Nationalism and the Internetn
THOMAS HYLLAND ERIKSEN
University of Oslo, Norway, and Free University of Amsterdam, The
Netherlands
ABSTRACT. The territorial integrity of nations is often taken as the premise for a
functioning, unifying national identity. Yet, the economic and technological developments
of recent decades have made it necessary to question this assumption. It can no
longer be taken for granted that the people who identify with a given nation inhabit the
same space, nor can it be assumed that cultural homogenisation takes place at the level
of the nation through mass media. When the Internet appeared, many social scientists
and commentators predicted that it would threaten the cultural integrity of nations;
that the non-territorial character of the Internet would lead to fragmentation and
unprecedented cultural differentiation, making it difficult, eventually impossible, to
uphold a collective sense of national identity based on shared images, representations,
myths and so on. Although it is too early to draw any conclusions regarding the longterm
effects of the Internet, experiences so far suggest that such predictions were
mistaken. In fact, nations thrive in cyberspace, and the Internet has in the space of only
a few years become a key technology for keeping nations (and other abstract
communities) together. Nations which have lost their territory (such as Afrikanerled
South Africa), nations which are for political reasons dispersed (such as Tamil Sri
Lanka or Kurdistan), nations with large temporary overseas diasporas (such as
Scandinavian countries, with their large communities in Spain during winter), or
nations where many citizens work abroad temporarily or permanently (such as India
or Caribbean island-states), appear in many sites on the Internet – from online
newspapers and magazines to semi-official information sites and ‘virtual community’
homepages. In a ‘global era’ of movement and deterritorialisation, the Internet is used
to strengthen, rather than weaken, national identities.
Although many disagree with various elements of his theory, nobody contests
Ernest Gellner’s central place in the research on nationalism over the last few
decades. His elegant theory, developed and refined over a period of several
decades, from the early 1960s until his death in 1995, famously, and with a
hint of the scandalous, was founded on the conviction that it was nationalism
that created nations and not the other way around. Nationalism, Gellner
argued, was a product of the transition from agrarian to industrial society – a
likely outcome but not a necessary one. Like his intellectual hero Malinowski,
also an immigrant from Central Europe who became an LSE man, Gellner
Nations and Nationalism 13 (1), 2007, 1–17.
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n
Editor’s note: This is the ASEN/Nations and Nationalism Ernest Gellner Nationalism Lecture,
delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 27 March 2006.
believed in the possibility of combining a love of culture with a politics based
on cosmopolitan, non-sectarian values. The theory, never uncontroversial,
has the twin virtues of simplicity and lucidity, and unlike other bodies of
thought that have influenced our generation of intellectuals, it is actually
possible to know when one agrees or disagrees with it.
My personal debt to Gellner’s work on nationalism is very considerable.
Just as I was about to embark on my first ethnographic fieldwork in an
ethnically complex society, reading Nations and Nationalism alerted me to the
importance of nationalism for any study of culture and modernity. This
connection was not self-evident at the time, in the mid-1980s, and it is likely
that my year of fieldwork in Mauritius, and much of my subsequent research,
would have taken a different course without that seminal book. Not least for
this reason, I am grateful for the opportunity to offer a small gift in return, in
the form of a lecture which tries to indicate the relevance of Gellner’s theory
for an empirical field which he never took on himself.
A common objection against Gellner’s theory of nationalism is that it is too
closely tied up with a particular period in European history, beginning with
the Industrial Revolution, Romanticism and the Enlightenment, and ending
with Woodrow Wilson and the Versailles Peace Treaty – in other words, Eric
Hobsbawm’s ‘long nineteenth century’. It is obviously the case that most of
Gellner’s examples were taken from that time and place, and the main,
hypothetical case in Nations and Nationalism, Ruritania, formerly a province
in Megalomania, has a distinctly Habsburgian feel to it. Yet the theory as
such was intended to be universal, even if it might require some extra
scaffolding here and there to fit circumstances in Asia or the Americas, and
it deserves to be taken seriously.
Gellner’s theory of nationalism is about political and cultural dimensions
of the transition from agrarian to industrial societies. It was conceived and
developed as a theory of territorially based identities, which stands to reason
since national identities were, and to a great extent still are, territorially based.
Although the territorial nature of nations remains undisputed, the growing
deterritorialisation of power, culture, politics, economies and people has in
recent decades created new problems (or challenges, to keep in line with
current newspeak), even for some of the oldest and most established nation-
states.
Technology and the new complexities
Ours is an era characterised by migrations which contribute to transforming
the nationalisms of our North Atlantic societies, as well as creating fertile
conditions for diasporic and transnational identity politics. Gellner occasionally
discussed diaspora nationalisms, once describing them as ‘a distinctive,
very conspicuous and important sub-species of nationalism’ (Gellner 1983:
101). In pre-modern societies, diasporas were often occupationally specialised
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and frequently constituted elites, albeit with little political and no military
power. In modern industrial societies based on nationalist ideology, Gellner
argued, such ethnic minorities might be assimilated, seek to be integrated into
the original ‘homeland’ or indeed found their own nation on a new or
mythical territory, or they might be expelled or physically exterminated. Their
occupational monopolies were unlikely to persist in societies increasingly
characterised by meritocracy and occupational mobility, and the drive
towards cultural homogenisation would create a chronic tension between
the cultural particularity of the diaspora and the national high culture of the
state.
