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## ROMAN FRONTIER POLICY UNDER MARCUS AURELIUS

## I

It is difficult at all periods of the Empire to discover what policy decisions were really being made – it is enough to cite the famous passage in Cassius Dio (53.19). Besides this, one must remember that by the 2nd century, at least, it may be misleading to study imperial history by reigns: “It is precisely during the period of the Antonines that the significance of the individual ruler declines steadily”.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, a change of emperor frequently did cause a manifest change of policy – for example, Hadrian’s dramatic reversal of the eastern policy of Trajan. One must remember also that Rome’s enemies frequently reacted to a change of emperor – and indeed, at a lower level, to a change of governor – by renewed aggression, which sometimes made a change in imperial policy necessary. One could point to several instances, but here it is enough to refer to the Parthian assault on Armenia following the death of Antoninus Pius in 161.<sup>2</sup>

But there was undoubtedly continuity of frontier policy over long periods. Certainly records must have been kept – presumably by the *ab epistulis* – of policy conferences, of decisions, perhaps even of contingency plans: a threat from Parthia may have provoked, as its initial reaction in Rome, consultation of a “Parthia file”, containing records of past aggression and diplomatic exchanges, and recommendation for deployment of troops and so forth. We can only detect hints of such possibilities. For instance, there is the famous hesitation of Nero over Britain.<sup>3</sup> Where did Suetonius find this recorded? Was it common knowledge in his youth – or did he, as *ab epistulis*, find it minuted in the files of his secretariat? One may note also how during the reign of Severus the memory of Julius Agricola was recalled (Dio has a mention of him twice – not only an account of his doings as governor, more or less in the predictable place, but a mention when Britain first enters his narrative, with Caesar<sup>4</sup>). One may suspect, no more than that, that Severus and his leading military advisers consulted available records of Roman military activity in Britain: deliberations which involved several changes of policy, until eventually a return was made to the Agricolan plan of incorporating the entire island within the province, so effectively doing away with a frontier at all – for this surely was the intention.<sup>5</sup>

A negative factor of some importance was the absence, at least until the late 3rd century, of anything resembling a military staff college. Leading generals served at opposite ends of the Empire from one another, and would have little opportunity of comparing notes until they had retired from active service. The imperial *consilium*, for that matter, must have been dominated by non-military men: the *militares viri* would be with the armies, until they retired after two or more consular commands. For this reason it is particularly vital to seek to detect long-lived ex-generals and to attempt to observe whether they were in contact with the emperor in their retirement. In this connection I have drawn attention elsewhere to the fact that Q. Pompeius Falco (cos. 108?), the predecessor in Britain of A. Platorius Nepos (consul 119) the builder of Hadrian’s Wall, was visited in the year 140 by Antoninus Pius, on his estates in Italy. All that is known to have been discussed concerned the grafting of fruit-trees – but in 140 the policy of Hadrian and Nepos was being dramatically abandoned.<sup>6</sup> During the reign of M. Aurelius the *militares viri* did have the opportunity of long service together; and one may suspect that some kind of *esprit de corps* grew up in that period, some feeling of agreement on common policy arising out of sober meetings of the imperial war cabinet.

Let me turn now to some general considerations concerning frontiers, or rather, in particular, to the defensive value of different types of frontiers. In a lecture on *Frontiers*, Lord Curzon cited Napoleon on this topic: "De tous les obstacles qui peuvent couvrir les frontières des empires, un desert pareil à celui-ci est incontestablement le plus grand [he refers to the desert between Egypt and Palestine]. Les chaînes de montagnes, comme les Alpes, tiennent le second rang, les fleuves le troisième".<sup>7</sup> Yet when one recalls the graphic phrase in which Tacitus gives the assessment made of Augustus' achievement at his death (*Annals*, 1, 9: *mari, Oceano aut omnibus longinquis saeptum imperium*), one notices that deserts and mountains are missing. Before long they were to be added. But the Rhine and the Danube continued to exert a hold on Roman military thinking, in spite of the fact that the system of defence there maintained was a very poor one – to quote Napoleon again: "Le système des cordons est des plus nuisibles".<sup>8</sup> How much of this was noted by Roman military minds we can only speculate. For instance, not long after Tacitus had commented that the Dacians and Germans were separated from one another "by mountains and mutual fear" (*Germania*, 1), Trajan seized the Dacian mountain bastion, where the new frontier was not a river, easily crossed, but a series of mountain-passes, each of which could be blocked – the *Talsperre* system – at no greater cost in troops than the old river line.

