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The Journal of Development
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China's Engagement with
Neo-liberalism: Path
Dependency, Geography and
Party Self-Reinvention
Leong Liew
Published online: 08 Sep 2010.
To cite this article: Leong Liew (2005) China's Engagement with Neo-liberalism:
Path Dependency, Geography and Party Self-Reinvention, The Journal of
Development Studies, 41:2, 331-352, DOI: 10.1080/0022038042000309278
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China’s Engagement with Neo-liberalism:
Path Dependency, Geography and Party
Self-Reinvention
LEONG H. LIEW
China’s post-Mao market reform, even after the Asian crisis, does
not conform to the standard IMF/World Bank model and the state
continues to mediate market reform. Three principal factors have
influenced how the state mediates China’s market reform: path
dependency, a result of China’s communist and nationalist
revolution; China’s geography, which favours developmentalstate-type
industrialisation; and most important of all, the Chinese
Communist Party’s successful post-Mao self-reinvention that has
enabled it to remain in power as a monopolistic party. These factors
determine that China’s engagement with neo-liberalism will be a
loose hug rather than an intimate embrace.
I. INTRODUCTION
China’s economic reform has been a resounding success. It has produced
stellar economic growth that has made a huge dent in the numbers of Chinese
people living in poverty. China’s official estimates show that its economy
grew at an annual rate of 9.7 per cent between 1978 and 1998 [Lardy, 2002:
12] and at an annual rate of 7.7 per cent between 1998 and 2002 [NBSC,
2003: 27].1
In 1978, 60 per cent of China’s population were below the
international poverty standard [World Bank, 1997a: 3], but by 1996, the
number of people living below the absolute poverty line had fallen to less
than 6 per cent of the population [World Bank, 1997b: 2]. Some scholars like
Stiglitz [2002: 180–94] saw China’s economic reform as a policy challenge
to the IMF/World Bank. China’s approach to economic reform differs from
Leong H. Liew, Department of International Business & Asian Studies, Griffith University,
Nathan Queensland 4111, Australia. E-mail: L.Liew@griffith.edu.au
The author wishes to acknowledge the comments of Kevin Hewison and anonymous referees for
the Journal, and the financial support from the Australian Research Council for a 2002–04
Discovery Grant, ‘Changing East Asia’s Economic and Political Regimes: What Kind of
Markets? What Kind of Polities?’.
The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.41, No.2, February 2005, pp.331 – 352
ISSN 0022-0388 print/1743-9140 online
DOI: 10.1080/0022038042000309278 # 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
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the approach prescribed by the IMF/World Bank, but China’s reform has
produced outcomes better than outcomes of reform in countries in the
Commonwealth of Independent States, which have followed more closely the
IMF/World Bank prescription.2
The Asian financial crisis had a weaker impact on China than on many
other countries in East Asia. The crisis initially appeared to increase the
urgency among China’s leaders to speed up liberal market reforms. But with
China escaping relatively unscathed from the crisis, ironically due to its
resistance to IMF pressure to open its capital account and allow free
convertibility of the yuan, the earlier imperative has disappeared. Today it is
‘business as usual’. In China ‘business as usual’ does not mean the status quo.
Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) commenced market reform in
1978, China’s economy has been transformed gradually from a centrally
planned to a market economy. ‘Business as usual’ means that China’s
progression to a market economy has multiple contestable pathways and the
form of market liberalism that is pursued continues to develop in ways that
are contingent on China’s history, geography and politics.
China’s market reform programme contains elements of the two key pillars
of the IMF/World Bank neo-liberal model – market liberalisation and
privatisation.3
However, I argue in this article that China’s market reform,
while it contains these elements of the IMF/World Bank’s market model, is
mediated distinctly by the Party/State and modifies this model. The standard
IMF/World Bank approach favours the free mobility of resources and use of
‘undistorted’ market prices, including wages, to allocate resources. According
to this approach, a country’s output is maximised when ownership of its
resources is largely in private hands and the country allocates its resources
according to its predetermined comparative advantage; public policy cannot
alter a country’s comparative advantage.4
Political interference with the
market, state ownership and management of sectors of the economy and any
form of strategic industry policy are incompatible with the model. Economic
reform in China has created a market economy that departs sharply from this
model.
One obvious departure is seen in the fact that state ownership remains
significant in post-reform China. In 2001 state-owned and state-holding
enterprises comprised 27.3 per cent of the total of industrial enterprises and
produced 44.4 per cent of industrial output [NBSC, 2002: 423]. It is a market
economy where the state continues to intervene actively to promote its
political goals and where the state remains a strategist in industry policy. The
state also remains tied to the CCP, limiting the scope of market reform to
what is possible under prevailing Party ideology and requiring the state to
protect the CCP’s privileged market position so that the CCP can preserve its
monopoly on political power.
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I argue that three principal factors – China’s history, China’s geography
and CCP self-reinvention – influence how the state mediates China’s market
reform. These factors are briefly outlined here, prior to a more detailed
discussion of each. First, the CCP came to power through a communist and
nationalist revolution. Although difficult, it is possible for a post-communist
government to erase the legacy of communism. But it is impossible for any
Chinese government, not least a CCP government, not to pay heed to Chinese
nationalism and do whatever is necessary to preserve national unity –
Xinjiang and Tibet are yet to be securely integrated within the PRC – and to
prevent de jure independence for Taiwan. China’s government also has to
intervene heavily in the market because poor factor endowments – in
Xinjiang and Tibet for example – that do not allow them to develop
economically without state intervention and unequal economic development
are considered likely to exacerbate ethnic tensions and are thus viewed as a
serious threat to national unity.