In spite of his interest in historical European diasporas like Jews, Greeks
and Armenians, and his mention of contemporary migrant groups like
overseas Chinese and Indians, Gellner never paid much attention to the
emergent cultural complexities caused by the twin forces of the new information
age and communication technology, and large-scale migration from
poorer to richer countries. In the last years of his life, he was engaged in
exploring political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and their
relationship to nationalism. Moreover, as is well known, Gellner wrote
prolifically on Islam and Muslim societies, noting among other things that
Islam is ‘unique among world religions, in being, so far, clearly incompatible
with the widely held secularisation thesis’ (Gellner 1997: 84). Yet he chose not
to address the problem of the place of Islam in contemporary Europe.
Since Gellner thought of nations as being chiefly territorially based, he saw
the uprooted, diasporic variants as an interesting deviation, an anomalous
form. As the most powerful political entities, the states, are territorial, and he
firstly defines nationalism as ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that
the political and the national unit should be contingent’ (Gellner 1983: 1), and
secondly tends to regard the national as synonymous with ethnic, it stands to
reason that nations should be territorial. Yet, in one of his very last statements
on nationalism, Gellner speaks of the ‘de-territorialisation of nationalism’,
adding that the power of a nation now ‘depends on its annual rate of growth
. . . and not on how much of the map it manages to paint with its own colour’
(Gellner 1997: 107). In other words, the social and cultural principles
legitimising nationalism and instilling loyalty among its adherents may well
operate across a non-contiguous territory. But although he mentions the
possibility that ‘two or more TV networks [may be] equally accessible in the
same ‘‘land’’’ (ibid.: 108), Gellner left it to others to work out the implications
of these and other new communication technologies for nationalism.
By addressing such questions, my intention is to explore the extent to which
the new diasporic or virtual nationalisms expressed through, and mediated
across, the Internet confirm or contradict the expectations arising from
Gellner’s theory, which was based empirically largely on nineteenth-century
European nationalisms.
Gellner’s theory of nationalism offered an original perspective on the
transition from agrarian to industrial society. Emphasising the unifying role
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of national labour markets, culturally homogenising educational systems and
increased communication because of mobility and urbanisation, the theory
presented nationalism as a compatible ideological companion to industrialisation,
filling the voids of existential belonging and political legitimation left
by the demise of feudalism and agrarian society. Using the ideal-typical
emergent nation of Ruritania as an example, he indicated ways in which social
entropy – the ironing out of cultural differences – took place, and the
measures a dominant ethnic group might take to deal with so-called
entropy-resistant groups, that is, minorities which were not easily assimilated.
Moving on to his present or what is now the recent past of our societies,
Gellner argues that the drive towards homogenisation continues, that the
‘nationalist imperative of the congruence of political unit and of culture will
continue to apply’ (Gellner 1983: 121).
The moot point in this argument concerns the definition of the term
culture. To what extent is it necessary, for the efficient functioning of the
shared institutions of society, that the inhabitants are culturally similar? Is it
sufficient that they speak the same language, or do they also have to share a
religious identity, believe in the same national myths of origin, and support
the same sport teams?
This question cannot be answered conclusively. The problems concerning
the relationship between cultural similarity and national identity hover
ominously above most theoretical treatments of nationalism, but they can
only be resolved at the level of practice or politics. However, we can say
something descriptive about the degree of inclusion experienced by minorities,
immigrant or otherwise, and their degrees of identification with the nation in
which they reside, with another nation where they or their parents were
born, or with other social and cultural units. Although cultural homogenisation
among immigrant minorities in Europe does in some important ways
take place, roughly along the lines predicted by Gellner’s theory, there is no
one-to-one relationship between this process and that of identification
with the nation. In a current research project on minorities and the media
in the UK, Marie Gillespie (2006) reports that many British Muslims felt
much more British (and probably less Muslim) before 9/11 and the war on
Iraq than they do now. This change is not a result of weakened cultural
homogenisation or even exclusion from the labour market, but of a widespread
feeling of being less welcome than before. While religious variation
may not have been seen as a major obstacle to national homoegeneity in
the recent past, the European Muslim is now increasingly perceived as the
alien within.
Writing about the cosmopolitan middle classes, Gellner comments that
they ‘already ‘‘speak each other’s language’’, even if they do not speak each
other’s language’, meaning that they adhere to an internationally shared
grammar of interaction and signification. With many ethnic minorities in
Europe these days, however, the opposite could be said to be the case: even if
they speak the same language as the majority, they no longer feel that they
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‘speak the same language’. Most of the immigrants are arguably in a better
state in their new country than they would have been in their country of
origin: they are free from persecution, acute material insecurity and hopelessness,
and their children have a wide range of educational and professional
opportunities. Yet most non-European immigrants have not been, and may
never be, fully assimilated. Many develop precarious and complicated
hyphenated identities. Some see their situation as one of temporary exile,
hoping to return when political conditions in their country of origin change.
