creative subject and with
the conception of life as the work of art, ought to be connected - according to Rorty - with social
reformism, the function of which is to develop the ideals of liberal democracy in present time. In
his view there are certain common features between liberalism and pragmatism because "both are
expressions of [...] the same suspicion of religion and metaphysics. Both can be traced back to
some of the same historical causes (religious tolerance, constitutional democracy)".16

       Rorty´s stress on the aesthetical way of life, self-invention and conceptual novelty in the
moral development of the human being led to Jürgen Habermas´s critique, especially in his book The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures (Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne:
Zwölf Vorlesungen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1985). Habermas criticizes Rorty´s but also
Derrida´s persuasion about hidden connection between the sphere of ethical and aesthetical as an
antirational drive of unconstrained hedonism. In fact Habermas is critical to Romanticism which is
- on the other side - very inspirative for Rorty. Certain elements of Romanticism endanger
according to Habermas not only the tradition of subjective, but also communicative reason: "Dreams,
phantasies, madness, orgiastic excitement, ecstacy - it is the aesthetic, body centered experiences
of a decentered subjectivity that function as the placeholders for the other of reason." 17

    According to Habermas, aesthetic experience depends on its rational discursive structures even
while purporting to oppose and transcend reason. "There is no escaping reason, because there is no
escaping language and because language is essentially and necessarily rational."18 Language is the
medium through which we live: "with any speech act, the speaker takes up a relation to something in
the objective world, something in a common social world, and something in his own subjective
world." [...] "Reason is by its very nature incarnated in contexts of communicative action and in
structures of the lifeworld.19 This Habermas°s claim is very close to Gadamer´s opinion that "die
Sprache ist die Sprache der Vernuft selbst.( H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode.M 2. Auflage.
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr  1965, p. 379.) But poetic language is the paradigma of language by both
Gadamer and Rorty.

        However, against Habermas Rorty argues that it is not possible to derive rationally and
universally oriented moral philosophy from the philosophy of language. There is nothing, for him,
in the nature of language that could serve as a basis for justifying the superiority of liberal
democracy. In his view, we should stop presenting the institutions of liberal Western societies as
offering the rational solution to the problem of human coexistence, as the solution that other
people will necessarily adopt when they cease being irrational.20

      In my view, when we deeply reflect and analyze the opinions mentioned above, we can agree
with Richard Schusterman that "through such polemics, Habermas and Rorty project misleading dualism
between reason and aesthetics that seems inconsistent with their own basic pragmatism".21

    In connection with emphasis on creative personality and in accordance with proclaimed slogan
about the priority of democracy to philosophy it is understandable that Rorty has rather critical
attitude to French structuralist, post-structuralist, respectively post-modern philosophical
thought. Emphasizing the notions of solidarity and the sense for community he cannot agree with
Foucault´s underestimating of subject and of his function in historical process. Rorty considers
Michel Foucalt to be "dispassionate observer of the present social order" who "affects to write
from the point of view light-years away from the problems of contemporary society". He even
reproaches him for "a lack of any identification with any social context, any
communication".22 From the same point of view Rorty could agree with Lyotard´s critique of Habermas
that studies of communicative competence of a transhistorical subject are of little use in
reinforcing our sense of identification with our community, but on the other hand he insists very
strongly on the importance of that sense.

      The problem of our identification with community is closely linked with the philosophical
reflection on the themes of tradition, national identity and the sense of Euro-American culture at
the present time. It is not surprising in this context that Rorty emphasizes the great importance
of tradition and of the consciousness of political and cultural continuity in the social life of
North Atlantic civilization. His conceptions are at that point very close to the conceptions of
tradition in contemporary European hermeneutics, mainly those of H.-G. Gadamer´s. As far as Richard
Rorty´s conception of tradition is concerned, we especially cannot miss the influence of German
hermeneutically oriented philosophy (M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer, J. Habermas). Rorty has a special
affinity to Gadamer´s hermeneutics in dialogical conception of understanding and  in a great  of
attention paid to  integrative function of interhuman relations. He also endeavours to synthetize
the spiritual heritage of European hermeneutics and American pragmatism. This synthesis was
succesful owing to Rorty's ability to find their common feature in the sense for solidarity and
dialogue, in historical attitude to social reality and in emphasizing the practical dimension of
philosophy. Both Gadamer and Rorty esteem highly the historical roles and moral authority of the
institutions originating in  gradual formation of the democratic political life.

     There is, of course, a certain difference in socio-historical a political foundations of
Gadamer´s.and Rorty´s conceptions of tradition. For instance, Gadamer emphasizes more  than Rorty
the importance of the spiritual heritage of Christianity in the life of Western society. 23   On
the other hand, Rorty conceived his notion of tradition along with a sharp analysis   and profound
reflection of the contemporary situation of American society and its future perspectives. As a
result, he interprets tradition  as historical continuity with the spiritual heritage of those
historical personalities in the political and cultural life of United States who  embodied the
ideals of democracy, justice, and equality among the citizens, especially (R. W. Emerson, A.
Lincoln, and M. L. King).24

       In this connection, Rorty argues that we cannot escape the traditions to which we belong or
"step outside our skins".25 Nowadays, he even criticizes American Cultural Left for lacking a sense
of tradition and national identity. He is aware of the fact that democracy is based on free and
intensive communication, which cannot be realized without a specific contexture which links people
speaking the same language, living in the same national tradition. From that point of view, he
stresses one unifying language and rejects multiculturalism which, in his opinion, could lead to
the creation of new ethnic and national ghettos in the USA.

