Music and the Muses

The Culture of 'Mousikē' in the Classical Athenian City

Edited by

Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson

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Preface

This book is the intended product of a colloquium held at the University of Warwick in 1999 to which a group of scholars were invited who were identified as working in innovative ways on the subject of *Mousikē*. That colloquium could not have taken place without the generous financial support of the Hellenic Foundation, London, the British Academy, the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, and the Gilbert Murray Trust, to whom we express our heartfelt thanks. We should also like to thank all the participants in the colloquium for making it an enjoyable and productive occasion; Simon Goldhill for his chairmanship and general support of the project; Sue Dibben for her efficient organization of the event; Anne Bowtell for computing assistance; and David Fearn for editorial support.

Rather than imposing a standard form, contributors' preferred spellings of Greek names have been retained throughout.

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List of Abbreviations

ABV	J. Boardman, *Athenian Black Figure Vases* (Oxford and New York, 1974)
ARV^2	J. Beazley, *Attic Red-Figure Vase Painters*, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1963)
CAH	*Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd edn. (1961–).
CID I	*Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes, Tome 1. Lois sacrées et règlements religieux*, ed. G. Rougemont (Paris, 1977)
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (1863–).
CVA	*Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum* (Paris and elsewhere, 1922–)
DAA	A. Raubitschek, *Dedications from the Athenian Acropolis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949)
DNP	H. Cancik und H. Schneider (eds.), *Der neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike* (Stuttgart, 1996–)
FD	*Fouilles de Delphes* (Paris, 1906–)
FGrH	F. Jacoby (ed.), *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1923–58)
FHS&G	W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R. Sharples, and D. Gutas (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1992)
IC	F. Halbherr and M. Guarducci (eds.), *Inscriptiones Creticae* (Rome, 1935–50)
ID	*Inscriptions de Délos*, ed. F. Durrbach et al. (Paris, 1923–37)
IEG	M. West (ed.) *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1971)
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin, 1913–)
IPriene	*Die Inschriften von Priene*, ed. F. Hiller (Berlin, 1906)
K.–A.	R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin and New York, 1983–)
LIMC	*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (Zurich, 1981–)

LSAM	F. Sokolowski (ed.), *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1955)
LSCG	F. Sokolowski (ed.), *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris, 1969)
LSS	F. Sokolowski (ed.), *Lois sacrées des cités grecques. Supplément* (Paris, 1962)
ML	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1969)
Para.	J. Beazley *Paralipomena: Additions to Attic Black-Figure Vase-Painters and to Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters*, 2 edn. (Oxford, 1971)
PLG	T. Bergk (ed.), *Poetae Lyrici Graeci* (Leipzig, 1914–23)
PMG	D. Page (ed.) *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford, 1962)
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (Amsterdam)
SIG^3	W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* 3rd. edn. (Leipzig, 1915–24)
SLG	D. Page (ed.), *Supplementum Lyricis Graecis* (Oxford, 1974)
SOD	*Demetrius of Phalerum: Text, Translation and Discussion*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schütrumpf, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. ix (New Brunswick and London)
Suppl. Hell.	H. Lloyd Jones and P. Parsons (eds.), *Supplementum Hellenisticum*, Texte und Kommentare no. 11 (Berlin 1983)
TrGF 1	B. Snell, corrected and augmented R. Kannicht (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, vol. 1: *Didascaliae Tragicae, Catalogi Tragicorum et Tragoediarum Testimonia et Fragmenta Tragicorum Minorum* (Göttingen, 1986)

Introduction: *Mousikē*, not Music

Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson

'Music and the Muses: the culture of *mousikē* in the classical Athenian city': our title is designed to show that this is not a book about music in the modern sense, but about *mousikē*, that union of song, dance, and word to which the Muses gave their name. *Mousikē*, the realm of the Muses, lies at the very heart of Greek culture, and is indeed a contender for the closest term in Greek to our (polymorphous) 'culture'. Yet it is a subject which has largely been approached in a fragmentary, atomistic manner or confined to abstruse specialisms and antiquarian attempts at reconstruction.

In its commonest form, *mousikē* represented for the Greeks a seamless complex of instrumental music, poetic word, and co-ordinated physical movement. As such it encompassed a vast array of performances, from small-scale entertainment in the private home to elaborate festivals in which an entire *polis* was involved. *Mousikē* was an endlessly variegated, rich set of cultural practices, with strongly marked regional traditions that made them a valuable item of local self-definition as well as a means for exchange and interaction. It also displays a markedly self-reflective element, a concomitant discourse about those practices: thus heroes, gods, and narratives of *mousikē* always loomed large in the realm of myth, that most malleable form of Greek creative and reflective discourse.[1] And it may well have been the very first area of Greek cultural practice that produced more or less systematic descriptive and explanatory accounts of itself: μουσική seems to be the first of the '*tekhnai*' nouns formed in -ική, reflecting its early conceptualization as a craft with established practices and principles. In short, musical 'theory' was apparently born with *mousikē* itself, and the persistent scholarly habit of locating its beginnings rather in the Hellenistic period (and in particular with the activities

[1] On musical myth see e.g. Abert (1910); Restani (1995) with further bibliography cited there; Landels (1999) 148–62; Castaldo (2000) from an iconographical perspective.

of Aristoxenos of Tarentum) reflects a narrow view of what counts as musical thinking.[2]

Mousikē shaped the way individuals and communities lived and sought to reproduce themselves. It was a medium through which ideals of behaviour were developed and enforced—the morality of individuals and collectives, notions of proper or ideal corporeal types, political principles and pragmatics. Consider for instance the way the Arkadians sought actively to mould their national character by means of *mousikē*, fixing it at the heart of their political life (εἰς τὴν ὅλην πολιτείαν τὴν μουσικὴν παραλαβεῖν Polyb. 4.20.7) Their state-funded programme of socialization on a grand scale included musical training for males until the age of thirty, demanding instruction and demonstration in instrumental performance and dance as well as vocal expertise.[3] The centrality of *mousikē* to Greek notions and practices of *paideia* demonstrated by the Arkadians is reflected at the theoretical level by Plato's use of *mousikē* in the *Laws*, where the ideal city is effectively to be sung and danced into existence.

Mousikē was also a vital medium through which societies created and related to their past: one need only point to the absolutely central position occupied by the aetiological reflex in musical myth and performance, or simply to the parentage accorded the Muses themselves by the Greeks, daughters of Zeus and Memory (*Mnēmosynē*).[4]

Such parentage for those who look over the realm of *mousikē* betokens not only total and privileged access to the past. It also registers the fact of *mousikē*'s enormous power in the world of men.[5] The victory song-dance performed by a *khoros* (the *epinikion*)—one of the artistic peaks of late archaic *mousikē*—could serve the colonial and military aspirations of city-states as much as it served to praise the athletic achievements of its commissioners.[6] If we are to believe their own publicity, in the earlier period masters

[2] Mathiesen (1999) ch. 4 is a recent example of this habit.

[3] Polyb. 4.20–1. The functional interpretation is that of Polybios himself, who as a Megalopolitan almost certainly experienced it at first hand. See Visconti (1999) 68–73; Stehle (1997) 66; Kowalzig in this volume.

[4] Hes. *Theog.* 54–71. See Barker (1994); also Vernant (1965) ch. 3.

[5] Note the hierarchy of power implied by the *Homeric Hymn* 25 (Muses, Apollo): *aoidoi* and *kitharistai* derive their wordly (ἐπὶ χθονί) authority from the Muses and Apollo, while kings receive theirs from Zeus.

[6] See Dougherty (1993); also Cole (1992); Hubbard (1992).

of this divine medium consorted with kings and tyrants on something approaching an equal footing: the great war-lord of classical western Greece, Hieron of Syracuse, engaged Pindar, Bakkhylides, and Aiskhylos in an orgy of *mousikē* designed (among other things) to beautify the brutality of his activities, which included ethnic cleansing and forced migration on a grand scale.[7] Even so, the poet could mobilize the power of *mousikē* to act as a control on the megalomaniac: 'no lyres in banquet halls welcome him [*viz* the bad tyrant] in gentle fellowship with boys' voices' (*Ol.* 1.97–8). And this prestige and social power of *mousikoi* did not wither away with the classical period, as is sometimes supposed. It is becoming increasingly clear that analogous negotiations of power continued throughout the hellenistic and later periods between generals, kings, and emperors on the one hand and those canny musicians, event-organizers, and image-makers who formed themselves into powerful associations and operated on a wide international scene—the Dionysiac Artists.

To delimit the potentially vast terrain for the exploration of *mousikē* we have focused mainly on classical Athens. This choice of time and place is not simply determined by the fact that it is for Athens that a (relative) abundance of evidence survives. It is rather driven by a recognition of the special, and in many ways unusual, place that *mousikē* occupied there. Famous for its elaborate festival calendar with its numerous agonistic events, this city provided itself and its many visitors with a more extended range of 'musical' activities than any other. Yet classical Athens also developed its musical culture in directions not apparently taken elsewhere in Greece. This distinctiveness can productively be related to its political (and social) culture of democracy, to its massive size and to its unique position within the wider Aigean

[7] Known major commissions of Hieron: Bakkh. *Epin.* 4, fr. 20c, an *enkomion*, Pind. *Pyth.* 1, *Pyth.* 2, Pind. fr. 105a, a *hyporkhema* (possibly all for the chariot-victory at the Pythia of 470: Gentili et al. (1995) 43–7); Pind. *Ol.* 1, Bakkh. *Epin.* 5 (for the horse-race at Olympia in 476); Bakkh. *Epin.* 3 (for the chariot-race at Olympia in 468). Others: Aiskhylos *Aitnaiai* 'as an augury of prosperity for those who were uniting in the settlement of the city': *Life of Aiskhylos*; cf. Dougherty (1993) ch. 5; Pind. *Pyth.* 3 perhaps related to an unsuccessful entry at the Pythia of 474; Pind. frr. 124d–126: an *enkomion*; cf. also Pind. *Nem.* 1 and 9, for Hieron's commander Khromios, in both cases crowned as 'Aitnaian' and so after and reflecting his appointment as governor of Aitna in 476. Luraghi (1994) 354–68.

world.[8] The fact that Athens became the dominating centre of performance over the course of the fifth century, a place to which poets, musicians, actors, and spectators from all over and beyond the Greek world gravitated, also made of it a place of vibrant critical reflection and exchange, where the theoretical analysis of *mousikē* flourished in an intellectually heterogeneous environment, alongside and in active competition with other trends of social and philosophical thought.[9] This culture of criticism also took place at the primary level of performance, for the strong thread of self-awareness and reflection on its contexts of production and social effects that characterizes all periods of Greek poetic culture was especially virulent in the musical culture of Athens.

Mousikē is also at the heart of Greek religion. Not only was this terrain the province of a special and in many ways mysterious group of divinities, the *Mousai* themselves, but the practices of *mousikē* were also a significant—indeed crucial—component of worship: from the simple instrumental music that accompanied every sacrifice (cf. Hdt. 1.132.4) to hymns of greater or lesser complexity, to elaborate choral performances (paeans, dithyrambs, prosodia, partheneia, and so on) and the hyper-sophistication of comic and tragic drama for Dionysos. The deeply musical and performative dimension of Greek religion has rarely been analysed in its own right. It is a recurrent theme of this volume, and the central concern of its first set of chapters (Part I; see also Stehle.)

Mousikē further encompassed a large part of what we would call Greek 'education', or more broadly, socialization (*paideia*). As our glance at the self-improving Arkadians shows, the words of the poets were routinely regarded as containing the ethical and moral material suitable for the formation of citizens as individuals and collectives. So too were the particular tunes and rhythms used to deliver them. All these were absorbed in contexts of performance. The fissures that seemed to be opening up in Athenian society in the last third of the fifth century—under pressure of rapid social and political change, the intellectual revolution centred in the city and the escalating effects of the claustrophobic conditions of war—famously found one of their clearest expressions in terms of 'old'

[8] See Goldhill and Osborne (1999); Boedeker and Raaflaub (1998); Csapo and Miller (1998); Musti (2000); Mosconi (2000); Csapo, Wallace, Wilson, and Rutherford in this volume.

[9] See Wallace (1998); Ford (2002) ch. 8; Murray in this volume.

and 'new' visions of *paideia*, and of *mousikē* as a core element of *paideia*. The ethical and educational aspects of Athenian *mousikē*—and its moment of major crisis—are another central concern of this book (Part IV).

Paideia and the political sphere are never far apart, and one of the core aims of this volume is to explore the relations between *mousikē* and politics in Athens. This was a society of which Plato could allege that a 'democratization' of musical practice had actually *led to* the increase of democratic liberty (*Laws* 701a–b), and in which a leading theorist of *mousikē*, a friend and adviser of the most poweful man in the city, was ostracized for his musico-political activities (as Wallace argues here). A fascinating but curiously neglected area of Athenian *mousikē*, in which major issues of intellectual, political, and social debate interweave, receives serious treatment in this volume for the first time (from Csapo; see also Barker and Wilson)—the so-called 'New Musical Revolution'. This complex set of developments, at the level of musical practice, instrumental and economic resource, and performance conditions, generated immensely heated interventions from partisans and critics alike. And yet no comprehensive study of its profoundly ideologized character and sociological significance has hitherto been attempted. It is possible to read the major works on Greek music, as well as much of the current scholarship on the 'new musicians' themselves, without being required seriously to engage with the question of what made this musical revolution so threatening, exciting and important—as if (to use the apt comparison made by Simon Goldhill)—the phenomenon of rock and roll was best approached through the tuning of the bass guitar; or as though the violence that erupted at the première of Stravinsky's and Nijinsky's *Le Sacré du printemps* on 29 May 1913 should be explained by reference to its scoring alone.[10]

Without any doubt the most conspicuous and idiosyncratic feature of the musical culture of Athens is its development and promotion of drama, especially tragedy. Drama has benefited most from recent developments in the study of Greek literature as performance rather than literary text, and from the excavation of its original contexts as, effectively, a prize manifestation of *mousikē*

[10] Goldhill (1999*b*). Hordern (2002) shows the degree to which the social and ideological importance of a poet like Timotheos continues to escape literary critics.

on a grand scale.[11] This volume builds on these developments (Part II, see also Csapo), but we also aim to bring to greater prominence a number of other performance-types that took place in the city alongside drama (see especially Rutherford on the theoric *khoros*, Ceccarelli on pyrrhic dance), and so to see drama as one—hugely important—element on a highly variegated musical topography.

Despite its centrality, few studies have approached *mousikē* in the manner proposed here. Italian scholarship, with its strong roots in cultural materialism, has led the way in the sort of integrated cultural analysis espoused: the work of Gentili, Pretagostini, Comotti, and Rossi stands out in particular; and there is evidently a younger generation continuing the tradition.[12] Claude Calame's magisterial *Les Chœurs de jeunes filles en Grèce archaïque* (1977) pioneered a fully integrated approach to *mousikē*, especially of choral *mousikē*. It also remains the most important study of Sparta as a musical society, and as such serves as a valuable foil to our focus on Athens. Two important volumes of anglophone scholarship are Eva Stehle's exemplary *Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece* of 1997 and *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy* edited by Goldhill and Osborne in 1999, though the latter adopts the more malleable modern concept of 'performance' as its guiding focus and so extends well beyond the orbit of *mousikē*. What the anglophone tradition has above all contributed are fundamental works devoted to the sources and history of Greek music.[13] In addition to providing the basic materials and framework for all subsequent study of ancient music, these also tackle some of the more daunting aspects of musical theory and technical matters of instrumentation and practice. In addition to these fundamental works there is a solid and growing body of documentary resources for broadening the study of *mousikē* into new areas. Stephanis's exhaustive prosopography of

[11] A selection from a vast bibliography: Taplin (1977); Winkler (1990*a*); Nagy (1990); Csapo and Slater (1995); Green (1994); Easterling (1997); Easterling and Hall (2002).

[12] Gentili (1988); Gentili and Pretagostini (1988); Gentili and Perusino (1995); Comotti (1989*a*); Cassio, Musti, Rossi (2000). The latter includes work of younger Italian scholars; see also Ceccarelli (1998); Restani (1995).

[13] Winnington-Ingram (1936); Barker (1984), (1989); West (1992*a*); Anderson (1994); cf. also Landels (1999) and Mathiesen (1999) in the same tradition. Mention should also be made here of the work by A. Bélis.

theatrical and other performers, ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΑΚΟΙ ΤΕΧΝΙΤΑΙ (1988), is an invaluable work of reference that will greatly assist the sociological study of ancient performers and performances. And more recently Brigitte Le Guen has made available the difficult corpus of (largely inscriptional) evidence relating to the activities of the Associations of Dionysiac Artists (οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνῖται) in her magisterial *Les Associations de technites dionysiaques à l'époque hellénistique* (2001).[14]

The tendency towards atomization in the study of *mousikē* has, however, been tenacious. It is of course largely the fact of our being irrevocably sundered from the acoustic worlds of the past that has encouraged the continued divorce in our studies of the poetic word—as 'literature'—from its original music, the latter being consigned to the rather recondite worlds of musicology and reconstruction.[15] Greek music in the modern sense of instrumental practice and scoring continues to be studied in curious isolation, largely ignored by all but expert musicologists and organologists. Another reason for this unhelpful divorce of music from *mousikē* is to be found in the historical development of music in the post-Enlightenment western tradition, and in its concomitant academic study in musicology. It is only very recently that the discipline of musicology acquired a critical orientation, some decades later than most of the other human sciences. The effect has been to dislodge—rather late in the day—music's sovereign position in the (post-)Romantic imagination as that realm of art floating most freely above ideology, the expression of pure spirit and emotion. And it has shattered the mirage that music is little more than man's genius acting upon a phenomenon of the natural world. At last it too has been seen as a cultural system, an entirely human artifice—albeit the one that disguises itself most brilliantly as nature. Music has been well described by one of the leading lights of this 'new musicology' as 'the ultimate hidden persuader'—but that is

[14] An independent full-scale study of the *tekhnītai* is also promised by Aneziri: see Aneziri (1997). A further *desideratum* would be a collection of the evidence for other musical associations and performances that brought the study of Poland (1909) up to date.

[15] The early conceptual separation of literature from music deserves closer study. The sophists were of great importance in this regard: Brancacci (2001) 144; see also now Ford (2002) esp. 4.

a discovery that would have come as small news indeed to men like Plato, Damon, and Aristophanes.[16]

Of all the elements of *mousikē* dance has until recently doubtless fared worst, remaining a largely antiquarian interest on the margins of classical studies, at best subjected to highly speculative and often ill-considered attempts at 'reconstruction'. Many of our contributors advance the study of this fascinating and ill-served subject, and Ceccarelli and Wohl tackle it directly, from complementary angles: Ceccarelli brings a wealth of detail and contextual evidence to the Athenian manifestation of one of the major forms of Greek dance, the *pyrrhikhē* or warrior dance, while Wohl follows the path of more philosophical reflection on *mousikē* offered by Xenophon's *Symposion* and its figure of the dancing philosopher.[17]

[16] Quotation from Cook (1998) 122. See also Cook and Everist (1999). Other recent works from musicology and related disciplines whose insights could serve to enrich the study of Greek *mousikē* include Attali (1985); Kramer (1990); Martin (1995); Delaere (1995); Krims and Klumpenhouer (1998).

[17] For encouraging signs that things are changing in the study of Greek dance see in particular Ceccarelli (1998); Naerebout (1997); cf. Delavaud-Roux (1993*a*), (1993*b*), (1995).

Part I

MOUSIKĒ AND RELIGION

1

Muses and Mysteries

Alex Hardie

I

As Aristophanes' chorus of mystic initiates proceeds across the stage in the *parodos* of the *Frogs*, it dismisses from its *choroi* 'whoever . . . has not seen or danced the secret rites of the high-born Muses.[1] An Athenian audience, certainly those within it who had been initiated at Eleusis, cannot have missed the implied wordplay between ὄργια Μουσῶν ('secret rites of the Muses') and μυστῶν ('mystics');[2] and if the joke remained in the minds of 'real' initiates in the theatre after the first performance of the play in 405, they might have pondered its significance for the place of *mousikē* in the celebrations at Eleusis, as recalled from their own personal experiences, and as represented in the dance steps of the comic chorus.[3]

At around the same time, or a little later, another Athenian audience was to hear of the association of the Muses with the Eleusinian Mysteries. In the *Rhesus*, the Muse blames Athena for her son's death, and taxes her with ingratitude in the face of the Muses' high respect for Athens, revealed in Orpheus' establishment of the mysteries (941–5):

> καίτοι πόλιν σὴν σύγγονοι πρεσβεύομεν
> Μοῦσαι μάλιστα κἀπιχρώμεθα χθονί,

A version of this chapter was read at 'Music and the Muses: Public Performance and Images of *Mousikē* in the Classical Athenian Polis', held at Warwick University in April 1999. I am grateful to those present, to the editors of this volume, and also to Professor Richard Seaford, for helpful comment.

[1] *Frogs* 354–6 εὐφημεῖν χρὴ καξίστασθαι τοὺς ἡμετέροισι χοροῖσιν, . . . ὅστις . . . γενναίων ὄργια Μουσῶν μήτ' εἶδεν μήτ' ἐχόρευσεν . . . For a new treatment of *Frogs* 354–6, associating Muse inspiration with mystic initiation, see Lada-Richards (2002) 87–91.

[2] Cf. Eur. *Her.* 613 . . . τὰ μυστῶν δ' ὄργι' εὐτύχησ' ἰδών. Thiersch (cited in Mitchell's edition of 1839) saw the point: 'exspectandum fuit chorum dicturum esse: *qui neque mystarum orgia celebravit* . . . dicit vero . . . Μουσῶν pro μυστῶν . . .'; Kleinknecht (1937) 39; Horn (1970) 128.

[3] Graf (1974) 40–50.

μυστηρίων τε τῶν ἀπορρήτων φανὰς
ἔδειξεν Ὀρφεύς, αὐτανέψιος νεκροῦ
τοὐδ' ὃν κατέκτεινας σύ· Μουσαίων τε σὸν . . .

and yet to your city we sibling-Muses show high respect, and we frequent your land; and Orpheus revealed the torch-processions of the unspeakable mysteries, cousin of this dead man whom you have killed. And your Musaeus . . .

The placement of Μοῖσαι and μυστηρίων, with their homophonic first syllables, at the start of successive lines (followed by Μουσαῖον, 945), suggests that the author meant to mark an etymological relationship between the two words.[4] We find explicit attestation of such a relationship in Diodorus' report that the Muses got their name 'from initiating men', a derivation which he explains in terms of the Muses' role in education.[5] In addition, 'Muses' and 'music' are found in juxtaposition with 'mystery', 'mystics', 'initiate', and cognate words in a long series of Hellenistic and later texts, and there can be no doubt that some of them, perhaps all, carry etymologizing significance.[6] I would suggest that this etymology had gained currency at Athens by the end of the fifth century, and that *Rhesus* 943–5 is a relatively early reference to its existence.[7] This is consistent in timing with the ferment of ideas associated with the New Music, including its intense interest in verbal play (see Eric Csapo below, Ch. 8). More specifically, we might surmise Orphic influence, from the direction of Eleusis itself, on an etymology which was patently intended to suggest that the mysteries were named for the Muse-mother of their

[4] Etymological 'markers': Cairns (1996) esp. 33; for 'vertical juxtaposition', see also O'Hara (1996) 86–8; for the antiquity of these techniques, Hardie (2000*b*) 163–4. Orpheus as founder of the Eleusinia: Graf (1974) 22–39, esp. 29–30.

[5] Diod. Sic. 4.7.4 Μούσας δ' αὐτὰς ὠνομάσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μυεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ διδάσκειν τὰ καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων ἀγνοούμενα (cf. Philo *De Spec. Leg.* 1.320 τί γάρ, εἰ καλὰ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ μύσται, καὶ συμφέροντα . . .). For the same etymology, Helladius ap. Photius 279 (p. 530b88 Becker) τὴν Μοῦσαν οἱ μὲν ἐτυμολογοῦσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μυοῦσάν τινα εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ παίδευσις οὐδὲν μυστηρίων διαφέρει; cf. *E.M.* 589 s.v. Μοῦσα.

[6] Plato *Theaet.* 155e; *AP* 4.1.57–8 (Meleager); *AP* 9.162.3; *AP* 14.60.2; the anapaestic 'Oracle of Cassandra' in Powell (1925) 188–9, ll. 29–30 (as restored by Wilamowitz); Strab. 10.3.9; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5.19.2; Mesomedes, in *Musici Scriptores Graeci* p. 462.5–7 Jahn; *AP* 2. 303–5; *Orph. Hym.* 76.6–7; contrast Dio *Or.* 36.33, and see below, n. 11.

[7] Cf. West (1983) 24 (placing the play in the 4th cent.); Ritchie (1964) 357–61 (not after 420).

'founder', Orpheus.[8] In later antiquity, it was suggested that as bringer of the mysteries, Orpheus was 'allegorically' the son of the Muse Calliope (Schol. Ar. *Frogs* 1032); and the Orphic hymn to the Muses (75.7) actually credits them with bringing the mysteries to mankind. But whatever the genesis of the etymology, the Athenian audience of the *Rhesus* will have been left, again, to ponder its implications for the role of *mousikē* at the Eleusinia.

Side by side with this pattern of etymological data we find parallels for ὄργια Μουσῶν, in which music, poetry and philosophy are described in language reminiscent of mystery revelation.[9] To the modern reader, sacral phraseology of this kind seems to be most readily explicable in 'literary' terms, as metaphor pure and simple. On this reading, initiation into the mysteries was a sacral analogue for the poet's engagement with the inspiring Muses, but was not really akin to it in any historical, musical, or cultic sense.[10] In support, it might be observed that there were no independent 'mysteries of the Muses' (the single surviving instance of the phrase occurs in a derivative, non-sacral context, in a letter written by a teacher in Egypt).[11] Moreover, the Muses seem not to feature in mystery iconography, and no Muse shrine (*Mouseion*) has been discovered at any cult centre of the mysteries.[12] Yet in seeking to understand 'poetry as mystery revelation', it should not be assumed that for ancient poets, 'sacral' and 'literary' spheres of activity were to be distinguished as they would be in the modern world. In the ancient world, much musical, literary, and intellectual activity took place in a sacral context. Individual works of poetry could acquire sacred status.[13] The Muses themselves were

[8] For Orphic interest in etymology, Kahn (1997) 59–60, 61–3; Baxter (1992) 130–6. For etymology and invention: Cairns (1996) 33–51; cf. Seaford (1976) 218.

[9] Plato *Phaedr.* 245a; Nonn. *Dionys.* 15.70, 38.31; *AP* 2.303–5; Him. *Or.* 69.7–9 Col.; Synes. *Dion* 5; Verg. *Georg.* 2.475–7; Prop. 3.1.4 (also 3.3.29, as emended); Stat. *Silv.* 5.5.2–3; Auson. 17 (*Bissula*) *praef.*; cf. *SH* 705.22, with Lloyd-Jones (1963) 94); Aristid. Quint. *De Mus.* 3.165.

[10] Nock (1952) 184–90; des Places (1981) 83–98; Riedweg (1987).

[11] Bilabel (1934) no. 7567.8–9 τῶν Μουσῶν τὰ μυστήρια; cf. Mitchell (1982) 146.5–6 (funerary) οὔτε γὰρ εὐεπίης Μου[σ]ῶν φιλίων ἐμυήθης . . .

[12] Contrast, for example, the 'neighborly relationship' which the cult of the Ilissan nymphs at Athens enjoyed with the Lesser Mysteries (arising from initiates bathing in the stream): Larson (2001) 128. Muses feature in aetiological myths at Samothrace and Eleusis: Strabo 10.3.19; Paus. 1.38.6; Eur. *Ion* 1074–86, *Hel.* 1341–5. Clinton (1992) 27–8.

[13] For the dedication of poetry in temples, Herington (1985) 201–3. For Orphic sacred poetry, see Graf (1974); West (1983); Albinus (2000).

goddesses, honoured in cult observance, and not simply literary abstractions; and their *Mouseia* provided a sacral focus for educational activity, literary performance, and the cults of poets.[14] The central institutions of Athenian philosophy conducted their activities under the cultic aegis of the Muses.[15] We hear too of Hellenistic cult societies of devotees of the Muses.[16] Some mystery cults based on clan or family tradition generated their own musical and hymnal activity;[17] and again, there were associated cult societies (*hetaireiai*), which have now been illuminated by Fritz Graf, as has the role within them of Orpheus as the first mortal poet-musician and telestic initiator.[18] Orpheus belongs to the business of *mousikē*, poetry and music; and from around the end of the fifth century, he stands for the association of *mousikē* with the Greek mysteries.[19]

Against this perspective, I would suggest that for the fifth- or fourth-century poet-musician, the boundaries between cult and literary-programmatic metaphor were less clearly defined than is sometimes supposed.[20] The main aim of this essay will accordingly be to assess the place and power of music at telestic initiation ceremonies, to locate it within the wider framework of Greek *mousikē*, and to re-evaluate its kinship with classical poetry. 'Muses and mysteries' takes its point of departure from the aural experience of the initiand, and it embraces Orphic eschatology, mystic 'education', the role of *mnēmosynē*, Pythagorean *hetaireia*, and the revelatory role of the poet-musician.

II

In a well-known excursus in the tenth book of the *Geography* (10.3) Strabo explores the place of music in orgiastic ritual. He distin-

[14] *Mouseia*: *RE* 16. 797–821; Fraser (1972) 312–15; Otto (1956) 62–8; also Boyancé (1937), with Lynch (1972). Poet-cults: Fraser (1972) 2.467–8 (n. 57), with bibliography on the Parian *Archilocheion*; Moretti (1963) 39–40 (Syracuse and Euripides). On Helicon and Hesiod, Schachter (1986) 153–6; 160–1.

[15] Boyancé (1937); Lynch (1972); Fraser (1972) 312–15, with the notes in 2.467–9.

[16] At Thespiae (*IG* 7.1785) and Ialysus (*IG* 12.1.680).

[17] Burkert (1985) 278–81; Boyancé (1937) 52 n. 4.

[18] Graf (1987); see below, section v; cf. Cornford (1952) 89.

[19] For the date, Graf (1974) 39.

[20] But for a challenging effort to associate Platonic enquiry with ecstatic ritual, see Morgan (1990). See now Lada-Richards (2002) 87–91.

guishes types of festival according to the role within them of divine possession, μουσική, and mystic elements.[21] Mystic concealment, he argues, induces reverence, and μουσική brings us in touch with the divine.[22] Strabo goes on to speak of music as the foundation of education and also as a way of imitating the gods. The Muses themselves, he points out, are goddesses (10.3.10); and the Pythagoreans regarded all music as the work of the gods, teaching that the cosmos was constituted according to the principle of musical harmony. He asserts a common Greek association of 'everything orgiastic, Bacchic, choric and . . . mystic', with Dionysus, Apollo, Hecate, the Muses, and Demeter; he notes choric activity as a feature common to all these cults, brings out the presiding role of the Muses over *choroi*, and finally, juxtaposes μουσικοί as servants of the Muses with μύσται as servants of Demeter (as also of Apollo and of Dionysus). Strabo's observations, like much of the surviving data about music at the mysteries, embrace ideas which postdate the classical *polis*.[23] But that Athens 'invented' the (Eleusinian) mysteries and transmitted them, together with civilization, education, and the dramatic arts, to the Greek world, became an article of civic pride, with some basis in truth so far as concerns the influential promulgation of mystery ideas.[24] Against this pattern of cult dissemination, data from a variety of later mystic contexts can be used to help us negotiate ways back towards fifth/fourth-century cultic and musical antecedents at Athens. Specifically, I would hope to show that Strabo's wide-ranging analysis, touching as it does on the mystery interface between mortals and gods, on musical 'education', on the Muses' presence within mystic *choreia*, and on cosmic harmony, derives from authentic classical ways of thinking about the power of *mousikē* in mystery ritual.

[21] Strabo 10.3.9 τὰς μὲν σὺν ἐνθουσιασμῷ τὰς δὲ χωρίς, καὶ τὰς μὲν μετὰ μουσικῆς τὰς δὲ μή, καὶ τὰς μὲν μυστικῶς τὰς δὲ ἐν φανερῷ . . .

[22] Ibid. ἥ τε μουσικὴ περί τε ὄρχησιν οὖσα καὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ μέλος ἡδονῆ τε ἅμα καὶ καλλιτεχνίᾳ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἡμᾶς συνάπτει . . .

[23] Strabo may be indebted to Posidonius: Reinhardt (1928) 34–51. For Strabo's use of technical initiatory terminology, Obbink (1997) 46–7.

[24] *IG* 2^2. 1134.16–28 (*FD* 3.2.69.11–19); Isocr. *Pan.* 28–9; Ael. Aristid. *Or.* 22.4; cf. Lucr. 6.1–8. See Kerényi (1967) 122; Burkert (1983) 256. Pindar's second dithyramb included a 'transference myth' of mysteries from Eleusis to Thebes: Lavecchia (1994) 76–85.

The various fifth-century mystery cults seem all to have involved appeal to the senses, to smell and hearing as well as to vision.[25] Indeed, noise will have been a feature of the earliest mystery ritual;[26] and Claude Bérard has demonstrated the role of thunderous, clattering, or clashing sounds in the mystic summoning up of chthonic deities.[27] There will have been a strong mimetic element in such noises, which carried over into mystery 'music' in the modern sense of the term.[28] A large body of evidence in literary and epigraphical sources, vase paintings and mosaics testifies to the presence of the full range of instruments (stringed, wind, and percussive) in mystery music.[29] Unsurprisingly, the fullest information relates to Dionysiac cult.[30] A Campanian relief, for example, shows an initiation ritual attended by a tympanon-player;[31] in a Roman sepulchral relief of the second or third centuries AD, Dionysus is juxtaposed with a *cista* containing *mystēria*, and with an aulos-playing Antiopa and dancing satyr; and two late mosaics, from Palestine and Germany, provide vivid depictions of instrumental music making in Dionysiac mystery contexts.[32] Again, hymn singing is known from an inscription to have been a feature of first-century AD Dionysiac mystery ritual at Pergamum.[33]

Musical instruments are found in other mystery cults. The first-century BC mystery cult at Andania made legislative provision for 'those who are to serve, both in the sacrifices and in the mysteries,

[25] Kerényi (1955) 33; for the role of the senses, especially 'seeing' and 'hearing', cf. Philo *De Spec. Leg.* 1.321; Plut. fr. 178; *Mor.* 590b.
[26] Cf. West (1983) 145; 146–7.
[27] Bérard (1974) 75–87; Lada-Richards (1999) 91–2.
[28] Mimetic music at the rites of Cotyto: Aesch. fr. 57.9–12; in Dionysiac ritual, West (1983) 172–3. Representation of myth by mimetic dancing: Burkert (1983) 288; Harrison (1922) 570; Nilsson (1957) 59–60.
[29] For thoughtful remarks, see Magnien (1950) 189, 270–1. For *aulos* and *tympanon* in Dionysiac and other orgiastic cult, Barker (1984) Index svv; Bérard (1974) 91–3, 98; for stringed instruments in Dionysiac and other orgiastic cult, Barker (1984) 75; Eur. *Cycl.* 40; 443–4; Plut. *Ant.* 24, with *RE* 3A.46 (on Silenus); *Orph. Hym.* 31.3; Juv. 3.63–4. Cybele and a cithara player: Kurgal (1961) 98, figs. 56–9. Roman sources in Wille (1967) 53–65.
[30] Horn (1972) 79–81; Braun (1995); see above, n. 29.
[31] Rizzo (1915) 58, fig. 12; Nilsson (1957) 88–9. Tambourines feature among cult objects in 4th-cent. BC funereal vases from Southern Italy: Schmidt et al. (1976) 10–20, nos. 15, 16, 21, 28, 35, 46.
[32] *CIL* 14.5303; Wilamowitz (1929) 96. Mosaic: Braun (1995).
[33] Fränkel (1890–5) 2.485.26 (two ὑμνοδιδάσκαλοι).

as pipe players and citharists';[34] cithara-playing seems to have featured at Samothrace;[35] and the appearance of a cithara with an initiate's bench and a *cista mystica* on a fragment of an Arretine vase indicates that music featured in whatever mystery ritual is referred to.[36] At Eleusis, there was aulos accompaniment of choric dance outside the sacred enclosure, although nothing certain is known about instrumental music inside the *telestērion*.[37] Initiands heard a bronze gong, the ἠχεῖον, struck by the hierophant when 'summoning' Kore from the underworld;[38] and in a striking aural contrast, the hierophant chanted aloud in a mellifluous φωνή, a voice which could be depicted as that of his eponymous ancestor Eumolpus.[39] We do not know whether this chant was accompanied by an instrument, but it must have been akin to singing, since Eumolpus is found together with the swan in Attic vase painting.[40] Euripides (*Helen* 1339–52) gives a syncretic account of Eleusinian music which links Cybele with Demeter, introduces the Muses and hymnal *choreia* (1345), and juxtaposes ἠχεῖον with tympanon. The singing of hymns ascribed to Orpheus, Pamphos and Musaeus by the Lycomedae clan to accompany ritual enactments in their mysteries is securely attested; and in the first century BC, Eleusinian singing is proved by the presence of *hymnagōgoi*.[41]

The impact of music at the mysteries is evoked in the late testimony of Proclus on the emotional effect of the aulos on the initiand, and its capacity to arouse him to communion with

[34] *LSCG* 65.73.
[35] Cithara at Samothrace: Lehmann and Spittle (1964) 230, with fig. 147; for a *kitharistria* as initiate, *IG* 12.8.178.6–7 (2nd cent. BC);
[36] Dragendorff and Watzinger (1948) 133 (Beilage 6, fig. 49).
[37] Aulos at Eleusis: Graf (1974) 57; Bérard (1974) 91–3.
[38] Kerényi (1967) 84; Otto (1955) 27; Bérard (1974) 83–6; Lada-Richards (1999) 91.
[39] Philostr. *Vit. Soph.* 2.20; Clinton (1974) 40–1; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 28.2. Hierophant as 'Eumolpus': *IG* 2^2. 3639.4; Kerényi (1955) 52–3. Aural contrast: cf. Hermesianax on Orpheus' *katabasis* (fr. 7.1-14P) contrasting the frightful sounds of Hades with the life-giving lyre; also the 'oracle of Cassandra' (Powell (1925) 188–9) contrasting clashing bronze ('chordless harmony' (27–8)), and the Apolline lyre (29–30); Plut. *Mor.* 590c–f (the harmony of the spheres and frightful chthonic noises at the oracle of Trophonius).
[40] Harrison (1922) 555; Boyancé (1937) 52–3; Kerényi (1955) 52–3. Cf. Pratinas fr. 708.3 *PMG*.
[41] Lycomidae: Paus. 1.22.7, 9.27.2, 9.30.12; Burkert (1985) 278–9. Eleusis: *SEG* 30 no. 93.18.

the divine.[42] There is also some evidence that music and dance played a cathartic, purifying function in Dionysiac mystery cult.[43] Evidence for the actual performance or staging of music at the mysteries is, however, regrettably sparse. Some rituals included a form of enactment of the sacred myth, and such performances may well have included mime-dancing and music.[44] At Rome, too, the rites of the Bona Dea, which Plutarch characterizes as 'Orphic', took place to the accompaniment of music.[45] Otherwise, we are left to make speculative inferences from a handful of literary texts. The opening of Claudian's *De Raptu Proserpinae* (1.9–14) refers to Eleusinian torchlight, and juxtaposes subterranean rumbling with *carmina*, to which the serpent-drawn chariot of Triptolemos is drawn upwards.[46] Aelius Aristides (*Or.* 22.6), among other ancient authorities, speaks of an incident in the battle of Salamis when a 'cloud arose from Eleusis and fell from above on the [Persian] ships, together with a mystic *melos*', thereby putting Xerxes to flight. That this fanciful picture owes something to Eleusinian practice receives some tangential encouragement from the Eleusinian character of Aristophanes' chorus in the *Clouds*, the νεφέλαι themselves:[47] these νεφέλαι, invoked as Socrates' deities of mystic revelation in the *phrontiserion*, are strikingly assimilated to the Muses;[48] and 'musical clouds' would sit well with allusion to music in Eleusinian ritual, associated with the smokey atmosphere from initiates' torches, and perhaps also the 'figures' (σχήματα) which appeared through it.[49]

[42] Procl. *In Alc.* 198 διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μυστηρίοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς χρήσιμος ὁ αὐλός. χρῶνται γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῷ κινητικῷ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἔγερσιν ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον Magnien (1950) 270–1. The impact of Dionysiac music is well evoked by West (1983) 163.

[43] Aristid. Quint. 3.25 τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λύγου τινὸς ἔχεσθαί φαιεν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται.

[44] Guthrie (1952) 203–4; Ricciardelli (2000) 265–82; Horn (1972) 76 ('die Pantomime in den Mysterien'). Eleusis: Burkert (1983) 288; Harrison (1922) 515.

[45] Plut. *Caes.* 9.8 μουσικῆς . . . πολλῆς παρούσης: 10.1.

[46] Luck (1973) 158. On Triptolemos and Demeter's chariot, see Richardson (1974) 194–6.

[47] Lada-Richards (1999) 72.

[48] Cf. 297 with *AP* 7.34.3 (Ant. Sid.) and Call. *Aet.* fr. 2.2; also 334, 358.

[49] For the importance of torch smoke in choric dance, cf. esp. Eur. *Bacch.* 144–50; Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 12, p. 256 Butterworth. σχήματα in torchlight: Burkert (1983) 287–8. At *Frogs* 313–14, Aristophanes pairs the 'breath of the pipes' and the 'most mystic whiff of torches'. Note Hesiod's invisible Muses, wrapped in mist (*Theog.* 9).

Choric dance was a fundamental component of the mysteries.[50] Strabo gives special prominence to τὸ χορικόν; and Lucian (*Salt.* 15) states that 'no ancient initiation ritual can be found that is without dance', claiming that Orpheus and Eumolpus judged it 'a most beautiful thing to be initiated with rhythm and dancing'. More specific evidence includes the Andanian *teletai*, for which professional *technītai* for choric dances were engaged.[51] Then, Plutarch (fr. 178) speaks of the (Eleusinian?) initiand's experience of 'voices' and 'choric dances'. Dionysiac religion was quintessentially characterized by choric dance, where the *choros* represented the god's following, both in its secret *orgia* and also in its public cult manifestations.[52] The Lesbian cult of Dionysus Ἐνόρχης was understood to reflect the role of dance in the celebration of the mysteries (ὅτι μετὰ ὀρχήσεως τὰ μυστήρια ἐγίνετο, Schol. Lyc. *Alex.* 212). Public *choreia* is attested for the Athenian mysteries of Sabazius (Dem. 18.313) and at Eleusis, dancing at the Kallichoron Well was among the oldest elements.[53] Vase paintings reveal the place of dance in telestic initation at the Cabirion at Thebes;[54] and at Samothrace, the famous frieze of dancing girls is similarly suggestive.[55] There too, we find the secret ceremony of *thronōsis*, the enthronement of the initiand, encircled by dancers.[56] Plato speaks of *thronōsis* as part of the Corybantic mysteries (*Euthyd.* 277d–e), again with *choreia*; and we find Dionysus as a seated initiand, encircled by dancing Corybants, in later reliefs.[57]

Through Dionysiac initiation, the individual became a member of the *choros* which worshipped the deity.[58] This merging of the

[50] Lada-Richards (1999) 98–102; Boyancé (1937) 89–91; Riedweg (1987) 57–8.

[51] *LSCG* 65.73; cf. 97.

[52] Horn (1972) 79–81, with an extensive collection of evidence; Lonsdale (1993) 99–109, esp. 100–1. For secret celebration within a public festival, Seaford (1994*a*) 260–1. See also Lada-Richards (1999) 101–2; Boyancé (1966) 33–4; for Dionysiac dance and song on the Lenaia-vases, Burkert (1983) 237.

[53] Eleusis: Richardson (1974) *Indexes*, 1. *Names and Subjects* sv *dancing in mystery cults*; Burkert (1983) 287–8; Kerényi (1967) *Index* sv *dance/dancer/dancing*; Graf (1974) 40–50; Lada-Richards (1999) 99–100.

[54] Daumas (1998) 33–4.

[55] Samothrace: Literary evidence: Lewis (1969) 142, 214, 215, 219, 220. Frieze of dancing girls in the *temenos*: Lehmann and Spittle (1982) 1.230–3.

[56] *Thronōsis* in Corybantic mysteries: Plato *Euthyd.* 277d. At Eleusis: Burkert (1983) 266–9. Samothrace: Nock (1941), now overtaken by Burkert (1993) at 185–6.

[57] Lada-Richards (1999) 101, with bibliography.

[58] Horn (1972) 79; cf. Lada-Richards (1999) 100, citing *Frogs* 354; also Magnien (1950) 271–2.

individual with the mystic 'group' through choric *mousikē*, so vital to the Greek mysteries, was picked up by the Christian fathers. In a passage strikingly reminiscent of *Frogs* 354–6, Clement (*Strom.* 5.19.2) compares the non-Christian to one 'uninitiated in mystery rituals (ἐν τελεταῖς ἀμύητον) or unversed in choric dances' (ἐν χορείαις ἄμουσον): he 'must stand outside the divine *choros*' (ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵστασθαι δεῖ).[59] Participation in the *choros* was thus the mark of successful transition, through initiation, to membership of the god's chosen elite. But, given that *choreia* involved *mousikē*, which was identified with the Muses themselves (presiding over *choroi*, in Strabo's formulation, 10.3.10), mystic initiates were to that extent involved with the Muses as well as with the dominant god(dess) whom their *mousikē* served. Thus, at *Frogs* 354–7, Aristophanes' *mystai* make participation in *choroi* a defining feature of their status, listing among their exclusions those who have not danced the ὄργια Μουσῶν and those who have not 'been initiated into the Bacchic tongue-rites of... Cratinus'; the Muses are thereby identified with Dionysiac cult and choric activity, and in that sense the *mystai* engage with them too.[60] Similarly, at Nonnus *Dionysiaca* 15.70–1, a drunken Indian, 'spying on the rites of the Muse in her *thiasos* [θιασώδεος ὄργια Μούσης], leapt together with the Satyrs in a mimicking dance'. The Muse's *orgia* consist of the *choreia* which the Indian imitates. The dance of a female (maenadic) *thiasos* is itself conceived of as embodying the Muse, and *choreia* becomes the '*orgia* of the Muse in her *thiasos*'. The ritual choric activity of Dionysiac mystery cult thus embraces the Muse who presided over the dance, and she in turn is assimilated to the character of a choric maenad. Within this strikingly fluid interchange of Muses (as goddesses), music, object of worship and cult celebrants in the *Frogs* and in the *Dionysiaca*, ὄργια Μουσῶν/Μούσης can be understood simultaneously as 'the Muses' rites' (i.e. the cult observance paid *to* the Muses, as goddesses), and as 'rites consisting *of* the Muses' (that is, the

[59] Cf. *Protr.* 12, p. 256 Butterworth: the 'initiate' in the true mysteries of Christ 'will dance with the angels around [god]'. Cf. Pulver (1955) esp. 174–5.

[60] The collocation of ὄργια/*orgia* and χόρος/*chorus* (and cognates) commonly refers to Dionysiac mystic activity. *orgia*: Serv. *Aen.* 6.657; *orgia* and *chorus*: Aristoph. *Frogs* 356–7; Verg. *Aen.* 6.517–18; Val. Flacc. 2.282; schol. ABD Hom. *Il.* 13.21; Plut. *Mor.* 758e; Nonn. *Dionys.* 13.7; cf. Sen. *Herc. Oet.* 593–4.

cult observance created by music and Dionysiac dance).[61] The ambiguity seems to be a conscious way of expressing the integration of music with mystic observance, but at the same time preserving the distinct 'personality' of *mousikē* as the sacred province of the Muses.[62]

Pierre Boyancé and others have argued that the prominence of music and dance in the Dionysiac mysteries suggests the presence of the god and the worshipper's union with him.[63] This attractive insight is consistent with the modern understanding that mystery ritual represented direct interaction between mortals and gods;[64] and it is specifically supported by the ancient sense, articulated by Strabo (above, n. 22) and Proclus (above, n. 42), that orgiastic music 'brings us in touch with the divine'. Closely related is the phenomenon of music-induced trance states, and 'possession', such as was exhibited in Corybantic ritual (and which Plato himself advanced as an analogue for the inspiration of poets by the Muses).[65] It would seem, at all events, to have been understood by the latter stages of the fifth century that through his response to the Muses and their *mousikē*, the initiand might achieve communion with the object of his worship.

III

At the mysteries privileged knowledge was imparted to the initiands. They learned from what they saw and heard, and their knowledge equipped them for salvation in a blessed afterlife.[66] The uninitiated, by contrast, were ἀμαθεῖς ('ignorant'). But the initiand needed guidance to understand the mysteries, which by the fifth century involved complex ideas presented in symbolic, enigmatic, or riddling form. Associated myths and sacred texts

[61] Identification of Muses and dance: Barmeyer (1968) 61–2. For relevant comment on the distinct, yet integrated character of ritual choric performance, see Barbara Kowalzig, Ch. 2 in this volume.

[62] Among the gods worshipped by the Athenian Iobacchoi was 'Proteurythmos', evidently a divinisation of the rhythmical Dionysiac dancing: *RE* 22.939–40.

[63] Boyancé (1966) 44; Guthrie (1950) 155; Horn (1972) 80.

[64] Albinus (2000) 155.

[65] In general, Rouget (1985). Plato *Ion* 533e–534b, with Murray's comments; Tigerstedt (1969); although closely related, the subject lies beyond the scope of this paper.

[66] Seaford (1981) 253–4; Riedweg (1987) 6–11; Obbink (1997) 45–7.

might themselves require exegesis;[67] indeed, exegesis could itself form part of the mysteries.[68]

Dionysiac 'teaching' features in the *Bacchae*.[69] When Pentheus praises his *sophia*, Dionysus replies: Διόνυσος ἡμᾶς ἐξεμούσωσεν τάδε ('Dionysus educated us fully in these matters', 825). The rare verb suggests that educative 'Dionysiac' revelation is linked with the Muses, a nuance that is strengthened by direct references to Muse cult elsewhere in the play (below, section VI).[70] Again, in Aeschylus' *Edonians* (fr. 60), Dionysus was ὁ μουσόμαντις, ἄλαλος . . . ('the Muse-prophet, speechless . . . '), implying that he projected his message purely through music and dance. In the *Cyclops*, the Satyrs describe Polyphemus as ἄχαριν κέλαδον μουσιζόμενος ('playing the musical with a graceless din', 489) and anticipate his downfall in 'educational' terms (492–3): φέρε νιν κώμοις παιδεύσωμεν | τὸν ἀπαίδευτον ('let us teach him, the untaught one, by our *kōmoi*'): like Pentheus in the *Bacchae*, Polyphemus will 'learn' the hard way; moreover, his 'ignorance' finds expression in his 'unmusical' singing (cf. ἄμουσ', 426).[71] Euripides depicts noise/singing which is hostile to Dionysiac ritual as, so to speak, 'unmuselike';[72] and in the chorus' attack on Polyphemus' ἀμουσία, we have a reflection of his uneducated and uninitiated status, and of his hostility to, and exclusion from, the *choros* which is the obverse of the idea of initiatory membership through choric *mousikē* discussed earlier (above, section II).

Here, then, we seem to have fifth-century evidence for the interplay between Muses, 'education', and initiation in the mysteries. The Muses were patrons of education, because the Greeks, as Strabo stresses, learned through *mousikē*;[73] and the association

[67] Seaford (1981). For exegesis, Obbink (1997); Tsantsanoglou (1997) 102; Harrison (1922) 514; Burkert (1983) 274 suggests 'mythological and philosophical-allegorical instruction'. Ritual symbolism: Burkert (1987) 92–3.

[68] Tsantsanoglou (1997) 103–4. Note the presence of two ὑμνοδιδάσκαλοι at Pergamum (above, n. 33).

[69] Seaford (1981) 254.

[70] Cf. Lada-Richards (1999) 247.

[71] The Cyclops' singing has a sequel in the Satyrs' description of his shouts of distress when blinded as 'a beautiful paean', which they ask him to sing again (664).

[72] Cf. *Phoen.* 784–90, contrasting war with normal sacral life at Thebes: Ares is Βρομίου παράμουσος ἑορταῖς; he does not λωτοῦ κατὰ πνεύματα μέλπῃ μοῦσαν, but inspires the Thebans to hatred of the Argives.

[73] Strabo 10.3.9. Muses and education: Aeschin. 1.10; Herodas 3; Athen. 348d; Diog. Laert. 6.69; *SIG*^{3} 577; Lynch (1972) 115–16; Queyrel (1988) 87–102; Hardie (1997) 22–3, 30. See Murray and Wilson above, Introduction and Murray below, Ch. 13.

of *mousikē* with god-given *sophia* is familiar from early Greek lyric, especially Pindar.[74] In the pronaos of the Samothracian Hieron, as initiands gathered before the ritual of *epopteia*, they would have seen on the ceiling circling centaurs equipped with musical instruments, suggesting a musical and educational component in what was about to take place.[75] Other, then, than bringing him into communion with the god, what might music have contributed to an initiand's knowledge? The 'intellectual' impact of *mousikē* will doubtless have varied from cult to cult; but again, a general approach is offered by choric dance, which helps illustrate the way in which the initiand's visual and aural experiences might have come to symbolize some greater and higher ideas. At the most basic level, we have the Platonic equation of the 'uneducated' and the 'un-choric'.[76] More specifically, there is fifth-century literary evidence that *choreia* at the mysteries could be projected symbolically up to the cosmos.[77] In Sophocles' *Antigone* (1146–7), for example, Dionysus is addressed, in an Eleusinian context (cf. 1119–21), as 'leader of the chorus of stars which breathe fire'; and the scholiast claims that 'according to some mystic account, he is the chorus leader of the stars'.[78] In Euripides' *Ion*, the chorus again associates Dionysus with Eleusis, with the torches of the *mystai*, and with a cosmic dance of the stars and moon.[79] Much later, Dio (*Or.* 12.33–4) associates a non-Dionysiac choric/astral analogue with *thronōsis*, presenting a closely drawn analogy between choric dancing round the enthroned initiand and the cosmic dance of

[74] Gundert (1978) 61–76; Maehler (1963) 67–8, 94–8.

[75] Lehmann (1969) 1.251–2. Chiron the Centaur was an educator of heroes, and a prophet, associated with, *inter alios*, Orpheus: Guthrie (1952) 28–9; cf. Duchemin (1955) 331. For musical centaurs in the Dionysiac mysteries, see Braun (1995) 112–15, 121–2 (late Palestinian mosaic and sarcophagus). For Centaur and Orpheus, cf. also Eisler (1925) 299.

[76] *Laws* 654a: οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, τὸν δὲ πεπαιδευμένον ἱκανῶς κεχορευκότα θετέον; Calame (1997) 222–31.

[77] Lada-Richards (1999) 102.

[78] Cf. the hymn to Attis at Hipp. *Ref. Omn. Haer.* 5.9.9, with music and astral symbolism: Ἄττιν ὑμνήσω τὸν Ῥείης, | οὐ <κ>ωδώνων σὺμ βόμβοις, | οὐδ' αὐλῷ <τῶν> Ἰδαίων | Κουρήτων <σὺμ> μυκητῷ, | ἀλλ εἰς Φοιβείαν μίξω | Μοῦσαν φορμίγγων εὐοί, | εὐάν, ὡς Πάν, ὡς Βακχεύς, | ὡς ποιμὴν λευκῶν ἄστρων.

[79] *Ion* 1074–80: αἰσχύνομαι τὸν πολύ- | μνον θεόν, εἰ παρὰ Καλλιχόροισι παγαῖς | λαμπάδα θεωρὸς εἰκάδων | ἐννύχιον ἄυπνος ὄψεται, | ὅτε καὶ Διὸς ἀστερωπὸς | ἀνεχόρευσεν αἰθήρ, | χορεύει δὲ σελάνα. Cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 340–3 for Iacchus as νυκτέρου τελετῆς φωσφόρος ἀστήρ, juxtaposed with torches. For the star in Dionysiac symbolism, see also Horn (1972) 31, 66.

stars and sun round the earth.[80] Again, a visual analogy between the torches of nocturnal choric dancers and the stars revolving in the night sky may be present in Clement's claim, in discussion of the true mysteries of Christ, to 'illuminate by torches a vision of heaven and of god' (*Protr.* 12, p. 256 Butterworth).[81] The common focus of these passages on choric activity, astral symbolism and torchlight suggests some cultic antecedent; and the multiple pinpricks of fire of initiates' torches presumably prompted the original analogy with the stars.[82] But there will have been more to it than that, for at some point Eleusinian initiands were bidden to look up to the heavens and shout 'rain', then down to the earth and shout 'conceive'.[83] The mystic action of gazing heavenwards is reflected in contemporary literary allusions to mystic star gazing, and perhaps even to visions of the cosmos.[84] Astral symbolism of this sort might have been in the mind of the third-century AD presbyter Hippolytus (or that of his source) when he refers to the greater Eleusinia as 'the celestial'.[85]

We do not know a great deal more about fifth-century choric/astral thinking at Eleusis; but the myth of Triptolemos' serpent-drawn chariot carried over lands and sea and (according to Claudian) attracted upwards by the sound of *carmina*, strongly suggests that the idea of 'celestial travel', found both in accounts of mystery experience and in figurative extensions of that experience, had antecedents there, associated with *mousikē*. We might also think of the ecstatic, out-of-body travel experiences associated with shamanistic music, and represented in the Greek tradition by

[80] For juxtaposition of stars and torches, cf. the fragmentary *SH* 680.48; 50 (Philicus' hymn to Demeter).