The CCP, unlike the communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE), remains in power and therefore controls the process of transforming
China from a centrally planned to a market economy. The path of liberal
market reform in China is therefore very much restricted to what is possible
given Party norms and beliefs. The CCP could never have contemplated the
‘shock therapy’ approach to marketisation adopted by the post-communist
governments of CEE when it made the decision to reform China’s economy
in 1978. The post-communist governments of CEE knew their ultimate aim
was to transform their planned economies to liberal market economies. This
was not the case with the CCP in 1978; it never aimed to transform China’s
planned economy completely to a market economy. The market was to
complement the plan, not to replace it (jihua wei zhu, shichang wei bu). It is
the contradictions inherent in a plan–market system and the momentum of
pent-up liberal forces when unleashed by reform that have gradually forced
CCP’s leaders to shift China’s economy away from a plan towards a market
economy.
Second, China’s geography bestows upon the Chinese state certain
advantages and disadvantages in its approach to and links with the global
economy. These incline the Chinese economy away from the standard IMF/
World Bank liberalisation model. Market reform in China has propelled the
size of China’s economy to number three or two, if purchasing power
calculations are used, in the world’s rankings [UNDP, 2002]. Its huge
domestic market is attractive to other countries to sell to and invest in, but it
also enables China’s industries to exploit significant production economies of
scale just by selling at home. Small market economies have to export to gain
production economies of scale, but this is not so for China. This asymmetry
gives China enormous advantages in bilateral and even multilateral
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bargaining over industry support and market access. Thus, in a globalising
world, China is in a good position to implement developmental state-type
industry policies and selectively adopt features of neo-liberal economic
policy to engage with the global economy on terms of its own choosing.
China’s geography endows sub-national governments and local actors with
power to mediate the central government’s market reform and strategic
industry policy. China’s physical size and large population have enabled its
sub-national governments to enjoy a large degree of autonomy from the
centre throughout its long history and this has posed enormous challenges to
national governance. China’s central government has often found it difficult
to enforce national policies at the local level without the cooperation of subnational
governments. Post-Mao, Beijing finds that its liberal market reforms
and strategic industry policies require active cooperation from sub-national
governments but local economic interests often lead sub-national governments
to oppose or moderate national policies [Baum and Shevchenko, 1999;
Breslin, 1996; Dougan 2002].
Finally, in the midst of market reforms, CCP self-reinvention so far has
enabled it to remain in power as a monopolistic party. For some, a
monopolistic party state with an IMF/World Bank-type market economy is an
oxymoron. A monopolistic party in power that functions exclusively and
continuously as ‘the state’ has to prevent the emergence of external groups
that can challenge its monopoly on political power and this requires it to have
overwhelmingly superior economic power. The party and its supporters can
ill-afford to allow other groups to compete equally with it for economic
resources on a level playing field.
This article now turns to a more detailed analysis of each of these factors.
II. PATH DEPENDENCY
China’s market reform has been gradual compared to the ‘big bang’ approach
to market reform in the post-communist countries of CEE, which follow
relatively closely the standard IMF/World Bank reform prescription. A key
reason for the difference was the collapse of communist party rule in CEE.
This allowed the IMF and World Bank to exert their considerable influence
on the reform programmes in these countries and inspired the determination
of the non-communist parties there to break up the core centres of the
communist parties’ influence, which were concentrated in the central
planning bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) [see for example,
Steele, 1994: 291–310]. In China, without the collapse of Communist Party
rule, there was no similar rush to replace central planning with the market and
to privatise industry. Instead, the market and private enterprise were only to
complement the plan and state ownership. Collapse of communist party rule
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produced discontinuous institutional change in CEE, but with continuing
Party rule in China, the presence of increasing returns to institutions ensures
that market reform in China is path dependent. Policy-makers remain
constrained by existing theories and ideologies, informal constraints and
entrenched interests [North, 1990].
Elsewhere [Liew, 2000], I have explored the trajectory of China’s market
reform from when it was first introduced in 1978 to the late 1990s. China’s
approach to market reform, as would be predicted by North’s theory, was
gradual and can be described in two phrases: ‘momo shitou guo he’ (groping
for the stones while crossing the river) and ‘Pareto-improving’. The former
phrase refers to the Party’s emphasis on experimentation and the latter refers
to the Party’s stated policy to, as far as possible, make no Chinese worse off
because of economic reform. As I explained in that article and elsewhere, the
endeavour not to make any Chinese worse off was designed to build a
constituency within the Party/State in favour of economic reform. I believe
the policy also reflected a genuine desire of the Party, at least until 1992, to
prevent the emergence of significant income differentials and to avoid social
conflict. The Party’s revolutionary history helps to explain this desire. In his
article, Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, the architect of
China’s market reform programme, Deng Xiaoping [1984: 36] wrote:
If we take the capitalist road, we can enable less than 1 per cent of the
people of China to become prosperous, but we definitely cannot resolve
the problem of how to make 90 odd per cent of the Chinese people
prosperous. Therefore, we have to persist with socialism. According to
the socialist principle of distribution according to labour, there will not
be a large gap between the rich and the poor. After another 20, 30
years, after developing our forces of production, there will not be a
two-class differentiation.
The CCP believed that persisting with state ownership could prevent
significant income differentials. Following Marxist ideology, the CCP
believed that incomes earned only from labour could not lead to large
income differentials. Until 1993, mandatory planning and state ownership
were inviolable principles of the Party; the market was introduced only to
support the plan. The reforming post-communist regimes of CEE were freed
from restrictions imposed by Marxist ideology and the need to establish a
pro-market reform constituency in the Party/State bureaucracy and therefore
never sought a ‘Pareto-improving’ outcome.
