

Towards an Integrated Theory of Chinese Foreign Policy: Bringing Leadership Personality Back In

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Abstract: Leadership transition in China in 2012 has caused unprecedented attention among scholars and policy makers alike around the globe. But not enough attention has been paid to the role of Chinese leaders in the study of Chinese foreign policy though Chinese leaders in history have played more important role than they do today. This paper intends to show how theories of leadership personality can help explain the changes in Chinese foreign policy under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping's time. Findings demonstrate that the integration of theory of personality and Chinese foreign policy helps better explain and understand the differences in foreign policy orientation, the main themes of China's foreign policy, as well as the foreign policies towards major countries. Theoretically, such integration contributes to the development of a more general theory that would travel beyond the borders of the American case. The conclusion calls for the necessity of an integrative perspective which would bring leadership personality back into the study of Chinese foreign policy.

Key Words: personality type, Chinese foreign policy, Chinese foreign policy, 1. Introduction

Leadership transition in China in 2012 has caused unprecedented attention among scholars and policy makers alike around the globe. But not enough attention has been paid to the role of Chinese leaders in the study of Chinese foreign policy though Chinese leaders in history have played more important role than they do today. By bridging the Western theories of foreign policy analysis with Chinese area studies, this paper proposes an integrated approach bringing leadership personality back into the center of analysis while taking into account other levels of analysis. By bridging the theories of political psychology with Chinese foreign policy studies, this paper tries to explain how leadership personality shaped Chinese foreign policy in history, and proposes an integrated approach that brings leadership personality back in to the center while taking into account other levels of analysis.

The traditional Chinese explanation of their foreign policy is that Chinese leaders calculate the international situation correctly and make foreign policy choices rationally. This Chinese view echoes those of mainstream studies of Chinese diplomatic history in the U.S. during the Cold War.² Such explanations provide evidence for structural realism, a mainstream IR theory, which attributes central importance to forces that operate at the international level. This is understandable since the tight bi-polar system

¹ Xie Yixian, *zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi (1949-2001) (Contemporary China's Diplomatic History, 1949-2001)* (Beijing: zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2003); Han Nianlong, *dangdai zhongguo waijiao (Diplomacy of Contemporary China)* (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1987); Tian Zengpei, *gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao (China's diplomacy after opening up)* (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994).
² Gerald Segal, *The Great Power Triangle* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982); Richard Solomon, *The China Factor* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cooperation, 1978).

was indeed a major reason for the newly founded People's Republic of China (PRC) government to "lean to one side", the power shift in the later 1960s and early 1970s was an important factor for Mao's decision to invite Nixon to visit China, ushering in a time of triangular power relationship in world politics. The drastic changes in power distribution in the late 1970s were indispensable for Deng's policy of normalizing relations with the U.S. and opening up. This structuralist approach fails, however, to explain some significant and seemingly contradictory changes. The switch of alliances between the USSR and the U.S. during Mao's time differs remarkably from the change from revolutionary diplomacy to peaceful independent policy in the early eighties when Deng became the de facto leader of China. Or if international balance of power determines Chinese foreign policy strategy how could China's foreign policy witness a change from "leaning to one side" to a dual adversary strategy toward both superpowers in the 1960s when the balance of power did not undergo major changes? More revealingly, the demise of the Cold War with the collapse of the East bloc, the biggest power shift after WWII, should have led to profound changes in Chinese foreign policy orientation, but it did not. These changes in Chinese foreign policy demand an alternative explanation.

China's opening up in 1979 provided opportunities for more close interactions between Chinese domestic politics and external behavior as well as opportunities for scholars of Chinese politics and foreign policy to look into the black box for evidence of how domestic politics impacts Chinese foreign policy. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen proclaimed in 1990 that "foreign policy is the extension of China's domestic politics."³ Scholars on Chinese politics and foreign policy from Barnett⁴ and Lieberthal and Oksenberg in the 1980s,⁵ to Zhao,⁶ Hamrin and Zhao,⁷ Swaine,⁸ and Lu in the 1990s,⁹ to Lampton in the 21st century,¹⁰ have provided an increasingly clear picture of the foreign policy making structure in China. Their findings almost unanimously held that Chinese foreign policy making was organized hierarchically with Mao and then Deng located at the very top, with the authority to make Chinese foreign policy. While "Mao was totally dominant and made all of the 'big decisions';"¹¹ the level of influence in China after China's opening up "is often determined primarily by the informal prestige and power on the individual who heads it."¹²

The significant role of predominant leaders in Chinese foreign policy has made it natural for the students of Chinese foreign policy to focus on the individual leaders on

³ Qian Qichen, "Qian Qichen on the World Situation," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1990), pp. 16-18.
⁴ Doak A. Barnett, *The making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

⁵ Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Process* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁶ Zhao Qiansheng, "Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy," *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 519 (1992), pp 158-75.

⁷ Carol Lee Hamrin and Zhao Suishe, *Decision-making in Deng's China: Perspective from Insiders* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1995).

⁸ Swaine Michael D., *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1996).