It is worth considering here, very briefly, the changing attitudes towards expansion of the Empire during the imperial period – for it is sometimes alleged that Augustus' final policy was solemnly adhered to with only minor exceptions, and that in any case the Romans were by nature inclined to keep the Empire *intra terminos*. That Tiberius followed Augustus' advice is undeniable. But what is interesting is Tacitus' opinion of him in this context: he records with regret that Tiberius was a *princeps proferendi imperii incuriosus* (*Annals*, IV, 32). Allusion to Hadrian may be concealed here.<sup>9</sup> But the point of view – that Rome should continue to expand, and that expansion is glorious – is consistently Tacitean, as one may see almost anywhere in the *Agricola* (especially Chapter 23), and in the *Germania* as well as in the passage just cited from the *Annals*, and in the others like it. After the abandonment of the Augustan policy by Trajan, Hadrian reverted to it. It may well be that Antoninus was selected by Hadrian as heir in 138 as much for his unmilitary background as for any other reason. It is worth noting that his main rival in 138 was L. Catilius Severus (consul 110), formerly governor of Trajan's province of Armenia: such a man may well have had lurking military ambitions, and ideas of reverting to a Trajanic policy – there was, after all, a threat from the east at this time, and the use of force was contemplated.<sup>10</sup>

But it is under Antoninus that we have the most remarkable statement of attitude: Aristides in the *Roman Oration* regards the Empire as virtually co-terminous with the *ακουμηνή* if any peoples do in fact remain outside they are to be pitied (Section 99). It is worth looking, by way of a real contrast with Tacitus, at the attitude of Cassius Dio. He accuses Trajan and Severus of being motivated in their eastern campaigns by nothing better than *δόξης ἐπιθυμία* (68.17.1 and 75.1.1). One should notice also Dio's crushing comments on Severus' boast that his new province of Mesopotamia was "a bulwark for Syria": "On the contrary," says Dio, "it is shown by the facts themselves that this conquest has been the cause of constant wars and great expense to us, for it yields very little and consumes vast sums" (75.3.3). One would like to find traces of a debate on this issue. It is only in the reign of M. Aurelius that any sign of it can be discovered.

## II

Three frontiers claim our attention in the reign of M. Aurelius – the eastern, the British and the northern. What is abundantly clear is that the eastern war was an unnecessary and

expensive interlude. It began with a Parthian adventure – an adventure risked surely because Antoninus was dead. A governor – M. Sedatius Severianus (consul 153) – turned it from a frontier incident into a five-year war, by losing a legion and his own life. One may justifiably quote Lucian's judgement on him: ὁ ἡλίθιος ἐκείνος Κελεός (*Alexander*, 27).<sup>11</sup> Yet at the end of the war the *status quo* had been restored. One might even say that Roman influence was stronger than it had ever been: the Parthians had been taught an effective lesson, and a Roman senator was king of Armenia.<sup>12</sup> There was no thought, however, of annexation, even if Lucian tells us that sensation-mongering writers were talking of Avidius Cassius taking the Third Legion and some auxiliaries against the Indians (*quom. hist. conscr.*, 31).