[81] For connections between torches, night and dancing, Riedweg (1987) 123 n. 33.

[82] Cf. esp. Apul. *Met.* 11.9 'magnus . . . numerus lucernis, taedis, cereis et alio genere facticii luminis siderum caelestium stirpem [sc. Isis] propitiantes. symphoniae dehinc suaues, fistulae tibiaeque modulis dulcissimis personabant.' Also *Il.* 8.555–61, comparing camp fires to stars. For torch-fire, smoke, choric dance and aether, cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 145–50. Albinus (2000) 183.

[83] Procl. *In Tim.* 3. 176.28 D; Burkert (1983) 293; reflected at Ael. Aristid. *Or.* 22.7 (Eleusis); Plut. *Mor.* 590c, f (oracle of Trophonius).

[84] Cf. esp. Eur. *Cycl.* 211–13 (also 578–80, with the Cyclops' drunken 'vision' of heaven mixed with earth, the 'throne of Zeus' and the company of gods); Aristoph. *Clouds* 231; Plato *Phaedr.* 249d; Plut. *Mor.* 590c, e.

[85] Hipp. *Ref. Omn. Haer.* 5.8.44 . . . τὰ μεγάλα, τὰ ἐπουράνια; cf. 5.8.41 ἀνακτόρεσιν δὲ <δυὰ> τὸ <ἀνάγεσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ> ἀνελθεῖν ἄνω.

Aristeas of Proconnesus.[86] Plato's divine chorus of gods in the *Phaedrus* may well have connected with celestial choric symbolism at Eleusis;[87] and Diotima's 'mystery' speech in the *Symposium* culminates (211bc) in an 'ascent' to καλὰ μαθήματα. Mystery 'travel', to the underworld and to the heavens is famously attested for the Isis mysteries by Apuleius (*Met.* 11.23): 'per omnia vectus elementa remeavi . . . deos inferos et superos accessi'.[88] Philo likes to speak of the mystic flight of the mind through the universe, and refers on one occasion to 'the initiate of the divine mysteries, fellow traveller with the revolutions of the heavenly dance-chorus' (*Praem.* 121).[89] Later Gnostic worshippers interpreted Eleusinian ritual as involving some form of 'ascent'.[90] Again, the survival of *choreia* and pipe music into the Christian mysteries involved complex astral symbolism, surrounding the ascent of the soul.[91] Now, although precise inferences as to the cult role of mystic music in the fifth century cannot safely be drawn from such passages, they do lend encouragement to the idea that the initiand was assisted in comprehending the cosmos and its 'astral chorus' by the performance of terrestrial *mousikē*.[92] One ancillary concept which will have played its part in framing these grand ideas is that of cosmic harmony, and its audibility through the medium of terrestrial music;[93] this will be explored below.

Music may help sustain life after death. In the fragmentary second column of the Derveni papyrus, the Erinyes (souls of the dead) are honoured with offerings including hymns.[94] On the

[86] Cornford (1952) 88–106, esp. 94–5.

[87] Riedweg (1987) 56–8.

[88] For astral symbolism, cf. Apuleius' description of the shaved, shining heads of the initiates of Isis as 'magnae religionis terrena sidera' (*Met.* 11.10).

[89] Leisegang (1955) 234–5; cf. Philo *De Op. Mund.* 70: the soul 'whirled round with the choric dance of the planets and the fixed bodies, according to the laws of perfect music'. In general, Jones, (1926).

[90] Leisegang (1955) 237.

[91] Pulver (1955) 182–93.

[92] The music of the spheres heard by Timarchus during his initiatory *katabasis* at the oracle of Trophonius (Plut. *Mor.* 590c; Harrison (1922) 578–80) cannot be safely related to ritual; cf. Clark (1968).

[93] Plato *Tim.* 47c–e; Cic. *Rep.* 6.18–19. Cf. Plutarch's comparison of the Platonic and Homeric Sirens (*Mor.* 745d–746b): the souls of the dead follow the Sirens' music and join them in celestial circuits; a faint echo of the music reaches those on earth (I have here largely ignored the role of the Sirens, which a fuller treatment would require).

[94] Tsantsanoglou (1997) 104–5.

island of Lipara, percussive music had a mystic–eschatological function, linked with *katabasis*, death and rebirth.[95] That music might foster life after death is suggested in Philetairus' *Philaulos* (cited by Athenaeus, 633ef): 'it's a fine thing to die to the playing of the pipe; for to these alone is it granted to make love in Hades; those who have impure ways, without experience of music, carry water to the leaking jar.'[96] Pipe playing features in vase-representation of mystic *anodoi*.[97] Elaborate Samothracian symbolism associating music and dance with the transcendence of death appears in an ivory group recovered from a tomb at Vergina.[98] Indirect evidence in the same area may be found in the opening of Clement of Alexandria's *Protrepticus*, where the supposed power of the music of mythical minstrels, and associated mountains (strikingly dismissed as 'initiation halls of error'), is contrasted with the true power of the 'new song' from Sion, which was instrumental in the creation of the harmonious cosmos, and which can now revive the 'dead'.[99]

That music is an integral component of the interaction between mortals and divine at the mysteries should now be clear enough. But can the eschatological power of music be related, by modern reconstruction, to the performance of music in mystery ritual? That a relationship existed between cosmology and mystic eschatology, and that that relationship had a musical dimension, is well understood. Pythagorean thinking in this area has been reconstructed by Walter Burkert;[100] and its association with Orpheus and his lyre has been clarified by Martin West.[101] This material

[95] Arist. *De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus* 101.

[96] The 'leaking jar', alluding to the fate of the uninitiated, confirms the eschatological reference: Harrison (1922) 613–23; Albinus (2000) 133–4. With μουσικῆς ἀπειρίᾳ, cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 355; Pind. *Ol.* 11.17; Heracl. fr. 1; Nonn. *Dionys.* 15.58.

[97] Berlin Crater F2646 (*ABV* 522.87); Bérard (1974) 103, Figs. 35a, 35b.

[98] Daumas (1998) 274–5, with pl. 25.2.

[99] *Protr.* 1 (p. 10 Butterworth): οἱ δὲ τηκάλλως νεκροί, οἱ τῆς ὄντως οὔσης ἀμέτοχοι ζωῆς, ἀκροαταὶ μόνον γενόμενοι τοῦ ᾄσματος ἀνεβίωσαν. τοῦτό τοι καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐκόσμησεν ἐμμελῶς καὶ τῶν στοιχείων τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰς τάξιν ἐνέτεινε συμφωνίας, ἵνα δὴ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ἁρμονία γένηται. Mystic import is guaranteed by a sequel in the peroration (12 (pp. 254–8 Butterworth)), with repeated reference to drunken revelling on Mt. Cithaeron, and praise of the true mysteries of Christ. See Riedweg (1987) 151–4, with bibliography.

[100] Burkert (1972) 350–68.

[101] West (1983) 29–33.

reveals intimate connections between the soul and harmony, as also between the fate of the soul after death, its reascent to the cosmos from which it had come, the divine nature of the stars and the celestial harmony of the spheres.[102] Unsurprisingly, it is less easy to pinpoint the place of the mysteries in these matters on the basis of explicit testimony. But that they played some part can scarcely be doubted, for the mainstream cults have an impressive record of borrowing and assimilating ideas from other cults and from fifth-century scientific thinking (including, for example, the concept of the cosmic elements).[103] We know that cosmology featured in the mysteries; and Dirk Obbink has suggested that cosmology and the elemental structure of the universe, together with eschatological myth, formed part of the instruction of mystic initiates.[104] What I want to suggest is an extension of Obbink's formulation: that *mousikē* too featured in the exegesis of the Greek mysteries.

The fifth-century initiand seems to have been encouraged to relate the performance of *choreia* to the workings of the cosmos. The interconnection of mystery, cosmos, and *mousikē* was prominent in the Samothracian mysteries, through the myth of the sacred marriage of Cadmus and Harmonia.[105] Musical harmony appears in the Derveni Papyrus in the context of the hymn-offerings to the souls of the dead (see above, n. 94), which were 'harmonized with music' (ἁρμοστ[ο]ὺς τῇ μουσ[ι]κῇ). Rather later, Apuleius (*Met.* 11.9) juxtaposes the torches which symbolized Isis' birth from the stars with the *symphoniae suaves* of instrumental music and the *carmen* of the Camenae.[106] Strabo (above, section 11) refers to the harmonious construction of the universe in his exposition of the role of orgiastic music. Then again Philo, who was deeply immersed in mystery ideas, repeatedly speaks in mystical terms of access to, and indeed yearning for, celestial harmony;[107] and *symphonia* and *harmonia* appear among the blessings of Clement's true mysteries of Christ (*Protr.* 12, p. 258 Butterworth), themselves designed to occupy the intellectual territory of the Greek mysteries. It is therefore striking that Orpheus himself is associated with such

[102] Eisler (1925) 65–9. [103] Seaford (1986). [104] Obbink (1997).

[105] Pindar's first hymn, which incorporated an account of this wedding (frr. 29–35c Ma.), embraced a mystic dimension and highlighted cosmic *harmonia*: Hardie (2000*a*) 30–2, 32–5.

[106] Cited above, n. 82.

[107] *De Somniis* 35–6; *De Congr. Er. Gr.* 51; *De Op. Mund.* 70–1.

thinking, in a mystery context, at pseudo-Lucian *Astrologia* (10): Orpheus, 'fitting together the lyre, produced the mystic rituals and sang sacred things; and the lyre being seven stringed represented the harmony of the moving stars'.[108] This precious testimony refers to a terrestrial musical instrument; and to the same body of ideas can be assigned an Orphic poem of the Hellenistic era entitled the *Lyre*. In it, the celestial zones were assimilated to the seven strings of Orpheus' lyre; and it was said, moreover, that 'souls are unable to ascend without the lyre'. The poem may have contained an eschatological account of the soul's ascent, with the lyre's help, through the planetary spheres.[109] It is especially important for present purposes that the genesis of these ideas of cosmic harmony and the lyre can be projected back at least to the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries through the fragmentary testimony of Scythinus, who speaks of Apollo harmonizing the (cosmic) lyre to Zeus, and deploying the sun as plectrum.[110]

Orpheus and his lyre featured in Polygnotus' fifth-century painting of the underworld in Delphi.[111] For more direct evidence of the eschatological role of the Orphic lyre in the mysteries, we can turn to fourth-century Southern Italian vase painting. In one example, a *cista* and a cithara appear below a seated Dionysus in a scene which has been interpreted, on other grounds, as featuring initiates.[112] Another depicts an old man sitting in a tomb-*naiskos*, while Orpheus dances and plays the cithara in front of him.[113] In a third, Orpheus offers his lyre to a young man who is apparently being led towards Hades, a gesture of protection which suggests that the instrument will serve to overcome the hostile powers of the underworld.[114] It has been suggested that these paintings reflect local mystery cult and that they depict the power of the cithara to

[108] Eisler (1925) 68–9.
[109] Savage (1925); Nock (1927); Lambardi (1986).
[110] Scyth. fr. 1 W.: ἁρμόζεται | Ζηνὸς εἰδιὴς Ἀπόλλων πᾶσαν, ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος | συλλαβών, ἔχει δὲ λαμπρὸν πλῆκτρον ἡλίου φάος. Another illustration of the penetration of the lyre and musical symbolism in the mid-5th cent. BC comes from Camarina in Italy, where the street nameplan was based on lyre-strings: Cordano (1994) (I owe this reference to Peter Wilson).
[111] Paus. 10.30.6; Albinus (2000) 132–3.
[112] Schmidt et al. (1976) 6–7, 35–6; taf. 7a, 8, 10a. Schmidt (1975) 133–5 (without comment on the cithara), tav. XVI. Cf. the lyre-playing Orpheus, with *cista* containing scrolls, on the Tyszkiewicz mirror: Froehner (1892) pl. 4; Eisler (1925) 97.
[113] Schmidt et al. (1976) 7, 32–4; taf. 11. Schmidt (1975) 112–16, tav. VII–VIII.
[114] Schmidt (1975) 120–1, tav. XIV.

rescue initiates from death.[115] The power of the lyre-playing Orpheus to overcome death is prominently represented in his *katabasis* to rescue his wife; but the vase paintings prove that the eschatological role of his music was not confined to that myth.[116] All these depictions of Orpheus and his lyre can be taken as evidence of the power of music in the mysteries. But despite the vivid iconography, it remains difficult to see how such ideas might have been made fully intelligible, even for the initiated, except through para-mystic exegesis, or else through poetry which was itself exegetical of the mysteries. The poetry ascribed to the telestic initiator Orpheus himself will certainly have played a influential role.[117]

Reflecting on the inevitability of death, and outlining its search for a life-restoring remedy, a Euripidean chorus claims to have attained, through the Muses, a celestial vantage point from which to survey its eschatological concerns (*Alcestis* 963–4): ἐγὼ καὶ διὰ Μούσας καὶ μετάρσιος ἦξα ('I have flown through the Muses and aloft'). This has to do with *mousikē* and intellectual apprehension, through *logoi* (964) and Orphic tablets (967), and it represents what may, for present purposes, be termed a literary extension of the place of eschatological *mousikē* in the Greek mysteries.[118] The influence, fluidity, and sacral origins of these ideas is further evident from a fragmentary Orphic *katabasis* in which the blessed souls of poets in Hades are depicted as having already, in life, been conveyed by chariot above the clouds to the celestial regions.[119]

[115] West (1983) 25; 32. See also Bottini (2000) 135–7. A stringed instrument is visible in the representation of a mystic *anodos* on a 5th-cent. Stamnos (Munich 2413 (*ARV*[2] 495.1)); Bérard (1974) 36, 148. Musical instruments are depicted on a series of 5th-cent. Attic funerary *lekythoi*: for an eschatological reading, Delatte (1913); contrast Beschi (1995), who argues that the purpose is socio-cultural, showing the *paideia* of young deceased persons.
[116] Harrison (1922) 599–606; Verg. *Georg.* 4.471–2 'at cantu commotae Erebi de sedibus imis/umbrae . . .' Cf. also Muses and lyre-playing Apollo on a red-figure Pelike (Ruvo J.1500, app. no. 45) depicted with funerary motifs for a heroised woman: Barringer (1995) 42–3; pl. 51–3.
[117] For interesting suggestions about the exegetical role of Orphic poetry, see Albinus (2000) 105–6. Cf. esp. Diod. 3.62.8 σύμφωνα δὲ τούτοις εἶναι τά τε δηλούμενα διὰ τῶν Ὀρφικῶν ποιημάτων καὶ τὰ παρειαγόμενα κατὰ τὰς τελετάς, περὶ ὧν οὐ θέμις τοῖς ἀμυήτοις ἱστορεῖν τὰ κατὰ μέρος.
[118] The suggestion of 'literary extension' begs the question of the interface between tragedy and mystery ritual, as set out by Seaford (1981). For the suggested 'dialectic' between literature and ritual, see below, section IV.
[119] Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (lines 103–6, with C. W. Macleod's comment recorded on 105).

IV

The Muses were the daughters of Mnemosyne, representing the memorializing function of singers and song.[120] Mnemosyne had a parallel role in the eschatology of mystery cult. She features in a series of gold tablets (*lamellae*) with which the bodies of initiates were equipped for their journey to the underworld (the earliest text dates from the fifth century BC and the latest from around AD 300).[121] The dead person is addressed directly, and is instructed on how to go about obtaining refreshment in Hades from the 'Lake of Memory'.[122]

Mnemosyne thus provides a link between immortality in Muse-inspired poetry and the blessed afterlife promised by mystery initiation. That these two spheres might intersect is suggested by a choric ode in Euripides' *Heracles*. In a context containing a cluster of mystic allusions, Heracles returns from his *katabasis* to Hades.[123] The chorus of old Thebans praises youth, expresses hatred of old age and wishes for a second life (637–72). It then (673–86) speaks as an 'aged singer' (like a swan) aligns itself with the Muses, rejects ἀμουσία, hopes always to be 'in crowns', salutes Mnemosyne and links this with references to Heracles' victory, Dionysus and wine, the lyre and aulos, and finally the Muses, ('who set me to choric dance'). The ode plainly articulates the idea of initiation through choric *mousikē* analysed earlier (section II). In addition, Scodel has suggested that Euripides evokes the central role of Mnemosyne in mystic *katabasis*; and that in wishing for a second life, the chorus is recalling the tradition that the 'old poet' Hesiod himself was 'twice young' and was twice buried.[124] Scodel plausibly sees the ode as operating in the context of Heracles' initiation and return from Hades, and at the intersection of ideas of eschatological hope and immortality in poetry. The eventual entry of such ideas into the consciousness of an educated elite

[120] Hes. *Theog.* 54; Pind. *Pae.* 6.56; Diod. Sic. 4.7.1; Phil. *de Plant. Noe.* 129. Gianotti (1975) 60–2. *RE* 15.2265–9 (Eitrem).
[121] Zuntz (1971) 277–393.
[122] Cole (1980), against Zuntz (1976). For a further discussion of Mnemosyne in the *lamellae*, with comment on the Pythagorean background, see Tortorelli Ghidini (2000). Mnemosyne also featured at the oracle of Trophonius: Clark (1968).
[123] Seaford (1994*a*) 378–91.
[124] Scodel (1980) 317. For comments on mystic *mnēmosynē* in Pindar, see Garner (1992) 50–8.

may be observed at *App. Anth. Add.* 2.712b, where we find an aspiration to post-mortem *mnēmosynē* 'beside the initiation hall of Demeter' (i.e. at Eleusis), on the part of a lady who had been born into a hierophantic family, who records her mother's name as 'Thaleia', and who evidently held some sacerdotal function in relation to Isis.

In Euripides' association of eschatological and poetic 'memory', we may glimpse a conceptual nexus embracing memorialization in poetry, heroization, and the mysteries.[125] This is reinforced by fifth-century and later evidence to show that some hero cults had connections with the mysteries.[126] In the Hellenistic age, we encounter the phenomenon of the poet who was himself an initiate of the mysteries seeking heroization and associated cult;[127] and there is abundant evidence (Hellenistic and later) for the linkage of hero cult with the Muses, both in funerary *Mouseia* and through the depiction of the Muses on sarcophagi.[128] These phenomena have further analogues in literature. Jacqueline Duchemin outlined the ways in which mystery cult, mythic heroization, and eschatological beliefs might connect with Pindar's claim to immortalize his epinician addressees;[129] and in an important recent paper, Richard Garner has given a detailed demonstration of the presence of these ideas (including *mnēmosynē*) in a single epinician, the sixth Olympian.[130] From an earlier period, against what is arguably the cultic background of Sappho's 'household of those who busy themselves with the Muses' (μουσοπόλοι; fr. 150.1 LP), we have her address to a lady later described as 'uneducated', and 'distant from the Muses and unlearned', in which post-mortem oblivion (i.e. no *mnēmosynē*) is predicted, together with unseen wandering in Hades.[131] Sappho's message is relevant to the eschatological concepts with which we are concerned, and her poetry helps to show how deeply rooted in the Greek cultural experience were ideas about 'memory', the afterlife, music and

[125] See also Albinus (2000) 148–52.
[126] Seaford (1994*a*) 398–400; (1994*e*); Brelich (1958) 118–24. Daumas (1998) 200–1 (relief from Cos, 2nd cent. BC; Samothracian initiation).
[127] Thus e.g. Posidippus (*SH* 705.22); Dickie (1995) 83–4; Rossi (1996).
[128] Marrou (1938); Hardie (1997) 33–5.
[129] Duchemin (1955) 297–334.
[130] Garner (1992) 50–8, 63–7.
[131] Fr. 55 LP; Lanata (1996) 14–15; Calame (1996) 13–14; 17–20; also Maehler (1963) 59–64.

the Muses.[132] These ideas will no doubt have been available to those who were responsible for planning the mysteries and extending their popular appeal. In this respect, as in others, it may be right to see the relationship between *mousikē* and the mysteries as something inherently more complex than a one-way process in which ritual is simply alluded to, or re-enacted, in literature. We may have to do with a more dynamic interplay of influences, in which poetry itself helped shape understanding of *mnēmosynē*.

V

The sound of music was identified with Muses, and was the audible signal of their divine presence.[133] They could be equated with the notes produced by instruments, and with the performance of a chorus.[134] This ancient phenomenon, with its origins in the belief that musical sounds represented 'voices', assumed a sacral dimension in the establishment of cults of the Muses and of *Mouseia* containing their anthropomorphic cult images.[135] Such shrines typically represented the public acknowledgement of the role of musical performance in the life of the *polis*.[136]

The ancient Pierian Muses, together with the lyre-playing Orpheus, are brought into sympathetic association with Dionysus and his cult music by Euripides in the *Bacchae*.[137] Graf and Rossi have argued that he is reflecting the interests of his royal Macedonian patrons in the ancient Pierian Muse cult, in the establishment of Orpheus and Orphic societies in Pieria, and in Dionysiac mystery cult.[138] He is also reflecting a wider, shifting, pattern of association between Orpheus, the northern telestic initiator, and

[132] For outline comments, see Gentili (1988) 84; I hope to treat this topic in greater detail in a future article on Sappho's Muses; the subject embraces other early evidence for a common family of ideas to do with telestic initiation, primitive *goeteia* ('wizardry'), Muse cult and mainstream musical tradition which are directly relevant to the present study, but which present special problems of interpretation. Some helpful material in Burkert (1962).

[133] Barmeyer (1968) 55–68.

[134] West (1967) 11–14; Kritzias (1980).

[135] West (1967) 12; Farmer (1957) 256–8.

[136] Examples are the *Mouseia* at Troizene (Paus. 2.31.3) and Sparta (Paus. 3.17.5; cf. Plut. *Lyc.* 21.4); Barmeyer (1968) 153–4.

[137] Compare *Bacch.* 409–15 and 560–5, and the comments of Segal (1997) 74–5.

[138] Rossi (1996) 63–4; Graf (1987) 87–90; 92.

orientalizing Bacchic rites.[139] The Greek Muses themselves had a part to play in this process of cult-assimilation, and in espousing eastern, orgiastic music. They tended to be absorbed into the cult of whichever god(dess) their music served, and took on its characteristics. In Sophocles' *Antigone* (965) in a Dionysiac context, they become 'aulos-loving', assimilated to choric maenads.[140] Again, the cultic synergy of Muses and Dionysus is highlighted in the *Frogs*: the chorus speaks (368) of 'the ancestral rites of Dionysus', alluding to the links between the Lenaia festival, at which the play was produced, and the Eleusinian mysteries;[141] through their musical presence in this cultic environment, the Muses themselves, chameleon-like, take on mystical colouring in association with Dionysus and the staging of comedy. But *mousikē* had the power to influence and shape its environment as well;[142] and so as goddesses, the Muses could lend their divine authority to music and cult, and render it acceptable to civilised sensibilities. We find this later in the Anatolian cult of Cybele;[143] and in a hymn to Attis, the singer rejects orgiastic musical accompaniment and claims to 'mix [the hymn] to the Apolline Muse of the lyres'.[144]

Relevant to these cultic contexts is the deployment by Greek and Latin authors of ὄργια Μουσῶν/*orgia Musarum*, in which ὄργια may denote either mystic rites or mystic objects.[145] The former usage was illustrated earlier (section II). For the latter, we have Propertius' description of a cave containing *tympana*, a bust of Silenus and Pan's pipe and *orgia Musarum* (3.3.27–30, as emended). In this sacral context, the musical instruments are cult objects;[146] moreover, Propertius delineates a cave-*Mouseion* shared with Silenus, suggesting allusion, through a lost Hellenistic model (Philetas?) to the formal incorporation of the Muses *qua*

[139] Cf. Harrison (1922) 459–60.

[140] Harrison (1922) 464.

[141] Deubner (1932) 125–6; Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 25–42, esp. 35; Seaford (1981) 266–7; Seaford (1994) 262–3.

[142] For the power and range of *mousikē*, Murray and Wilson above, Introduction.

[143] Roller (1991) 139–40; see below.

[144] Cited above, n. 78.

[145] Aristoph. *Frogs* 356; Prop. 3.3.29; Stat. *Silv.* 5.5.3–4; *AP* 2.133; 303; Synes. *Dion* 5; Nonn. *Dionys.* 15.70, 38.31. *Orgia*: Henrichs (1969). Musical instruments seem to be designated as ὄργια at Aesch. fr. 57.1.

[146] Cf. esp. Aristoph. *Frogs* 228–31, associating Muses, Pan, and Apollo through the construction of lyre and pipes; for such technical allusions in mystic contexts, cf. Seaford (1977–8); (1981) 270.

goddesses into Dionysiac sacral observance.[147] A real cultic example of precisely this process is available in the dedication to the Muses, at Gordion in Phrygia, of a third-century BC statuette of the Great Mother, shown leaning on a tambourine.[148]

Still more interesting is Isis.[149] The place in her cult of choric music, with aulos accompaniment, is vividly revealed in a first-century AD fresco at Herculaneum.[150] At one cult site, Canopus in Egypt, in the second century AD she had the cult title Μουσαναγωγός ('leading up the Muses').[151] This seems to indicate a role analogous to that of Apollo as *Musagetēs* (leader of the Muses), and it may connect with Plutarch's assertion (*De Isidi et Osiridi* 3) that at Hermopolis Isis was called 'she who precedes the Muses'.[152] In one of the ancient *Vitae Aesopi*, Isis appears to Aesop as leader of the Muses, and, in gratitude for his kindness to her priestess, prevails on them to grant him their gifts.[153] Cult music turns up again in a third-century AD inscription from Memphis addressed to Isis' son 'Karpocrates' (Harpocrates) and closely related to the 'Praises of Isis'. This includes the claim 'I presided over the education of children; I established hymns . . . and dances of men and women, the Muses aiding me'.[154] The Muses' status in mystery cult hovered below the level of formal incorporation into ritual in the fifth and fourth centuries; but by the third century BC, they found their way into the fringes of analogous cults in the Greek east, and in at least some centres, this was publicly re-affirmed in succeeding centuries. And there again, the educational role of *mousikē* remains in the cultic foreground.

The existence of more specific fifth-century antecedents for these cult contexts may be suggested in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, at the point where Dionysus gives instructions for a sacrifice to the

[147] *Mouseion*: Lavagne (1988) 274–5; 499–500. *Orgia* is an emendation of MS *ergo*: see Fedeli ad loc., and Shackleton-Bailey (1956) 141.
[148] Roller (1986) 209; Roller (1991) 139–40.
[149] Merkelbach (1995) 51–3. Burkert (1987) 27, 85.
[150] Naples, Archeological Museum 8924 (reproduced at Burkert (1987) 61).
[151] *POxy* 1380.62; Dunand (1973) 139.
[152] Cf. Apul. *Met.* 11.8–12 (processing musicians and choric singing of a *carmen* composed *Camenarum favore*). For Osiris and the Muses in the statuary of the Nilotic garden at the villa of Octavius Quartio at Pompey, Merkelbach (1995) 71, 236–7, Abb. 36a.
[153] *Vita* G 7; Perry (1952) 2, with n. 8. See Dillery (1999).
[154] J. and L. Robert (1946–7) 343.

Muses and the singing of a choric hymn in their honour (875–84), and then goes on to pray that he may judge the contest of Aeschylus and Euripides μουσικώτατα (871–4). This prayer is juxtaposed with Aeschylus' own prayer to Eleusinian Demeter (886–7) to make him 'worthy of your *mystēria*'.[155] Now, the cults of the Muses and Demeter had already been brought together in a Pythagorean context. Thus, an account of Pythagoras' *katabasis* to Hades shows him in the role of hierophant in the cult of Demeter;[156] and later *testimonia* record that after his death, Pythagoras' house and the narrow street (*stenōpos*) outside it were consecrated as sanctuaries of, respectively, Demeter and the Muses.[157] The background lies in Pythagoras' encounter with Southern Italian mystery cults;[158] and our sources speak of a Pythagorean *hetaireia* which espoused a quasi-mystic educative regime, the focal point of which was the Crotonian *Mouseion*, itself a symbol of musical and societal *harmonia*.[159] A later reflection of this lively mystic-Muse milieu turns up in Iamblichus' report (*VP* 146) that Pythagoras' *hieros logos* 'Concerning the Gods' derived from his initiation into the mysteries of Orpheus, which were themselves based on the teaching of Calliope. These are isolated glimpses, from later perspectives, of what must have been a complex and evolutionary sacral-intellectual environment in the fifth century; even so, they suggest that Pythagorean *hetaireia* could at that time have supplied an institutional context in which Muse cult was laid open to influence from the mysteries, and might in turn have influenced the staging of mystery festivals, and the exegesis offered to those who were initiated at them.[160]

[155] For comparison with the Orphic hymn to the Muses, Radermacher (1954) 268; Kleinknecht (1937) 105–6; Lada-Richards (2002) 86–7.
[156] Burkert (1972) 159.
[157] The *testimonia* go back to Timaeus. The house is variously that in which he lived at Croton and in which he died at Metapontum: Diog. Laert. 8.15; Porph. *VP* 4 (Timaeus: Croton); Iambl. *VP* 170; Vallet (1974); cf. Cic. *Fin.* 5.4. Burkert (1972) 112 n. 18. These Pythagorean/Demeter/Muse mystery associations find extended expression at Him. *Or.* 69.7–9.
[158] Burkert (1972) 112, 176–80.
[159] Burkert (1972) 45; Cornford (1952) 110; Morrison (1956) 138–9.
[160] Iambl. *VP* 71–9, esp. 72, 74, 75; Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 6.20; cf. Diog. Laert. 8.15; Guthrie (1962) 148–53; Brisson (1995).

VI

The Muses were nurses and educators of the freeborn Greek child. From them came the knowledge which equipped their favourites for their path through life. The Muses' protection extended further, into the afterlife, for they could guarantee remembrance after death; and their mother Mnemosyne provided the initiate's own remembrance of past life, and of the experience of mystery initiation itself. Among those promulgating such ideas were poets who were themselves initiates, and exegetes in mystery initiation. Cult societies, too, will have been influential, especially those with an interest in the figure of Orpheus, and in *mousikē*;[161] and the Pythagorean juxtaposition of teaching, Muse cult and the mysteries of Demeter supplies one cultic context for the spread of musical–mystery concepts.

As our understanding of Greek revelation expands, so we may see more clearly the poets' role in the articulation of wisdom about the cosmos, and the interface between them, their *mousikē* and the mysteries. A central argument of this paper is that *mousikē* was understood to contain cosmic and eschatological symbolism, a symbolism which was reflected within mystery ideas. Heard in this way, *mousikē* would complement the initiands' visual experiences; and since the sound of music was identified with 'Muses', initiands could additionally perceive the presence of the Muses themselves. By extension, initiates could have 'heard', through the music, the cosmic principle of *harmonia*. Listening to sublime music can provide a soaring, uplifting experience in any age: for the ancient initiand, it can be understood as an emotional experience which united him with his fellow-neophytes, brought him into communion with his god, and transported him to the celestial zones. Through the Muses (διὰ Μούσας, as Euripides put it), he was offered access to the harmonious governance of the cosmos, a deeper understanding of his own place within it, and ultimately the promise of post-mortem memory and salvation.

In a piece of para-mystic polemic, Dio of Prusa was later to point out that poets were 'servants of the Muses' and not *mystai* (*Or.* 36.33), in order to deny their ability to give a true account of the cosmos, which, he argued, could be expressed only by Apollo and

[161] Graf (1987).

the Muses, 'with the divine rhythm of their pure and consummate harmony' (ibid. 60). Something of the poet's descriptive incapacity as he looked up to the cosmos is reflected in Vergil's diffidence about the Muses' willingness to receive him in his mystic quest to penetrate the inner secrets of nature at *Georgics* 2.475–86.[162] But in the fifth century, when these grand ideas were first fully articulated, the mystic–revelatory role of the poet could be proclaimed with confidence (and was so proclaimed by Pindar, in his first hymn).[163] If, as I have argued, terrestrial *mousikē* at the mysteries offered those present an approach to understanding the cosmos, then the cosmic 'revelation' of the poet can be read as an extension of what was experienced in the *telestēria*, rather than as a purely figurative analogue of that experience. Again, we need constantly to recall that 'Orphic' poetry actually was part of the mysteries, and that the dividing line between it and poetry which represents or reflects mystery ideas may not always be clearly drawn. The evolving relationship between poetry and the mysteries will have been a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon; and the evidence presented here seems to point to the presence of dynamic mutual influences, generated in a variety of cultic contexts but deriving ultimately from a common family of ideas about music, teaching and telestic revelation.

[162] See Hardie (2002). [163] Hardie (2000*a*) 37–8

2

Changing Choral Worlds: Song-Dance and Society in Athens and Beyond

Barbara Kowalzig

> The practice of physical exercises and the pursuit of culture have been brought into disrepute by the common people as being undesirable because they realize that these accomplishments are beyond them. However, for the staging of dramatic and choral festivals, the superintending of the gymnasia and the games, and the provision of triremes, they realize that it is the rich who pay, and the common people for whom such things are arranged and who serve in the triremes. At all events, they think it right to receive pay for singing, running, and dancing, and for sailing in the fleet so that they may have money and the rich become poorer. In the courts too, they are as much interested in their own advantage as they are in justice.
>
> [Xenophon] *Old Oligarch*, 1.13, trans. Moore

This passage is one of the more striking examples in which the *Old Oligarch* reduces life in the Athenian democracy to continuous mutual exploitation between the rich and the poor, a constant struggle between the ruthless self-interest of the demos against the infinite riches of the wealthy. Quite apart from offering broader insights into the peculiar variety of Athenians' political pursuits, the extract has sometimes been taken not only to distinguish an 'aristocratic' from a 'democratic' phase in the life of the Greek *khoros* but also to illustrate how—by some intriguing political, rather than cultural, development—the performing arts were helped on their way towards professionalism. What this discussion disguises is the passage's most intriguing implication: with payment, choral dancing had been assimilated—elevated—to the status of a public office of the same kind as the much more

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familiar jury service, mentioned in fact in the same breath. If all these payments were instituted to increase the participation of the Athenians in their democracy, this must mean that dancing in the *khoros* was perceived as contributing as much to the running of the *polis* as any of the other jobs that made up the much-invoked democratic way of life. The juxtaposition of the tasks is nevertheless somewhat oblique: in reality there was no state pay for being active in a *khoros*; remuneration of the choral dancers had always remained the job of the officiating *khorēgos* and part and parcel of how the democracy shared out its costs. And we tend to think that the actual tribal competitors, unlike the jurors, were more often than not those whose milieu had educated them to perform. But the point remains that the Athenian wealth of choral festivals allowed vast numbers a share in dancing.[1]

Choral pay then was established to increase involvement, much as those on the other side of the orchestra were arguably being paid to watch. Subsidy of this kind can be seen as helping the poorer citizens on their way; it could also be seen as a shrewd move on the part of those in power to make it impossible to remain outside the community they dominated. It is part of Athens' strategy to create an environment in which one could not *not* participate. And participation, that essential feature that made the democracy work, is also at the basis of how *mousikē* and politics were intertwined.

The classical Athenian *polis* took to extremes what had long been practised in the archaic *polis* world. That a top dancer would appear at the top of the *polis*' political hierarchy seems to have been as normal as it has generally remained unnoticed: few words have been expended, for example, on the fact that Miletus' musical elite, the Molpoi, star-singers and loyal attendants of Apollo, were deeply implicated in the affairs of their city.[2]

The postulated identity of musical and *polis*-life could indeed be considered a mainstay of the archaic city. Choral song belongs to the earliest known practices in ancient Greek communities: some of the very first visual impressions we have are those of

[1] The issues of choral pay and patronage, as well as recruitment, are extensively discussed by Wilson (2000*a*) 75–80, 123–30; on aspects of 'collective experience' see Gould (1996), and Goldhill's answer (1996), esp. 249–51.

[2] Cf. the list of eponymous magistrates: Kawerau and Rehm (1967) no. 122–8. For their religious duties see the Molpoi inscription: *LSAM* 1450; for the privileges of the Onitadai 31–42.

male and female *khoroi* on gigantic vases of the geometric period. That choral song was much more than a peculiar preference for a particular type of performance has lately started to become a commonly held view, and some important work has gone into developing a broad religious context for it within archaic Greece; more recently choral performances have received attention as communicating values shared between performers and audience; and now the social economics of the classical *khoros*, too, have been investigated.[3]

What is only in its infancy is work on the precise relation between the archaic Greek and classical Athenian choral worlds. The transition is puzzling, and several proposals have been made to account for difference or sameness, but the question of how the dramatic *khoros* relates to the lyric one is essentially still unresolved.[4] What is clear is that the relationship is to be sought in the political changes within the *polis* environment, and is deeply intertwined with early fifth-century history: the move from elite *khoros* to the paid citizen *khoros* is a social, not a literary, one. And—as I shall suggest in the course of this chapter—at its heart lie musical strategies to enhance participation.

Classical Athens itself is not the place where traditional choral performances were most at home. It is generally assumed that the archaic city shared its choral practices with the rest of the Greek community; by contrast, while fifth-century Athens was prolific in creating dramatic *khoroi*, its lyric production, with the exception of the dithyramb, was poor. That Athenian classical *khoroi* took over some of the functions of the archaic *khoros* in the *polis* is a reasonable assumption. But to understand the different role of Athenian choral *mousikē* we need to go to places where it was not the same Dionysiac *khoros* that danced on all prominent occasions.

That *khoros*-singing is a form of social integration is both a long-acknowledged truth and a fashionable thing to say. There is evidence that the Greeks themselves were well aware of their choral

[3] The series started with the groundbreaking work by Calame (1997), though Brelich (1969) is an early predecessor; see further Mullen (1982); Nagy (1990) esp. 339–81; Lonsdale (1993); Bacon (1994–5); Stehle (1997); Ceccarelli (1998); Wilson (2000*a*); Bierl (2001); Rutherford (2001*a*).

[4] See e.g. Burkert (1986); Nagy (1994–5*a*); Herington (1985) 80–94 is interested in a literary continuity; Calame (1994–5); (1999a) in that of performative self-referentiality. Brelich (1969) 310–11 long ago observed that the change at stake here is primarily socially motivated.

habitus. Polybios, in a passage familiar to students of chorality, goes into astonishing detail about how choral and social order are quite indistinct: since rough and rocky Arkadia does not provide a natural forum for socialization, the choral form provides a basis upon which to establish community, and to counteract its natural tendency to disintegration. He even comes up with a remarkable counter-example: because the people of Kynaitha lack choral dancing as a tool for social inclusion, their *polis* is shaken by competition. The relevant inference here is of course that chorality is an essential community bond within a context of aristocratic strife. The *khoros* levels rather than distinguishes; its members compete for a prize in community ideals rather than for individual prowess. The *khoros* is what makes them all the same before the god.[5]

But ancient notions about the *khoros* go much further. Ephoros, quoted by Polybios in the same passage, points to the pitfalls of the technique. Speaking more broadly for the whole of *mousikē*, he condemns it as being brought into humanity 'for the purpose of deception and bewitching' (ἐπ' ἀπάτῃ καὶ γοητείᾳ παρεισῆχθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, 4.20.5–6). The terminology smacks of Platonic criticism, but we should take seriously the context in which it is quoted. *Mousikē* is criticized for the same reason as it is praised by Polybios: because it uses aesthetic strategies that affect everyone alike, *mousikē* effects a collective involvement. It is this notion of involvement that is both profitable and harmful to society. *Mousikē* is the medium through which a whole community propels itself into belief.

The implications of the *khoros*' potential for collective deception go beyond the simple problem of moral corruption of the young: it might be argued that it shakes the very foundations on which society is built. Choral *mousikē*, at Athens and elsewhere, is inseparable from its original context; it forms the heart and soul of a community's religious practices. The working of the *khoros* in its religious community ultimately presents the key to the wider understanding of the social potential of chorality. While aspects of this have to some extent been explored for lyric *khoroi*, I shall demonstrate that it may also present the cornerstone for understanding some of the workings of the—exceptional—Athenian choral world. In trying to unravel some relations between *mousikē*

[5] Polyb. 4. 20–1.

and religion, choral performances will be seen to form a supportive framework within the social structure of a working *polis*.

Antiquity's first coherent performance theorist provides an experimental framework for this investigation. Plato's *Laws* in many ways anticipates what modern sociologists are only just discovering.[6] The *khoros* forms the basis of Plato's musical sociology, the fundamental system for bringing order to society is provided by the *khoros*; and drama, too, functions within the realm of choral *mousikē* and thus also of religion. But this rather turns the *Laws* into the study of a choral zealot: the *Laws*' problems with Athenian culture are those with a dysfunctional choral world. That Plato's context is unreal need not worry us too much. It is even, strangely, an advantage. Like many contemporary criticisms of democracy as a political system, the *Laws* does not seek revolution, but reform from within the system itself. Plato is of interest in measuring the dimensions of the choral universe since he gives us hints both of how the choral order is and how it should be; his is a curious mixture of conservatism and deeply entrenched democratic thought. Nevertheless we must be aware that the *Laws*' fatalistic implications for contemporary Athens are a construction, one that may not represent the actual state of affairs with any accuracy. Needless to say, the *Laws* requires a full-scale study from the point of view of *mousikē* and its place within the Platonic philosophical system; the comments here only serve the purpose of highlighting a number of points that seem relevant for the relationship between choral *mousikē* and religion. The treatise demonstrates how musical *khoroi* are intertwined with religion, while at the same time we learn what is wrong—or special—about the Athenian system: the *Laws*' obsession with chorality more often than not accurately reflects what Athens was not. And through learning what Athens lacked, the choral world elsewhere

[6] The *Laws* has been insufficiently exploited from the point of view of choral *mousikē*: for some comments on the *khoros* see Lonsdale (1993) esp. 21–43; also Morrow (1960) 297 ff. Belfiore (1986) has interesting remarks on Plato's different attitudes in the Laws on the Dinoysiac *khoros*. For Plato's views on poetry Murray (1996), with further bibliography, is a helpful introduction. Nightingale's (1995) is mainly concerned with the philosophical embedding of literary genres, not with the social aspect of their chorality. Her discussion (1999) usefully provides a political and historical framework for a reading of the *Laws*. On the actual role of *mousikē* in 4th-cent. Athens see Robb (1994). For modern performance theory see most recently the overviews by Goldhill (1999) and Bierl (2001) 11–104.

is illuminated. The real value of Plato's *Laws* in getting to grips with the power of choral performance lies in reading them through the choral world outside Athens. Looking at some real *khoroi* and their religious context, therefore, will illuminate and develop a much broader understanding of the implications of choral performance for society as a form of socialization within the *polis*. Feeding those insights back into the Athenian dramatic scene will illuminate further the *Laws*' contemporary choral anxiety.

I PLATO'S CHORAL *KOSMOS*

Despite the Athenian's effortless superiority in managing the discussion, Plato's text labours hard to determine the relation between *mousikē*, religion, and society. The problem cannot be separated from some fundamentals of Greek religion: that the polytheistic system provides a framework within which society acts, and without which society cannot operate. Within this set-up, choral performance determines one's relation with the gods, while at the same time structuring society.

Choral performance, according to the *Laws*, is first and foremost a form of addressing the gods: the purpose is to gain and sustain the deity's favour. The Athenian's advice is to spend one's whole life sacrificing, singing, and dancing (θύοντα καὶ ᾄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον), so that it 'may be possible to make sure the gods are favourably inclined' (ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἵλεως αὐτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι, 803e1–3). The terminology of gaining favour recurs: ritual activity consists of men ἱλεούμενοι ('propitiating') and performing ἱκετείαι (804b2; 796c8: these are 'supplications', not prayers in the modern sense, for reasons which will become evident below; note the wording of the attack on private religious behaviour 910b2–3: λάθρα τοὺς θεοὺς ἵλεως οἰόμενοι ποιεῖν θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς 'in secret do they believe that they can render the gods favourably inclined through sacrifices and prayers'). The god's χάρις is at the centre of the religious effort, and the full recognition of it is central to the relationship between god and human (τὴν τῆς θεοῦ χάριν τιμῶντας, 796c3).

In Plato's construction, how and when you dance is of prime importance. The *Laws*' city's choral diversity is worked through with almost excessive precision. Thus the principle according to which the *nomophylax* performs his duty is to establish the relation between the *mousikē* and the different varieties of dance, and then 'share out to each sacrifice [in the calendar] the style of dance that is appropriate' or indeed 'expedient' (τὴν ὄρχησιν νείμαντα ἐπὶ πάσας ἑορτὰς τῶν θυσιῶν ἑκάστῃ τὸ πρόσφορον, 816c4–5). The point here surely is that the choice of a *khoros* is specific; *khoroi* cannot just be shared around but different deities each receive different choral types. The same idea is echoed a little later when the year-round festival curriculum is drafted. Crucially, each god is allocated a month sacred only to him or her, and each month the citizens should 'offer (προσνέμοντας) sacrifice to each of these gods and have *khoros* performances and musical and gymnastic contests as it befits (κατὰ τὸ πρέπον) each god and season'. And a further qualification is made, that Olympian and khthonian deities are to be kept strictly separate (οὐ συμμεικτέον ἀλλὰ χωριστέον).[7] In this way, too, one's 'personal daimon' will advise each individual beyond the public festivals 'on the sacrifices and *khoroi*', adding the interesting detail of 'telling them the various divinities in whose honour they should do what and on what occasions, so as to win the gods' good will' (οἵστισί τε καὶ ὁπότε ἕκαστα ἑκάστοις προσπαίζοντες τε καὶ ἱλεούμενοι, 804a 5–b4).

The configuration of all these elements must not be changed. Methods of ensuring stability had been introduced at an earlier stage, and they likewise make clear that specific gods want specific *khoroi*. The process by which the festival circuit is determined is first to draw up the year's calendar, and then to decide 'with what hymn the gods should be honoured in song at the various sacrifices for the gods and with which *khoreia* each *thysia* should be honoured', and to fix these relations the whole citizen body should consecrate them (καθιερόω) to the respective gods.[8]

The message is clear: you don't mix the gods but keep them clearly distinct. This is also where religious issues intertwine with Plato's views on literary forms. The Platonic utopia of pure choral genres, often interpreted in a purely literary way,[9] reflects the same pattern and should perhaps be considered a religious issue: mixed forms entail the mixing of gods (700a7 ff.). By

[7] 828b7–c5; c6–d5.
[8] 799a4–b8. Cf. the Egyptian musical dictatorship which explains Egypt's persistent art forms through the millenia: 656c1–57b8. See Nightingale (1999) 118–21.
[9] See n. 6 above.

contrast, worshipping the gods within polytheistic systems is all about honouring different gods, each in their own, distinctive, way. What choral dance then is about, according to this evidence, is differentiation, the ability to distinguish between different types of worship and, more importantly, the community's attitude towards a particular god.

Hence gods are mentioned with their specific functions: Apollo, for instance, is universally the deity who is responsible for *mousikē*. However, it is striking that the Athenian chooses to differentiate the discrete usages of communities in other respects, as if to emphasize the interdependence between individual communities and the way in which they deal with religious worship: military dances are performed under the protection of Athena at Athens, whilst the patronage is the Dioskouroi's and the Kouretai's in Sparta and Crete respectively (796b3–d5), so as to draw attention to the fact that gods have different roles in different places. The armed dance is an imitation of these gods' *tropoi* and, among other things, improves the quality of present and future citizens. The skills they acquire this way will be useful in war and—note—in festivals (πολέμου ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ ἑορτῶν ἕνεκα 796c3–4). The point here is that, by knowing how to address the god, one knows how to perform on behalf of one's community.

There is also an interesting, more general, recommendation with respect to the specificity of ritual, that whatever advice had been given of old on the introduction 'by the various groups in the *polis*' (ἕκάστους, 738b7) of particular gods and cult places following the ancient orders of renowned oracles such as those at Delphi or Dodona, this must not be overturned, implying that altering the arrangements of the gods means changing those within the city. And, it was just as important that the religious institutions maintain a place's relationship with the period relating to its foundation, the creative *illud tempus* of the mythological period. The alternative reason for founding cults is also stated: stories of old, received by some divine dream or vision, motivate the setting up of shrines. In the same section it is the lawgiver's concern that 'every unit' within the *polis* (ἑκάστοις μέρεσιν) should be given its god, *daimon* or hero, and appropriate sacred localities drawn up, while local festivities provide the opportunity to foster cohesion within the 'unit' (738d1–e2).

On a related issue, while the general point about the *khoros*' quality as a social tool in Plato is often made,[10] much less attention is dedicated to the content of these *khoroi*. An interesting passage comes to mind: in dreaming up his tripartite choral state, the lawgiver is to give special heed to ensure that as far as possible the entire community preserves "cohabitation" (συνοικία: sometimes translated as 'harmony') in its ᾠδαί and μῦθοι and λόγοι.[11] Choral content seems to matter. And a further strategy emerges on the shape of choral song: variation and diversity (μεταβαλλόμενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόμενα ποικιλίαν) in song are essential tools by which to avoid loss of interest (παύεσθαι) in the musical performances and to ensure constant eagerness (ἀπληστία) for pleasure (ἡδονή). An interesting notion: variety emerges as a crucial tool to create homogeneity of attitude within society (665c2–7).

The important point about differentiation between the choral honours for the gods can be made more widely: choral *mousikē* is about expressing distinctions, and ways of discriminating between the gods and a community's relationship to them. That this must be an underlying concern is clear from the way in which the *Laws* insists on the variety of modes through which choral dance can express things. The discussion regarding such choral modes is, ultimately, about how religious behaviour shapes social behaviour.

The origins claimed for the *khoros* are interesting in this respect. While in children's education 'pain' and 'pleasure' were feelings kept well apart, human attitudes grew slack with adulthood. So the gods took pity on their earthly counterparts, and thus they offered themselves to humans as *khoros*-leaders. Choral dance, and the 'emotions' (ἡδονή and λύπη) that follow from it, are god-inspired (653a5–654a7).[12] This is also why choral training is at the heart of education: '[the three *khoroi*] should charm the souls of the children while still young and tender, and uphold all the admirable doctrines (τὰ καλὰ) we have already formulated' (664b3 ff.). A man who is not trained in a *khoros* is, famously, an uneducated person.[13]

[10] e.g. most recently by Too (2001*a*) 12.

[11] 663e9–664a7.

[12] Gods are συνεορτασταί 653d4, συγχορευταί 654a1, and they lead the *khoros* (χορηγεῖν) 654a3.

[13] 654a9–b1: ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος ('uneducated, not trained in choruses') is set in contrast to πεπαιδευμένος κεχορευκώς ('educated and trained in choruses'). Cf. also 672c5–6 for *khoreia* as a form of pedagogy.

The basics of Platonic thought on choral education are well known: different human τρόποι ('manners' or 'dispositions') are staged in μίμησις of the gods, and in this manner the dancer experiences good and bad. What is striking is the emphasis given throughout the *Laws* on the many different dispositions that choral dance can convey. There is a remarkable concern with 'tropic' distinctions meandering through the text: choral dance can represent the good or bad (ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν / φαῦλον μιμούμενον), and is subdivided into various distinct war and peace dances (814d7 ff.). There is great concern that different age groups perform different dances (children: ὁ παιδικὸς χορός), men under thirty years (ὁ μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν), men between 30 and 60 (οἱ ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη μέχρι τῶν ἑξήκοντα γεγονότες 664b5–d5 ff.). What is intriguing above all is the considerable weight put on gender distinction. The *Laws* repeatedly makes the point that women must have their own dances and conspicuously insists on the discrete form and function of male and female melodies and rhythms (e.g. 802d8–e2). Female *khoroi* are the norm in the *partheneia*-filled world of a wider Greece; but the stipulation is particularly striking in the Athenian context where, as far as we know, there was no institutionalized women's dancing.[14] And this might present a problem: the *Laws*' implied complaint about its absence makes perfect sense when we consider that training in the *khoros* was a prime form of socialization; Athenian girls just fell short of the pedagogical curriculum which identified their Spartan peers in their community. In fact, the concern is met elsewhere when Plato insists on the necessity of girls' public education (804c2 ff.; cf. 796c2–4 on female *khoroi* in military education; 665c).[15]

The issue of gender distinction offers a useful foil against which to set the *Laws*' choral considerations: choral performance has discrete functions within the *polis* society. Dancing different choral forms for different gods means dancing distinct, clear-cut emotional and ethical *tropoi*, vital lynchpins of community integration.

[14] The point is discussed by Robert Parker (unpublished paper); he also makes comments on Athenian female dancing at the *pannykhis* (e.g. Eur. *Herakleidai* 777–82). Cf. Stehle (1997) 59.

[15] Evidence, mostly from vase paintings, for domestic musical and other education for 5th-cent. Athenian women, by contrast, is not scarce (see e.g. Beck (1975) 55–62). Cf. the recent discussion by Griffith (2001), esp. 69–70 and note 153; 43–7 generally on the nature of institutionalized, educational *khoros*-training.

And more than that, very particular gods also set their worshippers to dance in order to define their social role, age-group, gender or political status. Secondly, it follows that mixing the gods means blurring the associated mainstays of the community: keeping the gods' dances tidy becomes a means of keeping society's household pure. The *Laws*' interest then lies in showing how religious behaviour shapes social behaviour. And more widely, the *Laws*' statements are a defence of the social structure that supports Greek polytheism—having distinct gods to do distinct things for one's community. Choral diversity thus forms one of the backbones of Greek polytheism which itself presents the basis for a working *polis*-community. Polytheistic choral dance is the foundation of society.

II THE WIDER CHORAL WORLD

The *Laws*' claims become more substantial when we venture away from fictitious chorality to the dancing floors themselves. The world of choral *mousikē* elsewhere elucidates the problems which Plato might have had with the Athenian sphere. How existing gods are related to choral performances, how these performances work in society, and what part of society they address—all these things become clear from considering some real-life choral examples through various issues that Plato takes for granted and, carefully or carelessly, avoids telling the modern reader.

The close relation of many *khoroi* to sacrifice is both striking and significant. It is worth recalling that Plato's *khoroi* are almost always closely tied in with *thysia*, suggesting that they were a vital part of the worship. The personal daimon advises θυσιῶν τε πέρι καὶ χορειῶν ('on sacrifices and *khoroi*'); and similarly the lawgiver is asked to distribute 'to each feast and sacrifice' (ἐπὶ πάσας ἑορτὰς τῶν θυσιῶν) the appropriate dance (τὴν ὄρχησιν).[16] It is remarkable that this combination of 'sacrifice and *khoros*' recurs everywhere in choral talk in an almost formulaic manner: ἱερὰ καὶ χοροί denotes the requisite tribute for everyone wanting to participate in the Athenian Delia. The cornerstones of the Arkadians' holy customs mentioned above are 'the sacrifices . . . and furthermore the *khoroi*'; or Lukian's antiquarian *khoroi*

[16] 804a4; 816e3–5.

continuously dance together with sacrifices.[17] The point is particularly well made by Kleisthenes of Sikyon's division of the rites for Adrastos, a heroic character destined to be struck off the list of worthy men, into *khoroi* for Dionysos while 'the remaining offering' (τὴν ἄλλην θυσίαν) is to be directed to the new hero Melanippos: evidently both θυσία and χοροί are considered equal parts of the set ritual for Adrastos (Hdt. 5.67). The divisible, almost material, quality of the *khoros* goes hand in hand with its being an item on the ritual agenda in its own right. Without the *khoros*, the ritual would presumably have been incomplete.

Closer inspection of the religious circumstances in which actual *khoroi* danced immediately reveals why this should be so. In real life, too, *khoroi* are not arbitrary points in the programme of a religious occasion. How each *khoros* was imagined to have come into being through myth is relevant here: choral ritual and mythical narrative are intrinsically related to each other. To start with a simple instance: the Argive Hybristika included *khoroi* of women mocking the city's men for not having been able to expel the Spartans from the city generations ago. It was a female *khoros* under the guidance of the archaic poetess Telesilla who had achieved the feat. The teasing *khoroi* obviously matter to the ritual as a whole, and an awareness of the aetiological story is essential for performing the choral ritual. The story determines the particular character of this choral ritual.[18]

The specific nature of the *khoros* addressing the god is therefore relevant. How deeply intertwined god and *khoros* are becomes clear when we scrutinize more generally the relationship between myth and choral ritual. There is a reciprocal relationship unique to the cult in which it is performed, so that *khoroi* can be argued to be specific to the myth–ritual complex in which they function.

Artemis of Ephesos was traditionally worshipped in a peculiar ritual the aition of which is recounted in the *Etymologicum*

[17] Thuc. 3.104; Polyb. 4.20.5–21.9; Lucian *De Salt.* 16 and 17. Lucian interestingly identifies non-sacrificial Indian dancing rituals with what in Greece is represented by the 'combined set' of *eukhē*, *khoroi*, and *thysia*.

