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Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
Survey of Important Internal Moments
of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc
Political System of Interwar Hungary
(1919–1922)1
1
The end of World War I brought a radical change of the political map of Central
Europe. The Habsburg Monarchy broke up and the so-called successor
states were constituted on its fundamentals. Besides Austria and Hungary,
they included Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene
State. The constitution of the successor states was conﬁrmed at the Paris Peace
Conference. The Peace Treaties resulting from it gave an international-legal
full stop to the war conﬂict. The concept of the Versailles peace system
beneﬁted most the victorious successor states. The Versailles peace system
brought dramatic limitation of the political power of the defeated successor
states of Austria-Hungary, i.e. for Austria and Hungary, not only in the actual
Central European region. The adaptation to new post-war internal and external
political conditions was very complicated for the latter, i.e. Hungary. The
result of the search for new state identity of post-war Hungary was the birth
of the interwar, so called Horthyan Hungary at the turn of 1919 and 1920
with speciﬁc semi-authoritative regime. From constitutional perspective,
the interwar Hungarian state was based on civic parliamentarianism with
all appropriate bodies, but with autocratically regulated form or activity in
practice. The foundations of the semi-authoritative interwar Hungarian
kingdom were laid by the conservative Christian-national political course
that had seized power in August 1919, pushing the civic-democratic political
powers, including social democracy, that had striven to build civic-democratic
post-war Hungary like the Western democracies at the turn of 1918 and
1) The article constitutes a part of solution of the Grant Project No. P410/10/P140, Czechoslovak-Hungarian
bilateral relationships on the background of home aﬀairs development of
Horthyan Hungary in 1919–1927, funded by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic.
ANDREJ TÓTH
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Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
the monarchy, the latter divided into further two antagonistic camps – diehard
legitimists, i.e. supporters of the Habsburg house and uncompromising
supporters of free election of the king. But the sharp diﬀerentiation of the
society of the country, based on political beliefs, was complemented by spontaneous
anger against the surrounding world due to the international-legal
enforcement of territorial curtailment of the country, which united the society
virtually across the whole Hungarian political scene. The feeling of hopelessness,
bitterness and loss of rights due to the status of defeated country
constituted the greatest trauma of the society of interwar Hungary. The interwar
Hungarian society was not able to ﬁght down the national feeling of
grievance, resulting from the deep-rooted thousand-year-long tradition of
natural unity of the lands Lands of St Stephen’s Crown during the whole so
called Horthyan period of the Hungarian history.
Although the Hungarian peace treaty between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Hungary, i.e. the conﬁrmation of the borders of post-war
Hungary, was signed only on 4 June 1920, its oppressive territorial provisions
had been set in fact a year before, in June 1919, by decision of the supreme
Entente representatives to the Paris Peace Conference. The area of Hungary
decreased by two thirds, from 282 thousand km2
(without Croatia)3
to
93 thousand km2
.2
Thus the territory of the Hungarian State was reduced by
almost 190 thousand km2
that passed to Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia
and Austria. The number of inhabitants of Hungary dropped from 18,3
million (without Croatia)4
to 7,9 million, and up to one third of Hungarians
found themselves outside the Hungarian State.
The above stated conﬂict of interwar Hungarian society based on
political beliefs was overcome very diﬃcult too; its deep roots were nourished
by post-war revolutionary period under the sign not only of the red
but also the white terror; the excesses of the white terror outlasted until
1920 when not only the internal but also the very fragile external sensitivity
to such pathological phenomena in the Hungarian society at that time
brought gradual termination or at least marked restriction of the abnormal
persecution practices of the diﬃcultly controllable paramilitary groups. The
distinctive conﬂict of the society on political base was not in fact completely
warded oﬀ during the whole period of interwar Hungary, particularly due to
the semi-authoritative regime in the country symbolized by the regent of the
3) With Croatia 329 thousand km2
in total.
4) With Croatia 20,8 million in total.
1919, to the margin of the political spectrum. The goal of this study is to
summarize synoptically the important internal moments of the birth of so
called Horthyan Hungary that had predetermined its basic character and
development during the whole interwar period, as well as the beginning of
consolidation of the country and short outline of its course.
Summary of social-political and economic situation of Hungary at the turn
of 1919 and 1920
Hungary experienced the most complicated immediate post-war development
of all successor states of Austria-Hungary. It was burdened not only
by the consequences of the state-legal revolutionary turns from 1918 and
1919 but also by the occupation of a part of the country by the Rumanian,
Yugoslavian or French armies. The Rumanian army had been occupying
the Hungarian territory to the east of Tisza River since April 1919, after
having it taken during the anti-Hungarian push during the Hungarian
Republic of Councils. But on 4 August 1919, the Rumanian army took also
the capital of the country, Budapest, in spite of the prohibition by the Paris
Peace Conference. The Rumanian army stayed in the capital until autumn,
14–16 November when the Rumanians left not only Budapest but also the
territory between the Danube and Tisza rivers. The army of the Serb-CroatSlovene
State occupied larger part of the Baranya County including the
town of Pécs in the south of Hungary from 1918. The territory was abandoned
and transferred under the sovereignty of Hungary only in August 1921
upon pressure of the Entente Powers, after the failed declaration of local
Serbian-Hungarian Republic. During the existence of the Hungarian Republic
of Councils,2
smaller part of today’s Southern Hungary including
the town of Szeged was occupied by the French army, under whose protection
the conservative anti-revolutionary opposition and the National Army
lead by the Admiral Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya, the future head of state
of interwar Hungary was organized.
A signiﬁcant factor aﬀecting the formation of the shape of interwar
Hungary consisted in the insurmountable division of the society into
several implacable camps – supporters of the left wing and the right wing in
all their shades, further into supporters of the republic and supporters of
2) The Hungarian Republic of Councils lasted from 21 March 1919 to 1 August 1919.
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The economic fall of the country was naturally combined with disastrous
social situation. The living standard of state oﬃcials and oﬃcers
dropped, as compared to the situation of pre-war years 1913–1914, by up to
82–87% and that of workers by 61–74 %. The number of unemployed exceeded
the acceptable limit by far. About one third of workers were unemployed.
The unemployment statistics were further markedly negatively changed
also by the inﬂux of refugees from the separated territories. Almost 350
thousand of registered refugees moved to post-war Hungary due to forced
leaving of their original residence. The major part of them came from the
end of 1918 until the end of 1920. The territorially markedly diminished
Hungary was thus confronted with unsolvable problem of having to employ
up to 235 thousand intellectual workers in a country with about eight millions
of inhabitants. The situation was worsened even more by the need of
placement of signiﬁcant part of oﬃcers and non-commissioned oﬃcers of
the army whose staﬀ had been reduced to maximally allowed limit of
35 thousand men due to the peace treaty.7
Accession to power of Christian-national political course
In spite of the social-political problematic and economic aspects that had
complicated markedly the return of Hungary to peaceful and calm reconstruction
of the country and made considerably more diﬃcult the adaptation
of the country to the new post-war internal and external political situation,
last but not least predestining markedly the speciﬁc character of the
internal political atmosphere in the country in that period, during the second
half of 1919, after the fall of the Republic of Councils, conditions leading
to assertion of the desired internal standardization were established in
the country. The political situation of Hungary was naturally not calmed
down immediately by the fall of the “Soviet” Republic in summer 1919.
The situation in Hungary after the fall of the Republic of Councils
showed stalemate character. István Friedrich, the new Hungarian Prime Minister
who had thrown down the Prime Minister Gyula Peidl governing on top
of the unicolour socialist, the so called trade union government, only six days8
7) BALOGH, p. 138. E. IRMANOVÁ, Maďarsko a versailleský mírový systém, Ústí nad Labem
2002, p. 198.
8) Gyula Peidl’s government held power less than a week, from 1 to 6 August 1919.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
country, the temporary head of state, Admiral Horthy. The established regulated
political system did not allow full opening of the political scene, as was
usual in the Western democracies at that time and kept nourishing the hostile
division of the society into the “state-constituting” Christian-national
and agrarian right wing and into the left wing, dangerous and unacceptable
to the state, together with the civic-democratic political stream blamed for
having passed the power in the country to communists on 21 March 1919.