In Britain, on the accession of M. Aurelius and L. Verus in March, 161, it seems likely that Hadrian's Wall was once more the frontier and that virtually all Scotland had been abandoned. This view is not a new one, but I am glad to be able to report new evidence to back it up. But first, the old evidence. The Antonine Wall underwent a destruction ca. 155.<sup>13</sup> In 158 the governor Cn. Julius Verus (consul c. 151?) was rebuilding the Hadrianic frontier – the Wall itself and the outpost fort at Birrens. What is more important, he also rebuilt the fort at Brough-on-Noe in Derbyshire, that is, a fort in the southern Pennines some 120 English miles as the crow flies south of Hadrian's Wall.<sup>14</sup> It has always seemed difficult to believe that forts in the southern Pennines (let alone in Wales) could have been occupied simultaneously with Scotland and the Antonine Wall. The researches of my colleague Mr. Brian Hartley seem to me to render this even less likely. His survey of Samian stamps (some results of which are to be published in the *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*) which he has kindly allowed me to draw on here, has produced an interesting statistical picture. Only 3% of the stamps from the Pennine forts (excluding Ilkley, which he has treated separately, but which gives a similar result) tally with those found at Scottish sites, and from the Scottish side this forms 5% of the Scottish material. Similarly, only 3% of the stamps from Hadrian's Wall are matched by those from Scotland, which again form 5% of the Scottish material. By contrast, 34% of the Hadrian's Wall material is matched exactly at Pennine forts; and this forms 44% of the Pennine material.

Obviously there is just sufficient material that does match for someone to maintain that there was an immediate reoccupation of the Antonine Wall by Cn. Julius Verus, just long enough to account for the 3%, before an abandonment by Sex. Calpurnius Agricola. But when one compares the building activity of Verus with that of Calpurnius Agricola (exclusively in England), it is difficult to avoid the impression that they were carrying out the same policy. And, as far as one can tell, the policy was being continued in the early 170's, for Q. Antistius Adventus (consul 168?) is recorded at Lanchester in County Durham.<sup>15</sup> This picture of retrenchment in Britain does not tally with the picture which I want to present shortly, of an expansionist policy elsewhere by M. Aurelius. But here I would like to adopt another idea of Mr. Hartley. He has pointed out that insufficient attention has been paid to an action of M. Aurelius which affected Britain. In 175, under the terms of the armistice with the Sarmatians, 5,500 Sarmatian cavalry were sent to Britain. What was the purpose of sending such an enormous reinforcement? May it not be, as Mr. Hartley suggests, that these troops were sent in order to make possible a return to the Antonine Wall? Could it not be, in fact, that this policy was carried out, say, in 176? This must, for the moment, remain speculation. But in my view it would simplify some things at least if the Wall which the northern barbarians crossed at the opening of the reign of Commodus, was an occupied Antonine Wall.<sup>16</sup>

However important this question may have been to M. Aurelius, his major preoccupation throughout his reign was with the northern frontiers. A threat was present there from the start of his reign, and it had been put off by diplomatic activity (*SHA, M. Antoninus*, 12.13: *Dum Parthicum bellum geritur, natum est Marcomannicum, quod diu eorum qui aderant*

*arte suspensum est, ut finito iam Orientali bello Marcomannicum agi posset*). Before the Parthian war had ended the recruitment of two new legions had begun.<sup>17</sup> This alone is an indication that Aurelius had an intention to annex new territory. The point has been made before, but it seems to have been neglected.<sup>18</sup> One further point is worth making, to emphasize that the Emperor's attention was being turned to the north. He chose a new *ab epistulis* soon after his accession, T. Varius Clemens. This man was a native of Noricum, who had served as presidial procurator in Mauretania Caesariensis and Raetia, as financial procurator in Belgica and the two Germanies. Earlier he had served two tours of duty in Dacia during his equestrian *militiae*. The *ab epistulis* played a part in the selection of personnel.<sup>19</sup>

There is no need here to enter into details about the course of the campaigns.<sup>20</sup> Let us turn to the year 175: *Voluit Marcomanniam provinciam, voluit etiam Sarmatiam facere, et fecisset, nisi Avidius Cassius rebellasset sub eodem in oriente* (SHA, M. Antoninus, 24.5). Dio does not mention the intention to create new provinces at this stage (in what survives of his narrative): ο Κάσσιος καὶ ἡ Συρία νεοχιμασάντες ἠνάγκασαν καὶ παρὰ γνώμην τὸν Μάρκον