Others develop transnational networks with people from their own country,
as an alternative or supplement to full membership in one nation or the other.
Moreover, this unstable situation, where a certain proportion of the population
are neither full members of the nation nor foreigners, is unlikely to end
soon. Notwithstanding ongoing cultural homogenisation, identity politics
runs its own course, using some aspects of homogenisation (education,
technological skills, etc.) to prevent others (religion, beliefs, emotional
attachments). It is an irony of the present era that the more similar we
become, the more we try to remain different. In a certain sense, we are witness
to a twenty-first century version of what has been described as the problem of
the third generation in the United States. The grandparents lived in a culture
without being aware of it; the parents, moving into a modern society, did their
best to remove every trace of that pre-modern and shameful past; while the
children try to revive precisely that culture in which the grandparents lived
without being aware of doing so, and which the parents did their best to
forget.
Centripetal and centrifugal forces
I described our era as one characterised by migration and diasporic identity
politics, but it is also one of dramatic changes in the use and availability of
new information and communication technologies. The total number of
Internet users in the world is currently a little over a billion, or one in six,
and the growth rate is spectacular, estimated to average 35 per cent annually
over the last five years. The use of mobile telephones worldwide also continues
to grow exponentially, not least with respect to text messages, a cheap and fast
implementation of mobile technology which, to everybody’s surprise, conquered
the world in the space of a few years. A decade ago, text messages were
unknown in China. In January 2006, the Chinese sent about 15.6 billion text
messages.
Global cultural history of the Big Ditch kind favoured by Gellner – the
movement from bands and tribes to cities and states – can fruitfully be seen as
a movement from the concrete to the abstract: words and numbers are turned
into abstractions through the medium of literacy; local communities become
imagined communities; vast nations imitate the symbolism of kinship and
locality, and so on. In connection with this figure of thought, there is a
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widespread notion that increased complexity in social life creates larger and
larger communities – not so many years ago, leading sociologists thus
predicted the imminent rise of global identities, universal cosmopolitanism
and world governments. Notwithstanding the ethnic politics and ‘narcissism
of small differences’ so widespread in the 1990s, this simplistic view, like other
simplistic views, has some general truth to it. In relation to the Internet,
McLuhan’s (1964) cliche´ of the global village is often invoked to argue that
since the web of communication is now global rather than national, the
community with which individuals identify can also, for the first time in
human history, encompass the globe.
On the other hand, individualism – also a major result of modernity – leads
us to the apparently opposite conclusion that communities become smaller
and smaller, with the individual as the end result. Some of the prophets of the
Internet have indeed argued that the individual is an industrial product, and
that the multiple identities persons can assume on the Internet herald the end
of the integrated person.
As theorists of nationalism have shown, there is no contradiction between
individualism and the growth of abstract communities; on the contrary, they
are directly interrelated. The nation is a collective of individuals and a
collective individual, as Louis Dumont wrote many years ago (Dumont
1964). The question here, then, is what kinds of creatures will form what
kinds of communities in an electronic age of instantaneous, transnational
communication.
Seen together, the increased mobility of people and the rapid spread of new
communication and information technologies contribute to creating new
conditions for collective identity management. In the early years of the
Internet, many commentators believed that the deterritorialised, supranational
character of the Internet would contribute to the fragmentation of
populations and the breakdown of stable national identities; some even
foresaw the coming of an all-encompassing global identity. Similar prophesies
have been, and to some extent still are being made regarding the impact of
non-European migration into the European heartlands. Both tendencies have
the potential of liberating individuals from place-bound identities embedded
in myth and kinship; and, at a macro level, of breaking up the nationalist alloy
of place, language, ethnic identity, state, culture and nationality into its
constituent components, leaving many options open and few identities
unquestioned. In a friendly aside to Gellner’s description of nationalism as
the replacement of Kokoschka’s paintings, made up of thousands of tiny
coloured dots, with Modigliani’s calm, monochrome surfaces, the anthropologist
Ulf Hannerz (1996) suggests the return of Kokoschka in the teeming,
multicultural cities of the present. If nationalism engendered the replacement
in the world of many small differences with fewer but major differences, then
it can credibly be argued that substantial parts of the world are at least quickly
moving back to a culturally complex situation where hetereogeneity is the
norm and monoculturalism the exception.