But the international-political isolation of post-war Hungary and irreconcilable
political diﬀerentiation of post-war Hungarian society, inherited
from hectic revolutionary months, did not constitute the only obstacles to successful
start of internal consolidation of the country. Another crucial hindering
aspect of stabilization of post-war Hungary consisted in the burdening
economic and social situation of the country, worsened even more during the
revolutionary events of 1918 and 1919. Hungary entered the new phase of its
history with completely wrecked economic life, not only due to war but also
due to considerable territorial losses. For example the production of the country
in 1920, the year of the ﬁrst ordinary post-war elections, the year of peace
negotiations with Hungary and the year of enforcement of consolidation course
in the country constituted about 20–30% of the level of 1913. But the deepest
drop was experienced by the agrarian production, typical to Hungary. The export
of corn dropped by one half in 1920, as against the average of 1913.5
Another indicator of the lamentable condition of the economy of
the country rose to the skies. The post-war ﬁnancial situation of Hungary
was virtually disastrous. The paralyzed economic life of the country during
the war years devalued the common Austrian-Hungarian crown by 60%. But
in summer 1919, the crown dropped down to 15% of its original pre-war
value. The continuing dramatic fall of the crown is well illustrated by its
rapidly dropping value as against the Swiss franc. While in August 1919, 100
crowns were equal to 11.6 Swiss francs, in June 1920 the value of 100 crowns
as against the Swiss currency dropped to mere 3.1 francs. In consequence of
the rapid revolutionary events in immediate post-war period, the Hungarian
ﬁnancial policy found itself in chaotic web of provisional measures. The Government
was able to cover the state budget only by disproportionate print
of paper banknotes.6
5) M. ROMPORTLOVÁ, Z. SLÁDEK, Hospodářský a sociální vývoj ve střední a jihovýchodní
Evropě, Brno 1994, p. 65.
6) S. BALOGH (ed.), Magyarország a XX. században, Budapest 1985, pp. 137 and 139.
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tional Rumanian army that supervised virtually all political and cultural
life even in the political centre of the country. The main goal of the direct
entry into the events in Hungary was the retreat of the Rumanian army
from the country, demanded ineﬀectively by the Entente from the Rumanian
government since long time, and particularly the eﬀort to mediate the
formation of a government cabinet with broader political mandate that
could be sent an invitation to the Paris Peace Conference and that would be
allowed to hold ﬁnally the parliamentary elections in the country. A turn
towards direct active policy of the Entente as against Hungary took place in
direction of the Anglo-American diplomacy.12
Sir George Russel Clerk, a British diplomat, was charged with the
mediating role at the Hungarian internal scene and his mediating political
mission in Hungary started on 23 October.13
During the mission, the retreat
of the Rumanian army from central part of Hungary and the handover of
the territory left by the Rumanians to the National Army lead by Horthy was
ﬁnally achieved. Thanks to that, Horthy who managed the strongest military
power of the country worked his way to the very top of the political events
and his inﬂuence and authority immediately exceeded the previous frame of
army commander. Therefore Horthy played an important role from his
strengthened and legalized power position even in the complicated internal
political negotiations under Clerk’s direction. The diﬃcult Clerk’s negotiations
with the representatives of the decisive political streams of the country
were ﬁnally successfully completed on 24 November by formation of the
new, so called concentration government lead by Károly Huszár, the Prime
Minister, and by its subsequent recognition by the Paris Peace Conference on
25 November. Only then the Entente expressed its readiness to negotiate
with Huszár’s government as the “temporary de facto cabinet” of Hungary,
until a government reﬂecting the voters’ would be created in the country on
12) Gy. JUHÁSZ, Magyarország külpolitikája 1919–1945, Budapest 1987, pp. 43–46; K. SALAMON,
Nemzeti önpusztítás. 1918–1920. (Forradalom–proletárdiktatúra–ellenforradalom), Budapest
2001, p. 190, or p. 195; IRMANOVÁ, p. 167. F. BOROS, Magyar-csehszlovák kapcsolatok
1918-1921-ben, Budapest 1970, pp. 94–96 and 116–119.
13) For more details on Clerk’s mission see Gy. RÁNKI, A Clerk-misszió történetéhez, Történelmi
Szemle, 1967, 2, pp. 156–187.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
and had put the Archduke Joseph the Habsburg, member of the Hungarian
branch of the Habsburg family, to the top of the country as homo regius,9
did
not want to resign, in spite of repeated calls of the Entente. The Entente did
not want to recognize Friedrich as political partner for his bold political experiment
of restoration of the Habsburg power in the country10
even after the
archduke’s resignation and after the subsequent extension of the Cabinet by
non-Christian-national politicians and start of active preparations of the ﬁrst
ordinary post-war parliamentary elections in the country, on the base of broad
right to vote in compliance with the ideas of the Entente. Nevertheless, it was
during Friedrich’s function as Prime Minister that the Christian-national political
course was established in the country and gave birth to so-called Horthyan
Hungary. The main political stream of interwar Hungary, the Christian-national
stream, was formed out of neo-conservative and moderate
conservative liberal political groups of dualistic Hungary of the turn of the
19th
and 20th
centuries.
Diplomatic mediation at the stalemate Hungarian internal political
scene became key to the stalemate political situation in the country with
missing united power centre or state-wide authority of the Hungarian administration
that “shared” the control in the country with the ascending power
of the high commander of the so called National Army, Admiral Miklós
Horthy11
and was additionally under control of the command of the occupa-
9) Archduke Joseph the Habsburg stayed on top of the country only half month (16 days),
until 23 August.
10) Compare Sir Clerk’s speech at the interparty conference within his mediation on the Hungarian
political scene on 17 December 1919 when he conﬁrmed the fact of non-recognition
of the Prime Minister Friedrich by the Entente because of his eﬀort to restore the
Habsburg state power through the regency of Joseph the Habsburg. See e.g. Népszava, 47,
232, 19 December 1919, pp. 2–3, or p. 3 (Clerk George beszéde a hétfői pártközi konferencián).
Compare also IRMANOVÁ, pp. 134–135.
11) Horthy became oﬃcial the high commander of the National Army of the country, i.e. of all
anti-revolutionary armed forces in the regions not controlled by the Rumanians after
having sworn in as “high commander of all armed forces in the country” before homo regius,
Joseph the Habsburg, in presence of István Friedrich, the Prime Minister, on 15 August
1919 (for the original record of Horthy’s swear see Hungarian State Archive (Magyar
Országos Levéltár, MOL), K 26. Miniszterelnökség (hereinafter referred to only as ME),
1919 – I. – 4405, fol. 3–4, or p. 2; quoted from ibidem). Compare also F. PÖLÖSKEI, Horthy és
hatalmi rendszere. 1919–1922, Budapest 1977, pp. 23–24.
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So Huszár’s cabinet was concentration cabinet only on the surface,
with regard to its composition in eﬀectu. Also Károly Huszár’s Government
provided the greatest share of governmental power to the Christian-national
political course. Most essential positions in the concentration government
were occupied by ministers from Christian parties, i.e. ministers from the so
called Christian bloc, and the governmental policy of the new Cabinet went
on fully corresponding with the governmental policy of the Prime Minister
István Friedrich. The shape of the Cabinet constituted victory of the strong
position of the Christian-national course and reﬂected the fact stated by
Ernő Garami, the president of the Hungarian social democracy in an interview
with a collaborator of Az Újság, a liberal newspaper, during the ﬁnishing
interparty negotiations under Clerk’s direction by mid-November: “The
parties disposing of governmental power imagine concentration so that the
existing political line would be fully preserved, the current principles of the
regime would be unaﬀected and the power would stay in the hands of the parties
governing today. Democratic parties, in position of one-two also-rans,
would help to present the impression that not a compact government party
but a concentration cabinet holds the power…“19
That meant: the very composition
of the coalition and concentration cabinet predetermined on whom
detention and on whom possession will fall.
The position and authority of the new government was strengthened,
as against Friedrich’s cabinet, by the “unreserved” support of Horthy,
the chief commander of the National Army. After Clerk’s recognition of the
National Army organized by Horthy as the only guarantee of order in the
country after the Rumanian occupational army had left Budapest, the high
command became the second power centre in the capital as well. And it was
a signiﬁcant power centre. The power relationship between the central governmental
administration and the high command is ﬁttingly illustrated by
the observations of an unnamed citizen of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State from
his considerably long stay in Budapest, published in the Czech Národní listy
newspaper. “The Hungarian government has a quite inferior position besides
Horthy. Horthy often gives commands that are not in compliance with their
decisions. In Pest20
itself, he acts as if there is no authority besides him, and
19) Az Újság, 17, 156, 16 November 1919, p. 5 (Hétfőn dől el az ország sorsa. – Garami Ernő
nyilatkozata).
20) To wit Budapest.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
the base of the results of parliamentary elections.14
So only the seventh postwar
Hungarian Cabinet,15
or the ﬁfth post-war Hungarian Prime Minister
obtained recognition of the Entente Powers.16
The new twelve-member Cabinet included, besides ﬁve representatives
of the Party of Christian National Union (Keresztény Nemzeti Egyesülés
Pártja) including the Prime Minister, three representatives of the Christian
Smallholder Party (Keresztény Földmíves Párt) and one member of the more
liberal smallholders, the Statewide Smallholder and Agrarian Party (Országos
Kisgazda- és Földműves Párt), i.e. nine representatives of the so called
Christian bloc in total. The National Liberal Party (Nemzeti Liberális Párt) got
one ministerial position but its representative in the Cabinet represented
the conservative fraction of the party that was close to the policy of the Christian
bloc.17
Each of the liberal National Democratic Party (Nemzeti Demokrata
Párt) and the Social Democratic Party (Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata
Párt), i.e. the real representatives of the proclaimed concentration, got one
ministerial position in the new governmental team.18
14) Compare the text of Clerk’s note to the new Hungarian Prime Minister Károlyi Huszár, on
behalf of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference from 25 November 1919 in:
MOL, K 27, ME., Minisztertanács (hereinafter referred to only as MT), 25 November 1919
(box No. 123), pp. 4–6, or pp. 4–5.