Αυτωνῖνον τοῖς Ἰάζυξι συμβῆναι (71.17). Three years later, in 178, Marcus resumed campaigning, and spent a further three years on the northern front, until his death in March, 180: *triennio bellum postea cum Marcomannis Hermunduris Sarmatis Quadis etiam egit et si anno uno superfuisset, provincias ex his fecisset* (M. Antoninus, 27, 10). Dio relates that 20,000 men were stationed among the Quadi and an equal number among the Marcomanni. They were in forts equipped with bath-houses. The two peoples were treated harshly, being prevented from "pasturing their flocks or tilling the soil or doing anything else in security. The Romans kept receiving many deserters from them and captives of their own" (71.20.1). The Quadi were unwilling to endure the presence of Rome in this fashion and attempted to migrate in a body to their northern kinsmen the Semnones; M. Aurelius barred the roads: οὕτως οὐ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν προσκτήσασθαι ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τιμωρησασθαι ἐπέθιμει. (71.20.2).

What the Romans were doing is not quite clear. But it suggests that the Marcomanni and Quadi were still being treated as enemies and not yet as bound by a treaty. But it does not necessarily follow from what Dio says that there was no intention to make them into a province in due course. It need mean only that *this* act (barring the roads) and *this* behaviour (the restrictions on their pasturage, etc.) was not part of his plan to annexe their land, but simply a deliberate plan to punish them. In other words, "He did not wish in *this* way to acquire their land, but simply to punish them", or something of that kind. But the passage has lately been claimed as decisive proof that the Emperor did not intend to create new provinces.<sup>21</sup> It was the argument about this question which originally led me to begin this paper. After I had drafted it I was able to see a paper by Professor J. Dobias.<sup>22</sup> This has made it clear to me that there remain problems with the passage. But first, to quote from his paper: "Der Akzent liegt nicht auf dem Kontrast der Infinitive προσκτήσασθαι und τιμωρήσασθαι, sondern auf dem der Ausdrücke τὴν χώραν und τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Der Sinn der ganzen Stelle ist dann klar. Der Kaiser wollte und konnte sich nicht allein mit dem blossen Gebiet der Quaden zufriedenstellen, weil man erwarten konnte, dass die Quaden von ihren neuen Wohnsitzen aus das Reich belästigen würden, sondern er wollte ihr Gebiet in seinem bisherigen Ausmass erobern".<sup>23</sup> When studying this passage in Dio on a previous occasion,<sup>24</sup> I came to the conclusion that he meant more or less what Professor Dobias makes him say, and I felt justified in translating the passage as follows: "Thus he showed that he wanted not *only* to acquire their land, but to punish the people *also*". But the two words which I have italicized are not in Dio's text, and although one might suppose that they had dropped out, as the text stands

one must interpret it as a denial by Dio of an intention to create new provinces. Let us turn to the other fragments of Dio's narrative. In 71.19 he describes how the Emperor, presumably in the winter of 179-180, was receiving barbarian embassies, who were treated in varying ways. This does not prove, as has been claimed, that he was reverting to "das alte Faktik, die Stämme gegeneinander auszuspielen".<sup>25</sup> Some received Roman citizenship. Surely this may equally well be interpreted as a sign that their territory was indeed being made formally into a province. Some of the tribes would be treated as were the defeated Catuvellauni in Britain in 43, where the *caput civitatis* became a *municipium* and with this most if not all the Catuvellauni must surely have become, if not *cives Romani*, at least *Latini*<sup>26</sup>. The garrisoning of 40,000 troops beyond the Danube, in winter, and the equipping of these troops with baths, suggests to me an intention to stay for a prolonged period – the expense must have been considerable and the government was short of funds. It would have been far cheaper to withdraw to the Danube for the winter, if the intention had been to withdraw permanently after one or more punitive campaigns. In passing one should note something else: the Emperor prevented the exodus of the Quadi τὰς διόδους ἀποορᾶξας. This surely means that he barred the passes. There could not be a better demonstration of how effective the new mountain frontier might have been, even if on this occasion it was being used in reverse.

One must admit that Dio's denial is troublesome. But if Dio meant what he said, how can it be explained? Perhaps he simply thought that this was the truth. He may well have been taken in by Commodan propaganda. But he may have falsified the record. As has been noted, the expansionist campaigns of Trajan and Severus are severely handled. M. Aurelius was a hero to Dio<sup>27</sup>, and it may therefore have suited his purpose to deny the existence of a policy which in the first place was never achieved, and secondly would in any case, even if successful, have tarnished in Dio's eyes the image of his hero.