The plan–market system that the Party wanted to adopt was clearly far
from the usual IMF/World Bank model of free markets and private
ownership. In any case, the plan-market system became unsustainable
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because of economic and political developments. The plan–market system
was unable adequately to protect SOEs from market competition as corrupt
officials diverted massive amounts of critical supplies from the plan to the
market. A result of the plan–market system was the 1989 Beijing tragedy
when troops fired on demonstrators who were protesting against official
corruption and its negative impact on the standard of living of urban
residents, who had previously enjoyed access to subsidised goods distributed
through the plan.
The Party’s response to weaknesses in the plan–market system was to
abolish the plan and instead, provide fiscal and banking subsidies to urban
households and loss-making SOEs to maintain its Pareto-improving policy.
However, these subsidies soon became a huge drain on state finances and
impacted negatively on the financial sector. This forced the Party in 1993 to
adopt a ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’, to officially
replace mandatory planning and state ownership with the market and public
ownership as core features of China’s ‘socialist’ economy and as two of its
central ideological pillars.5
This ‘socialist market economy’ recognises that
private businesses make valuable contributions to the economy and so
effectively sanctions the privatising of state assets. The CCP had to overcome
intense objections among its regular members and even among its senior
leaders to replace the two central ideological pillars. There was intense
debate within the Party’s senior hierarchy and in the winter of 1991–92 Deng
Xiaoping had to go on a ‘southern tour’ to garner support from the coastal
and southern provinces, which are the major beneficiaries of market reform,
for the ‘socialist market economy’.
The CCP’s implementation of the ‘socialist market economy’ was
grounded in the policy of ‘grasping the large and releasing the small’
(zhuada fangxiao). To ‘release the small’ is to privatise or contract out small
SOEs or to let them go bankrupt.6
To ‘grasp the large’ is to turn into worldclass
businesses a select group of 300 out of a list of 1,000 already successful
large enterprises and enterprise groups [Xie, 1998: 54]. This is a policy of the
state picking and making winners and is encapsulated in the slogan ‘support
the excellent and the strong’ [Lin, 1998: 183]. It is South Korean-style
industrialisation in place of Soviet-style industrialisation and clearly runs
counter to the post-Asian crisis prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank,
which are against state-sponsored industry policy. There are, Hall and
Soskice [2001] point out, many varieties of capitalism; China’s variety is just
one of the many and is clearly not a clean break from China’s pre-reform
economic model and the model’s approach to industrialisation.
Even more critical than the retention of planning – in the form of state
industry policy and support – are the strategic reasons for China not
embracing wholeheartedly neo-liberal reforms. The CCP claims that it has
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yet to complete its task of nationalist revolution. The CCP continues to face
challenges to its rule in Tibet and Xinjiang and its declared historic mission to
reunify Taiwan with the ‘Motherland’ remains unaccomplished. In its
attempts to suppress separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, the CCP
seeks to win ‘hearts and minds’ with a policy of massive fiscal subsidies and
market intervention to improve standards of living of national minorities in
the two provinces [Liew, 2004; Wang, 2004]. The policy is designed also to
support the livelihood of the large number of Han residents in the two
provinces who have been encouraged to migrate there from other provinces
to dilute the national minority population for national security reasons
[Becquelin, 2000].7
A concrete example of this policy is official intervention in the cotton
market in Xinjiang. Xinjiang’s cotton is competitive against other domestic
suppliers in price and quality, but is not competitive against overseas imports
[Du, 2000: 251], and so is hit particularly hard by China’s entry into the
WTO. A study by China’s Academy of Social Sciences forecasting
developments in the cotton industry after China entered the WTO projected
a nationwide 12.6 per cent fall in production, with a corresponding decline in
employment of 22.6 per cent [Li, Zhai and Xu 2000: 75]. Safeguarding
national unity and successful economic development are the two pillars that
sustain the CCP’s legitimacy. The state has made Xinjiang’s economy highly
dependent on cotton and, WTO or no WTO, it is highly unlikely that it will
allow the fate of the cotton industry in Xinjiang to be determined solely by
market forces, given that it perceives the cost of this outcome to be highly
damaging to the national-unity pillar.
III. NEO-LIBERALISM AND GEOGRAPHY
Despite claims by supporters of the neo-liberal economic model of the
positive impact of free trade on economic growth, the available empirical
evidence to support this claim is inconclusive [Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000].
There is no doubt that exports have contributed to China’s phenomenal postMao
economic growth, but it is less clear that China’s gradual lifting of
import barriers has had a similar positive effect on economic growth. The
reason is China’s large domestic market, which challenges neo-liberal
prescriptions regarding free trade. The relative factor endowments model of
trade that is behind much of the IMF and World Bank trade policy advice to
countries assumes constant returns to scale production technology and the
presence of competitive markets with many sellers. The negative economic
outcome associated with trade intervention depends very much on these
assumptions of the model. Changing these assumptions in a model such that
they fit better with the realities of China’s large domestic market and the
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existence of oligopolies in world markets can produce the result where trade
intervention is economically beneficial. Krugman [1984] showed in his
theoretical model that with increasing returns technology and an oligopolistic
market structure that import protection for a firm could lead to an increase in
its exports. Although Krugman’s model is technical, the basic idea behind his
model is simple. Import protection for a firm can allow it to compete at home,
enabling it to realise economies of scale and lowering its production costs,
which makes it competitive in all markets at home and abroad.