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At the same time, forces militating against disorder and the dissolution of
boundaries remain strong. One of the most interesting findings in recent
research on Internet use is that this technology often strengthens rather than
weakens national identities, and that it can be exceptionally efficient in
reproducing such identities across vast distances, uniting dispersed populations
in virtual communities (see e.g. Miller and Slater 2000). Similarly, in
spite of the broad selection of TV channels which is now offered to many
Europeans, the vast majority prefer to watch domestic channels. The main
exceptions are certain immigrant groups, who can postpone cultural integration
into the new country by following television from the old country. Far
from being a ‘disembedding’ technology, the Internet has in fact proven to be
a ‘re-embedding’ technology. It can easily be used to strengthen identities
which might, in an earlier era of slower and more cumbersome communication
across oceans and mountains, have been forgotten or changed beyond
recognition by the third or fourth generation.
As noted by Steven Vertovec: ‘Whereas in previous eras migrants had to
make do with exorbitantly expensive calls or slow-paced post, they are now able
to communicate with their families abroad on a regular, if not day-to-day basis’
(2004: 220). Ayse C¸ aglar adds that Turks in Germany spend twice as much on
telephone calls as the average German (C¸ aglar 2002). Here Vertovec and C¸ aglar
limit their discussion to the telephone, which is an interpersonal communication
medium. If we look at other new media, that family of technologies which make
up the Internet – chatrooms, mailing lists, blogs, websites, discussion forums –
the emphasis moves from the micro via the intermediate to the macro. The
content may be rich and multifaceted, ranging from cool, factual news to
personal confessions and engaged political statements. An Iranian in California,
who feels that ‘The Internet seems able to rescue Iranians from . . . the
‘‘vacuum’’ and ‘‘intellectual desert’’ of the host society’ (Graham and Khosravi
2002, quoting van den Bos 2005), probably voices a widespread sentiment, at
least judging from the extent of diasporic activity on the Internet.
Some constituent parts of the Internet
The Internet consists of several relatively distinct technologies characterised
by qualitatively different modes of communication: some are one-way,
functioning as mass media; others, which are bilateral, are more similar to
the letter or the telephone conversation; while yet others occupy intermediate
niches between the interpersonal and the mass medium. Allow me to make
some initial distinctions.
The website is probably what most people associate with the Internet.
Usually consisting of interlinked pages with text and illustrations, it can be
compared with the newspaper or the magazine. Many websites include
feedback forms or even discussion forums. A main difference between the
older media and websites is that websites can be updated any time, and that
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they are cheap and easy to set up. A clever student can, at no financial cost,
operate a sophisticated website with a professional appearance.
The chatroom is a closed, virtual room where participants have to log on with
a unique username and password. Discussions in a chatroom take place in real
time, that is with no delays, and they often have an oral, spontaneous quality.
The usenet newsgroup is an open space defined by its topic, which could be
anything from Kurdish independence to industrial fertilisers. Anyone can read
posts on a newsgroup without logging in, but they often have to register in
order to place their own posts. Newsgroup posts have more permanence than
chatgroups, and are often more extensive and better documented. Discussion
forums on a website tend to function like newsgroups, and they are
often moderated by someone who censors inflammatory messages and decides
when to start a new thread or sub-topic. Both chatrooms and newsgroups
require special software, but it is often included in web browsers these days.
The email list is, as the name suggests, a regular email despatch from one
person to a list of people who have been added to his or her list, voluntarily or
not. Some email lists are collective in the sense that everyone can send
messages to everyone. The result of such democratisation, I can testify from
my own experience, is often that email inboxes are flooded with engaged
messages on peripheral topics.
The blog, finally, is perhaps the most original innovation to emerge from
the Internet so far. Blogs can be accessed directly on the World Wide Web,
they are made by one person who is usually known by name and face, and
they can be described as an intermediate form between the newsletter, the
social commentary and the diary. Some, but not all, blogs involve interactivity
in the shape of feedback forms and ‘guestbooks’.
All these modes of communication are used extensively by organisations,
interest groups and individuals with nationalist political agendas. In fact, the
Internet is fast becoming a major medium for the consolidation, strengthening
and definition of collective identities, especially in the absence of a firm
territorial and institutional base. Some of the nationalist groups that appear
to be most active on the Internet are Sri Lankan Tamils, Kurds, Palestinians,
Sikhs and diasporic Iranians, as well as others with a precarious relationship
to territory, such as diasporic Chileans, and Afrikaners in South Africa. We
now move to a few examples which indicate the variety of ways in which the
Internet can be used in nation-building.
Independence struggles in absentia
The Kurds are one of the largest ethnic groups with a distinctive cultural
heritage, language and collective self-identity, never to have controlled a state.
The persecution of Kurds in countries where they are numerous – Turkey,
Iraq, Syria and Iran – has, in the twentieth century, oscillated between
assimilationism and brutality. As a result, the Kurdish diaspora is large and
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sprawling, with substantial numbers in Germany, the USA, the UK, Sweden
and Australia. Lacking a Kurdish-language communications infrastructure in
their areas of origin, Kurds in exile have developed a variety of media –
magazines, satellite TV channels and Internet resources. These have been used
to build a shared identity and to let Kurds make themselves known as a nation
without a country to the outside world. Some of the Kurdish websites are
made by professional journalists, such as KurdishMedia (www.kurdmedia.com),
which is edited in, and hosted by a server located in, the UK. The
editorial statement says that the website aims to
 Develop a scientific approach to the Kurdish issue, including towards its
language, art and culture.