[18] Plut. *Mul. Virt.* 245e. Cf. the Aiginetan mocking *khoroi* for Damia and Auxesia: Hdt. 5.83.3: θυσίῃσί τέ σφεα καὶ χοροῖσι γυναικηίοισι κερτόμουσι ἱλάσκοιντο. Other instances of such 'mocking festivals' are those for Apollo at Anaphe: Apollon. 4.1717–28; Apollod. 1.9.26; Konon 49; Demeter at Pellene: Paus. 7.27.10.

Magnum in explanation for her epithet Δαιτίς.[19] Ephesian girls and young men had taken the goddess' image to the meadows (λειμών), and after their παιδιά ('ritual play', often '*khoros*') and τέρψις in these they honoured her with local products, σέλινον (celery) and the salt of the marshes. When this ritual was not repeated in the following year, a plague (λοιμός) sent by Artemis killed the young people; the goddess' wrath (μῆνις) was only appeased when on an oracle's advice the ritual was renewed. From sources as old as the fifth century we know that Artemis hosted a kind of standing *khoros* of *parthenoi* (the so-called Λυδῶν κόραι) who sang for the goddess, and a less neatly defined '*khoros*' of boy attendants changing by annual rotation (the ἐσσῆνες); and these were thought of in the ancient world under the appropriate title of ἑστιατόρες.[20] According to the description of the Artemisia in Xenophon's *Ephesiaca*, all ephebes and young women took part in the procession on occasion of the festival (*Ephes.* 1.2 f.).

The (double) choral form of the cult personnel is interesting. The *khoros* which in the mythical narrative itself already performs in the language of choral dance (*paidia*, *terpsis*) is both inherent to the story that establishes its ritual in the first place, and to the ritual customs performed ever since, almost as if the story had an informal, and the rite a formal, *khoros*. The defining feature of the *khoros*' relationship to the goddess lies in the word ἐξηυμενίσαντο 'they appeased': the young people's obliviousness is a sacred offence of the entire community for which their annual rite compensates; the choral offering is a tribute to the deity. The rite sets right the community's relationship with its god, and renews it in every ensuing performance.

The situation is similar for a much better-known set of *khoroi*. The end of Euripides' *Medea* gives the aition for the Korinthian festival performed annually in connection with the murder of

[19] *Etym. Magn.* s.v. Note that Klymena, daughter of the king is 'leading' this mixed chorus. Cf. Call. *Dian.* 237–47, where Amazons dance several *khoroi* under the guidance of their queen Hippo during the process of setting up the statue of Artemis.

[20] Standing chorus: Ar. *Nub.* 598–600. Cf. Ion of Chios *TrGF* 19 F 22: Αυδαὶ ψάλτριαι, παλαιθέτων ὕμνων ἀοιδαί. Autokrates K.–A. fr. 1 (*Tympanistai*) = Ael. *NA* 12.9 φίλαι παρθένοι Αυδῶν κόραι; Diog. Ath. *TrGF* 45 F 1.6–12.9: κλύω δὲ Αυδᾶς Βακτρίας τε παρθένου ... Ἄρτεμιν σέβειν ψαλμοῖ. Cult personnel at Ephesos: Paus. 8.13.1. On the festival see Calame (1997) 93–6 and Nilsson (1906/96) 243–7.

Medea's children at the sanctuary of Hera at Perakhora, just across the Isthmos. From antiquarian texts we know that the Korinthians did in fact regularly send to Hera a choral contingent consisting of seven boys and seven girls who would stay with the goddess for an entire year; vase depictions found locally of choral formations suggest that the choral aspect of Hera's worship goes back to at least the sixth century BC.[21] Here too, the choral tribute is intrinsically associated with the community's relationship to its god: in other versions of the myth it is not Medea but the Korinthians themselves who kill the children—to avoid, note, the 'foreign queen' becoming too powerful. Plague and wrath befall the city, until on oracular pronouncement the seven boys and girls are dispatched every year to the goddess' sanctuary 'to propitiate their wrath with sacrifices' (ἐναπενιαυτίζειν ἐν τῷ τῆς θεᾶς τεμένει καὶ μετὰ θυτῶν ἱλάσκεσθαι τὴν ἐκείνων μῆνιν).[22]

Extensive singing for the children at the annual festival is recorded by Philostratos when he remembers a θρῆνος ('dirge') τελεστικὸς καὶ ἔνθεος ('mystic and god-inspired'). The 'mystery' and 'funerary' aspects of the festival are in fact long anticipated by Euripides' ἑορτὴ καὶ τέλη (l. 1382) for the children, picked up by his scholiasts as πένθιμος ἑορτή. The central activity at this festival, too, is said by the texts to be propitiatory *khoros*-singing during sacrifice (ἱλάσκεσθαι, εὐμενίζεσθαι, μειλίσσεσθαι). The annual propitiatory cult tribute serves to make up for the community's impiety against Medea's children and to redress the city's perturbed relationship with the god.[23]

The prophecy by Athena at the end of Euripides' *Erekhtheus* reveals the crux of the matter. Foremost among the set of religious *aitia* stands the heroization of the Erekhtheids. One of Erekhtheus' daughters was sacrificed to save the Athenians in the war against Eleusis: ἣν τῆσδε χώρας σὸς προθύεται [πόσι]ς· ('whom your husband has caused to be sacrificed in defence of this country', trans. Cropp: fr. 370.66 K; cf. *Ion* 277: ἔτλη πρὸ γαίας σφάγια παρθένου κτανεῖν ('he steeled himself to slay his daughters as offerings for his country', trans. Lee)), and her sisters join her heroization because of the nobility (γενναιότης, fr. 370.69 K) they had displayed in remaining loyal to their sister and their oaths. The essence of both myth and ritual is encapsulated in the following few lines:

ἐπεὶ . . .
καὶ γῆν ἔσωσε, τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἀστ[οῖς λέγ]ω
ἐνιαυσίαις σφᾶς μὴ λελησμ[ένους] χρόνωι
θυσίαισι τιμᾶν καὶ σφαγαῖσι [βουκ]τόνοις
κοσμοῦ [ντας ἱ]εροῖς παρθένων [χορεύ]μασιν.

Because . . . they . . . preserved the land, I instruct my citizens to honour them, never forgetting over time, with annual sacrifices and slaughterings of oxen, adorning the festivals with sacred maiden-dances. (Eur. *Erekhtheus* fr. 370.75–80 K, trans. Cropp)

In compensation for their own sacrifice, *thysia* and *khoroi* of their 'likes' are offered as a tribute to the Erekhtheids. The pattern is, as usual, annual. Note, too, the warning not to omit the offerings, as if the maidens' wrath were lying in wait for the failure to obey the sacrificial rules.

As is well known, the Greek world, from the earliest times to the imperial period, is full of such patriotic and determined maidens and youths as willing to die as those of Ephesos or Korinth or the Athens of Euripidean imagination.[24] What has received less attention is the fact that their (self-)sacrifice in myth, in addition to their heroization, in ritual almost always ends in choral dance. While some elements of the aetiological stories, such as the plague and the oracular advice, may well be part of a standardization of the structure of such myths typical of learned antiquarian literature of later times, the pattern is already popular in the archaic and classical periods. Quite apart from the fictions of Euripides' *Erekhtheus*, the archaic poetess Korinna's Koronides, daughters of Boiotian Orion, who survive in antiquarian collections, quite literally offered themselves as a sacrifice (εἰ δύο δυσὶν ἑκοῦσαι παρθένοι

[21] See the list in Pemberton (2000) 95 (referring to Payne, Dunbabin, Blakeway (1940/1962)), in the course of a discussion of the popular dancing scenes on Korinthian vases specifically from Korinth (with further references; cf. Tölle (1964) 45 no. 113); Berlin Staatliche Museen 31093 (= 65 Wegner), Corinth Museum (55 Crowhurst, 113 Tölle, 104 Wegner).

[22] Eur. *Med.* 1378–83; Parmeniskos *FGrH* 417 F 3 = Σ Eur. *Med.* 264 (cf. Paus. 2.3.10, quoting Eumelos). See Brelich (1959).

[23] Σ Eur. *Med.* 1379; Philostr. *Heroic.* 20.24., p. 67 De Lannoy. Cf. also Ael. *VH* 5.21.

[24] The Erekhtheids were real cult-heroines in classical Athens, though what form exactly their ritual took is uncertain: see Kearns (1989) 59–63; 201–2 where there are also helpful remarks on this type of myth–ritual structure (44–63); for social aspects see Stehle (1997) 103–4.

θύματα γένοιντο) to appease (ἱλάσκεσθαι) the wrath of a set of local deities so that they would re-establish their city's disturbed relationship to Artemis (Nik. *ap.* Ant. Lib. 25). Annual μειλίγματα were offered to them by the local youth in compensation for their deaths. On the basis of such learned texts we tend to believe that the story was told in Korinna's *Geroia* which also mentions performing *khoroi* of maidens, and the obvious inference would be that the *parthenoi* dancing the story were part of the propitiatory ritual that honoured the characters of myth.[25]

It seems that the annual choral ritual for such local adolescents was perceived as a form of collective compensation for their—voluntary or enforced—death on the community's behalf.[26] The *khoros*' task is to appease the gods for the crime by which the relevant deity was offended. The *khoros* forms the community's gift or tribute paid to the youths and their god; the actual performance makes this tribute real. The dancing performers function as representatives of the dead youths, and in dancing the *khoros* they are 'sacrificed' to the god in the same way as their mythical predecessors. It is perhaps interesting how one thing in myth—the sacrifice of girls or boys—becomes differentiated into a combined working of *thysia* and the *khoros* in ritual, which may also explain why the two cannot be separated from each other in real-life cult.

In this way, the crucial element of the mythical story is re-enacted through the actual choral performance of the ritual. (Note that this form of re-enactment of myth in ritual does not entail corresponding sequences of myth and ritual, but the merging of ritual and narrative in choral performance.) The *khoros*' performance thus establishes the bond between mythical tale and its associated cult. These examples show the *khoros* at the borderline between the mythical story in which it first occurs and the ritual of which it is a part, and the more evidence there is for a *khoros* and its story, the

[25] Korinna, *Geroia*? *PMG* 655 (cf. *PMG* 654); Nikander *ap.* Ant. Lib. 25. Cf. similar offerings for the dead: Aesch. *Ch.* 15 (Orestes, Choes); *Eu.* 107 (Klytemestra, Choes); Parthen. 12.1. The most recent comment on the *Geroia*, also on its choral performance, is by Stehle (1997) 100–4. West (1970); (1990) assumes a hellenistic date for Korinna; cf. Davies (1988*b*). Orion and his daughters operate in a complicated network of local traditions between Tanagra and Orkhomenos: cf. Paus. 9.22.3.

[26] Similar patterns are offered by the Proitids (e.g. Bacch. 11); the Minyads (e.g. Korinna *PMG* 665); Theseus' 'seven youths and maidens': Plut. *Thes.* 18.1 and others.

more clearly the *khoros*' double role in both myth and ritual emerges. The *khoros* functions as a hinge element and really performs in both spheres.

Aetiological narrative thus has a vital share in choral ritual activity. The story is essential to the nature of the ritual: the combined working of myth and ritual conveys what the cult is about and why a community bothers to enact it. The co-operation of myth and ritual can be seen in many choral rituals and is essential for the creation of meaning in religion. Above all it entails that performance is essential to a working ritual and to such meaning being conveyed.

To come back to where we started, it should now be clear why how to address one's god is of prime importance, and why specific gods need specific rituals: the associated myth–ritual complex shapes the community's relationship with any given god. More importantly, it sets right and renews that relationship through every single ritual. We remember that to keep the god 'in favour' or 'favourably inclined' (ἵλεως) was what the *Laws* had considered the *khoros*' purpose in addressing the god, and choral activity is duly expressed by the derivatives of ἱλάσθαι, ἱλάσκεσθαι, μειλίσσεσθαι, εὐμενίζεσθαι.

There is a further interesting element in this performative approach to chorality: in the merging of myth and ritual in performance lies the fundamental social aspect of rituals with a *khoros*. It is the specific way in which myth and ritual are related through performance that makes the act relevant to the community. Chorality is the sign of a communal religion; the choral ensemble—ideally—embraces the god's worshipping group, or else most often the section of society that represents the community in relation to a particular god: the maidens and young men of Samos and Ephesos, or the city's women at Argos. The *khoros* is thus at the heart of people's participation in public religion.

The system as we know it is essentially aristocratic. Though the evidence is not abundant, the choral tribute tends to be highly selective: girls, boys or women are chosen 'from the most important families', or are the noble children of a mythical, and mostly royal, character such as Proitos or Orion. The Boiotian *Daphnephoria*, for instance, represent an extreme form of the practice in which a single family occupies all central positions in the (partly choral) procession; and by a mere stroke of luck we also happen to

know examples of those noble Theban families who performed the liturgy.[27] But Medea's children, too, are propitiated by the sons and daugthers of the local elite (τῶν ἐπισημωτάτων ἀνδρῶν Σ Eur. *Med.* 264). We are to think then that a differentiated choral landscape is a feature of an aristocratic society; and at the very least that Greece's polytheistic religious system and the aristocratic *polis* environment are somehow intertwined. That choral poetry flourished when the old-world *polis* too was in its heyday neatly fits this conclusion.[28]

Another aspect lurks behind these first few instantiations of chorality: *khoroi* are deeply intertwined with the past of one's city, and a crucial function of performances seems to lie in bringing this past of the myth into the present of the ritual. How deeply a community's existence and identity were based on its choral rituals becomes clearer still from a few relevant choral samples.

Choral performances often provide a mechanism for coping with social conflict, and, related to that, social change. It is remarkable how many choral traditions in Greece are prompted by an inter-*poleis* conflict preserved as mythical or semi-mythical stories. A whole array of problematic situations in some archaic past is solved through a choral performance that then continues into the present.

The sanctuary of Olympia, for example, was mythically, and repeatedly, fought over between the areas of 'Pisa' (Olympia) and Elis, with the latter eventually being victorious (the myth of the marriage between Pelops of Elis and Hippodameia of Pisa provides an explicit comment on this[29]). While Elis' subsequent domination of the Olympic shrine was never seriously contested, the old conflict is apparent in a religious tradition shared by the former competitors: in wartime, sixteen women, chosen as

[27] Pindar frr. 94 a–b; the family concerned are the Aioladai (on whom see Th. 4.91–3). Pindar is reported to have composed a daphnephoric hymn for his own son: fr. 94c SM = *vit. Pind. Ambr.* (1.3.3 Drachmann). For the ritual at the Daphnephoria see Paus. 9.10.4; Procl. *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 239.321b23–30.

[28] Cf. the khoristers of the Delphic Stepterion (Ael. *VH* 3.1: παῖδες εὐγενεῖς). Cf. the account of an ancient 'human' sacrifice for Dionysos Aisymnetes and Artemis Triklaria of a 'sacred couple', girl and boy οἳ εἶδος εἶεν κάλλιστοι (Paus. 7.19.4).

[29] It is doubtful whether a city 'Pisa' ever existed (Str. 8.31.1; cf. Pi. *Ol.* 2.3; 3.9; *Nem.* 10.32–3 where it means the sanctuary); more likely, the struggle revolved around the independence of the sanctuary; the name later denotes the sanctuary alone: e.g. *GDI* 1153; Σ Plato *Phaedr.* 236a.

'the most venerable' from one of the sixteen *poleis* in the area, succeeded in putting an end to the men's warfare, an action which brought about the unification of Elis to include Pisa. These women, who had previously danced in two separate *khoroi* of eight women each, in worship of one Elean and one Pisatan heroine, now created a collegium of sixteen (αἱ ἑκκαίδεκα), famous all over Greece, tending the cult of Hera at Olympia, and for whose performance an allegedly ancient hymn is transmitted. The festival consisted, among other things, of contests between women, a reminder of the ancient conflict within the region in symbolic competition.[30]

What is interesting about this choral tradition? The *khoroi* have an eminently social function: they re-enact both conflict and resolution, associated with the difficult process of the regional unification of Elis. Similarly, while none of the cities in Elis surrender their sovereignty, at the same time common worship creates community among them. The unification of Elis happened—as far as we know—at some point in the fourth century BC. The story was told as late as the second century AD. Whether this particular *khoros* was dancing away over some five hundred years cannot be either denied or confirmed. What is significant is that the Eleans chose to represent this religious tradition as if it were the product of a long process of transmission through song and dance. It is the continued dance, the *khoros*, that ensures that such conflicts of the past are not forgotten. And more widely, the *khoros* defines and reaffirms a city's identity and relation to the past.

Another familiar story illustrates further the complexity of the interaction between choral performances and history, for the choral traditions also shape the telling of history. It has long been observed that cult-aetiological myths often provide the framework through which to narrate historical events.[31] The ancient and chronologically indeterminate rivalry between Korinth and Samos (Hdt. 3.48 ff.)—probably economically motivated—is recorded in precisely this way. To take vengeance for the misbehaviour of their daughter-*polis* Korkyra, the Korinthians imprisoned 300 noble Korkyrean sons and sent them to the Lydian king for castration.

[30] Paus. 5.16 (Hera/Dionysos), esp. 5.16.5–6; the hymn (*PMG* carm. pop. 871) is quoted in Plut. *Mor.* 299b; 364f. For comments see Calame (1997) 136–7 and Stehle (1997) 104–5.

[31] See Sourvinou-Inwood (1988).

In a desperate attempt to rescue themselves, the boys went as suppliants to the temple of Artemis on Samos. The Samians creatively prevented their starvation: they simply invented a ritual entailing the setting up of '*khoroi* of maidens and young men,' during which they took foodstuff into the shrine, pretending that it was to be an offering to the deity, while in fact it was placed there to be eaten by the hungry boys.

The Samians' trick here is to come up with a ritual that is typical of Artemisian worship while at the same time the myth–ritual complex accounts for the use of baked goods in the cult characteristic of this area.[32] The same ritual was still performed in Herodotos' day, over a century later. It is the specific elements of the choral ritual that recall the historical event through every renewed performance. The story (which may well include historical elements) is integrated into the narrative framework of a typically Artemisian ritual; history is shaped by religious narrative.

Again, the reciprocity seems clear: the *khoros* needs a story to make sense in a ritual; and the story needs the *khoros* to survive. And so the telling of history adapts to the schemata of aetiological stories. The instance is paradigmatic of the way in which many choral traditions use history as much as history uses them. All this can work because the *khoroi* operate with the notion of their own continuity: the point of the choral ritual is precisely that it has been performed ever since what the (hi)story tells us happened.

Such choral performances therefore validate one's history all the better. It is in conveying historical 'truth' that the potential of these performances lies. The implied potential for inconspicuously wiping away this truth becomes evident when the choral performance takes issue with the claimed historical reality in the eyes of some others; for this possibility too we have some evidence. As is well known, Argos and Sparta, the two major cities in the Peloponnese, came to blows over a number of unsolved squabbles in the archaic period.[33] The most spectacular of these was the so-called Battle of the Champions, fought over the Thyreatis. Herodotos tells the famous story (1.82): three hundred soldiers were selected

[32] On the rite see Nilsson (1905/95) 240, quoting Plut. *Hdti. Mal.* 860b who ascribes the same story to the Knidians, an indication that the cake custom may have been more widespread in the area.

[33] The conflict itself had already a long history: Paus. 3.2.2; 7.2; 7.5; Euseb. Ad Ol. 15/2; Solin. 7.9. Cf. Brelich (1961) 22–3.

to fight on each side in something like a man-to-man battle. They fought with bravery, and at the end of the day, only one Spartan and two Argives were left on the battlefield. The two Argives thought this implied that victory was theirs, and hurried back to their city, while the remaining Spartan, observing the ritual of ancient battle to the very end, took the spoils of the fallen Argive warriors. When both cities' troops eventually turned up to learn about the outcome of the battle, both ascribed the victory to themselves.

Later sources tell us that the Spartans established a festival for Apollo Pythaieus in honour of those Spartans who died fighting. In the ritual of the *Gymnopaidia*, known for its military character, *khoroi* of boys wore victory crowns as 'a reminder of the victory gained in Thyrea' (ὑπόμνημα τῆς ἐν Θυρέᾳ γενομένης νίκης), and victory paeans were sung as if the battle had only just been fought. But this brazen claim remained hotly contested: the battle proved to be more prolific of legends than any other, to the degree that in the third century BC the Argives continued to commemorate their perceived victory with heroic epigrams on the virtues of the two surviving soldiers.[34]

While the *khoroi* performing at Sparta, impersonating and remembering their fallen ancestors, emphasize the continuity of military prowess among the local youth, it is obvious what function the choral tradition serves: it alone offers access to the truth of the Spartan claim. The fact that it is continuously performed is believed to be proof—proof enough—of the historical truth that the ritual propagates. The struggle for truth in history is deeply reflected in this episode; conflicting and competing historical traditions are easily danced into a solution: choral performance helps one to remember 'the right thing'. We recall from Ephoros above how performance compels one into belief: paradoxically, to dance 'beautifully' easily fades into dancing the history of one's city into disfigurement; and atrocious distortions of what lies behind the ritual are part and parcel of the much-desired control of the past, and as importantly, of social change.

[34] Spartan *Gymnopaidia*: Sud. s.v.; *Etym. Magn.*: χοροὶ ἐκ παίδων . . . εἰς θεοὺς ὕμνους ἄδοντες, εἰς τιμὴν τῶν ἐν Θυρεᾷ ἀποθανόντων Σπαρτιατῶν; cf. Sosibios in Athenaios 15.678b–c: wreaths of palm trees, named 'of feathers' are worn by the προπάτορες of the festive boys' and men's *khoroi*. Cf. *Anth.Pal.* 7.430: an epitaph for two Argives in which the Spartan glory features as κῦδος . . . κόθον, 'spurious glory'. On the legends of the battle see Brelich (1961) 22–34; Robertson (1992) 179–207; on the *Gymnopaidia* most recently Pettersson (1992) 42–56.

III ATHENIAN CHORAL CHANGE

Looking back to where we began, it becomes perfectly clear why the *Laws* has problems with the Athenian choral stage, and the complexity of the *Laws*' own choral state becomes more transparent. The *Laws* is obsessed with the individual character of individual gods which is, as we have seen, an inclination that is reflective of the functioning polytheistic landscape of Greece as a whole. This is substantially at odds with what we know of the Athenian choral situation at the time. Two points need to be made here: first, drama had the choral monopoly, and so did its god. It is a long-standing observation that the Athenians danced few *khoroi* other than those for Dionysos. Though this may not actually be true (after all there are such things as the *Brauronia*, or the *Oskhophoria*),[35] it is certainly the picture that the Athenians themselves are keen to present. Drama's proliferation, secondly, also entails that the performing personnel is drastically reduced by at least half: girls and women were missing out on what their male counterparts abundantly enjoyed. This means that Athenian drama violently disregards the basic law of archaic chorality—that it is performed by the human representatives of the mythical characters concerned.

The second point is less conventional and more interesting. It is not the case that the remaining gods suffer what Pindar's *Paean* 6 just about manages to avert for Delphic Apollo, to become 'bereft of choral dance' (ὄρφανον ἀνδρῶν χορεύτιος, l. 9). Many gods are addressed in drama's choral fiction. But, as I have shown elsewhere, whilst numerous deities are invoked, the hymns' essential addressee is the dancing god himself.[36] A number of prominent dramatic *khoroi* slip imperceptibly into a Dionysiac cult song, either within a single hymn or over the course of an entire play. Consider, for example, the parodos of *Oidipous Tyrannos* (ll. 151–215): a range of deities is addressed, but the one who emerges at the very end with the potential to rescue the city from impending pollution is Dionysos himself. The same god prevails in the famous sailors' *khoros* of the *Aias* (ll. 693–718): Dionysos and his

[35] Not even the Thargelia could be counted among the non-Dionysiac choral occasions: that dithyrambs were sung at this festival turns this festival into a special case, well worth some scrutiny.

[36] In (forthcoming (*a*)).

ecstatic associates are addressed when Apollo would really have been appropriate to the cultic situation of the play. The argument can be maintained to a greater or lesser degree for a number of plays and the phenomenon possibly has, in its different varieties, the same function throughout. The point of such moves is highly choral: in a strategy partly overlapping with the much-discussed choral self-referentiality, it moves the audience between the myth of the play and the ritual of the *polis*. It is thus a crucial technique to enhance audience participation. None of this should surprise in the context of a Dionysiac festival, but the result is that drama is not even within its own fiction a form of choral honour for the rest of the pantheon.[37]

That dramatic *khoroi* should pretend to invoke other deities but not succeed is a relevant observation, for it becomes clear why the *Laws* should have fundamental worries about the democratic *khoros*. It is blurred in membership, in what it says, and in the gods it addresses. Drama may give the illusion of differentiation between gods, but the reality is different. The *Laws*' intriguing interest in pointing out distinctions between *khoroi* and their gods, between different performers, and between the characters of the various dances, may well relate to this issue: the traditional *khoros* functions much more broadly than it does in the contemporary democracy. The democratic—Dionysiac—*khoros*, by contrast, is restricted, and therefore lacks its defining quality—as a form of socialization of all parts, rather than just some parts, of society. It falls short of what seems to be a vital point in having a *khoros*: the differentiation between the various gods, which in the polytheistic set-up builds the operating framework for all sections of the *polis*. If one takes the stipulations in the *Laws* to their extreme, they imply that Athens' fifth-century system undermines the fundamental structures of polytheism which requires many gods to be made ἴλεως through dance.

The same set of problems—which can only be tentatively touched upon in this discussion as a hypothetical scenario—becomes particularly apparent when one looks at the feature that makes the choral poetry of tragedy the rightful heir of archaic *khoroi*: tragedy's aetiological endings, in *Iphigenia in Tauris*, for

[37] Cf Soph. *Trach.* 216–24 and the whole *khoros* of the *Antigone*; the two key studies on choral self-referentiality are Henrichs (1994–5) and (1996*a*).

example. Euripides here presents an intriguing association of his protagonist with the cult of Artemis at Brauron (ll. 1462–7). The familiar myth for the goddess' worship there (Σ Ar. *Lys.* 645; Sud. s.v. Ἄρκτοις ἢ Βραυρωνίοις) is that of a tame female bear joining the girls' 'play' (παιδιά) in the sanctuary, and being killed through some unfortunate circumstance by one of the girls' brother(s). Instructions are given by Delphi to the effect that the resulting plague could be ended ('propitiated') if the Athenians 'sent their *parthenoi* to do the bear' in compensation for the death of the animal. The scholiast to *Lysistrata* helpfully adds that 'the young girls performed the sacrifice (θυσίαν) while propitiating (ἐκμειλισσόμεναι) the goddess' (cf. Sud. ἀπομειλισσόμεναι); and choral formations at Brauron are strongly suggested by the depictions on the *krateriskoi* found locally.[38]

The association with Iphigenia, which is central to the series of cult aetiologies at the end of the play, is easily made despite the heroine's Peloponnesian origins. Iphigenia, we remember, was to die because her father had hunted down an animal of Artemis at Aulis. The connection makes sense precisely because the legends and cults involved were similar: an act of impiety committed against Artemis' sacred (sacrificial) animals; and a human 'sacrifice' demanded in propitiation; this is then substituted by a real sacrificial animal and a tributary animal-*khoros* offered by the impious cult community to ensure the goddess' lasting favour.

A survey of the wider Greek world suggests that Iphigenia was a heroine many liked to associate themselves with. Cults involving her extended over the whole Greek world: to expiate Iphigenia's sacrifice was evidently a widely shared concern.[39] Why that should be so, and why Athens in particular laid claim to this character, emerges clearly from the play itself: there is a surprisingly strong emphasis on rescuing both the image and Iphigenia from the land

[38] Other, not substantially different, versions (some of which placing the episode at Mounukhia in Piraeus) are Sud. s.v. Ἐμβαρός εἰμι; Paus. *ap.* Eusth. *Il.* 2.732; Anecd. Bekk. 1.444; Apostol. 7.10; Append. prov. 2.54. Iphigenia at Brauron also appears e.g. in Phanodemos *FGrH* 325 F 14; Paus. 1.33.1. On the *krateriskoi* see Kahil (1977), (1981).

[39] For Athens' association with this myth see e.g. Paus. 1.23.7; cf. Str. 9.399; Paus. 1.33.1 Argos; 3.16.7: at the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia in Sparta. Cf. other cults of Artemis connected with Iphigenia: Paus. 1.43.1 Megara; 2.35.1 Hermione in the Argolid; 7.26.5: Aigeira in Akhaia; cf. the claim by various 'barbarian' cities: Paus. 3.16.8.

of the barbarian/Taurians.[40] The play makes no attempt to disguise its solution to the problem in cheerfully Athenian terms when making cult and heroine settle in Attika, and throwing in abundant comments to lift the last shadows of doubt about Iphigenia's real home:

> ἀλλ' εὐμενὴς ἔκβηθι βαρβάρου χθονὸς
> ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας· καὶ γὰρ εὐθάδ' οὐ πρέπει
> ναίειν, παρόν σοι πόλιν ἔχειν εὐδαίμονα.

'[O gallant goddess] Come in gracious might away from this bleak place, away from gloom, to the lovely light of Athens.' (Eur. *IT* 1086–8, trans. Grene)[41]

This version then brings image and heroine from the barbarians' 'home' to Attika. As if to confirm this understanding, Pausanias mentions that Artemis' cult image was seized by the Persians during the Persian War. This brazen claim, the bold reshaping of myth and cult, becomes almost grotesque when Iphigenia herself confidently states that actually her homes are both Argos and Athens.[42]

The punch-line in the Euripidean version lies in making this heroine the first 'Athenian' girl servant to Artemis at Brauron by relating her to the cult. The play uses all the features of the choral myth–ritual complex as explained above—and makes the cult a public concern for the Athenians. The play's resolution is presented in Athenian terms—just as an aetiology in archaic choral poetry would be offered in the terms of the commissioning cult community. Similar cases can be made for other, particularly Euripidean, plays.[43] Many of the heroes involved, in fact, have

[40] Tauris and the cruelty of the barbarian lands: e.g. 28–33; 458–66; cf. individuals' desire to flee and complaints about exile: 126–37 (temple servants); 773–6; 905–6; 1397–1400 (Iphigenia); cf. 1068: σώσω σ' ἐς Ἑλλάδ' ('I'll bring you safe to Hellas'); 1089–1152: the *khoros* is craving for their return.

[41] Similarly conspicuous in this 'Athenian' respect are 1013–4: Λοξίας ἐθέσπισεν | κομίσαι μ' ἄγαλμα θεᾶς πόλισμ' ἐς Παλλάδος 'Apollo commands me to bring her image back to the city of Pallas'; 1487–8: ναυσθλοῦτε τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονος | παῖδ' εἰς Ἀθήνας 'give passage to Agamemnon's son to Athens'. The fact that Athena is *deus ex machina* may be significant in itself. The play ends with an invocation to her by the chorus.

[42] Lines 221–4: Iphigenia misses singing for Hera at Argos and weaving for Athena; note the actual conservatism of the myth when Orestes promises to re-establish Iphigenia in Mykene, 981–2.

[43] e.g. the *Hippolytos*, *Helen*, *Herakles*, *Herakleidai* are also interesting, as are the much more discussed cases of Sophokles' *Aias* and *Oidipous at Kolonos*. I discuss this issue in greater detail in (forthcoming (*b*)).

their first cultic performances on Attic ground on the Athenian stage. Tragic aetiology, building on the archaic tradition, thus seems to claim its centrality to the process by which these figures are added to the existing apparatus of distinguished Athenian ancestors. Their myth–ritual complex is integrated in, and adapted to, their new, that is the Attic, pantheon and is perhaps integral to a more wide-ranging Athenian concern of trying to accommodate Greek mythology on Attic ground, delicately put into—probably vastly exaggerated—choral form by versatile tragedians.

But the crucial point is that religious aetiology turns tragedy's *khoroi* into a forum in which current religious affairs are being scrutinized. The new form of telling myth that is tragedy presents itself also as a new way of performing (heroic and divine) ritual, while at the same time it significantly redefines Athens' relationship with the panhellenic past: we had not known that Iphigenia was Athenian. Tragedy in this sense exploits the typically choral potential in providing a cleared, controlled access to Athens' own history: it makes sure that the right things are remembered. Or put in a different way, from the playwright's point of view, using *tragikoi khoroi* in the traditional manner forms an essential part of the strategy for success on the Athenian *skēnē*. The reason why the monstrous fiction should be so central to the Athenian stage might well lie in the mechanisms of the medium itself as explained above: it provides 'access' and ensures participation in these rituals by the assembled Athenian demos, a hypothesis which merits discussion in far greater detail than can be achieved here.[44]

We are here back to the archaic maxim and a further aspect in which the democratic *khoros* functioned just like its earlier predecessor: those who danced were also those in power. And here again one comes up against the Platonic problem of Athens' choral limitations. While Athens on the one hand vastly expanded choral participation, it drastically reduced it on the other. Iphigenia's, Hippolytos', or any other tragic hero's *khoros* performing the story of how it came to perform the cultic *khoros* remains one composed of the worshippers of Dionysos (entailing present and/or future active, male citizens). In the same way as the Sophoclean *khoroi*

[44] The view presented here is thus different from the two most recent discussions of tragic aetiology by Dunn (1996) and Scullion (2000) who thinks of it as a purely literary phenomenon.

cannot hide whom they really address, Euripides' choral art, too, disregards pretty much all that is relevant to the working choral state: that different sets of *khoroi* address different sets of gods; that the traditional social diversity of the choral worshippers in terms of gender and age forms the cornerstone of polytheism; and that this polytheism is one social foundation of the working *polis*. It is in fact ironic that many functions *khoroi* adopt on the tragic stage are well attested in archaic choral ritual while absent from democratic *mousikē*.[45] Athens' strategy and the *Laws*' problem is thus claimed above all to be a religious one, and lies in a simple contradiction: because Dionysos is the only, or at least the designated, god to provide access to his worship for all, the Athenian democratic *polis* can only have Dionysiac *khoroi*. We are left to believe that the social exclusivity of archaic polytheism and the inclusivity of democracy are fundamentally contradictory. And it is questionable whether the democracy ever solved that contradiction.

[45] These issues are discussed by Gould (1996) and Hall (1998).

3

χορὸς εἷς ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως (Xen. *Mem.* 3.3.12): Song-Dance and State-Pilgrimage at Athens

Ian Rutherford

I INTRODUCTION

One of the most important parts of interstate activity in ancient Greece was the sending and receiving of *theōriai*, that is sacred delegations consisting of *theōroi* (state delegates or sacred pilgrims) sent out by their city-states to perform religious functions abroad. This chapter examines the institution and activities of *theōriai* as a context for the performance of song-dance.

Athens sent *theōriai* to numerous sanctuaries, and equally other states sent religious delegations to Athens. *Theōroi* (members of a *theōria*) from Athens regularly visited the Panhellenic sanctuaries of Olympia, Delphi, Nemea, the sanctuary of Poseidon at the Isthmos, and Dodona. They also visited the regional sanctuary of Delos and several sanctuaries within Attica, including Brauron and Sounion.[1] *Theōroi* would visit the oracles at Delphi, Dodona, and the Siwa Oasis whenever the occasion demanded.[2] In most cases (the major exception are *theōriai* to oracles) *theōria* is a liturgy (a public service), funded by a so-called *arkhitheōros*, or in some cases a number of *arkhitheōroi* (no fewer than six of them in a dedication from Delos dated to the 420s (*ID* 43)).[3]

The other side of the reciprocal framework of *theōria* is receiving delegations from other states. The symbolic value attached to this right can be illustrated by a recently published decree from Mantinea enacting a synoecism between Mantinea and the little

Thanks to the editors, and to David Fearn.

[1] Brauron: Ar. *Peace* 874; Sounion: Hdt. 6.87.

[2] The best evidence is the catalogue of *theōroi* to the Ammonion at Siwa (*IG* 2.2.1642), discussed by Woodward (1962).

[3] *ID* 43; Davies (1967); Coupry (1954); liturgical status: Wilson (2000*a*) 44–5, 328, nn.186–7.

Arcadian city of Helissaon, in which Helissaon is guaranteed two religious rights: that of conducting its own sacrifices and that of receiving *theōriai*.[4] It is not clear whether this concession represents a serious negotiation of independence or is a token gesture. Athens' political position in the fifth century ensured that it received a large number of *theōriai* from other states. Many must have come for the Panathenaia, but they also must have come for at least one festival held at Eleusis, probably the *Megala Mustēria*, whose appeal was not confined to initiants.[5]

Perhaps the most typical cases are those involving religious co-operation between the *polis* in charge of the sanctuary and the *polis* that sends the delegation.[6] So, for example, fragments of a religious law from the Athenian Treasury at Delphi regulate relations between Athenian *theōroi* and the local *proxenoi*.[7] But there are exceptions. When Athens sends a *theōria* to a sanctuary within Attica, the rituals that take place there are not under the aegis of a different *polis*, although there are still local authorities whose conventions have to be observed.[8] Equally, *theōroi* can in exceptional cases represent not their *polis*, but a group within the *polis*. Thus, a lively pilgrimage-tradition is attested from the Marathonian Tetrapolis directly to Delos and Delphi, apparently without the cooperation of the Athenian state; Philochorus reports that this tradition was alive in the fourth century BC, and epigraphical data survives from Delphi from the early second century BC.[9] *Theōriai* sent by various groups among the Artists of Dionysos in the Hellenistic period represent them rather than any particular city-state.[10]

[4] Te Riele (1987), who published the first edition of the inscription (cf. *SEG* 37. 340), dates it to the early 4th cent.

[5] Panathenaia: *IG* I^3.43? *IPriene* 5, *IPriene* 45; *IG* 2.2.886; ML 49; *Megala Mustēria*: *IG* I^3.6 with Cataldi (1981), (1983). It is not clear what Eleusinian festival, if any, is to be linked to the bringing of *aparkhai* (*LSCG* 5).

[6] Sourvinou-Inwood (1990).

[7] *CID I* 1.4–6.

[8] A good example of what happens within Attica are the pilgrimages of ephebes to the Aianteia at Salamis, attested for 2nd cent. The local authorities at Salamis issue decrees praising the ephebes for their performance of the pilgrimage. See Pelekides (1962) 247–8. It is uncertain whether the ritual took place in earlier centuries (Taylor (1997) 187).

[9] *FGrHist* 328 F75 = Σ Soph. *OC* 1047. Another independent group, the *genos* of the Gephuraioi, are known to have made a pilgrimage to Delphi to consult the oracle in the 1st cent. BC: Merritt (1940).

[10] See below pp. 79–80.

A panhellenic sanctuary is naturally an arena in which people are concerned to project an identity, and to that extent self-definition becomes one of the main functions of *theōria*. On one level, pilgrimage to a sanctuary may tend to endow all pilgrims there with the same identity. State-pilgrimage within the framework of the amphictiony based round the Panionion at Mycale, for example, would have tended to confirm the Ionian identity on behalf of the pilgrims. Similarly, the sending of state-delegations to panhellenic sanctuaries was a primary focus for the development of panhellenic identity. So some anthropologists have spoken of the sense of 'communitas' felt by all pilgrims who attend a certain sanctuary.[11] But simultaneously, pilgrimage may serve to affirm the identity of individual groups of pilgrims against the rest. There is a good example of this in an inscription concerning the synoecism of Lebedos with Teos (303 BC), which lays down that in future citizens of Lebedos attending the Panionia would be called Teians (the exact opposite of the example from Helissaon mentioned above).[12] The festival is thus a privileged arena for the display of civic identity. So some recent anthropological work sees the sanctuary as a zone of 'competing discourses' where pilgrims from different places compete to assert their own identity.[13]

Now, the projection of identity might have a special meaning for the young men of a community. In that case, one might want to see this as a sort of *rite de passage*, where the young men assert their identity as citizens of their *polis* for the first time.[14] It could be argued, I think, that *theōria* itself can function as a *rite de passage* for young people.[15] In the Athenian *theōria* to Delos, for example, we have the fact that the underlying aetiological myth of Theseus and Ariadne is one that is often interpreted as 'initiatory'. Again, in the Athenian *Puthais* to Delphi, those who took part included

[11] Turner (1973).

[12] *SIG*^{3} 3.344, 2–4 = Welles (1934) nn. 2–4 (*JTeos* 59.2–4).

[13] Eade and Sallnow (1991).

[14] In cross-cultural terms, the classic example would be Myerhoff's study (Myerhoff (1974) 245—'Perils of the Return') of the Huichol Indians of the south-western USA, who make yearly pilgrimages to the sacred locality of *Wirikuta* in order to harvest sacred *peyote*. This pilgrimage is perceived to be dangerous, particularly for novices ('primeros'). See Rutherford (1995*c*) and forthcoming (*a*).

[15] The thesis that state-pilgrimage can be interpreted as a *rite de passage* is vulnerable to the objection that in the classic 'initiatory' schema we expect a journey to 'wild space' and back again, whereas the space of the sanctuary is not 'wild,' but in fact this objection could be defused in various ways: for example by noting that even

paides and *parthenoi*; and Theseus also had a role in the mythical background; according to Plutarch (*Theseus* 5), it was once the custom for young men to offer their hair at Delphi, perhaps a sign of an old tradition of initiatory dedication there.[16]

Where we have data for *theōria*, we often find evidence for song-dance. Herodotus (6.27) mentioned an ill-fated *khoros* that went from Chios to Delphi; the best piece of primary evidence for state-pilgrimage in the fifth century is a Delphic decree which records regulations relating to a regular Andrian *theōria*, and while no *khoros* is mentioned there, the surviving first line of a paian that Simonides wrote for the Andrians to be performed at Delphi indicates that, on one occasion at least, the Andrians took a *khoros* with them.[17] According to a Hellenistic inscription from Priene sacrifices at the Panionia involved a *khoros*, and the context here must be pilgrimage within the loose amphictiony of the Ionians.[18] From much later on we have descriptions of song-dance performance in Greek novels; and we know of song-dance performances by *khoroi* visiting Roman Claros.[19]

Our limited data for the use of song-dance in Athenian *theōria* mostly relates to two performance-scenarios. First Delos, where it seems the Athenians regularly sent *theōroi* and *khoroi* in the classical period; and second Delphi, where we have inscriptions describing *molpē* and *theōriai* from somewhat later around 100 BC. It stands to reason that there was much more than this. Most likely, the data that survives perpetuates only more elaborate and formal uses of song and dance; less elaborate performances probably do not

if the state-pilgrimages themselves do not involve a journey into 'wild-space,' the aetiological myths that go with them do. Or one might say that in the case of state-pilgrimage, the journey may be the part that is perceived as dangerous and wild. I would like to thank my friend Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood for a discussion of this issue.

[16] Boethius (1918) 28–9; Calame (1997) 28 n. 35, 106; cf. Callim. *Hymn* 4. 296 ff.; Theophr. *Char.* 21. For example, in one of the most systematic and complete studies of a pilgrimage tradition ever undertaken, Bhardwaj (1973) describes 'life-cycle functions' in North Indian pilgrimage, such as '*mundana*,' the sacred rite of tonsure, as 'an important initiatory rite marking the passage from infancy to childhood.'

[17] Inscription: *CID I* 1.7; poem: *PMG* 519, fr. 35b. Andrian song-dance is described in Philostratus *Im.* 1.25.

[18] *IPriene* 11, 11; Hommel in Kleiner, Hommel, and Müller-Wiener (1967) 45–63; Sokolowksi (1970).

[19] Numerous Claros-inscriptions are collected in Robert and Robert (1989).

register in our records.[20] To some extent we can hope to reconstruct the sort of performances that might have accompanied Athenian state-pilgrimages by looking at non-Athenian ones.

II AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIC SONG-DANCE

In the following section, I want to examine various other performance-scenarios for song-dance on state-pilgrimages.

1. The simplest case is when a state-delegation takes with it to the sanctuary a *khoros* to perform a hymn of worship, usually a paian (a hymn or prayer in honour of Apollo) or a *prosodion* (a poem whose performance is linked to a sacrificial procession).[21] In these cases the *theōroi* act as an escort for the *khoros*, which was probably seen as part of the offering to the god.[22]

2. The other side of the reciprocal process of *theōria* is that a city may play host to *khoroi* from other cities. So in the case of Athens we have to take account of performance by *khoroi* accompanying foreign delegations to Athens, or to Eleusis. Could such delegates have brought *khoroi* with them to perform song-dance? No certain cases survive, but perhaps we should consider the Keian *prosodion* to Demeter (*SLG* 460), in which the goddess is invoked as 'Eleusinia'.[23] This would suit performance at a major Eleusinian festival, either the *Megala Mustēria* (in Boedromion), or possibly the Eleusinia (held in the spring) or even the Proerosia (in Puanopsion). Another suggestive text in this context is a line of song "ἴωμεν εἰς Ἀθήνας" ('Let us go to Athens'), supposed to have been sung by a *khoros* of *parthenoi* from Bottiaia in western Thrace.[24] Aristotle, who was in a better position to interpret it than we are, explained this by the hypothesis that Bottiaia had been

[20] Thus, while no surviving evidence suggests theoric performance in connection with Athenian delegations to Dodona or Ammon, or to the athletic competitions of the Isthmos, Nemea, or Olympia, we cannot rule out the possibility that simple, traditional forms of song were performed in the context of *theōriai* to these places.

[21] Paean: Rutherford (2001*a*); *prosodion*: Rutherford (2001*b*) and forthcoming (*b*)

[22] Song as offering: see Rutherford (2001*a*) 324–5 n. 75; χοροὺς ἀνάγουτι πόλῃες in Callim. *Hymn* 4, 279.

[23] See Rutherford (1995*c*). Attestations of the epithet outside Athens: Lavecchia (2000).

[24] Arist. fr. 443 cited by Plut. *Qu. Gr.* 35 and *Theseus* 16; *PMG* 868; cf. treaty between Athens and Bottiaia, *IG* I^3.76. On the political background: Flensted-Jensen (1995).

colonized by Cretans, who included some of the Athenians sent to Minos as tribute. Nevertheless the *prima facie* implication is that there either was or had been a pilgrimage from Bottiaia to Athens, which the song was meant to accompany.

3. As well as a performance by the theoric *khoros* at the sanctuary, we should perhaps also think of multiple performances *en route*. There were sometimes sacrifices when *theōriai* set off, and the theoric *khoros* may have performed there. Another important point might have been the embarkation of sea-borne *theōroi*. 'Sacred ways' seem to have been lined with points of religious significance.[25] We know that the Molpoi of Miletus performed paians *en route* as they moved from Miletus to Didyma,[26] performing at a number of places: by Hekate in front of the gates, by Dunamis at the meadow by the Nymphs, by Hermes in Kelados, by Phulios, by Keraiites, by the statues of Chares. The sacred way from Athens to Eleusis was also lined with points of sacred significance; Plutarch (*Alkibiades* 34), describing the rerouting of the procession to Eleusis by sea during the Peloponnesian War, mentions that many sacrifices, song-dance performances and rituals usually performed along the sacred way had to be omitted.[27]

4. Another scenario for theoric song-dance is an 'apopemptic' performance, in which departing *theōroi* were given a send-off by a *khoros* who stayed at home, possibly in the context of a festival. Plutarch describes a pilgrimage made by the Aenianes in Thessaly to Cassiopaea in Epirus. The men took a bull as an offering, and as far as the border of Aenis they were accompanied by a *khoros* of *parthenoi*, who sang a particular song: 'may you never return to your native land' (μήποτε νοστήσαιτε φίλην εἰς πατρίδα γαῖαν).[28]

5. Another possibility is that the visit of an Athenian *theōria* to a sanctuary may have been celebrated by a local *khoros*. The likelihood of such a performance is suggested by the fact that some sanctuaries have strong song-dance performance traditions, such as the Deliades at Delos.[29] And we know that in the Hellenistic

[25] See Curtius (1894). [26] Molpoi: *LSAM* 50 (5th-cent.).
[27] Paus. 1.28–36; Plut. *Alc.* 34.
[28] Plut. *Qu. Gr.* 26. In Rutherford (2001*a*) I have suggested that Pind., *Pae.* 4 was apopemptic.
[29] The Deliades or Delian Maidens are already described in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 302–6; other references in Bruneau (1970) 35–8.

period, state-delegations visiting Delos often paid for song-dance performances by the Deliades.[30] There was also an established *khoros* of *paides* at Delphi for which Cleochares of Athens composed a paian, *prosodion* and *humnos* for the Theoxenia in 230–225 BC.[31] And there may be more complex possibilities also, for example various forms of joint performance.[32]

6. One of the oddest forms of theoric performance is suggested by an inscription from Priene relating to the celebration of the Panionia at the nearby Panionion:[33]

. . . θύειν δὲ] τῶι Διὶ τῶι Βουλα[ίωι τοίς τε ἄλλοις θεοίς, οἷς] ἐν χορῶι θύειν δεῖ [κατὰ τὸν ἱερὸν νόμον]

And to sacrifice to Zeus Boulaios and the other gods to whom it is necessary to sacrifice in *khoros*, according to the sacred law

In the context of the Panionia, to which the various Ionian *poleis* sent *theōroi*, one possible interpretation of this text is that the *theōroi* from the different *poleis* join in a simple choral performance together (perhaps just a communal paian-cry) when the sacrifice takes place. To take an example from Hellenistic Crete, it has been suggested that a very similar form of performance is seen in the Dictaean Hymn to Zeus, which could have been performed at the cult of Zeus near Palaeokastro in the east of Crete by ephebes from a number of local Cretan *poleis* which used the cult as a sort of federal sanctuary;[34] the

[30] For the data see Bruneau (1970). In the Hellenistic period we have data on state-delegations that visited from the Dodekanesos and other areas (not the Cyclades particularly at this time). Very often the temple-inventories mention χορεία Δηλιάδων or payment to the *khoros* of the Deliades made by visiting delegations. It seems a reasonable inference that in such cases the visiting delegations did not bring a *khoros*, but expected to be able to employ the Deliades to perform for them. Since the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* says that the Deliades knew how to imitate the voices of visitors, they may have performed songs brought or commissioned by visiting delegations in their own dialect. See Rutherford (1999).
[31] *SIG*^{3} 450 (= *FD* 3.2.78), 230–225 BC. The best example of that pattern is *SIG* 703 from around 118 BC, a Delphic decree honouring two musicians from Phenea for a residence in Delphi when they staged performances in Delphi and trained the local *khoros* of *paides*.
[32] Cf. some of the possibilities discussed in Rutherford (1997).
[33] For reference see n. 18 above.
[34] Summarized in Chaniotis (1996) 128; Chaniotis (1988). He also finds choral performance in the context of interstate delegations at *IC* 1.16.6 (restored) and *IC* 3.4.1B. He also suggests for the ritual term θίασος the translation 'Opferchor.' Perlman (1995*b*) finds an alternative context for the performance of the Dictaean Hymn, suggesting it was performed by ephebes from Itanos. In line 57 cities with whom their city was federated are mentioned.

performers of the poem in fact invoke Zeus to come to their cities (line 57: θόρε κὲς πόληας ἀμῶν), an expression that implies a *sunkhoreia* corresponding to the expected *sunthusia*.[35]

7. Another type of performance known to have existed is the poetic *agōn*. Poetic *agōnes* are reported to have existed at Delphi from the foundation of the festival there, and they no doubt happened in other places as well. They are particularly well attested in the Hellenistic period, for example in the context of the Delphic Soteria.[36] We normally think of the contestants in such *agōnes* as professional musicians, but there is reason to think that in some cases theoric *khoroi* would have competed in *agōnes* at sanctuaries.[37]

8. Mention should also be made of the reperformance of songs or parts of songs. There is a fragment of a *prosodion* by Pindar where the speaking-subject says that the Muse 'will put even someone dwelling far away in mind of the *theōria* of the hero.' It looks like this is about how reperformance of the *prosodion* in other locations will disseminate knowledge of the festival.[38] In the same way, Athenian theoric songs might have been reperformed at Athens, for example at *sumposia*.

III CROSS-CULTURAL PARALLELS

Before moving on to look at the Athenian evidence in more detail, I want to draw attention to the existence of parallels to the sort of phenomena I have been describing in other cultures. In different forms, pilgrimage is found in pretty well all cultures in the world, and in many cultures pilgrimage is an occasion for poetry, song, and dance. Here are four examples.

In ancient Egypt it was the custom every year for the statue of the goddess Hathor to be transported from her temple at Dendera north of Thebes about a hundred miles south to a festival at the temple of Horus at Edfu. This was the occasion for a major pilgrimage, which was joined by contingents on the way, including (possibly) a *khoros* of women from the town of Nekheb (Eileithuiaspolis).[39]

[35] Powell (1925) 160–2; for the text West (1965) 154.
[36] Nachtergael (1977) 358–62. [37] See below, section VI.
[38] See Rutherford (1992); Rutherford (2001*a*) 409.
[39] See Alliot (1949–54) 474. Centuries later chanting had a role in coptic pilgrimage: MacCoull (1998).

The Hittite civilization of ancient Anatolia during the later second millennium BC was one of the great song-cultures of the ancient world. The 'gate-house' (Sumerian KI.LAM) festival held yearly in the Hittite capital at Hattusas (Boghaz-Koy) was the venue for delegations from neighbouring towns, which took part in the festival and in some cases performed song and dance. For example, the men from the town of Tissaruliya sang from behind windows at a crucial stage (the songs were probably in Hattic, an obscure pre-Hittite ritual language), and the men of Kilisra performed a dance with bulls' genitals on their heads.[40]

There is a strong pilgrimage tradition in the New Hebrides. The anthropologist John Layard described how young men from the island of Vao off the coast of Malekula performed a 'special song' on an initiatory pilgrimage to the neighbouring island of Oba.[41] And when a major initiatory ritual (the 'maki') is performed on Vao, the ritual includes song-dance performances by locals and by delegations from neighbouring villages and islands. In the culminating part of the ritual the locals perform a circular dance which encompasses the visitors.[42]

To turn to the contemporary peasant culture of Peru, the late Michael Sallnow described how small Andean villages send delegations (the local word is *naciones*) to regional sanctuaries. Focusing on the village of Qamawara in the region of Cusco, he documents several pilgrimages to different sanctuaries.[43] 'All these pilgrimages', he writes, 'fell in the dry season, when work was light, food abundant and travel easy.' The most important was the one to Qoyllur Rit'i, which was made up of about thirty pilgrims. 'They were charged with taking a sacred image, a *lámina*, from their own village to the sanctuary. The task of financing the pilgrimage is a burden (*cargo*) that is undertaken by a *patrón* or sponsor of the pilgrimage, who supplied food and drink, and also a master of ceremonies.[44] Needless to say, there are many parallels

[40] I discuss this festival in Rutherford, forthcoming (*c*). For the festival see Haas (1994); Singer (1983–4).
[41] Layard (1942) 526. [42] Ibid. 299–301. [43] Sallnow (1987) 179.
[44] Poole (1991) 310–11: 'in many communities around Cuzco sponsorship for a comparsa's trip to a pilgrimage-sanctuary is considered among the highest-ranking prestige cargos of the local social hierarchy. Similarly, participation in a comparsa is itself a cargo of lesser rank within the total system, and one therefore carried out by young men just entering the social hierarchy.'

here to the structure of Greek *theōria*. Notice in particular that the pilgrims are accompanied by sacred dancers.[45]

> Without ritual dancers, the purpose of a sponsored pilgrimage cannot be fulfilled. Apart from providing entertainment for the other pilgrims, their routines serve as rites of entry and exit at criticial points in the passage of the *lámina*, especially at the sanctuary itself. There are dozens of different ceremonial styles in the central Andes, each with its own costume, choreography, music and symbolism. Very often a style carries undertones as to the social status of the performers. Styles may become defunct, but new ones, or subvariants of the old ones, are being created all the time.

The parallel with song-dance performance in Ancient Greece is suggestive, even though our evidence is not as rich, particularly in respect of the variety of different styles of dance that must have existed.[46]

IV ATHENIAN *THEŌRIA* TO DELPHI

The Athenian Treasury at Delphi already attests relations between Athens and Delphi in the sixth century BC.[47] In the *Eumenides* Aeschylus imagines the 'path-making sons of Hephaestus' (12–14) conveying Apollo to Delphi soon after his birth on Delos, a detail that seems to anticipate Athenian *theōria* to Delphi in the historical period. Athenians sent sacred delegations to Delphi in a number of contexts: to attend meetings of the Amphictyonic Council twice every year; to take part in Delphic festivals, particularly the quadrennial Pythia and the Theoxenia, which may have been yearly. The most celebrated Athenian delegation from Athens to Delphi, however, was the *Puthais*, which was probably not tied to any special Delphic festival,[48] but motivated by the observation of lightning from the sanctuary of Pythian Apollo in Athens.[49]

[45] Sallnow (1987) 182.

[46] On dance in Andean pilgrimage see further Poole (1991); Sallnow (1991*a*). See now also Bauer and Stanish (2001) 233–4 on different forms of dance accompanying the Inca pilgrimage to the islands of the Sun and the Moon on Lake Titicaca. On dance in different societies see Kaeppler (1978).

[47] For earlier relations see Daux (1940).

[48] Pomtow in *SIG*^{3} 711, n. 8 (p. 351) thought of a connection with the Delphic Herakleia (= Athenian Thergelion). cf. Parker (1983) 26, n. 37. Such a connection might provide an interesting background for the *tripodephoria* represented in the *Puthais*: Couve (1894) 88; Mommsen (1878) 322; but see Boethius (1918) 77, 87–8.