Krugman’s and other similar theoretical models provide a rigorous
economic explanation of why certain countries can continue to implement
developmental state-type industry policies in the current post-Asian crisis era.
The key is the presence of a large domestic market, which is very attractive to
trading partners and enables the domestic firm to exploit economies of scale
in production from import protection alone without having to rely on exports.
A large domestic market confers China advantages in international
bargaining over market access and makes China less vulnerable to trade
retaliation against its exports when it uses import barriers to exploit
economies of scale in production.
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, with much smaller populations than
China, have successfully carried out strategic industrialisation. But the
pinnacle of their success was during the Cold War when the US was willing
to allow its strategically important allies to industrialise through trade
subsidies. The US kept open its domestic market to subsidised exports from
its strategically important allies and acquiesced to their protection of their
domestic industries. Now the US no longer has any need to help these
countries economically for strategic reasons and often sees them more as
economic competitors than as strategic partners. Moreover, there is now a
backlash in industrialised countries against globalisation [Rodrik, 1997].
Increasing domestic opposition in the US, EU and other industrialised
counties to the loss of jobs due to unrestricted imports into these countries has
made it much more difficult for industrialising countries, unless they have
strong bargaining power, to implement strategic industry polices. Industrialised
countries are likely to act against any industrialising country
perceived to be supporting its exporting or import-competing industries. The
White House in 2004 lifted trade restrictions against steel imports into the US
from the EU not because of a ruling from the WTO, but because the EU
threatened to impose restrictions on imports from states of the US where
President Bush is vulnerable politically. A similar threat from a small country
would not carry any weight.
To govern a country with China’s physical size and population is a
challenging task. State power in China is decentralised by necessity. China
has a population of about 1.3 billion and many cities and provinces are as
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large as a typical European country. Shanghai has a population of over 16
million and Sichuan over 86 million.8
It is impossible for any government in
Beijing to govern a country the size of China without cooperation from local
authorities. Localities in the PRC enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy even at
the height of central planning and there was continuous tension between the
centre and sub-national governments. Conflicts between the centre and subnational
governments in China, especially over public finance, have a long
history that predates the PRC. In traditional China and the PRC until 1994
there was no central tax collection agency. Sub-national governments
collected taxes and the centre depended on them to deliver to it its share of
the taxes collected. The historic dependence of the centre on tax collection
efforts of sub-national governments made rich provinces powerful political
actors in the PRC’s political system. The political influence of provinces is
formalised in the PRC political system where ‘province’ is a rank in the
national political administrative hierarchy that is equal in rank to a national
ministry [Lieberthal, 1995: 164–66] and although not stated formally, richer
provinces rank higher than poorer provinces.
Under Mao, provincial cooperation was necessary to draw up and
implement the central plan and provinces were required to have had their
own plans, which complemented and supported the central plan. Mao,
while he advocated central planning and harangued against localism
(difangzhuyi), was also a firm believer in self-reliance and local initiative.
Post-Mao, the localities have become even more difficult for the centre to
control.9
The post-Mao central government had to intervene directly and
forcefully on numerous occasions in the localities to regain macroeconomic
control [Liew, 1995]. Sub-national governments in China have
utilised their large degree of autonomy to become major players, often as
shareholders, in local industrialisation, promoting the development of
various industries – from those involved in the production of consumer
durables, to those involved in high technology production like civil
aviation manufacturing [Dougan, 2002]. Local industrialisation efforts are
not limited to producing globally competitive industries. Sub-national
governments also promote local industrialisation to create local employment
and to maximise tax revenues. In promoting local economic
interests, sub-national governments have even erected trade barriers
against domestic products made in other localities [Gilley, 2001b; Watson
et al., 1989]. The disposition of China’s powerful provinces towards
strategic industry policies and the desire of sub-national governments to
create local employment and raise local tax revenues have led many
specialists to argue that sub-national governments and local economic
interests, not the central government, are the major impediments to
China’s WTO compliance [Johnston, 2003: 15].
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There is no guarantee that China’s strategic industry policy, which is
pushed by its national and sub-national governments, will be able to duplicate
the success of the post-War industry policies of Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan. Steinfeld’s [1998] and Beeson’s and Liew’s [2002: 147–54] studies
on SOE reform and Moore’s [2002] study of China’s textile and shipbuilding
industries cast doubts on the policy’s likely success. State–industry ties date
from the days of central planning and remain largely ‘particularistic ties of
industrial paternalism rather than the universalistic ties of rational–legal
authority’ [Moore, 2002: 305] and competition among sub-national
governments weakens further the effectiveness of China’s industry policy.
However, weakness in strategic industry policy does not translate into
strength in market reform. Competition among sub-national governments
weakens both market reform and industry policy. In sum, China’s geography
gives the PRC strong international bargaining power and has produced
powerful sub-national governments in China, which together with the PRC’s
earlier embrace of central planning and continued quest for national unity are
producing a form of market liberalism that is situated between the plan and
IMF/World Bank neo-liberal models.
IV. NEO-LIBERALISM AND PARTY SELF-REINVENTION
Post-Mao, the CCP has adopted a more liberal approach to managing the
national economy. Here there is an inherent ideological contradiction with
communist orthodoxy. Therefore, although the CCP remains in power as a
monopolistic party, it has had to reinvent itself to do so. The CCP so far
appears to be able to successfully reinvent itself by reconfiguring its support
base through co-opting the new social strata that have been empowered by
market reform. This has been a critical factor in enabling the CCP to remain
in power as a monopolistic party. It also ensures that China’s market reforms
will continue to depart from the standard neo-liberal model. In China,
financial resources are required to sustain political power in an increasingly
market-oriented economy. This is the key reason why the CCP, as a
monopolistic party, will not allow a full and free market; free market
competition would serve to erode the party’s continuous and dominant
control of the economy’s financial resources, which is essential if the party is
to preserve its political power.