15) Without three governmental formations of the socialist-communist government, the socalled
Revolutionary Directive Council of Sándor Garbai under the Hungarian Republic
of Councils.
16) PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 41–56; SALAMON, particularly pp. 197–207; IRMANOVÁ, pp. 136–138.
For the history of Horthy’s inﬂuence in anti-revolutionary period compare PÖLÖSKEI,
pp. 22–30 and I. ROMSICS, Ellenforradalom és konszolidáció: A Horthy-rendszer első tíz
éve, Budapest 1982, pp. 72–74. See here further the record from the meeting of the
Cabinet from 24. and 25 November 1919. In MOL, K 27, ME., MT., 24 November 1919
(box No. 123) and MT, 25 November 1919 (ibidem), point 2 of the agenda of the Cabinet
meeting.
17) Compare e.g. the comment on the political situation or the attitude to current political
issues of an unnamed leading representatives of the party, “close to the Government”,
expressed to the editor of the newspaper Az Újság during the days of the December Government
crisis in connection with the submitted requirements of social democracy. Az
Újság, 17, 183, 18 December 1919, pp. 1–2 (In Holnap dől el a politikai válság).
18) SALAMON, pp. 206–207.
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departments (army, interior, ﬁnance, justice and commerce) mastering foreign
languages and post clerks. 23
Also purposeful reduction of freedom of assembly and association
should contribute to protect the ideological base of the Christian-national
post-revolutionary or anti-revolutionary governmental course. The right of
free assembly and association was restricted by speciﬁc orders from the period
of Friedrich as Prime Minister, and their reduction continued later under
the ﬁrst cabinet of Count Pál Teleki in the course of 1920.24
The measures
adopted in this connection under István Friedrich were left unchanged also
under Huszár’s concentration cabinet.25
The counter-revolutionary justice measures that cast much stronger
shadow on the germinating interwar political system of Hungary became
a lot more striking. The mass “justice” sanction of “enemy creatures” by
the state administration had been asserted under Friedrich as Prime Minister
already, and it continued also in the period of Huszár’s concentration
cabinet. Besides the governmental decree of the counter-revolutionary regime
on “temporary modiﬁcation of justice”, adopted under Friedrich’s second
cabinet,26
it was particularly the ministerial internment decree that
highlighted the most the authoritarian tendencies of the germinating political
system in Hungary. The internment legal standard in form of the ministerial
decree was issued just under Huszár’s government, although it started
being prepared still under Friedrich as Prime Minister.27
The internment
decree of the Minister of the Interior “on remanding in custody of persons
dangerous from the perspective of state safety or from the perspective of public
order and safety, arousing fears and suspicious and harmful for econo-
23) Ibidem, p. 78.
24) Teleki’s ﬁrst governmental cabinet administered the country from 19 July 1920 to 14
April 1921, when it resigned after the ﬁrst restoration attempt of Karl the Habsburg.
25) PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 79–82.
26) The governmental decree of the second Friedrich’s cabinet not only restored the dualistic
legal standards in the ﬁeld of justice (see gov. decree No. 4038/1919 ME. in: Rendeletek Tára,
Budapest, Magyar Kir. Belügyminisztérium, 1919, pp. 647–651), but on the base of Act 1912:
LXIII. on exceptional measures for the case of war it introduced also abbreviated procedure
in criminal proceedings (see § 1 and 2 of gov. decree 4039/ 1919. ME., ibidem, pp. 651–656, or
p. 652). For anti-revolutionary criminal measures compare brieﬂy e.g. PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 57–60.
27) PÖLÖSKEI, p. 62.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
therefore frequent conﬂicts between the civil and military power occur.”21
The
power inﬂuence of the high command on the Government was indisputable
up to such level that it can be stated that in fact, the army did not serve to
civil administration but rather the contrary. The strong position of the high
command was obvious also at later assertion of Horthy to the function of
temporary head of state, but also at his actual election to the top of the country
by the ﬁrst legislative body of interwar Hungary, created on the base of
the ﬁrst post-war parliamentary elections.
The base to continue further strengthening of the semi-authoritative
tendencies of the arising political system based on purposeful correction
of civil rights in compliance with national interests, from the position
of the view of the Christian-national governmental course, had been
given to the concentration Huszár’s Government by Friedrich’s administration
already. The basic preventive measure of the new counter-revolutionary
political direction was strict control of press. The political censorship of
the press had been applied by the command of the Rumanian army during
the whole period of their presence in the capital already. But the “oﬃcial”
censorship of the state apparatus was only one of the obstacles to the “nonChristian”
and “non-national” press. The press, “dangerous” from the authoritative
national-Christian perspective, was independently censored
also by the high command. So the practice was, in the end, so that the censors
of the high command censored the contents of the press printed already
and aﬀected by the “legal” censorship. When they found it “dangerous”,
they avoided its distribution arbitrarily. They conﬁscated speciﬁc issues
and burnt them on railway stations near the capital. The army proceeded
in similar way also in regions where also arbitrarily units of repressive
services, the army and border police, contributed to avoid the distribution
of “inconvenient” press.22
But free spread of speech was restricted not only by political censorship
of press products. On the base of joint measure of the Ministry of the
Interior and the high command of the National Army from 10 January 1920,
also the telegraphic and phone contact was controlled, by special committees
lead by army oﬃcials and consisting of delegated members of individual
21) Národní listy, 59, 294, 10 December 1919, p. 4 (Politický přehled – Maďarsko – Horthy. Co
se děje?).
22) PÖLÖSKEI, p. 75.
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of 24 years was set also for women. But in their case, the assignment of the
right to vote was conditioned by obligatory literacy.30
Passive right to vote
was restricted by the age limit of 30 years.31
All members of the army, gendarmerie
and police in active service were deprived of the right to vote.32
Direct and secret right to vote was set by § 6.33
The election was based, also in
correspondence with the decision of the second Friedrich’s cabinet, on majority
election system.34
Although Huszár’s cabinet ﬁnally did not comply with one of the
basic conditions of recognition of his government by the Entente Powers in
autumn 1919, i.e. the provision of democratic election campaign, full open
to all competing political subjects on the base of equal chances, it managed
to lead the country to ordinary parliamentary election without further serious
internal commotions that would lead to further power conﬂicts in
the society, and the election was the ﬁrst one based on general, equal and
direct right of vote. But the fact is that the opportunity of free competition
of all political parties was provided only pro forma. The most obvious example
of it was the almost permanent suppression of right to free and
equal political competition particularly with regard to the Hungarian Social
Democratic Party whose candidates were very often provided from
freedom of free movement and frequently detained and interned. The
above stated governmental decree from 5 December 1919 was purposefully
abused to political persecution in order to intimidate the social democratic
candidates and their potential voters. Although the proposal had been oriented
particularly against communists, it was abused mainly against social
democrats in practice.35
The social democrats responded to those practices oriented
against them by leaving not only the concentration cabinet but also by
withdrawing their candidates to the parliament on the base of the decision
of the party leaders from 15 January 1920, thus boycotting the parliamentary
election. But as the election was compulsory for each authorized voter,
social democracy did not invite their potential voters not to participate,
30) Ibidem, p. 879.
31) Ibidem, § 2, p. 880.
32) Ibidem, § 3, ibidem.
33) Ibidem, § 6, p. 881.
34) Ibidem.
35) I. ROMSICS, Magyarország története a XX. században. Budapest 2000, p. 135.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
mic reasons” was issued under No. 91383/ 1919. BM. on 5 December 1919.28
The purposeful character of the internment decree was highlighted by the
fact that it not only had not deﬁned the cases justifying to internment but it
did not deﬁne the maximum time limit for which the interned person could
be kept in custody either. That fact oﬀered naturally suﬃcient space for arbitrary
assertion of such measures.
First ordinary post-war parliamentary elections in Hungary in January 1920
Only one year after declaration of independent Hungary, by the end of 1919,
the country met the basic conditions for implementation of the ﬁrst postwar
standard parliamentary elections: relatively calmed turbulent Hungarian
society, Rumanian occupational army away from the capital and mostly
from eastern Hungary too and particularly the takeover of power by the government
cabinet recognized by the Entente, with activity spread on essential
part of Hungary. Thus it was only Huszár’s government that got the consent
from the Entente Powers to call and implement the ﬁrst ordinary
post-war parliamentary election in the country. Also Friedrich’s administration
had striven to implement them, but without success. As it had not been
recognized by the Entente Powers, it did not dispose of suﬃcient mandate to
declare regular parliamentary election with results having the necessary
international legal respect.