[49] On the position of the observation see most recently Nulton (2000).

Puthaistai are already referred to in the Sacred Calendar of Nicomachus,[50] and we have evidence that the *Puthais* was celebrated at various points in the fourth century BC (in 355 BC and in 322 BC), but it seems to have fallen into abeyance during the period of Aetolian domination at Delphi. It was resumed in the late second century, from when four major *Puthaides* are attested by inscriptions at Delphi, which cover the south wall of the Treasury of the Athenians:[51] *Puthais* 1 in 138/7 BC, under the *arkhōn* Timarchus; *Puthais* 2 in 128/7 BC, under the *arkhōn* Dionysios (just after the Athenians reorganized the cult of Pythian Apollo in Athens: *LSS* 14); *Puthais* 3 in 106/5 BC, under the *arkhōn* Agathokles; and *Puthais* 4 in 98/7 BC, under the *arkhōn* Argeios.[52] The participants in the *Puthaides* were many and various, including *theōroi* and *arkhitheōroi*; an escort of boys and sometimes men known as the *puthaistai*, some of whom dedicated inscriptions on their return, as we see from those in the deme of Ikaria;[53] *kanēphoroi*, and ephebes. There were also *hippeis*, who took part in a special *agōn*. The *Puthaides* also included representatives from certain key religious *genē*: the Purrhakidai, the Kerukes, the Euneidai, the Erusikhthonidai and the Eupatridai.[54] A conspicuous role was played by the Marathonian Tetrapolis, which sent *theōroi* and *puthaistai* and in *Puthais* 4, a self-contained mini-delegation.[55] The Marathonian Tetrapolis had sent independent delegations to Delphi for about a century, and could thus be said to have maintained the tradition

[50] *LSCG* 17C, 11; notice that the restoration of a reference to the *Puthais* in *LSCG* 17B19–20 is dubious.

[51] For the history see Daux (1940); Habicht (1997); Boethius (1918). It used to be believed, on the basis of *IG* 2.2336, that the Athenians set up a *Puthais* for Delos around about the same time, but the theory was convincingly demolished by Tracy (1982).

[52] The inscriptions of the Hellenistic *Puthaides* stress the fact that they are traditional, following ἱστορίας: *SIG*^{3} 698.6.

[53] Boethius (1918), 26–8, 148; Voutiras (1982); also Erchia-Calendar (*LSCG* 18 B50–1; G36; E37–8) with Dow (1965) 211.

[54] The Purrhakidai sent a *theōros* in *Puthais* 1 and 2, a *puthaistēs* in *Puthais* 3 and three *puthaistai* in *Puthais* 4; the Kerukes sent three *puthaistai* in *Puthaides* 3 and 4; the Euneidai sent three *puthaistai* in *Puthaides* 3 and 4; the Eupatridai sent five *theōroi* in *Puthais* 1 and four *puthaistai* in *Puthais* 3; the Erusikhthonidai sent their own *arkhitheōros* in *Puthais* 4, implying a level of independence. Later Athenian *dōdekaides* to Delphi include a representative of the Euneidai and Kerukes, one from Marathon, and exegetes drawn from the Eupatridai.

[55] The Tetrapolis sent three *theōroi* in *Puthais* 1 and 2, a *puthaistēs* in *Puthais* 3 and in *Puthais* 4 an *arkhitheōros*, three *theōroi* and one *puthaistēs*.

of pilgrimage to Delphi when the Athenian state as a whole had neglected it.[56] Finally, the Athenian *Tekhnītai* (Artists of Dionysus) sent their own delegations, complete with *arkhitheōros* and *theōroi*, in *Puthais* 2 and *Puthais* 3.[57]

Unfortunately, we do not have any songs performed on Athenian *theōria* to Delphi in the classical period. Two possibilities are a fragment of a paian by Simonides, which seems to mention Apollo and mount Parnes;[58] and a fragment of a paian by Pindar[59]

. . . . . .
ὦβαθῠδ[
ἰήϊε παῖ με[
δᾶμον Ἀθα[να

O deep- . . . *ieios* child . . . people of Athens (?)

The only clue as to context is in line four, which probably contains a reference to the people of Athens. The likeliest scenario, perhaps, is that the *khoros* are calling on Apollo to look after Athens (which makes most sense if it is an Athenian *khoros*, perhaps visiting Delphi),[60] though there are many other possibilities.

In the region of 230–225 BC an Athenian poet, Cleochares, was honoured for having composed a paian, *prosodion*, and *hymnos* and it was decreed that the *khorodidaskalos* appointed for the year (presumably a local) should teach the poems to the *paides* and

[56] *FD* 2.18 in 300–200 BC; *FD* 2.19 for 204 BC; *FD* 2.20 for 178 BC; *FD* 2.21 for 300–200 BC.

[57] The main inscriptions are: *FD* 3.2.47 = *SIG*^{3} 698, from *Puthais* 2 (linked to the two paeans): an *arkhitheōros* and four *theōroi*; *FD* 3.2.48 = *SIG*^{3} 711L, from *Puthais* 3: an *akhitheoros* and seven *theōroi*, assigned to *Puthais* 4 on grounds of the hand by Tracy (1969) 385; *FD* 3.2.49 = *SIG*^{3} 728K, assigned to *Puthais* 4 in Dittenberger, but to *Puthais* 3 by Schröder (1999b); *FD* 3.2.137 = *SIG*^{3} 699: Athens sends representatives of the *synodos ton epopoion* also on *Puthais* 2, though they are not *theōroi*.

[58] *PMG* 519 fr.35; Rutherford (1990) 171–6.

[59] *Pa.* VIIc(c); Rutherford (2001*a*) 345–6. Pind. *Pae.* 8 (the song on the Four Temples at Delphi) might be thought to have an Athenian connection here, partly because Athena plays a prominent role in the song, and partly because of the theme of the song, since in *Pyth.* 7 (486 BC), Pindar praises the Alkmaeonids for building the new Delphic temple. So might the context of the first performance of this song be an Alkmaeonid/Athenian celebration of a new temple? Unfortunately, it now looks as if the title of the song in the papyrus was 'For the Delphians,' but there might still be Athenian involvement here. See Rutherford (2001*a*) 230–1.

[60] Cf. the prayer for Kos at Delphi in the Soteria inscription; and the final prayer in Pind. *Pae.* 6.

have them perform them at the Theoxenia; however, there is no sign that the context for this was *theōria*.[61] An Athenian *kitharoidos*, Menalkes, performed at the Soteria in 259/8 or 255/4, and we have evidence that Athenian *paides* were involved in the Delphic Soteria in the Hellenistic period, but again there is no evidence that the context was a *theōria*.[62]

It is the Hellenistic *Puthaides* that yield the best evidence for musical performance. The texts on the south wall of the Treasury of the Athenians include two hymns to Apollo—one a paian by Athenaios, and the other, entitled 'paian and *prosodion*' by Limenius, both of them complete with musical notation, both of them referring to the Athenian *Tekhnītai* of Dionysus. These can be dated with the help of two honorific inscriptions relating to the *Tekhnītai*. One of these, probably from the *Puthais* 2 in 128 BC, says that the *Tekhnītai* sang a paian, and also mentions a *megas khoros*;[63] in another honorific inscription probably from *Puthais* 3 of 106 BC, the *Tekhnītai* are said to sing the πάτριος παιάν.[64] On the basis of this Bélis has suggested that both paians date from *Puthais* 2 of 128 BC, and that they had a different function, one being a cult-hymn and the other a song for 'concert' (*akroama*). However Stephan Schroeder has recently argued that they should be assigned to different years, and that the least implausible view is that the paian of Athenaios dates from *Puthais* 2 and that of Limenios from *Puthais* 3.[65]

The *Tekhnītai* of course represent a stage of professionalization beyond that of the fifth century.[66] They must have put on a whole range of other performances at Delphi, but the paians seem to have been the focus of attention, at least in 128 BC. This is not the only case where *Tekhnītai* are associated with *theōria*, though in other

[61] *FD* 3.2.78 (= *SIG*^{3} 450).

[62] Menalkas: Nachtergael (1977), Actes 19; *paides*: Nachtergael (1977) 308–9. In Actes 7, 10: Nikon son of Theomenos; in Actes 8, 35: Menalkes son of Speuson; *ibid.* 40: Euboulides son of Aristopeithes; in Actes 9, 19: Nikon son of Theomenes; *ibid.* 25: Sosistratos son of Theophilos; *ibid.* 38: Lykos son of Dionysios; *ibid.* 42: Diodoros son of Theophilos.

[63] *FD* 3.2.47 = *SIG*^{3} 698.8–9; *megas khoros* also in *FD* 3.2.49. Le Guen (2001) 1.88–91.

[64] *FD* 3.2.48 = *SIG*^{3} 711L.12. Le Guen (2001) 1.117–23.

[65] Bélis (1988); Schröder (1999*b*).

[66] The *Tekhnītai* who sang the paean are also mentioned as having other specialities—auletes, aulodes, kitharists, comedians, tragedians—so presumably all these forms of performance went on. On *tekhnītai* see Poland (1934); Le Guen (2001).

cases they act independently of the *polis*. Already in a Delphic inscription from 360 BC, an Athenian actor is among those recorded as bringing *eparkhē*-offerings to Delphi.[67] Around 250 BC Isthmian and Nemean *Tekhnītai* were invited to the *Mouseia*-festival at Thespiai, and sent out *theōroi*.[68] In the period 230–225 BC they were granted *asulia* from Delphic Amphictyones for travel to a festival at Thebes.[69] Again, in the late third century BC the Ionian *Tekhnītai* send their own *theōroi* to the festival of Artemis at Magnesia.[70] And at some point the *Tekhnītai* of Ionia and the Hellespont were awarded the status of *proxenoi* at Samothrace, implying that they had come there as *theōroi*.[71] The organizations of the *Tekhnītai* thus seem to be treated to some extent like independent political units. In the Hellenistic *Puthais*, however, they act on behalf of Athens, thus appropriating in a sense the role of Athenian *theōroi*.

The *Puthaistai paides* also seemed to have made up a *khoros*. We know this because the inscriptions mention a *didaskalos* for them, at least in *Puthaides* 1 and 2.[72] They may have performed a simpler song than the *Tekhnītai*, perhaps one of the traditional songs I mentioned earlier, perhaps the "πάτριος παιάν" that the *Tekhnītai* sang in 106 BC.[73] In fact this is an example of a widely attested pattern in which young people, usually young men, stage a choral performance at a sanctuary.[74]

The content of the songs is pretty straightforward. The surviving part of Athenaios' paian begins with a description of its Athenian singers and goes on to describe how Apollo slew Python, and later drove off the Gauls (lines 21 ff.), referring to the attack of 278 BC. The poem of Limenius describes the birth of Apollo and his

[67] *CID* 2.4. 67–9

[68] *SIG*^{3} 457 = Le Guen (2001) 22; Athenians (not the *Tekhnītai*) also are invited: *IG* 7.1735; see Sifakis (1965) 206–14.

[69] *FD* 3.1.351; *SEG* 19.379; Le Guen (2001) no. 20; Bousquet (1961) 78–85; Robert (1977).

[70] Kern (1900) 54, 89 = Le Guen (2001) no. 40–1.

[71] *IG* 12.8.163c37 ff.; Le Guen (2001) no. 57, with p. 34.

[72] *SIG*^{3} 696B. 20; *SIG*^{3} 698.8, 29.

[73] No doubt there was *molpē* on the *Puthais* even before this; one example might be the Simonides fragment mentioned above p. 70.

[74] Examples from hellenistic Crete, discussed by Chaniotis (see above); mixed *khoroi* of boys and girls are attested from Roman Claros; Athenian young men at Delos: below.

journey to Athens and then Delphi, where he slew first the Delphic dragon, and second Tityos, who threatened Leto. The second part of Apollo's journey thus corresponds precisely to the *theōria* just undertaken by the *Tekhnītai*.[75] The main cretic-paeonic section of the poem is followed by a concluding prayer in aeolic, which is presumably the προσόδιον referred to in the title. Notice in particular the section of the poem concerned with the aetiology of the name Paion:

τότε λιπὼν Κυνθίαν νᾶσον ἐ[πέβα θεὸ]ς πρω[τό]καρπον κλυτὰν Ἀτ<θ>-
ίδ' ἐπὶ γαλ[όφωι πρῶνι] Τριτωνίδος·
μελίπνοον δὲ λίβυς αὐδὰν χέω[ν λωτὸς ἀνέμελ]πεν [ά]δεῖαν ὅπα μειγνύμ
ενος ἀιόλ[οις κιθάριος μέλεσιν· ἅ]μα δ' ἴαχεμ πετροκατοίκητος ἀχ[ὼ
παιὰν ἰὲ παιάν·
ἃ δ' ὀξὺ γέγαθ', ὅτι νόωι δεξάμενος ἀμβρόταν Δι[ὸς ἐπέγνω φρέ]μ" ἀνθ' ὧν
ἐκείνας ἀπ' ἀρχᾶς Παιήονα κικλήσκ[ομεν ἅπας λ]αὸς α[ὐτο]χθόνων
ἠδὲ Βάκχου μέγας θυρσοπλὴ[ξ ἑσμὸς ἱ]ερὸς τεχνιτῶν ἔνοικος πόλει
Κεκροπίαι.

Then leaving the Cynthian island the god stepped on glorious Attica, land of the first harvest, on the promontory of Triton, and the flute, pouring out a sweet strain, sang in a sweet voice mixed with the vibrant tunes of the kithara. Just then Echo, dwelling in a rock, sounded '*paian ie paian!*' He was delighted because he recognised the immortal mind of Zeus. For this reason we invoke Paieon, the whole people of the autochthons, and the great thyrsos-driven swarm of Bacchos, the sacred swarm of artists who live in the city of Cecrops.

Thus, Limenius appropriates for Athens the aetiology of the name 'Paion,' which is also the aetiology of the *paian*-genre. Now, we know that there was a rival aetiology that linked the origin of *paion/paian* to Delphi, where the nymphs shouted to Apollo 'Shoot, child! (ἵε, παῖ)' So this is one area where we can see the Athenians presenting a version of a myth which appropriates for their *polis* a greater role in Apolline mythology at the expense of Delphi. No doubt if more of these songs survived, we would find other examples of this pattern.[76]

[75] Cf. Aziz (1987) on how pilgrim-songs set out narratives from the mythological or historical past which motivate and prefigure the pilgrimages. Rutherford (2001*a*) 25 on the etymology.

[76] Vamvouri (1998); Urbano (1991). Cf. also Aesch. *Eum.* 12–14 cited above.

THEŌRIA TO DELOS: THE SONG OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

The Athenian *theōria* to Delos was a very ancient tradition. *Deliastai* were already mentioned in the *kurbeis* of Solon.[77] The high-point of Athenian activity on Delos is the later fifth and fourth centuries, when the Athenians exercised power through the framework of the Delian Amphictiony. Athenian activity on Delos ceases when Delos became independent in 336 BC, but it resumed when Athens took Delos over again under Roman protection in the second century BC. During the periods of Athenian control, there was a tendency for Athens to regard Delos as an extension of its own territory. Notice that the sacrifices on Delos are included in the early fourth-century Athenian state-calendar as revised by Nicomachus,[78] and during the period following 166 BC the priesthood of Delian Apollo was an Athenian appointment. On the other hand, Delos maintained its own *boulē*, and continued to provide the *neokoroi* and the *hieropoioi* who ran the festivals. But we should bear in mind that in some respects Athenian *theōria* to Delos resembles less a true interstate *theōria* than an intra-state *theōria*, such as the one to Brauron.

There were probably several regular *theōriai* from Athens to Delos. To begin with we know that Athens sent a major *theōria* to Delos every four years in the later fifth and fourth centuries, since a sequence of dedications is attested from that period.[79] And then a famous passage of Plato's *Phaedo* seems to refer to a yearly *theōria* commemorating the Cretan adventure of Theseus. Aristotle mentions a heptaeteric *theōria* to Delos as well as the pentaeteric one.[80] The Marathonian Tetrapolis sent *theōriai* to Delos as well as Delphi.[81] Finally, there is the Athenian hero Erusikhthon, ancestor of the Erusikhthonidai who were involved in the *Puthais*.

[77] Polemo Periegetes περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνηθεν Ἐρατοσθένους ἐπιδημίας, fr. 78 Preller (= Athen. 234c, citing the κύρβεις of Solon: Stroud (1979) 4–5); Harpocration s. v. Δηλιασταί says that the orator Lycurgus mentioned the Attic Δηλιασταί (= Blass, fr. 89).

[78] *LSS* 10B, 6; Dow (1961) 67–8 with Dow (1968) 174, thinks this fragment, from the thinner wall, is from a supplementary calendar, dealing with *inter alia* sacrifices outside the city.

[79] Collected in Coupry (1972); good survey in Davies (1967) 31.

[80] *Ath. Pol.* 54.7; Rutherford (2001*a*) 297–8.

[81] See Philochorus cited above.

He is supposed to have been the first to make a pilgrimage to Delos, dying when he returned at Prasiai. This may reflect a different tradition again.[82]

The timing of these *theōriai* remains uncertain. We might expect them to have corresponded with a major festival in Delos. The most important festival of Apollo there seems to have been in the month of Hieros, the Athenian Anthesterion, rather early in the year for a sea-voyage.[83] A late and isolated source tells us that the Delians celebrated the birth of Apollo on the seventh of Thargelion (Targelion on Delos).[84] That might fit the Theseus-*theōria*, since Theseus was supposed to have left Athens in Mounikhion and to have returned in Puanopsion.[85] An association in literary sources between the activities of Theseus on Delos and the cult of Aphrodite may make us think of the Delian Aphrodisia-festival, which took place in the month of Hekatombaion.[86] Noel Robertson has recently suggested the radical thesis that the *theōria* commemorating the journey of Theseus could have happened as late as Puanopsion, correlated with the Athenian Oschophoria in that month.[87] It is impossible to say which, if any, of these possibilities is right.

It is likely that many of these Athenian *theōriai* took *khoroi* with them. Plutarch's account (*Nikias* 3.4–6) of how Nikias arranged for a bridge to be constructed between the islands of Rhencia and Delos, so that the Athenian *khoros* would arrive on Delos in good order, seems to reflect such a tradition of choral performance. An obvious theme for such songs would have been the mythological exploits of Theseus, particularly how he founded the Delian festival—Bacchylides *Ode* 17, although it is not itself an Athenian theoric song, might nevertheless be thought to reflect this hypothetical form.[88] The only surviving fragment of an Athenian theoric song, which dates from up to fifty years before the time of Nikias, in fact has a different subject. Pindar's *Paian* 5

[82] Paus. 1.31. [83] Bruneau (1970) 76 ff.

[84] Anon. *Vita Platonis* p. 6 Didot. Bruneau (1970) 88–9 is sceptical.

[85] On Theseus and Delos see Smarczyk (1990) 470 n. 181, 472 n. 184.

[86] Plut. *Thes.* 21; Callim. *Hymn.* 4.307–15; Bruneau (1970) 341; Calame (1990).

[87] Robertson (1992).

[88] As David Fearn suggests to me, Bacchylides 17 seems to differ from other Keian poems in reflecting an Athenian agenda, and it may reflect a period of development of the Delian amphictiony in which Athens dominates.

was a short and simple composition with seven strophes of five lines; we have the end of it.[89]

[—⏑⏑—⏑⏑ Εὐ-]
βοιαν ἕλον καὶ ἔνασσαν·
Ζ΄ ἰήϊε Δάλι' Ἄπολλον·
καὶ σποράδας φερεμήλους
ἔκτισαν νάσους ἐρικυδέα τ' ἔσχον
Δᾶλον, ἐπεί σφιν Ἀπόλλων
δῶκεν ὁ χρυσοκόμας
Ἀστερίας δέμας οἰκεῖν·
Η΄ ἰήϊε Δάλι' Ἄπολλον·
Λατόος ἔνθα με παῖδες
εὐμενεῖ δέξασθε νόῳ θεράποντα
ὑμέτερον κελαδεννᾷ
σὺν μελιγάρυϊ παι-
ᾶνος ἀγακλέος ὀμφᾷ.

Σ 35 ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων || 45 Πανδωρο <υ> Ἐρεχ[θεως] Αἰκλον

. . . (they) took Euboea and dwelt there. Iete Delian Apollo! And they made homes in the scattered islands rich in flocks, and held far-famed Delos since Apollo of the golden locks gave them the body of Asteria to settle. Iete Delian Apollo! There may you, children of Leto, graciously welcome me as your servant, to the clear honied strain of a glorious paian.

(35) From the Athenians. (45) Pandorus, son of Erectheus, Aiklos

The extant part seems to describe the colonization of Euboea and other islands, and then the singer asks Apollo and Artemis to receive him on Delos. The lost title would have provided evidence about the performers. Some have thought that it was sung by a Euboean *khoros* (it would not be the only Euboean song written for performance on Delos).[90] But all in all it seems likelier that the performers were Athenians describing the Athenian colonization of Euboea and other islands. The colonizing movement described

[89] What might have been contained in the earlier stages of the song? An Athenian singer/*khoros* might have wanted to lay claim to other Athenian colonies also, perhaps some in Ionia. Other themes suitable for an Athenian song performed on Delos might have been Theseus' founding of the festival (cf. Bacch. 17); perhaps also the story of Athena Pronoia's involvement in the birth of Apollo (cf. Pind. *Pae.* 12.11).

[90] We know that at least one Euboean *khoros* performed at Delos in the 5th cent. BC, since it was in this century that the *aulētēs* Pronomus, son of Oeniades, composed a προσόδιον for the Chalcidians for performance at Delos (Paus. 9.12.5–6).

in the song thus mirrors their own *theōria* from Athens to Delos, and the performers both create and reenact the earlier tradition.[91] The song would thus be an assertion of Athenian claims to leadership in the region.[92] Its celebrity in Athens is perhaps indicated by the fact that the refrain is echoed in the parodos of Sophocles *Oedipus Tyrannus* (line 154): ἰήϊε Δάλιε Παιάν.

The simple structure of *Paian* 5 (non-triadic, short strophes) is a good illustration, I think, of the traditional nature of this poetry. The paian was a simple genre by the standards of *avant-garde* Athenian culture; no 'New Music' here. And much theoric poetry was even simpler than this. Many of the songs performed by visiting delegations were probably traditional and old, either anonymous or attributed to poets of the distant past, like Olen or Tynnichus. (The πάτριος παιάν mentioned in the *Puthais*-inscriptions might be this sort of thing). By that standard, the songs of fifth-century lyric poets like Pindar were probably modern and transgressive. They would be commissioned to compose a song on the occasion of a particularly special *theōria*; otherwise an old song would be used. And that is probably one of the reasons comparatively few of these theoric songs have come down to us.

The performers of *Paian* 5 were probably a *khoros* of young men. Athenian *theōriai* were primarily masculine in make-up, as we see hinted in a passage of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (3.3.12):

ἢ τόδε οὐκ ἐντεθύμησαι ὡς, ὅταν γε χορὸς εἷς ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως γίγνεται, ὥσπερ ὁ εἰς Δῆλον πεμπόμενος, οὐδεὶς ἄλλοθεν οὐδαμόθεν τούτῳ ἐφάμιλλος γίγνεται, οὐδὲ εὐανδρία ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ὁμοία τῇ ἐνθάδε συνάγεται.

Or have you not considered this, that when one *khoros* happens from the *polis* (like the one that is sent to Delos), no other from anywhere else can rival it, nor can any other city assemble a strength of manhood equal to that assembled in our city.

Here the use of the term εὐανδρία, reminiscent of the 'Euandria' event attested in the Panathenaia,[93] suggests that the pilgrimage to

[91] Cf. the relation between Apollo's journey and that of the *Tekhnītai* in the Limenius-paian.

[92] Notice the two heroes mentioned in the scholion on line 45: Pandoros, son of Erechtheus, founder of Chalcis, and Aiklos, brother of Kothos, founder of Eretria, and possibly son of Xouthos. The scholiast seems to imply that the speaking subject in the closing prayer actually *is* Pandoros and Aiklos, justifying presenting the Ionian colonization of the Aegean as an Athenian achievement.

[93] Boegehold (1996).

Delos was an arena where men were prominent. Aristotle describes the ship taking the delegation to Delos as carrying ἡΐθεοι, which strongly suggests that the *khoros* was composed of young men (cf. the *Puthaistai paides* in *Puthaides* 1 and 2).[94]

There is an obvious contrast with the indigenous performance tradition of Delos, where the most famous performers were female. In his study of Hellenistic Delos Philippe Bruneau observed that while during the period of independence the Apollonia-festival featured performances by Deliades, during the later period of Athenian rule from 166 BC there is no evidence of women's *khoroi*, and we do find lists of ephebes.[95] Perhaps this is a hint of a conflict between the local Delian performance tradition, that gave women a prominent place, and Athenian performance traditions, where women played a much less important role.

VI *KHOROS* AND *AGŌN* AT DELOS

Athenian *theōriai* might also have taken *khoroi* to take part in a musical contest on Delos, as is suggested by the detailed accounts for the Athenian administration of Delos (the 'Delian Amphictyony') for 377-373 BC, the so-called 'Sandwich Marble'.[96]

στέφανος ἀριστεῖον τῶι θεῶι, καὶ τῶι ἐργασαμένωι μισθός Χ[ᴾ,
τρίποδες νικητήρια τοῖς χοροῖς, καὶ τῶι ἐργασαμένωι μισθός Χ[.],
ἀρχεθεώροις Τ,
εἰς κομιδὴν τῶν θεωρῶν καὶ τῶν χορῶ[ν] Ἀντιμάχωι
φίλωνος Ἑρμείωι τριηράρχωι ΤΧ[,
ἀριθμὸς βοῶν τῶν ε[ἰς τὴ]ν ἑορτὴν ὠνηθέντων Η[ᴾΙΙΙΙ,
τιμὴ τούτων ΤΧΧΗΗΗΗΔ[ᴾ⊢⊢⊢,
πέταλ[α χρυσ]ᾶ καὶ χρυσωτεῖ μισθός ΗΔΔ[ᴾ.].
εἰς τὰ προθύματα τῆς ἑορτῆς ?
[...'κομ]ιδὴ τῶν τριπόδων καὶ τῶν βοῶν [κα]ὶ πεντηκοστὴ καὶ τρο[φὴ]
[τοῖς βοσ]ὶ καὶ ξύλων τιμὴ τῶν ἐπ[ὶ.....]ν τιμ[ὴ...]

A crown as a prize for the god and payment for the manufacturer: 1500dr
victory tripods for the *khoroi* and payment for the manufacturer: 1000dr
for the *arkhetheōroi*: 6000dr

[94] The expression of Plato *Phaedo* 58a, 'twice seven', possibly suggests that there were seven young men and seven young women.

[95] Bruneau (1970) 76–81; Linders (1987) argues that these are *gunaikes* rather than *parthenoi*.

[96] *ID* 98.94 [= Tod 125]; cf. also 100.41. We also hear of multiple *khorēgoi* in *Ath. Pol.* 56.6, which seems to suggest multiple *khoroi* in at least one Athenian *theōria*.

for transport of the *theōroi* and *khoroi* 7000dr
to Antimakhos son of Philon of Hermos the *trierarkhos* number of oxen bought for the festival: 109dr
price of these 7418dr
gold leaves and payment to the goldsmith 126dr
for the preliminary sacrifices of the festival [ ]
... transportation of tripods and oxen and two per cent tax and feed for the oxen and price of logs for the ...

The Athenians sent *theōriai* to Delos on a regular basis from the 420s till they gave up control in the later fourth century, but this may have been a particularly ambitious instance of the festival, staged shortly after the foundation of the Second Athenian Federation in 378 BC. It included 109 oxen, a full *hekatombē* and more. There were also multiple *arkhitheōroi* (line 34), all of whom were involved in the same festival (line 37). This *theōria* may have been as complex as the one in the 420s when no fewer than six Athenian *arkhitheōroi* made a joint dedication at Delos (*ID* 43 = *IG* 1^3. 1468).[97]

Line 33 seems to imply that a choral *agōn* took place at Delos—similar, perhaps, to the choral *agōnes* of the Athenian Dionysia and Thargelia.[98] The contest would be the same sort of event which accommodated the performance of Bacchylides' *Ode* 17 ('Theseus' Dive'), which presents itself as a Keian paian. However, its extended narrative structure looks decidedly like the *dithurambos*,[99] and the *dithurambos* is the preferred genre for choral competition in Athenian festivals.[100] This would, however, antedate the period of the regular Athenian *theōria* to Delos.[101]

[97] Tod is wrong to say that they must be from different *poleis*; so Dillon (1997) 127. Plural *arkhitheōroi* at Olympia are mentioned in (ps.)-Andoc. 4.29; *ID* 43; Coupry (1954). We find multiple *arkhitheōroi* also in the *Puthais*-inscriptions. There were two in *Puthais* 1; in *Puthaides* 2 and 3 there was just one (identical with the *arkhōn*); but in *Puthais* 4, there are independent *arkhitheōroi* for three groups: the Erusichthonidai, a priestly *genos*, related to Erusichthon, who founded the pilgrimage to Delos: Parker (1996) 289–90; the Marathonian Tetrapolis; and the *Tekhnītai*. This variation of *arkhitheōroi* only happens in *Puthais* 4, but it could still be a traditional feature.

[98] According to Amandry and Ducat (1973), the tripod bases found at Delos (and presumably used in the Delian competition) closely resemble those from the Athenian Pythion, which seems to have stored tripods won in the Thargelia. I owe this reference to Peter Wilson.

[99] On Bacchylides 17: Rutherford (2001*a*) 98–9; Schröder (2000).

[100] See Csapo in this volume; Wilson (2000*a*).

[101] A reference to 'Delian *dithuramboi*' by Simonides, *PMG* 539; Rutherford (1990) 203–6. Aelius Aristides *Eis to Aigaion Pelagos* 12, compares the islands surrounding Delos to a dithyrambic *khoros*.

The major problem is with the nature of the *agōn*. *Prima facie* there are two possibilities, corresponding to two ways of construing Athens' relation to Delos.

1. The contestants might have been from different *poleis*, presumably those contributing to the Delian Amphictiony. The only state known to have played an active part in its administration is Andros, but we may expect other Cycladic states to have sent representatives as well, for example Keos, which had strong traditions of choral song-dance performance.[102] In that case the *khoroi* mentioned in line 35 would perhaps include one *khoros* intended for the *agōn* and one (or more) intended for cultic performance.

2. All or many of the contestants may have been from Athens and Attica. In that case the multiple *khoroi* mentioned in line 35 will presumably consist of or include entries for the *agōn*, which may have been drawn from each pair of tribes, as at the Thargelia.[103] Thus, we would be dealing with a choral competition more or less transplanted to Delos.[104] This would be possible if, as I suggested earlier, there was a tendency for the Athenians to regard Delos as an extension of their own territory.

In the end, it is likelier that the competition was for members of the Amphictiony. In that case, what do we make of the khoroi transported to Delos? Either they belong to different states, or they are all Athenian, in which case only one of them would have been taken to compete in the *agōn*, and any others would have been for ritual performance. We cannot rule out the possibility that the ritual staged by the Athenians at Delos in this period was very elaborate (after all, it included a full *hekatombē*), and involved performance by several different Athenian *khoroi*. This is too early for the Athenian *Tekhnitai*, but there could have been different *khoroi* of men, *paides*, and *parthenoi*.[105] Finally, if the elaborate *theōria* of 377–374 BC contained one or more sub-delegations, such as the one from the Marathonian Tetrapolis in the Hellenistic *Puthais*, it is possible that such a sub-delegation could have taken with it a separate *khoros*.[106]

[102] Delian Amphictiony: Tausend (1992) 47–55.

[103] In that case the six *arkhitheōroi* of *ID* 43 might represent five representing the tribes and one more.

[104] Peter Wilson drew my attention to the Samian inscription—Klaffenbach (1926) 36—which seems to refer to religious activities by the Pandionis tribe, which might imply Athenian tribes operating independently on Samos: cf. Parker (1994) 343; but however we interpret that document, it seems to imply the permanent presence of Athenian or Athenian-type tribes on Samos, which I am not suggesting here.

[105] Cf. the seven boys and seven girls in *Phaedo* 58a.

VII SUMMING UP: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THEORIC *KHOROI*

The best way of understanding the theoric *khoros* is probably to see it as a special case of institution of the activities of *theōroi*. Just as *theōroi* serve as proxies and mediators, performing religious duties on behalf of their city, and negotiating its broader identity within the group of states represented at the sanctuary, so the reason we find song-dance often used in *theōria* is precisely that song-dance performance is a good medium through which the *polis* can represent itself in a conspicuous and memorable manner.

Thus, Athenian *theōroi* to Delos in the fifth century will have been concerned to put forward a statement about Athenian history and identity in the locale of a key Ionian sanctuary, and the performance of Pindar's Fifth Paian will have reinforced this message. In that case, as in others, the performers may well have been young men, who were deemed to represent the best of the city and its future. As the example of dance in Peruvian pilgrimage suggests, numerous formal features—the make-up of the *khoros*, the style of dancing, the content of the song and the dress of the performers—could all have made a contribution to the projection of local identity.[107]

Above all, a theoric *khoros* would have tended to represent its whole community, projecting an image of unity and coherence, 'one *khoros* from this *polis*', as Xenophon said. Individual subsections of the community were not singled out; nor was the

[106] Some of the *arkhetheōroi* listed in *ID* 43 could have led independent delegations, for instance, the one from more-autonomous-than-average deme of Eleusis; or even that from the tiny deme of Plotheia, in view of *IG* I^3.258, in which Plotheia undertakes to make sacrifices at 'the penteteric festivals,' which might well include the Delia. If they did, then either Plotheia sent contributions to Athens to be used in the Athenian-*theōria*, or they sent their own delegation, which could have gone either directly to Delos, or *via* Athens and in company with the main Athenian delegation.

[107] Spencer (1985) 21 ff.

arkhitheōros, as far as we can tell.[108] Compared with performance in the home city, it is likely that these will have been perceived as conservative and traditional. Even if an Athenian *theōria* took several *khoroi* with it corresponding to different genders or age-groups, the point would be the same. And even when in the Hellenistic period the *Tekhnītai* take over some of the functions of the Athenian citizen *khoroi*, it is still one city that they represent.

Looked at more broadly, Xenophon's 'one *khoros* from this *polis*' implies a contrast with the most conspicuous *khoroi* performing within the Athenian *polis*, which were not 'one', in so far as they tended to represent different *intra-polis* groups, like the *khoroi* that performed *dithuramboi* in Athens. Other forms of traditional *khoreia* performed on Attic soil (whether in Athens or in the demes) were (I would guess) simpler, and would have provided less of a contrast.[109] But local Athenian *khoreia* in the shape of the *dithurambos* would perhaps have been a good foil for the simple ideal of theoric poetry in other ways as well: in respect of musical form (complex and innovative), and in respect of artistic content (oblique narrative).[110] Nevertheless, it can be seen that Xenophon probably captures an important difference between forms of song-dance designed for consumption at home and abroad.

[108] If it had done so, theoric poetry would have been like that other form of 'theoric' poetry, the *epinikion* where the focus is on the single aristocratic victor. Athenian examples include: Euripides' *epinikion* for Alcibiades (*PMG* 755); Pind. *Pyth.* 7. *Arkhitheōroi* are regularly singled out for praise in honorific inscriptions. But nothing that survives suggests that it was possible for the role of the *arkhitheōros* to be highlighted in theoric poetry.

[109] On the simple *khoros* and the city see Tuo (1997) esp. 14–15.

[110] Centuries later, Plutarch (see Rutherford (2001*a*) 82) contrasted the 'multiple' and 'complex' dithyramb with the 'simple' paian. Might the idea that the conservative traditions of the state-*theōria* are readily opposed to the complex and fissured nature of choral song-dance performed in the *polis* be part of what lies behind Plutarch's contrast?

4

Dancing the *Pyrrhichē* in Athens

Paola Ceccarelli

Archaic Greece has been defined as a 'song and dance culture';[1] but dance continued to retain its importance in the classical period, when to participate in the city's choruses was an essential part of any citizen's education. In Athens more than 1,150 citizens would dance every year in the tragic, comic, and dithyrambic choruses at the Great Dionysia, under the gaze of the whole *polis* and of many foreigners as well; choral dances (with performances by girls as well) would be part of a number of other festivals.[2] Dance, together with music and song, thus appears as a constitutive element of Athenian culture.

The *pyrrhichē*, possibly because of its striking warlike character, has a special place as one of the best documented among ancient Greek dances. Nonetheless, its meaning is very difficult to evaluate: very different—and sometimes contradictory—facets of the dance are highlighted by its various aetiologies. Thus, the derivation of the name *pyrrhichē* from that of a Spartan or a Cretan called Pyrrhichos stresses a geographical or geopolitical factor. The fact that this Cretan Pyrrhichos is sometimes said to have been one of the Kouretes has implications as to the values and possibly the modalities of performance of the dance. A Panhellenic meaning is implied by the attribution of its invention to Achilles, or to his son Pyrrhos/Neoptolemos. The derivation of the name from the funeral pyre points to a connection with funerary rites; and the performance aspect is central to the aetiology, which has the dance named from

This chapter began to take shape during my stay at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington in 1999. I owe thanks to Kurt Raaflaub and Hans van Wees for stimulating discussion as well as to Egbert Bakker and Ian Rutherford for useful criticisms on a later version. The article by J. L. Shear, 'Atarbos' base and the Panathenaia', *JHS* 123, 2003, pp. 164–80 came out too late for me to take into account.

[1] Archaic Greece as a 'song and dance culture': Herington (1985) 3; Henrichs (1996*a*). On Greek dances: Fitton (1973); Lonsdale (1993).

[2] Importance in public life: Henrichs (1996*a*), and n. 65 for the statistics; Wilson (2000*a*). I cannot discuss here the impact of dance in private life—at symposia for example; but see on this Wohl this volume, and specifically for the *pyrrhichē*, Ceccarelli (1998) 58–60, 65–7.

its similarity to the swift movements of a flame. To this list a few more aetiologies might be added, like that connecting the dance with the birth of Athena, or with her victory over the Giants.[3]

These pieces of information are however decontextualized. Apart from some very general information, like the fact that it was performed by dancers equipped with weapons, that it 'imitates the modes of avoiding blows and missiles by dropping or giving way, or springing aside, or rising up or falling down; also the opposite postures which are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of archery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sort of blows' (Plato *Laws* 7.815ab), and that in the course of time it tended to 'degenerate' towards a pantomimic dance with dionysiac contents (Athenaeus 14.631ab), we do not know much about the pyrrhic. In particular, it is difficult for us to evaluate the impact and the social function of weapon dances in Athenian life.[4]

As an intentional and repeated movement of the human body performed according to a definite pattern, dance is part of the more general category of ritual. In itself, it is not a self-explanatory entity: meaning comes to it from the context in which it is performed. On the other hand, ritualized movements frequently repeated in one context take on a specific meaning from their very repetition in that context. This implies that the performance of the same dance in two different contexts—so long as these are not too distant in time and space—may transfer meanings pertinent to the one context on to the other, or may imply a similar global meaning for the two events.[5]

[3] A Spartan: Aristox. fr. 103 Wehrli (Athen. 14.630e); a Cretan: Ephor. *FGrHist* 70 F 147–9 (Strabo 10.4.16) and *schol.* Pind. *Pyth.* 2.127; one of the Kouretes: Paus. 3.25.1 and Plato *Laws* 7.796b; Pyrrhos: possibly Arch. fr. 304 W; the Cretans, or Neoptolemos, or the Molossians, or Kastor, or Dionysos: *schol.* T Hom. *Il.* 16.617a; Achilles on the funeral pyre of Patroclos: Arist. fr. 534.1 Gigon = 519 Rose (*schol.* Pind. *Pyth.* 2.127); swiftness of fire: Hesych s.v. πυρριχίζουσιν. For Athena, *infra*. Aetiologies, no matter whether correct according to our scientific criteria or not, are important inasmuch as they reveal how the ancients perceived the reality they were thus trying to explain.

[4] I do not think that the *pyrrhichē* had a strong practical utility in preparation for war (as frequently affirmed: see e.g. Reed (1998) *passim*); Rawlings (2000) offers a sensible discussion, but I would rather insist on the social, cohesive, integrative function of (weapon-) dances. Wilson (2000*a*) 37–8 and 47 stresses the highly symbolic value of festival leitourgies with military qualities.

[5] A discussion of modern definitions of dance in Naerebout (1997) 155–73. Dance as ritual: Burkert (1985) 102. Greek definition of dance as a rhythmical and patterned movement of the body: Plato *Laws* 814de; Xen. *Symp.* 2.16; Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.15.747c; Liban. *Pro Salt.* (64) 28. Mimetic aspect: e.g. Plato *Laws* 7.815a. Interrelationship of words, harmony and rhythm: e.g. Plato *Rep.* 3.398d. On the problem of genre: Calame (1974); Nagy (1994–5*b*); Bierl (2001) 63–4, who on the basis of the strong anchoring of poetry in ritual in archaic Greece, stress the equivalence of genre and occasion.

For this reason, I shall try to map out the attested performance contexts of the *pyrrhichē* in Attica, with the aim of locating it among the vast range of activities arranged by and for the *polis*, and of advancing some hypotheses as to its meaning and its relationship to other Athenian dramatic and musical genres. The evidence for performances of pyrrhics in Attica consists, for the period from around 420 to 320 BC, mainly of literary texts and inscriptions (victory dedications, lists of prizes, honorific decrees, comments of comic poets and of orators) which were intended for wide and public diffusion, and which are concerned with public aspects of the life of the *polis*. For the earlier period (*c.*530 to 400 BC) we have to rely almost exclusively on the evidence of Attic vases—that is, on a variety of evidence of a very different status and purpose.

I THE PANATHENAIA

The first allusion to the staging of a pyrrhic in this context is to be found in Aristophanes' *Clouds*: there, the Better Argument vents its rage at the young men of contemporary Athens, unable to hold their shield properly when dancing for Tritogeneia at the Panathenaia.[6] The dance was probably part of the festival from an early time. By the end of the fifth century, it was performed both at the Lesser and at the Greater Panathenaia.[7]

The performance of the pyrrhic was clearly connected with the city goddess, who had herself danced a *pyrrhichē* at the moment of her birth from the head of Zeus, or, according to another version,

[6] Ar. *Clouds* 988–9. Cf. Wohl this volume, Dover (1968) ad loc., and schol. Ar. *Clouds* 989d: Τριτογενείας τῆς ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ πυρρίχης ὀρχήσεως with Borthwick (1969) for the hypothesis of a specific connection between the epithet *Tritogeneia* and the pyrrhic dance.

[7] Antiquity: Robertson (1996) 56–7 suggests that *pyrrhichē* and *apobatēs* may go back to Mycenaean time; Brelich (1969) 315–22 sees in the *pyrrhichē* and *euandria* initiation rites of penteteric cycle, introduced in the agonistic program when the Panathenaia were founded, in 566. Pyrrhic at Lesser and Greater Panathenaia: Lys. 21.1–4 (referring to choregies in 410/9 and 403/2).

after having defeated the Giants.[8] The latter aetiology is particularly interesting because Athena's victory in the Gigantomachy is also one of the aetiologies of the festival of the Panathenaia itself, a new-year's festival celebrating the victory of order over disorder, of civilization over savagery. Thus the pyrrhic would certainly have been one of the most important moments of the Panathenaic festival.

More detailed information comes from *IG* 2^2.2311, a list of prizes for victors at the Panathenaia, dated to the first half of the fourth century (probably around 375). After the prizes for the musical competitions (golden crowns and cash) and those for the gymnic and equestrian events (olive oil), we find, under the heading νικητήρια, the pyrrhic competition followed by the εὐανδρία, the λαμπαδηφορία (torch-race) and, after another, identical heading, by the νεῶν ἅμιλλα, the boat-race.

The specific heading νικητήρια sets this group apart from the other competitions, whose prizes are individual ἆθλα. In this case, the victorious teams receive as their prize a bull worth a hundred drachmae, a type of prize very different, in kind—and in its implications—from all other prizes in the music, gymnastic and equestrian Panathenaic competitions.[9] These four competitions were

[8] Ferrari-Pinney (1988). Plato (*Cratyl.* 406d–407a and *Laws* 7.796b) associates Athena with a generic armed dance (ἐνόπλιος ὄρχησις); in the latter passage the goddess' dance is compared to those of the Kouretes in Crete and of the Dioskouroi in Sparta. Cf. also *Orph. fr.* 185 and 186 Kern (Procl. *in* Plat. *Cratyl.* 406 and Procl. *in* Plat. *Rep.* 1.38.12, Procl. *in* Plat. *Tim.* 42d), and Epicharmos fr. 92 K.-A. (Athen. 4.184f, with schol. Pind. *Pyth.* 2.127, and Ael. Arist. *Ath.* 37.22 K.). Lucian *Dial. Deor.* 8, *POxy* 2260 (Apollod. περὶ Θεῶν) and an oracle from Miletus (P. Herrmann, *Chiron* 1, (1971) 291–8) connect the invention of an armed dance with the birth of Athena; this tradition builds on the assonance Παλλάς/πάλλειν, and probably goes back to the 6th cent., since the papyrus mentions Stesichoros, Ibycos, and Euripides (resp. Page *PMG* 56 (233); *PMG* 17 (289); Eur fr. 1009a Nauck–Snell). Victory over the Giants and subsequent pyrrhic: Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.72.7. An account of the stories concerning the birth of Athena and her battle against the Giants in Parker (1987) 190–3. Lonsdale (1993) 148–57 sees a connection between the iconography of Athena's birth and the pyrrhic dance.

[9] Institution of the festival: Davison (1958) 24–5; Brelich (1969) 315–22; Brûlé (1992); Parker (1996) 89–92; introduction of the tribal competitions: Rausch 1998 (debatable). *Nikētēria* were 'social occasions, an opportunity, whether the victory was military or agonistic, for the victors to provide a generous feast', Jameson (1994) 313. The frequent assumption that the victors would receive a substantial sum of money ('A hundred drachmas *and* a bull') is wrong: as in Attic calendars, the sum indicates the value of the animal. Changes in the prizes: cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 60.1–3 with Rhodes (1981) 676.

also distinguished from most of the other μουσικοί and γυμνικοὶ ἀγῶνες (musical and gymnastic competitions) of the Panathenaia by their militaristic character, and by the fact that they were ἐκ πολιτῶν: only citizens were allowed to participate. This is explicitly said in our sources of the εὐανδρία,[10] but must have been the case for all competitions that were organized according to tribal subdivisions.

If they share some features, these *agōnes* also present differences which imply that they were not introduced at the same moment, nor thought of as a group. To begin with, they did not take place at the same venue (this is most obvious for the boat-race, which must have been introduced in the program some time after the battle of Salamis). Nor is it clear whether *euandria*, *lampadēphoria*, and the boat-race were part of the annual Panathenaia.[11] For the pyrrhic there was a *chorēgos*; but the person in charge of the λαμπάς was the gymnasiarch, who possibly also assumed the liturgy for the *euandria*; while for the boat-race there would have been trierarchs: the three latter *agōnes* were thus of a gymnastic rather than a musical nature.[12] Finally, it is most striking that for the pyrrhic there is no mention of a tribal subdivision. There is however a division into three age-classes, παῖδες, ἀγένειοι, and ἄνδρες. Such a division is rather exceptional in the panorama of fifth-century festivals; in our prize-list it is attested for the pyrrhic and for the gymnastic competitions—not however for the musical ones.[13] This tripartite division was already in existence in 403, the year in which an anonymous litigant defended by Lysias exercised the *chorēgia* for the pyrrhicists *ageneioi* (Lys. 21.4). It is impossible to say how

[10] *Anec. gr.* 1.257.13 Bekker, probably an inference from Dinarchus 16, fr. 3 Conomis: cf. *FGrHist* 328 F 102, with Jacoby's comments. Some of the equestrian competitions were also reserved for citizens: thus for the *apobatēs* (Crowther 1991), the chariot and horserace competitions in the agora near the Eleusinion, and some of the events in the hippodrome: Tracy (1991) 139–42.

[11] For Davies (1967) 37, the *euandria* and the boat-race were not; the contests in cyclic choruses and pyrrhic certainly were, as probably also the torch-race, even though not attested for the annual festival.

[12] Davies (1967) 36–7. While the case is clear for the λαμπάς, for the *euandria* the only sources on this point are late and not from Attica: Gauthier (1982) 228–9.

[13] On age-class divisions, Petermandl (1997); Klee (1918) 43–6. ἀγένειοι are found in Pind. *Ol.* 8.54 and *Ol.* 9.89, and in *IG* 1^3. 1386, an inscription from Salamis (but possibly from Athens: Raubitschek wanted to relate it to the Panathenaia) dated to *c.* 450. *Ageneioi* at the *Isthmia* and *Nemea* in the 5th cent.: *IG* 12.5.608, with Schmidt (1999).

much further back it went.[14] Interestingly, the tripartite division was taken up in other festivals, but, as far as I know, only in relation to gymnastic contests. In the panorama of Greek choral dances, the three categories of pyrrhic choruses of the Panathenaia thus appear as an exception, comparable only with the Spartan *trichoria*.[15]

The absence of any indication of a tribal organization for the pyrrhic in *IG* 2^2. 2311 is matched by the silence of the other sources. In Isaeus' speech *On the Estate of Dikaiogenes*, the meanness and civic worthlessness of Dikaiogenes are demonstrated by the fact that 'He acted as a *chorēgos* for his tribe at the Dionysia and was fourth; as *chorēgos* in the tragic contest and pyrrhic dances he was last' (5.36: οὗτος γὰρ τῇ μὲν φυλῇ εἰς Διονύσια χορηγήσας τέταρτος ἐγένετο, τραγῳδοῖς δὲ καὶ πυρριχισταῖς ὕστατος). The fourth position obtained when *chorēgos* for his tribe at the Dionysia is here contrasted, in a well-balanced phrase, with the fact that he only managed last place in the tragic and pyrrhic competitions. This does not prove that the pyrrhic, just as tragedy—and in contrast to the dithyramb—was not organized on a tribal basis; but neither can this passage be taken to mean the reverse.[16] The passages from Lysias already discussed do not give any indication. As for the three Attic bases which celebrate a victory in the pyrrhic, they are admittedly fragmentary, but in none of them can a mention of the tribe be read or restored.[17]

To this rather inconclusive evidence may be added a decree of the tribe Pandionis (*IG* 2^2.1138), dated some time after 403/2, in which the tribe votes to inscribe on the stone the name of all victors, from the time of the archonship of Euclides, in the competitions of *paides* or *andres* at the Dionysia, Thargelia, Promethia or Hephaistia—that is, in all kinds of tribal choral contests; the *epimelētai* are to set up the stele in the sanctuary of Pandion.[18] Clearly the tribe aimed at publicizing its successes; certainly, having included such relatively minor competitions as the Promethia and the Hephaistia, the tribe would not have omitted the more important choral competitions of the Panathenaia, if they had been relevant, nor, among them, the pyrrhic.[19]

While it may be possible to find an *ad hoc* explanation for the failure of every one of these documents to mention a tribe in connection with pyrrhic competitions, the only comprehensive explanation is to assume that they were not organized on a tribal basis. But what then might be the reason for this, when (with the exception of tragedy and comedy) all other choral performances in Athens, including the other three competitions in this section of the Panathenaic prize list, were contested between the tribes? How many pyrrhic choruses were there, and how were they formed, if the organization was not based on the tribal structure? And what does this imply for the meaning of the ritual performance?

Part of the answer might be sought in the dance's antiquity. If the pyrrhic competition was already in existence before Cleisthenes, and if it had a strong traditional significance, then it is possible that it would not have been tampered with in the course of the numerous 'reforms' of the festival. As Brûlé has recently

[14] Periklean times: Reisch (1894), without giving any grounds. Perikles is linked to musical competitions (Plut. *Per.* 13.9–11; schol. Ar. *Clouds* 971), but these do not present a division in three age-groups. See Davison (1958) and Davies (1967) plausibly suggesting that the cyclic choruses may have been reorganized as a liturgy by Perikles in 446/5. Much earlier: Brûlé (1992) developing, on the basis of *Il.* 2.546–51 (annual sacrifices of bulls and rams offered to Erechtheus by the κοῦροι Ἀθηναίων), a parallelism between Hyakinthia and Panathenaia.

[15] There are of course dances of ἡίθεοι or ἔφηβοι (cf. Calame (1997) 26–7); but in these instances the two other categories are not present. On the *trichoria* (whose occasion is not known: Plut. *Lyc.* 21.3 introduces it rather vaguely with τριῶν γὰρ χορῶν κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας συνισταμένων ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς), cf. Page *PMG* 870, Sosib. *FGrHist* 595 F 8 and Jacoby's comments. Plato (*Laws* 2.664b and 8.833c) certainly knew about it.

[16] As Latte (1913) 32–3 did, with an intervention on the transmitted text. He has been followed by e.g. Brelich (1969) 324–5; Scarpi (1979) 85; Brûlé (1992); Osborne (1993) 30–2 (not on the basis of this passage). Both Roussel (1922) 99 and Forster (1928) 186a, left open the possibility that as for tragedy, so also for the pyrrhic only three choruses, chosen among the entire citizenship, might have been designated. Davies (1967) 36–7 thinks that at the Panathenaia neither the pyrrhic choruses nor the cyclic ones were organized by tribes.

[17] Base Athens M.N. 3854, *SEG* 23.103, dated *c.* 370, celebrating on one side a victory with the *paides pyrrhichistai* at the Greater Panathenaia and on the other probably a tragic victory (thus Wilson (1997*a*)); Atarbos base, Athens Acr. 1338, *IG* 2^2. 3025, *SEG* 30.128, dated to 366/5, whose two remaining blocks celebrate a victory with a cyclic chorus and a victory in the pyrrhic; and Xenokles' base, Athens Acr. 6465, 2^2. 3026 (this last one quite fragmentary).

[18] On this decree cf. Lewis (1955) 17–24.

[19] The hypothesis of non-tribal performances at the Panathenaia applies both to the pyrrhic and to the cyclic choruses. Kotsidu (1991) 60 believes that the pyrrhic was organized on a tribal basis, but points out that the scanty evidence for χοροὶ ἀνδρῶν at the Panathenaia does not support the idea of tribal organization (Lys. 21.2, not referable with certainty to the Panathenaic festival; the other part of

reaffirmed on the basis of an analysis of the sacred law regulating the Lesser Panathenaia, *IG* 2^2.334 (+ *SEG* 18.13), even in the fourth century the Panathenaia preserved elements of pre-cleisthenic organization. In particular, it is possible to recognize in the 'Athenians who participated in the procession' marchers organized by age and sex (*skaphēphoroi*, *hydrophoroi*, *thallophoroi*, *ergastinai*, *kanēphoroi*), contrasted to those grouped by demes or other post-Cleisthenic political subdivisions.[20] Similarly, the pyrrhic competition might have preserved an organization in which the important factor was the age grouping. Thus, the two anomalies (absence of tribal division, but presence of a threefold division in age-classes) would, taken together, make sense. In this connection, Deubner's suggestion that the four sheep and four cows on the north side of the Parthenon frieze might be the offerings of the four pre-Cleisthenic tribes might be compared to the presence of two groups of four pyrrhicists on the Atarbos base (see Fig. 1). The four armed dancers on an Attic black-figure skyphos from Thasos dating to 520/10 have also been tentatively connected to the procession of the Panathenaia, because of the relatively rare multiple Herm on the vase, similar to the quadruple Herm of the Kerameikos (Fig. 2).[21]

There are no answers for the other questions. One may guess that for the contemporary audience, the fact that the dancers did



FIG. 1 The remains of the khoregic monument of Atarbos, with two groups of four pyrrhicists on the right-hand block.

the Atarbos base, νική[σας κυκλίωι χο]ρῶι—if one assumes that the victories mentioned on the base must pertain to the same event; and the very general indication of [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.4).

[20] Brûlé (1996) 42 and 51 (*SEG* 42.92 and *SEG* 44.40); on the components of the *pompē*, cf. Maurizio (1998).

[21] Skyphos *ARV*^{2} 1627; cf. Poursat (1968) 555–9. Rausa (1998) 229 has suggested, on the basis of the length of the inscribed text, that the Xenokles base should be restored so as to present four dancers. However, we cannot be sure that the inscription did not also include the archon's name, as in the case of the Atarbos base.



FIG. 2 An Attic black-figure skyphos from Thasos (*c.*520/10).

not come from one tribe but were selected from among all the citizens, added to the fact that they represented three age groups, might have enhanced the feeling that the entire community was being represented.

II THE TAUROPOLIA OF HALAI ARAPHENIDES

In a decree of the deme of Halai Araphenides dated between 334 and 314 BC, one Philoxenos is honoured for having taken care of the *chorēgia* for the pyrrhicists and for having accomplished well and honourably the other liturgies of the deme.[22] The Halaieis

In that case, the dancers would have to number at least six. For the archaic dedication from the Acropolis, interpreted by Raubitschek *DAA* 326+ (cf. also *DAA* 327– and *DAA* 328+) as made by a board of eight *hieropoioi*, cf. now *IG* I^3. 507 (and 508, 509): that they are *hieropoioi* is not certain, and restorations based on a shorter line-length leave only five names.

