JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 12. - i ‘I-.w 1 ! 7 i i I
The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias
in Social Perception and Attribution Processes
LEE Ross, DAVID GREENE, AND PAMELA HOUSE
Stanford University
Received April 21, 1976
Evidence from four studies demonstrates that social observers tend to perceive a
“false consensus” with respect to the relative commonness oftheir own responses.
A related bias was shown to exist in the observers’ social inferences. Thus, raters
estimated particular responses to be relatively common and relatively unrevealing
concerning the actors’ distinguishing personal dispositions when the responses in
question were similar to the raters’ own responses; responses differing from those
of the rater, by contrast, were perceived to be relatively uncommon and revealing of
the actor. These results were obtained both in questionnaire studies presenting
subjects with hypothetical situations and choices and in authentic conflict
situations. The implications of these findings for our understanding of social
perception phenomena and for our analysis of the divergent perceptions of actors
and observers are discussed. Finally, cognitive and perceptual mechanisms are
proposed which might account for distortions in perceived consensus and for
corresponding biases in social inference and attributional processes.
In a sense, every social observer is an intuitive psychologist who is
forced by everyday experience to judge the causes and implications of
behavior.
Many researchers and theorists have expressed a general interest in
naive epistemology and implicit psychological theories. However, it has
been the attribution theorists (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones,
Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1972; Kelley, 1967, 1973)
who have pursued this topic most vigorously and most systematically. The
primary focus of formal attribution theory (following Kelley, 1967, 1973)
has been the logical rules or “schemata” that the layman employs in
making causal inferences and extracting social meaning from particular
configurations of data. In the typical attribution study it has thus been the
experimenter who has supplied the relevant data and, in so doing, has
manipulated the degree of apparent response consistency, distinctiveness,
and consensus presented to the social observer. This research strategy
(e.g., McArthur, 1972) has obvious and undeniable advantages if the
experimenter’s primary concern is the attributor’s rules for data analysis
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Michael Fleming who helped to
design and execute Study 3and Study 4 and of Michael Hubbard who assisted in the analysis
and interpretation of data from all four studies.
David Greene is now at Carnegie-Mellon University.
279
Copyright 0 1977 by Academic Press. Inc.
All rights of reproductmn in any form reserved. ISSN 0022.1031
280 ROSS. GREENE. AND HOUSE
and data interpretation. But such a strategy also has serious costs, for it
necessarily demands that one overlook those potentially crucial phases in
the attribution process, preceding data analysis, during which the data
must first be acquired, coded, and recalled from memory.
The professional psychologist relies upon well-defined sampling
techniques and statistical procedures for estimating the commonness of
particular responses. Where such estimates are relevant to subsequent
interpretations and inferences, he can proceed with confidence in his data.
Intuitive psychologists, by contrast, are rarely blessed either with adequate
“baseline” data or with the means of acquiring such data. To the extent
that their systems for interpreting social responses depend upon estimates
of commonness or oddity they must, accordingly, rely largely upon
subjective impressions and intuitions.
The source of attributional bias that we shall consider in the present
paper directly involves the probability estimates made by intuitive
psychologists. Specifically, we shall report research demonstrating that
laymen tend to perceive a “false consensus”-to see their own behavioral
choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate to existing
circumstances while viewing alternative responses as uncommon, deviant,
or inappropriate. Evidence shall also be reported for an obvious corollary
to the false consensus proposition: The intuitive psychologist judges those
responses that differ from his own to be more revealing of the actor’s stable
dispositions than those responses which are similar to his own. Thus, we
contend that the person who feeds squirrels, votes Republican, or drinks
Drambuie for breakfast will see such behaviors or choices by an actor as
relatively common and relatively devoid of information about his personal
characteristics. By contrast, another person who ignores hungry squirrels,
votes Democrat, or abstains at breakfast will see the former actor’s
responses as relatively odd and rich with implications about the actor’s
personality.
The term relative is critical in this formulation of the false consensus bias
and it requires some clarification. Obviously, the man who would walk a
tightrope between two skyscrapers, launch a revolution, or choose a life of
clerical celibacy recognizes that his choices would be shared by few of his
peers and are revealing of personal dispositions. It is contended, however,
that he would see his personal choices as less deviant and revealing than
would those of us who do not walk tightropes, launch revolutions, or
become celibate clerics. Furthermore, the present thesis does not deny that
“pluralistic ignorance” could lead to erroneous estimates by minority and
majority alike. The incidence of infant abuse. for instance, might be
underestimated by abusing and nonabusing parents alike. The relative terms
of the false consensus thesis demand only that abusing parents estimate
child abuse to be more common and less indicative of personal dispositions
than do nonabusing parents.
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 281
References to “egocentric attribution” (Heider, 1958; Jones & Nisbett,
1972) to “attributive projection” (Holmes, 1968; Murstein & Pryer, 1959)
and to a host of related projection phenomena (e.g., Cameron & Magaret,
1951; Cattell, 1944; Murray, 1933) have appeared sporadically in the
literature. Perhaps most directly relevant to present concerns are empirical
demonstrations of correlations between subjects’ own behavior and their
estimates about their peers. For instance, Katz and Allport (1931)
demonstrated that the admitted frequency of cheating by a student was
positively related to his estimate of the number of other students who have
cheated. Holmes (1968) summarized several other related demonstrations
dealing with political beliefs and judgments of personal attributes and,
more recently, Kelley and Stahelski (1970) have stressed the role of
egocentric perceptions in the prisoner’s dilemma situation.
In the present paper we shall demonstrate the generality of the false
consensus or egocentric attribution bias. More importantly, we shall
explore its implications for our understanding of social perception
phenomena and the often divergent perceptions of actors and observers.
Finally, we shall discuss more basic shortcomings of the intuitive
psychologist which may underlie such phenomena.
STUDY 1
Method
Study 1 presented subjects with questionnaires containing one of four brief stories
composed specifically for our purposes. A total of 320 Stanford undergraduates (80 for each of
the four stories) participated. Each story asked the readers to place themselves in aparticular
setting in which a series of events culminated in a clear behavioral choice. The subjects were
not immediately required to state their own choice but were asked to estimate the percentage
of their peers who would choose each ofthe two possible courses ofaction suggested. The four
stories and the consensus questions are reproduced below:
SUPERMARKET STORY
As you are leaving your neighborhood supermarket a man in a business suit asks
you whether you like shopping in that store. You reply quite honestly that you do
like shopping there and indicate that in addition to being close to your home the
supermarket seems to have very good meats and produce at reasonably low prices.
The man then reveals that avideotape crew has filmed your comments and asks you
to sign arelease allowing them to use the unedited film for aTV commercial that the
supermarket chain is preparing.