I have spoken earlier of a debate between a peace party and a war party during this period. This has been most vividly described by Dr. John Morris<sup>28</sup>. In my view he goes a little too far in giving credence to the speech delivered by Commodus on the front at the beginning of Herodian's history (1.5.3-8): here the eighteen year old Emperor expresses an intention to take Roman arms to the Baltic (1.5.6: μέχρις ὠκεανῶν). Dr. Morris was perhaps thinking of Nero's speech in Tacitus' *Annals*, XIII, composed by Seneca, when he assumes not only that the speech represents what was said but also that the sentiments were composed by Ti. Claudius Pompeianus (consul II ord. 173). I think it more likely that Herodian was trotting out a rhetorical τόπος.<sup>29</sup> Further, I do not believe that one need ascribe to Pompeianus imperialism on quite so lunatic a scale. But I think that Dr. Morris has made a very important point when he describes Pompeianus as leader of a war party. And it may be right to see Avidius Cassius as leader of a faction that found the northern wars both burdensome and undesirable. One may detect a hint of a conflict of views in the speech that Dio puts into the mouth of M. Aurelius, addressing the troops after the news of the *motus Orientalis* had reached them: he refers to an unfulfillable wish to put "the matter at issue" between himself and Cassius before the army or Senate in debate.<sup>30</sup> Surely the issue may have been that of war or peace, of expansion or containment.

During the reign of Commodus, Pompeianus retired from public life. When Commodus was murdered he was replaced by Pompeianus' protégé Pertinax.<sup>31</sup> It is worth noting the behaviour of Pertinax as emperor:

βαρβάρους γοῦν τινὰς χρύσιον παρ' αὐτοῦ (sc. Κομμοδού) πολὺ ἐπιληφῶτας μεταπεμψάμενος (sc. Λαίτιος) . . .

ἀπήτησεν αὐτό, εἰπὼν αὐτοῖς ὅτι "λέγετε τοῖς οἴκοι Περτινᾶκα ἄρχειν"

Surely this is clear enough evidence that Pertinax, representative *par excellence* of the Marcan



high command, rejected the Commodan policy of subsidizing Rome's northern neighbours – however traditional it may have been to do so – in favour of the more offensively inclined outlook he had learned from M. Aurelius. Had Pertinax reigned longer – but speculation is rash and unnecessary. We may stick to facts. Pertinax' own ultimate successor was in a large degree his own protégé – at least, as legate of IV Scythica, Severus had been under the orders of Pertinax as governor of Syria; both lost favour while Perennis ruled Commodus; the same Laetus that obtained for Severus his Pannonian command made Pertinax emperor.<sup>32</sup> Severus was in any case of the right age to have imbibed notions current among leading figures in the Marcomannic wars. One might have expected therefore that he would attempt to recreate the Aurelian policy. In the north this was not so. But he did so elsewhere, and is justly described as a *propagator imperii*.<sup>33</sup>

One final comment. Before the evidence of Dio is preferred to that of the *Augustan History*, one should ask whence the biographer of M. Aurelius derived his information. There cannot be much doubt that it was from Marius Maximus – L. Marius Maximus Perpetuus Aurelianus (consul II ord. 223).<sup>34</sup> This man, as consul for the first time in 198 or 199, cannot have been born much after 158, and thus, at the outset of his career, as a tribune of the Mainz legion XXII Primigenia and the Regensburg legion III Italica, must have served in the last campaign of M. Aurelius. It is therefore of special interest to note the precision with which the *vita* of M. Aurelius mentions not only the Marcomanni, Quadi and Sarmatae, but also the Hermunduri (27.10) – and indeed, earlier, the list of tribes who had “conspired together from the frontier of Illyricum right up to Gaul” includes the names of at least seventeen peoples. It suggests that the fruits of Marius Maximus' personal experience have been preserved in the *Augustan History*. I conclude that for this and the other reasons stated one should accept the statements in the *Augustan History*, that M. Aurelius intended to create two new provinces. Whether one may go further, and argue that there existed some among his advisers who had the Napoleonic insight into the superiority of a mountain to a river as a frontier, is a question that must remain unanswered.

