1 [)tlhrilck 198�: Oman
•·F+ Lot 194(,·
\\"t:rf1<:r 198+ Dudi.H
I')\10: (;oft"art 1980:
Ba.;:·hrach 1994b, I')')�h.
\Verne! 198+ Durliat
l')')O; Coff.m I')Sl'l:
H.h:hr:�ch 1994h. I')<J�h.
\llliT,l\" !•):;';. 1<)88
-\ucr P))l.
i.cysct l')-'): hcc�an I<)<);.
6. Bachrach 1994b.
H.J.chr.Kh 1972: Br,Jdbur;·
:992: Andenon 199�
8 B.Khrach I');-oh. IT�:
;..1urra;· i<)S8; .A.nckr�nn
l')')j.
'). Lunwak 1')76:!)::'.-I_:q.. outlines
fin: m.Ijor dcrnenr'.
Howe\'n. it would �l·cn1
reasonable to su�gc�t that
Luuv>ak\ poinr fivc i.e.
conservation of the
�uength of mobile t(Jru·'·
can rea,onahly be ,uh<;umcd
under poim fi1ur.
�� e.g.lsaac; 1990; \X'hin.Ik�·r
1<)8').
II. \\'heeler 1')')_'1.
12. Lurt>�·ak 19;6:n6-r')O;
Bachrach 1995b.
11. Johnson 1983; Peuikovirs
1971; Buder 1959; Grenier
1934; Bruhl 1975, 1990:
Blanchet 1907; Fhrier
19-:-3; Huhen 1959.
Bradbury 1992. Bachrach
19'))b.
1). xv,ii.L
16. Bradbury 1992; Harri�on;
Bachrach 1994a.
3 · BernardS. Bachrach
The imperial roots
ofMerovingian
military organization
Since the mid-nineteenth centurY e.trlv
mcdiev<Il miliurv hisron· has heen reduced ro a
rather simple formula. Prior ro the \fiddle .-\�es
warfare in \\-/cstnn Europe \\·a� dornin.Jt�.:..: b�·
the high\�· trained and \\·dl oq;..mi1ed in;�:.:�:ry
legions of the Ronun empire. Then for �c·. cr.1l
hundred year\, the barb:mans, who <.:ithc .lrc
credired or bbmed f(H destroying the Rc•!!un
empin· and cre:Hing thL· so-c.llled Thrk .-\:::c<.
fought according to the 1ribal cu�torn":> thJ� ::lc�
had brought with thl·m from the Cn:-n,m
forests. These h.uhari.ms. ,,·ho \\·ere g.nho:-r<;:·d
into embarrassingly sm,1ll .lrmed �roups 'C�.J..:h
imagination has lwcn CXf1L'lldnl rn·1:�� lO
explain hm\· the} m.ln,lgcll w L.Oih.jll<.- ;::1c
Roman empir<.:) put�HiH·Iy I(Hlgln t.'ach mh.:: in
an ongoing search for greater and �rcncr
amounts of plunder and dw 'irrational' f1LJ:--,uir
of glory. \VarCtre, a.\ commonly undersWt1� in
Western civilization on the ba�is of a Crc..:oRoman
model, is belieYed osremibl�· to �J.,·c
ceased ro exi\t amon1;'1hesc barbarians.
lr is clear, however. that roda�· the hiswringraphical
construct 'Dark Ages' is dead. The
successor swtes of the empire are seen accur.nely
as Romano-German polities.' Those who
would still conjure up carl�· medieYal sratclc....s
polities·· as analogues of America's non-lircr,ue
'Red Indians' or sub-Sahara's warrior nomJ.ds,'
have seriously misunderswod the earl�· :\Iiddle
Ages in general, and carl�· medieval mihJI")'
organization, strategy and tactics in particular.''