⁹ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

¹⁰ David M. Lampton ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the era of Reform* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

¹¹ Barnett, *The making of Foreign Policy in China*, pp. 7-8.
¹² Swaine, *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking*, p. 73.

foreign policy orientations. However, much of this research stops at describing how leaders made decisions without explaining or analyzing why they did so. As several leading scholars point out, while reviewing the current status of this field, "we have tended to do it without the benefit of the literature on personality type, on the leader type, on decision-making unit type, and so forth."¹³ This observation keenly illustrates the gap between foreign policy analysis theory and area studies (Chinese foreign policy in this case) that students of foreign policy analysis are trying to fill. One leading scholar in personality studies has expressed her concern about the "U.S. bias in the decision-making literature" because it has "made it difficult to generalize to other countries and has given researchers blind spots regarding how decisions are made in governments and cultures not like the American."¹⁴

The reciprocal needs of Chinese foreign policy scholars for theories of personality types for foreign policy analysis and the needs of comparative foreign policy analysts for non-American cases call for an integration of these two subfields of international relations, and this paper intends to show how this is possible. It will explore the abrupt disjuncture in Chinese foreign policy after Deng became the paramount Chinese leader. As Lampton keenly observes, Mao's "policies reflected a bunker mentality of economic autarky, acquisition of coercive military and ideological strength and strategic balance of power maneuvers... The strategy of his successor, Deng Xiaoping, from 1977 on was a reaction to the enormous human, economic and diplomatic costs of Mao's policies... The People's Republic of China we see today reflects this fundamental strategic decision and its logical consequences."¹⁵ As a matter of fact, the changes in Chinese foreign policy from Mao's time to Deng's time were very broad, including different conceptualizations of the main theme of international relations, China's overall international orientation, its general relations with major powers, and its regional policies. This disjuncture renders the diplomatic history of the PRC separable into two contrasting periods: Mao's period from 1949-1978 and Deng's period after 1978.

I do not intend to invalidate any traditional explanations. The balance of power was an important factor that made Mao change his foreign policy in his late days and it was he who started the Sino-U.S. normalization process, which Deng completed. But Mao also switched the target of China's opposition first from one superpower to both superpowers, and then to another superpower. Furthermore, China under Deng not only normalized relations with the U.S. but at the same time sought to normalize relations with the Soviet Union. Had it not been for Deng, these major changes would not have happened. As a matter of fact, Hua Guofeng, Mao's handpicked successor, did not and would not have changed China's foreign policy. Instead he had, in the wake of Mao's death, insisted on the "two whatevers": "We should resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions

¹³ Thomas J. Christensen, "Alastair Iain Johnston, and Robert S. Ross, Conclusions and Future Directions," in *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, Johnston Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross (ed) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 391.

¹⁴ Margaret G. Hermann, "How decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: a Theoretical Framework," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001), p. 49.

¹⁵ David M. Lampton, "China: Outward Bound But Inner-Directed," see { HYPERLINK "http://www.sais-jhu.edu/" } publications/publications/sais/herewinter06/lampton.html.

Chairman Mao gave."¹⁶ China's foreign policy changes only occurred after Hua lost to Deng in the power struggle and Deng became the de facto leader of China.

I argue that Mao and Deng's personalities play a very important role in the foreign policy disjuncture in Chinese foreign policy. To do so I will employ a popular personality type framework to compare the differences in personality between Mao and Deng and their respective impact on more general Chinese foreign policy. The empirical questions include: what are the differences in Mao and Deng's personalities, or what types of leaders were they? How did these differences relate to the differences in Chinese foreign policies? The first part of this paper raised these questions. The second part reviews the different frameworks of leadership types and introduces one of the most popular frameworks this paper will employ. The third part examines the similarities of Mao and Deng's personalities, while the fourth part focuses on the relations between their different personalities and the differences of Chinese foreign policy in their respective times. The paper concludes with some theoretical observations on the feasibility and benefit of integrating Chinese foreign policy studies with the theory of personality, and proposes an integrated approach in studying Chinese foreign policy.

2. Theories on Leadership Types

Though the study of individuals has not been the mainstream in IR studies, it has nonetheless remained a persistent theme. Classical IR thinkers, such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Hans Morgenthau all explicitly acknowledged the impact of individuals' personalities on international relations. In his classic work *Man, the State and War*, Waltz proposes three images in analyzing the cause of war—individual, societal, and systemic.¹⁷ However he later became a staunch proponent for the third image.¹⁸ As structural realism dominated IR studies during the later stages of the cold war, the study of the individual was marginalized.

However, research on the individual's impact on international politics continues. Following Freud's tradition on unconsciousness or ego-defense of people, psychoanalytical approaches use a psycho-biographical method to examine the life history of leaders, focusing on psychopathology, such as neuroticism, narcissism, or paranoia; others conduct detailed, in-depth case studies of individual leaders, tracing their personal, social, and political development from early childhood through to young adulthood.¹⁹

Cognitive studies, by contrast, have focused on how individuals process information, including how they make sense of others and themselves in the context of political issues, how they interpret information and make decisions, and what are the

¹⁶ This statement was made in a joint editorial entitled "Xuehao wenjian zhuazhu gang" (Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link), printed on February 7, 1977 in *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily).

¹⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

¹⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

¹⁹ Ofer Feldman and Linda Valenty, *Profiling Political Leaders* (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger Publisher, 2001).

Linda Valenty and Ofer Feldman, *Political Leadership for the New Century* (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger Publisher, 2002); Jerold Post, *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: with Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Jerold Post, *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: the Psychology of Political Leaders* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2004).

factors that affect their information processing. Cognitive studies are diverse, including enemy image and mirror images, cognitive mapping, attribution theories, perception and misperception studies, operational code studies, affect and emotions studies, and attitudes and motivation studies.²⁰

The third and final group of scholars tries to understand foreign policy through the personality traits of preeminent leaders.²¹ Scholars in this group address leadership personality according either to how they relate to their work, or to their environment.²² Among this third group is one very popular framework developed by Margaret Hermann, which typologizes personality by several intervening variables. Johnston and others cited Hermann's typology in their call for a more nuanced approach to the study of Chinese foreign policy, and it has also been tested and proved to have more explanatory power compared with other frameworks in studying non-Chinese cases.²³ This paper will employ Hermann's framework (table 1).