What % of your peers do you estimate would sign the release?-%
What % would refuse to sign it?-% (Total % should be 100%)
TERM PAPER STORY
You arrive for the first day of class in a course in your major area of study. The
professor saysthat the grade in your course will depend on apaper due the final day
of the course. He gives the class the option of two alternatives upon which they
282 ROSS, GREENE. AND HOUSE
must vote. They can either do papers individually in the normal way or they can
work in teams of three persons who will submit a single paper between them. Your
are informed that he will still give out the same number of A’s, B’s, and C’s, etc., but
that in the first case every student will be graded individually while the second case
all three students who work together get the same grade.
What % of your peers do you estimate would vote for group papers?-%
What % would vote for individual papers?-% (Total % should be 100%)
TRAFFIC TICKET STORY
While driving through a rural area near your home you are stopped by a county
police officer who informs you that you have been clocked (with radar) at 38 miles
per hour in a 25-mph zone. You believe this information to be accurate. After the
policeman leaves, you inspect your citation and find that the details on the summons
regarding weather, visibility, time, and location of violation are highly inaccurate.
The citation informs you that you may either pay a $20 fine by mail without
appearing in court or you must appear in municipal court within the next two weeks
to contest the charge.
What % of your peers do you estimate would pay the $20 fine by mail?-%
What % would go to court to contest the charge?-% (Total should be 100%)
SPACE PROGRAM REFERENDUM STORY
It is proposed in Congress that the space program be revived and that large sums be
allocated for the manned and unmanned exploration of the moon and planets
nearest Earth. Supporters of the proposal argue that it will provide jobs. spur
technology, and promote national pride and unity. Opponents argue that a space
program will either necessitate higher taxes, or else dram money from important
domestic priorities. Furthermore, they deny that it will accomplish the desirable
effects claimed by the program’s supporters. Both sides, of course, refute each
other’s claims and ultimately a public referendum is held.
What % of your peers do you estimate would vote for the proposed allocation of
funds for space exploration?-%
What % would vote against it?-% (Total should be 100%)
After completing the relevant percentage estimates, subjects were required to fill out a
three-page questionnaire. On one page, they were first asked to indicate which of the two
behavioral options they personally would choose and then asked to rate themselves on a series
of Likert-type personality scales. This self description page of the questionnaire was either
followed or preceded by two pages on which the reader was required to rate the persona1 traits
of the “typical person” of the reader’s own age and sex who would choose each of the two
specific options presented in the story. For example, subjects who read the Supermarket
Story were required on one page to rate the traits of “the typical person . who would sign
the commercial release” and, on another page. to rate “the typical person . who would
not sign the commercial release. ” The order of these three rating sheets was systematically
varied.’
I In the interests of brevity and clarity, neither self-ratings nor the “order of presentation”
variable receives detailed consideration in this report, It should be noted only that self-ratings
were irrelevant to our present hypotheses and, similarly, that the order variable produced no
significant main effects or interaction effects of immediate theoretical relevance.
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 283
The nature of the rating scales merits some emphasis. For each story, the actors were rated
with respect to a different set of four personal characteristics that might influence or be
reflected by the behavioral choice described in the story. (In the Supermarket Story, for
example, the traits considered were shyness, cooperativeness, trust, and adventurousness.)
For each trait a IOO-point rating scale was used. The midpoint and two extremes of this scale
were labeled to specify both the extremity of the dispositional inference made and the rater’s
conjdence concerning the relevant actors’ dispositions. Thus, for the disposition of
“cooperativeness”, the scale was anchored as follows:
+50 Certainly more cooperative than the average person of my age and sex,probably very
much more cooperative.
0 Probably average with respect to cooperativeness. I have no reason to assume that
the actor differs from the average person of my age and sex with respect to this
characteristic.
-50 Certainly less cooperative than the average person of my age and sex,probably very
much less cooperative.
Summary ofhypotheses. The consensus estimates and trait ratings for each story provided a
test of two principal hypotheses:
I. Subjects who “choose” a particular hypothetical response will rate that response as
more probable for “people in general” than will subjects who “choose” the alternative
response.
2. Subjects who “choose” a specified response will use less extreme and less confident
trait ratings in characterizing a “typical” person making that response than will subject who
“choose” the alternative response.
TABLE 1
PERCEIVED CONSENSUS: ESTIMATED COMMONNESS OF OWN AND ALTERNATIVE
BEHAVIORAL CHOICES (STUDY I)
Rater’s own choice
in hypothetically
Story described situation n (%)
Supermarket Sign release 53 (66%)
story Not sign release 27 (34%)
Term paper Choose individual 64 (80%)
story paper
Choose papergroup 16 (20%)
Traffic ticket Pay speeding fine 37 (46%)
story Contest charge 43 (54%)
Space program Vote for cutback 32 (40%)
story Vote against cutback 48(60%)
Summary of Choose option 1 186 (58%)
four stories” Choose option 2 I34 (42%)
a Unweighted average of means for four stories.
Estimates of consensus:
estimated
percentage of raters
who would choose
Option 1 Option 2 F
75.6 24.4 17.7
57.3 42.7
67.4 32.6 16.5
45.9 54.1
71.8 28.2 12.8
51.7 48.3
47.9 52.1 4.9
39.0 61.0
65.7 34.3 49. I
48.5 51.5
284 ROSS, GREENE, AND HOUSE
Results
Perceptions of consensus. The data presented in Table 1 offer strong
support for the first of the experimental hypotheses. For each of the stories,
those subjects who claimed that they personally would follow a given
behavioral alternative also tended to rate that alternative as relatively
probable for “people in general”; those subjects who claimed that they
would reject the alternative tended to rate it as relatively improbable for
“people in general.”
The effect of subjects’ own behavior choice upon their estimates of
commonness was statistically significant for each story individually. When
Story was treated as a “fixed” variable in an analysis of variance
combining the data for all four stories, the main effect of Rater’s Choice
was highly significant, F( 1,312) = 49.1, p < .OOl, while the Story x Rater’s
Choice interaction was trivial, F( 1,312) = 1.37, p > .lO. It is clear
that the Rater’s reported behavioral choices were associated with, and
presumably exerted a large and consistent effect upon, their perceptions of
behavioral consensus.