In militaf)' terms it ha..., long been demonstrated
that the institutions that were de\'eloped
during the later Roman empire provide rhe
proper background for the study of mosr of
Western Europe and especially Gaul during the
<.:arly Middle Ages.- Neither rhe primitiYe� so
artfully constructed by Tacirus in his Gennania
nor the legions so carefully described by Caesar
in his Opera are of importance to the study
either of late antique or of early medieval military
organization <Ind warfare:'
In rhis context, it is important ro emphasize
four closdy rebred milit�lry devdopmems rh.u
took place during the later empire. Followins
the crash of the third century. the imperial gm·ernment
decided to pur:;ue a grand srr;negy dur
we have come to characr<.:rizc a\ 'defemc in
deprh·. This required the radical transf(mll.ltion
orrhe citie..., of the Lucr Ronun empire inro
'han..knnr centers of milira0· strength whKh
had f(mr imerre!ared military functions: 1. supply
depors; 2. control points at key land .md
w�ll<.:r r<HHcs; ). coordination of rear are�l �CCtlrir�·
:llld inrclligcnu:; and 4· sclf..cont:und
strongholds with mobile field tOrces.·'The quibbling
criticisms"' that have follnw<.:d in the wake
of Lurrwak's magisterial rhe....is now han· hccn
dismantled eHCcrively.:·
In order to implemem this strategy of
defense in depth a ma...,si\'c program of fonif:·ing
.1 v.:.�r number of the cities and lesser habitation
cenrers of the empire was carried our
with great vigor.': These efforts in military construction
·were continued through the greater
parr of the fourth cenrury.1' The walls existed a...,
a major factor nor only in evef)'day life bur rbe�·
also played a significant role in fmure miliran·
strategy and tactics.1·' Indeed, Isidore of Se\'ille.
\'vTiting during the early seventh century called
attention to the crucial role of such fortifications
in his Etymologies, when he '\\Tote: "A city
is made by its walls".1'
The vast material changes in the milirar:-·
topography of the empire brought about by the
fortification of the urbes and lesser fortifications,
led, as rhe imperial government intended,
to the dominance of siege warfare.'" The building
of the walls was intended, in large parr, to
thwart the effons of the so-called 'barbarians'
from beyond the frontiers in their efforts to loot
25
and ravage the cities of the empire. In this context
Ammianus Marcellinus tells his readers
that the Visigorhic ruler Fritigern, "[S]eeing
that his men, who were ignorant of the manner
in which to conduct a siege and were experiencing
serious casualties," warned "be at peace
with the walls....". 17
As imperial military commentators saw the
matrer, learning how to deal with fortifications
was the shze qua non for being civilized in miliwry
terms.1·' The younger Merobaudes, a
Romano-frankish genc::wl and author, observed
that the 'Teurons whom Caesar had fought
had only a crude command of warf�ne and were
inexperienced in irs developed an." However.
the newcomers learned "the mature skills of the
an of warfare" after their settlcmem within the
empire. This education consisted, in large pare
of learning how to defend and build great stone
fortitlcuions.1''
Contemporary with imperial measures to
foni�· the cities of the empire w�l.\ the accderau.:d
militarization of the civilian population
throughout the Roman world.c'' This process
was driven, in pan, by the need to have militia
ff.1rces available ro man the walls of the newlv
fortified cenrers of population. Thus, for example,
d1e legislation establishing urb:1n militia
forces was :llready very well in train by 440
when rhe Emperor Valentinian Ill clarified the
exisring �iwarion with regard ro m�nrns ;lt
Romt' in the tdlowing manner: "\\'c decr(.:c...
rhat all arc to know...that no Rom;m cirizen or
member of a guild is ro be compelled to do
[expeditionary] military service. Indeed, he is
required ro do armed service only on the walls
and at the gates [for rhe defense of rhe city]
whenever the necessity arises. The regulations
made by the Illustrious Prefect n� the Ciry are
to be obeyed hy alL":-1
Siege warfare, which is manpower intensive,
required large numbers of militia troops to
defend the wall. However, even greater numbers
of effectives were needed to invest the
empire's new fortress cities when they fell into
enemy hands.:': Finally, as noted above, the socalled
barbarians, who came to attack or to setde
in the empire, were required to learn the
sophisticated techniques and discipline, from
logistics to the building and operation of
machines, that undergirded siege warfare.23
The focus of war in Merovingian Gaul was
upon gaining control of and holding the civitateswith
their fortified urbes. The civitates were
the fundamental units of political, military,
economic, and religious organization during
the Roman empire and cominued to play this
role throughout the Middle Ages and even
beyond.24 The prizes of diplomacy and by
extension of war were viable civitates with their
highly developed economic resources of a rural
nature as well as their fortified urbes.