Nevertheless, the right to vote, on the base of which the ﬁrst postwar
parliamentary election took place in the country, had been standardized
by the governmental decree of Friedrich’s cabinet No. 5985/1919. ME.29
According to § 1 of the governmental decree, the right to vote was assigned
to all men who had been holders of Hungarian citizenship for six months at
the minimum, having permanent residence at one place for six months at
the minimum and aged over 24 years. But in case of minimally twelve-week
service in the battlefront, the age limit was reduced to 21 years. The age limit
28) See Rendeletek Tára, 1919, pp. 1076–1081, or p. 1084 (annex to gov. decree). According to
the governmental decree, persons dangerous and suspicious with regard to state interests
and interests of the society or with regard to the public order and safety, as well as persons
arousing fears from the above stated perspective. (See § 2, or § 1 of the governmental decree,
ibidem, p. 1077, or p. 1076.)
29) Ibidem, § 1, pp. 879–881.
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less both the results of the actual parliamentary election and the future political
atmosphere in the country.37
The pre-election political scene of Hungary at the turn of 1919 and
1920 was controlled by two central political directions: Christian-national and
agrarian. The national Christians were represented by the party of Christian
National Union (KNEP), established on 24 October 1919. The political interests
of smallholders were patronaged by the Statewide Smallholder and Agrarian
Party (OKgFP) that had turned away from the liberal-democratic direction after
fusion with the Christian smallholders on 29 November 1919, claiming publicly
allegiance to the Christian bloc. The Hungarian Social Democratic Party,
reorganized after the fall of the Republic of Councils on 24 August 1919, had the
most complicated position in the country. Its discredit caused by conspiracy
with the Communist party on 21 March 1919 and its participation in the creation
of the Hungarian “Soviet“ Republic doomed it to the extreme margin of the
political scene in the anti-revolutionary atmosphere. That occurred although
social democracy claimed full allegiance to the original party program from
1903 and representatives of the right wing of the party of the state apparatus
became the new head of the party. The civic-democratic liberal political forces
that were under constant pressure of ideological oﬀensive of the Christian-national
course and the state bodies controlled by it were markedly weakened. Their
position was considerably weakened also by absent unity and by substantial
fragmentation. The National Democratic Party, established on 10 October 1919,
was the only successful political formation of the liberal-democratic current.38
The ﬁrst ordinary post-war parliamentary election in the country
took place on 25–26 January 1920. But for the moment, the election
could be held only in 164 electoral districts out of the total number of 219
electoral districts. The remaining electoral districts were situated on the
37) The course of the election campaign is well illustrated by the following words from an
article of the Národní listy newspaper (see Národní listy, 15, 20, 20 January 1920, p. 3
(Politický přehled – Před volbami): “The censorship spoils issuing of election leaﬂets, calls
and brochures, distorting completely their contents and sense. Mentions on state form and
republic are not admitted either. Uncomfortable candidates and persons who could succeed
in the election are arrested.”
38) Summarized survey on the political scene of Hungary in autumn 1919 see e.g. A. TÓTH,
The Hungarian Political Stage of the Second Half of 1919 and the Results of the First Regular
Post-War Parliamentary Elections in 1920, Prague Papers on the History of International
Relations, 2009, pp. 350–365.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
but instructed them through their central newspaper, Népszava, thoroughly
to boycott the election actively, i.e. to participate in the election if possible,
but to vote by crossing out the whole ballot paper.36
But the persecution
by the state apparatus aﬀected also candidates of liberal parties, besides
the social democratic candidates. In some cases even the second main political
direction of the country, the smallholders, had problems with restriction
of free political competition.
The ﬁrst ordinary post-war parliamentary election of post-war
Hungary reﬂects the most markedly the irreconcilable and distinctive diﬀerentiation
of the Hungarian society based on the political belief of the population
that gave its speciﬁc character to the election. The ﬁrst standard postwar
election in Hungary, as well as the preceding canvassing constituted,
thanks to the set governmental course, mainly election and canvassing
against the communists, their social democratic “accomplices” and also
against the “traitors” of the nation – liberals who, according to the Christiannational
politicians should clear the way or hand the governmental power
over to the communists, thus causing the origin of the detested Hungarian
“Soviet“ Republic. The Christian-national governmental course, as well as
the National Army intervening markedly into the life of the country, exerted
considerable eﬀort to create the picture of the only possible path to salvation
of Hungary, of the only possible alternative for the country, together with
the Catholic Church not only during the canvassing but also during the whole
period after the fall of the Republic of Councils: the alternative consisted
in restoration or building of strong national Christian Hungary. As most
inhabitants of the country had strong Christian belief and as the conservative
political thinking had strong roots from the period of Austria-Hungary,
it is natural that such purposeful oﬀensive of the crucial political forces,
aided also by the uncompromising attitude of the international community
towards Hungary, found fertile breeding ground and predestined more or
36) Népszava, 48, e.g. 17, 20 January 1920, p. 3 (A választások és a szociáldemokrata párt) or
ibidem 19, 22 January 1920, p. 2. (Hogyan szavaznak a szociáldemokraták. Utmutató a
választásokra.). During the election, ballots spoiled according to the instruction of social
democracy were submitted by 71 000 voters for example in the capital.
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The structure of representation of individual social groups in the
new Hungarian legislative assembly changed markedly as compared to the
last election period of the dualistic Hungary. The representation of aristocracy
in the ﬁrst elected legislative assembly of post-war Hungary dropped
strongly, by two thirds, from 15% to 5%. The representation of big and small
landowners dropped more than by a half, from 36% to 15%. On the contrary,
the number of deputies representing small farmers, i.e. smallholders, increased
markedly, from 1% up to 15%. So in 1920, the representation of
smallholder classes of the society in the parliament achieved the percentage
level of representation of aristocracy in the last lower chamber of the parliament
of dualistic Hungary. But compared to 1910, the representation of the
Catholic Church in the Hungarian legislative body increased markedly in
1920, by almost two thirds, from 4% to 11%. And it was in 1920 when the
ﬁrst woman was elected to the parliament.44
Restoration of constitutionality and election of temporary head of state
The ﬁrst post-war legitimately elected legislative assembly of the country
was convoked festively to the 16 February 1920. Its primary task was to
deﬁne post-war Hungary from legal and constitutional perspective. It was
expressed in the basic legal article of interwar Hungary, the so-called Horthyan
Hungary, No. 1920: I. tc. on restoration of constitutionality and temporary
arrangement of execution of supreme state power that was adopted
by the National Assembly on 28 February 1920 and declared in the Code
a day later. The origin of the basic act of legal and constitutional character
was accompanied by complicated negotiations between both strongest political
parties, KNEP and OFKgP. The Gordian knot of the negotiations was,
from the beginning, particularly the issue of the head of state, characterized
by sharp clash of views between the supporters of legitimism, i.e. supporters
of the Habsburgs, which means of the former Austrian Emperor
Charles I, or Charles IV as the Hungarian king, and the supporters of national
kingdom who strove for free election of a new monarch of the country.
Both those antagonistic camps originated from the strongest parliamentary
parties. The legitimists included particularly the deputies and politici-
44) ROMSICS, Magyarország, p. 135.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
territories occupied by the Rumanian and Yugoslavian army. The election
could be called there only after the foreign armies would have left. The unequivocal
winner of the election was the Christian bloc. OKgFP got the
most posts in the post-war Hungarian National Assembly with restricted
transitory two-year term of oﬃce. It occupied 78 posts in the National Assembly
in total (47.56 %39
). The candidates of KNEP occupied 73 posts
(44.51%) in total in the legislative body. To the contrary, the liberals failed
the election completely, as was expected. Only 6 candidates (3.66%) of the
National Democratic Party got into the National Assembly. Nevertheless,
the National Democratic Party became the second strongest political party
in the capital, following the National Christians. It obtained 68 000 valid
votes, i.e. 19% out of the 374 262 votes submitted in the Budapest electoral
districts in the ﬁrst ballot.40
The smallholders won also in the Rear Tisza Region where the
election was held between 13 June and 19 July 1920 in the 44 electoral
districts. The central party of smallholders got further 27 mandates there.
On the contrary, KNEP got only 8 mandates there. The election in the remaining
11 electoral districts in the Baranya County in the south of the country
was held almost one and half year later, on 30–31 October 1921. Smallholders
won them too, succeeding in 6 electoral districts. The KNEP party
obtained only one mandate.41
The right of vote from 1919 was the most democratic right of vote
applied on the territory of Hungary. On its base, 3 133 094 authorized voters
could go to the ballot boxes, constituting almost 87% of all inhabitants over
24 years of age. To the contrary, the total number of authorized voters of former
dualistic Hungary in 1910 was only 6.4% of the total number of population.
That means that from the total number of Hungary inhabitants at that
time, 18 264 53342
, only 1 162 241 could take part in the election to the former
Hungarian Parliament.43
39) The percentage expresses here and further in the text the percentage proportion of the
mandates occupied out of the total number of all mandates of the legislative body.