Hermann, a psychologist by training, has developed a framework to connect the personality of predominant leaders with their country's foreign policy behaviors.²⁴ She writes that only under certain conditions, such as having a predominant leader, under ambiguous situations, and the leader's active participation in decision-making processes, does a leader's personality come into play and exert its influence. Three intervening variables act as filters that condition whether a leader's belief system can exert influence on their country's foreign policy outcomes: interest, training, and sensitivity to

- ²⁰ Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1962), pp. 244-52; Robert Axelrod, *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Daniel Hradstein, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979); Mildred Hewstone, *Causal Attribution: From Cognitive Process to Cognitive Beliefs* (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1989); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in World Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Yaacov Y. L. Vertzberger, *Misperception in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Alexander George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leader and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1969), pp. 190-222; Stephen G. Walker, "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1990), pp. 403-17; Feng Huiyuan, *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-making: Confucianism, Leadership and War* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Robert Frank, *Passions with Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions* (New York: Norton, 1988); Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957); Darl J. Bem, *Belief, Attitudes and Human Affairs* (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1970).
- ²¹ Alexander George and Juliet L. George, *Presidential Personality and Performance* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality Theories: A Comparative Analysis*, 6th ed. (Washington D.C.: Brooks/Cole, 1996).
- ²² James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Prediction Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985); Harold Sprout, and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: with Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956); Margaret G. Hermann, "How decision units shape foreign policy: a theoretical framework," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001), pp. 47-81.
- ²³ Thomas J. Christensen, "Alastair Iain Johnston, and Robert S. Ross, Conclusions and Future Directions," in *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, p. 391; Charles Smart, "Applying Personality Theory to Foreign Policy Behavior: Evaluating Three Methods of Assessment," in *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*, Eric Singer, and Valerie Hudson (ed) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
- ²⁴ Margaret G. Hermann, "How decision units shape foreign policy: a theoretical framework," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001), pp. 47-81; Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 7-46; Margaret G. Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision making," in *Diplomacy, Force and Leadership*, Dan Caldwell, and Timothy J. McKeown (ed) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Margaret G. Hermann, *Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis* (Columbus, OH: Societa Science Automation, Inc, 1999); Margaret G. Hermann, and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Make Foreign Policy and How: An Empirical Inquiry," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 361-87.

Deng Xiaoping, but on two primary sources. One is *Mao on Diplomacy*, the other is the third volume of *the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1982-1992*, vol. 3 (1993).²⁷ The former consists of 173 of Mao's writings, speeches, talks, comments, and telegrams on China's diplomacy covering a period from before the founding of PRC to his death, encompassing all open sources by Mao on Chinese diplomacy. Among the 119 entries in Deng's volume, 26 were specifically focused on international affairs, 97 have foreign affairs content, and 73 were Deng's talks with foreign guests. Unlike most political speeches in China today, which are prepared in advance, most of these works are the verbatim record of Mao and Deng's impromptu or extemporaneous comments. They best reveal their inner world and are the ideal and most reliable primary materials to study their personality. Remarkably, however, they have yet to be systematically examined. Secondary sources, such as biographies, are only used as supplementary evidence. If these texts and Hermann's theory can shed light on Chinese foreign policy under Mao and Deng, future work can seek to replicate these findings with a broader sample.

3. Similarities between Mao and Deng's Personalities and Continuities in Chinese Foreign Policy

There are both similarities and differences between Mao and Deng's personalities that impacted Chinese foreign policy. I begin with some similarities.

Both were Predominant Leaders According to Hermann predominant leaders have the "ability to stifle all opposition and dissent as well as the power to make a decision alone if necessary."²⁸ Both Mao and Deng belong to this category. Lu Ning, a former Chinese diplomat, wrote that during Mao's time, "If Mao still needed to consult members of the top leadership in making foreign policy decisions in the early 1950s, by the middle of 1950s, Mao at the pinnacle of political power would make all major decisions by himself". Furthermore, Mao "not only made all the major decisions but also decisions concerning the implementation of policy changes."²⁹ Western scholarship on Chinese foreign policy making during Mao's rule largely concurs.³⁰

Deng also enjoyed similar authority in foreign policy. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attributed the major diplomatic achievements from China's opening up to after the end of the Cold War to Deng.³¹ For instance, China's "one country, two systems" policy was not proposed in a formal policy document but in Deng's casual talk with a Chinese American professor.³² The formula resulted from a summation of Deng's

²⁷ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong wenxian chubanshe (Selected Works of Mao on Diplomacy)* (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe and zhongyuan wenxian chubanshe, 1994); Xiaoping Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3 (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1993).

²⁸ Margaret G. Hermann, "How decision units shape foreign policy: a theoretical framework," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001), p. 56.

²⁹ Lu, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China*, p. 86.

³⁰ Barnet, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China: Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security*.

³¹ Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang gangyao (the Outline in Studying Deng Xiaoping's Diplomatic Thoughts)* (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2000), pp. 9-11.

³² Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3, pp. 30-31.

talks with members of a Hong Kong industrial and commercial delegation and some prominent Hong Kong figures.³³ He retained the final say on any details of this policy while the policy was later refined and substantiated.