After more than two decades of market reform, the private sector in China
increasingly dominates the lives of ordinary citizens. As can be seen from
Table 1, the growth of private enterprises in China in the 1990s was
phenomenal. The growth of the private sector is occurring despite China’s
market reforms falling far short of the standard liberalising advice of the IMF
and World Bank, but as Hall and Soskice [2001] have shown, resistance to
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this advice does not mean that the government is anti-private ownership. On
the contrary, the growth of private enterprises could not have been so rapid
had it not been for state acquiescence and support.
Accompanying the growth in private enterprise is the shift in the national
emphasis from ‘politics in command’ to ‘economics in command’, which
switches the demand for political activists (cadres) to demand for skilled
professionals, managers, and risk-taking entrepreneurs. This shift in national
emphasis has weakened the coercive powers of the Party/State and its control
over financial and human capital resources. While China’s economic growth
originating in market reform has been spectacular and has enabled substantial
poverty reduction, this has come at a cost of rapid and significant increases in
income inequality. China’s Gini coefficient increased from 0.288 in the 1980s
to 0.388 in the 1990s, transforming China from one of the world’s most equal
countries (in terms of income) before reform to one in the middle of world
rankings [World Bank, 1997: 2].10
China’s entry into the WTO is predicted to
increase inequality further [Zhai and Li, 2002].
The significant change in income distribution and shift in national priority
from ‘making revolution’ to ‘making money’ has produced a profound shift
in popular perception of the relative status of social groups. Table 2 shows the
outcome of a survey, conducted by China’s Academy of Social Sciences in
three cities (Shenzhen, Hefei and Hanchuan) and one county (Zhenning), of
how members of different social strata evaluate their social standing [Lu,
2002]. Two observations from the data are particularly interesting. First, even
casual and unemployed workers rank themselves higher than peasants rank
TABLE 1
DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
Year
Number
(‘000)
Annual
growth
(%)
Employees
(10,000)
Annual
growth
(%)
Registered
capital (100
million
yuan)
Annual
growth
(%)
1989 91 164 84
1990 98 7.7 170 3.7 95 13.1
1991 108 10.2 184 8.2 123 29.5
1992 140 29.6 232 26.1 221 79.7
1993 238 70.0 373 60.8 681 208.1
1994 432 81.5 648 73.7 1448 112.6
1995 655 51.6 956 47.5 2622 81.1
1996 819 25.0 1171 22.5 3752 43.1
1997 961 17.3 1349 15.2 5140 37.0
1998 1201 25.0 1701 26.1 7000 36.2
Nov. 1999 1486 23.7 1901 11.8
Source: Yan [2002: 194].
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themselves. Second, private entrepreneurs rank themselves higher than do
political and civic leaders in three of the four places surveyed. In Shenzhen,
the city in China’s southern Guangdong Province specially built as one of
four special economic zones at the beginning of reform,11
and Hefei, the
capital of Anhui Province, private entrepreneurs rank themselves higher than
political and civic leaders rank themselves. In Hefei, political and civic
leaders rank themselves below the level that managers, professional and
technical staff, and even non-professional white-collar staff rank themselves.
In Zhenning, political and civic leaders rank themselves below the level that
professional and technical staff rank themselves, but above the level selected
by private entrepreneurs.
The CCP leadership have recognised that under these social and political
conditions it cannot sustain its hold on power without the Party transforming
itself. The change described here is so profound that we can describe it as the
Party’s self-reinvention. The CCP reinventing itself has meant changing the
‘body and soul’ of the Party. In practice this involves changing the
characteristics of Party members (‘body’), especially that of Party elites, and
redefining the Party’s ideology (‘soul’). The Party is keen to co-opt the
growing elite of skilled professionals, managers, and private entrepreneurs.
Their bargaining power vis-a`-vis the Party/State has continued to strengthen
while marketisation gives professionals, managers and entrepreneurs wealth,
leverage and space to pursue their interests within a political marketplace.12
How has the Party changed its soul? Jiang Zemin, the former Party general
secretary who took over from the disgraced Zhao Ziyang in 1989, delivered
an important speech at the 14th Party Congress in 1992, which called on the
people not to debate whether certain reform methods are socialist or
TABLE 2
SELF EVALUATION OF SOCIAL STANDING
Social standing (max 10 pts)
Social stratum Shenzhen Hefei Hanchuan Zhenning
Political and civic leaders 6.8 5.4 5.5 4.7
Managers 6.4 5.6 4.9 na
Private entrepreneurs 7.1 6.0 4.0 4.0
Professional and technical staff 6.2 5.7 5.1 5.4
Non-professional white-collar 5.6 5.5 4.7 4.3
Small business owners 5.8 4.7 4.4 4.2
Service workers 4.9 5.1 4.0 4.6
Production workers 5.3 4.8 4.4 3.8
Peasants na na 3.8 3.7
Casual workers/unemployed 5.7 5.2 4.1 4.3
Average 5.7 5.2 4.2 3.9
Source: Lu [2002: 32]
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capitalist, but to concentrate on production [Jiang, 1992: 2]. By shifting the
attention to production, the CCP is able to justify the nation’s ever widening
income differentials. Instead of preventing widening income gaps, especially
from large returns to private capital and skill, the CCP is defending income
differentials and is resorting to appeals for those in front economically to lead
those behind to achieve common prosperity [CCP, 1993: 22]:
It is necessary to introduce competitive mechanisms for rewarding
individual labour and break away from egalitarianism, so as to
implement the principle of more pay for more work and rationally
widen the income gap. . .. [T]hose who have become well off should be
encouraged to lead forward and support those lagging behind, so as to
achieve common prosperity.