[22] *SEG* 34, 1984, no. 103: ἐπειδὴ Φιλ–|όξενος καλῶς καὶ φιλοτέμ–|ως τοῖς τε πυρριχισταῖς ἐ–|χορήγησεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας λ–|ειτουργίας ἁπάσας τὰς ἐν | τῷ δήμῳ καλῶς καὶ φιλοτ–|ίμως λελειτούργηκεν (l. 1–7). Date: Tracy (1995) 124, 128.

declare that a herald shall announce the honours voted to Philoxenos publicly, during the *agōn* of the Tauropolia. Moreover, he is granted front-row seats (*proedria*) at all the *agōnes* organized in the deme. The decree does not indicate the festival in which the pyrrhicists performed, but since the Halaieis would presumably refer in their decree to a *chorēgia* connected with deme festivities,[23] it may be assumed that the pyrrhic took place in one of the *agōnes* organized in Halai.

Since the performance of a pyrrhic is attested for Artemis Amarysia in Eretria (and the similarity of the cults of Artemis found on both sides of the Euripos has been underlined more than once[24]), and since the honours for Philoxenos are to be announced during the Tauropolia, I suggest that the *agōn* of the pyrrhic was part of the Tauropolia of Halai, in which Artemis received—certainly already from the sixth century—a cult as *Tauropolos*.[25] In Attica itself a red-figure pyxis offers evidence of a pyrrhic—danced by a female pyrrhicist, however—in front of a statue of Artemis.[26] The cult of Halai—a deme cult, but one which attracted participants from all Attica—may thus be used to recover a meaningful setting for the pyrrhic dance.

The speech with which Athena intervenes in order to solve the conflict at the end of the Euripidean *Iphigenia in Tauris* points to a connection between the ritual of Halai and rites of transition: the location of Halai is stressed as being 'on the margins of Attica, in a mountainous region'. A localization on the margins is typical of the period of segregation marking the second stage in transition rituals. There, Orestes—according to Athena's injunction—must build a temple: it shall house the statue of the goddess 'named from the Taurian land and from the sufferings, which you encountered wandering through Greece under the pressure of the Erinyes. And

[23] So Knoepfler (1988); Brûlé (1987) 199. Usually honorific decrees by the demes refer to activities which have taken place within the deme. When it refers to activities outside the deme, the decree is appended to some other decree of the institution more directly concerned: cf. the list in Whitehead (1986) 374–92, and 316–26 on the negligible overlap between deme activity and *polis* activity.

[24] Brûlé (1987) 186–200; Knoepfler (1988) 387; Brûlé (1993) 57–65. Pyrrhicists in Euboea: cf. *IG* 12.9.191, 236, 237; and Ceccarelli (1998) 91–5.

[25] Deubner (1932) 208–9; Parker (1996) 26, 74 n. 29; Whitehead (1986) 183, 218–20. Among the finds, which attest the frequentation of the temple at least for the 6th, and perhaps also for the 7th cent., were fragments of *kratēriskoi* very similar to those from Brauron; cf. Kahil (1977) 88 and n. 23, 96.

[26] Pyxis Naples, M.N. 81908 (H 3010); Ceccarelli (1998) 77–8 and pl. XXIII.

mortals will forever sing hymns for her, Artemis the Tauropolos goddess' (1454–7). Euripides' choice of περιπολεῖν to describe Orestes' wanderings may be determined by the possibility it creates of a word-play with Artemis' epithet Tauropolos.[27] But περιπολεῖν is also the term used to describe the patrolling of the frontiers of Attica. Even if περίπολοι could designate adults and mercenaries, the term was particularly used of ephebes: according to Pollux (8.105), Athenian ephebes in their second year were called περίπολοι.[28] The rest of Athena's speech concerns the institution of a definite ritual: when the people gather for the festival, in requital for Orestes' sacrifice a sword must be held to the throat of a man, and blood must be spilled, in a symbolic death. As for Iphigeneia, she must become the warden of Artemis in Brauron, and there she shall receive as offerings the garments of women who die in childbirth. The cults of Brauron and Halai are thus arranged according to a symmetry which focuses on transition rites.[29]

Spectators might have sensed a polarity between the pyrrhic dance performed for Athena during the Panathenaia at the very heart of the city and the one performed for Artemis at Halai—a 'marginal' pyrrhic, possibly limited to one specific age-class, the youths. Such a polarization might on the other hand be a (relatively) late feature, following the integration of Halai into the Attic cultic calendar: the festival of Halai is part of a wider group of cults of Artemis spread along the Euripos (Aulis, Amarynthos, Halai, Brauron) and down towards the Megarid. The sanctuary of Artemis Amarysia in Euboia, where performances of pyrrhics are

[27] So Platnauer (1938) *ad* v. 1455.

[28] Inclusive meaning: Thuc. 8.92.2 and Lys. 13.71. In Ar. *Birds* 1169–78 the messenger, who has a 'pyrrhichic look,' is also—suggestively—linked to the group of the *peripoloi*. Patrolling of the margins by ephebes: Vidal-Naquet (1981); Merkelbach (1973).

[29] Lloyd-Jones (1983) interprets the two Attic cults of Artemis in Brauron and Halai, linked by the presence of Iphigeneia, as initiation rituals concerned respectively with girls and boys. The two cults show similar features: Strabo 9.1.22 mentions them together; both featured a παννυχίς; the plot of Menander's *Epitrepontes* turns on the violence practised during the all-night revel of the *Tauropolia* on a girl—which, as remarked by Deubner (1932) 208, is what is supposed to happen at the Brauronia too, according to Ar. *Peace* 873 ff. Most significantly, Artemis Tauropolos seems to have been represented in the Brauronion enclosure on the Acropolis (Paus. 1.23.7). Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 447 (mentioning a Tauropolos) connects the epithet to Athena, citing Xenomedes of Keos (*FGrHist* 442 F 2): οὕτω τὴν Ἄρτεμιν ἐκάλουν. ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν οὕτω καλοῦσιν, ὡς Ξενομήδης ἱστορεῖ.

attested, was located outside the territory of the *polis*, at Amarynthos. However it played an important political role, since in it the Eretrians recorded all public acts, and Artemis may have had a function in Eretria similar to that of Athena in Athens.[30]

III THE APATOURIA

My next context is certainly more hypothetical than the preceding one. I propose that the pyrrhic was connected, either in actual performances or only on the level of aetiologies mimed in the dance, with the Apatouria festival. This suggestion derives from the convergence of different materials—on the one side, stories of duels in which a young hero proves his ability as a warrior by killing an enemy of overwhelming strength; on the other, the tradition concerning the composition of pyrrhics by the tragedian Phrynichos.

First, the aition of the Apatouria. A duel or a ritual combat lies behind many of the contexts for weapon dances. Thus Archilochos (fr. 304 W.) mentioned the dance (a pyrrhic?) performed by Pyrrhos/Neoptolemos in his joy for having killed Eurypylos. The Arcadian duels between Lykoorgos and Areithoos and, in the following generation, between Ereuthalion and Nestor are the most interesting for my purpose, because they are particularly apt to be compared with the aition of the Apatouria, and because they do imply a dance.

The sources for these duels are Nestor's reminiscences in the *Iliad* (7.132–57), and the local historian Ariaithos of Tegea (*FGrH* 316 F 7). In the Iliadic version, Lykoorgos won with a trick (δόλῳ), and carried away Areithoos' weapons; these he gave in his old age to Ereuthalion, who in his turn was defeated by Nestor. The local Arcadian tradition followed by Ariaithos gives more details on this second duel: in his joy at having defeated Ereuthalion, Nestor leapt in the air, trespassing out of the zone (a circle) reserved for the battle—and this led to a renewed general fight. Both Vian and

[30] Replacement of the armed procession (Strabo 10.1.10) with the pyrrhic: Knoepfler (1988) 387. Connor's (1987) model of the replacement of an aristocratic procession organized around the military components by a less aristocratic festival—still however centred on military elements—works in the cases of both Athens and Eretria.

Nagy recognize in Nestor's dance after his triumph over Ereuthalion (the 'Red' warrior) a pyrrhic comparable to that performed by Athena after her victory over the Giants. This tradition is echoed in the local Arcadian ritual, since the duel was commemorated in the festival—markedly military in character—of the Μώλεια (Moleia), whose name derives from the epic μῶλος Ἄρηος. Moreover, Mantinea was famous for its armed dance, the Μαντινικὴ ὄρχησις.[31]

In the *Iliad*, Nestor's reminiscences have the function of pushing the Achaeans into accepting Hektor's challenge to an individual duel: the old duels motivate a new one. Uncannily, Hektor's answer to the speech with which Ajax indicates his desire to take up the challenge seems to take up Nestor's narrative, insofar as it shows his awareness of a relationship between dance, war, and tricks: he does not want to be treated as a child or a woman who doesn't know anything of war; he knows how to move his leather shield to the right and to the left; he knows how to dance in the mêlée of Ares.[32] Hektor however refuses this 'cunning' model, affirming that he wants to fight Ajax openly and not λάθρῃ.

These Arcadian duels are in many respects comparable to the Apatouria duel and to the stories concerning Achilles and Pyrrhos—or the exploits of the young Athena. Foremost in building a field of associations is the colour red in the name of the champions (Xanthos, Ereuthalion, Pyrrhos); swiftness and youth are also important elements (Nestor's reminiscences are neatly bracketed by references to his youth (ἥβη) at the time of the events narrated: *Il.* 7.131–2 is taken up in 7.156). The Arcadian duels are also more specifically linked to the Apatouria duel by the strongly marked story of a trick played on the enemy. It is in fact possible to think, with Mühlestein, that there is a genetic connection between

[31] Vian (1952) 242–3; Nagy (1979) 330–2. *Moleia*: *schol.* Ap. Rhod. 1.164. Μαντινικὴ ὄρχησις: Xen. *Anab.* 6.1.11. Arcadian origin of the Roman *Salii*: Plut. *Numa* 13.7; Polemon *in* Fest. s.v. *Salios* pp. 438–9; Varro in Isid. *Orig.* 18.50 and Serv. Dan. *in Verg. Aen.* 8.285. Cf. Ceccarelli 1998, 150, to which add Lacroix (1967) arguing for the presence of an armed dance as a motif on coins from Mantinea of the first half of the 4th cent. BC.

[32] Hom. *Il.* 7.234–43; the emphasis on movements in 238–41 (οἶδ' ἐπὶ δεξιά, οἶδ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ νωμῆσαι βὼν ἀζαλέην, τό μοί ἐστι παλαύρινον πολεμίζειν ... οἶδα δ' ἐνὶ σταδίῳ δηίῳ μέλπεσθαι Ἄρηι) is striking, and comparable to Tyrt. *PMG* 856, to Neoptolemos' terrible pyrrhics in Eur. *Andr.* 1131: ἐκεῖσε κακεῖσ' ἀσπίδ' ἐκτεινῶν χερί, and to the description of the movements of the dance in Plat. *Laws* 7, 815a.

the two, and that a version of the Apatouria duel is the model on which the Arcadian duels are built.[33] This means that the story of the duel cannot be considered a late accretion to the Apatouria.

Second, the tradition concerning Phrynichos. Both Aelian and the *Suda* attribute to the famous tragedian the composition of pyrrhics. The *Suda*, in a garbled notice (φ 765), credits an Athenian tragedian, Phrynichos son of Melanthas, with the composition of two tragedies and of pyrrhics (ἐποίησε καὶ πυρρίχας). The notice ends with the story concerning the fine imposed on the tragedian by the Athenians for his *Sack of Miletos* (Μιλήτου ἅλωσις). I have tried to show elsewhere that this notice must be read as part of the notice φ 762 concerning the more famous Phrynichos, the 'son of Polyphradmon or of Chorokles, or according to others of Minyros'.[34] As is commonly admitted for the other two supernumerary fathers Chorokles and Minyros, Melanthas, not otherwise attested as a personal name in Athens, may be assumed to refer to some aspect of Phrynichos' activity. Μελανθᾶς is one of a small group of hypochoristic names in –ᾶς, with genitive in –ᾶ, typical of the Ionian milieu and mostly used as sobriquets ('the little black one').[35] The patronymic might then be interpreted as an (ironical?) allusion (by a comic poet?) to a reference in Phrynichos' work to the Apatouria story. This need not imply that a pyrrhic was actually danced at the Apatouria, even though the comparison with the more general ensemble of frontier duels might suggest that it was so.[36] A 'minimalist' solution would be to think that Phrynichos used the aition of the Apatouria as the subject-matter of one of his tragedies.

It is interesting to see that the tradition prominently associates the tragedian with the composition of pyrrhics: Aelian in his *Varia historia* relates that Phrynichos was elected by the Athenians to the *stratēgia*, 'because he had composed for pyrrhicists in a tragedy

[33] Mühlestein (1987) 66–70; cf. already Usener (1898) 370–2 (= (1912–13) 97–300). In *schol.* Ar. *Peace* 893a (one of the versions of the duel), Melanthios, usually said to be a Neleid from Pylos, is Ἀρκὰς τὸ γένος. The antiquity of the version with Dionysos Melanaigis has been defended by Kolb (1977) 126–8.

[34] Ceccarelli (1994) taking up a suggestion first advanced by Bentley (1781) 293–300, and expanded by Welcker (1826) 285.

[35] Cf. Chantraine (1933) § 27.

[36] Contests at the Apatouria: Plato *Tim.* 21ab, Proclus and *schol.* Plato *Tim.* 21b. Cf. Lambert (1993) 152–61 for the festival, and 144–52 for a discussion of the myth.

songs very appropriate and warlike'.[37] This may be a late tradition, perhaps modelled on the story concerning Sophokles' *stratēgia*, or based on the fact that another Phrynichos actually served as *stratēgos* in the fifth century. Still, Aelian's anecdote fits very well with what little is known of Phrynichos' involvement in contemporary issues.

It would thus appear that a weapon dance was connected with an Ionian festival of the phratries, one in which youths were presented and accepted into the group.[38] It is moreover particularly interesting that the aition of the Apatouria has sometimes also been related to the origins of tragedy.[39]

IV PERFORMANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF TRAGEDY, COMEDY, OR CHORAL LYRIC

The data concerning the composition of pyrrhics by Phrynichos may be inserted into a more general context. Figures (σχήματα) of the pyrrhic dance were probably used in many forms of choral lyric; for example, as Mullen suggests, in the epinician, whose general structure implies a movement from the joyous atmosphere of victory to a mythical *agōn* and then back to the actual victory: 'the choreography will thus usually display young men dancing their way from a dance of peace to a dance of war and then back again.' But the dithyramb has also been suggested as a candidate: observing that we do not know a dance specific to the dithyramb,

[37] Ael. *VH* 3.8 (= *TrGF* I 3 T 16).

[38] According to Lambert (1993) 143–89 the festival was not so much about ephebia as about control, maintenance, and affirmation of kinship and of membership in society at every level. I agree with this formulation, which—I think—fits the interpretation I am proposing. See also Deubner (1932) 232–4. Of particular interest is his comment that on the occasion of the Koureotis, the phratry would take notice of four facts—birth, celebration of the *choai*, ephebate, and wedding. On the level of myth or on that of ritual, the *pyrrhichē* fits three of these facts. I wonder whether the one chous with a depiction of a child dancing a pyrrhic (Louvre K 46–CA 8, Deubner 1932 pl. 17, 1), for which no satisfying account has been given, might not be interpreted in this connection.

[39] Thus Winkler (1990*a*) 36–7: 'Our story seems caught in some sort of force-field between the Apatouria and the City Dionysia.' See also Kolb (1977) 124–30. The identity of Dionysos Eleuthereus and Melanaigis is not certain; cf. however Plut. *Mor.* 716b and *IG* 2^2. 1358 B 7–18 (sacrifice of an all-black goat on the first day of the City Dionysia). The cult of Dionysos Melanaigis is associated with the daughters of Eleuther, who first rejected Dionysos, by the *Suda* s.v. μέλαν. It is also uncertain whether the cult of Dionysos Melanaigis should be considered as belonging to north-west Attica, or rather to the Apatouria; cf. Parker (1996) 94–5.

Luetcke suggested long ago that the *sikinnis* and the pyrrhic would be the most appropriate dances for it.[40]

Allusions to movements or themes connected with the pyrrhic in tragedy have been tracked by Borthwick: the pyrrhics performed by Neoptolemos on the altar of Delphi (Eur. *Andr.* 1135–6) are well known, but the description of the movements of Athena's feet in Aeschylos' *Eumenides*, or of her fight against the Gorgon in Euripides' *Ion*, also fit into this category.[41] The problem with these allusions is that they appear in passages in iambic trimeters: they serve the purpose of creating a 'champ d'attente', but they certainly cannot be taken as implying an actual performance of the dance. However, choral dances in tragedy may have been performed as pyrrhics. Apart from the tradition concerning Phrynichos, one possibility is the chorus of the Salaminian sailors in Sophokles' *Ajax*.[42] One would in any case expect more transparent references to the pyrrhic in those passages where no additional meaning could be conveyed mimetically through the dance, and vice versa.

Schēmata typical of the pyrrhic dance were also imitated or parodied in comedy. A commentary on Eupolis' *Goats* gives a very graphic description of the action which must have been going on on stage, while in addition giving us information on a further story which could be danced as a pyrrhic—the slaying of the Gorgon by Athena. It also provides one precise indication concerning one of the dance's *schēmata*, the one performed with the head turned back.[43]

[40] Mullen (1982) 64–5. Luetcke (1829) 62. 'Ephebic' interpretation of Bacchylides' *Theseus*: Merkelbach (1973).

[41] Borthwick (1967), (1969), (1970), pointing out that even in the case of Neoptolemos, the characterization as γοργὸς ὁπλίτης (Eur. *Andr.* 1122) recalls the Athena–Gorgon tradition. The following allusions concern Athena: Aesch. *Eum.* 294–5 (Athena, whether in Lybia or in the Phlegrean plain, τέθηπεν ὀρθὸν ἢ κατερεφὴ πόδα / φίλοις ἀρήγουσα); Eur. *Ion* 210 (γοργωπὸν πάλλουσαν ἔντε) and 987–91 (killing of the Gorgon in Phlegra); cf. also (in comedy) Ar. *Ach.* 964–5: Lamachus τὴν Γοργόνα πάλλει.

[42] Soph. *Ai.* 693 ff.; cf. *schol. vet.* Soph. *Ai.* 699 and 700, and Krummen (1998) 311–15.

[43] *POxy* 2738 = Eupolis *Aiges* fr. 18 K.–A. and Cratinus fr. 433 K.–A; cf. Borthwick (1970). Other allusions to *pyrrhichē* in comedy: Ar. *Clouds* 988–9; Ar. *Birds* 1169, πυρρίχην . . . βλέπων; and for Kinesias, *infra*. Bierl (2001) 225–51, sees in the *pyrrhichē* a kind of 'subtext' of Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae* (in particular at 821–9).

Among references in comedy to the pyrrhic, one that associates its performance with the dithyrambic poet Kinesias is particularly important, because it provides some clues as to what was happening with the pyrrhic dance towards the end of the fifth century. In Aristophanes' *Frogs* Herakles, while describing to Dionysos the way to the Underworld, mentions 'a vast sea of mud and ever-flowing dung', in which all sort of disreputable people lie; Dionysos comments that 'They ought to add to this, by the gods, anyone who's learnt that war-dance by Kinesias!'[44] The connection between Kinesias and a disreputable kind of pyrrhic is taken up in a few late sources, which probably depend on Aristophanes;[45] but some idea of this kind is also present in a passage of Pherekrates' *Cheiron*, where Kinesias is accused by *Mousikē* of having insulted and perverted her, to the point that in his dithyrambs, 'just as in the shields' (καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀσπίσι), things right seem left (ἀριστερὰ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται τὰ δεξιά).[46] The meaning of the passage may be that Kinesias' dithyrambs are the reverse of what they should be, just as an image is reversed in reflection (shields are compared to mirrors in Ar. *Ach.* 1128 and Plato *Theaet.* 193c). But it would make even better sense, as Borthwick (1968) first pointed out, to think that the comic poet is playing on two levels of language—that the shields allude to the *pyrrhichē*, and that what is criticized here is a mixing of genres.

It is difficult to say what Kinesias' pyrrhics may have been like. Evidently neither his dithyrambs nor his pyrrhics found much favour with the comic poets. The subsequent history of the pyrrhic demonstrates however that the association between this dance and dithyrambic poetry was not just an idiosyncratic idea of Aristophanes'. Three inscriptions dating from around 200 BC and listing victors at the Dionysia of Cos show that the pyrrhic dance had by then taken the place of the dithyramb.[47]

[44] Ar. *Frogs.* 145–53 (in Sommerstein's trans.).

[45] Suda π 3225 πυρρίχη; *schol. vet.* Ar. *Frogs* 153; Diom. *Art. Gramm.* 3, in *Gr. Lat.* 1. 475. 9–25 Keil, the latter a corrupted passage, with rather more information than can simply be deduced from Aristophanes, perhaps reflecting other elaborations on the theme.

[46] [Plut.] *De Mus.* 30, 1141c = Pherecrates fr. 155 K.–A., 8–12. Good discussion in Borthwick (1968).

[47] The wording has become χορεγὸς κυκλίων τᾶι πυρρίχαι: cf. Segre (1993) *ED* 52 and *ED* 234, and Herzog (1899) no. 13, with the restorations proposed in Ceccarelli (1995).

V EVIDENCE FOR A DIONYSIAC PYRRHIC

According to Athenaeus 14.631ab (citing Aristocles and possibly through him Aristoxenos), the bacchic aspects of the pyrrhic dance are relatively late, and are to be interpreted in terms of a 'degeneration' of the once warrior-like dance.[48] However, five Attic vases of the period between 520 and 480 BC, on which armed satyrs dance what cannot be defined other than a pyrrhic, suggest a connection between Dionysos and the *pyrrhichē* (and it is striking that two of these painters, the Nikosthenes and Athena painters, also painted male pyrrhics.)[49] The association can be pursued through Attic icononography to the end of the fifth century—and beyond (see Fig 3*a* and *b*).

Satyrs may have danced the pyrrhic in satyr-plays: the ancient tradition consistently stresses the proximity of the *sikinnis* to the *pyrrhichē*.[50] But this does not yet tell us much about the meaning of the depictions on Attic vases. Some indications come from a general assessment of the contexts in which armed satyrs appear: very often they are depicted—mostly armed in non-hoplitic manner, with *peltai*, thyrsoi-spears or phallus-spears—fighting, together with Dionysos, in the Gigantomachy.[51] In Athens, one of the foundation-myths of the pyrrhic is connected to Athena's triumph over the Giants. It seems reasonable to interpret the pyrrhics of the satyrs as reflecting—maybe in a parodic way, certainly according to anti-hoplitic models—Dionysos' Gigantomachy, rather than as reflections of a specific theatrical event.

[48] On the more general issue of what this bacchic pyrrhic may have been cf. Slater (1993).

[49] Fragmentary red-figure cup Florence 4 B 48 + Louvre C 11255, *ARV* 133/10, to which should be added (see Carpenter, *Addenda*) the fragments Florence 4 B 48 + Louvre C 11256 + New York 1984.500.3, *ARV*^{2} 133/11 (circle of the Nikosthenes Painter, *c.* 520–510); red-figure amphora Berlin 1966.19, *Para* 323bis (signed by Smikros, *c.*520–510); lekythos Athens N.M. 18567, *ABV* 522, 20 (Athena Painter, *c.*490–480); and lekythos Athens M.N. 19761 (*c.* 480), oinochoe London 1864.10.7.248, *ABV* 531/4 (Athena Painter, *c.*490–480), on both of which there is no aulos-player.

[50] Cf. e.g. the prologue of Euripides' *Cyclops* (5–8 and 37–40, with Seaford (1988) ad loc.): Silenos pretends to have slain Enkelados, in terms suggestive of the pyrrhic; later on, in preparation for the entry of the chorus, he comments on the κρότος σικινίδων, wondering if this is the same as when their Βακχίῳ κῶμοι συνασπίζοντες approached the house of Althaea. General statement: Athen. 14.630d, and the discussion and texts in Voelke (2001) 149–57.

[51] On Dionysos' gigantomachy cf. Vian (1952) 83–90, Lissarrague (1987).

FIG. 3a (*a* and *b*) An Attic lekythos with pyrrhic satyrs (*c.*490–480).

FIG. 3b (*continued*)

An Attic pelike attributed to the Theseus Painter and dated around 500 might tell us something about the relationship between the pyrrhic and Dionysos Melanaigis (Fig. 4).[52] On one side an aulos-player and a pyrrhic dancer, equipped with helmet, spear, and shield and dressed in a short *chitoniskos*, are symmetrically depicted around a central folding chair, on which rests a folded *chlamys*. The aulos-player and the dancer move their bodies in the same direction, but the dancer has turned his head (in a gesture typical of the pyrrhic) and looks towards the aulos-player. On the other side, once more an aulos-player and a pyrrhic dancer, both turned towards the left, are arranged around a central folding chair with *chlamys*. But on the left side of the vase the painter has added a goat, with her body also turned towards the left, but with her head looking backwards at the pyrrhic dancer, whose head, this time, is not turned. This is the only scene of pyrrhic in which a goat is present. Since the animal is not here in order to fill a void, its presence may be considered meaningful. The goat might be interpreted in relation to the story of Dionysos Melanaigis and the Apatouria, as a pointer to the content of the mimetic dance described on the vase. Another possibility would be to think more generally of tragedy.[53]

All this shows that the association between Dionysos and the pyrrhic dance is relatively early, which should keep us from thinking of the Dionysiac pyrrhic in terms of 'degeneration' only. In fact, a Dionysiac pyrrhic danced by maenads brandishing torches and thyrsoi, such as Athenaeus describes (14.631ab), is indistinguishable from the dances of maenads brandishing thyrsoi which are so frequent on Attic vases—nor is there any reason to attempt such a distinction.

VI FUNERARY PYRRHICS

And so to our last context: funerary pyrrhics. The evidence for armed dances in a funerary context in Attica is mainly iconographic. Leaving aside geometric and late geometric vases, three one-handled kantharoi dating from around 500 BC present scenes

[52] Pelike San Antonio Museum of Art 86.134.157, *Para.* 257.

[53] Following Burkert (1966), who underlines the Dionysiac connotations of goats in Attic iconography. A recently published skyphos from the Guarini collection (Theseus painter?), with a peculiar kind of armed dance on both sides, and a big goat under each handle, might be pertinent too; cf. Ceccarelli (1998) 82 and pl. XXIV.

FIG. 4 An Attic pelike (*c.*500) with an aulos-player and a pyrrhic dancer, arranged around a central folding chair with *chlamys*; and a goat on the far left-hand side of the image.

of burial, in which the funerary chariot being driven to the mound is followed by an aulos-player and armed dancers.[54] These kantharoi are part of a class made specifically for export to Etruria. It is clear that the shape was chosen in accordance with an Etruscan prototype. As long as no Attic vases of different shapes with funerary dances were known, the iconography, just as the shape, could be thought to reflect Etruscan concerns.[55]

This interpretation can now be challenged on the basis of a recently published cup (see Fig. 5) signed by Euphronios and dated *c.*520 (so slightly earlier than the kantharoi).[56] The interior of the cup has a floral decoration. One of the external sides presents the removal of the body of Sarpedon by Acamas, Hypnos, and Thanatos (the names are inscribed). On the other side, the centre of the space is occupied by an aulos-player facing a pyrrhic dancer. These two figures are framed by two onlookers, a young man dressed in a long *himation* with a flower on the left; and a woman, also with a flower, on the right. This kind of framing is unique: while women—and men—are present as onlookers on vases with pyrrhics danced by female dancers, this is never the case when the dancer is male. One explanation for this exceptional setting might be to relate this scene to the transportation of Sarpedon's corpse on the other side, and to interpret it as a pyrrhic with funerary connotations.[57] The comparison with the one-handled kantharoi is instructive: one or more women are present on all of them, participating in the funerary lament. Whether these images reflect reality, or whether they are to be interpreted rather as iconic constructs,[58] they demonstrate that the armed dance in late

[54] One-handled kantharoi Paris, Cab. Méd. 35, *ABV* 346/7; Paris, Cab. Méd. 355, *ABV* 346/8; and Basel, market, *MuM Auktion* 56, 1980, pl. 27 no. 72.

[55] So e.g. Shapiro (1991) 633 n. 28. A discussion of funerary dancing in Lonsdale (1993) 234–60 (who however is only marginally concerned with armed funerary dances and with the problem of the kantharoi); for funerary weapon-dances, Ceccarelli (1998) 53–7, 81, and pl. VI–VII.

[56] Red-figure cup signed by Euphronios, ex coll. Nelson Bunker Hunt, Sotheby's, *The Nelson Bunker Hunt Collection*, New York 19.6.1990, no. 6.

[57] Lesky's (2000) 43 agonistic and non-funerary interpretation of this vase cannot be accepted: a woman spectator is out of place in an *agōn*, and what Lesky dismisses as a 'späteres scholion' are actually Aristoteles frr. 534, 1–5 Gigon (cited *infra*, n. 60).

[58] Reality: Peifer 1989, 104–5; heroized scenes: cf. Lissarrague's (1990) 81 analysis of the return of the warrior, an iconographic motif particularly important in the years 540–500, as 'une mise en place, une construction fondée, à un certain niveau de réalité, sur la représentation épique de la mort guerrière'.



FIG. 5 A red-figured cup signed by Euphronios (*c.*520). One of the external sides shows the removal of the body of Sarpedon by Acamas, Hypnos, and Thanatos. On the other, the central space is occupied by an aulos-player facing a pyrrhic dancer, both framed by an onlooking young man dressed in long *himation* with a flower (left); and a woman, also with a flower (right).

sixth-century Athens is part of the mental representation of the rituals following an heroic death.[59]

This is not surprising, since funerary armed dances are part of Greek culture—they are already present in the Homeric poems (cf. Hom. *Od.* 24.68–9, the funeral of Achilles mentioned in the second *Nekyia*). According to Aristotle, the *pyrrhichē* derives from the dance executed by Achilles around Patroklos' pyre.[60] An appreciation of the funerary overtones of the pyrrhic dance allows *inter alia* a richer reading of the chorus of the Salaminians in the *Ajax* discussed above: a pyrrhic choreography might have been put into use in order to add a deeper layer of meaning to the song. The dance would have moved in a dionysiac and corybantic sphere, but the overtones of death present in the *Trugrede* would also have been felt by the spectators during the choral dance (and in fact ancient commentators were undecided as to the real connotation of the dancing of the chorus).[61]

All this does not mean that a funerary pyrrhic was being danced in sixth- and fifth-century Athens. It does mean however that the armed dance still preserved the memory of a connection with death rituals.

VII SYNTHESIS

I shall now attempt to pull together the lines of inquiry pursued so far. What seems to link all the contexts we have examined is

[59] There is evidence in Attica for musical competitions at the Epitaphia. Athenians who had won at the Boeotian Epitaphia from the end of the seventh century to the end of the sixth dedicated on the Akropolis bronze cauldrons; and three marble disks from the Akropolis have also been interpreted as prizes for funerary games. Cf. Parker (1996) 48, 76 n. 35, and 133–5, and on the importance of death ritual in the *polis*, Seaford (1994*a*) 74–143.

[60] Arist. fr. 534. 1 Gigon = 519 Rose: schol. Pind. *Pyth.* 2. 127: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ πρώτον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ Πατρόκλου πυρᾷ τῇ πυρρίχῃ κεχρῆσθαι, ἣν παρὰ Κυπρίοις φησὶ πρύλιν λέγεσθαι, ὥστε παρὰ τὴν πυρὰν τῆς πυρρίχης τὸ ὄνομα θέσθαι (for the text cf. Lorimer (1938) 129–32); cf. schol. T *Il.* 23.130 = Arist. fr. 534.2 Gigon, and Marius Sacerdos, *Gramm. Lat.* 6.497.16–498. 3 Keil = Arist. fr. 534.3 Gigon. To this may be added the evidence concerning the *prylis*: Hesych. π 4113–15 (Gigon fr. 534.5), and Hesych. π 4117 πρυλέτρεις· ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκφορᾶς τῶν τελευτησάντων παρὰ τῷ ἱερεῖ. If one could be sure of Schmidt's very hypothetical correction, παρ' Αἰσχύλῳ Ἱερείαις, this would bring us back to an Athenian milieu.

[61] Cf. *supra* n. 42. For an analysis of the way in which choreography might be used to enhance the meaning of choral songs, underlining—or making apparent—correspondences between strophe and antistrophe, cf. Wiles (1997) 87–113.

(re)integration: of youths among citizens, as in the Tauropolia or in the Apatouria, whose myth concerns the fight, victory, and integration of a young warrior into the social system; of bonds in life after the rupture of death; of order after disorder and savagery, in the case of a New Year's festival such as the Panathenaia.

Funerary rites are a means of strengthening group solidarity, in the form of a collective reaction to the death of a member of the social group. Contests serve then as an outlet for tensions, or as an occasion for reaffirming the status of a group. Seaford has recently sketched a progression leading from funerary rituals for important individuals to hero cult in the *polis*, and the cup of Euphronios is but one example of the way in which funerary ritual may be linked to hero cult. It is also important to stress the mimetic tendency of lamentation. It has been argued, particularly by Nilsson, that death ritual and hero cult are one of the components from which drama originated.[62] It is thus not startling to find pyrrhic dancing in funerary ritual, dramatic contexts and *polis*-festivals.

We have seen that the pyrrhic was danced at the Panathenaia. The fact that the pyrrhic chorus was not organized according to tribal division points to a pre-Cleisthenic organization of this part of the festival, to an organization where the dominant concern was the division in age classes, in the more general context of a festival of the new year, of renewal, and—also—of the renewed cohesion of the whole *polis*.[63] With the Cleisthenic reforms, an originally whole-*polis* festival was modified with the progressive addition of competitions organized on *polis*-subdivisions; however the *agōn* of the *pyrrhichē* retained its original form.

As for the City Dionysia, in their organized form they are certainly more recent than the Panathenaia. The two festivals share some interesting features: among them, the relative prominence of ephebes, the openness to foreign residents and colonists, the fact of also featuring, besides whole-*polis agōnes* and *pompai*, events articulated on a tribal subdivision.[64] If one accepts the

[62] Seaford (1994) 74–142 (esp. 87–91); Nilsson (1911).
[63] Brûlé (1992); Brelich (1969) 342–8.
[64] Sourvinou-Inwood (1994) 271–3, who moreover, comparing these two festivals to the Thargelia (certainly of an early date and involving the tribes, but also another kind of *polis*-subdivision, the phratry), suggests that the City Dionysia are the result of the reorganization of an older festival with a whole-*polis* focus; the new arrangement would have included, at the edge of the core ritual, an articulation through the new *polis* subdivisions; Seaford (1994), 248–9.

existence of a link between Dionysos Melanaigis and the duel of the Apatouria and the tradition concerning the arrival of Dionysos from Eleutherai to Athens (with the consequent institution of the City Dionysia), then it is also possible to interpret the difference at the latter between dithyrambic contests (tribal) and tragic contests (whole-*polis*) in terms of a core built on an age-class division, flanked by tribal events. Winkler's hypothesis that sees an intimate connection between the tragic chorus and the ephebes[65] fits a scheme in which the three age classes which are represented together at the festival for the Poliad goddess are, at the Dionysia, distributed through the dithyrambic competitions for *andres* and *paides* on the one side and the tragic competitions on the other. The pattern of dedication, for what it is worth as an argument, falls in neatly with this hypothesis. If we accept the restorations proposed by Peter Wilson, the base published by Poursat is 'our first archaeological record of a tragic khoregos memorialising his victory in the city'.[66] But it is also our first archaeological record of a victory in the pyrrhic at the Panathenaia: in both cases, the occasion is specified with exceptional care. Might the pattern of significant (non)-dedication remarked by Wilson for tragic victories also apply to the pyrrhic? If the chorus was not organized on a tribal basis here, as in tragedy, the *chorēgos* would have taken on a position of really considerable importance, and a dedication would have meant something close to a personal appropriation of the victory.

In the fifth century, the military value of pyrrhic dancing would probably have been a fossil, and up to a point the same would have applied to its connection with transition rituals, whose practical impact on the everyday Athenian may have been by that time relatively slight. On the symbolic level, however, the pyrrhic dance appears as an extremely important element of Athenian 'song and dance' culture. The frequent allusions to it, as well as its presence in a number of festivals, creating a sort of intertextual net between these events, show that it constitutes a fundamental element in the Athenians' perception of themselves.

[65] Winkler (1990*a*); see also Graf (1998*a*) 25–7 and the updated discussion of Bierl (2001) 283–7.
[66] Wilson (1997*a*) 178 and n. 23.

5

Choral Prayer in Greek Tragedy: Euphemia or Aischrologia?

Eva Stehle

Is the chorus of tragedy also a ritual chorus? There is a widespread feeling that it is, both as being a descendant of the traditional melic chorus so prevalent in Greece, especially for the young, and as performing songs with ritual qualities. But tragic *choreia* still needs investigation from the perspective of ritual *choreia*. In other areas we have studies of the use tragedy makes of ritual, whether recounted in a messenger speech or enacted on stage. Patricia Easterling and Eveline Krummen have both argued that ritual in tragedy is 'metaphorical', that is, adapted so as to replicate the themes of the play.[1] To this end, rituals may be condensed, conflated, distorted. Easterling reminds us that to catch the effects of evoked rituals we must pay attention to 'the connexion between what is said and what is shown' as much as is possible.[2] Krummen emphasizes both ritual as a source of imagery and the polysemy of words used to describe ritual actions. These studies expand on the common motif of the corrupted sacrifice, which Froma Zeitlin and Helene Foley have explored in important earlier

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[1] Easterling 1988; on 101 she observes, 'the use—or misuse—of ritual language and action to intensify a sense of moral and social disorder is extremely common in tragedy'. She discusses Sophocles' *Ajax* (drawing on Burian (1972): Teucer places Ajax's young son, Eurysakes, by Ajax's dead body in a ritual that combines supplication, curse, and offering to the dead) and Euripides' *Electra*. Krummen (1998), esp. 299 on ritual as a system of imagery. She looks at condensed vocabulary and ritual of purification in *Ajax*, as well as the distorted 'wedding' staged by Cassandra in Euripides' *Trojan Women*.

[2] Easterling (1988) 90–1. Cf. also Csapo (1997) 279–87 on Pentheus' cross-dressing and his sitting on the tip of the pine tree to see better in *Bacchae* as possibly having a basis in ritual.

work.[3] Tragedy, in short, is not concerned with representing such rituals realistically or for their own sake. Rather, ritual is one of the codes that tragedy draws on to add power to its representations of human struggles to comprehend the cosmos.

Among scholars working on ritual in tragedy there is also a temptation to go beyond the idea of ritual as a semiotic code and think of it as not fully contained within the fiction. They look for places where the boundary between fiction and ritual is blurred and the action may appeal to the audience as actual ritual.[4] David Wiles cautiously suggests that the endings of plays like Aeschylus' *Eumenides* and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* unite ritual (the Panathenaic procession and hero cult of Oedipus respectively) with drama. He comments in connection with the parodos of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* that '[t]he boundary between "theatre" and "ritual" was far from clear in the Greek world'.[5] The last example is especially interesting, for it is primarily in choral song that scholars have seen dramatic fiction and Athenian ritual fused, with the ritual aspect of the song and dance temporarily taking the foreground in the audience's eyes. Both Claude Calame and Albert Henrichs have recently analysed particular choral odes this way. At such moments, they suggest, the chorus locates itself between the fiction and the song/dance in the orchestra in the here and now of performance.[6]

But these studies of the chorus in tragedy, finely attuned as they are to tragic texts, are taking place in a vacuum because they do not have a good account of ritual *choreia* to draw on. They do point out similarities between *texts* of tragic and cult songs, especially with regard to speech acts, but that is not enough. The full context of ritual *choreia* must be taken into account, as far as is possible, and

[3] Zeitlin (1965); Foley (1985).

[4] Krummen (1998) 325 instead suggests that tragedy replaced ritual, which had become problematic in 5th-cent. Athens.

[5] Wiles (2000) 37, 45. On 37 he refers to ritual as a 'vein of symbolism for the dramatist to exploit', but he also argues (ch. 2) that tragedy is efficacious, using Richard Schechner's term (Schechner (1988) 120), because it incorporates ritual. But in most of his examples the ritual is inefficacious or perverted. Bierl (2001) argues that comedy is more ritualized than tragedy, using *Thesmophoriazusae* as his paradigm text.

[6] See esp. Henrichs (1994–5) 65–70 and Calame (1999a) 135–7. Cf. also Henrichs (1996*a*), (1996*b*); Segal (1999) 235: 'The ritual act of the choral dance in the orchestra includes and symbolizes all the rituals performed in the play. It reminds us that the rituals in the orchestra represent ritual within ritual.'

tragic texts must be assessed for their differences from cult poetry as well as their similarities. Only then will we begin to approach the highly differentiated experiential knowledge that the original audience brought to tragedy and have some sense of whether tragic *choreia* replicates traditional ritual *choreia*. The difference from the treatment of sacrifice in tragedy is instructive. In Euripides' *Electra*, for instance, because we know the sequence of procedures in a sacrifice we can see the significance in Orestes' casual-seeming refusal to wash his hands (793–4) before participating in Aegisthus' sacrifice. With no equivalent sensitivity to the differentiae and rules of choral ritual performances, scholars are tempted to assign ritual value to choral song in tragedy ad libitum. The purpose of this essay is to begin the process of elucidating *choreia* in tragedy in comparison with choral ritual as the Greeks practised it in civic religious life. Because my argument has several stages I begin with an outline to make the relationship among them easier to see.

1. The anthropological idea of studying *ritualization* allows us to focus on the frames that define rituals and therefore to discriminate among kinds of rituals that utilize *choreia*, e.g. victory song or lament.
2. If our interest is in approach to the gods involving choral song, we must further distinguish between two kinds of choral performance for the gods, euphemic ritual and what I will call aischrologic ritual. The first is addressed to the god(s) in prayer or praise, requiring well-omened speech (euphemia); the second is manifestation of the presence of the god in uninhibited speech.
3. It is possible to identify general, non-verbal characteristics of the chorus in euphemic ritual. When that is done, it becomes clear that the chorus in tragedy does not qualify: it does not look or move like a euphemic chorus.
4. It is also possible both to identify kinds of speech that would violate euphemia and to detect constraints imposed by euphemia in ritual choral texts. These results allow us to study the prayerful hymns that choruses do sing in tragedy and observe that they sometimes violate euphemia. Examples are the first stasimon of Euripides' *Ion* and the parodos of *Oedipus Tyrannus*.

5. When we combine the results of 3 and 4, we see that choral ritual, like other ritual in tragedy, is metaphorical and may be distorted; the markedly non-euphemic chorus can *evoke* ritual, only to succumb to the tragic disturbance and violate euphemia. Thus the audience may be emotionally engaged by ritual-like song but is protected from thinking that bad ritual has actually been performed in its name. We can go further and speak of a metaritual perspective arising from the audience's *desire* for *idealized* ritual. In addition to the hymns mentioned in the last paragraph, I discuss, very briefly, Aeschylus' *Suppliants* 524–99 and *Eumenides* 1032–47.
6. On the other hand, one could analyse tragedy as aischrologic, in an extended sense, and think of its choral odes as including ritual aischrologic speech. This will merely be suggested at the end.

I

In order to investigate what constituted ritual, I turn to anthropology. As Catherine Bell shows in her recent book, anthropologists are moving away from seeking definitions or ultimate meanings of ritual and are now looking at the *process* of ritualization, how people create ritual.[7] Anthropologists characterize ritual by frames that set it apart from the rest of human activity. The idea of frames is familiar, of course, but looking at the process of ritualization forces us to take account of multiple layered frames; the more constricting the intersecting modes of framing, the more ritualized an activity can be said to be. Frames are made up of location and orientation, time, and prescriptions or conventions for certain kinds of dress, gesture, and speech. Actors and audience must move into a ritual frame, a special space, like a sanctuary, for instance, or a special time. While they are within the frame, appearance, behaviour, speech distinguish participants from their normal selves, and those present can interpret actions differently from normal. Walking in a certain direction, carrying objects, or killing can take on new significance. Ritual parallels theatre in having its own semiotic system.

[7] Bell (1997) esp. 80–3, a clear reprise of Bell (1992). For recent efforts to identify a Greek concept of ritual see Calame (1991) and Henrichs (1998).

We should therefore describe ritual choral dance by considering the frames and conventions that define it. In fact, rather than *being* ritual, choral song was a malleable medium that participated in many kinds of ritualized event: approach to the gods, including prayer; victory celebration and celebration of male prowess; wedding; lament; possibly choral narrative (if Stesichorus' poetry was performed chorally); and possibly encomium in the symposium (if the encomia of Ibycus and Pindar were performed chorally).[8] Whether one would want to call all of these 'ritual' depends on how broadly one wants to apply the term. But since choral songs belong to such different kinds of occasions, aiming at different psychological effects, the frames that govern each type of song are different. They call for different classes of performers and different kinds of movement, dress, and rhetorical style. At farthest remove from one another are lament and hymns to the gods, treated as antithetical in Greek literature.[9] Lament was inappropriate for the gods and therefore offensive in speech meant to honour them.[10] This is one item of cultural knowledge that we should bring to tragedy, where the two are sometimes combined. I return to this point.

II

The frames for each kind of ritual involving *choreia* should be examined separately. Here I investigate only choral approach to

[8] Plato *Rep.* 10.607a distinguishes songs for gods from songs for men. Athenaios 14.618d–620a lists a large number of songs. These include lament-like songs for local heroic figures as well as a number of work songs, which would have been sung to rhythmic work movements rather than danced.

[9] A fragment of Pindar's *threnos* 3 begins, 'There are paeans, songs belonging to the children of Leto of the golden spindle, and there are (songs) [celebrating?] the crown of Dionysus of luxuriant ivy . . . but (other songs) put the three sons of Kalliope to sleep so that memorials might be set up for her when they had passed away.' My translation of the disturbed text largely follows Race (1997). See McClure (1999) 44–6, on style and politics of lament, with bibliography. She includes description of possibly dance-like movements that accompanied lament. See Rutherford (1995*b*) 121–4 on the mixing of pacan and dirge or dithyramb (both with chthonic associations) in tragedy, Rosenmeyer (1982) 152–7 on lament and prayer as forms of expression in Aeschylus.

[10] Aubriot-Sévin (1992) 143–5. She concludes (145) that, although individuals who are intimate with the gods are sometimes depicted in literature as addressing them tearfully, this was acceptable only outside sacred places and religious ceremonies. Eur. *IA* 1487–90; Plato *Laws* 800d (both quoted below); and Callim. *Hymn* 2.21–4 all rule out lament in the setting of approach to the gods.

the gods, for it is ritual for the gods that scholars most often identify as the ritual face of tragic choral song and dance. But the Greeks had two civic modes of approaching the gods that must be distinguished. These are euphemic rituals and what I will call aischrologic rituals.[11] Euphemic rituals address a god or gods, aischrologic ones demonstrate the presence of a god. Euphemic rituals are highly constrained, while aischrologic rituals allow expansive speech and behaviour beyond what is normally acceptable.[12] Both may include choral song. Although euphemic rituals employ various genres of choral song, the difference was thematized in Greek literature as a contrast between paean and dithyramb.[13] My focus will be on euphemic rituals, but I will return to aischrologic rituals at the end of the chapter.

The term euphemia means auspicious speech and could be applied in a range of situations. An individual could use it in conversation to stop someone, for that person's sake, from continuing to articulate an offensive thought or an ill-omened one in a tense situation.[14] Most important, and perhaps primary, was its use in situations of collective approach to the gods. There it applied globally; instead of stopping a particular utterance in progress it warned everyone present to avoid any statement or noise that could be construed as negative, however inadvertent. In this context it functioned as a frame within which speech had to be interpreted differently from normal. Since euphemia enjoins

[11] This distinction is similar to the anthropological distinction between 'liturgy-centered ritual' and 'performer-centered ritual' made by Atkinson (1989) 14–15; the former is 'dominated by an orderly set of ritual procedures', and the latter is 'governed . . . more by the actions and inclinations of individual practitioners'. Shamanism is Atkinson's example of the latter; shamans establish individual ritual authority, which is not a prominent aspect of aischrologic ritual.

[12] Burkert (1985) 248 contrasts these terms. Hesychios s.v. *stēniōsai* ('celebrate the Stenia', a women's festival for Demeter) defines the term as *blasphēmēsai* ('speak blasphemy'), the opposite of euphemia. The Stenia was an aischrologic ritual, so the contrast is implicit in Hesychios. For euphemia, see Aubriot-Sévin (1992) 152 n. 96, 155, who disputes the old interpretation of it as holy silence. For *aischrologia* see Fluck (1931). Euphemia has received little attention; it is not in the list of religious terms in Rudhardt (1992) 363–81.

[13] On this contrast see Rutherford (1994) 117–18. Athenian competitive dithyramb muted its aischrologic character, but it is visible in e.g. Archilochus 120 W and Philochorus, who quotes the Archilochus passage (Athen. 628a). On paean and tragedy, see below.

[14] e.g. Hdt. 3.38; Aesch. *Suppl.* 512, *Ag.* 1247; Soph. *Ajax* 362, *Trach.* 178; Plato *Euthyd.* 301a. This usage was sometimes expanded to refer to respectful speech toward humans (e.g. Plato *Laws* 717c of speech toward parents). Cf. LSJ.

against letting fall an ill-omened word, it is sometimes translated, 'silence!' But it applies to prayers and songs as well.[15] Most of the evidence for deployment of the term in public ritual and its area of application come from drama, but it is corroborated by other testimony. In the *Iliad* and in a court speech by Dinarchus a scene is described or alluded to in which a herald commands a group of men, respectively leaders meeting at Agamemnon's hut and the Athenian assembly, to observe euphemia before one individual offers a prayer. In the *Iliad* passage Nestor simultaneously orders an attendant to bring water, so ritual washing along with the euphemia marks out movement into a special frame of prayer.[16] A libation is poured (and presumably the prayer is uttered before or during the libation, although Homer does not specify).[17] The Suda preserves an interchange pertaining to such situations: 'Those pouring libations would say, "Who (is) here?" (instead of, "Who is present?"), then those present said euphemically, "Many men and good." They did this so that those aware of some guilt could remove themselves from the libation.'[18] In sum, either silence or a prescribed answer could satisfy the requirements of euphemia. The Suda's last sentence shows that, ideally, mental and bodily as well as verbal purity were required.

In scenes set in a sanctuary the command to *euphēmein* is given before sacrifice, prayer, or hymn. In a slapstick scene in the *Birds* Peisetairos calls for euphemia (959) at the start of one of his attempts to carry out a sacrifice uninterrupted. In Callimachus' *Hymn* 2, set in a sanctuary, the narrator ('master of ceremonies') says as the song begins (17), 'You who hear, be silent at (*euphēmeite*) the song for Apollo!' Perhaps the sharpest description is from the end of *Iphigeneia in Aulis* as the Greek army prepares to sacrifice Iphigeneia (1563–76):[19]

[15] Benveniste (1949) 116–17 stresses its positive meaning, 'speak words of good omen'. Likewise, Pulleyn (1997) 184 points out that euphemia refers to speech rather than silence *per se*.

[16] In *Ion* 1187–9 a slave utters *blasphēmia* as the celebrants at the feast for Ion are about to pour a libation. Ion takes it as an omen and orders that fresh libations be prepared. Had Ion ignored it (as the messenger's attitude suggests was possible in practice) the prayer that presumably accompanied the libation would have been hideously contravened.

[17] Ar. *Peace* 434 is similar.

[18] s.v. *tis tēide*. Quoted from Pulleyn (1997) 177.

[19] The speech containing these lines is considered a non-Euripidean addition by Stockert (1992) 1.79–87; Diggle (1994) ad loc. marks it as 'vix Euripidei'. For my purpose the authorship is not critical.

Standing in the middle Talthybios, to whom this was a care, proclaimed euphemia and silence to the army; and Kalchas the seer laid the sharp sword into the gold basket with his hand, drawing it from its sheath, and bent the head of the girl. The son of Peleus, taking the basket and the water together, ran in a circle around the altar of the goddess and said: 'O child of Zeus, O wild-animal-killer, you who roll the bright light through the dark, receive this sacrifice which we, the army of the Achaians and Agamemnon together, give you as gift, the undefiled blood of a beautiful maiden's neck. And grant that the sailing of the ships be untroubled and that we take the towers of Troy with the spear.'

The account is meant to shock, of course; the careful procedures and well-formed prayer arising from holy silence are rendered blasphemous by the identity of the victim. But observing euphemia means suppressing any acknowledgement of the abominable act (except obliquely in the adjective *kalliparthenou*, 'of a beautiful maiden'), as though euphemic ritual could contain the barbarity.

Euphemia characterized hymn-singing also. In Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae* the priestess Critylla cries (295), 'let there be euphemia', before commanding the assembled women at the Thesmophoria to pray. The chorus then sings a brief ode. The queen in Aeschylus' *Persians* requests that the chorus 'sing hymns euphemically' (*hymnous euphēmeite*, 620). Plato lays down a law that choruses must observe euphemia (*Laws* 800e). Terms associated with euphemia like the adjective *euphēmos* are also used to characterize an altar or sanctuary or typical speech and song in its vicinity.[20] They indicate that euphemia was a permanent characteristic of the intensely sacred space around the altar. Like physical boundary markers, the felt need to guard one's speech served as a frame marking the area within which one was in proximity to the god.

The other arena of public prayer and song in which euphemia operates is on the path of a procession, which may be moving along a sacred way. Judging from depictions in drama, the leader of the procession, or a chorus itself, would call to the onlookers to *euphēmein* before the chorus began its hymn to the god. In this case the space would be marked off only momentarily, by the procession itself, which created a moving area of heightened efficacity in

[20] e.g. Aesch, *Suppl.* 694–5: *euphēmos* song at altars; *Androm.* 1144–5: a *dysphēmos* shout in the *euphēmos* sanctuary; *TW* 1071–2: *euphēmos* shouts of choruses, in a list of honours that the gods have lost with the fall of Troy.

language and proximity to the god. In Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, Dikaiopolis calls for euphemia at the start of his procession to celebrate the rural Dionysia (237, 241) and follows with a prayer to Dionysus (247–52).[21] Trygaios in the *Peace* calls for euphemia (1316) before praying at the start of his wedding procession.[22]

Pindar's pacans and the hymns found in inscriptions at Delphi and Epidauros may be our best examples of actual euphemic hymns sung in processions or sanctuaries.[23] Alcman's two *partheneia*, both of which refer to offerings being made to the gods, I take as euphemic also. Euphemic processions must have included the Daphnephoria at Thebes, for instance, in which young women sang a *daphnephorikon* song to Apollo as they went in turn to two of his temples.[24] Likewise Isyllus' ceremony: one Isyllus persuaded the fourth-century Epidaurians to establish a procession to the temples of Apollo and Asklepios in turn. He composed a paean for the event and also the prayer to be offered when the procession reached its destination.[25] The paean as a genre could be identified as euphemia, so the texts for these occasions must count as euphemic speech.[26]

As these examples show, euphemia operated in or on the way to sacred space. It reinforced the geographical separation from the everyday and signalled a special state, or frame, in which

[21] The prayer is followed by instructions to the other participants then by a song to Phales. Both contain sexual joking. In comedy, euphemia lasts only for the brief interval of the prayer. Similarly, in *IT* Iphigeneia calls out for euphemia (123) just before her attendants, a chorus of Greek slave women, enter singing a short astrophic invocation to Artemis as they approach her temple.

[22] Cf. *Birds* 1719: euphemia invoked before a song welcoming the new king and his bride. In *Frogs* 354 ff. and Eur. *Bacch.* 68–70 the chorus-leader and chorus, respectively, call for euphemia and ask the uninitiated to move away; both scenes represent processions of initiates into mystery cults. Cf. also Kleinknecht (1937) 21–2 on euphemia and the initiation scene in *Clouds*.

[23] For cult hymns, see Furley (1993) 23–4; Maas (1933) on the hymns found at Epidauros; Bremer (1998); Käppel (1992) on the paean; Rutherford (2001*a*) on Pindar's paeans.

[24] A *daphnēphorikon* song is preserved: Pindar fr. 94b SM (= *parth.* II). See Stehle (1997) 93–100 on this poem.

[25] An inscription (IG 4. 1 ed. min. 1929, no. 128) preserves the proposal, instructions, paean, and prayer. Text and bibliography in Käppel (1992) 380–3, no. 40.