Trait ratings. To test the second experimental hypothesis individual trait
TABLE 3
TRAIT RATINGS: RATERS’ INFERENCES ABOUT PERSONAL DISPOSITIONS OF “TYPICAL
ACTORS” BEHAVING LIKE OR UNLIKE THE RATER (STUDY 1)
S10ry
Supermarket
story
Term paper
story
Trafhc ticket
Sf”,Y
space program
S,“,Y
Summary of
four storwsh
TraIta
Shyness
C”“peratl”eness
TrUst
Adventurousness
Gregariousness
LEIZl”ess
Competitweneaa
G~~~r”Slly
Self-coniidence
Legal knowledge
Argumenfativemw
Miserlmess
Rationality
Social concern
Idealism
Selfishness
Rater‘\
own choice
sgn release
,n = Si)
Not sag” release
In = 27)
Choose mdivldual
grade ,n = 641
Choose group grade
cn = 161
Pay speedmg hne
,n = 371
Contest charge
cn = 431
Vote for cutback
In = 32,
Vote agamst cutback
IfI = 48)
Choose opt,“” I
Choose option ?
Trait ratings:” Rater‘s
asseaament of person
who would choose
DlffW
OptIon I OptIon 2 ence t
60.4 x9 5 -29.1 17.27
90.0 65 ? +?‘I.7
66.4 66.6 -0 2 21.83
loo.9 46.8 +54.1
35 8 77.4 -41.6 3 IX
59.4 79.? - 19.2
56 X 67 9 -III I.XI
6X.‘) 6X.9 0
54.9 7S.J -20 5 37.40
79.x 65.1 +14.7
a Larger numbers reflect stronger trait inferencrr and greater willmgness t” assert that the person would prox denant
or discrepant from average with respect to the four .pecltied tranz
b Unweighted average of means for Sour ‘tone>.
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 285
ratings were measured as absolute discrepancies from the midpoint of the
loo-point Likert-type scale. Ratings for the four traits for each story were
then combined to provide an overall measure of the rater’s inferences about
the “typical” actor who might choose each of the behavioral alternatives
specified. The results are summarized in Table 2.
The pattern of trait ratings for each story is in accord with the research
hypothesis. That is, relatively strong inferences about the typical person
who might choose a given response are made by those raters who
personally would choose the alternative response. The difference scores in
Table 2 are the critical indices; in each case this difference score is more
positive (or less negative) for the rater who would choose the second
alternative over the first. For two of the stories (Supermarket Story and
Term Paper Story), the effect of Rater’s Own Choice upon the difference in
ratings for the two behavioral alternatives was clearly significant,
F(1,78) = 17.27,~ < .OOl andF = 21.83,~ < .OOl, respectively. Forone
story (Traffic Ticket Story) the effect was marginally significant, F = 3.18,
p < .lO, and for one story (Space Program Story) the effect was relatively
trivial, F = 1.81,~ < .lO.
The four stories again may be considered within a single analysis of
variance. When Story is treated as a fixed variable, the main effect of the
subject’s own behavioral choice upon the difference in trait ratings is highly
significant, F(l,312) = 37.40, p < .OOl. The Story x Subject’s Choice
Interaction, however, is also significant, F(3,312) = 3.71,~ < .05.2 Thus,
like perceptions of behavioral consensus, trait inferences are systematically
influenced by the rater’s own behavioral choices, although the effect is less
consistent for the latter measure than the former.
An obvious question arises concerning the relationship between the two
effects that have been demonstrated. However, consideration of this
question, and other questions concerning alternative interpretations and
underlying mechanisms, shall be postponed until the procedures and
principal results for the remaining three studies have been reported.
STUDY 2
Rationale and Method
Study 2 attempted to extend the domain of the false consensus effect. Whereas Study 1had
demonstrated that subjects tend to overestimate the degree of consensus enjoyed by their own
behavioral choices in ahypothetical conflict situation, Study 2was designed to explore a more
2When Story is treated as a random variable (so that the “Mean Square” for
Story x Rater’s Choice interaction constitutes the appropriate error term) the F ratio for the
main effect of Rater’s Choice is reduced to 10.1: this F ratio (with only 3 degrees of freedom
associated with its lesser mean square) is only marginally significant (p = .05). A more
discriminating and appropriate test of the generality of the hypothesis, of course, would
require a far Larger sample of stories than that employed in Study I.
286 ROSS, GREENE, AND HOUSE
general tendency for subjects to overestimate the extent to which others share their habits,
preferences, fears, daily activities, expectations, and other personal characteristics.3
The procedure was simple. A total of 80 Stanford undergraduates completed a
questionnaire dealing with 35 person description items (see Table 3). Each item presented a
pair of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Half of the subjects first categorized
themselves with respect to the 35 variables and then proceeded to estimate the percentage of
“college students in general” who fit into each category: the remainder answered these
questions in reverse order. (The “order variable” produced no relevant main effects or
interaction effects and, accordingly, receives no further consideration in this report.)
The hypothesis in Study 2 was simply that subjects who placed themselves in a given
personal description category would estimate the percentage of “college students in general”
in that category to be greater than would subjects who placed themselves in the alternative
category.
Results
The personal description items (listed in the same order presented to
subjects) and the relevant percentage estimates made by subjects are
summarized in Table 3. One of the 3.5items, a Political Expectation item
concerning the impeachment of President Nixon, became unusable in the
midst of the study. Each of the remaining 34 items separately tested the
false consensus hypothesis (although the tests were not “independent”
since the same group of subjects responded to all items). A quick inspection
of the results presented in the table reveals considerable, although less than
universal, support for the hypothesis. Overall, the difference in percentage
estimates was in the predicted direction for 32 of the 34 items, and the
magnitude of the two reversals was trivial. That is, subjects who placed
themselves in a given descriptive category consistently estimated the
percentage of “college students in general” in that category to be greater
than did subjects who placed themselves in the alternative category. Of the
items showing the predicted effect, 17 produced differences significant
beyond the .10 level while 11 differences were significant beyond the .01
level.
Further examination of the data reveals that three of the seven categories
provided fairly strong and consistent support for the false consensus
hypothesis. Most dramatic were the items pertaining to Political
Expectations: Subjects who expected women soon to be appointed to the
Supreme Court, poverty to abate, nuclear weapons to be used, or
extraterrestrial life to be discovered, perceived these views to be relatively
widespread among their peers; subjects with the opposite expectations
similarly thought that their own expectations were characteristic of
“college students in general.” Less dramatic but reasonably consistent
support was also provided by these items dealing with Personal Traits and
Views and those probing Personal Problems. For example, subjects who
3The full text of this questionnaire is too lengthy to be reproduced in the present report,
although Table 3 does list all of the relevant personal description categories. The
questionnaire itself may be obtained from the first author.