The message here is explicit. Egalitarianism is not the national ideal, income
maximisation is. This requires ‘those who have become well off’ to lead from
the front. In Jiang Zemin’s report to the 16th Party Congress in 2002, he
invoked the notion that whether a person is politically advanced (xianjin) or
backward (luohou) does not depend on whether the person owns any personal
property or how much personal property the person owns. What are important
are the person’s political thinking, his or her biaoxian (‘compliant and
supportive behaviour’) towards the Party, how the property is acquired, how
it is used and the person’s contribution in ‘building socialism with Chinese
characteristics’ [Jiang, 2002b: 15]. Thus, the working class is no longer
necessarily considered the class that will lead from the front, and this paves
the way for the Party to change its ‘body’. In his speech to celebrate the 80th
anniversary of the foundation of the CCP on 1 July 2001, Jiang Zemin [2001]
made it clear that those who should lead are members of the new social strata
such as private sector entrepreneurs, managers and professionals. These new
rich can remain in the Party or are welcome to join because they are
‘productive forces’ and are therefore potential ‘advanced elements of
society’.
Indeed, the Party has to rely on what it considers to be ‘advanced elements
of the new social strata’. Their interests are more closely aligned with those
of the Party than are the interests of workers and peasants. Members of the
new strata are the major beneficiaries of the Party’s policy on the economy
and are therefore more likely to share the Party’s vision of a socialist market
economy and thereby support the Party. Moreover, money and political
influence go together in a market economy and money increasingly buys
political voice. Marketisation introduces a situation where money and
competition commodify power and influence and tie the political marketplace
to the market economy. This is the case even when there is no serious
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electoral contest in China since power through regulation or influence does
not require an electoral system and operates effectively through corruption
and money politics. The new rich are in a position with their financial
resources to buy influence, and perhaps power, and the Party recognises that
it has to co-opt them lest they form an external threat. Furthermore, political
mobilisation requires financial resources, to which the new wealthy strata
have ever greater absolute and relative access and the old Party elites had
ever less relative access. Here we see the reasons for the making and
remaking of Party elites. In a widely publicised case of resistance by the new
rich to the CCP, in 1992, villagers in China’s richest village, Daqiu, south of
the northern port city of Tianjin, challenged Party rule, which ended only
with the intervention of para-military forces. The village rebel leaders were
able to organise and mobilise against the Party only because they had the
economic means to do so [Gilley, 2001a].13
The 16th Party Congress amended the Party’s constitution and legitimised
the previously illegitimate Party membership of many private entrepreneurs.
The revision of the CCP constitution at this Congress symbolises the formal
reinvention of the CCP. The former CCP constitution starts with a declaration
that the CCP is the vanguard of the working class. In the revised constitution,
the Party declares itself to be the vanguard not only of the working class but
of Chinese peoples of all nationalities [CCP, 2002: 57]. Article One in
Section One of the revised constitution states that Party membership is
opened to workers, peasants, members of the armed forces, intellectuals and
advanced elements of other social strata who are 18 years and above [CCP,
2002: 66]. Here recognition and legitimation of new social classes are made
explicit as is their eligibility for Party membership. With the amendment to
its constitution, the CCP formally embraces the new class structure and
transforms itself from a revolutionary Party for the working class to a ruling
Party, at least in theory, for the whole people irrespective of their class.
In sum, the Party changes its ‘body’ in two ways. First, is the reinvention
of Party elites as many in the Party remake themselves into technocrats and
entrepreneurs in the service of market reform in order to remain relevant to
the Party and to maintain their power and influence in the Party. Second, it
accepts into the Party a new category of members who are brought into the
Party from the ‘advanced elements of other social strata’ to prevent the
creation of power centres that are external to the Party.
Many Party members have in fact transformed themselves from Party
activists into skilled professionals or even entrepreneurs when the state
corporatises or privatises its enterprises. One Party member who has remade
herself is Guo Fenglian, the well-known ‘iron maiden’ poster girl of the
Cultural Revolution era who has become an icon of entrepreneurship. Guo
comes from Dazhai, the village in the slogan, ‘In agriculture learn from
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Dazhai’, coined by Mao Zedong to celebrate the ideology of ‘self-reliance’.
She joined the Party when she was 14. Now 56, she runs 12 enterprises,
which had a combined output of 100 million yuan (about US$12 million) and
employed more than 1,000 workers [South China Morning Post, 2002: 4].
As an indication of their increasing influence in recent years, private
entrepreneurs have been ‘elected’ to sub-national people’s congresses in
increasing numbers. A survey of private entrepreneur membership in the
provincial parliament (renda daibiao) in the capital of Hebei province,
Baoding, in the mid-1990s for example, found that 15.5 per cent (100 of 644)
of members were private entrepreneurs [Yan, 2002: 203]. Furthermore, as
indicated in Table 3, many private entrepreneurs were already members of
the CCP before the 16th
Party Congress. The Forbes team that drew up
China’s 2002 ‘rich list’ estimated that 25 per cent of those in the list are Party
members [Hoogewerf, 2002] and Dickson [2003: 108] estimated that about
20 per cent of private entrepreneurs are Party members.