 Using this analogy, if we reflect on the problems concerning the current geopolitical orientation
of the Czech Republic, it is necessary to take into account questions of national identity and the
danger of its loss. These dangers are caused not only by global problems, but in association with
"the decline of public space in contemporary postmodern era when you cannot differentiate between
higher and lower, value and interest, eternal and ephemeral".26 The problem is very important in
the specific historical situation in the Czech Republic, where, unfortunately, a sense for rational
political discourse is lacking within political life. This discourse often has been substituted,
especially in the first half of 1990s, with a pseudo-religious triumphalistic exaltation about the
victory of good over evil, democracy over totalitarism, market economy over socialism.

     In Rorty´s communitarianistic opinion there is no general superhistorical and theoretical
ground reasoning the existence of democratic institutions. This problematique can be solved only
from the historical point of view and with regard to concrete community in a certain stage of its
historical development. It is also interesting that Rorty°s communitarian views are in many aspects
analogous to Gadamer°s conceptions. In Gadamer°s view for instance the category of solidarity
(common sense) could be reflected adequately only from the historical point of view.

       From this reason Gadamer in his Wahrheit und Methode pays such a great attention to A. A. C.
Shaftesbury´s conception of common sense as the ability of communicative behaviour and the deep
feeling of solidarity with the other participants in political dialogue. But this is explained by
Gadamer (and by Habermas) in the framework of historical narrative about the rise of democratic
institutions and the ways of life in England in the historical period of political compromise
between the victors and the defeated after Glorious Revolution (1688).27

     The notion of sensus communis (common sense, shared sense) was perceived and elaborated on
from a theoretical point of view by the English philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of
Shaftesbury (1671-1713) as the special ability to obligation, social feeling, understanding and
mutual agreement: "A public spirit can come only from a social feeling or sense of partnership with
human kind".28 Gadamer appreciates Shaftesbury°s conception of a specific unity between the sphere
of ethical and aesthetical - and this is also very close to Rorty°s conceptions. In broader context
it is also understandable that the narratives on democracy, dialogue, tolerance, solidarity and the
persuasion that nobody has exclusive right to know the truth connects the philosophical thought of
R. Rorty and H.-G. Gadamer.

 At the end of this study I would like to point out to some motives uniting pragmatism with
contemporary spiritually oriented hermeneutics (J. Lacan, J. Hillman, R. Bly, P. von Matt, M.
Exner, R. Starý) . It is well known that W. James, influenced by Frederick C. Myers, has introduced
to his philosophical and psychological thought the categories of subliminal consciousness and of
subconscious self, used lately in the psychoanalysis of S. Freud: "The subconscious self is
nowadays a well-credited psychological entity; and I believe that in it we have exactly the
mediating term required."29

 W. James - on the contrary to the influential opinion of German psychologist W. Wundt (Grundriss
der Psychologie, Leipzig 1902, p. 248-251) - has legitimated the existence of the psychical
processes which exist outside the primary consciousness. This has been very appreciated by the
forerunner of the depth hermeneutics and the founder of analytical psychology Carl Gustav Jung. It
is not surprising that in Jung´s essay Theoretische Überlegungen zum Wesen des Psychischen we can
find this important passage from W. James°s The Varieties of Religious Experience: "I cannot but
think that the most important step forward that has occured in psychology since I have been a
student of that science is the discovery, first made in 1886, that [...] there is not only the
consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in
the shape of a set of memories, thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the
primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to
reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most important step forward because,
unlike the other advances which psychology has made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely
unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of human nature."30

 Anticipating the conceptions of the deep hermeneutics W. James was convinced that "there is
actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of." 31 In this
consequence we ought to realize that the philosophy and psychology of William James, especially his
theoretical reflections from The Varieties of Religious Experience, have helped C. G. Jung to
create a new, very inspirative paradigma of psýché. It might be argued that Jung°s theories of
collective uncousciousness and archetypes (with the central archetype of Selbst (Self)32 have been
influenced by Gnostic and Neoplatonic conceptions of the soul, too, but these spiritually oriented
philosophical ideas are characteristic for the Emersonian and Romantic tradition in American
philosophy. In particular Jung°s conception of Selbst (Self) - which represents the central
archetype of order, as well as that of the totality of the spiritual life of human being - has been
immensely inspired by W. James and his idea of wider self: "we have in the fact that the conscious
person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of
religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and positively true as far as it goes."33

 Thus William James has inspired Jung´s paradigma expressed in his primary archetypes of Selbst and
Individuation - that coherent growth and self-transformation is central to the philosophical,
religious and ethical life. In this context we can find therefore analogical features between
Jung°s theory of Selbst (Self) on one side and the stress on the self-improvement, identity and
moral self-development of human personality in the ethical theories of W. James°s followers on the
other side (as one of many examples we can state for instance the concept of "growing, enlarging,
liberated self" in John Dewey´s ethics).34 The use of the methodological procedures of the deep
hermeneutics - whose founder C. G. Jung, as we have shown, was in his early philosophical and
theoretical development in 1910s crucially influenced by W. James - enables to explain and deeply
reflect the turn toward Romanticism and spiritualism in the contemporary neo-pragmatic philosophy
(R. Rorty, H. Bloom, S. Cavell).