Similar Belief Systems Mao and Deng shared a similar belief and value system. Beliefs are defined as associations people create towards objects and their attributes, reflecting what one thinks is true; value reflects what one wishes to see come about, even if it is not currently true.³⁴ Here I use the two terms interchangeably. Both Mao and Deng strongly believed that communism was better than capitalism and would finally replace the latter. Mao was one of the founding fathers of the CCP, and Deng joined the Chinese revolution as a teenager. The two fought side by side from the 1920s onward. Mao had consistently tried to maintain the purity of communism and even launched the disastrous "Cultural Revolution" to avoid the restoration of capitalism in China. Externally he strongly criticized and opposed the Soviet revisionists when he perceived the Soviets to have betrayed Marxism.

Deng, a member of the first generation of CCP leadership, shared the same experience with Mao in their early days. Later, in the 1980, he took strong measures to avoid bourgeois "spiritual pollution" and maintain the purity of communist ideology in China. Even after the collapse of the Eastern European socialist countries and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s he still maintained that, "I am convinced that more and more people will come to believe in Marxism, because it is a science." Deng continued: "Feudal society replaced slave society, capitalism supplanted feudalism, and after a long time, socialism will necessarily supersede capitalism."³⁵ The PRC has insisted on the principle of "one central task and two basic points" since 1987, with the central task being economic construction and the two basic points as the four cardinal principles (the principle of upholding the socialist path, upholding the { HYPERLINK "http://www.answers.com/topic/people-s-democratic-dictatorship" \t "_top" }, upholding the leadership of the { HYPERLINK "http://www.answers.com/topic/communist-party-of-china" \t "_top" }, and upholding { HYPERLINK "http://www.answers.com/topic/maoism" \t "_top" } } and opening to the outside world. According to their respective belief systems, Chinese foreign policy should not manifest major differences under Deng as compared with that of Mao.

Both Mao and Deng paid great attention to foreign affairs, and wanted to be informed and consulted on what was happening in foreign affairs. Mao's interest in foreign affairs came from his great concern on the viability and security of the PRC in a tight bipolar international structure. Such concerns made Chinese foreign policy always on the very top of his political agenda. *Mao on Diplomacy* is a clear manifestation of his interest in foreign affairs. China's international environment improved during Deng's rule as concerns about foreign invasion decreased, but Deng himself was increasingly interested in foreign affairs. He was always deeply

³³ Ibid., pp. 58-59.

³⁴ Martha Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena M. Masters, and Thomas Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology* (Mahwah, NJ, and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), p. 125.

³⁵ Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3, pp. 382-83.

involved in handling China's foreign relations with major countries, like the U.S., and was involved in critical times, like after the Tiananmen incident in 1989.

Neither Mao nor Deng had any training in foreign affairs, nor were they rich in diplomatic experience, but both were interested in foreign affairs and made the major diplomatic decisions of their times. Congruency could be found between these identical aspects of their personality and the continuities in Chinese foreign policy. Deng himself emphasized these continuities by saying "We will continue to adhere to Mao Zedong Thought... a treasured possession of the Chinese Communist Party and of our country."³⁶ For instance, both emphasized Marxist internationalism as one of the guiding principles for Chinese foreign policy. China during Mao's time was more explicit in saying the combination of patriotism and internationalism was the guideline for Chinese foreign policy,³⁷ while China under Deng would say that China would make foreign policy in accordance with the interests of Chinese people as well as the interest of the people of the world at large.³⁸ Both insisted on the principle of independence in handling foreign affairs, both held that sovereignty as supreme in diplomacy and insisted that Chinese internal affairs should not be interfered with. For instance, both insisted that Taiwan should be reunited with the Chinese mainland.

4. Differences between Mao's and Deng's Personalities and Changes in Chinese Foreign Policy

Differences between Mao and Deng's personalities can help us understand the drastic changes in Chinese foreign policy that are not well explained by mainstream structuralist theories.

4.1 Mao's Personality

Closed to information The term "closed to information" refers to situations in which a leader only pays attention to information consistent with his or her preexisting views, neglecting contrary information, or interpreting such information selectively. In other words, such leaders are cognitive misers always seeking to maintain cognitive consistency. Mao was generally closed to information and was inclined to interpret incoming information in a way consistent with his belief system. Mao's 1974 conversation talk with Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, about the definition of three worlds in 1974 offers a good example:³⁹

Mao: We hope the Third World will unite. The Third World has a large population!

Kaunda: That's right.

Mao: Who belongs to the First World?

Kaunda: I think it ought to be the world of exploiters and imperialists.

Mao: The Second World?

Kaunda: Those who have become revisionists.

³⁶ Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 2 (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 347.
³⁷ Han, *dangdai zhongguo wajiao*, p. 3.
³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 340.
³⁹ Mao, *Mao Zedong wajiao wenxian*, pp. 600-601.

Mao: I hold that the U.S. and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the Third World.

Kaunda: I agree with your analysis, Mr. Chairman.

Mao: The U.S. and the Soviet Union have a lot of atomic bombs, and they are richer. Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada, of the Second World, do not possess so many atomic bombs and are not so rich as the First World, but richer than the Third World. What do you think of this explanation?

Kaunda: Mr. Chairman, your analysis is very pertinent and correct.

Mao: We can discuss it.

Kaunda: I think we can reach agreement without discussion, because I believe this

analysis is already very pertinent.

Mao: The Third World is very populous.

Kaunda: Precisely so.

Mao: All Asian countries, except Japan, belong to the Third World. All Africa and also Latin America belong to the Third World.