## NOTES

- 1 R. Syme, reviewing a work by W. Weber, *CR*, LII, (1939), p. 79.
- 2 Cf. my *Marcus Aurelius* (London 1966), pp. 160 sqq.
- 3 Suetonius, *Nero* 18, and cf. E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, Kendal, 1953, pp. 1 sqq.
- 4 66. 20 and 39. 50. 4.
- 5 See my paper “Excavations at Carpow”, *Studien zur Militärgrenze Roms* (Bonn 1967), pp. 1 sqq.
- 6 Cf. *Marcus Aurelius, op.c.*, 73 f.
- 7 The Rt. Hon. Lord Curzon of Kedleston, *Frontiers: The Romanes Lecture 1907* (Oxford 1907), 15 sq. He quotes (in English) the comment of “the greatest Captain of modern times”, which proves to derive from *Correspondance de Napoleon Ier*, vol. XXX (Paris 1870), p. 10.
- 8 I take this quotation from E. Swoboda, *Carnuntum*<sup>4</sup>, Graz-Köln, 1964, p. 247.
- 9 Cf. R. Syme, *Tacitus*, Oxford 1959, pp. 481 ff., esp. 490.
- 10 Cf. my *Marcus Aurelius, op.c.*, pp. 53 sq. On the foreign policy of Antoninus see now K.F. Stroheker, “Die Aussenpolitik des Antoninus Pius nach der Historia Augusta”, *Bonner-Historia-Colloquium, 1964/1965* (Bonn 1966), pp. 241 sqq., especially (on relations with Parthia in 138 or soon after) p. 253.
- 11 On Severianus cf. my paper “The Duration of Provincial Commands under Antoninus Pius”, *Corolla Memoriae Erich Swoboda Dedicata*, Graz-Köln 1966, pp. 43 sqq., p. 49.
- 12 Namely Sohaemus: cf. *RE* IIIA (1927), cols. 798 sq.
- 13 Cf. K. Steer, “John Horsley and the Antonine Wall”, *A.*<sup>4</sup> *XLII*, (1964) pp. 1 sqq. But I cannot follow him in his account of the sequel. His view (pp. 26 sqq.) that the fort of Bar Hill was rebuilt after the destruction in the lifetime of Pius is based mainly on the arbitrary assignment of the two inscriptions of *coh. I Baetasiorum* to this period. It should be emphasized that neither inscription proves that this