These cities also served as the administrative
capital, religious center, and focus for commercial
activity within each administrative region.
Campaign strategy, and to a lesser extent battle
ucrics, recognized the primary importance of
keeping the desrrunion of both people and
resources to a minimum and of avoiding
unnecessary damage when possible. Massacred
t�umers and artisans, burned buildings, dcvast<ued
vine�·ards. broken canals, and destroyed
bridges merely undermined the value of victory
as raxes \muld fill in arrears and productivity
would slump.:' The unjustified emphasis on
military destruction and disasrer in Merovingian
Gaul found in rhe 1-fistor)' of Gregory of
Tours. our mosr important and inAuenrial
�ourcc. is due w the bishop's ovef\vhelming
bias against secular society, in generaL and military
matters in particular:'"
In Gaul. the ?\1erovingian rulers, wirh the
help of their Calla-Roman advisers, mainrained
when pm�ihle the milirary srrucrures that rhey
had acquired from rhe larer Roman empire.
Thus. the military forces of Clm·is and his successor:.
were dr,m·n from a vast variety ofethnic
groups. e.g. Gallo-Romans, Alans, Saxons, and
T.�ibk Thc�c forces were organized in a bt.:\vildering
congeries of insrirurional structures from
military colonies of \'arious sons to urban garri�ons.
general le·ies and select levies.2Procopius,
\Hiring toward the mid-sixth cenrury,
describes in considerable detail the fare of
one group, perhaps limitanei, that had been
serving in Armorica and subsequently was
amalgamated into Clovis's armies.co Procopius
writes: "[T]he�· handed themselves over along
with their military standards and the lands that
they had been guarding for the Romans for a
long rime to rhe Arborychoi [Armoricans] and
to the Germans [Merovingian Franks]." These
Roman soldiers, Procopius continues, "handed
down to their offspring all of their fathers' customs....and
this people held them in rever•
''"!
ence...even up to my time. The
Roman legacy, physical, institutional
and human, that the leaders in Merovingian
Gaul, who made military policy or grand strategic
decisions, inherited, they modified over
time in response ro their perception of contemporary
conditions.50 Nevertheless, throughout
the Merovingian era and, indeed, for a very
long rime thereafter the walls that had been
r
I
I
1 ·'· 3k. XXXI, ch. 6. p.-1r.l 4·
11\ B:�chrach I99Jh.
19. Lint's 144-15J.
:co. BKhr.-�ch I')')P
:r. �o1·. Val. V.2.
__ Bachrach and ,\ris I')')O:
13achrach 1')')4·':c;;.
Bachr.lch !')')_)h: B:.tchr.Kh
'99-i-J
24. Bachrach 1995b.
:'.). !bJJ.
2.6. Goffan I<;S8.
r. B::tchrach 1')"'2
·Q K;Khrach 19-oh. 19-::'.
_\nrlcnon I')')): cf. !'ol_1·.
29. 196;:2.64ff: cf. l<JI'):)_2n
"10. Bachrach 1970a. !')-:::
Anderson 1995_:;r.
!ohmon !')S): Brlihl l'r\.
I')<JO; Ft'vrier 1973: Huh<:n
1959u.
Ibid. and Petrikovirs 1')71:
Butler 1959: Gn:·•ier 1914:
Blancher I')OJ:
33- Bk. l!I, (h. I').
54- Bachrach 1972: Bradbury
1')')2.
.H- Bachra,h 1972:1-17.
36. Bk. Il, ch. 32.
_:p. Bk. II, ch. 32. N.b. rhi�
conver�atton may never
have taken place and it i-"
unlikely that even if it had
taken place that Gregory
recorded it verbatim.
However, it is important
that Gregory wants ro convey
to his readers that Clovis
accepted the validity of
such diplomatic and strategic
thinking and that it
was "Roman" thinking as
personified by Aridius.