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 287
TABLE 3
RATERS' SELF-CATEGORIZATIONS ANDTHEIRCATEGORIZATIONSOF
"COLLEGE STUDENTS IN GENERAL"(STUDY 2)
Questionnaire item:
category 1 (category 2)
Raters‘ estimates of percentage of
college students in category I DIrection of
difference
Mean estimates by Mean estmates by (+ predicted:
raters placmg them- raters placing them- opporite
selver in category I selves in category 2 to predicted) I
Personal traits and views
Shy (not shy)
Optimistic (not)
Competitive (not)
Politically left of center (not)
Supporter of women’s lib (not)
Unweighted mean of live items
45.9 35.9 +
61.9 50.4 +
75.1 6Y.9 +
59.7 5X.0 +
57.3 33.4 +
60.0 49.5
Personal preferences
Brown (white) bread
To be alone (with others)
Italian (French) movies
City (country) life
Basketball (football)
Unwaghted mean of five items
52.5
36.0
51.6
51.4
36.7
45.6
Personal characteristics
Male (female)
Brown (blue) eyes
Subscribe (don’t) to magazines on list provided
First-born (laterborn) child
Hometown more (less) than 200,000
Unweighted mean of five items
5x.7 57. I +
58.3 54.5 +
56.9 42.7 +
42.2 37. I +
5x.2 51.9 +
54.9 4x.7
Personal problems
Think about dying? yes (no) 44.0
Hard to make friends? yes (no) 3x.7
Difficulty controlling temper? yes (no) 42.1
Frequently depressed? yes (no) 55. I
Emotional needs satisfied? yes (no) 52.9
Unwaghted mean of tive items 46.6
Personal activities
Watch TV 30 hours/month? yes (no)
Play tennis once a week? yes (no)
Attend religious service once a month? yes (no)
Donate blood once a year? yes (no)
Long distance phone call once a week? yes (no)
Unwelghted means of tive wms
49.2
33.0
26.5
22.6
50.7
36.4
Personal expectations
Marriage by age 30? yes (no)
Better financial status than parent? yes (no)
Live outside U.S. for one year in next 20?
yes (II”)
74.5
6x.3
Great satisfaction from job or career? yes (no)
Death before 70th birthday? yes (no)
Unwetghted mean of five items
37.4
53.5
57.6
58.3
Political expectations
Removal of Nixon from office? yes (no)
Woman in Supreme Court within decade?
yes (noI
Deleted
63.3 34.6 + 6.196
37.4 +
30.7 +
43.4 +
49.8 +
37.7
39.x
25.6 +
35. I +
27.9 +
39.2 +
42.2 +
34.0
2.664
2.w
1.35
<I
3.%8
3.26t
1.18
2.001
<I
<I
I.01
1.63
2.76$
1.57
1.6X*
2.878
<I
3.26t
3.25%
2.29t
40.9
30.3
27.5
21.2
45.0
33.0
+ <I
+ <I
<I
+ <I
+ 1.06
71.9 +
61.8 +
36.9 +
43.3 +
43.Y +
51.6
<I
I .X6*
<I
<I
?.Xl$
Continued
288 ROSS, GREENE. AND HOUSE
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Queatmnam stem:
category I Icategory ?I
Raters’ estunates of percentage of
college students I” category I DIrectIon of
difference
Mean ettimatec by Mean rbt~matrs by (i- predicted:
rater\ placing them- raters placmg them- - opposite
relves I” category I \e1ve7 I” category ? to predxtedl I
Poverty problem reduced m next 20 years’?
yes <no1
Nuclear weapon used ,n warfare in nrxr 10
years? ye\ (“0,
Discovery of extralerrestnal life by year ?MXl”
ye5 trio,
Unwelghted mean ot low ,trim
hi.?4 43. I
5n.x iI 2
56.h 3.3
h0. I 3J.h
* ,’ < in.
: ,, < .n5.
i,, < .OI.
‘i/l c .ool.
categorized themselves as shy, optimistic, or supporters of the Women’s
Liberation Movement and subjects who reported that they often thought
about dying, had difficulty in controlling their temper, frequently
experienced depression, or felt their emotional needs to be unsatisfied,
were relatively inclined to think that their peers shared these traits and
views or problems. Similarly, subjects who reported opposite traits and
views or felt themselves to be free of the personal problems specified
tended to perceive relatively high consensus for their particular
characteristics.
Sporadic support for the false consensus hypothesis was provided by
items dealing with three descriptive categories: Personal Preferences,
Personal Characteristics, and Personal Expectations. The only items
providing no significant differences supporting the hypothesis were those
dealing with everyday Personal Activities (e.g., television watching, tennis
playing, etc.).
In summary, it is evident that the false consensus effect applies to many
types of personal behaviors, feelings, opinions, and characteristics,
although there is some ambiguity about the specific domain and the limits of
the phenomenon. It is premature to attempt any post hoc generalizations in
this regard, although such generalizations should be facilitated by an
appreciation of possible experiential, perceptual, and cognitive
mechanisms that may be responsible for the false consensus effect.
Speculation about some of these mechanisms will be offered in the
discussion section of this paper. First, however, it is appropriate to
consider a final pair of studies designed to demonstrate that the false
consensus effect is more than a dubiously interesting artifact of the
questionnaire and hypothetical choice methodology.
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 289
STUDY 3 AND STUDY 4
Study 1 had featured questionnaires that described hypothetical
situations, sought hypothetical behavior choices from the reader, and
required readers to rate the distinguishing traits of hypothetical actors.
While such questionnaire studies may furnish a handy tool for the initial
exploration of attributional processes, it is important also to recognize their
limitations. No questionnaire account of a situation or a behavior can
capture all of the subtle nuances available to the real-world observer. Also,
an actor’s actual responses to situations that involve real consequences
may differ markedly from hypothetical choices. Finally, trait judgments
about hypothetical “typical actors” may be very different from judgments
made about actual specific individuals. These special limitations of
questionnaire simulations raise the possibility that the phenomena they
purport to demonstrate may be illusory or of limited relevance to everyday
instances of attribution and social inference. Study 3 and Study 4 were
parallel studies designed to demonstrate that the false consensus and trait
rating effects demonstrated in Study 1 were not limited artifacts of the
questionnaire methodology. They were conducted, moreover, to underscore
our general conviction that the relevance of questionnaire
simulations for attribution theory must be demonstrated rather than merely
assumed.
Methods
Overview. Study 3, like Study I, presented subjects with a hypothetical circumstance and
then asked them to indicate which of the two behavioral alternatives they personally would
follow and to rate the personal dispositions of the “typical individual” who might follow each
alternative. Study 4 actually confronted subjects with the conflict situation described
hypothetically to subjects in Study 3. Furthermore, subjects in this final study made trait
assessments about specific individuals whom they believed to be real and about whom they
had additional relevant information.
Procedure for Study 3. In Study 3 a total of 104 Stanford undergraduates read one of two
slightly differing versions of a story which presented a conflict situation and asked the reader
for consensus estimates. The first version of the story and the relevant consensus measure is
reproduced below:
It is an official course requirement of your introductory psychology class that you
participate as a subject in at least three experiments during the quarter. Sign-up
sheets for experiments are posted on the bulletin board outside class which allow
students to choose a time which is convenient. You decide to sign up for an
experiment described as “a study concerned with attitudes,” and arrive at the
designated time and place where you are greeted by the experimenter and thanked
for coming.