[26] Cf. *IT* 1403: the sailors *epeuphēmēsan . . . paiana* to Iphigeneia's prayer. This is probably just the shout *iē paian*, but the same character must extend to the expanded song. The *ololygē* is also a euphemic shout; cf. e.g. *Ag.* 595–6.

channels of communication were open from community to divine, and the gods were at their most attentive.[27] Within the frame the heightened language approached the self-fulfilling, that is, the god was extremely responsive to the precise words used, so utterance had to be carefully controlled. All speakers should articulate only words that suggested a well-disposed deity, a pious community, and a favourable outcome.[28] Thus they gave the god delight: the combination of sacred space, euphemia, and *charis* ('delight', 'favour', 'gratitude') created the conditions for drawing nearer to the god in mutual joy. In Pindar, *Pyth.* 10.34–5, Apollo delights in the Hyperboreans' festivity and euphemia, and in Callimachus, *Hymn* 2.1–7, Apollo is felt to be drawing near. Obviously, ritual characterized by euphemia was a very conservative form, reproducing hegemonic discourse in the community. The anthropologist Maurice Bloch, who has made a study of constrained language in ritual, points out that rules about allowable speech limit the range of things one can say, so suppress challenges to the prevailing ideology.[29]

III

Now that the evidence for typical locations and aims of euphemic ritual has been marshalled, we can identify other significant characteristics of such rituals. Because euphemia characterizes an attitude as well as a sense of the potency of language, it entails constraints equivalent to the linguistic reserve in other dimensions of communication: dress, movement, and gesture must be analo-

[27] Cf. the pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades* 2. 138b–c, where Socrates warns Alcibiades against praying out of ignorance for evils. Fear of drawing the attention of divine powers is evident also in Soph. *OC* 125–33, where the chorus describes the grove of the Eumenides and its way of passing by 'without looking, projecting the voice of a *euphēmou* mind without sound, without word'.

[28] See Parker (1998) on *charis*; Race (1982) 8–14 on the formal expressions of desire to create *charis* and please the god often found in hymns; Pulleyn (1997) 13–15, 37 on its importance in prayer. For euphemia as pleasing to the god see also ps.-Plato, *Alcibiades* 2. 148d–149b, where in response to an Athenian complaint the oracle of Zeus Ammon declares that he prefers the euphemia of the Spartans to all the Athenian sacrifices and offerings (*hiera*).

[29] Bloch (1974). Bell (1997) 70 has a summary of his argument. He stresses constraint on syntax (rather than content) leading to maximum performative force and minimum information. The constraint caused by euphemia operates on both content and syntax, but its effects are similar.

gously intensified and well omened as well.[30] These are the visible analogues of the bodily/mental purity alluded to by the Suda (quoted above). The god should see nothing, as well as hear nothing, that does not contribute to his or her pleasure, honour, and inclination to respond favourably.[31] As far as we can tell from vase painting and other evidence, the chorus typically moved in a circle around an altar or else toward a focal point, as would a procession moving along a sacred way toward a sanctuary or altar.[32] Their focus was the location of the divine presence, and they moved either toward or around it in a geometrically graspable, symbolically simple way. The dance ensured rhythmic, harmonized movement, even if it was sometimes little more than a walking step. Vase paintings show chorus members holding hands or carrying branches (or both), and we hear that the chorus at the Daphnephoria carried suppliant branches of laurel.[33] These contributed to the audience's visual experience of rhythmic regularity.

We know how predictable the rhythm of movement was, for pre-Hellenistic cult poetry has a monostrophic or triadic metrical structure.[34] The Hymn to the Kouros has four-line strophes punctuated by a six-line refrain.[35] Alcman's first *Partheneion* has a repeating strophe whose internal pattern could be analysed as a primitive triad.[36] In Pindar's paeans the triad form predominates. All these forms are rhythmically predictable and draw the audience to respond with kinaesthetic pleasure. Listeners can pick up the cadence and anticipate the points of closure and new beginning. Dance translated the rhythm into visual and kinetic terms,

[30] Bremer (1981) 202–3 cites a 2nd-cent. CE inscription from Stratonicea that specifies singing of a daily hymn by a local poet for Zeus Panamarus and Hecate by a boys' chorus and lays down their status, appearance, and movement. The concern for these details, though this inscription is late, seems to have been typical of cultic worship. Cf. Isyllus' ceremony (above, n. 26).

[31] Furley (1995) 32–6 stresses the 'pleasing spectacle' that humans should offer the god and adduces the description of the festival included in Delphic Hymn I, composed for the Pythais in the 2nd cent. BCE, and comments in Menander Rhetor.

[32] Bremer (1981) 197.

[33] Schachter (1981) I.83–4 for carrying branches at the Daphnephoria.

[34] For the metre of extant paeans see Käppel (1992) 75–82, with chart on 76–9. Some are listed as astrophic; these are mainly composed of a single foot, ionics or cretics, in lines of irregular length. Ariphron's paean (Käppel no. 34) is astrophic lyric, but it is only ten lines long and represents a single stanza.

[35] See West (1965) on this hymn.

[36] Alcman 1 L.–P = 3 C. For the metre see Page (1979): 23–5.

synaesthetically reinforcing the metrical pattern and aiding observers to feel it with their bodies.

Evidence exists in some cases to show how members of a ritual chorus dressed; typically, uniform finery is required. White cloaks, wreaths, and long hair let down are specified for the singers of Isyllus' paean to Apollo and Asklepios, mentioned above.[37] Girls dancing for Artemis at Brauron wore saffron robes.[38] Female choruses in two texts refer to their clothes, which suggests that they had ritual significance.[39] Gold ornaments might be called for, like the golden cicadas that the men of Samos wore in their hair when processing to the temple of Hera.[40] Such rich dress, as well as other evidence, also suggests that dancers were typically drawn from the relatively well-off part of the community, the noble or notable.[41] The conservatism that Bloch underlines was at work in social hierarchy as well as speech. Formal beauty, regularity and uniformity, and reproduction of the established social (and cosmic) structure appear to characterize full community euphemic ritual as analogues of euphemic speech. One can see an analogy with the sacrificial procession as well; just as the animal should be unblemished and go willingly, so human performers should look well and move predictably.

How do tragic choruses compare? Tragic choruses do not move or look like the choruses I have been describing. The tragic chorus, uniquely, dances in a pattern of strophic pairs.[42] Strophe and antistrophe respond metrically, but the chorus then shifts to a new metrical pattern, forcing the dance to shift with it. The audience, of course, could not get into the rhythm because the changes of pace would throw off expectations. Tragedy makes frequent use of a metre, the dochmiac, that is never used as the metre of cult song.[43] A protean foot, the dochmiac has thirty-two possible

[37] Cf. n. 26 above. For prescriptions for clothing in cult (not specifically the chorus) see Wächter (1910) 15–24. White clothing was often stipulated (16–17) and sometimes hair hanging loose (22).

[38] Ar. *Lys.* 644/5.

[39] Alcman 1 L–P (= 3 C) 64–9; Pindar fr. 94b SM (= *parth* 11) 6.

[40] Athenaios 12.525e–f. The men wore snowy robes also.

[41] See Stehle (1997) 23–5 for evidence for the social status of choral performers.

[42] Kranz (1933) 115; cf. 230: the single triad becomes a common form in tragedies from 415 on.

[43] Except in one Hellenistic composition: see West (1982*a*) 108. For the dochmiac in tragedy see Dale (1968) 104–14, esp. 110 on its effect.

forms, of which twenty-four are actually used.[44] It ranges emotionally from the driving beat of the basic form (υ––υ–) to the agitation of a completely resolved form (υ υ υ υ υ υ υ υ). The dochmiac could stand as the paradigm of tragedy's deviation from cult song.[45] Rhythmically, tragedy is adapted to emphasize the very qualities that euphemic ritual suppresses: unpredictable movement and disorienting emotion.

The tragic chorus's dancing seems also to have been different in style from that of the ritual chorus. Instead of carrying significant items like branches or baskets, the chorus, we are told by late sources, used hand-gestures and 'figures' or 'poses', *schēmata*, to reinforce its song.[46] Many students of Greek tragedy do not believe that this is true for the fifth century, but David Wiles takes it seriously.[47] To the extent that the chorus used mimetic gesture, it again elevated the variable over the single significant gesture directed toward the god. The audience had to work to decode what the chorus was presenting rather than knowing a priori what meanings the song embodied. Again, there is dispute over whether the fifth-century chorus typically moved in a block of five by three choreuts, like a military company, as Pollux claims.[48] If it did, as I believe, it maximized its mobility, for it could change direction quickly to either side or back, unlike the processional file or circle of the liturgical chorus.[49] What this represents, in addition to mobility, is an orientation toward the human audience, not divinity, for the chorus could sing in turn to the front and two

[44] See statistics in Conomis (1964) 23. A number of these are quite rare.

[45] Stehle in progress considers the shift from dochmiacs to cult-hymn style in the parodos of Aesch. *Seven*.

[46] Ath. 1.21d–22a on Aeschylus creating dance movements; Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.15 (= *Moralia* 747a–748d), Pollux 4.99 on *schēmata*. Csapo and Slater (1994) 394 gives translation of Ath. and Pollux; 365–6, nos. 319–22, gives other references to mimetic dance figures, perhaps from satyr-play and comedy.

[47] Wiles (1997) 88–9, 92, 96–113, who works out gestural patterns fitting the theme of both strophe and antistrophe of several tragic odes.

[48] Pollux *Onom.* 4.104; see Csapo and Slater (1995) 394 for translation, 393 for assessment of Pollux as a source; Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 239–41 for discussion, 246–57 for overview of dance in drama. Wiles (1997) 89–96 is sceptical but concludes by proposing (96), 'a gradual change of emphasis towards frontal presentation', that is, rectangular formation. Cf. Wiles (2000) 134. That the number of choreuts was raised by *three* suggests that rectangular formation was already in use.

[49] Wiles (2000) 134–5 remarks that movement teacher Jacques Lecoq found more flexibility in the rectangle than in the circle, confirmation of the idea that tragedy emphasized variegated movement.

sides. These qualities, its unpredictable, rapidly shifting rhythm, mood, and direction, allow the tragic chorus to act and react, but they force the audience to engage with it, kinaesthetically and emotionally, in a very different way from the reactions solicited by euphemic *choreia*.[50]

Distinctive to the tragic chorus is the fact that the choreuts were masked. Rather than with notable or noble members of the community the chorus confronted the audience with generic, interchangeable faces. As masked figures individual chorus members were hidden from the audience, a fundamental alteration in the relationship of performers to spectators.[51] The interplay of individual identity and corporate unity that obtained in euphemic ritual *choreia* was blocked, together with the authority projected by high-status speakers lending their identity to the utterance. Individuals in the audience for tragedy might know who one of the dancers really was, but there was no way for the audience as a whole to identify these disguised figures as worthy representatives from them to the gods. Only their virtuosity in dance and song could define their appropriateness to stand before the audience, not their status or character. Demosthenes (21 *Meidias* 58–9) tells the story of a man who was convicted of failure to serve in the army and hence not eligible to dance in the tragic chorus. He was engaged by an ambitious chorus master anyway, since he was a good chorus-leader, and was not stopped from dancing. Presumably the audience did not know whom it was watching, or did not care.

In addition, a remarkable number of choruses in extant tragedy played characters like slaves or foreigners who could not have performed civic ritual. Their costuming would interpose a further visual obstacle to seeing the chorus as ritual; the problem is not just that it would be far from the rich and festive garb meant to attract the god but that it would communicate a visual message of social inversion that would make the ritual look irremediably wrong.[52]

[50] The tragic chorus was accompanied by pipes (*auloi*), which were more emotional than lyre-music. On evidence for use of the pipes and Athenian attitudes toward them see Wilson (1999).

[51] On masks see Calame (1986); Halliwell (1993); Schlesier (1995); Csapo (1997) 255–8; Marshall (1999) for a pragmatic actors' view. Halliwell points out (197–9, 202) the lack of direct connection between masks in tragedy and religious use.

[52] See Gould (1996) on this phenomenon and the perspective that such choruses can bring to the tragic action: they draw on myth and community memory. See Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 180–9 *passim* and 208–9 on choral costume.

A chorus might be visually deviant from a ritual chorus even if its members' fictional identity did not require costumes that inhibited the status-conscious audience from visualizing them as legitimate religious representatives. The chorus of *Agamemnon*, for instance, is feeble (72–82) and must have reflected old age in some fashion in the opening march and dance. Beauty of movement there might have been in the sense of effective mimesis, but the god preferred the beauty of the young and the vigorous.[53]

And finally, the theatre was not euphemic space.[54] Though an altar stood in the playing area, it did not define the playing area as constrained in speech.[55] Plato is our best witness. Speaking of what must be tragic choruses, he complains in the *Laws* (800d) that 'not one but a throng of choruses come and, positioning themselves not far from the altars, in fact sometimes beside them, pour every sort of blasphemy down on the holy offerings, with words and rhythms and the most lament-like tunes straining the souls of the audience; and whichever chorus most effectively causes the sacrificing city to burst into tears on the spot carries off the prize.'[56] He uses the word *blasphēmia*, the strongest possible contrast to euphemia. It is after this passage that Plato announces his law (mentioned above) that all choruses should observe euphemia. Plato is offended, but it is clear that the audience at large felt no anxiety about violation of the altar. We may conclude that, even though lament was normally polluting to altars, the altar in the theatre was treated as exempt. The reason may be that altar and chorus were framed by a fictional setting, including, by 458 BCE, the painted backdrop of the *skēnē*. If the altar in a sanctuary was a place of divine presence, the theatre was a duplicitous place where presence was illusionary and shifting

[53] Cf. Plato *Laws* 2.665d–e on the embarrassment of old men at the thought of dancing in public.

[54] Cf. Sommerstein (1997), Wilson (1997*b*) 97–100 on the important fact that one had to pay to attend. That in itself perhaps renders dubious the idea that drama could be equated with ritual for the *polis*.

[55] On the altar see Wiles (1997) 70–3, who remarks (72) that if a rough rock pictured in the Pronomos Vase is the *thymelē* (low altar), it was not sacrosanct, for someone has his foot up on it.

[56] 'These must be tragic choruses because there is no other situation in which a chorus might win a prize for causing emotional upset. Plato says that this happens in 'almost all' cities, and by the time of the *Laws* tragedy had become popular all over the Greek world: see Taplin (1999). Wiles (1997) 187–8 describes theatre space as sacred; my point is that it was not euphemic.

rather than fixed.[57] Like the mask, the stage setting bespoke ambiguity about who or what was really present. Theatre space therefore defined the altar as fluctuating in meaning.

For an Athenian audience the differential markers of euphemic ritual must have been evidently absent from tragedy. Visually, the chorus would not have met the audience's experience of choral ritual approach to the gods in its euphemic form.[58] The conclusion seems inevitable that there would have been no real blurring of the boundaries between tragedy and euphemic ritual, the mode of civic choral prayer to the gods.

IV

But that is not the end of the matter, for choruses in tragedy do sing hymns containing prayers.[59] It is important to know whether a given hymn follows the rules for euphemia even if the chorus is not visually framed as a ritual chorus. We therefore need a separate inquiry into euphemic speech in prayer.[60] This is more difficult than investigating appearance and movement, for it requires identifying a negative: the sort of speech that was not acceptable as euphemic speech. But some evidence exists. I have already remarked on the antithesis between lament and worship of the gods.[61] The passage from Plato's *Laws* quoted above shows that lament was ill-omened in the sacred space around an altar. Iphigeneia in Euripides' *Iphigeneia in Aulis* agrees. At 1466–7, a scene

[57] On scene-painting see Wiles (1997) 161–2 on transformation of space, 162–6 on the encyclema and the skene door as the entrance to Hades, 114–22 on redefinitions of the playing area.

[58] Segal (1995) 180 lists some of these same differences succinctly and adds: 'Because of this distance from an actual ritual, the dramatist can use ritual forms with greater freedom and even reflect on the relation between ritual and drama.' But cf. Segal (1999) 235, quoted above, n. 7.

[59] Prayer and hymn to the gods are different but overlapping categories of utterance. A hymn to the gods may include a specific request or simply a request to 'come' or 'look' or the like, or it may contain praise of the god but no request. Request is implicit in the very performance of a cult hymn, however, for as a gift to the god it maintains the exchange of *charis*. On prayer see Aubriot-Sévin (1992), Pulleyn (1997), Depew (1997). On hymns see nn. 24 and 32 above.

[60] Kranz (1933) 128–37 discusses 'ritual' style in Aeschylus, meaning refrains, rhyme and alliteration, doubling of words, and the like. 'Ritual' here refers to intensified, compelling use of language: lament, prayer, magic, etc. For other older bibliography see Garvie (1969) 93 n. 2.

[61] Cf. nn. 10 and 11.

that precedes the one quoted above, she tells her weeping mother that she does not allow tears and commands the chorus to sing a paean to Artemis with euphemia while the army of the Danaids observes euphemic silence.[62] A short while later in her song to Artemis she says (1487–9), 'O august august mother, I will not give you my tears; it is not fitting at the holy rites.'[63]

A dysphemic topic can be deduced from three passages in which someone in conversation with another gives the command to observe euphemia. The first is from Herodotus (3.38), who describes the reaction of a group of Indian Calliatae to Darius' question as to what would make them willing to burn their dead: 'crying out loudly, they commanded him to observe euphemia'. The feeling is analogous to what the Greeks would feel at eating their dead, which points to disgust and pollution as the *dysphēmia* to be exorcized.[64] In *Agamemnon* (1246) Cassandra tells the chorus, in response to their professed incomprehension: 'I say that you will behold the doom of Agamemnon.' 'Make your tongue *euphēmos* in quietness, wretched one!' they exclaim. Ajax, in Sophocles' play, asks the chorus of sympathetic sailors to kill him (361). Their response is: 'Speak euphemic things!' In all these passages the exclamation is provoked by mention of death with concomitant pollution or violence.[65] Reference to death and its pollution or violence would a fortiori be dysphemic in the solemn space of opened communication with the gods.

If one looks for what is being avoided in ritual texts, one finds that a text may express fear or inadequacy, but in unreal terms, and that the singers quickly cancel the admission. In Alcman's first

[62] Iphigeneia is imagining the site of her sacrifice, for she is not yet there. In this interpretation I follow Stockert (1992) ad loc. Diggle (1994) ad loc marks this scene as 'fortasse Euripidei', which is his most positive category. The line quoted in the following sentence is the next step down in likelihood of Euripidean authorship.

[63] Stockert (1992) ad loc mentions Eur. *Suppl.* 289 f. as a parallel and *IT* 860 (groaning at the altar of Artemis Tauropolis, place of human sacrifice) as a counter-example.

[64] On ill-omened words as polluting see Parker (1983) 219.

[65] Cf. Sophocles *Trach.* 178, where the chorus commands euphemia after Deianeira expresses her fear that Herakles' death may be at hand. In Plato the command to observe euphemia can also be more jocular, but the desire to deflect mention of pollution or violence is still detectable. In e.g. *Symposium* 214d, Socrates tells Alcibiades to observe euphemia after Alcibiades claims that Socrates is violently jealous. In *Republic* 1.329c, the old Kephalos recalls a story about Sophocles: when someone asked him in old age whether he could still have intercourse with women, the poet said, 'Speak euphemically!'

Partheneion the chorus of young women says, turning to the gods (85–8), 'I would speak, but I myself, a parthenos, screech in vain from the roofbeam, an owl; yet I long especially to please Aotis.' (Aotis is a dawn goddess.) The chorus identifies its singing as screeching like an owl, a sound that is not only ugly but ill-omened. Their self-description is a form of women's de-authorizing their own voices in ritual, lest they appear to take on ritual power.[66] The young women are of course not screeching, so no ill-omened sound actually occurs, but the very mention of the owl could be inauspicious. However, they follow their violation of euphemia with an immediate corrective, 'yet I long especially to please Aotis', which substitutes their proper desire for proper execution and so preserves the ritual's pleasingness to the goddess.

Pindar's *Paean* 9 is an interesting example that can serve to illustrate religious poetry in response to a fearful situation. It was composed after an eclipse, probably that of 463. As we learn from the poem itself, it was sung at the temple of Ismenian Apollo at Thebes.[67] It begins by posing a fearful question to the sun. By the end of the antistrophe the questions have risen to a hyperbolic crescendo: '[O]r will you flood the land and set up a new race of men altogether?' But with the epode a corrective begins to set in: 'I lament nothing that I will suffer together with all.' The rest of the epode is lost, but presumably it continued by asking that *Thebes* not be singled out for suffering. There is a process of focusing at work. In the second strophe the chorus members shift focus from their anxiety to the performance itself as a song of delight for the god (34–43):

> I was ordained in response to a certain unearthly [sign?] to join together near the ambrosial couch of Melia a noble cry by means of a reed and by the skill of my intellect, a delight to you. I pray, far-darter, dedicating to the Muses' arts the oracular place [ ] in which the daughter of Okeanos, Melia, bore Teneros of broad strength , outstanding prophet of righteous things [ ], mingling (in love) in your bed, Pythian one.

The point of mentioning Melia's couch is to remind Apollo of his unique ties to Thebes through the beloved nymph and the local hero Teneros who was born from the union. Euphemia, it seems,

[66] Stehle (1997) 85–7.
[67] See Rutherford (2001*a*) on this paean, with bibliography.

does not stop the chorus from expressing fear in abstract or unrealistic language, but requires that the singers overcome it. This poem acts out its own efficacy as a response to the portent: fear followed by mobilizing local resources in local appeal to Apollo.[68]

Alcman and Pindar were sophisticated poets who could create complex positioning of the audience. Other extant hymns do not refer to the trouble they are designed to counteract. The context of Isyllus's hymn as response to disturbances (probably political), for example, is hinted at in the record of the act establishing the ritual, but not in the paean.[69] Typical, probably, of the basic euphemic hymn is the *Erythraean Paean*. It was recorded on stone in the first half of the fourth century but could go back to the fifth century. Three copies are known from different cities in the imperial period, so it was deemed efficacious for centuries.[70] To our eyes it appears utterly dull:

> Sing of famously skilled Paian, | young men, the far-darting son of Leto, iē Paian | who begat a great joy to humans, | mingling in love with Koronis in Plegyeian land, | iē Paian, Asklepios, | most famous divinity, iē Paian. ‖
>
> From him was born Machaon | and Podaleirios and Iaso [Healing], iē Paian, | and bright-faced Aigla [Radiance] and Panakeia [All-curing], | the children of Epiona [Soothing], (along) with glorious bright Hygieia [Health]. | Iē Paian, Asklepios, | most famous divinity, iē Paian. ‖
>
> Respond to me with joy and visit propitiously | my wide-wayed city, iē Paian, | and grant that we joyously see the light | of the sun as excellent, with glorious bright Hygieia. | Iē Paian, Asklepios, | most famous divinity, iē Paian.

Its effectiveness must have lain in the list of names of good omen in the second stanza, along with the repeated shouts of *iē paian*, perhaps also in the satisfying repetition of the phrase 'with glorious bright Hygieia' in the second and third stanzas.

The prayer that a euphemic chorus utters often has a typical rhetorical structure that guides its address to ensure that it is well-omened and pleasing.[71] The speakers call on the god by name,

[68] On this effect see Stehle (1997) 46–51.
[69] IG 4. 1^2 no. 128; text and bibliography in Käppel (1992) no. 40, 380–3. Stehle (1997) 132–7 discusses the background and the politics of the poem.
[70] Texts and bibliography in Käppel (1992) no. 37, 372–4, discussion 189–200. Schröder (1999) 64–74 emphasizes its cult character. Ax (1932) 430 uses it as evidence of dactylic meter in cult poetry; only the 'iē Paian, Asklepios' of the second to last line of each stanza is iambic.
[71] On the rhetorical conventions of prayer see Norden (1956) 143–76.

often adding local cult titles or adducing a locally relevant myth. They may include reference to a previous transaction between god and community, reminding the god either of humans' gifts to him or her (the so-called 'da quia dedimus' form) or of the god's previous gifts to the petitioners ('da quia dedisti'). The request usually follows, producing a three-part structure of invocation, argument, and petition, to use Jan Bremer's terms.[72] The argument is the most variable part, for instead of referring to a previous transaction it can identify the reason for the request, a reason to which the god is presumed to be sympathetic. In the *Erythraean Paean* it is implicit in the 'great joy' of line 3. The Alcman and Pindar poems have complex structures but contain these three parts.

With this general impression of euphemic speech as a guide, it is possible to test particular choral prayers in tragedy to see whether they observe euphemia. Every prayerful hymn must be taken separately, of course. The first stasimon of Euripides' *Ion* will serve as an example. The *Ion* involves Kreousa, only surviving daughter of Erechtheus, son of Erichthonios, the earth-born king of Athens. Kreousa is therefore the sole hope for Athens to continue its autochthonous line. She is married to a non-Athenian, Xouthos, but the marriage has been childless. Kreousa and Xouthos come to Delphi, where the play is set, in order to ask Apollo whether they will have children. Kreousa has in fact given birth to a child, after being raped by Apollo in a cave on the slope of the Acropolis. She hid her pregnancy and exposed the baby in the cave. The baby did not perish, for Apollo had it brought to Delphi and raised, where it is now a young man, Ion, who serves in the sanctuary.

The chorus consists of slave women who serve Kreousa. After they are already in the orchestra, Kreousa enters and during a sympathetic interchange with Ion explains that a 'friend of hers' was raped by Apollo and exposed her baby. Xouthos comes on briefly, on his way to consult the oracle. He asks his wife to pray while he is inside asking Apollo for children; then all the actors

[72] See Bremer (1981) 196, who adopts the term 'argument' to replace Ausfeld's 'pars epica' for the part of a prayer that expands the reason for addressing the particular god. Depew (1997) 231 points out that the tripartite structure is more commonly found in prayerful hymns than in simpler kinds of prayers (such as those preserved in inscriptions).

depart the stage. The chorus is left to perform for the audience the prayer that is the onstage analogue for Kreousa's prayer. The prayer is technically what Danièle Aubriot-Sévin calls 'free prayer', spontaneous personal prayer.[73] The strophe calls on Athena and Artemis (452–8, 465–71):[74]

σὲ τὰν ὠδίνων λοχιᾶν
ἀνειλείθυιαν, ἐμὰν
Ἀθάναν, ἱκετεύω,
Προμηθεῖ Τιτᾶνι λοχευ–
θεῖσαν κατ' ἀκροτάτας
κορυφᾶς Διός, ὦ † μάκαιρα † Νίκα,
μόλε Πύθιον οἶκον...

σὺ καὶ παῖς ἁ Λατογενής,
δύο θεαὶ δύο παρθένοι,
κασίγνηται † σεμναὶ Φοίβου†.
ἱκετεύσατε δ', ὦ κόραι,
τὸ παλαιὸν Ἐρεχθέως
γένος εὐτεκνίας χρονίου καθαροῖς
μαντεύμασι κῦρσαι.

You who are without birth from lochial pains, my Athena, I supplicate you, born with the help of the Titan Prometheus from the top of the head of Zeus, O blessed Victory, come to the Pythian home . . . you and the child of Leto, two goddesses, two virgin young women, reverend sisters of Phoebus. And supplicate, O girls, that the ancient race of Erechtheus win good birthing at last through pure oracles.

Note how saturated the lines are with 'female' and cult language reminiscent of Acropolis cult.

The antistrophe (472–91) is completely taken up with praise of legitimate children, speaking from the male point of view: male children will inherit family property, provide joy and strength, and fight to protect the fatherland. It is connected to the strophe by *gar* ('for') and can be taken as a delayed 'argument' part of the prayer, that is, an explanation of the reason for the request.[75] Instead of basing the argument on prior exchange of favours between god

[73] Aubriot-Sévin (1992) 41–3. [74] I cite Diggle (1981).

[75] On the theme of the antistrophe and the 'insistent presence of the feminine sign' in the ode, see Loraux (1993) 211–12. For an 'argument' that consists of explaining why the requested favour is good to have, cf. the paean of Ariphron to Hygieia (Athen. 15.701f–702b), discussed by Bremer (1981) 210–11.

and community the chorus speaks of the political benefits of legitimate birth, with which the Athenians would expect Athena to sympathize. This part of the prayer, with its first-person pronouns of personal engagement, comes strangely from the mouths of slave women, who have no households or legitimate offspring. The chorus seems almost to step out of character.

The epode is very similar in pattern to the strophe and antistrophe for its first five lines.[76] Depending on how the dance expressed the metre, the audience may have been reminded of a monostrophic cult song. Now the chorus evokes Acropolis ritual, the Erechtheum cults and the Arrhephoroi (492–502):

> ὦ Πανὸς θακήματα καὶ
> παραυλίζουσα πέτρα
> μυχώδεσι Μακραῖς,
> ἵνα χοροὺς στείβουσι ποδοῖν
> Ἀγλαύρου κόραι τρίγονοι
> στάδια χλοερὰ πρὸ Παλλάδος
> ναῶν συρίγγων
> ὑπ' αἰόλας ἰαχᾶς
> †ὕμνων† ὅτ' ἀναλίοις
> συρίζεις, ὦ Πάν,
> τοῖσι σοῖς ἐν ἄντροις,

O recesses of Pan and rocks neighbours to piping at the caves of the Long Rocks, where in the dance the triple daughters of Aglauros tread with their feet the green stretches before the temple of Athena to the flashing cry of songs (?) of the panpipes when, O Pan, you pipe in your caves that are sunless, . . .[77]

So far, the text of this prayer contains the conceptual elements of community euphemic ritual, distributed over the three stanzas: honorific clauses and epithets for the addressees, affirmation of the ideology of community structure, and attachment of it to local (Athenian) cult and ritual. It is sung by slaves who could not represent Athens, but the song itself is full of appeal to an Athenian audience.

[76] I follow Owen (1939) 187–8. After line 496 the metre deviates.

[77] There are two problems with the text. What is given as 'sunless' is an emendation, accepted by Diggle 1981 and Owen 1939 ad loc, with discussion. The mss have what might be interpreted as 'on little pipes'. *Hymnôn* is suspect as well because it is very awkward to construe and Pan is playing the pipes, not singing. Diggle obelizes it. The musical terms, if correct, would further connect the two choruses.

But let us examine the end of the epode (503–9):

> ἵνα τεκοῦσά τις
> παρθένος μελέα βρέφος
> Φοίβωι πτανοῖς ἐξόρισεν
> θοίναν θηρσί τε φοινίαν
> δαῖτα, πικρῶν γάμων ὕβριν.
> οὔτ' ἐπὶ κερκίσιν οὔτε λόγων φάτιν
> ἄιον εὐτυχίας μετέχειν θεόθεν τέκνα θνατοῖς.

where a pitiful *parthenos*, bearing an infant to Apollo, cast it out as a feast for the birds and bloody banquet for beasts, the outrage of her bitter mating. Never at my weaving nor ever from narratives did I hear the report that children (born) from the gods to mortals have a share in good fortune.

The abrupt shift from celebratory language must have caught the audience completely by surprise: suddenly the chorus is describing the bloody consequences of the rape, culminating in the powerful phrase 'outrage of a bitter mating'. The Acropolis is polluted in imagination by the image of the frightful, tombless death of an infant. This must be dysphemic in a prayer for good birth.[78] Pollution and violence connected with death provoked, as we saw, commands to observe euphemia even in ordinary conversation. In *Paean* 9 the chorus invokes Apollo's local sexual tie to Thebes, but, in this case, localizing Apollo sexually at Athens provokes an outburst of bitterness that destroys the prayer.[79] In the chorus's following words a negatived euphemia can almost be heard: [*ou*] *phatin aion eutuchias*.

Myth also tells the singers that children born to mortals from the gods do not have any share in good luck. Ostensibly the observation refers only to the baby exposed in the cave. But the term *theothen* is so general that it can mean 'given by the gods' as well as 'fathered by the gods'. A child given by Apollo to Kreousa is

[78] Mikalson (1989) 84–5 comments on prayers of the chorus at 714–20 and 1048–60 that they are unanswered, although their intent is realized. Moreover, the first is addressed to Parnassus and the second to Einodia (= Hekate), the dark side of Persephone, which make them uncanonical prayers.

[79] Henrichs (1996*b*) discusses perverted *choreia* in Euripides from a very different perspective; the chorus may 'establish an ironic distance between its own collective character and the action of the play' (54) through choral projection. *Heracles* is his paradigm example; the hero becomes a maddened 'dancer' who renders the chorus' dance, thematized earlier, ambiguous.

exactly what the chorus has been praying for, so for a finale they reject the desirability of the thing for which they were asking. On every level, the prayer is evacuated of its power as an efficacious speech-act. Beyond violation of ritual, we find a self-reflexive moment destined to undo ritual.[80] The final lines of the prayer therefore capture the central problem of the play: the violation of Athenian autochthony and the sacred space of the Acropolis by rape, the futility of prayer until the wound is healed by symbolic reenactment of Ion's birth.[81] New birth is not possible until the integrity of the Acropolis is restored.[82]

Another example will confirm that the treatment of prayer in *Ion* is not unique. The parodos of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* is often cited as an example of prayer in tragedy.[83] It is performed by a chorus consisting of adult citizen men, friends of the king. The singers enter in good order to a predominantly dactylic rhythm, found in cult poetry also.[84] Their song is a paean, with rhetoric very reminiscent of the opening of Pindar's *Paean* 9.[85] In the strophe (151–8) they apostrophize 'the sweet-spoken word of Zeus' (the oracle from Delphi) with anxiety about what it brings, punctuating mid-stanza with the ritual paean cry, *iēie Dalie Paian*. The antistrophe (159–66) invokes Athena, Artemis, and Apollo, all with honorific epithets:[86]

[80] In addition the chorus deconstructs ritual by its near-quotation of the *Iliad* in 504–5. I discuss this elsewhere.

[81] Hose (1991) 2.175–6 notes the parallel with Kreousa's (offstage) prayer and the change of theme, which he treats as preparation for the following episode (in which the chorus derails Xouthos' plan of keeping Kreousa ignorant). In her sung monody, 859–922, Kreousa picks up the imagery of the epode.

[82] The chorus is therefore right to tell Kreousa (761–2) that according to the oracle Xouthos has received she will never bear a child, even though Xouthos has reported no such statement. See Wiles (1997) 204–5 on Athena's olive replacing Delphic laurel at the end of the play.

[83] Most recently by Furley (1995) 41–2, with bibliography (n. 59), Wiles (2000) 44–5. Bollack (1990) ad 151–8 speaks of prayer interrupted by appeal to the gods' pity in the second strophic pair.

[84] Ax (1932) 426–36 analyses the metres of this parodos as cult metres. He has good parallels, including the *Erythraean Paean*, for the first strophic pair. For the second pair he compares citharodic nomos (427–9), which is not a cult form (Kranz (1933) 145; but cf. 185–6 where the parodos is treated as prayer). On the metres of the whole parodos see Bollack (1990) I.307–8 and 331–3.

[85] See Rutherford (1994–5) 118–21 on identifying paeans in tragedy. He makes the comparison between this ode and *Paean* 9.

[86] I quote from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990*a*). But see Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1997) ad 162 and 168.

πρῶτα σὲ κεκλόμενος, θύγατερ Διός, ἄμβροτ᾽
Ἀθάνα,
γαιάοχόν τ᾽ ἀδελφεὰν
Ἄρτεμιν, ἃ κυκλόεντ᾽ ἀγορᾶς θρόνον εὐκλέα
θάσσει,
καὶ Φοῖβον ἑκαβόλον αὐτῶ,
τρισσοὶ ἀλεξίμοροι προφάνητέ μοι
εἴ ποτε καὶ προτέρας ἄτας ὑπερορνυμένας
πόλει
ἠνύσατ᾽ ἐκτοπίαν φλόγα πήματος, ἔλθετε καὶ νῦν.

Calling you first, daughter of Zeus, immortal Athena, and (your) sister who holds the land, Artemis, who is seated in the well-famed circling seat of the agora, and far-shooting Phoebus, I ask (you), threefold warders off of death, appear to me; if ever earlier also when destruction was rushing over the city you accomplished removal of the fire of ill, come also now.

This is good prayer style, with an 'argument' based on the gods' past help in a Homeric *ei pote* construction. Artemis is invoked by her local cult, and the adjective *euklea* for her 'seat' recalls her local epiklesis Eukleia.[87] Hints of the plague are confined within recall of the gods' previous aid. Evident in strophe and antistrophe is the same move from anxiety and question to prayer to a localized god as is found in *Paean* 9.

But having begun well, the chorus does not sustain its appeal; the language of prayer disintegrates.[88] The first lines of the second strophe make clear their despair (168–71):

ὦ πόποι, ἀνάριθμα γὰρ φέρω
πήματα· νοσεῖ δέ μοι πρόπας
στόλος, οὐδ᾽ ἔνι φρουτίδος ἔγχος
ᾧ τις ἀλέξεται·

O popoi, for I bear uncountable pains, and my whole assembly of people is ill, nor is there in me any spear of thought by which anyone will ward (sickness) off.

O popoi, a Homeric exclamation of surprised disgust, signals a drastic change of tone.[89] They clearly consider the prayer of a

[87] As Dawe (1982) ad loc. points out.

[88] Cf. Rutherford (1995*b*) 118: 'The calm joyful, healing paean tends to run into conflict with the general thrust of the tragedy toward disruption, disorder, and death.'

[89] Cf. *ō popoi ē* opening the choral ode that follows Dareios' revelations in Aesch. *Pers.* 852.

moment ago useless, and they ensure that it will be ineffectual by speaking despairing, ill-omened words within the frame of euphemic ritual. The rest of the strophe describes miscarriage and death. The antistrophe, continuing the strophe with a demonstrative relative pronoun, adds the picture of children lying, death-bringing and unlamented, on the ground. Next the singers describe the scene of supplication (182–6):

ἐν δ' ἄλοχοι πολιαί τ' ἔπι ματέρες
ἀκτὰν πάρα βώμιον ἄλλοθεν ἄλλαι
λυγρῶν πόνων ἱκτῆρες ἐπιστενάχουσιν.
παιὼν δὲ λάμπει στονόεσσά τε γῆρυς ὅμαυλος'

Then wives also and grey-haired mothers too from all sides by the altar's edge add their groans as suppliants for (help against) their grievous troubles. The paean shines out and (so does) groaning speech to the same pipes.

The paean, as a healing song, should express the healing it requests with words of good omen, as the *Erythraean Paean* does. But just as paean and groans intermingle in the scene at the altars, so in this paean itself, sung to the pipes, the groans break through, speaking of death and pollution.[90] The last two lines of the second antistrophe (187–8) then offer a prayer to the 'golden daughter of Zeus', but one too short and undirected (which daughter of Zeus?) to counteract the power of the previous sixteen lines.

The third strophic pair again attempts prayer, but feebly.[91] In the strophe the chorus utters a hope that Ares might retreat (190–7), but it is expressed in the accusative and infinitive with no vocative to direct it.[92] The opening is a travesty of prayer: 'Ares

[90] Oedipus makes the same observation in line 5. Bollack (1990) ad 186 f. (p. 114) would take *homaulos* in 186 to mean 'in the same place', describing groans cutting off the paean, and comments, 'healing is annulled, as it were, in advance by the negativity of the songs of lament'.

[91] Furley (1995) 41–3 treats this strophic pair as equivalent to myth in prayer giving a paradigm of the divine action requested. But its deviance from the parallels he mentions is striking, for it does *not* supply a prior model with a favourable outcome, which is the rhetorical point of the other examples.

[92] Prayers with accusative and infinitive of the third person are known, though uncommon: see Pulleyn (1997) 151–4. But these are normally preceded by a vocative (e.g. *Il.* 7.179; *Od.* 17.354; *Thesm.* 287–91), so there is no doubt about the performative thrust. *Od.* 17.354 and *Thesm.* 289 have *moi* as well, to indicate the speaker's interest. Here no vocative appears. For the vocative, see also the discussion of Friis Johansen and Whittle (1980) ad Aesch. *Suppl.* 141–3 = 151–3. Bollack 1990 ad 190–4 accepts this construction but thinks of it as logically attached to the

the furious, who without the bronze of shields burns me . . . '. The god's name stands first, with a relative clause attached, in a typical prayer construction, but here it describes his hostility.[93] In lines 198–9 description of the plague abruptly breaks through again: 'for what night neglects to finish off day attacks'.[94] In the antistrophe the chorus uses a potential optative, not for the content of the request but for the verb of requesting itself—'I might wish' (205)—a strangely feeble construction.

In addition to such uncertain appeal, the chorus uses adjectives and images that apply more readily to the plague than to healing.[95] In the last three lines of the strophe, it asks Zeus to shrivel Ares with lightning (200–2). But the language it uses sounds just like that used earlier to describe the plague: Zeus' *purphoron* lightning in line 200 recalls line 27, where the priest of Zeus calls the plague a *purphoros theos*. The imperative *phthison* in line 202 recalls the same verb used intransitively of the city (*phthinousa*, 'shrivelling') in emphatic anaphora in lines 25 and 26. The language still does not so much conjure up healing as reinforce the image of plague blighting the land.

The antistrophe is the culmination of the struggle between prayer and plague (203–15):

Λύκει' ἄναξ, τά τε σὰ χρυ-
σοστρόφων ἀπ' ἀγκυλᾶν
βέλεα θέλοιμ' ἂν ἀδάματ' ἐνδατεῖσθαι
ἀρωγὰ προσταθέντα, τάς τε πυρφόρους
Ἀρτέμιδος αἴγλας, ξὺν αἷς
Λύκι' ὄρεα διάσσει·
τὸν χρυσομίτραν τε κικλήσκω,
τὰνδ' ἐπώνυμον γᾶς,
οἰνῶπα Βάκχον, εὔιον
Μαινάδων ὁμόστολον,

end of the previous antistrophe as a kind of result clause ('send help, so that Ares retreat . . . '). That ignores the force of the rhythmic and syntactic break between strophic pairs.

[93] On the habit of opening songs to a god with the name followed by a relative clause describing attributes or narrating an exemplary story, see Norden (1956) 168–72.

[94] These lines are difficult; the translation depends on the emendation *telein* for *telei*. Dawe (1982) ad loc. also raises the question about how they fit into the train of thought. The point may be that they do not.

[95] Segal (1999) 217–18 makes this point.

πελασθῆναι φλέγοντ'
ἀγλαῶπι <–υ–>
πεύκᾳ 'πὶ τὸν ἀπότιμον ἐν θεοῖς θεόν.

Lycian lord, I might wish that your darts from the gold-twisted bowstring be showered unconquered, set in front as an aid, and the fire-bearing lights of Artemis, with which she rushes through the Lycian mountains. And I invoke the golden-headbanded one who gives a name to this land, the wine-faced Bacchus, halooing fellow-marcher of the maenads, to come near, a burning [ally?] with his bright-faced torch against the god without honour among gods.

The imagery of plague continues. Apollo's arrows are known to cause plague, not ward it off, and Artemis' torches are *purphorous* (206). The gods are no longer localized at Thebes; Apollo is Lycian (?) and Artemis rushes through Lycian mountains.[96] Plague and confusion pervade the faltering language, a more sustained failure of euphemia than the outburst of dysphemic language in the prayer in *Ion*.

The antistrophe ends with a prayer to Dionysus (209–15) to put Ares to flight. The chorus finally finds its performative voice again with *kiklēsko*, and it identifies Dionysus as local to Thebes. Yet the effect is chaotic. Dionysus is 'golden-headbanded' (i.e., in female or eastern dress), 'wine-faced', 'a halooing fellow-marcher of the maenads', the opposite, in short, of the choreuts. If the prayer is answered, the maenads will replace the choral performers of the paean, and Thebes will be healed by riot.[97] Like the choral prayer of *Ion*, the paean reproduces the problematic of the play: salvation and pollution are utterly intermingled.[98] Just as the chorus' prayer is infected by the plague, so Oedipus, the saviour of Thebes, is also its polluter. Until salvation and pollution are separated, prayer will be ineffectual—and healing will require upheaval of the civic hierarchy.

[96] It is not clear how to take Apollo's epithet; see Bollack (1990) ad loc. for discussion. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990*b*) 83–4 suggest that the epithet 'Lycian' is meant to connect Artemis with the Phrygian Great Mother.

[97] This passage replaces euphemic with aischrologic celebration; see the end of the chapter.

[98] Bollack (1990) ad loc. gives a more positive analysis of the final strophic pair. He takes Apollo's epithet to refer to light, not Lycia, and connects it with a theme of the cosmic struggle of light and dark in which the light of Dionysus triumphs at the end. I do not find the imagery clear or positive enough for that conclusion.

V

What do the results of these two inquiries into the visual framing and the language of choral prayer tell us about the use of choral prayer in tragedy? The most obvious conclusion is that, protected by the visual disparity between tragic and euphemic choruses, tragedians could stage a failed or perverted prayer: they could show disorder breaking through into language and disrupting the constraint imposed by the requirements of euphemia. Thus they could subordinate their depiction of choral ritual to the themes of the drama, just as they did other kinds of ritual, like sacrifice or wedding. Although choral song was fully enacted, unlike those other kinds of ritual, even superstitious members of the audience must not have felt that Athens was ritually compromised.

We can go further in suggesting possible metaritual effects on the audience of such violated prayers. To do so, I draw on—and modify—the conclusions of Claude Calame's study of the sources of authority for the choral voice. He distinguishes three dimensions of choral speech: the ritual (characterized by performative language), the hermeneutic (narrative and comment), and the affective (emotional reactions to events on stage). The ritual aspect he describes as a continuation of that of traditional melic choruses: 'In as far as archaic and classical melic poetry is ritual and cultic speech, the choral odes of tragedy can also be considered as cultic speech acts.'[99] This ritual aspect is for him the key for understanding the choral voice of both melic and tragic choruses, for the performative language of ritual allows the chorus to combine the voice of the author and that of the audience. 'In melic poetry', he says (151), 'the use of language of community allows, for example, a female choral group to express itself in a song composed by a male poet; it explains how, notwithstanding differences of social status and of gender, the public can take on the words of the choros, not only as the "you" but above all as "I".'[100] Likewise in

[99] Calame (1999*a*) 130. He defines 'performative language' as use of first-person present or 'performative future' or modal forms of the verb, especially those expressing the act of song, of second-person forms, and of deictics. On 130 these forms are implicitly equated with ritual speech. In fact they represent engaged speech and, though common in ritual, do not serve as the markers for ritual.

[100] In Stehle (1997) 20, 28 I give an analogous description of melic choral song through the notion of speaking to and for the community but do not identify choral 'I' with the author.

tragic choruses (153): '[T]he position of the speaker of choral odes in tragedy lends itself to being occupied either by the author as the master of song or by the spectators performing their cult act in the theatre of Dionysos. Both are summoned to take part in the collective masked mimetic voice of the *I/we* of the choros to give the "mythic" action played out on the stage a ritual and performative interpretation, a participant interpretation with a real social effect.'

As is clear from what has preceded, I disagree with Calame's view that a tragic chorus can be assimilated to a melic chorus performing euphemic ritual song. Yet the idea that spectators may take on the first person of the chorus is crucial to understanding the ways in which playwrights position the audience vis-à-vis ritual. In *Ion* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* the audience is drawn in initially through an emotionally charged *idealization* of ritual. In *Ion* the strophe evokes Acropolis cult, with its language of virgin girls and birth-giving. The antistrophe, on the blessings of children, contains sentiments most men would have endorsed. And the epode opens with an image of the primitive Acropolis. This is not prayer that men in the audience would have uttered themselves, but it is one that seems to belong to the heart of Athens. Audience members could respond with a romantic or nostalgic identification with the prayer. They could adopt the first person of the chorus out of desire for connection with the Athens of the past or attachment to the idea of women's religious ritual on the Acropolis. And the more intense a spectator's identification with the choral 'I', the more sharply the outburst of violence at the end would intrude on the illusion. By soliciting exactly the response that Calame points to, identification with the first person of the choral song, but at the level of romantic affirmation and desire, Euripides could increase the audience's reaction to the rape of Kreousa and problem of Athenian identity.

Sophocles creates a similar effect in *Oedipus Tyrannus*. His choreuts perhaps had as many props of euphemic ritual as possible. Their song begins as a recognizable paean. They may have been dressed for ritual, with wreaths and special cloaks. Their entrance follows the scene of supplication directed to Oedipus, and they may have moved toward the altar just quitted by the suppliants,[101]

[101] Calame (1999*a*) 132–4 points out that the suppliants create a ritual context for the chorus. See 132–40 for his discussion of the chorus throughout the play.

The whole city, it is clear, has turned to ritual for help, so this paean makes a strong contrast to the 'free prayer' of *Ion*. Distanced as 'Theban', the chorus can more nearly reproduce authoritative ritual appearance.[102] Calame suggests that the chorus's appeal to Athena and to Delian Apollo (since that epiklesis of the god is seemingly not attested in Boeotia) may have led the Athenian audience to recognize its own gods and feel greater concern.[103] The identity of the gods would add to Athenian involvement, but this is too dispassionate and mechanistic a description. Not recognition of Athenian ritual but deep attraction to the idea that a healing paean could help end a plague would move audience members to identify their voices with the chorus's.[104] As in *Ion*, desire for idealized efficacious ritual would provide a motive for them to claim the ritual song for themselves—and to recoil at the course it took. In this process of eliciting and frustrating a yearning for efficacious ritual tragedy creates a metaritual perspective: it exposes ritual as thoroughly implicated in the troubles disturbing the community and not a means of transcending them.[105]

Tragedy utilizes prayer to create a metaritual perspective in other ways also. I point briefly to two instances. In Aeschylus' *Suppliants* a chorus of young women suppliants in dark masks and non-Greek clothes petition to find asylum in Argos.[106] Their appearance is strange; the Argive king Pelasgos comments on it at length, claiming that the suppliant boughs are the only aspect of the sight he recognizes (234–45). They are troubling in other ways; in order to blackmail Pelasgos into supporting them they have threatened to pollute sacred space by hanging themselves from the statues of the gods (463–5).[107] When they sing a hymn to

[102] See Gardiner (1987) 97–8 for the pious and civic character of the chorus.

[103] Calame (1999*a*) 132–4. However, his discussion of the first antistrophe is rather muted, perhaps because the absence of first-person reference except *moi* in 163 makes the question whose voice the chorus represents less insistent.

[104] I assume that the Athenian plague was somehow relevant to this play.

[105] Goldhill (1996) 254 speaks of the tension within the chorus' position relative to status and authority; its failed ritual is certainly a manifestation of that tension.

[106] For the Danaids' dark colour see 154–5; dark colour is implied also by Pelasgos' list of people whom they look like: Libyans, Egyptians, Cyprians, Indian nomads, neighbours of the Aethiopians (as well as Amazons). On the Egyptians as dark-skinned see Hdt. 2.57.2, on the Indian nomads, Hdt. 3.101.1.

[107] Rosenmeyer (1982) 158–60 discusses the Danaids' misleading use of myth in this song and in the parodos.

Zeus asking for his help their song opens in a way foreign to Greek hymns (524–8):[108]

> ἄναξ ἀνάκτων, μακάρων
> μακάρτατε καὶ τελέων
> τελειότατον κράτος, ὄλβιε Ζεῦ,
> πιθοῦ τε καὶ γένει σῶι
> ἄλευσον ἀνδρῶν ὕβριν εὖ στυγήσας...

Lord of lords, most blessed of the blessed, of perfecters most perfecting power, happy Zeus, be persuaded and ward off the arrogance of men from your race, hating it well...

The style of the invocation is Egyptian or Persian and must have sounded overwrought to the audience.[109] In this case the audience members could well have desired to *reject* such a prayer for political or xenophobic reasons. Yet the language is grand and there is nothing obviously dysphemic about it, so on what grounds could one deny the potential efficacy of such a powerful appeal to Zeus?[110] The scene confronts the Athenian audience with questions about the relationship of politics and ritual.[111]

The exodos of *Eumenides* comes as close as any scene in extant tragedy to collapsing the difference between tragic and euphemic *choreia*. I follow Sommerstein's view of the staging; he believes that the female *prospoloi* mentioned in line 1024 actually appear on stage and sing the exodos song, a prayer to the Furies.[112] As cult attendants of Athena and a fresh chorus, they are detached from the fiction, in which they have not taken part. They represent actual Athenian ritual officials and serve along with the Areopagites to link this final scene with the audience's world. Their song, though it consists of two strophic pairs, approaches monostrophic style, for the pattern of the two pairs differs only in the number and the resolutions of the dactyls and in the resolutions of the final

[108] I quote from Page (1972).

[109] On the Egyptian and Persian parallels and on the whole stasimon see Friis Johansen and Whittle (1980) ad loc.

[110] Mikalson (1989) 93–4 discusses the prayers of the Danaids as the only unanswered prayers in Aeschylus.

[111] See Sommerstein (1997) 74–9 on the possible political thrust of *Suppliants*.

[112] Cf. Taplin (1977) 410–15; he assigns the final chorus to the Areopagites because the *prospoloi* cannot be proved to be on stage. But it would be deflating to the sense of ritual to name them as important figures in the procession if they were not present, and as escorts they are the natural ones to sing the final hymn.

paroemiac.[113] And they end each strophe of the first pair with the command to observe euphemia. In the strophe the command is directed apparently at the Areopagites, but in the antistrophe the line is, 'Keep euphemia, in a collective body!' As Sommerstein points out, it must be addressed to the *audience*.[114] The second two strophes end with a general command to shout the *ololygē*, a euphemic utterance, in response to the song, and the audience may have done so in fact. The audience becomes participant through its familiar role in euphemic ritual of silence and response.

By having the *prospoloi*, whom Athena describes as 'those who keep watch over my statue', sing the hymn Aeschylus reverses the polluting assault on Athena's statue that the Furies make earlier in the play. In their 'Binding Song', the chorus of Furies uses the language and rhetorical conventions of euphemic choral dance, and perhaps the dance style as well, for a spell meant to render Athena's statue religiously impotent.[115] Its refrain contains dysphemic language of violence and death: 'This is my song over the sacrificial victim, knocking sideways, carrying askew, mind-destroying, a song from the Furies that binds the mind, sung without the lyre, withering to humans.'[116] Such a horrid parody of euphemic ritual must have had an emotional effect on some in the audience that only a powerful evocation of efficacious ritual could undo.[117] But although the final scene conjures up prayer at the start of the Panathenaic procession, it is not actual ritual.[118] The procession contains the Furies, now dressed in crimson robes but still in their hideous masks. The scene could be said to create visually the metaritual perspective of *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Ion*: conservative,

[113] On dactyls in cult song see Ax (1932) and n. 84 above on the parodos of *OT*. There are minor questions about the scansion; cf. Sommerstein (1989) ad loc.

[114] Sommerstein (1989).

[115] Cf. Citti (1962) 106–11 on prayer language in the two songs; Henrichs (1994–5) 60–5 on the language of ritual *choreia* in the 'Binding Song'.

[116] See Prins (1991) on this song, including the metrical patterns, intertwining of body and speech, and performative quality, Faraone (1985) on its similarity to judicial curses.

[117] Easterling (1988) 109 comments: 'In so far as tragedy betrays a concern for *euphēmia*... a sequence like that at the end of the *Eumenides* could have been perceived as actually "working" to propitious ends. When the Furies threaten to blight and poison the land, Athena always has a well-omened answer to their words...'. She tentatively suggests that here ritual may go beyond the fictive world of tragedy to affect the world of the audience.

[118] Easterling (1988) 99–101 points out this out.

euphemic ritual can only transcend disturbance in the community when the disturbing forces are already checked or conciliated by other means, as the Furies have agreed to accept new robes as metics.[119]

VI

And now one final suggestion. Earlier I distinguished euphemic ritual from aischrologic ritual.[120] The latter was associated especially with festivals of Dionysus and Demeter and involved calling out obscenities and insults to or about members of the community. The frames that define *aischrologia* remove it from normal life in the opposite direction from euphemia, for the latter demands extra control and constraint, while *aischrologia* allows release from normal constraint.[121] Euphemia and *aischrologia* can be contrasted in other ways also. *Aischrologia* was not addressed to the god; rather it indicated the presence of the god, making humans the primary audience for speech. *Aischrologia* did not necessarily take place in sacred space; the whole city was the space for the mocking 'from the wagons' of the Anthesteria.[122] Correlatively, performance was not focused on a single point; its orientation was diffused over the horizontal plane. Dress embraced expanded possibilities as well. At the Anthesteria some revellers dressed in costumes of satyrs and maenads.[123] Unlike euphemic ritual aischrologic festivity was not tightly choreographed but open to improvisation, while its licence was always vulnerable to shifts of social opinion. It should be added that a single festival could contain both aischrologic and euphemic ritual.

Choruses could perform *aischrologia*, as they did for Damia and Auxesia at Epidauros and on Aegina, according to Herodotus (5.83.3). Old comedy was of aischrologic character. Studies of

[119] Wilson and Taplin (1993) 174–7 make a different but compatible point in suggesting that the end of the *Eumenides* metaphorically stages the incorporation of tragedy into the city.

[120] See Fluck (1931).

[121] Cf. Csapo (1997) for phallus-riding and its play with gender roles at Dionysiac festivals. Such representations are another aspect of the festival type I am calling 'aischrologic'.

[122] See Deubner (1932) 103.

[123] Deubner (1932) 107; the evidence is late. On the escape of revellers from the demands of citizenship see Maurizio (2001).

comic license to 'mock by name' conclude that no laws protected speech in comedy but that Aristophanes does appear to violate existing laws against certain kinds of accusations.[124] It certainly violated decorum. There must therefore have been an understanding that comedy was less constrained than normal public speech, and the same must have been the case for the more spontaneous mocking of the Anthesteria or the 'mocking at the bridge' of the Eleusinian procession. Possibly the mockers were disguised in all these cases, as they certainly were in comedy.[125] What I would like to suggest is that we could extend the category to tragedy also. Tragedy does not indulge either obscenity or political mocking by name. Instead it exposes hidden disorder at the level of community and cosmos rather than of the individual: pollution, curse, disease, violence, the arousal of the dead, sexuality, women's power in reproduction and magic. Its portrayal of failed or perverted ritual as symptomatic of human disorder was then part of its licence to speak the normally unspeakable.[126] No wonder Dionysus is often evoked in choral odes in tragedy, as Anton Bierl shows, especially when human blindness is at its height or disaster looms.[127] In a perceptive article, Kai Heikkilä shows the connection among the chorus' reference to its dancing, wild joyous dance, Dionysus, and the chorus' delusion in Sophocles, and Albert Henrichs has argued that the combination of choral self-reference or choral projection and evocation of the realm of Dionysus points to the choral dance as ritual.[128] Perhaps we should see these passages as peak moments of tragedy's 'aischrologic' manifestation of the presence of Dionysus.