3lj. Bachrach 1972:18-73;
Bachrach 1994C:II9-148.
39- Bk. VI, ch. 41.
built following the crash of the third century
not only survived throughout the Middle Ages.
Indeed, the walls continued more often than
not and in more places than in fewer to be
maintained in defensible condition.31
Thus in Gaul, some eighry per cent of the
one hundred and fifteen urbes that are listed in
the Notitia Galliarum were drastically reduced
in size and became the beneficiaries of massive
"\valls which averaged ten meters in height and
fOur meters in thickness at the base. These fortifications
were generally suengthened with
equally massive rowers, that on average were
placed at nventy-five meter intervals along the
walls, and by elaborate fortifications ro protect
the gates.This entire complex was usual!�· further
reinforced with an internal citadel, i.e. the
mx or pMetorium. FinJ.lly, in order ro enhance
rhe defenses, it \\·as not uncommon ro have
ditches dug around the walls which were then
fil!t:d wid1 \\'J.ter by haYins nearby streJ.m� or
rivers din·rted.<
In this context. Gregory ofTours's description,
in his Histm')'. of the fOrtress to\nl of
Dijon is \\·orth quoting: "It is a tOrrified place
wid1 very strong walls built in rhe middle of a
plain....Four gates f:Ke the four corners of the
earth and thirty d1ree-to\\·ers guard the [circuit]
walls. These rowers an: huilr of squared stones
ro a height of nvenry teet and J.hon� rhese are
cour.<.cs of .small srones. The total heiglu of rhe
walLs comes to thirtv fecr .md they ha\·e a thickness
of fifteen feet."
The OYerpowering presence of the Roman
fOrtresses assured thar sieges would dominate
v.rarfare both at the strategic and ar the tactical
level. Thus, the centrality of siege warfare
"\vhich focussed upon dl't tabes of Gaul during
the early Middle Ages is massively documented.'"
For example, Clovis·s conquest, during the
later fifth and early sixth centuries, of what is
now the greater parr of France, was based upon
the abiliry of his armies to capture great fortress
cities such as Verdun, Paris, Avignon, Albi,
Rodez, Clermont, Bordeaux. Toulouse, and
Angouleme.-1;
The siege, or, at least, d1e threat of a siege,
dominated warfare, but like war, in general,
intelligent commanders undertook such operations
only when diplomacy failed. Gregory of
Tours makes an effort to illustrate this by showing
how a Gallo-Roman magnate named Aridius
explained rhe relation between diplomacy
and war to Clovis while the Merovingian ruler
already was besieging the massive fortress ciry of
Avignon. Thus Aridius begins by asking rhetorically:
"Why do you keep this army in the field
when your enemy is ensconced in this exceptionally
strong place?"' Aridius then goes on to
observe: "You depopulate the fields [of their
animals], consume the meadows, hack down
the vines, fell the olive trees, and all the fruits of
this region you completely destroy." Nevertheless
you still "do not prevail against your en­
emy."-'6
Gregory then depicts Aridius suggesting a presumably
more a([racrive and obviously more traditional
option to Clovis. Thus, rather than continuing
to impose such destruction on the countryside,
Clovis is advised that he should send a
delegation to King Gondobad and offer terms by
which the Burgundian ruler will agree to pay "a
yearly tribute to you so that he may save the
region." Then Aridius explains, "You will be the
lord [and] the tribute will be paid in perpetuum.''