The experimenter then proceeds to describe his study. He explains that he is
concerned with persuasion and attitude change and will be comparing various types
of communication techniques. He further explains that today he needs subjects to
290 ROSS, GREENE, AND HOUSE
walk around campus for 30 minutes wearing a sandwich board sign which simply
says: “Eat at Joe’s” While they are wearing this sandwich board subjects are
simply to keep a record of the number of people who say something to them. They
are also required to note the person’s sex and whether the person’s comment is
positive, negative, or neutral.
The experimenter makes it clear that you are not compelled to participate if you are
unwilling, but that he would obviously prefer that you go along with his request to
wear the sign and make the necessary observations. Subjects who decide not to
participate, he explains, will be missing the chance to learn something interesting
and to help the research project but they nevertheless will receive credit toward
their course requirement.
What % of your peers do you estimate would agree to carry the sandwich board
around campus?-%
What % would refuse to carry it?-% (Total should be 100%)
The second version of the story differed only in that the relevant sign read “Repent,” rather
than “Eat at Joe’s: (By varying the signboard message, we hoped to vary both percentage of
compliance and the specific trait inferences made about compliant subjects. Our intent simply
was to increase the generality of our demonstration and to rule out possible narrow alternative
interpretations relating to the specific message on the signboard.)
At the conclusion of the story the subjects were asked whether they personally would agree
or would refuse to wear the sandwich board. They were also required to make trait ratings for
themselves, for the typical person of their age and sex who would agree to wear the sandwich
board, and for the typical person who would refuse to wear it. (The order of these items was
counterbalanced. Order, however, produced no significant main effects or interaction effects
and receives no further consideration in this report.) Eight Likert-type trait rating scales were
used, each essentially similar to the IOO-point scales used in Study I (i.e., the midpoint
reflected no inference about distinguishing traits, increasingly extreme scores in either
direction from the midpoint reflected increasingly confident and extreme trait inferences). The
traits on which the hypothetical actors were rated included: cooperativeness, shyness,
aggressiveness, submissiveness, attractiveness, inquisitiveness, uprightness, and cynicism.
Procedure for Study 4. A total of 80 Stanford undergraduates, participating in groups of two
to five subjects, provided the data for Study 4. These subjects had volunteered to take part in
an experiment concerned with “communication techniques.” Upon arriving at the site of the
study, the subjects were first asked to complete a single-page “Likes and Dislikes”
questionnaire which asked them to describe briefly some of the things they liked to do, and
some of the things they disliked doing. (The purpose ofthis preliminary procedure will become
apparent presently.)
The experimenter then began to introduce a study which he represented to be “concerned
with communication techniques.” In reality, his introductory description was designed to
create aconflict situation closely paralleling that presented hypothetically to subjects in Study
3. The experimenter’s specific remarks were a slightly expanded version of the following:
“Let me explain what this study is all about. We’re running aseries of experiments
about attitudes and self-perceptions. We’re interested in how different types of
people respond to different types of messages, depending on the medium in which
they’re presented. For example, we’ve already used telephone calls, handbills, and
newspaper ads. Today we are studying another medium-a more personal one-a
sandwich board sign like this one. We want to see how many people respond, who
responds, and how they respond, when a message is presented on a sandwich
board. We’re particularly interested in what difference it makes who is carrying the
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 291
sandwich board sign. What we’d like you to do today is to put on one of these
sandwich boards and walk around the campus for about 30minutes. We have amap
to give you with the route outlined. We also have a tally sheet for you to carry
around on which to keep track of the number of people who respond verbally and to
record whether their responses are positive, negative, or neutral. If you are not
willing to do this we will still give you your experimental credit although you will
miss the chance to have an interesting experience and to do us a big favor. Now
would you please indicate if you’re willing to do the task by checking the
appropriate box on the Likes and Dislikes questionnaire in front of you.”
Subjects were then asked to indicate, privately, their choice to wear the sign as the
experimenter had requested or to withdraw from the experiment. This choice was expressed
by checking the relevant alternative printed on the bottom of the questionnaire on which they
had previously described their “likes and dislikes.”
Once the subject had made his own decision, he was asked to make consensus estimates
concerning his choice, and to rate the traits of one person who agreed and one who refused to
wear the sign. In contrast to Study 3, however, subjects were not asked to rate hypothetical
“typicalactors”; instead they were asked tojudge the traits of two supposedly real individuals
who had previously participated in the study. The basis for these ratings was ostensibly to be
the ‘likes and dislikes” questionnaire purportedly completed by the two previous
participants. In fact, however, the two questionnaires, bearing both the participants’
“decisions” to participate or not participate and their “likes and dislikes,” had been
contrived by the experimenter. One questionnaire (Version A) suggested that the person
whose traits were to be rated liked “to take walks, read, sculpt, run, swing, lie on the beach,
and eat” and disliked “being in crowds, being inside all day, feeling pressured by people, or
having to make conversation.” The other questionnaire (Version B) suggested that the target
person liked “to listen, talk, laugh, bake, do arts and crafts, play with a pet dog, and tease
close friends” but disliked “writing term papers, sitting in dull classes, or being with badly
behaved children or objectionable adults.”
Roughly half of the subjects received version A of the questionnaire paired with a target
person’s expressed agreement to wear the relevant sign and version B associated with atarget
person’s expressed refusal; the remainder received the opposite pairings of questionnaires
and expressed choices. (Although the version [A vs B] of the target person’s self-descriptions
ultimately produced a main effect upon the subjects’ trait ratings, it did not produce any
interaction effects relevant to the present research hypothesis; accordingly, it receives no
further attention in this report.)
The experimenter justified the introduction of the consensus and trait rating measures on
the grounds that they “might help us to interpret the results of our communication
study . . . by giving us some idea about the responses and perceptions of participants
. . . and by telling us something about the kind of people who agree or refuse to take
part in our communication study.” In fact, of course, these measures provided the test of the
two primary research hypotheses.
The presentation of the two questionnaires supposedly describing the likes and dislikes of
the two participants whose traits were to be rated served two purposes: First. it further
emphasized to subjects that they were rating the traits of real persons rather than hypothetical
ones; second, it placed any effects of the target person’s behavioral choice in
“competition” with the effects of other potentially relevant information. Thus, confirmation
of the principal research hypotheses would illustrate that the impact of the false consensus
effect was neither of trivial magnitude nor likely to disappear with the introduction of other
possible determinants of social perception.