40) L. HUBAI, Magyarország XX. századi választási atlasza 1920–2000. I. köt., (MVA, I.) Budapest
2001, pp. 25–26.
41) Ibidem, p. 28.
42) Without Croatia and Slavonia.
43) M. RUSZKAI, Az 1945 előtti magyar választások statisztikája, Történeti Statisztikai Közlemények,
1959, 3, 1–2, p. 16.
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only to elect the temporary head of state in regent rank.49
In connection with
arrangement of the issue of supreme state power in the country, the act deﬁned
the authority of the temporary head of state, i.e. deﬁned the restrictions
of rights of royal power for the regent. His basic authorities included appointment
of the government and the right to return acts to the National Assembly
to re-debate, except for acts related to state form of the country or of head of
state. But the regent could return acts to the National Assembly only once.50
In case the legislative body became inquorate, the regent could dissolve the
National Assembly. But the regent could do that only after the deputies did
not obey his appeal to restore the quorate character of the parliament.51
The
right to adjourn parliament session had originally not been awarded to the
regent. Nevertheless, on the base of Horthy’s antecedence of being elected to
the top of the state, the regent was awarded, within extension of the range of
his authorities, also the right to adjourn and terminate the session of the National
Assembly by the additional Act No. 1920: XVII. tc. from 18 August 1920,
fully according to the right belonging to royal power in compliance with acts
from the 19th
century No. 1848: IV. tc., or 1867 : X. tc.52
In the foreign political sphere, the temporary head of state was
awarded the right to receive and send envoys. He could enter into ally and
other agreements through the government, but only provided that they did
not aﬀect the matters falling under the authority of the legislative process.
In such case, the regent depended on the consent of the National Assembly.
Also in case of declaration of war, use of army outside the state borders or
also in case of entering into peace treaty, the regent was imposed the duty of
additional request for consent of the National Assembly.53
The regent could execute the executive power according to the law
only through the ministry accounting to the National Assembly. All measures
and decisions of the temporary head of state, including the measures related
also to armed forces, were legally valid only if countersigned by the
responsible minister. But that condition did not concern the constitutional
49) Ibidem, § 12, p. 4.
50) Ibidem, § 13, ibidem.
51) Ibidem, pp. 4–5.
52) Ibidem, 1920. évi XVII. törvénycikk az alkotmányosság helyreállításáról és az állami
főhatalom gyakorlásának ideiglenes rendezéséről szóló 1920. évi I. t.-c. 13. §-ának módosításáról,
p. 77.
53) Ibidem, 1920: I. tc., p. 5.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
ans from the Party of Christian National Union and the supporters of free
election of king the deputies and politicians from the Smallholder Party.
The adoption of the basic legal article of interwar Hungary No.
1920: I. tc. completed the process of restoration of standard legal and constitutional
limits of functioning of the internal political life in the country.
The act codiﬁed particularly the current legal and constitutional position of
Hungary. It stated the separation of the country from the Austrian-Hungarian
state and the termination of both chambers of the land assembly of dualistic
Hungary on 16 November 1918, recognizing the new temporary legislative
body of the country, the National Assembly, convoked on the base of
the results of the January parliamentary election, as the exclusive legitimate
representative body of national sovereignty.45
The act legitimized the period
following after the fall of the Republic of Councils, from the arrival of István
Friedrich to the position of Prime Minister on 7 August 1919, i.e. all governments
constituted after that date and their decrees. On the other hand, it
cancelled all legal measures of the Popular Republic46
and of the Republic of
Councils in form of acts, decrees, as well as all other measures of legal character
of both those republics issued under other names. It ordered particularly
complete removal of so called popular decrees and popular acts from
the national corpus iuris.47
The basic purpose of those provisions of Act No.
1920: I. tc. was to restore legal continuity of post-war Hungary with the period
before 31 October 1918, i.e. with dualistic Hungary.
The act arranged further the issue of the head of state. It stated that
the execution of royal power had been interrupted on 13 November 1918, on
the base of the oﬃcial letter of the Emperor Charles I, written in the imperial
castle at Eckartsau, to the east of Vienna, in which he had given up the direction
of state matters of Hungary.48
But the legal article did not solve the issue
of the head of state ﬁnally, but ad interim. It assigned the National Assembly
45) 1920. évi Országos Törvénytár (Corpus Juris, CJ) 1920, 1920. évi I. törvénycikk az alkotmányosság
helyreállításáról és az állami főhatalom gyakorlásának ideiglenes rendezéséről,
preamble of the Act, p. 1 and § 11, 4.
46) The Hungarian Popular Republic was originated by so called Chrysanthemum Revolution
and declared on 31 October 1918. Its existence was terminated on 21 March 1919 by establishment
of the Republic of Councils.
47) Ibidem, § 9 and 10 of the Act, pp. 3 and 4.
48) Ibidem, preamble of the Act, p. 1.
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from 1918, passed by the government of Count Mihály Károlyi on 16 November
1918.56
By that legal act, Hungary was declared a republic and Popular
Republic of Hungary became oﬃcial name of the state. Count Mihály Károlyi
became the ﬁrst post-war head of state or ﬁrst Hungarian president; he was
charged with administration of supreme state power in the country temporarily
by the Hungarian revolutionary National Council on 11 January 1919. On
21 March 1919, the civic-democratic popular republic was substituted by the
socialist-communist experiment in form of the Hungarian Republic of Councils.
The supreme state representative of the Republic of Councils was Sándor
Garbai who presided the Revolutionary Governing Council, i.e. the “soviet”
government consisting of popular commissioners. It was in that case equivalent
to the position of Prime Minister. After the resignation of the government
of the Republic of Councils and the accession of Gyula Peidl’s unicolour socialdemocratic
government on 1 August 1919, the Popular Republic of Hungary
was restored, which the Government claimed allegiance to by the governmental
decree No. 1/1919 ME, based on the decision of the Cabinet from 2 August
1919.57
Let us emphasize that, from the perspective of signiﬁcance at that
time, the name of “popular republic” should express that the Hungarian Government
claimed allegiance to the principle of civic parliamentary democracy.
Both Peidl’s and Károlyi’s government wanted to dissociate from the old
“aristocratic”, i.e. monarchist dualistic Hungary and the national-right-wing
forces that wanted to link post-war Hungary, from constitutional perspective,
to the social-political system of pre-October Hungary.
The only unambiguous legal allegiance of Hungary to the monarchist
state form was represented, until autumn 1921, by the governmental
decree No. 2394/1920. ME, passed by Sándor Simonyi-Semadam’s government,
the ﬁrst post-war Hungarian government originated from the results
of the parliamentary election, based on its decision adopted at its second
Cabinet session on 16 March 1920. The fact that act No. 1920: I. tc. did not
emphasize expressis verbis the state form of the country required, in context
with the oﬃcial naming of governmental bodies and authorities, additional
emphasis on the fact that restoration of legal continuity of the country with
the period before 31 October signiﬁed also restoration of the monarchist
state form. So the governmental decree declared clearly: “The act of restorati-
56) CJ 1918. Budapest, 1918, p. 202.
57) MOL, K 26, ME., 1203. cs., 1919 – I. – 3887, folio 2–4 a Hivatalos Közlöny, 1919, 109, p. 3
August, title page.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
rights belonging to the regent from the position of commander-in-chief, i.e.
the measures concerning direction, command and internal organization of
the National Army. In spite of the monarchist character of the regent rank
and the monarchist political system of interwar Hungary, the regent was not
awarded the right to grant titles of nobility. The temporary head of state was
also denied the right to award general amnesties. The regent’s person was
inviolable and enjoyed the same criminal protection as the monarch. In case
of violation of law or constitution, he could be held responsible by the National
Assembly. But the relevant initiative of hundred deputies as a minimum
was needed for that.54
The temporary head of state of post-war Hungary, conﬁrmed in the
provision of Act No. 1920: I. tc., was elected by the National Assembly on
1 March 1920. Admiral Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya got the position. Out of
the total number of the 141 votes submitted, 131 were for Horthy, 7 deputies
gave their vote to Count Albert Apponyi, the president of the Hungarian
peace delegation, and 3 votes were invalid. Horthy’s election to the regent
position was conﬁrmed by the parliament on 5 March by the second act adopted,
Act No. 1920: II. tc.55
It can be striking that the basic legal article based on constitutional
law of so-called Horthyan Hungary did not emphasize explicitly the state
form of the country or oﬃcial name of the state, which was Hungarian Kingdom.
The monarchist structure of interwar Hungary is referred particularly
in the declaration of the preamble of the Act conﬁrming interruption of
execution of royal power in the country by 13 November 1918. But the Act
did not emphasize verbatim that the monarchist state form of Hungary, in
compliance with the legal continuity with dualistic Hungary, persisted. In
connection to the reference to future ﬁnal solution of the issue of head of
state, the Act operated only with formulations like “ﬁnal solution of execution
of supreme power in the country” and “head of state”, i.e. not with formulations
of “monarchist power” or “monarch”.