- cohort was in garrison at the fort. Both are probably building-inscriptions and could easily belong to the original construction, in which the unit could have participated.
- 14 For Julius Verus, *cf.* my paper "The Roman Governors of Britain", *Epigraphische Studien*, IV, (1967), 72-73 sqq.
  - 15 *Cf.* *Epigr. Stud.*, IV, 73 sqq. In connection with the activity of Calpurnius Agricola, attention should be drawn to the commemorative coins of leg. VI (*Brit. Mus. Cat.* IV, *Marcus Aurelius and L. Verus*, nos. 500-501). One type shows a standard with a victory, the other does not. Clearly, the coincidence that VI Victrix and VI Ferrata were both engaged in fighting must have made the issue seem appropriate. One type clearly refers to VI Victrix, *cf.* G. Askew, *The Coinage of Roman Britain* (London 1951), pp. 15-16.
  - 16 B.R. Hartley, "Some problems of the Roman military occupation of the north of England", *Northern History*, I (University of Leeds, 1966), pp. 7 sqq., pp. 17 sqq.
  - 17 *Cf.* H. Dessau, 1097-1098 (M. Claudius Fronto) and *AE*, 1965, p. 123 (Ti. Claudius Proculus Cornelianus), on which see H.-G. Pflaum, *Les carrières procuratoriennes équestres*, Paris 1960, no. 164 *bis*, pp. 397 sqq., especially pp. 400-402.
  - 18 *Cf.* H.-G. Pflaum, *Les procureurs équestres* (Paris 1950), pp. 35, 50, 54, 71 sq.; *Hermes*, 91 (1963) pp. 483 sqq. The raising of XV and XXII Primigeniae was followed by the conquest of Britain; of I Italica by Nero's project for a Caucasian conquest; of I Minervia by an extension of the *Agri Decumates*; of II Trajana and XXX Ulpia Victrix by the annexation of Dacia and Arabia; of the *legiones Parthicae* by the creation of the new province of Mesopotamia.
  - 19 On Clemens, *cf.* H.-G. Pflaum, *Les Carrières, etc., op. cit.*, no. 156 pp. 368-373 and my *Marcus Aurelius op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.
  - 20 *Cf.* my *Marcus Aurelius, op. cit.*, pp. 211 sqq.; and my paper "The invasion of Italy in the reign of M. Aurelius", *Festschrift für R. Laur-Belart*, Basel, 1968, 214 sqq.
  - 21 F. Hampl, "Mark Aurel und die Völker jenseits der Donaugrenze. Eine quellenkritische Studie", *Festschrift zu R. Hausbergers Ehre* (Linzbruck 1960), pp. 33 ff., followed by E. Swoboda, *Carnuntum*<sup>4</sup>, *op. cit.*, 55, pp. 251 ff.
  - 22 J. Dobias, "Rom und die Völker jenseits der mittleren Donau", *Corolla Memoriae Erich Swoboda Dedicata, op. cit.*, pp. 115 sqq., especially p. 123.
  - 23 I may refer here also to Dobias, *op. cit.*, p. 125, for a refutation of the anomalous view of J. Fitz, "A military history of Pannonia etc.", *A Arch Hung.*, XIV, (1962), p. 34, n. 128, that the Sarmatians were not to be made a province (but that the Marcomanni and Quadi apparently might have been).
  - 24 *Marcus Aurelius, op. cit.*, pp. 285.
  - 25 E. Swoboda, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
  - 26 See now S. Frere, *Britannia*, London 1967, pp. 200 sqq.
  - 27 It is enough to refer to 71, 34-36.
  - 28 J. Morris, "The vallum again", *CW*<sup>2</sup>, (1950), pp. 33 sqq., p. 37 and *id.*, "The dating of the Column of Marcus Aurelius", 15, 1952, pp. 32 sqq., p. 37. *Cf.* also *Marcus Aurelius, op. cit.*, 257-8.
  - 29 *Cf.* E. Hohl, "Kaiser Commodus und Herodian", *Sitz. Deutsch. Akad. Wiss.*, (Berlin), 1954, pp. 1 sqq., pp. 9 sqq.
  - 30 The expression used by Dio is: ἐβουλόμην, εἰ οἷόν τε ἦν, προσκαλέσασθαι τὸν Κισσίων' καὶ δικαιολογήσασθαι παρ' ὑμῖν ἢ παρὰ τῆ ἡερουσίᾳ
  - 31 *Cf.* *PIR*<sup>2</sup> II 73 and Dio 73, 3, 1-3.
  - 32 I may refer to my paper entitled "The *coup d'état* of the year 193", *BJ*, 169, (1969), pp. 247 sqq.
  - 33 *Cf.*, for example, *IRT* 395 (Lepcis Magna).
  - 34 On Marius Maximus *cf.* G. Barbieri, *L'albo senatorio* (Roma 1952), nos. 35, 1100. The same writer takes a negative view of the extent to which the *Historia Augusta* is indebted to Marius Maximus in his paper "Mario Massimo", *RFIC*, XXXII (1954), pp. 36 sqq., 262 sqq. For a contrary view *cf.* E. Hohl, *op. cit.*; H. Nesselhauf, "Patrimonium und *res privata* des römischen Kaisers", *Historia-Augusta-Colloquium Bonn 1963* (Bonn 1964), pp. 73 sqq., *id.*: "Die *vita Commodi* und die *acta urbis*", *Bonner-Historia-Augusta-Colloquium, 1964/1965* (Bonn 1966), pp. 127 sqq., especially 132 sqq.; H.-G. Pflaum, "La valeur de la source inspiratrice de la *vita Pii* à la lumière des personnalités nommément citées", *ibid.*, pp. 143 sqq.