The final procedure in Study 4 was the thorough “debriefing” of all participants. The
subjects learned the true purposes and rationale for the study and were assured that their
acquiescence or refusal to carry the sandwich board sign was a perfectly reasonable response
292 ROSS, GREENE. AND HOUSE
to the experimentally-created conflict situation. After the experimenter had answered all
questions to the subjects’ satisfaction, the participants were urged not to tell their peers about
the experimental procedures and deceptions that had been employed.
Research hypotheses for Study 3 and Study 4. The research hypotheses for Study 3 and
Study 4were identical. It was predicted first that subjects would perceive a false consensus for
their own behavioral choices regardless of whether these choices were “hypothetical” (in
Study 3) or “real” (in Study 4). The second prediction was that subjects’ trait assessments.
whether made about hypothetical typical individuals or about specific real individuals, would
be distorted by their own behavioral choices in the manner previously described and
previously demonstrated in Study I.
Perceptions of consensus. Overall, the false consensus effect (Table 4)
was strikingly apparent both for those subjects who faced the hypothetical
decision in Study 3 and for those who faced the authentic conflict situation
created in Study 4. Subjects whose hypothetical or real decision was to
acquiesce to the experimenter’s request to wear the sign thought such
acquiescence was relatively common; subjects who refused to wear the
sign, by contrast, thought that acquiescence was relatively uncommon. In
fact. in both studies, regardless of the message or the sandwich board sign,
TABLE 4
PERCEIVED CONSENSUS: ESTIMATED COMMONNESS OF OWN AND ALTERNATIVE
BEHAVIORAL CHOKES (STUDY 3 AND STUDY 4)
Estimates of consensus:
estimated percentage of
subjects who would
Sandwich board Rater’s own choice
sign n (%) Wear sign Not wear sign F
Eat at Joe’s Wear sign
Not wear sign
Repent Wear sign
Not wear sign
Combined” Wear sign
Not wear sign
Eat at Joe’s Wear sign
Not wear sign
Study 4
28 (70%)
12(30%)
60.8 39.2 4.0
43.3 56.7
Repent Wear sign 20 (50%) 63.5 36.5 34.14
Not wear sign 20 (50%) 23.3 76.6
Combined” Wear sign 48 (60%) 62.2 37.8 26.47
Not wear sign 32 (40%) 33.0 67.0
Study 3
27 (53%)
24 (47%)
27 (51%)
26 (49%)
54 (52%)
50 (48%)
64.6 35.4 33.3
31.2 68.8
58.3 41.7 23.5
29.7 70.3
61.4 38.2 56.2
30.4 69.6
u Unweighted average of means for two signs.
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 293
the acquiescent and nonacquiescent subjects estimated that their own
response was shared by a clear majority of their peers.
Comparison of the consensus estimates made in the two studies reveals
that for one sign (Eat at Joe’s) the false consensus effect apparently was
stronger for the hypothetical conflict situation than for the real one; for the
other sign (Repent), however, the real conflict situation seemed to produce
the more pronounced effect. Thus, while the data for the hypothetical and
real situations differed somewhat, with regard both to subjects’ own
decisions and their estimates concerning the decisions of their peers, the
studies together provide compelling evidence that the false consensus
effect is genuine. It is not an artifact of the questionnaire procedure and it is
not restricted to circumstances of hypothetical, as opposed to real,
behavioral choice.
Trait ratings. As in Study 1, trait ratings in the two final studies were
expressed in terms of absolute discrepancies from the midpoint of
loo-point Likert-type rating scales. In Table 5, the ratings for eight separate
traits are combined to provide an overall index of the rater’s tendency to
make confident and extreme inferences about the distinguishing traits of
the person being rated. An examination of the results of Study 3 and Study
4, summarized in Table 5, provide clear evidence that subject’s trait
inferences reflected, and presumably were influenced by, their own
responses to the conflict situation. Subjects in Study 3 who indicated that
they personally would refuse to wear the sandwich board sign made
relatively strong inferences about the traits of the “typical” individual who
would acquiesce but made relatively weak inferences about the individual
who would refuse to wear the sign. By contrast, subjects who said that their
own response would be acquiescence seemed unwilling to assume that an
individual’s acquiescence provided the basis for stronger dispositional
inferences than his refusal.4
Subjects in Study 4 made their ratings about specific individuals whom
they believed to have agreed or to have refused to wear the sign;
furthermore, they made these ratings knowing something about these
target individuals (i.e., the information provided by the individuals’ “likes
and dislikes” questionnaire). Most importantly, subjects in Study 4 made
their ratings after their own real and seemingly consequential decisions to
acquiesce personally or to refuse the experimenter’s request. Nevertheless,
the pattern of trait ratings for Study 4 is remarkably similar to the
pattern reported in Study 3 where judgments, decisions, and actors were
4 The trait ratings in Table 5 serve to emphasize again the relative terms in which the false
consensus hypothesis must be stated. The subjects who chose to wear the signboard actually
did not see that choice as less revealing of personal dispositions than refusal to wear the sign.
The hypothesis nevertheless was confirmed since the overall tendency for subjects to rate
acquiescence as more revealing than refusal was relatively strong among subjects who refused
to wear the signboard but relatively weak (in fact, virtually absept) among subjects who agreed
to wear it.
294 ROSS, GREENE, AND HOUSE
TABLE 5
TRAIT RATINGS: RATERS’ INFERENCES ABOUT PERSONAL DISPOSITIONS OF “TYPICAL
ACTORS” BEHAVING LIKE OR UNLIKE THE RATER (STUDY 3 AND STUDY 4)
Sandwich
board sign
Rater‘s own choice
Trait ratings: Rater’s
assessment ofperson who would
Wear sngn Not wear sign Difference t
Eat at Joe’s Wear s,gn (?I = 27)
Not wear sign ,n = 24)
Study 3
123.4
1X3.6
124.7 -1.3 x.53
117.1 +66.5
Repent Wear sign ( n = 27) 143.2 140.5
Not wear sign ,n = 26) 155.5 101.3
+2.7 9.74
+54.2
Combined“ Wear sign (n = 54) 133.3 132.6 co.7 17.79
Not wear sign (n = SO) 169.6 109.2 +60.4
Eat at Joe’s Wear sign In = 28)
Not wear sign tn = 12)
Study 4
115.4
155.8
119.X
121.3
Repent Wear sign In = 20) 124.9 130.8
Not wear sign (n = 201 123.5 92.3
Combined’ Wear sign (n = 4X) 120. I 125.3
Not wear stgn (n = 32) 139.7 106.x
-4.4 4.37
+34.5
-5.9 3.93
t31.2
- 5.2 x.93
+32.9
u Unweigbted average of means for two signs.
merely hypothetical. Although the relevant effects are somewhat reduced
in magnitude, Study 4 provides a clear demonstration that the effect of
one’slown behavior upon trait inferences, like the false consensus effect, is
neither an artifact of the questionnaire procedure nor a phenomenon
restricted to hypothetical choice and hypothetical judgment.