 Create new definitions for the future of the Kurdish nation within the
international arena.
 Create a sphere for Kurdish thinkers and strategists to be able to further
develop upon the Kurdish issue.
 Introduce Kurds as a civilised nation in the international arena.
 Define a state of ‘United Kurdistan’ as an isle of peace at the heart of the
Middle East (www.kurdmedia.com/about.asp).
Although the issue of statehood is left largely untouched, the aims of the
website are clearly of a classic nation-building kind. However, due to the
transnational nature of both the Internet and the Kurdish diaspora, ‘the
international arena’ is given much greater attention than in earlier forms of
nation-building. Lacking a state which is committed to the maintenance and
strengthening of Kurdish identity, the task of creating a Kurdish civil society
and collective identity is largely left to private enterprise. Since much of the
Kurdish elite is in exile, the Internet has turned out to be a perfect medium for
the consolidation of identity and dissemination of news for Kurds. The main
Kurdish websites, including KurdishMedia and KurdistanWeb.org, have few
if any feedback opportunities for the users and function as de-localised
newsmedia. However, such websites, important as they are for the formation
of a nationalist elite discourse, are supplemented by personal websites, blogs,
newsgroups and chatrooms, where participation appears to be broad, even if
it is dominated by students (cf. Bakker 2001).
Kurdish national identity may be said to be in a formative stage. There is
considerable factionalism, a complicated language issue involving differences
in both dialect and script, and political elites remaining in Kurdish areas tend
to engage in minimal cooperation across state borders. It may actually be said
that the Kurdish nation reaches its fullest, most consolidated form on
transnational websites in the metropolitan languages of English, German
and French. With Sri Lankan Tamils, the situation is different. The territory
over which they claim nationhood is relatively clearly defined, does not cut
across existing state borders, and is populated by a culturally homogeneous
majority population. The most important transnational voice for Tamil
independence may be the websites TamilNet (www.tamilnet.com) and
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Tamilnation (www.tamilnation.org), which are updated frequently. While
Tamilnation is edited in a personal and idiosyncratic style by Nadesan
Satyendra, an attorney, TamilNet has many of the functions of a newspaper
and TV channel. Largely edited in Sri Lanka itself (unlike the Kurdish
websites), TamilNet is considered sufficiently dangerous by opponents of the
Tamil independence struggle for its editor, Dharmeratnam Sivaram, to have
been murdered in 2005.
TamilNet and other websites dedicated to politics in Sri Lanka, many of
them in the Tamil language, play a role both in identity formation
among Tamils overseas and in shaping international opinion. However, it
must be kept in mind that such websites represent only a small part of the traffic
on the Internet. There exists a plethora of personal blogs made by and for Sri
Lankan Tamils, overseas or not, ranging from the aesthetic to the militant.
Some have language courses in Tamil, chiefly intended for the children of
migrants, and some give links to sites where Tamil computer fonts can be
downloaded.
As a result of the widespread activity on the Internet among scattered
diasporas like Kurdish and Tamil refugees, many peoples have developed a
sense of belonging to a community which would otherwise have been
difficult to achieve. Chatrooms, newsgroups and blogs mime direct interaction
and can, given some time, create a sense of familiarity and intimacy
among regular users which bears some resemblance to real-life interaction.
Before considering some further implications of Internet nationalism,
we shall consider a few more examples indicating other varieties of Internet
nationalism.
Stable hyphenation
As Fuglerud (1999) has shown, many Tamil refugees are engaged in longdistance
nationalism (Anderson 1992), actively supporting political causes in
Sri Lanka; and they were, at least in the early years of their exile, relatively
uninterested in the country in which they lived. This makes their situation
different from that of many other diasporic groups, whose members may
interact more intensively with, and who may in some ways be more integrated
into, their host societies. Moroccans in the Netherlands are a typical example of
the latter kind of diaspora. Although some have arrived as refugees from the
war in Western Sahara, the majority of Dutch Moroccans are free to return to
Morocco, but stay in the Netherlands for economic and other reasons. Their
most important website is, tellingly, neither in Arabic nor French, but in Dutch.
Varied and comprehensive, the website includes subsections on Islam, a wide
variety of discussion forums, a newspage, games and even a dating subsite. The
journalistic perspective is emphatically Dutch and European, and addresses its
readers as a permanent minority in a European country, offering job advice,
links to Dutch language courses and so on.
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Maroc.nl aims at the creation of a stable, diasporic, hyphenated Dutch
identity (d’Haenens and van Summeren 2005). There is no yearning for a
return to, or for social reform in Morocco, but instead for recognition and
respect as a new kind of Dutchmen. In fact, this kind of website is arguably
not nationalist at all, but represents a cultural minority hoping to function as
an interest group in a consolidated nation-state. If anything, Maroc.nl
represents a reformed, expanded Dutch nationalism.