To get compact picture with regard to constitutional form of interwar
Hungary, so called Horthyan Hungary, let us remember also the preceding
declared constitutional forms of post-war Hungary. The ﬁrst post-war
constitutional deﬁnition of Hungary was expressed in the popular act No. I.
54) Ibidem.
55) See ibidem, 1920. évi II. törvénycikk nagybányai Horthy Miklós úrnak kormányzóvá
történt megválasztásáról, pp. 7–8.
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Trianon, constituted the basic obstacle of the internal political consolidation
process or cooperation of the governmental coalition.
The conclusion of the peace treaty was under way already. Hungary
was invited to the Paris Peace Conference on the base of the decision of the
Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference from 1 December 1919, although
Budapest had been invited to send its peace delegates to Paris on
1 May 1919 already. But at that time, the invitation of the Supreme Council
was stopped by the Vienna Entente missions reluctant to deliver the invitation
to the then “soviet” Cabinet of Budapest.59
Hungary signed the peace treaty
with the Allied and Associated Powers on 4 June 1920, although it did not
agree with its uncompromising provisions. The Hungary peace convention
became publicly known as the Peace Treaty of Trianon, by the place of its
signature, the Grand Trianon Palace at Versailles near Paris. 60
The greatest share in the process of strengthening of the foundations
of the consolidation process of the country appertains to Count Pál
Teleki’s government that had substituted the temporary Simonyi-Semadam’s
cabinet after the June and July parliamentary election in the Rear Tisza
Region on 19 July 1920. The central item of the government program of the
ﬁrst Teleki’s cabinet was ﬁrstly to restore legal order in the country, to extend
the political base of the Christian-national political course by suppressing
the non-standard political power of the military and semi-military
structures, achieved during autumn 1919, under simultaneous restoration
of the dominant political power of large farmers, aristocracy and ﬁnancial
capital representatives, as well as further correction of political space for
civic-democratic opposition powers and social-democratic movement.61
The basic legal frame for strengthening of the Christian-national
political line in the social-political life of the country was provided to
Teleki’s government by the extended validity of all legal measures originated
on the base of act No. 1912: LXIII. tc. on extraordinary measures for the
59) For the issue of invitation of Hungary to the Paris Peace Conference see A. Tóth, A Huszárkormány
meghívása a párizsi békekonferenciára (1919. december – 1920. január), Századok,
2005, 139, 5, pp. 1477–1495.
60) For the history and progress of conclusion of peace treaty between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Hungary in English compare I. ROMSICS, The Dismantling of Historic
Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920, Boulder, Colorado 2002.
61) Gy. RÁNKI (ed.), Magyarország története, 1918–1919, 1919–1945, Vol. I., Budapest 1978, pp.
426–427.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
on of constitutionality and temporary arrangement of execution of supreme
state power, 1920: I. stated that the execution of royal power had been interrupted
on 13 November 1918, but Hungary had not changed its thousandyear-long
state form and had not cancelled the royal majesty and the royal
power as legal institution.”58
Hungary declared its monarchist political system as higher state
form only on the occasion of dethroning of the Habsburgs under the pressure
of foreign countries after the second restoration attempt of the ex-king
Charles the Habsburg in October 1921 in act No. 1921: XLVII. tc. “On extinction
of monarch rights of His Majesty Charles IV and the successor rights of
the Habsburg House” of István Bethlen’s government, passed by the deputies
on 6 November 1921. The § 3 of the act declared preservation of the monarchist
state form of Hungary, postponing the issue of occupation of the vacated
throne for a later point in time.
Start of ﬁnal consolidation of the country and outline of its progress
The implementation of the ﬁrst ordinary post-war parliamentary election in
the country at the beginning of 1920, the constitutional deﬁnition of postwar
Hungary together with the temporary solution of the issue of head of
state by legal article No. 1920: I. tc. and the election of the temporary head of
state constituted the indispensable constitutional base for consolidation of
internal political and later also economic life of the country. On 15 March
1920, the eighth post-war Hungarian cabinet under participation of both
strongest parliamentary parties, KNEP and OKFgP, under Sándor SimonyiSemadam
as Prime Minister, was appointed the regent of the country to administer
the country until the parliamentary election in the Rear Tisza Region.
But such indispensable basic constitutional acts did by far not
constitute the last meritorious steps “codifying” the form of interwar Hungary.
Hungary was to engage in conclusion of the peace “talks” and signature
of the peace treaty, implementation of the above stated parliamentary election
also on the gradually left Hungarian territories, as well as in ﬁnal solution
of the issue of head of state that, after the signature of the Peace Treaty of
58) The quotation from the record of the concerned Hungarian Cabinet. MOL, K 27, ME., MT.,
16 March 1920 (box No. 125), pp. 28–29.
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Nevertheless, the actual completion of the process of consolidation
of the country pertains only to the long-year Prime Minister, István Bethlen.
Count Bethlen’s accession to the Prime Minister position on 14 April 1921
terminated the period of relatively frequent changing of Prime Ministers
and Governments, seven of the former64
and nine of the latter65
being
changed in the period from 31 October 1918 to 14 April 1921. Count Bethlen
was appointed the Hungarian Prime Minister after the resignation of Teleki’s
cabinet after the unsuccessful ﬁrst restoration attempt of ex-emperor Charles
I in Hungary in spring 1921, and held the position of Prime Minister almost
ten years, until 24 August 1931.
Count Bethlen, the Prime Minister, main architect of the political
system of interwar Hungary, so called Horthyan Hungary, was defender of
democratic civic parliamentarianism. But he advocated its political regulation
in order to direct the share of individual social groups in political administration
of the country. For that reason, Bethlen opposed radical extension
of civic freedoms including the right to vote, as its adaptation to the
political-power needs of the conservative Christian-national political course
constituted the basic frame to the semi-authoritative direction of the democratic
principles of civic parliamentarianism in interwar Hungary. The regulation
of the right to vote should further eliminate particularly the share
of left-wing opposition, i.e. social democracy, in the political power of the
country. But its objective was to regulate also the political inﬂuence of civicliberal
political directions, i.e. of political groups based particularly on those
pre-war political currents that accentuated principles of classical civic
liberalism, as against the governmental regulated liberalism of that time.
So those objectives were identical to the objectives of the Christian-national
governmental set of pre-election period, i.e. of the turn of 1919 and 1920.
The political system of so called Horthyan Hungary, completed and
strengthened by Bethlen on the base of the above stated purposeful politi-
64) Six Prime Ministers without the President of the Revolutionary Governing Council of the
Hungarian Soviet Republic, Sándor Garbai (Count Mihály Károlyi, Dénes Berinkey, Gyula
Peidl, István Friedrich, Károly Huszár, Sándor Simonyi-Semadam and Count Pál Teleki –
the Prime Ministers arranged chronologically by their terms in oﬃce).
65) Without the Revolutionary Governing Council that governed between 21 March 1919
and 1 August 1919 in three formations. The Prime Minister István Friedrich presided
during his term in oﬃce (from 7 August 1919 to 24 November 1919) three government
teams in total.
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Interwar Hungary (1919–1922) | Andrej Tóth
case of war, or on extraordinary regime of state power with reference to
“extraordinary” conditions in the country caused by the events of the years
1918-1919. It was established by the legal article No. 1920: IV. tc., passed by
the National Assembly on 28 April 1920, under Simonyi-Semadam’s government.
The provision of the act from 1912 was extended by one year as from
ratiﬁcation of the peace treaty.62
In compliance with the above stated program, Teleki’s government
under the regent’s support proceeded ﬁnally to liquidation of country and
Budapest brachial troops or to their transformation, liquidating also the
best-known centres of brachial power during the second half of the year.
Although those measures of the Government did not lead to full elimination
of extreme-right-wing forces from political power and political life, their
manoeuvring space was markedly restricted, particularly with regard to undesirable
adventurous arbitrary repressive events of the so called white terror,
provoking undesirable negative response even abroad. The stabilization
of internal political situation of the country under direction and in spirit of
the Christian-national course should be supported also by the bill of Teleki’s
cabinet for more eﬃcient protection of state and social order, adopted by the
National Assembly as legal art. No. 1921: III. tc. on 16 March 1921. The act
stated that he who instigated or lead to organization or movement directed
at violent subversion or destruction of legal order of the state and the society,
particularly at violent establishment of exclusive government of any social
class, committed crime under pain of prison of up to ﬁve years. In cases of
armed movement, its leaders could be condemned to prison for ten to ﬁfteen
years. The act included also provisions for protection of the state and the
nation. According to its wording, he, who stated or spread such untrue fact
that would harm the reputation or credit of the Hungarian nation, committed
oﬀence under pain of prison of up to ﬁve years. If such action were directed
at instigating any foreign state or organization to unfriendly action
against the Hungarian nation, the originator of such action could be condemned
to prison for up to ten years. But if such action of any foreign state
or organization had provoked unfriendly action against the Hungarian nation,
its originator could be condemned even to life imprisonment.63
62) For the provisions of Act No. 1912: LXIII. tc. see CJ 1912. Budapest, 1912, pp. 691–710. For
the wording of Act No. 1920: VI. tc. CJ 1920. Budapest, 1920, pp. 26–27.