Theorists like Diamond [2003] emphasise that economic development will
create pressures for democratisation only if it is accompanied by rising levels
of education, the growth of a diverse middle class that is independent of the
state, and the creation of a ‘pluralistic, active and resourceful civil society’.
However, it is clear that the CCP’s self-reinvention is designed to prevent the
emergence of an autonomous civil society. At a time when it is seeking to
recruit members from the newly economically empowered strata, the Party is
actively denying autonomy to potentially influential civil organisations
formed by members of these strata that choose to remain outside the Party.
While some argue that an active civil society is emerging in China [He,
2003; Pei, 1998], it remains true that the most influential civil organisations
are not autonomous of the state [Yu, 2002: 216–20]. Although official
regulations demand that civil organisations sever all official ties with the
Party and government, the government is still the sponsor of most
professional associations. According to official regulations, a civil organisation
must first be affiliated to a Party or government organ before it can be
registered. The civil organisation, once registered, is accountable to that
organ. Furthermore, although official regulations state that Party and
government officials above the division level (zhichu) cannot serve as
leading officials of civic organisations, former senior Party and government
officials continue to fill almost all the senior leadership positions in important
civic associations. For example, a former minister of the State Economic
Commission became president of the National Council of Industrial
Economics [Yu, 2002: 218]. Retired village Party secretaries often serve as
presidents of village senior citizens’ association and the Party appoints the
officials of chambers of commerce at both central and sub-national levels.
Officials in many civic associations are like public servants, who rotate
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TABLE 3
PROPORTION OF SOCIAL STRATA WHO ARE PARTY, OR FORMER OR CURRENT YOUTH LEAGUE MEMBERS 2001
Shenzhen (%) Hefei (%) Hanchuan (%) Zhenning (%)
Social stratum Party
Youth
League Party
Youth
League Party
Youth
League Party
Youth
League
Political and civic leaders 100 100 77.5 95 100 90 100 93.3
Managers 35.7 76.8 58.8 97.1 53.8 61.5 na na
Private entrepreneurs 22.2 85.2 24.4 72.1 9.1 45.5 0 0
Professional and technical 27.2 86.4 25.2 88.2 17.8 73.3 24 67.3
Non-professional white-collar 28.2 87.4 40.7 83.6 54.5 75.3 46.3 44.4
Small business owners 13.7 60.8 10.4 52.8 7.7 41 5.2 11.8
Service workers 10.4 59.5 7.6 68.3 10.6 55.3 3.9 28.8
Production workers 0 72.2 13.3 72.9 5.9 31.1 10.3 21.6
Peasants na na na na 4.3 23.9 5.2 10.2
Casual workers/unemployed 2 58.4 9.1 58.3 1.8 46.4 3.9 9
Average 17.5 73.1 23.4 74.1 12.1 40.3 6.7 12.9
Source: Lu [2002: 36]
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between positions in Party–government and civic associations. Some Party
members who are alarmed by endemic official corruption have called for an
active civil society to supervise the Party [see, for example, He, 2002].
In a widely publicised article in the official newspaper of the Guangzhou
Party committee, Nanfang ribao [Ren, 2000], Ren Zhongyi, a former Party
Secretary for Guangdong Province, writing on the ‘Four Cardinal Principles’
(si xiang jiben yuanze), called for external supervision of the Party.14
According to Ren, for the Party to lead well, it must be supervised because
‘absolute power corrupts absolutely’ (juedui de quanli hui daozhi juedui de
fubai). As Ren claimed, ‘The Communist Party supervising itself is like using
one’s left hand to supervise one’s right hand’. However, the official Party
position is that only the Party should be allowed to supervise the Party [Jiang,
2002a: 7]. The Party’s desire to retain its monopoly power outweighs its
concern with official corruption.
Nevertheless, endemic official corruption has forced the Party to introduce
institutional reforms such as appointments based on merit as opposed to
personal connections, and village elections to achieve greater accountability
[Li and O’Brien, 1999; Nathan, 2003]. The increasing complexity of
managing a market economy exposed to global economic forces is another
reason for the CCP regime’s institutionalisation [Shambaugh, 2001]. The
Party’s self-reinvention and pursuit of institutional reform are efforts at
political renewal, which are intended to preserve its position as a monopolist
of political power. That members of the middle and entrepreneurial classes,
the new social strata that the Party wishes to co-opt, are lukewarm in their
support for democracy, is helping the Party to preserve its monopoly political
power.
The assertion of the existence of a causal relationship between the size of
the middle class and successful democratic transition assumes members of
the middle class demand democracy, which is not necessarily the case
everywhere [see Bellin, 2000]. While the middle class is growing in China,
only 15 per cent of the population are members of this class and they are not
strong advocates for democracy [Lu, 2002: 73]. This pessimism about middle
class support for democracy in China is supported by interviews of the middle
class conducted by An Chen [2002: 13], who found them to have a
‘disposition against lower-class empowerment’. Similar elitist views against
lower-class empowerment are held by most entrepreneurs in a survey on
political beliefs of private entrepreneurs in China [Dickson, 2003: 135].