This is even clearer in the case of the largest Norwegian website representing
Muslim immigrants, Islam.no. It aims to represent all the national, ethnic
and cultural groups who are Muslim and live in Norway. The two websites
have a double aim in common: to strengthen a shared collective identity in a
diasporic group or category, and to rectify the negative image of Muslims
conventionally projected through the mainstream media. Exclusively using
the national languages of their host sociaties (no English, French or Arabic),
they see both the diasporas and the majorities as their audience, but they do
not communicate to a transnational diasporic group.
With the Iranian diaspora in the Netherlands, the situation is slightly
different. Many Iranian refugees are engaged in oppositional politics involving
countrymen dispersed across the North Atlantic area, and therefore need
to create and maintain transnational links. Transnational websites uniting
exiled Iranians do exist, but van den Bos has shown (2005) that there are a
large number of Dutch-Iranian websites (he has found 72) as well. In addition,
Iranians in the diaspora maintain connections, increasingly of an electronic
nature, with relatives and others in Iran.
This latter use of the Internet is possibly its most important function as a
vehicle for nationalism. In a study of the Internet in Trinidad, Miller and
Slater (2000) show that transnational Trinidadian families have become more
tightly integrated after getting online. Contact with relatives overseas has now
become cheaper, faster and easier than it was in the time of the aerogramme
and the expensive long-distance call.
The examples we have considered so far indicate that diasporic use of the
Internet varies in its relationship to nationalism. Some are content to
strengthen and confirm a particular cultural or religious identity in the
context of their country of residence; some prioritise interpersonal links
with their country of origin; while yet others – presumably a minority – use
the Internet to actively promote the political cause of a territorial nation, real
or prospective, in a dispersed diaspora, which is brought together as an
abstract community only because of the Internet.
My last two examples add even more variety.
Surrogate nationhood
When South Africa witnessed the end of white political hegemony in the early
1990s, some Afrikaners – that is, white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans –
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found it difficult to reconcile themselves with the new political realities. Some
Afrikaners have championed the building of a ‘white homeland’, a Volkstaat;
others have engaged in terrorist attacks aiming to destabilise the State; and yet
others have created a virtual nation, or perhaps a nation-in-waiting, on the
Internet. Ranging from the virulent to the moderate in their rhetoric, these
websites have a few important elements in common with Kurdish and Sri
Lankan Tamil sites. They always contain a potted history of the people
constituting the nation, arguing why a just world would allow them the
privilege of their own nation-state; they praise the beauty of the land and the
glory of past achievements; and they make passionate appeals to the
international community. In spite of the fact that some of these websites,
such as the official site of AWB (the militant Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging,
the Afrikaner Resistance movement), even contain sections with poetry, most
of them are singlemindedly political, criticising perceived injustices, and
portraying the Afrikaners as a tormented people of martyrs and victims.
There is a concern with nationhood, for example in this editorial statement on
boer.ca.za: ‘This webpage . . . serves as a cultural link-up point which has as
its aim, the preservation of the Boer nation. It also supports efforts to obtain
self determination for the Boer nation. . . . The Boer Nation is the only White
indigenous tribe in Southern Africa’ (www.boer.co.za). There is also concern
with ethnic identity, which is seen by some as dissolving in the new South
Africa. On www.stopboergenocide.com, for example, a contributor states that
‘people are again losing their ethnic identity and confused about what to call
themselves – Boers, Afrikaners or whites, which are you? They are losing their
ethnic identity – and it’s not the first time this tragedy is occurring’ (http://
www.stopboergenocide.com/29301/index.html).
Many of the Afrikaner sites are bilingual written in Afrikaans and English,
as are the discussion forums associated with them. Like most of the websites I
have spoken about, they aim both to consolidate and strengthen the internal
group cohesion and to canvas for support from outsiders. Unlike the other
groups considered, however, Afrikaners still largely live in South Africa,
though many feel that they have been deprived of their civil rights. Their
virtual nations on the Internet therefore function both as a compensation for
the nation they have lost (twice, in fact; first to the British after the Boer Wars,
and then to the African National Congress) and as rallying-points for future
and imminent political action.
The virtual province
An underlying issue in all the examples discussed so far, except perhaps the
last, concerns the problem of divided loyalties. Apart from clear-cut immigrant
websites like Maroc.nl and Islam.no, where the main topic consists in
finding a balance between integration and preservation, the issue of divided
loyalties is not tackled explicitly, though it is a main reason why the websites
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r The author 2007. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007
were set up in the first place. To varying degrees, diasporic populations
develop networks and loyalties in their countries of residence, sometimes at
the cost of gradually losing their commitment and loyalties towards the home
country. My examples so far have suggested that the Internet has considerable
potential in strengthening transnational loyalties not only across ethnic and
national lines, but also – and perhaps predominantly – along them. It can
bridge the territorial abysses that separate people ‘of the same kind’ from their
metaphorical brothers and sisters, and counteract cultural assimilation into
the host country.