Before Mao proposed his "three world theory," there existed in the academic community a consensus on who belonged to which world, and such consensus was reflected by Kaunda's initial answers to Mao. But Mao dismissed the prevailing view to advance his own and very different definition of the three worlds, which was later substantiated and elaborated to the world by Deng Xiaoping at the 6th UN Special General Assembly in 1974. The Chinese officially explained that Mao's "three world theory" was the theoretical guideline for China's united front strategy in the 1970s. Considering the fact that Mao's "united front strategy" was first put forward in 1973 while the "three world theory" was put forward in 1974, one could say that the "three world theory" was shaped by and put forward to rationalize his own strategy rather than providing guidelines for the strategy. Other examples on Mao's closure to new or discrepant information include his insistence that nuclear weapons were paper tigers, which clashed with Nehru's thoughts in 1954,⁴⁰ and scared many Eastern European leaders and Nikita Khrushchev, who later decided not to help China develop nuclear weapons.

Top-down decision-making process. Late in his life Mao made most Chinese foreign policy decisions in a top-down manner. Liu Huagui, former Vice Foreign Minister and director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee, offers a typical example.⁴¹ After Mao put forward his "Three World Theory," the Chinese government decided to dispatch a delegation to the 6th UN Special General Assembly to promulgate Mao's theory to the world. When the Foreign Ministry began to consider who should head the Chinese delegation, Zhou Enlai asked the Foreign Ministry first to refer to Mao. When asked by his liaison officer on March 19, Mao "pondered for a while and then

⁴⁰ Mao, *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, pp. 170-71.

⁴¹ Liu Huagui, *Zhengyi zhansheng xie'e: ji weihao dengxiaoping tongzhi chuguo de yichang douzheng* (Justice defeated evil: record of a struggle about comrade Deng Xiaoping's mission abroad), in *xin zhongguo waijiao fengyun* (*Winds and Clouds of New China's Diplomacy; Reminiscences of Chinese Diplomats*) vol. 5. (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1999).

said it is good if comrade Deng Xiaoping heads the delegation, but do not say this is my idea and the Foreign Ministry should first ask for instructions.⁴² The Foreign Ministry drafted on March 22 a "Report for Instructions on Participating in the 6th UN Special General Assembly," which suggested that Deng be the chief Chinese delegate. This was first sent to Zhou, who passed it up to Mao. Mao endorsed it the same day.

Afraid that heading such an important delegation would increase Deng's importance and influence, Mao's wife Jiang Qing, who was later arrested as the head of the Gang of Four, was strongly opposed to "the Foreign Ministry's initiative."⁴³ She called the Foreign Ministry four times pressuring it to withdraw its report. Jiang's action was reported through Zhou to Mao on March 25 and Mao replied that it was his idea to have Deng head the Chinese delegation, but "if the majority of the Politburo do not endorse such an idea, let it go (*na jiu suan le*)."⁴⁴ Receiving Mao's instruction, Zhou called a Politburo meeting that evening to discuss the issue. Jiang kept asking during the meeting if it was Mao's idea or that of the Foreign Ministry to have Deng head the Chinese delegation, and she demanded that the Foreign Ministry withdraw its report and insisted her opposition and reservation be included in the resolution of the meeting, which was of course to be reported to Mao for final approval. When the situation was reported to Mao, he wrote a personal letter to Jiang on March 27 saying: "It is my suggestion that Deng Xiaoping go abroad. Be careful, do not oppose my idea."⁴⁵ Upon receiving Mao's letter, Jiang Qing ended her opposition and the Politburo held another meeting on April 2 to approve Deng heading the Chinese delegation.

This episode demonstrates that although Mao had the Foreign Ministry go through a bottom-up process, during which different voices competed for different preferences because the process had entangled with Chinese domestic factionalism, in the end he controlled the decision. Once it was clear that Deng heading the Chinese delegation was Mao's suggestion, the dissident voices were silenced. The most important decisions in Mao's time, including bombing the offshore islands in the Taiwan straits in the 1950s, China's war with India in 1962, China's border clash with the Soviets in 1969, and ping pong diplomacy in 1970, China's open door to the U.S. in 1971, and Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization were all made through such a process.⁴⁶

Challenging external constraints Mao had an "inside looking outward" perspective on life, always acting on the basis of his own views regardless of the situation. Zhou Enlai was the opposite, keenly sensitive to the policymaking environment. Their conversation with former British Prime Minister Heath in 1973 offers a revealing example of Mao and Zhou's different sensitivities to the policy making environment.⁴⁷

Heath: I am very glad to meet you. It is my great honor.
Mao: Thank you. You are welcome.

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 24.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 25.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 26.

⁴⁶ Lu, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China*; Xu, *A Study of Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Policy Decision-making Model*.

⁴⁷ Mao, *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, pp. 602-603.

Heath: The welcoming ceremony at the airport was very touching, full of bright colors, active and brisk.

Mao (to Zhou Enlai): Why no guard of Honor?

Zhou: Since he is not the incumbent prime minister, we were afraid it might cause misunderstanding and incur unpleasantness with the current Prime Minister.

Mao: I think it is necessary.

Zhou: We shall arrange a guard of honor at his departure.

Wang Haowang (the deputy director of the Protocol Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs): You aren't afraid of offending Wilson?

Mao (turning to Heath): I cast my vote for you!

This episode shows that Premier Zhou was very sensitive to the policymaking environment and respected constraints. Overseeing the implementation of Chinese foreign policy, what Zhou had in mind when the Chinese Foreign Ministry received Heath was consistent with international norms. Since Heath was no longer Prime Minister, Zhou was careful not to offend the incumbent Prime Minister Wilson and did what China was expected to do by diplomatic protocol: He did not arrange a guard of honor when Heath came. But Mao did not care about this diplomatic protocol and thought there should be guard of honor and a welcome ceremony for Heath. When Mao insisted, Zhou changed his view immediately and followed Mao's instructions. Mao challenged the international system and tried throughout his life to foster a world communist revolution. Most Chinese political scientists and diplomatic historians agree that Mao and Zhou handled foreign affairs very differently.