DISCUSSION
Considered together, Studies 1, 3, and 4 offer strong support for the
hypothesis that raters’ perceptions of social consensus and their social
inferences about actors reflect the raters’ own behavioral choices. The
relevant research hypotheses were confirmed both in questionnaire studies
presenting situations, choices, and judgments that were hypothetical and in
an actual conflict situation demanding personally relevant behavioral
choices and social judgments about specific actors. Study 2, furthermore,
extended the potential domain of the false consensus phenomenon to
include perceptions of commonness or oddity regarding a wide variety of
personal problems, expectations, preferences, and characteristics.5 The
5An unpublished manuscript, dealing specifically with “Public Beliefs about the Beliefs of
the Public,” by James Fields and Howard Schuman ofthe Institute for Survey Research at the
University of Michigan has recently provided strong evidence for the phenomenon we have
labeled the “false consensus effect.” These findings extend earlier and more specific survey
results reported by previous investigators including Hayes (1936). Thomsen (1941). Wallen
(1941, 1943). Travers (1941). and Calvin, Hanley, Hoffman. and Clifford (1959).
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 295
implications of these four studies for our conception of the “intuitive
psychologist” should be clear. His intuitive estimates of deviance and
normalcy, and the host of social inferences and interpersonal responses
that accompany such estimates, are systematically and egocentrically
biased in accord with his own behavioral choices. More generally, it is
apparent that attributional analyses may be distorted not only by biases in
the intuitive psychologist’s eventual analysis of social data but also by
biases in the earlier processes through which relevant data are estimated,
sampled, or inferred.
False Consensus and the “Divergent” Perceptions of Actors
and Observers
The results of the present research are interesting to consider in the light
of Jones and Nisbett’s (1972) provocative thesis that observers view the
causes and implications of their peers’ behavior rather differently than the
actors themselves view their behavior. Specifically, these theorists
presented both anecdotal evidence and research to suggest that we
consistently see our peers’ behavior as the product and reflection of broad,
consistent personal dispositions while we attribute our own responses to
situational forces and constraints. Indeed, the evidence suggests that we
are reluctant to agree that we ourselves possess the type of stable
personality traits that we readily apply to our peers. To account for their
observations and empirical findings, Jones and Nisbett called attention to a
variety of important differences in the perceptual and informational
“perspectives” enjoyed by actors and observers.
The presently reported research, however, leads one to speculate that
attributional differences of the sort described by Jones and Nisbett may
arise, at least in some measure, simply from attributers’ misconceptions
about the degree of consensus enjoyed by their own responses and by the
alternative responses of their peers. The derivation is a simple one: To the
extent that particular responses by one’s peers differ from one’s own
responses in a given situation, such responses are likely to be seen as
relatively odd or deviant- the product, therefore, not of situational forces
(which guide one’s own contrary responses) but of distinguishing
personality dispositions or traits. Since all of one’s peers respond
somewhat differently from oneself in many situations, it is inevitable that
such peers be seen as the possessors of more numerous and more extreme
distinguishing personal characteristics than oneself. The false consensus
effect thus allows us to account for many of the phenomena and
experimental results that have been mustered in support of Jones and
Nisbett’s thesis (cf. Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, &
Maracek, 1973) without resorting to the “differing perspective”
mechanisms they suggested.
The results reported thus far, it should be emphasized, do not prove that
296 ROSS. GREENE. AND HOUSE
biased estimates of response consensus are the only factor accounting for
the effects obtained in Jones and Nisbett’s research and for the trait rating
effects we have presented earlier. Indeed, the present studies permit one to
determine whether raters’ own behavioral choices exerted an influence on
their trait ratings beyond any effect that could be accounted for by
consensus estimates. To do so. one need only perform analyses of
covariance, treating consensus estimates as a covariate.
Such analyses were performed separately for each of the four stories
presented in Study I and for the conflict situation explored in Study 3 and
Study 4. For each covariance analysis performed, the relevantF ratio was
considerably lower than the corresponding statistic obtained in the original
analyses of variance. Nevertheless, for the two stories in Study 1 which
showed the strongest effects of the raters’ own choices in the original
analyses of variance (i.e., the Supermarket Story and the Term Paper
Story), the effects were clearly significant for analyses of covariance,
F( 1,37) = 7.90,~ < .Ol andF( 1,37) = 8.91 ,p < .Ol. respectively. For the
remaining stories in Study 1, however, and for both the hypothetical and
authentic conflict situations explored in the two final studies, the analyses
of covariance revealed no significant effect of the raters’ own behavioral
choices. Accordingly, it is clear that the perceived consensus and
trait-rating effects demonstrated in the present research were not
independent. The present analyses, however, leave unresolved the issue of
whether (and, under what circumstances) responses similar to one’s own
are regarded more revealing of dispositions than alternative, but equally
common. responses,
Attributional Inferences and the Consensus Criterion
The analyses reported above provided clear evidence that consensus
estimates and corresponding trait inferences by subjects were negatively
correlated.‘j Such findings, of course, are consistent with the theoretical
contentions of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) that atypical,
counternormative or unexpected responses in a given situation prompt
stronger inferences about the relevant actors than do more common
responses. They are also consistent with results obtained by several
investigators who have directly manipulated consensus information
available to observers (e.g. Jones & Harris, 1967; McArthur, 1972;
Pilkonis. in press). The present findings, moreover, seem to challenge the
host of recent investigators who have begun to raise doubts about
6 The fact that F ratios for the effect of own choice upon trait ratings were substantially
reduced when consensus estimates were treated as a covariate attests to this relationship.
Furthermore. the correlation coefficients indicating the relationship between perceived
consensus and trait ratings uYthin each group of subjects who chose agiven behavioral option
in Studies 1. 3. and 4 were consistently negative, ranging from I’ = -.09 to r = - .64 with a
median ofv = -.34.
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 297
relevance of consensus information to attributional judgments. Most
notable among these are: Cooper, Jones, and Tuller (1972); Miller, Gillen,
Schenker, and Radlove (1973); Nisbett and Borgida (1975); Nisbett,
Borgida, Crandall, and Reed, 1976; and others who have contended and
seemingly demonstrated that consensus manipulations frequently have no
effect at all, or at least have far less effect than would be demanded by most
normative attributional models.
It is premature, perhaps, to draw conclusions or attempt reconciliations
of contending viewpoints and findings. It seems clear, however, that the
relationships among perceptions of response consensus, trait inferences,
and actors’ own behavioral choices are extremely complex. In the
concluding sections of this paper we shall try to explicate some of the
factors and processes that underlie these relationships and, in so doing, we
shall also try to further clarify the implications of the false consensus
phenomena that have been demonstrated.