The final example I am going to introduce shows that virtual nations
need neither be oppositional nor secessionist; that the struggle engaged
in by diasporic populations need neither be secessionist nor oppositional,
and that the work of collective identity may simply amount to an enlarging, or
a deterritorialisation, of the existing nation. This, incidentally, may be the
most common, if not most spectacular, form of virtual nationalism.
Some Norwegian friends of mine lived in Guatemala as foreign aid
workers in two periods. During the first period, in the early 1990s, they felt
isolated, receiving little news of events at home and feeling out of touch
with their friends in Norway. Returning to Guatemala after a few years in
Oslo, they had a broadband Internet connection installed in their house.
They were suddenly able to follow Norwegian news, gossip, weather
forecasts and public debates just as well as any other Norwegian, regardless
of location, and their eldest daughter could stay in touch with her
friends continuously through email and IRC chat. This change, brought
about in the space of a few years, is not trivial in matters pertaining to
national identity.
In countries with large diaspora populations, one might even imagine
the development of state-sponsored virtual nations on the Internet,
ensuring the continued loyalty and identification of citizens or ex-citizens
living abroad. In terms of economic and strategic interests, such an enlarging
of the national interest makes perfect sense. However, the only example
of this kind that I have come across so far is from Chile. During
the military dictatorship (1973–90), roughly a million Chileans left the
country, and the majority did not return after the reintroduction of
democracy. There are people registered as Chileans in 110 countries around
the world, even though many lost their citizenship after fleeing from the
Pinochet regime.
In recent years, the government has actively sought to reintegrate overseas
Chileans and their descendants, not by encouraging their return, but by
enhancing their sense of Chileanness, which might in turn benefit the state
through investments and ‘Chilean’ activities scattered around the globe. Chile
is officially made up of thirteen regions, but increasingly a fourteenth region,
called the region of el exterior or el reencuentro (the reunion) is mentioned in
official and unofficial contexts. The Chilean government’s website (www.
gobiernodechile.cl) has a first-order link to a subsite called ‘Chilenos en el
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exterior’, and there has been talk of giving voting rights to Chileans abroad.
Initiatives have even been taken to allow Chilean artists living abroad to apply
for government funding.
The use of the Internet by states, in order to stimulate and kindle national
loyalty among nationals living in diasporas, is likely to become both widespread
and controversial in the near future. Granted that most debates about
immigration in the receiving countries deal with integration, this kind of
measure is bound to be perceived by them as a negentropic force, to use
Gellner’s term. Be this as it may, I have tried to show, through the cursory
presentation of a handful of deliberately divergent examples, that the Internet
is a communication technology which has the potential of making political
boundaries congruent with cultural ones, as Gellner puts it in Nations and
Nationalism – even when both kinds of boundaries are thoroughly deterritor-
ialised.
I have described four varieties of Internet nationalism: state-supported
(Chile), surrogate (Afrikaner), pre-independence (Kurdish) and multiculturalist
(Moroccan-Dutch). A fifth, which I cannot discuss for lack of space, is
the oppositional, exemplified in Uimonen’s (2001) work on anti-government
websites developed by expatriate Laotians in the Laotian language, partly
directed at the minuscule minority in Laos who have access to the Internet. A
sixth variety might be the diasporic Chinese identity, which is increasingly
actualised on the Internet, but which has fairly weak links with China itself.
The question that remains to be addressed, which we are now prepared to
make some qualified, even if provisional, statements about, concerns the
similarities and differences between Internet nationalisms and territorial
nationalisms.
Virtual nations and the theory of nationalism
Gellner’s theory of nationalism emphasises changes in the quality of interpersonal
relationships as a result of increased mobility, standardised education
and large-scale labour markets following the industrial revolution. Some
of the central features of nationalism, in his theory, are:
 shared, formal educational system
 cultural homogenisation and ‘social entropy’
 central monitoring of the polity, extensive bureaucratic control
 linguistic standardisation
 national identification – the abstract community
 cultural similarity as a basis for political legitimacy
 anonymity, single-stranded social relationships
In my examples of transnational nationalism, some but not all these elements
are in place. Diasporic groups rarely have their own, exclusive educational
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system, but it should be noted that segregated, private schools have been on
the political agenda of several minorities in Western Europe for some time.
They obviously do not have their own state either, at least not in the country
where they live, and in some cases – Kurds, Tamils – not anywhere else either.
Deterritorialised, virtual nationalism on the Internet also distinguishes itself
from territorial nationalisms through its keen interest in the outside world’s
gaze on itself. A main objective for most of the nationalist websites I have
visited is to make the plight, the virtues or the beauties of this or that nation
known to members of the ‘global village’. The widespread use of English
indicates a wish to communicate outside the virtual nation itself. This is
unsurprising, granted the setting of these virtual nations in an overcrowded
world where others’ attention and recognition have become truly scarce
resources.