Achievement focused motivation Mao was born in the late Qing dynasty when China was on the verge of being divided by imperialist powers. He became political active as a youth with an overriding nationalist concern about the possibility that the Chinese people might lose their state and become "slaves without a country". He was extremely ambitious. In a 1936 poem, included in Chinese high school textbooks, Mao writes after describing the beautiful scenery of North China:⁴⁸

"So many heroes thus in homage bowed.

The first king of Qin and the seventh king of Han,

Neither was a true literary man;

The first king of Song and the second king of Tang,

Neither was noted for poetry or song.

Even the Proud Son of Heaven, for a time,

Called Genghis Khan, in his prime,

Knowing only shooting eagle, over his tent,

With a bow bent.

Alas, all no longer remain!

For truly great men,

One should look with this age's ken."⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong's Poems* (Beijing: People's Literature Press, 1976), p. 22.

⁴⁹ The first king of Qin, called Yingzheng (259 B.C.-210 B.C.), conquered all the other states during the Warring States period (475B.C.-221 B.C.), and founded the first centralized state in China. The seventh king of Han, Liu Che (156 B.C.-87 B.C.), was noted for his political and military achievements in Chinese history. The first king of

Song, Zhao Kuangyin (927-976), built out of the political and military chaos of Five Dynasties and Ten States period a united central power in China. The second king of Tang, Li Shimin (599-649), is well known for his political and military talents of helping his father to overthrow the Sui Dynasty and founded the Tang Dynasty, the strongest in Chinese history. Genghis Khan, the Mongol conqueror and emperor (1162-1227), gained control of Mongolia (1206) and conquered northern China (1211-1215), then vast territories in central and south Asia as well as Asia Minor. This poem was criticized by the Nationalist Government as revealing Mao's ambition of assuming emperorship.
50 Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong zhuzuo xuandu (Selected readings of Mao Zedong's works)*, Vol. 2, (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. 715.
51 Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 2, 1994, p. 128.

China's foreign policy adjustment in the early 1980s also resulted from Deng's changing perceptions. Deng advanced the China had made mistakes in the 1970s. He said that from the late 1970s we have made two important changes in our assessment of the international situation and in our foreign policy... The first change is in our understanding of the question of war and peace. We used to believe that war was inevitable and imminent and many of our policy decisions were based on this belief... after a careful analysis of the situation, we have come to... conclude that it is possible that there will be no large-scale war for a fairly long time to come and that

position within the CCP, beyond the opening up policy.
11th Central Party Committee of the CCP, which formally reinstated Deng leading and remain forever backward. Their motto here, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Party Committee of the CCP, which formally reinstated Deng leading problems continually arising. We can't stand to lock our doors, refuse to use our brains. The world is changing every day, new things are constantly emerging and new information. During his investigation in Henan Province in September 1978, he said, "reform and opening up". Deng was the general architect of China's "reform and opening up". Deng was the general architect of China's "reform and opening up".

Openness to new reformations... as the general architect of China's reform and opening up. This policy was to a large extent a result of Deng's openness and receptiveness to new information. During his investigation in Henan Province in September 1978, he said, "reform and opening up". Deng was the general architect of China's "reform and opening up".

Deng Xiaoping... his fundamental... related to the policy... information, as well as Deng Xiaoping... to new information, the way he

42 Deng Xiaoping's... to Sino-Soviet... position to... Central... to be the leader of the... and... who felt secure and... as a staunch... His achievement-driven... Our goal must be... We are now engaged in a... all difficulties and... he spoke... to his... and... his... in Chinese history.

there is hope of maintaining world peace...we have changed our view that the danger of war is imminent." Deng continued: "The second change is in our foreign policy. In view of the threat of Soviet hegemonism, over the years we formed a strategic line of defense... Now we have altered our strategy and this represents a major change."⁵² With these sweeping changes, Chinese foreign policy entered the era of Deng Xiaoping.

Two kinds of decision-making processes

The Chinese foreign policy-making process in Deng's time retained many similarities with that of Mao's time, and important decisions were made through a top-down process. But as Chinese foreign policy agendas expanded, many organizations, whose responsibility had previously been domestically bounded, began to get involved in foreign affairs. No leader was able to initiate and control every foreign affairs issue. Because many foreign policy decisions were initiated by lower level agencies, decision making quite often went through a bottom-to-top process.⁵³ For instance, as the military saw its budget decline and began to cut back on procurement from domestic weapon manufacturers in the 1980s, both the PLA and arms manufacturers were incentivized to increase arms sales abroad. As this occurred, the U. S. became increasingly concerned about the character of regimes that were purchasing Chinese arms. With increased pressure from the U.S., the Foreign Ministry began to question the wisdom of some arms sales. China's sale of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s is a case in point. When the PLA negotiated with the Saudis about the sale of DF-3 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia, neither the Foreign Ministry nor China's top leadership knew about the deal until it became an issue of international concern. It was finally brought to Deng's attention, who then asked the military trading corporations how much money it would make in the sale. When he was told the deal would earn 2 billion RMB, Deng apparently responded, "bu shao" (literally: not a little), and approved the deal, greatly facilitating the diplomatic normalization process between China and Saudi Arabia.⁵⁴ Several cases in Lu's book, including Zhao Ziyang's visit to the U.S. in 1984, the U.S. navy's visit to Qingdao, and the extradition of a Russian pilot who hijacked a Russian plane to northeast China in 1985 all show the marked pluralistic and horizontal nature of Chinese foreign policy in Deng's time.⁵⁵

Adapting to the policymaking environment Deng's belief system was not different from Mao's, but Deng tried to accomplish his goals through a gradual process, during which he adjusted his objective to the situation at hand. China's policy during Deng's time is one of adjusting and readjusting to adapt to domestic and international constraints, as demonstrated by his oft-quoted statement, "groping one's way across the river by feeling the stone." China's policy of reform started in the countryside before

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 127-28.