False Consensus Mechanisms
Motivationalfactors. Investigators who have discussed false consensus
phenomena or egocentric attributional biases have typically emphasized
their motivational status or function for the individual. Such biases, it is
contended, both foster and justify the actor’s feelings that his own
behavioral choices are appropriate and rational responses to the demands
of the environment, rather than reflections of his distinguishing personal
dispositions. More dynamic interpretations (e.g., Bramel, 1962, 1963;
Edlow & Kiesler, 1966; Lemann & Solomon, 1952; Smith, 1960) have
stressed the ego-defensive or dissonance-reducing function of attributive
projection, particularly as a response to failure or negative information
about one’s personal characteristics.
It is worth noting that the desire to forestall trait inferences about oneself
could lead to three distinct types of influence or distortion. First, one might
distort one’s private perception and/or one’s public estimate of the degree
of consensus for one’s own responses. Second, when the response to be
reported is merely hypothetical or otherwise unverifiable, one could distort
one’s response report; that is, report a response that is more common, and
presumably more normative, than one’s probable or real response. Finally,
one could distort one’s actual behavior in the relevant situation; that is,
actually conform to the response of one’s peers to the extent that it enjoys
high consensus, even if one’s personal preferences, perceptions, or
proclivities dictate an alternative response.
The present research cannot speak to the first of these potential sources
of distortion. With regard to the other alternatives, there is some relevant
evidence at hand. It is apparent at least that the false consensus
phenomenon was not restricted to circumstances where response reports
298 ROSS, GREENE, AND HOUSE
were hypothetical or otherwise free from verification. Indeed, the false
consensus hypotheses were as strongly confirmed for Study 4 in which the
raters’ own choices were real and consequential as they were for Study 3 in
which the conflict situation described was merely hypothetical. It is
possible, of course, that subjects’ actual decisions in Study 4 about whether
or not to wear the sandwich board were influenced by their assumptions
about the modal response of their peers. If so, it is worth emphasizing the
costs of such conformity, for example, facing an uncomfortable stroll on
campus wearing the sandwich board or, alternatively, confronting a
disappointed experimenter, were far from inconsequential for the subject.
Selective exposure and availability factors. Several nonmotivational
factors that create the impression that one’s own judgments and responses
enjoy a high degree of consensus can be grouped together under the
heading of “selective exposure” effects. Obviously, we tend to know and
associate with people who share our background, experiences, interests,
values, and outlook. Such people do, in disproportionate numbers,
respond as we would in a wide variety of circumstances. Indeed, our close
association is determined, in part, by feelings of general consensus and we
may be inclined to exclude those whom we believe do not share our
judgments and responses. This exposure to a biased sample of people and
behavior does not demand that we err in our estimates concerning the
relevant populations, but it does make such errors likely. More subtle, and
more cognitive in flavor, are the factors which increase our ability to recall,
visualize, or imagine paradigmatic instances of behavior. In a given
situation the specific behaviors that we have chosen, or would choose, are
likely to be more readily retrievable from memory and more easily
imagined than opposite behaviors. In Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973)
terms, the behavioral choices we favor may be more “available,“ and we
are apt to be misled by this ease or difficulty of access in estimating the
likelihood of relevant behavioral options.
Ambiguity resolution factors. A second nonmotivational source of the
false consensus effect arises from the intuitive psychologist’s response to
ambiguity in the nature and magnitude of situational forces and in the
meaning and implications of various response alternatives. Attempts to
resolve such ambiguity involve interpretation, estimation, and guesswork,
all of which can exert a parallel effect on the attributer’s own behavior
choices and upon his predictions and inferences about the choices of
others.
The biasing effect of ambiguity resolution perhaps is most obvious when
the attributer’s knowledge of a response or situation is second-hand and
lacking in important specific details. Consider, for example, the subject
who must decide on the precise meaning of such modifiers as often or
typically or of any other potentially ambiguous descriptors encountered in
the context of questionnaire items (for example, in Study 2). It is obvious
THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 299
that both the response category to which that subject assigns himself and
his categorizations of his peers will be similarly influenced by these
decisions about the precise meaning of terms.
Similarly, the subject who read about the impromptu television
commercial dilemma in Study 1was forced to imagine the interviewer, the
physical setting, and a host of other situational details which might
encourage or inhibit the relevant behavioral options. If these imagined
details seemingly would encourage one to sign the release then the subject
was more likely to assume that he personally would sign, that a similar
decision would be a common response among his peers, and that signing
the release would reflect little about the distinguishing dispositions of any
particular actor. By contrast, if the details imagined by the subject would
inhibit signing of the release, the subject was more apt to assume that he
personally would refuse, that his peers typically would do likewise, and
that signing of the release would reveal much about the personal
dispositions of the relevant actor.
In questionnaire studies this resolution of ambiguities in descriptions of
situations and behaviors may seem a troublesome artifact. However, the
same factor becomes an important source of bias in everyday social
judgments and inferences where attributers may often respond to accounts
of situations or actions that are vague and frequently second-hand. The
intuitive psychologist constantly is confronted with statements like “Sally
hardly ever dates short men” or “John refused to pay the painter’s bill
when he saw the paint job.” In such circumstances he is forced to resolve
ambiguities or uncertainties in the statement, and such resolutions will
exert parallel effects upon his assumptions about his own behavior, his
impressions about consensus, and his inferences about the dispositions of
those whose behavior has been loosely categorized or described.
The present demonstrations of the false consensus effect, it should be
reemphasized, were not restricted to circumstances where raters relied
upon ambiguous second-hand descriptions. However, even when attributors
actually experience or have fully adequate descriptions of a
choice situtation, ambiguities remain which inevitably will be resolved
differently by different subjects. Thus, the subjects in Study 4 who anticipated
and feared the ridicule of peers for wearing the “Eat at Joe’,s” sign
and regarded the experimenter’s wishes and expectations as trivial, were
likely to refuse to wear the sign, to assume similar refusals by their peers,
and to draw strong inferences about the traits of any subject who chose to
wear the sign. Opposite priorities, of course, would have produced opposite
personal choices and opposite social estimates and inferences,
The false consensus bias, in summary, both reflects and creates
distortions in the attribution process. It results from nonrandom sampling
and retrieval of evidence and from idiosyncratic interpretation of
situational factors and forces. In turn, it biases judgments about deviance
300 ROSS, GREENE, AND HOUSE
and deviates, helps lead actors and observers to divergent perceptions of
behavior, and, more generally, promotes variance and error in the
interpretation of social phenomena.
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