Gregory then explains that Clovis accepted
the principles embodied in this advice.,\Vhen
Clovis's sons, grandsons, and great
grandsons fought their exhausting civil wars,
the urbes remained rhe tOcus of their military
activit)', horh strategically and tactically.'' For
example, prior to rhe beginning of rhe campaigning
�cason of 584, Gregory of Tours
recounts in his History that King Chilperic of
Neusrria obtained intelligence that his brother,
King Guntram of Burgundy, and his nephew,
Childebt.'rt II of Amrrasia, had formed an
alliance. lnformarion on this pact wa� followed
by intelligence that Childebert had mustered an
army, mtensibly for a campaign in Spain, but
,.._,hich Chilperic would appear to have believed
was intended to attack him. Indeed, any Austrasian
invasion of Spain very likely would have
to pass through Neusrrian territory. Consequently,
Chilperic sent messeti:gers to sound rhe
alarm to his generals and to the counts in each
of the cities of his regnum. He ordered these
officers to repair the walls of the cities and to
bring their troops and resources within the
defenses in order to withstand a siege. Chilperic,
himself, mustered an army and kept it the
field under his direct command.1''
Despite the meager description of these
events provided by Gregory, it is clear that
Chilperic was employing a defense in depth
strategy. His well defended cities- not only did
he order the walls to be repaired but the generals
and counts were instructed to bring their
field forces within the fortifications- were to be
used as strategic 'hardpoims' which the enemy
could nor easily overwhelm. Chilpcric, himself,
stayed in the field with an army that could be
brought up quickly against any force that was
besieging one of his ci(ies.
ShouJd an enemy force refuse to raise its
siege, the fortified hardpoinr served as the
potential anvil in Chilperic's strategy and his
fidd army as the hammer. According to such a
plan any besieging force would be caught
between the two and seriously discomforted. In
addition, because field forces had been brought
into the cites and could reinforce the urban
militia forces on the walls, the fortifications
would be very difficult ro capture by storm.
Fina!ly, these regular troops could sortie from
rhe det"t-nses and in coordination with Chilperic's
army catch the besieging army in a pincer
movement with the immense tactical advamage
such a deployment enjoyed.
There is a clear indication rhar a defense in
depth straret,•y \V;ls put in place. This is proYided
by rhe recognition, reported by Gregory in
the HiJtOJy, that both Chilperic and his commanders
understood that rheir unprotected
assets in the countryside would be at risk �md
like!!· \\'ould be seriously dJ.nuged invading
army. Thus, rhc king guaranteed to his officers
rhar whatever assets that might be lost would be
replaced to their profit. The recognition that
unprotected and unprotectabk as�cts are w be
�acritlced in the short rerm i� a key aspect of a
defeme in-depth srratet.'!'···"
The importance of the great t()ftres� cities
remained a significant strategic and tactical
constant when eHecrivc control of rhc governmcm
p;1sscd from the ,�v1erovingian roi.flillltliW
to rhe Carolingian mayors of rhe palace and
other great regional magn;ue Cm1ilics. Thus, f(n
example. Charles Marrel be.\ieged Avibnon
twice and Narbonne once all in 737· '1 In
Aquitaine, rhe independent dukes, Eudo and
Waiofar, based their entire strateg)' upon conrr�<�l
of the great fortress cities of rhe·region.
Waiofar's ulrimate failure ro defend rhese
againsr Charles Martel's son, Peppin, in fact,
sounded the death knell of Aguiranian inde­
pendence>
The militarization of the popubtion, that
had been accelerated by the building of fortress
cities, thoroughly informed Merovingian milirary
organization. In Gaul each able bodied
male, whether free or unfree, was required to
provide service in the locally based militia for
the defense of the region in which he lived.