[124] Halliwell (1991); Csapo and Slater (1995) 165–85, with evidence.

[125] For the *gephyrismos* see Fluck (1931) 52–9. Test. 26 refers to a mocker 'covered up'

[126] Cf. Goldhill (1986) 213–16 on the unspeakable as a theme in *Oedipus Tyrannus*. Rutherford (1995*b*) 118 links dithyramb, and tragedy, with disorder and themes of transgression and disaster; the paean fits it ill: 'Paeans in tragedy rarely have their proper force, and they are almost never what they seem.' See also above, n. 24.

[127] Bierl (1991).

[128] Heikkilä (1991); Henrichs (1994–5) and (1996*a*), (1996*b*). Henrichs describes the ritual he means as consisting of dance, which threatens to make his argument circular, but his point is that the chorus' self-reference makes the audience see the chorus as a self-identified chorus rather than a group of participants in the fiction.

6

Choral Forms in Aristophanic Comedy: Musical Mimesis and Dramatic Performance in Classical Athens

Claude Calame

The wholly mimetic mode of tragedy and comedy seems to preclude any direct invocation of the Muse by the poet, the composer and director of the dramatic action which was staged in the theatre. But that does not mean that the Muse, the inspirer of song, was absent from the Attic stage. In the comedies of Aristophanes she appears, for example, in the *Frogs* in the *agôn* between Euripides and Aeschylus, over which Dionysus himself presides as judge.[1] It is, of course, not by chance that the tragic Muse is summoned to the stage at the moment when the contest moves from the spoken verses of the prologues to the songs (μελή, 1297, 1307) of the choral parts. In the parody of his adversary's choral songs Aeschylus summons the Muse of Euripides, whose presence (δεῦρο, 1306) he invokes in the most time-honoured manner; for the new-fangled songs, inspired by a Muse whom Dionysus does not hesitate to compare to a lewd woman from Lesbos, the lascivious movements of a castanet-player will prove more suitable than the traditional accompaniment of the lyre. Thus the contest between the two tragic poets turns more on the lyrics, both choral and 'monodic', than on the spoken parts. Any mention of the Muses' art in archaic

Note: I am conscious of the tendency to self-reference in the notes to this study. Apart from the work already done on tragedy in the same domain of the functions assumed by the choral voices, self-reference avoids the quoting of the numerous studies used for that research. I would like to thank Anton Bierl for his useful remarks through a dense epistolary and electronic exchange, and Penelope Murray for a translation which in many cases eased the technical harshness of the French text!

[1] Ar. *Frogs* 1296–1308, cf. 1242–68; on these verses see Dover (1993) 350–7, who points out the double pun contained in the word ἐλεσβέαζεν used of the Muse: it can refer both to the legendary founders of melic poetry and to fellatio, allegedly a speciality of Lesbian girls. Dover also provides a metrical analysis of the Euripidean choral lyrics performed by Aeschylus.

and classical Greece refers primarily to poetical forms which are sung and danced to an instrumental accompaniment.

The contest is therefore well suited to an enquiry into the religious significance of the dramatic representations at the Great Dionysia and of the ritual performances which, by this mimetic intermediary, are transposed onto the stage, particularly in the choral parts of tragedy and comedy. Divinely inspired by the Muse, as is epic poetry, the melic choral compositions from which the songs of tragic and comic choruses derive present themselves from the enunciative point of view as song acts. Not only in its pragmatic, but often in its performative dimension, and in so far as it often forms part of a ritual celebration, the melic choral poem must be considered as a true cult act.

That is to say that in tragedy, as in comedy or satyr drama, the generally choral melic forms brought to the theatre-sanctuary of Dionysus by the dramatization of a heroic or parodic action assume, from the religious point of view, a triple role:

(*a*) they transpose into the orchestra of the *theatron*, by means of an entirely mimetic demonstration, the relation of the poet and the performers with the inspiring Muse, thus taking up and transforming the traditional forms of melic poetry;
(*b*) they mimic the ritual and cultic addresses to the gods which the dramatic action on stage requires;
(*c*) they contribute indirectly, and particularly through the masks which the *choreutai* wear, to the celebration of Dionysus, the god celebrated on the occasion of the dramatic festivals.

The question of the role played by the melic choral parts and by musical mimesis in the dramatic representations placed under the sign of Dionysus thus seems relevant to an enquiry into the ritual relations of the Athenian public with the gods and heroes of the pantheon. This question will be approached here from the point of view of the musical authority of the choral voice, using a perspective which is both enunciative and anthropological.

I ENUNCIATIVE MODALITIES OF THE CHORAL VOICE ON THE ATTIC STAGE

But what does this have to do with the conception of Aristophanes' comedies? What is the role of song in a genre which, according to

Aristotle, goes back to iambic poetry *par excellence*? More precisely, what profile and functions do the songs of the chorus have in comic dramas devoted to spoken dialogue? The choral parts of Aristophanes' comedies have been exhaustively studied from a formal and metrical point of view in two recent works, one of which focuses essentially on the entrances of the chorus and their exchanges with one of the actors (*parodoi* and *amoibaia*); the other is devoted to the metrical forms assumed by Aristophanes' choral songs. Moreover, the central part of ancient comedy, the *parabasis*, has been the object of a considerable number of studies concerned with this choral part where the voice of the poet himself can be discerned, and the poet can indirectly put himself on stage. By contrast, probably because they are often rather sketchy, the *exodoi*, the final songs of the chorus, have attracted markedly less attention.[2]

Although the sung parts of Aristophanes' comedies have been studied extensively from a formal point of view, the question of the authority of the choral voice has scarcely been touched. This silence is all the more surprising when one considers the number of hypotheses elicited by the same question in relation to the choral parts of tragedy. August Wilhelm Schlegel himself was not content to conclude his own reflections on this matter with his famous characterization of the chorus as 'the idealized spectator'; the tragic chorus could also embody the poet's thoughts as the 'mouth-piece of all humanity'.[3] Curiously enough, the ambivalent conclusion that can be drawn from Schlegel's brief reflections coincides, so far as the choral voice of classical Athenian tragedy is concerned, with that suggested by the new examination of the question proposed here; as already mentioned, a linguistic approach will be combined with an anthropological perspective, sensitive to practical effects, and consequently to the pragmatic dimension of the Greek poetic texts in performance.

On the one hand, from the point of view of its semantic and pragmatic aspects, the choral voice of tragedy is composite, or at least complex, taking on a role that is ritual, interpretative, or emotional, depending on the circumstances: ritual, in so far as it

[2] 'The recent metrical study of all the sung parts of Aristophanes' comedies is that of Parker (1997); for the *parodoi* and *amoibaia* see Zimmermann (1985–7) vol. 1; for the *parabasis* see e.g. Sifakis (1971).
[3] Schlegel (1846) 76–7.

is often in relation to the cult act represented by their song that the chorus takes part in the action performed by the masked actors on stage; interpretative, in that the chorus in tragedy gives additional information, and comments, through narrative or description, on the action played out before the spectators' eyes; emotional, in that the *choreutai*, especially the women, often express through their singing and dancing the emotions aroused by this same dramatic action. On the other hand the enunciative approach reveals the shifting between the enunciative positions constructed in and by the text, notably through the use of first and second person pronouns, and the different biographical personages who can in turn assume these 'actantial' positions: the author, with his biographical and psycho-social identity, of course, but also the men or women who perform the song, as well as the audience or spectators in their communal and individual identities. In particular a study of the judgements which the chorus make on the tragic action, in the modalities of its utterances and its interactions with the κορυφαῖος, shows that the author as well as the public can occupy the position of the choral 'I' when it is expressed, for instance in relation to the gods; and the same is shown by the analysis of the effects of the performative self-referentiality of the choral songs in their most ritual aspects. That is to say that by different means, such as the twists given to the songs of the chorus or the generic forms that these choral songs can assume (prayer, hymn, paean, etc.), the place of the speaker performing the utterances of the choral song can be taken, in a move from the intra- to the extra-discursive, by the two partners of the traditional scheme of communication: the sender and the recipient, the enunciator and the enunciatee.[4]

The identity and authority of the choral voice is thus shared; it is shared between the different instances which can occupy the position of the 'I', alternating with that of the 'you': on the one hand, the biographical author and his actual public, but also the *choreutai* in their civic identity (the performers); on the other hand, the virtual author constructed in the text (often in the explicit position of speaker) and his ideal or implicit receiver (particularly in the explicit position of addressee), but also the *choreutai* as actors more

[4] Calame (1994/5) 146–9 and (1999*a*), with extensive bibliography on the question of the identity of the choral voice in Attic tragedy; Gould (1996), with Goldhill's response (1996) and Mastronarde (1998).

or less involved in the fictional action of the drama put on stage by the poet. In the Attic theatre the distance between the real, historical, extra-discursive figures, who are the protagonists in the cult of Dionysus Eleuthereus in his sanctuary of the theatre and the virtual or ideal figures, sometimes just implied and constructed intra-discursively, in and by the text, is marked in particular by the wearing of costume and mask. And it is even more marked in the case of Old Comedy, where the actors were equipped not only with grimacing mask with prominent brow and exaggerated features, but also with pot-belly, false buttocks, and a long stocking representing super-sized genitals.[5] Apart form their extra-discursive and historical identity, the actors and the *choreutai* of Attic comedy are involved in the action played on the stage as well as in the ritual performed for Dionysus in his sanctuary which is also the theatre.

Taking the example of *exodoi* which have a particularly developed choral form, I should like to investigate the authority of the choral voice whilst taking into account the pragmatic and performative effects obtained, especially in relation to the gods, by the use of traditional melic choral forms, with their corresponding metric rhythms. When one considers that most of the melic poems that have come down to us present themselves, in their enunciative forms, as speech acts, and then, in view of their performative context, as cult acts, attention will focus especially on the relation between the intra- and extra-discursive, on the relations between the enunciative figures constructed in the text and their possible correspondents in the social reality of the worship of Dionysus.

The very brief song of the chorus, in anapaests, which closes the ritual enacted on stage by the women celebrating the Thesmophoria in the comedy of that name, maintains on its own all the enunciative ambivalence which the complex relations between the world of the text and its corresponding 'reality' show. In asking the two thesmophoric goddesses, Demeter and Persephone, to 'grant us their grateful favour in return for our dances', the women of the chorus, having just celebrated the fictional

[5] Calame (1989), with the necessary references to the evidence at our disposal on this subject; see also Foley (2000) 287–301. The double ritual identity of the actors and of the choral group in comedy is pointed out by Bierl (2001) 11–22. For the participation of the comic chorus in the action played on the stage, see Zimmermann (1998).

Thesmophoria, seek the gifts of the two divinities both for themselves, and for the public who are in the process of participating in the Great Dionysia; this in playful echo of an earlier choral song in which the chorus presents its own musical performance as an offering to various gods, including Apollo, who is deemed to grant victory (972).

In the *exodos* of *Thesmophoriazusai*, the choral offering to the two goddesses who bestow the gifts of agricultural plenty seems to be formulated on behalf of the public who are also going to return home (οἴκαδ', 1229) after having their fun (πέπαισται, 1227).[6] But this movement of the '*dedi ut des*' where the choral song and the Muse who presides over it are presented as offerings to the divinity recalls the functional dynamism found in particular in the concluding verses of the *Homeric Hymns*. In this form of epic or rhapsodic hymn it is the speaker, the author-singer of the poetic composition, who asks for the favours of the divinity in return for the pleasure aroused by his song. In so far as the *exodos* of *Thesmophoriazusai* exploits the form of the coda of the hymn, the repeated use of the plural form 'us' (ἡμῖν, 1227, 1230) in these concluding verses could include the ideal and implied author (the speaker) amongst the number of *choreutai* and, by this discursive intermediary, Aristophanes himself. What is in question, therefore, is the authority of the choral voice in relation to the persons capable of assuming it, both on the stage and outside the action being performed there. The appropriation by the comic *mise-en-scène* of traditional forms of song in order to obtain particular enunciative and performative effects is the object of this study. After the brief example of *Thesmophoriazusai* above it will concentrate on the more developed choral *exodoi* (*Lysistrata*, *Peace*, *Birds*) before returning in conclusion to the shorter forms (*Ekklesiazusai*, *Wasps*, *Frogs*).

II *LYSISTRATA*: HYMNS AND CHORAL SONGS

Lysistrata is one of the three or four comedies of Aristophanes whose developed *exodos* distinguishes it from all those which, like

[6] Ar. *Thesm.* 1227–31, probably echoing 959–1000: on this suggestion see Bierl (1998) and (2001) 158–61, who is going to publish a work on the ritual functions of the chorus in Aristophanes. On the form of prayer which concludes the *Homeric Hymns* in the exchange mode, see Calame (1995*b*) 8–12.

Thesmophoriazusai, end with a brief choral intervention, sometimes consisting simply of spoken verses.[7] Performed after the defeat of the Sicilian expedition and the defection of numerous cities to Sparta, the *Lysistrata*, devoted to the reconciliation of Athens and Sparta by means of female impersonation, does not end with the brief choral song which generally characterizes the *exodos*. Nevertheless, its conclusion takes the form of a complex ensemble of songs and dances, which are partly choral, and which substitute for the brief κῶμος we expect; it is unnecessary therefore to assume a lacuna at the end of the text of the comedy to account for the absence of a choral procession led by one of the principal actors, since this musical form recalling the κῶμος is in fact transformed and considerably developed and inserted into the stage action.

Hymnic κῶμος and Spartan Song

The rich sung coda of *Lysistrata* is preceded by a συμπόσιον (1225), which takes place on the Acropolis under the aegis of Reconciliation, and which marks the promises of peace which are finally exchanged between the Spartans and the Athenians. The guests now come out in procession (1241, cf. 1224) from the party where, ironically, the Spartans prove to be as charming symposiasts as the Athenians are clever (1225–7). The Athenian ambassador, head of the city's delegation, behaves like Apollo enjoying the singing and dancing of the Ionians gathered together on Delos in his honour (ὡς ἡδομαί γ' ὑμᾶς ὁρῶν ὀρχουμένους, 1246) in the first part of the *Homeric hymn* dedicated to him.[8] Indeed the performer of the ceremony, inviting a pipe-player to accompany him, announces his intention of dancing a *dipodia* and singing a 'fine song' (καλὸν ... ἆεισμα, 1244) for the Athenians and Spartans: a 'monody' usually associated with the rhythms of the trochaic dimeter, but which the Athenian ambassador perceives as

[7] Zimmermann (1985–7) 2.75–81. *Lysistrata* and *Knights* are generally treated together as the two comedies of Aristophanes which lack a proper *exodos*, and distinguished from *Acharnians*, *Clouds*, *Thesmophoriazusai*, *Frogs*, *Ekklesiazusai* and *Ploutos*, all of which conclude with a very brief choral part. Contrast the *exodoi* of *Peace* and *Birds*, and also that of *Wasps*. For a comparison with the *exodoi* of tragedy, see the important remarks by Taplin (1996) 196–9.

[8] *Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 151–5. The staging and the role of the ambassador are well discussed by Henderson (1987) 208–10.

a choral dance (ὑμᾶς ... ὀρχουμένους in the plural, 1246); a 'monody' which is self-referential, and introduced by forms of the performative future (διποδιάξω, ἀείσω, 1243), which are precisely those by which a chorus usually describes its actual sung performance in archaic and classical melic poetry;[9] a 'monody' which once again shows that for melic poetry the classificatory distinction which people have sought to introduce between monody and choral singing is not only late, but also irrelevant.[10]

The song of the Spartan ambassador, a guest at the συμπόσιον which has just taken place, is divided, not into two, but into three parts, in the manner of a Homeric or rhapsodic hymn. The first part of the song, therefore, takes the form of the *evocatio*: a direct address to the incarnation of Memory, mother of the Muses; this form of invocation probably involves a play on words on a figure who, instead of being called Μνημοσύνη as in Hesiod's *Theogony*, is addressed as Μναμόνα (1248), the feminine form of μνάμων; such a name is given to the man who perhaps presided over the συμπόσιον amongst the Dorians of Sicily. Alternatively there may be a parodic allusion to the μνήμονες Erinyes of Aeschylus.[11] Expected in the grammatical position of the 'I' in the dative on the model of 'Tell *me*, Muse, of the man ...', the speaker appears in the third person, in a technical local qualification which describes him as 'a young lad' (κυρσανίῳ, 1248) from Sparta and which forms a kind of *sphragis*; this kind of self-deprecation in an address to the Muse recalls the stance that Hesiod, 'the rustic shepherd', adopts in relation to divine inspiration in the *Theogony*.[12]

[9] See Henrichs (1994/5) 80 and 87, and the references in Calame (1999*a*) 130, with note 9.

[10] As is well shown by Davies (1998*a*).

[11] According to the somewhat ambiguous testimony given by Plut. *Mor.* 612c; but one could also refer, for the use of the term μνήμων, to Aesch. *Eum.* 382 and *Prom.* 516 (see also Soph. *Aj.* 1390); Simondon (1982) 223–32. For the role of Μνημοσύνη see Hesiod *Theog.* 53–4 and 915–17, with Simondon's commentary (1982) 103–27. One part of the manuscript tradition of the text of Aristophanes indeed gives the reading Μναμοσύνα. For the structure of the *Homeric Hymns* see the references in Calame (1995*b*).

[12] The local sense (perhaps obscene) of κυρσάνιος is explained in the glosses cited and commented on by Henderson (1987) 186; cf. Hes. *Theog.* 23 and 26, with West's commentary (1966) 158–61. The mention of the youth of the singer should not be interpreted in relation to his appeal to Memory, as a reference to his difficulty in remembering events in which he would not have been able to participate, as many commentators have supposed: see e.g. Sommerstein (1990) 220.

The mention of the Muse is followed by a 'hymnal relative' which introduces in a poetic hymn the second part of the praise to a god, identified by scholars as *narratio/descriptio* or *pars epica*; this hymnic procedure is split into two by Aristophanes' Spartan player and singer. This splitting allows the singer-poet of Sparta to associate the Athenians and the Spartans through the plural and collective form 'we', whilst at the same time making the narrative of which both are the protagonists dependent on the knowledge (οἶδεν, 1250) of the Muse. Narrative action whose 'actants' are the 'we' of the Spartans and the 'they' of the Athenians, in past time marked grammatically by forms of the imperfect and of the aorist: heroic times in which the naval engagement at Artemisium is placed alongside the resistance of Leonidas' soldiers at Thermopylae (μὲν ... δ', 1251–6) in the struggle against the Persians.[13] From a semio-narrative perspective one could speak, therefore, of a partial 'enuncive shifting' which makes the actors of the enunciation, in the *hic et nunc* of the sung performance, the protagonists of the narrative action situated in the epic time of heroes. Henceforth, even if the goddess was not named in the part of the *evocatio*, as is usually the case in a *Homeric Hymn*, the Spartan has only to address, in the third part of his song, the goddess evoked by the name of Cape Artemisium and regularly honoured by the Spartans before going into battle. In this part of the *preces*, which is here unusually developed in comparison with the usual structure of a hymn, Artemis Agrotera is called on to intervene here and now (δεῦρο, 1262; νῦν, 1265) to consecrate the oath of friendship taken by a 'we' (ἁμέ, 1265) which henceforth includes both Spartans and Athenians. This friendship will bring to both sides the prosperity often sought from a divinity who is celebrated in hymnic form. The song thus concludes, like a cultic hymn, with an urgent appeal for the epiphany of Artemis the huntress.[14]

A hymn, then, modelled firstly on the poetic type of the *Homeric hymn*, then on that of a cult hymn, but sung and danced on the comic stage. This displacement involves, for example, the parody of an invocation to the Muse in the *evocatio*, the heroic reference to recent events of the second Persian war in the *pars epica*, and the

[13] The epic resonances of the similes used in this narrative passage are elucidated by Henderson (1987) 212.

[14] The features of the 'cult hymn' as opposed to the Homeric-type hymn are discussed by Miller (1986) 1–9.

removal of Artemis Agrotera from the battlefield to the terrain of reconciliation in the *preces*. Besides, the choral character of this 'monody' is reinforced by the use of a rhythm which, like the Spartan dialect forms, evokes the trochaic and dactylic melic rhythms which characterize the poems of Alcman.[15] Thus, in the Athenian ambassador's concluding song, echoing that of his Spartan counterpart, the address is directed at the Spartans in general, encompassed in a 'you' (ὑμεῖς, 1275) which makes the guests leaving the συμπόσιον the potential performers of a κῶμος in the form of a hymnic song. Traditionally a hymn could be performed in the choral form of a citharodic hymn, that is, a 'monodic' song accompanied by the lyre and a dancing chorus.[16] On the comic stage the representative of the Athenians is transformed into bard and χορηγός at the same time.

An Ambivalent Victory Song

In fact, the apparently choral song of the Athenians corresponds to the hymnic song danced by the Spartan. Acting once more as master of ceremonies, the Athenian ambassador encourages the guests to celebrate the gods with new dances in which he himself participates. This, at any rate, seems the right way to interpret the forms of the 'we' which are used both in this introduction in iambic trimeters (ὀρχησάμενοι θεοῖσιν εὐλαβώμεθα, 1277) and in the song itself, which mixes trochaic and dactylic sequences, as in the ode sung by the Spartan (χρησόμεθ', 1288).[17] This song, whose refrain oscillates between the form of a paean (1291) and

[15] These rhythms are analysed by Henderson (1987) 210–11 and by Parker (1997) 384–9 (cf. also Zimmermann (1985–7) 3.66–7), to be compared with the metrical analyses of the poems of Alcman which I proposed (1983) 219–24 (on the question of Laconian dialect forms see *ibid.* xxiv–xxx).

[16] The relation between the symposiac κῶμος and the *exodoi* of comedy (in relationship with the etymology of the word) is summarized by Pappas (1987). On the choral form of *kitharodia* see the references in Calame (1997) 49–50 and 80–2.

[17] Readers of this song generally regard it as a monody which they attribute either to Lysistrata herself (cf. Sommerstein (1990) 148–51 and 221–2, who is mistaken in referring the 'you' of 1275 to the Spartans and Athenians), or to the Athenian ambassador alone (Henderson (1987) 213; Zimmermann (1985–7) 2.45–7 and 3.67); therefore only verses 1291–4 of the refrain would correspond to a choral song; but, as in melic poetry, the alternation between 'I' and 'we' forms seem to suggest choral performance: on this controversial question see the references in Calame (1999*a*) 131–2 and Nagy (1994/5*b*). For metrical analysis see Henderson (1987) 215–16 and Parker (1997) 388–93.

that of a song addressed to Dionysus (1294) is in fact presented straightaway as that of a choral group, as is suggested by: the forms of the imperative (πρόσαγε χορόν, ἕπαγε Χάριτας, ἐπὶ δὲ κάλεσον Ἄρτεμιν, 1279–80) which are substituted for the performative future forms expected at the beginning of a choral song, but which take on the same function of performative self-reference; the initial appeal to the Χάριτες, goddesses who are regularly associated with choral dance;[18] the address to Apollo, healer and twin of Artemis, as well as χορηγός (ἀγέχορον, 1281). This latter is also the function assumed by the Athenian ambassador and master of ceremonies.

The naming of the gods and their successive evocation in this choral song places it in the tradition of those choral prayers which call for the presence and general protection of the gods, without a precise object; these gods are asked here simply to safe-guard the state of peace and reconciliation brought about at the end of the play by the intervention of Aphrodite. It is to the goddess of desire and her attendant, Eros, that Lysistrata attributes the power of inspiring such erections in the men that only the women will appear capable of turning the Greeks away from the battlefield (551–4; cf. 1114–21).[19] Also named are Artemis, invoked in the song of the Spartan ambassador and associated with her brother Apollo, Dionysus with his Maenads, Zeus and his blessed consort, Hera, the gods in general (δαίμονας, 1287); but the appeal culminates in the invocation to the goddess of Cyprus.[20] The comic deformation of a traditional choral form addressed to the gods who make up the 'pantheon' of the city is twofold here: whereas at the beginning of Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* the long invocation which the chorus addresses to the divinities of the *polis* amidst the dangers that threaten it ends with an address to the gods in general (ἰὼ φίλοι δαίμονες, 174), here the return to Cypris brings us back to the plot of the *Lysistrata*, and at the same time, by appealing to the goddess of love, reminds us of the numerous

[18] *Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 194 and 27, 15; Ar. *Thesm.* 120–2 and fr. 348 K.–A.

[19] References necessary for such an interpretation of this choral song are given in the excellent commentary of Henderson (1987) 215–18. Following the terminology used by Menander Rhetor 3.333–5 Spengel, these general addresses to the gods are often called 'cletic hymns'.

[20] The question of the address to several gods has been treated most recently by Pulleyn (1997) 108–11.

sexual allusions which marked its unfolding.[21] Deformation again in the refrain which, through the cries of joy provoked by the movements of the choral dance (αἴρεσθ' ἄνω, ἰαί, 1292), transforms the paean (ἰὴ παιών, 1291) into a song addressed to Dionysus (εὐοῖ εὐοῖ, εὐαί εὐαί, 1294). In tragedy, by contrast, if ritual cries addressed to the god of wine and the theatre can sometimes appear in a choral song which is also addressed to Apollo, they are generally inserted into a fixed choral form, whether it is the prophetic wedding song sung by Cassandra in Euripides' *Trojan Women*, or the paean itself which Sophocles' *Women of Trachis* perform when they hear the news of Heracles' return.[22]

One can better understand, therefore, the meaning of the mimetic appeal to victory in *Lysistrata* (ὡς ἐπὶ νίκῃ, ἰαί, 1293) which immediately follows the performative call to choral dance and which closes the melic song placed between the ritual evocation of the god of the paean and of the god of the *evoe*: particularly in view of its Dionysiac colouring, this song can refer both to the victory of the women involved in the plot enacted on stage and to the victory of the comedy itself in the competition at the Great Dionysia.[23] Everything happens from now on as if the chorus of Athenians at the end of the comedy has abandoned its stage identity to take up the perspective of the author and the spectators celebrating Dionysus Eleuthereus in his sanctuary of the theatre. In this movement from the intra- to the extra-discursive, from the actor involved in the plot and the possible virtual spectator, the choral group directed by its κορυφαῖος-χορηγός becomes a virtual author; it presents a position and a textual and stage figure which can be as easily assumed by the biographical author of the comedy as by its empirical public! So there will be no surprise in saying

[21] Aesch. *Septem* 77–180; cf. Calame (1994/5) 138–41.

[22] Eur. *Tr.* 308–40; Soph. *Trach.* 205–24 (cf. Henrichs (1994/5) 79–84); à propos the double cry of the refrain addressed to both Bacchus and Paean in Philodemus' *Paean to Dionysus* (= *Paean* 39 Käppel), see Käppel's study (1992) 222–37 and 66–7 of the forms of the *epiphthegma* in the paean. The treatment of the choral form of the paean in tragedy is studied by Rutherford (1994/5).

[23] This allusion to the victory anticipated by Aristophanes has been pointed out both by Henderson (1987) 213 and 218, and by Sommerstein (1990) 223, who finds parallel expectations of victory in the comic competition at *Ach.* 1224–34 (for this interpretation see Wilson (forthcoming *b*) 14–15, and below, n. 49), *Eccles.* 1182 (see below, section v), *Thesm.* 1229–31 and *Birds* 1764.

that this movement from the fictional action dramatized on stage to the cultic circumstances of its enunciation operates precisely in a song of ritual type, performed by a group of Athenian *choreutai* directed by a protagonist who, having been master of ceremonies, becomes its χορηγός.

The Staging of Spartan Choral Skill

Introduced once again by a brief intervention from the Athenian ambassador, who from the point of view of the Athenian spectators guides the overall development of the plot right up to the end, the second and final song of the Spartan 'lad' echoes both the choral hymnic song of the Athenians and that which the young man himself has just addressed to Artemis Agrotera.

In the first place it echoes the song of the young Spartan himself in as much as the Athenian presents it explicitly as 'a new song to follow a new song' (μοῦσαν ἐπὶ νέᾳ νέαν, 1295). Following the opening formula of many melic poems, the repetition (αὖτ', 1296) is incorporated by the Spartan into his address to a 'Laconian Muse' whose creation is once again marked by the dialect forms of traditional Spartan melic poetry and by dancing rhythms familiar from the compositions of Alcman.[24] In the resumption of the formula of *evocatio* which opens many hymns of the Homeric or rhapsodic type, it is the Muse, mistress of the musical song which bears her name, who is entrusted with the task of glorifying Apollo, presented here in his most famous Spartan incarnation. The speaker is henceforth placed in the enunciative position of 'addressee' through the first person plural pronoun (ἁμίν, 1297) which makes one think of a choral performance.

A response also to the Athenian choral song, not only through its form and content which reveal themselves to be largely choral, but also because it responds to the Athenians' song of praise to Apollo, which itself picks up on the Spartan hymn of praise to Artemis. But whereas the choral group of Athenians used a quasi-panhellenic polytheistic configuration before focusing, by

[24] See the metrical interpretations proposed by Zimmermann (1985–7) 2.47–9 and 3.68 and by Henderson (1987) 218–9; see also Perusino (1968) 57–60, and above all (1998). For the dialect forms in relation to the Spartan poetic tradition, see Colvin (1999) 260–3; Willi (2001) 139–41. Whilst in general I follow the arguments developed by Henderson (1987) 213–14, I accept the order of the hymnic songs as they are transmitted in the manuscripts.

the very form of its appeal, on the god of the Attic stage, the Spartan group invokes divinities which animate their local pantheon: Apollo of Amyclae, of course, Athena Chalcioicos, the Dioscuri, Dionysus, albeit indirectly, and finally Helen. There is no need to discuss here the cult devoted to each of these divinities, except to recall that all of them almost certainly involved ritual choral dancing.[25]

But the most striking musical feature of this final song lies in the subtle development of performative self-reference. With the evocation of the Dioscuri sporting (ψιάδδοντι, 1301) beside the Eurotas, the part of the *descriptio-narratio* introduced by the intermediary of the Muse in the *evocatio* is brusquely interrupted by a call to dance, and then to sing; such a call is probably addressed to the group which is actually in the process of singing these verses: the second person of the vocative ἔμβη (1302) is followed by the first person plural of the verbal form, 'let us sing' (ὑμνίωμες, 1304).[26] The merging of the present dance with the dances of the Spartan divinities is underlined as much by the use of the present tense for the latter as by the following allusion to the city's love of divine choruses (or of the gods: σιῶν χοροὶ, 1305) in general. This theme of the love of music is used next in the famous evocation of the chorus of young girls prancing by the Eurotas and tossing their hair in their Maenad dances, under the leadership of Leda's daughter, their 'beautiful and respected χορηγός': a legendary scene itself made present. The evocation in the present of a Helen who receives the same epithet as Sappho receives from Alcaeus recalls the enunciative move of the first Laconian song; it made the performers of the present song the protagonists of the heroic actions of the past which they themselves were reciting.[27] This evocation of legend involves, in effect, a double *mimēsis*: the Laconian ambassador playing the part of the inspired poet and accompanied by his group of dancing symposiasts seems from now on to be identified with a chorus of young Lacedaemonian girls and their χορηγός; the κῶμος becomes a *partheneion*! All this suggests that, if it were not already the case in the song

[25] As can be expected, I refer the reader to the part of my doctoral research devoted to the cults of Sparta, (1997) 91–113.

[26] On the *epiphthegma parakeleustikon* represented by the form ἔμβη at 1302, cf. Henderson (1987) 221.

[27] Alcaeus fr. 384 Voigt; cf. Gentili (1995) 285–93.

directed by the Athenian, the women and the chorus that they form in the course of the comedy are now associated with the choral song: when the master of ceremonies invites 'husband to stand beside wife and wife beside husband' (1275), following the suggestion made by Lysistrata herself (1186–7), has he not already included the ensemble of actors and actresses in the plot in the 'we' of the dances performed in honour of the gods (ὀρχησάμενοι θεοῖσιν εὐλαβώμεθα, 1277)?

In these circumstances, the three iambic catalectic tetrameters which, for us at least, bring both the plot and the comedy to an end, can speak for themselves. The initial invitation to dance (feminine! ἀλλ' ἄγε, 1316–17) as well as the call to hymn (ὕμνε, 1320–1) Athena Chalcioicos (just as at the beginning of the choral song itself, at 1300) can be substituted for the brief choral exit-song that we expect and that may have been improvised.[28] For us, then, the comedy ends with an invitation to sing and dance a choral hymn in honour of Athena of the Bronze House: the tutelary goddess of Sparta, undoubtedly; but also the guardian of Athens. The corruption in a later manuscript, which reads the Athenian epithet πρόμαχον in place of the παμμάχον (1320–1) of the text is significant in this respect.[29]

Through the effect of a probable ring composition, the Spartan singer who, at the beginning of his intervention, was nothing but a young man in the presence of Memory and her daughter the Muse (1248) is now identified with the beautiful divine daughter of Leda in her role as χορηγός (1314–15). The monodic two-step (*dipodia*: ἐγὼν διποδιάξω, 1243) which serves as the κῶμος for the Athenian and Spartan guests coming out of the Reconciliation banquet (1225–7) is transformed into a choral song probably danced by men and women (1275–9). From the Spartan perspective, the 'new Muse' demanded by the Athenian (1295) reveals herself in the performance of the most traditional Spartan song possible. But, in the final choral summons to celebrate Athena with hymns and dancing, the Spartan Muse and her stage interpreters

[28] The question is discussed by Henderson (1987) 214, and Sommerstein (1990) 224; for comparison with the ending of other comedies see Zimmermann (1985–7) 2.80–1; cf. above, section 1.

[29] Athena Chalcioicos and Athena Pallas (with Athena Promachos) reign over the Acropolis of Sparta and Athens respectively; cf. Henderson (1987) 220 and 222, and Zimmermann (1985–7) 2.49.

undoubtedly succeed in involving the spectators themselves in the choral exit-song. In any case this is the sense in which we should understand the final performative form in *Lysistrata*'s *exodos*, 'let us go' ἀλλ' ἄγε (1316–17), which establishes a relation between the virtual spectator/ideal 'author' represented by the choral voice and the empirical audience of the comedy.

III *THE PEACE*: AN *EXODOS* AS WEDDING-SONG

In contrast with the *Lysistrata*, the *Peace*, like the *Birds*, presents at its end a developed choral part which concludes with several melic verses in an exit-song proper.

Adaptations of a Traditional Melic Form

Performed at the Great Dionysia of 421, on the eve of the signing of the actual (temporary) peace of Nicias, the comedy of that name transforms its *exodos* into a very lively wedding song. This traditional choral form, also adapted and put on stage in several contemporary tragedies, is marked by a refrain which, like the *epiphthegma* of the paean, corresponds to an appeal to the heroic figure who is the protagonist in the foundation legend of the institution of marriage. Fragments of the *hymenaei* of Sappho show that the wedding song, sometimes designated by the more restricted term *epithalamium*, could take an amoebean form: matching exchanges sung by young girls and young men, who performed a danced poetic composition which took different forms to consecrate ritually the salient moments of the marriage ceremony.[30] In these circumstances and in the absence of thorough documentation any attempt at division and exact and systematic distribution of the rhythmic periods of Aristophanes' song between his protagonists seems doomed to failure. The probable lacunae in the text add to the confusion concerning the organization of a song where only some of the responses are definitely sung by Trygaeus, the principal protagonist of the comedy, and bridegroom from now on; other responses are made by the κορυφαῖος,

[30] See Sappho fr. 114 Voigt with the description in fr. 44. 31–4, and the paradeigmatic scene represented on the shield of Achilles in Homer, *Il.* 18.491–6. Other more precise linguistic parallels between the form of the *hymenaeus* and the wedding song staged by Aristophanes are given by Kugelmeier (1996) 154–8.

others still (including the refrain) by the whole chorus of Attic peasants who have helped to restore Peace and Opora, the young bride.[31]

Whatever the exact structure of the wedding song which concludes *Peace*, the traditional choral form of the wedding song is appropriated, through the effects of dramatic *mimesis*, not only for the benefit of the stage plot, but also in accordance with the poetic conventions of Dionysiac dramatic ritual. Like the Bacchic wedding song sung by the maenad-like Cassandra, gripped by the apprehension of her tragic destiny in *Trojan Women*, or like the dramatic wedding song transformed into a hymn to Aphrodite by the chorus of young girls who ironically announce the tragic end of the young Phaethon in the drama which bears his name, so the marriage song which, by a sort of metaphorical transposition, marks the return of harmony and plenty in *Peace* responds to the conventions of the dramatic genre in which it is embedded.[32] It is evidently to the phallic rule of ancient comedy that one must refer the sexual allusions contained, for example, in the *double-entendre* of the performative declaration of the chorus (or of the κορυφαῖος), 'we'll gather her vintage' (τρυγήσομεν, 1339–40; with an additional allusion to the name of Trygaeus, the 'young bride-groom'); this in reply to the tragic question, 'what must we do, to her?' (τί δράσομεν αὐτήν; 1337–8), itself transformed by the sexual innuendo. The same goes for the double allusion, both erotic and phallic, which is perhaps contained in the evocation of a return to the golden age which will henceforth be spent in gathering figs; the traditional and often hyperbolical eulogy of bride and groom thus celebrates the sweetness of a fig which is as metaphorical as the 'strength and size' of the groom (μέγα καὶ παχύ, 1351).[33]

[31] The historical context, the plot and the philosophical problems involved in establishing the text of the final choral song of the *Peace* are discussed by Platnauer (1964) ix–xvi and 173–4. I follow here the text restored by Parker (1997) 290–5, with the metrical analysis that she proposes; see also Zimmermann (1985–7) 1.185–8 and 3.44–5; Olson (1998) 315–16 and also the scholia on 1329 (p. 181 Holwerda).

[32] Eur. *Tro.* 308–40 and *Phaeth.* 227–44; see Olson (1998) 317.

[33] For reasons of rhythmical symmetry Parker (1997) 292–3 puts verses 1350–2 before verse 1345. The role of the golden age in the plots of Old Comedy has been analysed most recently by Ceccarelli (1992). For the pun on the fig see Henderson (1991) 118 and 135; see also Olson (1998) 318.

Performative Metaphors

For it is, of course, in the form of metaphor, of performative metaphor, that the danced song of the *hymenaeus* which constitutes the *exodos* of *Peace* is developed. As in *Lysistrata*, one of the principal protagonists of the action, in this case Trygaeus, takes on the role of master of ceremonies in order then to share with the κορυφαῖος the function of χορηγός of the choral group who sing the coda of the comedy. The four introductory tetrameters spoken by Trygaeus effect the transition between the general banquet to which, in the same performative and rhythmic mode, he himself and the κορυφαῖος invite the assembled peasants, together with the members of the chorus (see the play on ἡμῖν (1311) and ὑμῖν (1315) in the verses spoken by the κορυφαῖος or chorus members), and the wedding procession which seems to come out of the house and the banqueting hall and which then becomes a κῶμος.[34] For this symposiac procession rapidly turns itself into one of those wedding songs which accompany the νυμφαγωγία. Marked by the exit of the bride who is brought 'here' (τὴν νύμφην ἔξω . . . δεῦρο, 1316), illuminated by torch-light, accompanied by the rejoicing (συγχαίρειν, 1317) of all the people, then effectively danced on the stage, this wedding song is presented in a former age as a return to the fields with the abundance of blessings and fertility which the restoration of wealth and the disappearance of arms will confer on all the Greeks (τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, 1321); a return duly preceded by dances, by libations and by prayers to the gods; a return which is also a desire to return to the past (πάλιν at 1318, taken up again in the expression πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς at 1327).[35] These verses in anapaestic tetrameters and dimeters, spoken and then sung by Trygaeus, are followed by the prelude to the wedding song proper: so it is Opora herself who is invited to 'come here' (δεῦρο, 1329, cf. 1316) to return to the fields, but also to sleep with Trygaeus: obligatory in the comic genre!

The direct address to the bride Harvest in the form of a proem effects the passage from the return of the peasants to their fields

[34] Despite the invitation to 'enter' (εἰσίωμεν, 1302), Trygaeus and his chorus remain outside, watching the guests' children coming out (ἐξέρχεται, 1265) to urinate. For the complex metric structure of this passage, see Perusino (1968) 55–7.

[35] On the comic utopia as the 'return of youth' in the *Peace*, see the reflections of Auger (1979) 78–80.

(which sanctions the end of the plot of the action played on stage) to the νυμφαγωγία; accompanied by the matrimonial song, this ceremonial wedding procession expresses the metaphorical relationship between the return to agricultural plenty and the concept of marriage, but equally its dramatic enactment in the *exodos*.[36] Summoned by the first chant of the refrain, the *choreutai* can start singing the wedding song introduced by Trygaeus in the aeolian melic rhythm which will be that of the whole song.[37] According to the text adopted, the choral song begins with a *makarismos* extolling the happiness of Trygaeus (whom the *choreutai* address in the second person), who 'now' possesses the promised blessings (τἀγαθὰ νῦν ἔχεις, 1334);[38] or with the ambiguous performative questions already mentioned (τί δράσομεν . . . , in the performative future, 1337–40). In the choral exchange between Trygaeus and the *choreutai*, first and second person plural forms alternate before returning, through ribald allusions and interjections, to the theme of the abundance of wine and fruits.

It is then Trygaeus who has the honour of singing the last strophe of the song of the wedding procession. Addressed in the first place to the *choreutai*, the invitation to wine and dine recreates in the wedding song the atmosphere of the κῶμος, whilst the analogous invitation to the 'men' (ὦ . . . ἄνδρες, 1357), referring as much to the *choreutai* as to the public, takes up, by the order to follow Trygaeus (ξυνέπησθέ μοι, 1358), the idea itself of the *exodos*. The final call to enjoyment (χαίρετε, 1357), signifies, through its performative form, that Trygaeus' invitation to all the people to rejoice together (συγχαίρειν, 1317), in the tetrameters introducing the *exodos*, is realized in the dance. Through the Muse's art and the melic form of the wedding song the enjoyment is now that of all the spectators gathered together in the theatre of Dionysus, spectators who have been summoned to reach that state of conviviality with

[36] For the metaphorical significance of marriage see Calame (1996*c*) 130–45. If, as Bowie suggests (1993) 146–50, the *Peace* uses a series of ritual elements borrowed from the Anthesteria, one could speculate that the marriage of Trygaeus and Opora might be a parody of the ritual wedding of Dionysus and the Basilinna!

[37] A rhythm entirely composed of acephalous glyconics (telesilleans) and acephalous telesilleans (reiziana); see the excellent critical analysis of Parker (1997) 290–5 (cf. n. 31 above).

[38] A form of *makarismos* opens one of Sappho's *Epithalamia*: fr. 112 Voigt; see also Eur. *Tro.* 311 and *Phaeth.* 240–4; other references in Dunbar (1995) 754.

the gods which gastronomic pleasures and choral activity imply. In this movement from the intra- to the extra-discursive, the audience is invited to take pleasure in the present song, just as the gods are invited to be there at the end of a Homeric-type hymn, which can be presented to them as an offering.

IV THE *BIRDS*: THE WEDDING SONG AS HYMN

As in *Peace*, the melic form of the *hymenaeus* marks the choral development of the *exodos* of the *Birds*, a comedy staged at the Great Dionysia in the spring 414, when the Athenian army was heavily engaged in the expedition to Sicily.[39] Here it is the messenger who announces the triumphant return of the Athenian Peisetairos in the form of a *makarismos*; the latter carries the thunder-bolt, the symbol of Zeus' power, in his hand, and on his arm he holds his bride, whose name embodies this royal power. This 'beautiful sight' (καλὸν θέαμα, 1716) recalls the spectacle of the theatrical performance itself, but at the same time evokes the 'great wonder' (μέγα θαῦμα, 156) represented by the dances of the young Delian maidens, servants of Apollo in his sanctuary on Delos, in the choral scene of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* already referred to. Adorned with perfumes which make the bird-protagonists on stage the equal of the gods in their ethereal happiness, this spectacle cannot but culminate in choral rejoicing. Assuming the role of master of ceremonies, like the Athenian ambassador in the *Lysistrata* or Trygaeus in *Peace*, the messenger then introduces the voice of the Muse in terms reminiscent of the introductory verses spoken by Trygaeus himself (χρή, 1718, cf. *Peace* 1316 and 1318). As in *Peace*, the happy ending of the plot of the *Birds* will be celebrated with a song of good omen (εὔφημον, 1719, cf. *Peace* 1316), a song issuing from a sacred mouth, which corresponds to that of the Muse!

The Ritual and Metaphorical Praise of Bride and Groom

The chorus immediately obeys the messenger's command. In a double melic prelude they introduce the wedding-song which

[39] It seems pointless to try and find precise references in the *Birds* to contemporary political and military events: cf. Dunbar (1995) 1–6.

constitutes the first part of their intervention.[40] The first proem in its turn is composed of a series of commands. In self-referential mode, the last of these helps to effect the performative invitation to celebrate the marriage of the newly-wed couple on the level of ornithological parody: the dance to which the chorus of bird-*choreutai* invite themselves consists of a sort of flying around (περιπέτεσθε, 1721). But this address to themselves is preceded by a sequence of commands, in parataxis, to make way for the young couple; these addresses, formulated in the singular, seem to be directed not only at the *choreutai* who are going to surround the nuptial procession, but also at the spectators, whose attention is requested. Indeed, in the following verses, the formula of *makarismos*, which often opens the traditional type of wedding-song and is signalled in the choral song by the polyptoton μάκαρα μάκαρι (1721), is adapted for the benefit of 'this' city; the use of the deictic τῇδε (1725) can refer as much to the utopian city constructed by the birds on stage as to the city of the spectators. The divine happiness of the young Basileia in all her beauty becomes, through her marriage, that of the city.

But in this hyperbolical praise which opens the wedding-song in the traditional manner, the bridegroom is not forgotten. The short melic proem just discussed is followed by a second prelude, perhaps sung, in anapaestic rhythm, by the κορυφαῖος alone.[41] After having attributed to 'this' man the origins of all the blessings which the 'race of birds' will henceforth enjoy, the speaker, a second master of ceremonies, urges the *choreutai* to welcome Peisetairos and Basileia in a formula of injunction (δέχεσθ', 1729) reminiscent of the way in which a divinity is invited to appear in all his light.[42] Here the divine epiphany takes the ritual form of a νυμφαγωγία; as in *Peace*, the nuptial procession, accompanied by a wedding song, becomes in a way a kind of metaphor for the exit of the chorus. The form of the wedding procession assumed by the *exodos* is all

[40] Despite copyists' attempts to divide up the different events of this long choral intervention and distribute them between two semi-choruses, several enunciative indications show that the chorus of *Birds* sings here in unison; cf. Dunbar (1995) 750–1.

[41] According to the hypothesis formulated by Parker (1997) 350–7, who should be consulted for an analysis of the rhythms offered by the ensemble of this choral finale. In Zimmermann's view (1985–7) 1.189–90, the first two verses of the first prelude with their commands (1720–1) should be uttered by the κορυφαῖος alone.

[42] As suggested by Zimmermann (1985–7) 1.190–1.

the more important from the enunciative point of view adopted here since the torch-lit ritual procession leading the bride from her father's house to that of her husband wound its way through the streets of the city.

From Hymnic Wedding Song to Victory Song

Such is precisely the wedding song which the chorus begins to chant in the two strophes which follow immediately after this double proem; they are sung in an aeolian rhythm which recalls that of the *hymenaeus* at the end of the *Peace*.[43] The chorus here evokes the paradeigmatic νυμφαγωγία which unites Hera and Zeus, through the will of the Moirai, and aided by Eros; in comic fashion Eros combines the functions of a child with both parents living (ἀμφιθαλής, 1737) who is present at the wedding feast, of young friend of the groom (πάροχος, 1740) assisting the young bride, and of driver of the chariot carrying the happy bride. In addition to the attribute of Zeus which Peisetairos carries in his own epiphanic return to the stage (1714), the relation between the indeterminate time (ποτ', 1731) of the original and foundational scene of the marriage of Zeus and Hera (articulated in ring composition) and the time of the celebration on stage in the *hic et nunc* of the marriage of the Queen with the master of the birds is indicated by the invocation of the hero Hymenaeus in the traditional refrain (Ὑμὴν ὦ, Ὑμέναι' ὦ, 1736 a/b, then 1741–2); it is he who gave his name to τοιῶδ' ὑμεναίῳ (1735), which is both the song accompanying the wedding procession of Hera, and the one performed on stage to celebrate the marriage of Peisetairos and Basileia.[44]

Just as in the introduction to the long choral part at the end of the *Lysistrata* the Athenian ambassador, in his role of master of ceremonies, announced his intention of enjoying the choral dance

[43] Dunbar (1995) 756–7; the rhythm and structure of this wedding song are well analysed by Zimmermann (1985–7) 1. 191–2.

[44] 'This is how I understand the ambiguous expression ἐν τοιῶδ' ὑμεναίῳ, 'on the occasion of such a wedding song'; problems in the interpretation of this passage are discussed by Dunbar (1995) 758–9, who also points out the role played by the Moirai in marriage (cf. in particular Pind. fr. 30 Maehler). On the νυμφαγωγία, its protagonists and its iconography see Dunbar's commentary (1995) 759–61 and Calame (1996*c*) 130–1 and 138–9; for other parallels with *hymenaei*, see Kugelmeier (1996) 154–8.

he was organizing, so in *Birds* Peisetairos intervenes to say how much he is enjoying the wedding song, which he regards as a song of praise (ἐχάρην ὕμνους, ἐχάρην ᾠδαῖς, 1743). Since he is holding one of the attributes of Zeus' power he imagines that the *logoi* (1744) are addressed to him; these *logoi*, in a sense very close to that of *muthoi*, designate words of praise, as in Xenophanes or Pindar, which are intended as an offering to arouse the pleasure and gratitude of the gods.[45] Whether sung by Peisetairos himself or by the κορυφαῖος, the following intervention in anapaests succeeds in maintaining the same confusion as to the identity of the hero of the *Birds*: the *choreutai* are now invited to glorify (ἄγε νυν ... κλήσατε, 1744–5) the thunderbolt of Zeus which the Athenian master of the city of birds holds in his hand (1714). Peisetairos intends to be regarded as king of the gods.

There then follows, in dactylic 'lyric' rhythm, a hyperbolical hymn to the power of Zeus' lightning; a general hymn of praise, in the sense in which Plato uses the term;[46] a hymn which takes the place of the κῶμος which, as we have seen, often concludes a comedy. The reference to the man who holds this power now, at the present moment (ὅδε νῦν, 1751b), leads into a celebration of Peisetairos' victory; by addressing their hymn of praise to Zeus' attribute, the *choreutai* are careful not to treat this mortal as the equal of a god. But the mention of the Athenian's success could refer, in an extra-discursive manner, to the hoped-for result in the comic *agōn* itself. As for the presence beside the citizen-king of Basileia, tactfully referred to as the help-meet of Zeus, even if she is in fact that of the actor who takes himself for a god, she inspires the resumption of the concluding refrain of the *hymenaeus*. But the wedding song in the meantime has become a song of praise!

In a final intervention and in a movement which recalls not only the finale of *Peace*, but also that of *Acharnians* (ἕπεσθέ νυν ᾄδοντες, 1231) and *Ploutos* (δεῖ ... ᾄδοντας ἕπεσθαι, 1208–9), it remains now for Peisetairos to invite all the tribes of birds to follow

[45] Xenophanes fr. 1.14 Gentili-Prato; Pind. *Pyth.* 1.68 etc. For χαίρειν of divine enjoyment of listening to song cf. Calame (1995*b*) 10–12. The question of the division of this anapaestic intervention between Peisetairos and the κορυφαῖος is fully discussed by Zimmermann (1985–7) 1. 192–4.

[46] On the meaning of ὕμνος in Plato see *Rep.* 677a and *Laws* 801c-e (contrast *Laws* 700a–b); cf. Calame (1995*b*) 3–4. Questions concerning the establishment of the text of this hymnic song are discussed in detail by Dunbar (1995) 762–5, who also points out the epic and melic elements in the language.

(ἕπεσθέ νυν, 1755) the newly-wed couple to the 'precinct' of Zeus. By the subtle play on a simple conjunction and in a probable allusion to the garden belonging to the king of the gods, this 'ground' turns out to coincide with the marriage bed of the newly-wed couple in the comedy.[47] It is towards the marriage bed that the procession of the νυμφαγωγία now turns, transformed henceforth into the procession of the *exodos*. Through his injunction to follow the couple, of which he himself is one of the actors, Peisetairos in effect combines the function of master of ceremonies with that of κορυφαῖος, sharing his identity between that of stage actor and of leader of the choral accompaniment to the dramatic action. It is then the task of the Athenian himself, king of the birds, to engage his bride, the blessed one (ὦ μάκαιρα, 1759) in a communal aerial dance (συγχόρευσον, 1760–1). The strong presence of the 'I' of the speaker in these verses, in iambic dimeters alternating with lecythia, serves to confirm the power of the new master of the utopian city of birds; but the close juxtaposition of the forms of 'I' and 'you' also reinforces his close union with Basileia. This union refers to the final reconciliation, as in *Peace* and *Lysistrata*, but in a utopian city which, through the abuses of power of a Peisetairos armed with Zeus' thunderbolt, recalls only too much the imperialist Athens of the spectators . . .[48]

So there is no surprise to see that in the *exodos* proper the wedding song turned hymn is transformed in turn into a very brief paean. In this concluding song the chorus of triumphant birds heaps up choral references to victory: a cry of triumph, the refrain of the paean which is sung in particular to celebrate military success, imitating through onomatopoeia the sound of the pipe which can accompany the paean, a refrain which alludes to the beauty of victory itself, and recalls the *exodos* of

[47] In spite of the reservations concerning this interpretation expressed by Dunbar (1995) 766–8, it is likely that, in the context of the identification between the Athenian and Zeus, the reference to the 'ground' of Zeus implies an allusion to the meadow which was the scene of the paradeigmatic union of the king of the gods with Hera: cf. Hom. *Il.* 14.46–51, with the references in Calame (1996*c*) 58–60 and 173–80.

[48] In *Birds* the utopian city constructed on stage suggests, in its impossibility, an ironic critique not only of the utopia itself, but also of 'real' Athens: cf. Auger (1979) 81–9; Bowie (1993) 174–7; Slater (1997) 89–94.

Acharnians.[49] The final address to Peisetairos, addressed as 'highest of the gods', in a description which is not applied exclusively to the Olympian gods, leaves open the final destination of the marriage procession turned into victory song: Olympus, as could be suggested by the attribution to Peisetairos of Zeus' thunderbolt and his consort Basileia? The utopian city of the birds with its power replacing that of the Olympians? Or simply Athens offstage, the Athens of the spectators? The final choral ode maintains the same indeterminacy in this respect as that which predominates in this concluding choral part as a whole as to the exact status of Peisetairos: having to content himself with the thunderbolt, in place of Zeus' sceptre, Peisetairos embodies the paradoxical social identity of a citizen of democratic Athens who has become the tyrannical ruler of the utopian city of birds.[50]

Be that as it may, the indirect affirmation of Zeus' power, via the ornithological masks worn by Peisetairos and the members of the chorus, turns the jubilant cries of triumph of the birds' *exodos* towards the victory which the comedy itself could win in the musical competition organized in honour of Dionysus. Though one should not necessarily look for a political allusion to the difficulties experienced by the Athenian soldiers in Sicily in this song celebrating victory under the authority of Zeus' representative, it is nevertheless certain that the relationship established by the performative song between the end of the action on stage and the victory in the competition anticipated by the author and his chorus is all the stronger, because the whole song of the *parabasis* of *Birds* was placed precisely under the sign of the prophetic and melodious voices of Apollo and the Muses.[51]

[49] Cf. Ar. *Ach.* 1226–34 with the commentary of Perusino (1966). Amongst the texts attesting the use of the refrain of the paean in a victory song cited by Käppel (1992) 308–10, note in particular Eur. *Erechth.* fr. 4. 5–6 Diggle (ἀλαλαῖς ἰὴ παιὰν | κ]αλλίνικον βοάσω μέλος); for the possible accompaniment of the paean by the pipe, see Käppel (1992) 80. Other references in the different forms of the victory song in Dunbar (1995) 769–70.

[50] On this subject see the fine remarks of Dunbar (1995) 12–14 and 770. For the relation between the imperialist Athens of the spectators and the utopia finally deconstructed on stage, see the references above n. 48.

[51] See in particular the ode following on the *parabasis* proper and the *pnigos* where the members of the chorus compare themselves to the Muses and boast of the vocal qualities of the bird-*choreutai*: 737–52, fully commented on by Dunbar (1995) 461–7.