63) RÁNKI, pp. 431–432. BALOGH, p. 126.
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lism political system of Hungary abroad, which could have been used not
only by the Hungarian democratic emigration.
The need to provide at least for minimum level of constructive character
of opposition policy of social democracy, i.e. its minimum state loyalty,
was necessary towards foreign countries last but not least as at that time,
social democratic parties constituted essential parliamentary force or were
even governmental parties in most countries. Thus any open political obstruction
by left-wing opposition would be undesirable for Christian-national
Hungary also from the foreign political point of view. So Bethlen was
interested in holding social democracy in play, in spite of gradual restriction
of the right to vote. That means, it was necessary to allow not only its participation
in the legislative body but also to provide for constructive line of its
opposition policy, not damaging state interests of Hungary. Nevertheless, at
the beginning of Bethlen’s era even social democracy was aware of the fact
that it rather incurred harm by its intentional absence from parliamentary
life and that its passive role was rather counter-productive for it. By the end
of 1922, opposition agreement was entered into between Bethlen’s government
and the Hungarian social democracy. The agreement called BethlenPeyer’s
pact delimited coexistence of both parties, of the government representing
central Christian-national political line and social democracy, in the
set limits of functioning of the political system of the country. Within the
pact, the social democracy promised, among other things, that it would support
foreign policy of the government, it would not promote republican system,
it would withdraw from political cooperation with civic-liberal opposition
and it would not initiate political strikes. The government promised
the socialists, among other things, not to prevent the organizational functioning
of social-democratic party and trade unions and the distribution of the
central newspaper of the party, Népszava.67
That internal political strategy of Bethlen’s policy trying to preserve
maximally the impression of full implementation of democratic principles
of civic parliamentarianism, or full preservation of its basic construction
unit, political pluralism in Hungary had primarily new foreign political
concept of Hungary in the background. The new political line did not give
cold shoulder to the revisionist line, but concentrated its interest pragmatically
primarily on integration into new structures of foreign political relationships
of the Versailles peace system, within which it wanted to establish
67) RÁNKI, pp. 448–451.; BALOGH, pp. 131–133; PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 180–183.
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cal regulation of functioning of democratic principles of civic parliamentarianism
gave ﬁnal basic practical constitutional frame to the constitutional
principles conﬁrmed in the ﬁrst legal article of constitutional character No.
1920: I. tc. adopted by the post-war legislative body of the country for the
period of subsequent 24 years, i.e. until the country was occupied by the
Germans during World War II in 1944.
The political system of interwar Hungary, completed during
Bethlen’s era, was based on the basic Bethlen’s thesis on democracy, about
which he said in his program speech before the deputies of the national Assembly
that: “It cannot signify blind power of the mass, blind power of undirected
masses.”66
“Blind power of masses” must be perceived here not only as
left-wing political groups representing particularly the labourers, but also
the civic-democratic political groups representing particularly the interests
of middle classes of towns and villages that had not participated in central
political administration of the country in decisive manner so far. But the
policy of the Prime Minister Bethlen was, as against the left-wing opposition,
characterized not only by unilateral adverse correction of limits of free
political competition. Count Bethlen, the Prime Minister, was primarily
good political pragmatist and strategist, aware of the need of preservation of
the principles of pluralistic political life of the country not only with regard
to the political image of Hungary abroad, but also from the perspective of
social reconciliation in the society. The society was to experience several
years of diﬃcult period of economic consolidation, with the main necessary
victim consisting of lower social classes, i.e. of the part of society constituting
fertile grounds particularly for social-democratic movement. Therefore
Bethlen could not proceed to restrict radically the political activity of the
main speaker of those classes, social democracy, because such step could
lead to uncontrollable and undesirable explosion of politically and pointedly
organized social dissatisfaction and resistance directed by social democratic
party. That would have markedly negative impact on economic life and on
the desired economic stabilization of the country. But power checkmate of
social-democratic movement from the oﬃcial political life could lead to general
undesirable harm to the credit of civic parliamentarianism and plura-
66) Az 1920. évi febr. hó 16-ára hirdetett Nemzetgyűlés naplója. (Stenographic records from the
National Assembly session convoked for 16 February). Vol. IX (21 March 1921 – 12 May
1921, 166. – 190th
session.) Budapest, Az Atheneum Irodalmi és Nyomdai Részvénytársulat
Könyvnyomdája, 1921, 175th
session, p. 187.
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mentary majority had to be ensured, to provide the Government with ﬁrm
and reliable support. Therefore the main eﬀort of the Prime Minister Count
István Bethlen consisted from the beginning in creation of a politically consolidated
and homogenous uniﬁed governmental party that would be
bound, with regard to the government, by the jointly binding political line
and program, thus providing the political interests of the governmental
cabinet with stable political support in the National Assembly. The Christian-national
and agrarian governmental coalition originated from the election
was delicate and inhomogeneous and its heterogeneity not only in essential
political issues often paralyzed the activity of the Government and
of the parliamentary majority. The ﬁrst Bethlen’s attempt for creation of
uniﬁed governmental party in summer 1920 ended only at the level
of a rather loose political union of both biggest political parties, KNEP and
OFKgP, and it did not last long due to the then insurmountable contradiction
in the royal issue.
The chance of implementation of Bethlen’s plan increased in autumn
1921 when the National Assembly adopted the above stated act of dethroning.
So the Gordian knot that had paralyzed the eﬀorts to unify both
governmental political parties into one subject was solved. Nevertheless, due
to two restoration attempts of ex-Emperor Charles I in 1921, Bethlen deviated
politically from the “central” party of the Christian-national political
course because of the legitimists, concentrated particularly around the
KNEP party, and got closer to smallholders, who were mostly supporters of
free election of the king. So the Prime Minister saw the foundation of a future
united governmental party not in the KNEP party any more, but in
Nagytádi’s Smallholder Party he had wanted to decompose and unite with
KNEP. Therefore he focused his policy on the eﬀort for his political line to be
accepted by smallholders, or for him to be accepted by the smallholders. He
succeeded in the end at the beginning of 1922, and on 22 February 1922 he
joined the Smallholder Party together with several conservative liberal or
conservative deputies, becoming its political leader. The Smallholder Party,
expanded and changed in such way, went on acting under the name of Christian
Smallholder, Agrarian and Civic Party (Kersztény-keresztyén Kisgazda,
Földműves és Polgári Párt), or in short as United Party (Egységes Párt, EP). So
the narrowly agrarian smallholder party focused primarily on country classes
became a party with much broader social platform, the so-called collection
party. The united governmental party created by Bethlen was active for
the whole ten-year period of so-called Bethlen’s era in unchanged form and
on unchanged base. But it held the role of central united governmental party
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
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basic standard multilateral relationships and try to break through its foreign
political isolation. Hungary expressed the new political course on 23
May 1921 already, when Bethlen’s government ﬁled application to the League
of Nations. By that, together with signature and subsequent ratiﬁcation of
the peace treaty in 1920, Hungary conﬁrmed in fact the newly constructed
international political system based on mutual respect of political and territorial
independence of the member states. Such turn of the Hungarian foreign
policy directed by the Prime Minister Count Bethlen constituted, from
the perspective of surviving emotions of the Hungarian society due to signing
and ratiﬁcation of the peace treaty with the Allied and Associated Powers,
uncompromising for Hungary, clear sign of the upcoming new phase
of the policy of the Hungarian governmental set, directed by the Prime Minister,
Count Bethlen, and the Regent Horthy. But by that, the Hungarian
government virtually positioned itself against the radical national-rightwing
political groups promoting open revisionist policy. Open political activity
of those groups became undesirable and dangerous to the Government
from the perspective of its new foreign political line. The sober and realistic
aspect of the new political course of interwar Hungary was evidenced also
by liquidation of the ﬁrst restoration attempt of the ex-Emperor Charles I in
spring 1921 as well as of his subsequent second attempt for restoration of his
royal power in Hungary in autumn 1921, after which the political inﬂuence
of the legitimists on central policy was gradually markedly restricted, which
could be seen also in the appointment of the non-legitimistic Count Bethlen
as Prime Minister by Regent Horthy instead of the legitimistic Prime Minister,
Count Teleki.68
But the Prime Minister Bethlen focused, within his eﬀort to
strengthen and consolidate the internal political scene in order to provide
for standard political environment, not dangerous to the Christian-national
consolidation interests of the state inwards and outwards, not only on
political paciﬁcation of the opposition social democracy. For the governmental
policy to be long lasting, continuous and eﬃcient, also stable parlia-
68) BALOGH, pp. 129–130. For details on the issue of restoration attempts of Charles I in Hungary
and his foreign political dimension in 1920 see M. ÁDÁM, Les deux coups d’Etat de
l’ex-roi Charles et la Petite Entente. Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae,
1985, 31, 1–2, pp. 33–85. For newer data on the ﬁrst restoration attempt see A. TÓTH, Czechoslovak
Policy and the First Restoration Attempt of Charles Habsburg in Hungary in the Spring
1921. Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 2007, pp. 241–279.