These men played the primary role in defending
the walls of the city in which they livedY In
addition, those men, who lived in or near one
or another of the many orher fortificarions that
dotted rhe countryside, were trained to defend
the walls of these castra, castella, or lesser
strongholds."'4 This aspect of a general military
28
obligation was nor confined to the Merovingian
kingdoms bur was ubiguitous in Rome's
successor stares. For example, the Anglo-Saxon
analogue to the Merovingian local militia was
the greatjjrd.4'
Civilians of sufficient means, regardless of
their ethnic backgrounds, had military obligations
that went well beyond participation in the
local defense, i.e. they were called upon for
expeditionary serYice."r' These men were
required nor only to provide for their arms,
armor. and transport bur also to sustain their
food costs for three months and clothing costs
for six months of campaigning each year.'- This
aspecr of a wealth-based military obligation
w.ts, like the general levy, a ubiquirous feature
of military organization in Rome's successor
stares. For example, the Anglo-Saxon analogue
"·as the ..selectJj·rd'._,
from a numerical perspecrive, the militarized
ciYilian popularion throughour Gaul pro\·idcd
rhe oYcrwhelming majority of rhe armed
forces t()r local dett-nse and also the rank and
file of rhe armies rhar carried our major offen.\i\·e
operations \\·hich were aimed ;H permanenr
conque�r. Hm,·eyer. these parr-rime militia
unir:. \H·Jc- �ignitlcand:· strengthened both tOr
local ddense and while on e>.:peditio hy rhe
addition of units of prot"t.-ssional rroops. These
Lmer t{)rces \Wre organized in a vast variety of
\\"<1:·\. Firs{ and tOremo�r among the profc.ssion,d
.1.o!Jier.s were rhe armed tOilowers who served
in the king's household. i.e. the analogue of the
emJK'for-s prae.i(ll/,de.i. Orhcr members of the
rm··,d anm· were escablished with their families
in military colonies or as garrisons in local
strongholds, and sometimes even on lands of
their own.-··
Other imporranr men in society, lay and
derical alike, commonly supported a military
household in accord with whar, as seen above,
was the imperial tradition. The importance of
the armed following was well undersrood in the
Roman empire and flourished in Rome's successor
stares. For example. the great Byzantine
general Belisarius, a contemporary of Clovis's
sons, is reported by a contemporary on his staff
to have had 7,ooo effectives in his military
household. Most of the members of such a
GefolgJChafi, like the praeJenta!es of the emperor,
served in rhe household of the man who
supporred rhem.'0 During the period of transition
from direct imperial rule to the derivative
consrirutions of Rome's successor states in the
West, rhe episcopate gradually became one of
the dominant elements in local government.'1
Thus, important ecclesiastics played a key role
.jO. F\k. \'L ..:h. ..p.
41. S:khr:1ch I\J-O�l
4:'.. Ehchrach 19:-+
4>- Bachrach 1•r2
44· B;Jchrach I')')_l<J:<;�-S'J
4'\ Ho!liqcr 1')6:'..
;k ltKhi,K-h I'Tl: RKhr.l�-h
:')}U:)il·)c).
4-. HachrKh J')-oa: cf.
\1\illcr..:dc:nem 1')6:;:
\X.-cidemann I')Sc.
Yoi.Jl:.:>.-y-281.
48. Hollisrcr 1•)62..
49· B2chrach 199)b.
so. Ibid.. Concerning rhc rok
of these GefO�t,>•h�,f�oJ in
what ha� come to ht· char·
ac!eriLed as '"fCw.b!i�m" �et·
Re;•nolds who;e now pro·
vidc:s the ba�is f(H further
di.;;cu�sion of this subject.
51. Hcinzclmann 1976. 1')�8.
\l Bachrach J9')_lb
'i."i· Hincmar r8�9:35: l'.'clson
1')86:124)4..
Bachrach and Ari; I')')O.
)\.Claude 1')6o: Briihl 1')7S·
1'}')0.
56 Bachrach and Ari� 1990.
);. Bradbury 1')')2: Rogers
1992: Bachrach 1994c
sfL Bachrach 1994C:79-So, 161-
167.
''J. Bk. IV, chs. 42, 44. 45; hk.
Vi, 26: hk_ Vll, ch<>. 10,
34-37
(io.
Goffan 1988:16L 1Xo, 217,
2!').
61. Bachrach 1995a.
in the military organization of Merovingian
Gaul. Usually each bishop supported a military
component in his jdmilia or household. They
also had the responsibility for seeing ro it that
their dependents, both free and unfree, performed
service in the general levy.''
Towards the latter part of the nimh century
Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, who is to be
considered one of rhe most ferocious defender
of church rights during the early Middle Ages,
attempted ro codify the long-standing military
obligations that were owed to rhe stare by rhe
church. Thus. he made it clear rhar according
ro cusrom a full rwo-fifrhs, i.e. forry per cent, of
episcopal income as well as of rhe income that
was collected by other religious inSiirurions ·was
to be made available to the government for the
defense of the res publim.'