⁵³ Lu, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China*, pp. 87-95, 156-161; Xu, *A Study of Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Policy Decision-making Model*, pp. 267-332.

⁵⁴ John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Lital, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-export Dilemma," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1991), p. 96; Xu, *A Study of Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Policy Decision-making Model*, pp. 306-10; Lu, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China*, pp. 113-17.

⁵⁵ Lu, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China*, pp. 87-94, 156-66.

Vietnam, and Laos.

Deng's relationship-focused motivation was also manifested in his way of handling China's relations with the other super power. In his meeting with former U.S. President Nixon in December 1989, when bilateral relations were locked in a stalemate following the Tiananmen Incident, Deng also proposed that "China and the United States should put behind them the strained relations of the past few months and open up a new era."⁶⁰ Discussing western sanctions against China, Deng instructed the Chinese leaders that "we should maintain friendly exchanges with them. We should keep them as friends but also have clear understanding of what they are doing."⁶¹ As to China's relations with developing countries, he said: "Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third World. We absolutely cannot do that—this is one of our basic state policies... China will always side with the Third World countries, but we should never seek hegemony over them or serve as their leader."⁶² With Deng's emphasis on relationships, China not only survived the demise of the Soviet Union but kept its relations with big powers on a normal track.

5. Personality Type and its Impact on Foreign Policy Change

The examples discussed above reveal Mao and Deng's different personalities: Mao was closed to information, challenged constraints, made foreign policy through a top-down process, and was achievement-focused in his motivation. In contrast, Deng differed from Mao in almost every respect. These differences locate them at different positions in Hermann's personality type matrix and make them different kinds of leaders (table 2) Mao was a typical "crusader" and an "expansionist" while Deng was an "opportunistic" and "accommodative" leader.

TABLE 2. *Comparison of Mao's and Deng's Personality*

	Predominant leader	Belief system	Interests in FA	Training / experience	Sensitivity to Environment	Information process	openness	Relation to constraints	leader type	motivation
Mao	yes	Marxist communism	yes	no	Up-down	closed	Challenges	Crusader/strategist	power expansionist/incrementalist	
Deng	yes	Marxist communism	yes	no	Bottom-up	open	respects	opportunistic/pragmatist	Relationship	Accommodative

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 331.
⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 322-23.
⁶² Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3, p. 363.

that China was still in the preliminary stage of socialism and he borrowed everything but a political system from the West and reversed everything that Mao had stood for in foreign policy: joined the World Bank and the IMF; opened the country to private foreign investment; turned his back on Third World revolutionaries; sent hundreds and then thousands of China's best and brightest overseas for higher education; but then later renewed his open policy after using force to suppress the Tiananmen movement. China under Deng gradually integrated itself into the extant international system, forming a benign relationship with the outside world. In doing so, China has found export-oriented road of development, which later was referred to as China Model or China way of development.

Thirdly, the ways China handled its relations with major powers under the two leaders were also different. China always had a target of opposition during Mao's time: opposing the U.S. in the 1950s, the two superpowers simultaneously in the 1960s, and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Whoever China opposed was consistently the strongest power of that time, making it the most evident feature of China's revolutionary diplomacy. To oppose one superpower necessitated China to form a formal alliance (with the Soviet Union in 1950s) or an informal alliance (with the U.S. in the 1970s) to oppose the other. Though many of these changes were reactions to international pressure, Mao would find ideological ground for such an antagonistic policy. China under Deng realized diplomatic normalization with the U.S. and the Soviet Union consecutively. Deng's China declared in explicit terms that it would not enter into an alliance or strategic relationship with any superpower to oppose the other and maintained sound relationships with all major powers. During the process of Sino-Soviet normalization in the 1980s, Deng cautioned his colleagues not to do so at the cost of China's relations with the U.S. Even when the U.S. and other countries were imposing sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Incident, China still emphasized the principle of "reducing trouble, increasing trust, developing cooperation, not seeking confrontation" in developing relations with the U.S.⁶⁵

Finally, China's regional policy and relations with small powers were also different. China under Mao always had an arch enemy, usually the strongest power, to oppose. It had to rely on poor and weak countries to form a united front to oppose the richest and strongest country. While China supported the national liberation movements in third world countries, it also expected them to support China's diplomatic cause—opposing the superpower. China under Mao decided its policy to and relations with non-superpowers according to their relations with the superpowers. Since Deng's was relationship motivated, China under Deng abandoned the policy of "drawing lines" and reiterated that China was willing to develop omni-directional relations with all countries on the basis of the "five principles of peaceful co-existence."⁶⁶ Deng strongly advocated not letting differences in ideology or political system impacting Chinese foreign policy. Since the early 1980s, China has reiterated again and again that it respects the special relationship that developing countries have historically formed with superpowers and that China will decide its position on international affairs according

policy but his domestic policies, including Mao's determination to continue with the Great Leap even after he was informed of its immense costs, his decision to begin the mass movement of the Cultural Revolution in domestic politics. However, Hermann's framework fails to explain Mao's abruptly changing course and successful opening to the United States by welcoming his ideological enemy Nixon in the early 1970s. Hermann's model would not expect Mao, "closed" to his environment and a "crusader" focused on power and expansionism, to have done that. This disjuncture reveals the limit of Hermann's theory in studying Mao's foreign policy.