A main difference between various cases of Internet nationalism concerns
their relationship to the country of origin. Some minorities clearly envision
going back to an improved, or newly independent nation; others accept that
they have no home other than the diaspora. Thus, the transnational Kurdish
websites and the Dutch-Moroccan ones convey very different identity
projects; independence for the mother country and acceptance in the country
of adoption, respectively. In general, nonetheless, the two main principles of
belonging in human societies, those of kinship and territory, are brought into
tension with each other in a diasporic situation characterised by a heightened
awareness of cultural differences among majorities as well as minorities.
Attempts to develop territorial nationalisms encompassing several ethnic
groups, and subjecting them to the same processes of cultural homogenisation,
are counteracted by identity politics spokesmen who insist on group
differences, such as ethnic discrimination in the labour market and other,
related processes. Although members of ethnic minorities in urban societies
interact extensively with members of the majority as well as those of other
minorities, various kinds of resources follow informal, ethnic lines – jobs,
spouses, gossip, housing. At the same time, migrant diasporas rely on the state
in which they live for a number of resources that cannot be obtained through
their virtual nations. What the Internet nation has to offer is chiefly a sense of
identity which can be exploited socially, politically and economically, but only
at the cost of entering into a tense, sometimes conflictual relationship with the
territorial state.
At the same time, we must conclude that with the Internet creating an
invisible, but perceptible umbrella covering scattered diasporas in numerous
countries, one’s German Kurdishness or Moroccan Dutchness is more
likely to persist than it would have in an earlier era, where encapsulation or
assimilation were the most likely long-term outcomes. The political and
cultural effects of diasporic Internet nationalism in the ‘homeland’ are also
frequently perceptible: at times, the elites-in-waiting use the Internet to
coordinate their takeover plans; at other times, diasporas actively support
militant and sometimes violent groups ‘at home’, knowing that they
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themselves need not pay the price for an increase in violence (Anderson 1992),
remaining as they do in the comfort of a peaceful diaspora.
It is in this diasporic world of imperfect integration in a territorial polity,
and similarly imperfect membership in a dispersed nation, that Internet
resources help create a sense of social cohesion and cultural integration.
Both would have been difficult to achieve under a different technological
regime. However, unlike the Gellnerian model nation-state, which was
territorial and bounded, this kind of situation is inherently unstable. Both
the territorialising forces of the nation-state and the deterritorialising forces
connecting people to a nation which is elsewhere or perhaps only in cyberspace
persist, and are at odds with each other. The territorial nation-state, as
described analytically by Gellner, can be compared to a patrilineal
kinship system, where all rights and duties are tied to a single principle. The
diasporic, plural, changing, complex, contemporary nation-states, and certainly
their minorities, conversely resemble matrilineal systems, where it
becomes a task of paramount importance to balance opposing principles.
As Ernest Gellner knew, there is no easy way out, but pluralism must be a part
of the equation.
References
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International Studies Association Annual Convention ‘International relations and the new
inequality: power, wealth, and the transformation of global society at the beginning of the
twenty-first century’. Chicago, 20–24 February 2001.
van den Bos, Matthijs. 2005. ‘Dutch-Iranians exile and online networks’, paper delivered at the
conference ‘Ethnic diversity in Europe: cultural complexity’, University of Oslo, 27–28 October
2005.
C¸ aglar, Ayse. 2002. ‘Media corporatism and cosmopolitanism’ in Steven Vertovec and Robin
Cohen (eds.), Conceiving cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
d’Haenens, Leen and van Summeren Cindy. 2005 ‘‘‘Digital citizenship’’: Moroccan youngsters in
the Netherlands’. Unpublished paper, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Dumont, Louis. 1964. ‘Nationalism and communalism’, Contributions to Indian Sociology 7:
30–70.
Fuglerud, Øivind. 1999. Life on the outside: The Tamil diaspora and long-distance nationalism.
London: Pluto.
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gellner, Ernest. 1997. Nationalism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Gillespie, Marie. 2006 ‘Shifting securities: news cultures before and after the Iraq war
2003’, paper presented at the ‘Cultural complexity’ seminar, University of Oslo, 13 March
2006.
Graham, Mark and Khosravi Sharam. 2002. ‘Reordering public and private in Iranian cyberspace:
identity, politics and mobilization’, Identities 9(2): 219–46.
Hannerz, Ulf. 1996. Transnational connections. London: Routledge.
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Miller, Daniel and Slater Don. 2000. The Internet: An ethnographic approach. Oxford:
Berg.
Uimonen, Paula. 2001. Transnational.Dynamics@Development.Net: Internet, modernization and
globalization. Stockholm: Department of Social Anthropology.
Vertovec, Steven. 2004. ‘Cheap calls: the social glue of migrant transnationalism’, Global
Networks 4(2): 219–24.
Selected websites
http://www.awb.co.za
http://www.boer.co.za
http://www.gobiernodechile.cl/chilenos_exterior/
http://www.islam.no
http://www.kurdmedia.com/
http://www.kurdistanweb.org/
http://www.maroc.nl
http://www.stopboergenocide.com
http://www.volkstaat.za.cx
http://www.tamilnation.org
http://www.tamilnet.com
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