NOTES

 1 William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism. The Writings of William James. A Comprehensive
Edition. Edited, with an Introduction, by John J. McDermott. New York: Random House 1967, p. 195.

 2 Russell B. Goodman, American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1990, p. 60.

 3 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford (UK) - Cambridge (USA): B. Blackwell
1994, p. 144.

 4 Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften. Band VII. Leipzig - Berlin 1927, pp. 198-218.

 5 Hans-Georg Gadamer. Wahrheit und Methode. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1965, pp. 253-254.

 6 The Works of William James. A Pluralistic Universe, ed. Frederick Burkhardt. Harvard University
Press 1977, p. 129. See also: Patrick L. Bourgeois, Sandra B. Rosenthal, Thematic studies in
Phenomenology and Pragmatism. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner Publishing Corporation 1983, p. 37.

 7 H.-G. Gadamer, "Gadamer on Gadamer", in: Gadamer and Hermeneutics, ed. with an introduction by
Hugh J. Silverman. Routledge: New York and London 1991, p. 15.

 8 William James, The Principles of Psychology. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1981, p.
238.

 9 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1965, p. 496.

 10 R. B. Goodman, American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1990, p. 65.

 11 R. Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford (UK) and Cambridge (USA): B. Blackwell
1994, p. 357.

 12 Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical Papers. Volume 2. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1994, p. 174.

 13 Georgia Warnke, Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. Stanford (California): Stanford
University Press 1987, p. 146.

14 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford (UK) and Cambridge (USA): B. Blackwell
1994 p. 359.

 15 G. Warnke, Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. Stanford (California): Stanford
University Press 1987, p. 145.

 16 Richard Rorty, "Response to Ernesto Laclau", in: Deconstruction und Pragmatism, ed. Chantal
Mouffe. London and New York: Routledge 1996, p. 74.

 17 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures. Translated by
Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge (UK) and Oxford (UK) : Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers 1995, p.
306.

 18 Richard Schusterman, Practicing Philosophy. Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life. New York and
London: Routledge 1997, p. 117.

 19 J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures. Translated by Frederick
Lawrence. Cambridge (UK) and Oxford (UK): Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers 1995, p. 313-314,
322.

 20 See Chantal Mouffe, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, and the Politics of Democracy", in:
Deconstruction und Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe. London and New York: Routledge 1996, p. 4.

 21 R. Schusterman, Practicing Philosophy. Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life. New York and
London: Routledge 1997, p. 114.

 22 R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical papers. Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1994, p. 173.

 23 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. 2. Auflage.
J. C. B. Mohr. Tübingen 1965, p. 266.

 24 R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical papers. Volume 2. Cambridge University
Press 1994, p. 173-175. See also R. Rorty, "The Unpatriotic Academy", The New York Times. Sunday,
February 13, 1994, p. 15.

 25 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1982, p.
XIX.

 26 Václav Bělohradský, "Kapitalismus glasnosť a perestrojka teprve čeká" [Capitalism has been only
waiting for glasnost° and perestroika], in: Právo, November 6, 1997, supplement Salon, p. 3.

 27 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1965, p. 16-23. See
also Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. 2. Auflage. Neuwied am Rhein und Berlin
1965, p. 69-78.

 28 Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times
with a Collection of Letters. Volume 1. Basel 1790, p. 90.

 29 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Vintage Books. The Library of
America 1990, p. 457.

 30 Ibid., p. 215. Carl Gustav Jung, "Theoretische Überlegungen zum Wesen des Psychischen", in:
Gesammelte Werke von C. G. Jung. Band 8. (Die Dynamik des Unbewussten). 2. Auflage. Olten und
Freiburg in Breisgau: Walter Verlag AG 1971, p. 215. In my reflection concerning the affinities
between W. James°s and C. G. Jung°s psychology I am grateful to PhDr. Karel Plocek and to prof.
PhDr. Vladimír Smékal from Masaryk University in Brno for their advice, kind help and theoretical
inspiration.

 31 W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Vintage Books. The Library of
America 1990, p. 457

 32 Carl Gustav Jung, "Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten". In: Gesammelte Werke
von C. G. Jung. Band 7. (Zwei Schriften über analytische Psychologie). 2. Auflage. Olten und
Freiburg in Breisgau: Walter Verlag AG 1974, pp. 195-201, 263-269.

 33 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Vintage Books. The Library of
America 1990, p. 460.

34 John Dewey, Ethics. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press 1981, p. 307.