The limitation indicates that a more nuanced approach is needed when western born theory is to be applied to none western situation like China. The formation of leaders' personality is an evolving social process and politics is always dynamic, while the framework of leadership types, like any other theories of foreign policy analysis, is always static. The dynamic nature of politics and personality should be taken into full consideration in bridging the two. On the other hand, the failure to explain Mao's foreign policy changes does pose challenges to Hermann's framework. Finding the problem means that there are rooms for the framework to improve, and making up the hole is the very way to develop a more general and universally applicable theory.

From the perspective of Chinese foreign policy studies, this paper does not intend to invalidate the theories of other levels of analysis; neither does it make the case for future negligence of them. The influence of the world on China today is unprecedented. The balance of power has been an important shaping factor on Chinese foreign policy and will continue to exert its influence, as the ongoing power shift in East Asia shows.⁶⁸ As China joins the international system and claims to play a responsible and constructive role in the world, other international variables are also becoming important. One is international norms, which define the terms of international discourse, and another is the hundreds of international regimes China has joined. They will become equally, if not more salient factors, in shaping China's foreign policy as the distribution of balance of power.

The external influences on China are unprecedented, so are China's domestic changes. As Marxist ideology loses ground in China, the Chinese turned toward its traditional culture as an ideological replacement, and rising nationalism is gaining strength in Chinese politics.⁶⁹ As China joins the world, more and more agencies of Chinese government began to get involved in foreign affairs. New developments, such as "corporate pluralization", "professionalization", "decentralization" and other fragmentation tendencies against the background of globalization within the Chinese foreign policy structure are making Chinese foreign policy more often than not reacts to issues and challenges imposed on it by society and government.⁷⁰ Multiple and diverse

⁶⁸ Chenghong Li, "Limited Defensive Strategic Partnership: Sino-Russian Rapprochement and the Driving Force," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 16, No. 52, (Aug.) 2007, pp. 477-497; June Teufel Dreyer, "The Shifting Triangle: Sino-Japanese-American Relations in successful times," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 75, (May) 2012, pp. 409-426.
⁶⁹ Suisheng Zhao, "Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn," Vol. 22, No. 82, (Mar.) 2013, pp. 535-553; Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2004); Peter Hay Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, (Stanford, CA: University of California Press, 2004).
⁷⁰ Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the era of Reform*, pp. 10-27; Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, *New Foreign Policy Actors in China*, SIPRI Policy Paper (2010), 26.

domestic focus are accepting to shape China's external behaviors. An enlarging zone of domestic focus, especially those concerning the interest of certain domestic or bureaucratic interests, would go through a long process of domestic coordination and bureaucratic consultation, making bureaucratic and domestic political models better roots to understand such decisions.

Starting with Jiang Zemin, China's leaders onward will no longer enjoy the same level of political capital and charisma as their predecessors. So long as the Chinese hierarchical decision-making structure remains along with its authoritarian political system, the role of the core leader will continue to be the central to understand the major features of Chinese foreign policy. For instance, Jiang's rich experience and interest in foreign affairs made him closely involved in foreign affairs. His strong incentive to learn and show off his foreign languages ability and his frequent travels abroad—he paid 107 foreign visits to more than 70 countries as China's top leader—led to a constitutional revision in 2002 to legalize top leaders' foreign travel, leaving a stark Jiang's personal imprint on Chinese foreign policy.⁷¹ While Hu Jintao's influence on China's foreign policy was also impacted by his personality. For instance, years of working experience in China's poorest areas of Gansu, Guizhou, and Tibet led to Hu to emphasize the notion of governing for the people while in power, which led to the principle of "diplomacy for the people" in foreign affairs. Though Hu travelled no less than Jiang, his disinterest in foreign affairs was the major reason for the Chinese Foreign Ministry to become the weakest it has ever been since the founding of the PRC. With a world view formed when China was isolated in radical Cultural Revolution and a personality of insensitivity to the policymaking environment, Hu did not make any substantial political reform during the ten years of his tenure. Moreover, increased players vying for different policy outcomes make it more imperative for the central leadership to reconcile divergent interests and better supervise subordinate agencies, giving the paramount leaders different opportunities and means from those available during Mao and Deng's time to influence Chinese foreign policy. Foreign policy-making during international crisis and on important strategic issues, especially issues that concern the central leadership's domestic image and legitimacy will remain a woefully sensitive domain. Leaders will be more likely to participate in these decisions making and their personality will come into play.

It should also be noted as in conclusion that neither external systemic nor domestic societal factors with their various constraints or opportunities can have any significant influence on Chinese foreign policy unless or until they are perceived and acted upon by Chinese decision makers through their own decision-making system. A more nuanced and integrated model is needed that brings leadership personality back into the center of analysis, while taking into consideration both external and domestic factors into consideration. In such an integrated framework, the study of leadership will remain to be a core, if not the core. Whoever will be the core of next general of Chinese leadership, his personality should not be neglected in analyzing his foreign policy, and experiences in the past may offer some useful clue.

⁷¹ Zhong Zhicheng, *Welle shijie genjuehuo: Jiang Zemin chufang jishi*, [For a Better World: True Story of Jiang Zemin's Foreign Visits], (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2006), pp.2-3.