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whose political line depended on the Prime Minister and from the Regent of
the country in the background.71
The limits of the widest democratic right to vote in the history of
the Hungarian parliamentarianism from 1919 were not preserved in the
course of so called Horthyan Hungary, and they were gradually markedly
restricted. That tendency is clearly declared by the fact that twenty years later,
Hungary had 400 000 less authorized voters than in 1920. That means that,
while the number of citizens had grown by 15% between 1919 and 1939, the
number of authorized voters had dropped by 12% in the same period. The distinctive
diﬀerence could be seen in the second post-war parliamentary election
in 1922 already. In the election of 1922, the right to vote was awarded to
about 750 000 inhabitants less than in the ﬁrst post-war parliamentary election.
So only 29.5% of the total number of inhabitants of the country were
authorized to vote. The right to vote was assigned to all men over 24 years of
age then, but the age limit was shifted to 30 years for women. A condition of
obtaining the right to vote was, among other things, at least 10 years of citizenship
and 2 years of permanent residence. And the right to vote was not
secret any more, or better said it was not secret in blanket. The election was
secret only in Budapest and surroundings and in statutory towns. The smallest
fall of the proportion of the number of authorized voters and the number
of inhabitants of the country occurred in inter-war Hungary at the election of
1926, when only 26.6% of inhabitants had the right to vote.72
So before 1922, the Prime Minister Bethlen succeeded in creating
standardized stable political environment respecting outwards the principles
of pluralism political system, but on the other hand not restricting the
political goals and plans of Bethlen’s governmental course. After creating
some political base, Bethlen’s governmental apparatus could fully focus on
stabilization of the disastrous economic situation of the country.
The stabilization of economic and ﬁnancial situation of Hungary
was not easy, but both the economy as the ﬁnances were restored successfully
in the course of the ﬁrst half of the Twentieths. The basic tool of the Government
to stabilize the economic life of the country was high inﬂation.
While, as stated above, 100 crowns were equal to 3,1 Swiss francs in June
1920, the value of 100 crowns dropped to 2,34 in summer 1921, in 1922 to
0,56, in 1924 to 0,08 and in 1927 to 0,0065 Swiss franc. In consequence of
71) BALOGH, pp. 135–137.
72) Ruszkai, pp. 28–30; Balogh, p. 134; Romsics, Magyarország, pp. 222–225.
Survey of Important Internal Moments of the Process of Birth of the Speciﬁc Political System of
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for the whole interwar period, although in the Thirtieths it shifted strongly
to the right as against the Twentieths.69
The basic internal political goal of the Prime Minister, Count Bethlen,
to establish power-political balance on the internal political scene, while
preserving the dominant political position of the existing power forces, i.e.
to reduce the political inﬂuence of town and country middle classes and to
increase the political inﬂuence of traditional higher social classes as against
reality, e.g. the eﬀorts of the political elite from 1919 and 1921, was completed
by the second post-war parliamentary election in 1922 on the base of the
reduced right to vote. The composition of the new National Assembly reﬂected
the results of Bethlen’s policy combined with autocratic elements that
should ensure guaranteed stable majority political power to the central governmental
course. The political forces dangerous to Bethlen’s policy, preventing
it from assertion in the National Assembly due to reduced right to
vote70
, either fell out from the new legislative body or shrank into insigniﬁcant
parties or party fractions. So in the newly elected National Assembly,
the representation of the legitimists uncomfortable to the Government both
from internal and from foreign political perspective was markedly restricted,
as well as the representation of the democratic smallholder political direction
endangering the large farmer groups, the neo-conservative Christian
socialists endangering the interests of big capital and last but not least
the extreme anti-Semitic groups uncomfortable to the governmental course.
Only 40% deputies from the ﬁrst election period were re-elected to the second
National Assembly. Left-wing opposition represented by deputies of social
democracy was newly elected to the legislative body. But their opposition
policy was regulated from the perspective of state interests by the above stated
so called Bethlen-Peyer’s opposition pact. So the implementation of the
second postwar parliamentary election in the country in 1922 conﬁrmed
the basic line of the political system of the country: the legislative power
depended on the legislative body, the legislative body was controlled by the
United Party, the united governmental party depended on the Government
69) PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 171–177. RÁNKI, pp. 442–443. BALOGH, p. 133. Gy. FÖLDES, L. HUBAI, Parlamenti
választások Magyarországon 1920–1998, Budapest 1999, pp. 86 and 92.
70) For adaptation of the right to vote on occasion of the second postwar parliamentary election
and for the history of political negotiations in re compare FÖLDES, HUBAI, pp. 87–91.
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same year, GDP per inhabitant in Czechoslovakia was 586, in Rumania 331,
in Yugoslavia 341, in Bulgaria 306 and in Poland 350 dollars per capita (dollar
from 1960).73
Conclusion
The political system of interwar Hungary, so called Horthyan Hungary, the
foundations of which were laid at turn of 1919 and 1920 and completed during
the internal political consolidation process in 1920 to 1922 was based,
from constitutional perspective, on civic parliamentarianism, with a system
of several political parties, with a parliament and a government accounting
to the parliament, sovereign justice and pluralism cultural life. But the functioning
of standard political institutions of civic parliamentarianism of interwar
Hungarian Kingdom was purposefully regulated by the supreme state
power through anti-democratic measures and interventions. The main
anti-democratic element of the political system of so-called Horthyan Hungary
was the restriction of competition of political parties through unequal
conditions or through elimination of considerable part of the society from
the competition. The basic tool for regulation of political power of individual
social and interest classes of the society consisted in the relevant restriction
of civic freedoms particularly through public manner of voting in the election
in most electoral districts, correction of freedom of press and later even
through religious and racial discrimination. But the political system of so
called Horthyan Hungary did not include the main fascist and national-socialist
elements leading to absolute totalitarization, i.e. oﬃcial ideology, system
of one party, liquidation of parliamentarianism, elimination of pluralism
of cultural life and its complete state control, assertion of armed
pressure terrorist system for intimidation of the society.74
73) ROMSICS, Magyarország, pp. 152–156. BALOGH, pp. 139–140 and 142. ROMPORTLOVÁ,
SLÁDEK, pp. 65–67.
74) ROMSICS, Magyarország Története, Budapest 2007, p. 806.
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inﬂation combined with import bans and import restrictions, so called inﬂation
prosperity was established in 1921 to 1922. Thanks to those measures,
industrial production of the country was almost doubled and the agricultural
production was increased by 20% between 1920 and 1924. Both of
the sectors of the national economy, the industry and agriculture, approached
or achieved 70% of the level of pre-war Hungarian economy by 1924.
But in 1923 and 1924, the inﬂation policy became unsustainable. The uncovered
print of banknotes did not manage to cover huge price increase and
money lacked in circulation. The lack of cash in commerce and industry
provided ideal ﬁeld to loans with interest rates between 20–40%. As compared
to pre-war years, the banknote circulation increased up to thirty times.
But the high increase of prices (up to twenty times as compared to pre-war
period) deepened markedly the social situation of lower social classes that
became unbearable. Real salaries of 1923 corresponded to only half the value
of the pre-war salaries. It was practically not realizable any more to implement
practically the consequent restriction of state budget expenses and
to rely on own forces, as the Finance Minister Lóránd Hegedüs had tried in
1921 without success. Hungary, like Austria in 1922 and later Rumania, Poland
and Bulgaria, had to proceed to solve its burdensome ﬁnancial situation
through international loan; Bethlen’s government applied for it in 1923.
In 1924, the state stopped covering its expenses by printing uncovered banknotes
and stopped oﬀering large inﬂation credits. It established a formally
independent central bank of the country, the Hungarian National Bank that
became the only standard subject in the country with the right to print
banknotes. By summer 1924, the Government had met the basic conditions
of using foreign loan and could make use of its account as from June 1924.
The state economy got balanced by the end of 1924, and the period
of prosperity was started. About a fourth of the international loan covered
the state budget deﬁcit, and the rest was used primarily to pay old debts and
to build schools, hospitals and public buildings, etc. In the course of the second
half of the Twentieths, further loans ﬂowed into the country, in total
amount of about 3 billion in the new currency, pengő, but they were unfortunately
used mainly in non-productive sphere. However, high interest percentage
was paid for such credits, and whole industrial branches were
pledged. Nevertheless, the positive growth of Hungarian economy in the second
half of the Twentieths is well illustrated by the GDP calculated per one
inhabitant (according to P. Bairoch), ranking Hungary at top place in the
space of (not only) south-eastern Europe. While in 1925, the GDP in Hungary
was 365 dollars per inhabitant; in 1924 it was 424 dollars already. In the