Several China specialists writing in a special issue of Journal of
Democracy in January 2003 discussed the CCP’s post-Mao efforts at
political renewal. As expected, there was disagreement among them on the
success or otherwise of the CCP’s efforts. Minxin Pei neatly sums up the
opposing conclusions of the specialists: ‘political renewal is still a work in
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progress, while political decay has yet to reach a terminal stage’ [Pei, 2003:
80]. One could speculate about China’s political economy should the CCP’s
political decay not become terminal. But it is clear that as long as the CCP
survives as a monopolistic party, which it has managed to do so far, it will
never allow market competition on a level-playing field. Allowing the use of
a level-playing field runs counter to the Party’s imperative to secure dominant
control over the country’s financial resources lest social groups external to
the Party obtain significant independent sources of finance that can provide
them with the capability to pose a serious challenge to the Party’s monopoly
power.
V. CONCLUSION
The Asian crisis has not altered fundamentally the form of China’s
engagement with neo-liberal economic policy. China has not embraced the
IMF and World Bank neo-liberal model and the state continues to mediate
and direct China’s market reform. Three principal factors continue to
influence how the state mediates China’s neo-liberal engagement: path
dependency, China’s geography and the CCP’s successful post-Mao selfreinvention
that has enabled it to remain in power as a monopolistic party.
The CCP cannot simply disown its history as a revolutionary and nationalist
party. The CCP’s mission to achieve national unity has special significance
here. Safeguarding national unity is one of the two pillars of the CCP’s
legitimacy, alongside successful economic development. This severely limits
the CCP’s freedom to leave economic development in the restive provinces
of Tibet and Xianjiang entirely to market forces.
China’s geography is conducive to the implementation of developmental
state-type policies because its large domestic market presents significant
economies of scale in production and gives China bargaining power in
international negotiations over industry support and market access in the
current era of globalisation. Moreover, China’s size and population bestows
upon sub-national governments a significant degree of independence from the
centre and they have utilised this independence to promote local industry
even to the extent of erecting regional blockades against domestic goods from
other localities. China’s centre–local policy conflicts have a long history that
predates the PRC and localities will contest China’s WTO compliance with
varying degrees of success.
Finally, the CCP has reinvented itself by co-opting wealthy and potentially
powerful new groups of middle and entrepreneurial classes that its market
reforms have created. These groups are lukewarm in their support for
democracy and the CCP’s reinvention has allowed the CCP to remain a
monopolistic party in power. As a monopolistic party in a market economy,
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where financial power has a huge bearing on political power, the CCP has to
retain dominant financial power and keeps within the fold, or least on side,
others who have financial power. This imperative determines that the Party
cannot allow fair economic competition among market actors; the playing
field has to be sloped to favour the Party and its supporters. Thus path
dependence, geography and the Party’s self-reinvention will ensure that
China’s engagement with economic liberalism will not conform to the neoliberal
model and will remain a loose hug rather than an intimate embrace.
NOTES
1. There are doubts over the reliability of China’s official statistics. Annual growth rates may
have been overestimated by up to 2 per cent, but even if growth rates are lower by 2 per cent,
China’s economic growth in the reform period remains very impressive and ranks
comfortably among the world’s ten fastest growing economies [Lardy, 2002: 12; World
Bank, 1997a: 3].
2. However, Sachs and Woo [2000] argued that China’s strategy is the result of conditions that
are unique to China and therefore cannot always be adopted by other transition countries.
3. The remaining pillar of the IMF/World Bank model is monetary and fiscal austerity. It was a
key feature of China’s pre-reform model and China remains committed to it. CCP leaders are
very afraid of inflation because hyperinflation in the late 1940s contributed to defeat of the
Nationalists (Guomindang). For more details regarding the World Bank’s and IMF’s
preferred model, see Beeson and Islam, this volume.
4. This is a clear implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment theory of international
trade, which is the intellectual foundation behind the IMF/World Bank push for free trade.
The theory is taught in all university-level international trade courses and appears in all
textbooks on international trade. See Appleyard and Field [2001: 117–39] for an excellent
exposition of the theory.
5. Public ownership is group ownership where no one individual has a controlling interest and
the major owners are primarily domestic institutions and the state, with the possibility of
foreign participation.
6. Cao, Qian and Weingast [1999] argued implicitly that privatisation of small SOEs can be
Pareto-improving in some instances because small SOEs are often privatised to employees at
a discount and some former SOEs become profitable after a change in ownership. Hence
retrenched workers are compensated ex-post with help from the local government to find new
jobs or buy into the privatised SOE business at a discount that creates an ex-post
environment, with workers having new sources of income. Workers then neither oppose
privatisation nor demand subsidies.
7. The policy is part of a larger project to spur economic development in all the poor western
provinces [Gao et al., 2000].
8. If one includes the population of its capital, Chongqing, which has provincial status and has a
population of 30 million, the population of Sichuan is over 116 million [NBSC, 2002: 94].
9. The influence of the localities can be gauged by the crucial role some of them played in
supporting the introduction of post-Mao reform in the late 1970s [Shirk, 1993] and, as I
discussed earlier, in helping Deng to push through the ‘socialist market economy’ in the early
1990s.
10. Some studies give Gini estimates as high as 0.49. See for example Wang, Hu and Ding
[2002].
11. The others are Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen.
12. Neo-liberals argue power operates in a kind of political marketplace.
13. At the beginning, the villagers of Daqiu rebelled against CCP economic policies. Later the
villagers fought discrimination against the new rural rich. The CCP finally cracked down on
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the villagers when they directly challenged Party rule. The village Party secretary, Yu
Zuomin had a slogan that said ‘If you want to get rich, then abolish the party organisation’
[cited in Gilley, 2001a: 156]
14. The Four Cardinal Principles are Party leadership, socialist road, dictatorship of the
proletariat (people’s democratic dictatorship), and Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong
Thought.
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