The requirement that the walls of the great
fOrtress cirie� and of the lesser population centers
be manned in warrimt.: undoubtedly pla�·ed
a crucial role in accelerating the milirariz.;,Hion
of the civilian population. Indeed. proper
d(:'fcnse required rbr one man ddL·nd approximardy
f(>ur leer of wall..' Thus. for example.
the 2.900 meter circuit w.1lb of Bourgcs'·
required a ddCnse f(>rce of something in excess
of 2,350 local militia men. C:onn�rsely. an
attacking fOrce, in ord..:r ro pose a credible
threat to storm the w.llls, had ro h.1w ;H !..:·.1st <l
four to one numcricd adYantagt: o\·cr the
defenders."" Thus, for example, if Bourges were
to be defended simply b�- irs local militia. as
estimated above, ;m attacking force in the order
of magnitudl' of JO,ooo d"tecciws would be
required in order to create a credible thre;n to
storm the walls. These calculations remained
valid throughout the early ;'v1iddle Ages becau�t'
the milirary technology rlur was Jsailahle to
those who defended the walls and to those on
the offensive ostensibly remained constant until
the period following the first Crusade in nor
later..'·
Large military t()rces were reqUJred ro invest
large and prosperom fonress cities such as
Bourges. Then:fore, it was necessary tOr large
forces to be mobilized if sieges were to be raised
or otherwise th\'.'arted by the defenders who
sought to engage the invaders in the field.. For
example, in the summer of 583 an army of
between Is,ooo-zo,ooo effecrives, led by Duke
Desiderius and Duke Bladast, advanced on
Bourges from the south with the aim of laying
the city under siege. This invasion force was
confronted at Chiteaumeillam, on the Berry
frontier, by a force of some Is,ooo troops composed
of the augmented general levy of the
region and commanded by Ullo, the count of
Bourges. In the ensuing battle, the Berichon
forces were defeated and retreated to Bourges in
order to prepare the defense of the city against
the forthcoming siege. A contemporary reports
that the forces in the battle at Chiteaumeillam
suffered combined casualties in the 7,ooo
range.5�
Continuity between the later Roman empire
and the Merovingian kingdoms can also be
identified in regard to the campaign srrateg�"
and tactics used by the commanders of field
armies. For example, the Gallo-Roman general,
Mummolus (d. 586), is consistently depicted by
Gregory of Tours in his HiJtory as employing
trickery and surprise, avoiding potentially risky
encounters, choosing the battlefield when he
decided to fight, preparing fortifications carefully,
looking after his logistic needs, .slaughtering
fOragers in surprise raids, fOrcing rhc enem�·
to surrender irs plunder. and concentrating
overwhelming fOrce before going imo battle..· ·
In short, despite Gregory's defecrin' and hostile
descriptions of military operations, in general.
and Mummolus' military activities, in panicubr,'·"
it is evident that he very 3.blc officer.
Arguably he was the best military comnunder
produced in Mero\'ingian G;wl and it is clear
that he operated in consonance with the �H_hxe
f()und in the militan· handbook... such .1� \'l'gcrius's
Dt n' !vfilitan�''
To conclude: the construction of nu�-�iYc
f(>rrress cites and lesser forrificarion during the
later Roman empire thorough!�· altered the military
topography of Gaul and conditioned
grand strategy, campaign strategy, tactic�. and
combat techniques for a millennium and more.
Sieges came to dominate warfare and the popt;- !arion
was militarized both to defend the fOnified
population cc::nters and to provide the rink
and file for local defense forces and for expeditionary
armies. The so-called 'barbarians· were
Romanizcd culmrally not only as ;1 result of liYing
within rhe physical environmellt of the
empire but through conversion to Christianity,
learning Latin, having their laws redrawn under
the influence of Roman law, and, in general,
preserving to the best of their ability the institutions
that they found in Gaul.
In order to function militarily within the
empire the newcomers had to learn the full
range of skills that had informed warfare in !arc
antiquity.. These extended from the construction
of siege engines to the provision of logistic
support for the large armies that were needed to
be.<>iege massive fortress cities. 'Where possible,
existing imperial military personal were
absorbed into the armed forces of the Merovingian
kingdom and these men were encouraged
w maintain their training. The tradition of
learning about warfare from experienced commanders,
from books, as well as from on the job
experience continued in the Roman manner
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