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The comedy devoted to the civic utopia of birds is not the only one of Aristophanes' plays whose ἔξοδος effects, through a choral victory song, a movement from the action dramatized on stage to the extra-discursive and ritual context of the comic performance itself. The action of *Ekklesiazusai* ends with a song, partly in anapaestic rhythm, which presents two performative forms, in the imperative and future respectively, 'lift your legs ... we shall have a feast' (αἴρεσθ' ἄνω, ἰαί, 1180; δειπνήσομεν, 1181). In the movement from an address by the *choreutai* to themselves in the second person to an inclusive 'we', the *exodos* dance of this comedy merges with the κῶμος, which, following on the pantagruelian banquet sung of in the preceding verses, is punctuated with cries of 'euhoe' evoking Dionysus. But this evocation itself turns this concluding dance into a victory song:[52] 'as at a victory' (ὡς ἐπὶ νίκῃ, 1181) the *choreutai* sing, perfectly aware of the mimetic movement from the intra- to the extra-discursive! In view of the dionysiac colouring assumed by the choral dance, the movement leading to the outcome of the comic performance itself is exactly the same as that observed in *Lysistrata*.

In the choral song in archilochaeans which forms the *exodos* of *Wasps*, the enunciative reference to the extra-dramatic is even more marked since, after an allusion to the reactions of the spectators themselves (οἱ θεαταί, 1528) and a movement which leads the *choreutai* in performative manner 'towards the door' (θύραζε, 1535), the author himself seems to intervene in his text. To say that 'no one has yet sent off a comic chorus dancing' in effect refers both to the dancing on stage of the crab-master and his *choreutai* and to an indirect intervention, in a sort of *sphragis* in the third person, of the man who undertook the training of the chorus made up of 'faces smeared with wine dregs' (χορὸν τρυγῳδῶν, 1531).[53] This allusion to the masks of the comic singers only serves to reinforce this transfer from the intra- to the extra-discursive by

[52] See the remarks of Vetta (1987) 276–7 and 286–7, and of Wilson (forthcoming *b*) 17; for a different metrical analysis, taking no account of the interjections, see Parker (1997) 552–3.

[53] It is worth noting that when he joins the dance of the chorus, together with the crab dancers, Philocleon expresses a desire to win (ἦν ἐγὼ κρατῶ, 1515) which evokes the victory of the comedy itself.

drawing attention to the mimetic and dionysiac aspect of the fiction played out on stage.

This same movement is yet more marked in the finale of the *Frogs* in that the *exodos* of this comedy is inserted into the end of a choral song where the group of frog-*choreutai* consecrates the victory of the tragic poet Aeschylus in his poetic contest with Euripides, who is himself rejected like a comic buffoon (βωμολόχος, 1521)! In this song in trochaic dimeters, the *makarismos* form introduces the praise of the poet who, through his cultivation of the Muses' art, puts his qualities of intelligence at the service of the citizens (τοῖς πολίταις, 1487) and their education. With Aeschylus returned to the light of day, the master of the Underworld can urge the *choreutai*, in the *prokērugma* in completely regular anapaestic dimeters, to escort (ὑμεῖς ... προπέμπετε, 1524–5) the victorious poet, singing choral songs and melodies for him (μέλεσιν καὶ μολπαῖσιν κελαδοῦντες, 1526–7). Let us remember that in the *parodos* the frog-*choreutai* placed the song in which they invoked Dionysus under the authority of the Muses of the lovely lyre and Apollo ὁ φορμικτάς (228–30). Obeying Pluto, the *choreutai* return to the solemn rhythm of the dactylic hexameter, with expressions to match in the style of Aeschylus, in order not only to send Cleophon and the war party to work in the fields, but above all to ask the gods below to grant the poet (ποητῇ, 1528) a happy return, and to give the city (τῇ πόλει, 1530) wise thoughts which bring great blessings.[54] If the city, in the context of the poetic and educational art of Aeschylus, evidently corresponds to Athens, the generic figure of the poet who reappears in the land of the living can, at the end of the comedy whose plot concludes once more with a victory, correspond to Aristophanes himself! Another form of indirect *sphragis* in an appeal to the gods!

When the *exodos* of an Aristophanic comedy is developed in choral song, the ritual and performative dimension of the choral interventions in attic drama is deployed to such a point that it includes the hermeneutic and emotional dimension:[55] whilst

[54] The use of Aeschylean rhythm and expressions in this scene of the *Birds* is elucidated by Zimmermann (1985–7) 2.77–8; on the role played by the *parabasis* in the enunciative portrayal of the poet, see Goldhill (1991) 201–7.

[55] Bierl (2001) 19 would go so far as to see in the choral group of Aristophanes' comedies 'ein ritueller Mitspieler'. Whilst just mentioning the 'emotive' dimension of the interventions of the comic chorus, Zimmermann (1985–7) 1.242–61

celebrating the happy outcome of the dramatic plot, the jubilant cries of the *choreutai* give a ritual turn to the comedy, evoking the dionysiac cult of which the comic drama is itself one of the acts. Even more than in tragedy, the mask and the costume of the *choreutai* evoke the cult devoted to Dionysus. Choreographic rhythms, cult interjections, the use of traditional melic forms to 'ritualize' the dionysiac κῶμος (according to one of the etymologies proposed for κωμῳδία): these are the many means of transforming the happy outcome represented dramatically and mimetically on the stage into a victory in the musical contest celebrated in honour of Dionysus. From the enunciative point of view, this relation between the choral action played on stage and the performance of the comedy as a cult act is marked by the constant movement from the performative invitations in the second person plural, 'you', to self referential affirmations in the first person plural, 'we'. In addition, through this interaction between the forms of 'you' and 'we' in the performance of the choral song itself, not only are the spectators ('you') associated with the outcome of the plot and with the comic ritual act, but the biographical author himself also seems to be included in the 'we' celebrating a triumph which could be transformed from the victory on stage into victory in the competition under the aegis of the god of the theatre.

In the comedies whose titles regularly evoke the name of the choral group who enliven the drama, the active participation of the protagonists in the ritual show in honour of Dionysus is realized in the melic forms put on stage by the chorus; that was all the easier since at Athens, as the κορυφαῖος in the *parabasis* of *Frogs* recalls, good citizens received their education in the palaestra, but also in the chorus, thanks to the art of the Muses (ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ χοροῖς καὶ μουσικῇ, 729) and on different festive occasions and ritual celebrations of the heroes and of the gods.[56]

Translated by Penelope Murray

distinguishes above all between a 'handlungstragend' role and a 'handlungsdeutend' role, which correspond, in the terms I have suggested (1994/5) 152–4, to the 'performative' and 'hermeneutic' dimensions of the choral voice in tragedy.

[56] There are numerous references to musical education in Aristophanes' comedies themselves; see the references in Calame (1999*a*) 150–2.

7

Transforming the Nightingale: Aspects of Athenian Musical Discourse in the Late Fifth Century

Andrew Barker

It is no surprise that Aristophanes' *Birds*, with its light-hearted frivolity and its chorus of feathered songsters, is full of allusions to music. Old Comedy in general is packed with snippets of musical discourse, and it is, in particular, a rich source of comment, usually scathing, on the musical practices of the times. If we put two and two together and look for morsels of such comment among the various musical snacks provided in the *Birds*, the second part of the play offers several explicit examples, notably in its caricatures of the unnamed poet-composer and of the dithyrambic composer and chorus-trainer Cinesias.[1] Those passages are entirely characteristic of the ways in which exponents of the 'New Music' now all the rage in Athens were routinely pilloried on the comic stage.[2] The first part of the *Birds* is different. Here most of the musical allusions and performances seem to arise naturally out of the avian paraphernalia of the story; and one might reasonably suppose that there is no more to them than that.

Ingenious commentators have nevertheless risen to the challenge, and have proposed more or less persuasive readings of various passages in the first part, as well as in the second, which represent them as satires on contemporary musical

I am grateful to those who took part in the Warwick conference for a number of useful comments on this chapter, and especially to Alan Sommerstein, who rescued me from several mistakes. Valuable observations were made also by two anonymous readers; I have tried to respond to most of them, though I do not imagine that I have satisfied all their wishes or stilled all their doubts.

[1] *Birds* 903–57, 1373–1409.

[2] See e.g. Ar. *Thesm.* 39–69, 95–104, *Frogs* 905 ff. (*passim*, but especially 1299–1465); Pherecrates fr. 155, on which see particularly Restani (1983); on the 'new music' of this period in general see e.g. Richter (1968); Barker (1984) ch. 7; West (1992*a*) ch. 12; Musti (2000); and Csapo in this volume.

practices.[3] I shall not review their analyses here; instead I want to push the same approach a little further, by focusing on a figure which has not been examined in detail, so far as I know, with these possibilities in mind.[4]

The role of this figure is at first sight straightforward, just what one might have expected in this amiable fantasy; but on closer inspection, I suggest, it becomes so enigmatic that we are compelled to look for an underlying motive of some rather special sort. If there *is* such a motive, of course, it should not be so obscure as to be undetectable to an alert Athenian audience; if it is unclear from the text alone, we should expect it to be discernible in some way through aspects of the play's *performance*. We shall therefore be compelled to offer some suggestions about how the play's original production can have given visible form to ideas which the text leaves obscure.

The figure in question is the Nightingale. Of course this creature must appear in such a play—how could a musical comedy set in the world of birds omit its best-loved and poetically most celebrated singer? And there indeed she is, called from her sleep in the thickets by the Hoopoe, Tereus, to help summon the company of birds; and at her music everyone on the stage, birds and humans alike, fall into ecstasies of rapture. So much seems unproblematic; but now the puzzles begin. First, the lovely nightingale is central to the musical delights of birdland; more generally she is emblematic, throughout the history of European poetry, of the perfection and endlessness of song. Yet in this play she utters not a word. She offers no verbal account of herself which would help us to reconstruct her meaning, or to interpret her interactions with other characters in the drama. Secondly, she performs no function whatever in the unravelling of the plot; she not only *says* nothing, but *does* nothing to propel the action on its way. Thirdly, soon after the second passage in which she is mentioned, which is also the first and only time she actually appears, she promptly disappears from

[3] The hoopoe's 'summoning song' at 227–62 has attracted particular attention. For discussion and references to earlier studies see Dunbar (1995) 209–24, and cf. also Pretagostini (1988).

[4] Many very valuable points are made in Romer (1983), an altogether delightful article; and we agree on a high proportion of the matters he discusses. But the main issues that I shall be considering here are not ones that his essay is designed to address.

sight and is never heard of again. Yet here we are less than half-way through the play. Other curiosities in her treatment will make themselves felt later; but that is enough to suggest that the role Aristophanes is giving his star performer is not altogether what we might have expected.

I shall argue that Aristophanes' nightingale, despite her wordlessness, intervenes significantly in the musical discourse of the play, and constitutes a significant expression of musical opinion. As such she has important things to teach us about musical values and controversies in late fifth-century Athens. But I must first prepare the ground. Comedy thrives on parody; parodic allusions to images, passages and ideas taken from earlier and more overtly serious literature are part of its regular stock-in-trade; and the nightingale is a figure with a distinguished literary history. If Aristophanes' Prokne and her music are anything more than meaningless decorations in the *Birds*, their meaning can certainly not be reconstructed independently of her previous appearances in the tradition. We need to put together at least a sketch of the character of those appearances, and of the patterns of meaning which the image of the nightingale had regularly served to establish in the past.

The nightingale makes her bow in European literature in the nineteenth book of the *Odyssey* (518–23). Penelope is telling Odysseus, who has not yet revealed his identity, of her sorrowful days and restless nights in which troubling thoughts flock in upon her: 'As when the daughter of Pandouros, the greenwood nightingale, sings her lovely song at the onset of spring, perched among the trees' dense foliage, and with rapid turns pours out her voice's many notes, mourning for Itylos her beloved child, king Zethos' son, whom she killed in ignorance with a bronze sword, so too my heart shifts hither and thither . . .'; and she goes on to explain the dilemma that confronts her, in a pair of options, both hard to face, between which she cannot decide.

The nightingale myth sketched here is different from the one used by most later writers, but the passage nevertheless incorporates almost all the motifs and resonances embedded in the archaic and classical tradition. The nightingale is χλωρῆϊς, an untranslatable adjective that hints at its association with the green freshness of Spring. The music-making bird is female, here as everywhere else in Greek literature, false though that is from a

severely ornithological perspective. Its music is conceived as song, not on the analogy of performance on an instrument. Our translations of the phrase καλὸν ἀείδῃσιν, 'sings beautifully', are bound to suggest that its song is outstandingly lovely; but of this I am not altogether convinced. The adverb καλόν is so much a formulaic pendant to the verb that it need express nothing about the nightingale's singing in particular, nothing, that is, to distinguish it from any other song; the 'beauty' attaches to singing in general, not to this instance of it as distinct from lesser manifestations. To continue, her song is liquid, poured out, with rapid turns and many notes; and above all it is a lament, a lament for the child she has unwittingly killed. (In the more familiar tale, of course, she has killed her son Itys deliberately; but that was an act of revenge against her husband Tereus for his rape of Philomela, and her song is still a lament for her murdered child.)

Two points in particular need emphasis. First, the significance of the nightingale in this context, though given colour by reference to her song, is not constructed out of the song's musical qualities but out of the mythical scenario in which it is embedded. It is the myth, not the sounds themselves, which gives the nightingale qualities appropriate to the purposes of the poem; and the song itself is not, in the last resort, the feature of her to which our attention is primarily drawn. The main focus of the simile is rather on the state of mind which, according to the postulates of the myth, is expressed in the song; and it is this that is compared with the indecision and emotional torment of Penelope. Secondly, once granted its mythologically constructed character as a lament, the song's 'many notes' and its 'rapid turns', which are indeed there to be heard,[5] can serve to enhance the impression of uncertainty, complexity, and irresolution which the simile seeks to convey.

At the same time, of course, the sweet liquidity, the turns and trills and many notes of the song are features that convey the image of a supreme musician. But from a musicological point of view we should notice the semantic instability of words naming attributes such as these. Right through to the early fifth century, in Pindar, for example, expressions evoking the complexity of a musical composition, its honey-sweetness and the numerousness of its notes are used to call attention to its delightfulness and its craftsmanship, and to compel admiration.[6] In the transformed musical context of the latter part of the century, however, references to a piece's suppleness, intricacy, and multiplicity of notes become elements in a vocabulary used to point the finger at the controversial 'new music', and are regularly employed in the context of criticism and parody.[7] There is evidently a semantic crevice here through which it is possible for ambiguities to creep into the image of the emblematic bearer of these attributes, the nightingale herself. In so far as the patterns of reference and association awakened by mention of the bird attach themselves to the new musical and social context, they can acquire new resonances that undermine and destabilize the positive implications they had carried in the earlier tradition.

[5] See the fascinating discussion in Pliny, *HN* 10.29.43 (81–5).

But I am getting ahead of myself. I have already suggested that in Homer the figure of the nightingale is not merely or even primarily that of the ideal singer, but takes its meaning from the myth by which it is surrounded. We may notice in passing that this is not an isolated phenomenon; none of the birds commonly represented by the Greeks as musicians gets this attribute directly from its actual song. The partridge is scarcely a 'real' singer; neither is the quail or the swallow, and nor is that allegedly most musical of birds, the swan.[8] All of them acquire their musical characters from a penumbra of myth, religious association, and folklore.

Let us now glance briefly at some of the nightingale's appearances on the fifth-century Athenian stage in the serious context of tragedy. In Aeschylus' *Supplices* (57–72) the chorus liken their own laments and their exile to hers; in the *Agamemnon* (1140–55) the chorus tell Cassandra that she is singing a lament for herself like some ξουθὰ ἀηδών, a trilling nightingale, weeping insatiably for Itys and over her sorrowful life. The chorus of Sophocles' *Ajax* imagine the frenzied, shrill wailing of Ajax's mother, and contrast it with the more muted pathos of the nightingale's moaning (624–34); and his Electra identifies her lonely and sorrowful state with that of the nightingale lamenting for Itys, bewildered with grief (*El.* 147–9). In all these passages the nightingale is there, as in

[6] e.g. *Ol.* 4.2, *Pyth.* 4.296, *Nem.* 4.14 (intricacy, complexity); *Ol.* 7.7–8, 11.4–5, *Nem.* 3.4–5, 76–9 (sweetness, liquidity).

[7] e.g. Ar. *Thesm.* 50–69, 130–70, *Birds* 1373–91; Pherecrates fr. 155; cf. Plato *Laws* 669b–670a, 700a–701b.

[8] See the entries for these birds in Thompson (1936).

the *Odyssey*, for the sake of a comparison, and the comparison is always built out of the mythology of her lament; that is the governing theme. But we can pick up other ideas and images too, which are accessible to the poet and triggered in his audience through allusions to the nightingale's song. As in the *Odyssey*, it is, explicitly, *song*, and even has words, the word 'Itys' endlessly repeated. In the *Ajax* the lament has more pathos than frenzy; but in the *Agamemnon* it is reflected in Cassandra's manic ravings, incomprehensible to the chorus—this may perhaps be an adaptation of the *Odyssey*'s images of bewildered uncertainty. It is a νόμος ἄνομος, 'unmusical music', or—trading on the ambiguities of the word νόμος—a song without coherence or order, bursting the bounds of due form; and Cassandra's outpourings are a horrifying δύσφατος κλαγγά, an unutterable or ill-omened clamour, sung in high-pitched strains, ὀρθίοις ἐν νόμοις. We may note that the nightingale's κλαγγή, which seems to indicate something more strident than ordinary *musical* sound, recurs in a fragment of Nicomachus Tragicus (fr. 1 Nauck).

Euripides speaks of the nightingale in two surviving plays, both later than our target-piece, the *Birds*. We can pass over the passage in the *Helen* (1107–16), which seems, rather curiously, to be a case where tragedy draws on comedy rather than vice versa; it is an almost verbatim echo of the *Birds* itself.[9] A passage from the *Rhesus* (546–50) is unusual in that no immediate comparison is involved; the chorus speak of the nightingale they actually hear, singing in the dawn. Even here, however, she is still 'the bird that killed her child', and sings of her 'murderous marriage'. Similarly in a fragment from the *Phaethon* (fr. 773.23–6 Nauck), which again is pure scene-description, not comparison, she sings a multitude of laments for Itys. In both passages her song is also characterized in more directly musical ways—a 'delicate melody' in the *Phaethon*, the outpouring of a πολυχορδοτάτη φωνή, a 'voice with a multitude of notes' in the *Rhesus*. Let us add just one more example, a fragment from the *Palamedes* (fr. 588 Nauck). The chorus are singing about Palamedes, unjustly killed by the Greeks at Troy:

> ἐκάνετ' ἐκάνετε τὰν
> πάνσοφον, ὦ Δαναοί,
> τὰν οὐδὲν ἀλγύνουσαν ἀηδόνα Μουσᾶν

[9] See Dover (1972) 148–9.

> You have killed, you have killed, you Greeks, the all-skilled, harmless nightingale of the Muses.

Here we find as attributes of the nightingale and Palamedes a close affinity with the Muses, harmlessness, and for the first time in the tradition, outstanding skill—skill, we must suppose in the nightingale's case, as a virtuoso musician, a theme only fully exploited centuries later in an intricate passage of Pliny.[10]

The thread running through almost all this material is the theme of lament. But we have noticed the seeds of other ideas too. The song is insatiable, endlessly iterated. The repeated verb meaning 'killed' in the *Palamedes*, ἐκάνετ' ἐκάνετε, may itself hint at this iteration, which the tragedians regularly represent by repetition of the name 'Itys', ἄ Ἴτυν, αἰὲν Ἴτυν ὀλοφύρεται (Soph. *El.* 148). In the *Agamemnon* there are graphic evocations of confusion and disorder, even madness, and a suggestion of it in the 'bewilderment' spoken of by Sophocles' Electra. There are trillings and quaverings, and the mysterious word ξουθός, which as first Wilamowitz, later Silk, and later still Dunbar have argued, probably has reference simultaneously to sound and to rapid movement.[11] The *Phaethon* has multitudinous laments, and the *Rhesus*, in line with the *Odyssey*, a multitude of notes. The *Palamedes*, finally, adds outstanding musical skill.

It is a complicated package. But you will see at once that it might have great potential as a resource for a comic dramatist with a good deal of brazen cheek, and with his eye alert for images through which he could poke fun at the excesses of the elaborate 'new music' that was fashionable in his day. I shall try to persuade you that he does precisely that, and that the nightingale in the *Birds* is by no means the figure of pure beauty and charm which most commentators seem to have imagined.

We first hear of the nightingale at line 203. The hoopoe is preparing to summon the birds; and he says that they will come running if he goes into the copse and wakes up 'his nightingale', τὴν ἐμὴν ἀηδόνα, and if they call together. Peisetairos urges him to do so; and at this point he must disappear behind the trees of the stage set. The next part of the scene is played out, then, I think,

[10] See n. 5 above.

[11] See the remarks at Dunbar (1995) 206, where references to Wilamowitz and Silk are also supplied. Cf. also Taillardat (1965) 135 n. 4.

with the audience's attention focused on something invisible but heard, first the voice of the singing hoopoe and then the sound of the nightingale herself. Even if the hoopoe is visible on top of the stage building, as Dunbar suggests, the nightingale is certainly not.

The song with which the hoopoe wakes the nightingale consists of fourteen anapaestic lines. It has been much admired, and it is unquestionably charming; but that is not the aspect of it I want to emphasize.[12]

ἄγε σύννομέ μοι, it begins. 'Come my . . .'—what, exactly? The word σύννομος is nicely and multiply ambiguous, between 'companion', 'spouse', 'mate', 'sharer of habits', 'sharer of accustomed places', and 'sharer of νόμοι' in its sense 'musical pieces'. This last sense is immediately reinforced. 'Release the νόμοι of sacred ὕμνοι'; and all the rest of the song is a prolonged evocation of the nightingale's music. She sings her ὕμνοι as a lament 'for my child and yours, much-mourned Itys, quivering in the liquid melodies of your vibrating throat'. The pure sound or resonance, ἠχώ, goes up to the home of Zeus, where golden-haired Apollo hears it, and plucking his ivory-covered lyre in answer, ἀντιψάλλων, to her laments, ἔλεγοι, he sets up choruses; and from the mouths of the immortals comes a glorious ringing shout, ὀλολυγή, in tune, σύμφωνος, with the nightingale's melody.

This is all very impressive, but certain features of it are definitely odd. First, we may reasonably ask what *sort* of music the nightingale is represented as performing; and the answer is more than a little confusing. It is too many things at once. It is a νόμος, a ὕμνος, a θρῆνος, an ἔλεγος, a sound to be recapitulated or responded to by the lyre, the inspiration and accompaniment for choral song, and specifically for choral song characterized as ὀλολυγή. Even if everything else fitted, *that* would remain strange. As Dunbar says, an ὀλολυγή is regularly a cry of joy or triumph, and she likens the gods' ὀλολυγαί to the shouts uttered by Scotsmen performing Highland dances. Can they do this to music which is essentially a mournful θρῆνος? The nightingale's song seems in fact to be represented as every kind of music at once.

It may seem plausible to read this as an essentially unproblematic piece of poetic rhetoric, harmlessly expanding its praises of the nightingale beyond what could literally be true. Perhaps so. But we

[12] On the passage as a whole see Fraenkel (1950).

should bear in mind the fact that it is a recurrent complaint about composers of the 'new music' that they ignore established boundaries of genre and style, mixing every sort of music together in an incomprehensible jumble. Plato is particularly severe about this lack of respect for formal categories; and we may notice that in the *Laws*, his short list of four musical forms that were previously kept distinct but are nowadays unpardonably fused includes three of the types explicitly mentioned here by Aristophanes, ὕμνοι, νόμοι, and laments. Plato's fourth form, the dithyramb, may possibly be hinted at in Aristophanes' ὀλολυγή.[13] It seems to me that alert members of Aristophanes' audience might well see through the charm of the hoopoe's song, and might at least smile knowingly to themselves at its images of fashionable genre-confusion. Their perception will have been reinforced by its references to the 'quivering' and 'trilling' suggested by the words ἐλελιζομένη and ξουθῆς, and the 'liquidity' evoked in the phrase διεροῖς μέλεσιν. There is nothing wrong with 'liquid songs' as such, of course, which are there in our passage of the *Odyssey* and appear repeatedly in Pindar; and the other words have almost equally august literary ancestries, ξουθός being used of the nightingale in Aeschylus, while Pindar uses ἐλελίζομαι to describe the lyre's strings being set in quivering motion.[14] But once a different context of thought has been established in the audience's mind, these words can readily jump out of their original frames into a picture representing the complicated, rapid turns and twists regularly mentioned as characteristic of the new music, and the melting malleable softness of pretentious musical aesthetes like Agathon, brilliantly caricatured a few years later in the *Thesmophoriazousae* (especially 39–69, 95–104).

Consider next the image of the bird's music reaching the admiring ears of Apollo. He strikes up in response on his splendid lyre, inlaid with ivory, and sets choruses in action; and the other gods in their turn respond with song and dance in concord with the music of the nightingale. The ingredients of this description are all

[13] *Laws* 700a–b. For earlier hints of the impulse to classify music into 'genres', linking each to a specific kind of socio-religious occasion and purpose, see Pindar fr. 128(c) Snell–Maehler. An almost impenetrable jungle of such classifications is attributed in the pseudo-Plutarchan *De musica* (mainly on fourth-century authority) to musicians of the archaic period; see for instance 1132a–1134f.

[14] Aesch. *Ag.* 1142; Pindar *Pyth.* 1.4.

familiar, of course; but they are combined in a manner that is calculated (or so I believe) to de-familiarize them and indeed to startle the audience. Two points stand out. First, the image is in several respects unique. Nowhere else is the nightingale's song said to interest the gods; and though the gods are sometimes said to be pleased by human music-making, when it is performed in the context of ritual or prayer, there is no other case where they themselves are prompted into musical activity by singers who are not themselves divine. Most importantly, there is no other case in which Apollo, the gods' leading musician, is said to take *his* lead from the music of another, prior performer, so that Apollo acts as a secondary respondent, not as the protagonist.[15] Apollo is often found as instrumentalist for the chorus of Muses, but it is always he who is the leader and inspirer.[16] In the context of this tradition, the picture painted by Aristophanes looks hyperbolic and hubristic, even sacrilegious. It is a fitting preparation for the humiliating defeat of the gods by the birds in the closing stages of the play.

Secondly, though the verb meaning 'plucking in answer', ἀντιψάλλων, apparently occurs nowhere else, the literature of this period and earlier does offer a number of examples where one instrument is said to 'sound in response' to another. Many of them are collected in a single long passage of Athenaeus (634b–636c). Their interpretation is difficult; but the most striking fact about them is that almost all appear in passages designed to conjure up the atmosphere of a music that is non-Greek, exotic, and oriental. References to Lydia, in particular, recur repeatedly, and so do references to instruments of the harp type, πηκτίς and τρίγωνος. These instruments were marginal at best in classical Athenian culture, and in literature their names evoke both unrestrained, eastern emotionality, and the unusual complexities of melodic pattern that were made possible by the multiplicity of their strings. When Plato's Socrates outlaws them in the

[15] In the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* (416–512) it is indeed Apollo who is entranced by the performance of another musician, and goes on to play himself. But there the scenario is quite different, since Apollo is being introduced for the first time to the skills that he will make his own; he is not an already accomplished musician entering, in a subordinate capacity, into a performance led by another. It is also relevant that his tutor in this initial music-lesson is himself a god.

[16] For characteristic examples see the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* 182–206; Pind. *Nem.* 5.22–5.

Republic, no one is likely to be surprised.[17] Aristophanes' nightingale is no harpist, to be sure. But the style of music-making into which Aristophanes' allusions so subtly insert her performance carries perceptible overtones of exotic elaboration alien to the established tradition.

If we pull all these points together, I cannot yet claim to have proved that the nightingale stands here as an emblem of the excesses of the 'new wave' composers. But I submit that there is a case to answer, and that at the very least this stretch of text is a minefield of musicological ambiguities.

As the hoopoe ends his evocation of the nightingale, her music is heard from behind the scenery; the bird herself is still unseen. What in fact the audience hears is not a singing voice but the sound of the *auloi*, the pipes. We may imagine at this point an elaborate little solo; but of its musical character we know only that Euelpides finds it ravishing:

> ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τοῦ φθέγματος τοὐρνιθίου·
> οἷον κατεμελίτωσε τὴν λόχμην ὅλην

O Zeus the king, the voice of the little bird! How it filled the whole copse with honey-sweetness! (223–4).

I shall return to this brief episode later. Now the hoopoe sets off, accompanied by his still hidden, piping nightingale, to summon the company of birds in a long and highly virtuosic aria. This splendid stretch of text has been much studied, and I shall not re-examine it here. We shall move on to the next occasion on which the nightingale herself is mentioned; it comes at line 659.

By this time the spectacular bird-chorus has assembled. They have spotted the human intruders and set off to do battle with them; but they are persuaded by the hoopoe that these men are really potential benefactors who should be welcomed and not harmed. The hoopoe now invites Peisetairos and Euelpides into his nest, where they will be given something to eat and kitted out with wings. But as they are about to leave the stage, the chorus begs the hoopoe to call out the ἡδυμελῆ σύμφωνον ἀηδόνα Μούσαις, the 'sweet-songed nightingale who sings in concord with the Muses', so that they may 'play' with her, ἵνα παίσωμεν μετ' ἐκείνης. Peisetairos and Euelpides echo the request; they

[17] *Rep.* 399c–d; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1341^{a-b}.

are very keen to *see* the nightingale whose lovely voice they have heard and found so delightful. 'All right,' says the hoopoe (665), 'if you like. Come on out, Prokne, and show yourself to the strangers'; and out she comes.

This little climax has been carefully prepared. The *Birds* is a play whose effects depend greatly on the tantalizing postponement of expectations, both major and minor.[18] The audience had been led to expect the arrival of the chorus long before it actually appeared; when it finally does, the theatrical effect built up by the suspense of its delayed arrival is made all the more impressive by its gaudy and spectacular costumes. The nightingale, similarly, has been a figure in the play since line 204, greatly admired, musically present but unseen; the audience will be on the edge of their seats waiting to see how she will be visibly represented. They will therefore form common cause, as it were, with the characters on stage who are begging the hoopoe to call her outside—Aristophanes has effectively lured his audience, if only for a moment, into fusing their own desires with those of the human and avian riff-raff of the drama. He must certainly have been preparing *some* dramatic surprise, to be created by her long-awaited appearance. So what exactly is it that the audience sees, as she finally emerges from the bushes some 450 lines after she was first brought to their attention?

We have to reconstruct her visual characterization from the reactions of others on the stage (667–74). It is immediately obvious that—within the conventions of comic drama—she is presented as a cross between a bird and an utterly desirable young woman. Peisetairos calls her καλόν, ἁπαλόν, λευκόν, 'beautiful, tender, white'. Euelpides, the more outrageously vulgar of the two, wants to 'get between her thighs' without delay. Peisetairos exclaims at the amount of gold she is wearing, ὥσπερ παρθένος, 'like a girl'. Euelpides wants to kiss her; and when Peisetairos points out that she has a beak like a pair of skewers, Euelpides proposes to peel what he calls the 'egg-shell' from her head, and *then* to kiss her. The line is probably best interpreted as meaning that he suits the action to the word and does precisely that. With this bit of slapstick out of the way, the hoopoe and the two humans go off-stage, leaving the nightingale and the chorus together.

[18] On this aspect of the play see Gelzer (1996).

To repeat my question, what exactly do the audience see? I do not mean 'Is the male actor convincingly dressed as a pretty woman?', a matter which has indeed been debated by the commentators, but 'Whatever the costuming conventions involved, how would the audience have *understood* the character presented to them?', 'What did they see her *as*?'. Some editors have based their interpretations on the fact that Prokne is Tereus' wife, and have made her a suitable consort for the king of the birds, either a lovely, high society lady decked in gold, or a pretty young child-bride who can fairly be compared to a παρθένος.[19] But this, I think, is all wrong. It is true, of course, that she is represented as Tereus' wife; the description is unambiguous at line 368, and the fact is in any case presupposed by the mythological background.[20] But this conjugal relationship is not invoked when Tereus first mentions her (at 203, where she is merely τὴν ἐμὴν ἀηδόνα, 'my nightingale', as if she were a bird in a cage); and it can hardly be reckoned prominent among the images confronting the audience in the scene we are reviewing. Here Tereus, a person of high social standing, has called her out of doors, has allowed her to be pawed by the lascivious Euelpides without a murmur of protest, and has then left her alone in the company of the raucous rabble constituted by the chorus. Even on the comic stage, this suggests very strongly that her 'respectable' wifely status has for present purposes been shelved.

These observations are impressionistic and not necessarily reliable. But there is another point which carries more weight. This nightingale is not a singer; she is an instrumentalist, specifically a piper. That, we may note, is a significant break with the tradition. Now it is a fact that with certain very special exceptions to be noted immediately, iconographic and literary representations of respectable female musicians in archaic and classical times, whether they are girls or women, *never* depict them as playing instruments in public. They sing and dance, but they do not play; even the

[19] See e.g. Rogers (1906) on 665; Arrowsmith (1969), stage directions to 666–7; cf. Sommerstein (1987) on 670.

[20] The word σύννομος at line 209 is presumably to be understood at least partly in this sense, though we have already noted its ambiguities. The hoopoe's reference at 212 to 'my son and yours, much-lamented Itys' underlines the point, bizarre though the allusion is—given the context of the myth—in its 'presumption of domestic normality between these two' (I owe this way of putting it to an anonymous reader).

instrumentalist who accompanies women's choruses is invariably male. Women publicly play instruments in two contexts only. One is the context of the wilder forms of religious ritual; they play percussion instruments in the cult of Demeter, and percussion and pipes in the ecstatic rites of Dionysus. This manifestation may perhaps be called 'respectable', but it is clearly irrelevant here. The second setting is not respectable at all. It is that of the male symposium, where female pipers, αὐλητρίδες, normally slaves, notoriously provided sexual diversions for the guests as routinely as musical entertainment. The tawdry image of the αὐλητρίς in Athenian society is established beyond question in pictures on a multitude of fifth-century painted pots, as well as in written sources.

This, I submit, is the nub of Aristophanes' little *coup de théâtre* in our passage of the *Birds*, and it is reassuring to find that Dunbar seems to agree.[21] (It is perhaps relevant that the phrase τὴν ἐμὴν ἀηδόνα, 'my nightingale', to which I drew attention earlier, is almost a homophone for τὴν ἐμὴν αὐλητρίδα, 'my pipe-girl'.) The audience has been held in suspense. They have effectively been promised a glimpse of this paragon of musicality; what will she be like? Perhaps they will have realized that Aristophanes was setting up a surprise, but they cannot have known what it would be; and the effect of her appearance, when at last she arrives on stage, could be made startling enough to bring the house down. Enter the figure of Music incarnate, probably dressed in nothing to speak of apart from her golden ornaments, with pipes in her mouth, shimmying provocatively at Euelpides. Where we might look for a vision of idealized beauty from another world, what we get is the all too familiar, degraded figure of the slave-girl hired out to play the pipes and to double as a prostitute.[22]

What, then, from a musicological point of view, would this revelation convey? The best answer to that question is given by Aristophanes himself, in the *Frogs*. In the contest between the

[21] Dunbar (1995) 422, in a note on 667–8. Others who take the same view include scholiasts on 667 and 670. Romer (1983) agrees that the figure is that of an αὐλητρίς, but apparently discerns no negative connotations in this image, and supposes that the qualities conveyed by her appearance are femininity, beauty, and elegance (137 n. 7).

[22] For a sophisticated development of more traditional (or romantic) readings of Aristophanes see Moulton (1982) in (1996) 225.

poet-composers at the end of that play, Aeschylus represents the noble dignity of the old tradition, Euripides the trendy new music with its disrespect for established norms, its colourful complexity and its unashamedly populist emotionalism. They bombard one another with insults. Prominent among those levelled at Euripides are comments on the sources from which he draws his musical inspiration (1301 ff.). They come, according to Aeschylus, 'from all sorts of lascivious songs, trivial drinking songs, Carian pipe-tunes,[23] laments, dance-music'. And with an eye to an effect very similar to that in the *Birds*, Aeschylus summons to the stage the Muse of Euripides, a naked, dancing houri banging a pair of ὄστρακα (pieces of broken pot or shell) by way of percussion accompaniment. Dionysus' reaction is revealing: αὕτη ποθ' ἡ Μοῦσ' οὐκ ἐλεσβίαζεν, οὔ, 'Surely the Muse was never a whore!' If the message in the *Birds* is the same, as I think it is, it is to point up the indiscriminate vulgarity of the motley music represented by the nightingale, its affinities with the world of cabaret entertainment and sexual licence. It is no use protesting that characters on stage in the *Birds* find her music divinely lovely, and that the audience, through identification with them, have been enticed into doing so too. Consider who those characters are—two prototypical comic vulgarians and a gaggle of feather-brained and gullible birds, just the sort of 'democratic' audience, according to Plato, whose gutter-level tastes are to blame for the successes of the abominable 'new music'.[24] *Their* approval is no sort of serious recommendation. Aristophanes has indeed pressed home his point as effectively as possible by the neat trick he has played on his audience, or at least the more gullible among them, first persuading them to join the characters in their rapturous enjoyment of the nightingale's music and in their eagerness for her to appear, and then slapping them in the face with his image of just what it is that they, the real audience in the theatre, had been so foolishly admiring.[25]

[23] 'Carian' is a term commonly used to suggest 'slave'; Carian pipe-music is linked with symposia at Plato Com. fr. 71.12 K.–A.

[24] *Laws* 700d–701b.

[25] Aristophanes' strategy may in fact be understood in either of two ways. On the reading I have suggested, he relied on the musically 'right-thinking' members of his audience to relish the trick played on the more gullible, while enough of the latter—once they had seen the point—would delude themselves into believing that they had

There is one more issue that I would like to consider briefly. Editors have regularly assumed that the part of Prokne is performed by an actor who does not *really* play the pipes, but mimes to the music of the aulete who was bound to be present in any case for other purposes.[26] Every Greek theatrical performance required a piper to accompany its choruses and solo songs. Under normal conditions he was not an actor, costumed and presented 'in character', any more than are the members of the orchestra in a modern opera; he wore no mask, and was rather splendidly dressed in a garment that bore no relation to the scenario of the play, a long, decorated robe suggesting dignity and status.

But this view of the matter runs into difficulties; and there are features of the play's structure which hint at an altogether more dramatically adventurous approach. The hoopoe's song of invocation to the nightingale is the first piece of music in the play. Up to that point no aulete has been called for, and there is no good reason why he should be in place already, kicking his heels in the *orchestra* with nothing to do. There has been no point in the action at which he could make a suitably dignified entrance. The song itself, as Zimmermann, Gelzer, and others have seen,[27] must be performed without accompaniment. Dunbar disagrees,[28] but I find her scepticism unnecessary and unconvincing; to have used the pipes at this point would have disastrously undercut the effect of the nightingale's own pipe-solo, which follows immediately. Here, evidently, the pipes *are* played, but they are played either from behind the scenery or *as if* from behind the scenery. Which is it? There is at least one good reason for arguing that it is the former. An audience could be expected to understand the representation of pretended nightingale-music well enough even if it was really being played by an official aulete in full view, so long as the

really understood it all along. Alternatively, the music of the nightingale had been so obvious a pastiche as to deceive nobody, and the audience would simply be relishing the spectacle of the ludicrous bad taste displayed by the characters on stage. In either case Aristophanes presumably hoped that by securing the audience's approval for his musical polemics he would improve his chances of winning first prize.

[26] See the meticulous and cautious notes in Dunbar (1995), 421–4, with the references she supplies; see also Taplin (1993) 106–7, though I cannot see that his doubts about Prokne's presentation as an αὐλητρίς are well founded. For a brief but thorough review of earlier opinions see Romer (1983) 137 with n. 7.

[27] Zimmermann (1985–7) 70; Gelzer (1996) 205.

[28] Dunbar (1995) 203.

nightingale were visibly miming. But here there is no question of mime, since the nightingale is hidden. For the real piper to be visible while the nightingale is not would be a pretty broken-backed piece of theatre. In any case, why damage the illusion? The moment would be far more effective if the pipes were really played from behind the stage shrubbery, that is, from the place where Prokne is waiting to make her appearance.

The pipe-playing continues while the hoopoe sings his summons to the birds; and it is still represented as the nightingale's voice, since the hoopoe has said that he and she together will call them (203–5). If it sounded from behind the scenery before, it must go on doing so now. When the summons is over, the chorus assembles *without* any singing, which is rather unusual. There is no splendid choral procession as there is, for instance, in the *Clouds*. The fact that we do not get the chorus's familiar entrance-song might be accounted for in a number of ways; but one explanation, at any rate, would be that Aristophanes does not want either to over-use his nightingale before her dramatic entrance at line 666, or to diminish the effect of her piping by matching it with the routine accompaniments of a visible aulete.

But of course he cannot leave the chorus songless for ever; various parts of the passage that follows are certainly sung and presumably accompanied. Even here, however, it must be reckoned at least uncertain that an aulete has appeared in full view of the audience, since once again, in the absence of a formal procession, there is no readily identifiable moment at which he could make a dramatically appropriate entrance. At line 667, by contrast, there is a heavily signalled entrance of just the right sort. When Prokne appears, it is a reasonable hypothesis that the 'pair of skewers' mentioned by Peisetairos is not just a beak on an actor's bird-mask, but is a pair of pipes, whether they are genuine or merely stage-props. Similarly, the 'egg-shell' which Euelpides will peel from her head to kiss her may indeed, in part, be a sort of skull-cap bird mask, but there is no reason why it should not be built, and perhaps detectably built, as an attachment to the *phorbeia*, the harness worn by a piper on his face and over the top of his head to support the muscles of his cheeks.[29]

[29] The various issues surrounding this point of detail are closely examined in Romer (1983).

Here, then, is the nightingale presented as a piper; and we must notice that the chorus is given another song immediately after her arrival, as though her appearance on stage served as a catalyst for their traditional musical role. They can sing only when the real piper is playing. According to my hypothesis, their previous songs have been accompanied from behind the scenes; and when the nightingale arrives, in the guise of a girl-piper, they welcome her as the one who is 'bringing the sweet sound to me', ἡδὺν φθόγγον ἐμοὶ φέρουσ' (681). She has brought the sound of the pipes out from its hiding place into the chorus's presence. There is a strong presumption, I suggest, that the real piper and the nightingale-piper are identical. But we can assemble more evidence yet.

The little song, only nine lines long, first expresses the chorus's delight in the nightingale's music. I shall say nothing about that part of it. But it ends as follows. 'You who play the lovely-sounding pipe with the notes of spring-time, ἄρχου τῶν ἀναπαύστων, lead off our anapaests' (682–4). What this means is immediately clear from the context, since the chorus sets off at once on a long and initially anapaestic *parabasis* (685–800). The nightingale, then, is being urged to accompany the *parabasis* on her pipes; and it is perfectly clear that she does so.

But does she *really* do it? Or does she merely mime to the music of a regular aulete who has after all been in his place all along? There is no way of proving the matter one way or the other. One might argue that miming would lose its entertainment-value and become tedious after a while, certainly in the course of a 115-line set-piece; and we know that she is still there about half-way through it, at any rate, since her lovely song is again invoked at 737 ff. But that sort of argument is perhaps unreliable. A more difficult problem for the 'mime' theory is the apparent disappearance of the nightingale once the *parabasis* is over. She is never mentioned again; and no character says anything that might motivate or mark her exit. Does she leave the scene? If so, when and why? And if not, what does she do for the rest of the play? It seems to me that both her absence from the plot and action of the second half of the drama, and the fact that she never utters a word—not to mention the lack of any music before the moment she is woken—are most simply explained if she really is a piper, and not only *a* piper but *the* piper, the one responsible for accompanying all the musical items in the play. What happens as the

parabasis unrolls itself is that she slips from what looked like an acting role into the role of accompanying musician; that is her real function, and she stays with it for the rest of the performance. The character of the nightingale, then, is not played by an *actor* at all, but by the official aulete himself. The spectacle of a man dressed—or rather undressed—as a cheap *aulētris*, taking over the functions standardly given to a dignified, formally costumed *aulētēs*, would constitute a continuing visual comment on the music and the play as a whole. She would be the perfect accompanist for such figures as the Poet and Cinesias in the later episodes, and would effectively undercut any temptation to take seriously the various musical offerings of the chorus. It would be a most unusual trick, but an effective one; and if I were producing the *Birds*, that is certainly how I would do it.[30]

So why not? Why have editors found this surely rather obvious reading unacceptable? As far as I can see, the only serious obstacle arises from their assumptions about the traditional, and perhaps professionally guarded dignity of the musician, the haughty detachment from the frivolities going on around him that is symbolized by his lack of a mask and his impressive costume. 'The aulete', says Dunbar in this connection, 'had a professional dignity to maintain' (p. 503).

Possibly so; but the notion calls for two comments. First, we do occasionally hear of auletes taking a part in the action as well as the music of a piece, especially in the context of the 'new music'. The greatest of the late fifth-century auletes, Pronomos of Thebes, entranced his audiences with his graphic changes of facial expression and the movements of his body as he played.[31] Aristotle talks of 'bad auletes'—bad, that is, by his own conservative standards—who whirl around to imitate the throwing of a discus, or who grab at the chorus-leader while accompanying Timotheos' *Scylla*.[32] Such antics, it appears, were not always below an aulete's professional dignity. According to most commentators, admittedly, they

[30] In discussion at the Warwick conference, Prof. Csapo suggested that the 'nightingale' might in fact be the accompanying aulete in his regular ceremonial costume. That is perfectly possible; it would alter the focus of the farcical exchanges at 658 ff., and would give a different dimension to the innuendoes contained in its hints about αὐλητρίδες, but it might be equally effective as comedy.

[31] See Pausanias 9.12.6.

[32] Arist. *Poet.* 1461^{b}30–2.

are attested only for dithyramb, not for drama; but as the *Cyclops* of Philoxenos bears witness, the dividing line between the two genres was becoming progressively less clear,[33] and another passage of the *Poetics* (1454ª31–2) is at best rather odd unless Aristotle is thinking of the *Scylla* itself as a play.[34] Secondly, if the strategy I am attributing to Aristophanes would have seemed bizarre to a fifth-century audience, so much the better. It would have been relatively pointless if it had *not* subverted their expectations, revealing to them that dramatic music of a kind they themselves might be tempted to enjoy would appropriately be led by a common *aulētris*.

To conclude, then. I have argued that Aristophanes has first constructed his figure of the nightingale as an emblem of the musical avant-garde, and has then made his point about the character of such stuff by identifying her with everything that is musically debased. He evokes the nonsensical, mould-breaking, hyperbolic theatricality of the 'new music' by plundering the resources of traditional nightingale-poetry and reassembling them in patterns that give them a radically satirical edge; and he shows us what the semi-divine patroness of such music would really look like by presenting her as a musical whore. By giving his nightingale one further, final metamorphosis, transporting her into the role of the official accompanist himself, he brings the whole of his own production within the target area of its own brand of musical parody.[35]

[33] See West (1992*a*) 365–6.

[34] The *Scylla* appears here (1454ª31–2) in a list of examples all of whose other members are Euripidean tragedies (*Orestes, Melanippe, Iph. Aul.*).

[35] That is not to say, of course, that Aristophanes deliberately composed music for his play that was 'bad' in the sense 'ineffective or inappropriate in its context'. On the contrary; the context is that of satirical parody, and a certain sort of 'bad' music—music of an extravagantly populist and decadent character—is precisely what it calls for.

Part III

THE POLITICS OF *MOUSIKĒ*

8

The Politics of the New Music

Eric Csapo

The critics cried 'insurrection!' and 'buggery!' with a vehemence likely to dumbfound any who examines the actual remains of New Music. The extant poetry contains no overt discussion of politics or ethics—nothing more provocative than occasional mockery of the critics' sense of scandal—and the music, so far as we can reconstruct it, was rather tame by modern standards. The furore had less to do with what was performed, than where, how, and by whom. In this essay, I examine three closely integrated aspects of the New Musical 'revolution': its historical context (section I); its style (section II); and its reception (section III).

I 'THEATRE MUSIC' *OR* THE ECONOMICS OF NEW MUSIC

The term 'New Music', written thus as a proper noun, is a useful but misleading term. Νέα Μουσική, or the like, never appears as a genre concept or even an epoch style. The practitioners of the new style described their songs as 'novel', or 'modern' as opposed to 'ancient', 'old-fashioned', or 'traditional'.[1] But when ancient critics spoke collectively of works in the style of (what we call) New Music, they tended to speak of 'theatre music', or otherwise explicitly connect it with the theatre.[2] New Music most affected the theatrical genres of drama and dithyramb. The acknowledged champions of the new style were tragedians (Euripides and Agathon), or lyric poets, chiefly famous for dithyramb (Phrynis, Melanippides, Kinesias, Timotheus, Philoxenus, Crexus, and

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[1] See esp. Tim., *PMG* 791.202–3, 211–13, *PMG* 796; Eur. *Tr.* 512–15.

[2] Pl. *Leg.* 700a–701d (discussed below); Arist. *Pol.* 1342ª18; Aristox. frr. 26, 29 (da Rios); Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1140d–f, 1142d (σκηνική).

Telestes), though only Kinesias and Telestes wrote dithyramb exclusively. New Music also exerted a powerful influence on the nome (instrumental pieces with or without solo song accompaniment) which, though not strictly speaking a theatre genre, was generally composed by the same musicians who composed dithyramb, and also came to be performed in theatres at large festival competitions. As we will see, the general influence of drama upon the dithyramb and nome, indeed the 'theatricality' of New Music in the broadest sense, was enough to justify the epithet 'theatre'.

The rise of the theatre in fifth-century BC Athens had a deep impact on the economics and sociology of musical patronage, performance, and spectatorship.[3] With the building of massive theatres and the creation of annual theatrical festivals certain kinds of musical performance increased in frequency and magnificence. For the first time Greek public entertainment had outgrown aristocratic patronage. At Athens, theatrical performance depended upon a complex combination of public money, private patronage, admission charges (previously unheard of for public and religious entertainments), and the capital investment of publicly-licensed entrepreneurs. At the Great Dionysia alone roughly thirty-two talents changed hands over the course of five days, more than Hipponikos, the richest man in Greece, could earn in as many years.[4] Only large states were in a position to finance theatre.

Theatre spread quickly.[5] By the end of the fifth century Attica had at least six annual theatrical festivals, at least fifteen or sixteen by the mid-fourth, and a minimum of eighteen or nineteen in the late fourth century.[6] By the last decades of the fifth century, theatrical festivals are attested in Macedonia and are probable for

[3] All dates will be BC, unless otherwise specified.

[4] For the finance of the Great Dionysia, see Kallet (1998) 46–7, 54–5; Csapo and Slater (1995) 140–1, 287–8. The public contribution was much higher if Bremer (1991) 56 is right at setting the pay for tragic poets at a talent. On admission charges, see further Sommerstein (1997) 66; Wilson (1997*b*) 97–8. For Hipponicus, see Davies (1971) 260.

[5] The dissemination of drama through Greece has only recently begun to receive serious attention: see Csapo and Slater (1995) 1–17, 121–38; Taplin (1999); Dearden (1999); Wilson (2000*a*) 282–301; Scodel (2001); Csapo (forthcoming).

[6] Inscriptions or reliable literary evidence guarantee the following latest dates for the inclusion of drama and/or dithyramb: Great Dionysia (*c.*508); Lenaea (*c.*440); Anthesteria (*c.*330); Rural Dionysia at Anagyrous (*c.*440), Ikarion (440–415), Eleusis (late 5th cent.), Thorikos (*c.*400), Acharnai (early 4th), Salamis (early 4th),

Syracuse, Taranto, Metapontum, Argos, Eretria, and Isthmia. They were widespread in Greece by the mid-fourth century, and ubiquitous by the late fourth. We are less well informed about the spread of dithyrambic competitions, but the little evidence we have shows a comparable pattern. Though an international genre in the sixth century, the Athenian democracy seems to have been primarily responsible for turning dithyramb into a mass spectacle. Twenty dithyrambs were included in the democratic (re?)-organization of the Great Dionysia, *c.* 508. By the end of the fifth century dithyrambic contests spread to the Greater and Lesser Panathenaea, Thargelia, Hephaestia, and Prometheia, and are attested in the fourth century at three or four of the Rural Dionysia.[7] Outside Athens dithyrambic contests are attested in the fifth century at Delos and Delphi, and by the end of the fourth century at Thebes, Keos, Euboea, Iasos, and probably Thasos.[8]

All this suggests that by the last decade of the fifth century, Athens was in serious competition for top talent. For one, the tyrants of Macedon, attracted many top entertainers (allegedly Archelaus could afford to pay the epic poet Choerilus 400 drachmas a day), and made permanent residents of the New Music's best poets (Melanippides, Euripides, Agathon, and Timotheus).[9] The received opinion that smaller festivals in Attica and Greece were content with reperformances by wandering, second-rate artists is based only on a passage of Plato, which exaggerates to make a rhetorical point, and is in any case demonstrably refutable in several instances: even the Rural Dionysia secured top talent and possibly new works.[10] It was perhaps the rising demand and cost for good performers that induced the

Aixone (early 4th), Kollytos (*c.*370), Phlya (*c.*370), Peiraeus (well before 346), Aigilia (before mid-4th), Paiania (mid-4th), Halai Araphenides (341), Myrrhinous (*c.*340), Rhamnous (by late 4th), Halai Aixonides (?by late 4th).

[7] Old Oligarch *Ath. Pol* 3.4; Ieranò (1997) 49–73; Wilson (2000*a*) 32–40.

[8] Ieranò (1997) 74–86; cf. Wilson (2000*a*) 283–301.

[9] Pl. *Rep.* 568a–b, *Symp.* 172c; Arist. *Pol.* 1311^{b}33; Schol. Ar. *Ra.* 83; Ael. *VH* 13.4; Suda s.v. 'Melanippides'. For Archelaus and the theatre, see Bremer (1991) 42–4. Choerilus' pay: Istrus *ap.* Ath. 345d.

[10] Pl. *Lach.* 182–83b, cf. *Leg.* 817a–d. Against this inscriptions or contemporary or near-contemporary writers attest the presence at the Rural Dionysia of: Euripides (*IG* I^{3}.969 (Wilson (2000*a*) 132–3 gives good reasons for associating this monument with the Rural Dionysia, though this is not his conclusion); cf. Ael.

Athenian state to assume the fees of poets, actors and, possibly pipers.[11]

Leisure-class Athenians dominated dramatic poetry and were even prominent among actors until the early fourth century. But by 440–430 theatre music was performed almost entirely by working-class, foreign professionals.[12] Pipers were the first to live entirely from the proceeds of the new mass entertainment industry which would one day number 151 specialized trades.[13] Aristotle maintains that gentleman amateurs did cultivate pipe music in the pre- and post-Persian War generations, and is even able to cite the case of a choregic-class Athenian who piped in the comedy he himself sponsored in or after 457/4; but his statement that the following generation 'rejected the pipes as unworthy of free men' is a sufficient index of the growing importance of wage-earning professionals.[14] The increased frequency, scale, and distribution of theatrical entertainments now afforded musicians a comfortable living, while the theatre's very public and competitive arena conferred unprecedented opportunities for acquiring a level of celebrity and social status which an entrenched birth-elite might well envy. By the last quarter of the fifth century theatre pipers with international reputations were competing for professional distinction by virtuosity and innovation.[15] The appearance of pipers' names, even before the poets' on choregic inscriptions,

VH 2.13), Aristophanes and Sophocles (*IG* 2^2.3090), Dikaiogenes (*IG* 2^2.3092), Telephanes (*IG* 2^2.3093), Pindaros (*Thorikos* 9. 84), possibly Theodoros (*Thorikos* 8. 76), Ischandros and Sannion (Democh. *FGrH* 75 F 6a); Parmenon (Aeschin. *Tim.* 157). Cf. Wilson (2000*a*) 282.

[11] Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 75–6, 90, 93–5. For the payment of poets, see further Bremer (1991) 54–6. Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1141c explicitly connects the rise of New Music to the fact that pipers ceased to be paid directly by the poets. Afterwards pipers were chosen and possibly paid by the state, since they, like the actors, were assigned to the choregoi by lot (Dem. 21.13–14). Wilson (2000*a*) 69 thinks that the expense may have fallen to the choregos.

[12] 'There is great need for a sociological study of ancient actors. Sutton (1987) is a step in the right direction but avoids the sociological questions and expresses pessimism about the prospects of such a study. For actors and poets, see Taplin (1999) 35. For pipers, see Kemp (1966); Nordquist (1994); Scheithauer (1996); cf. also Scheithauer (1997); Wilson (1999) 74–5.

[13] Wallace (1995) 209–11; Chaniotis (1990 (1994)). Note that when Aristophanes (*PCG* fr. 696) has Aeschylus say 'I devised the dance figures for the chorus myself', this is implicit evidence for a class of professional chorodidaskaloi in Aristophanes', not in Aeschylus' day (as Anderson (1994) 119 supposes).

[14] Arist. *Pol.* 1341^{a}26–39; Wilson (1999) 93–5.

[15] Kemp (1966) 218; West (1992*a*) 366–8.

are testimony to the growth of the piper's status and independence by the early fourth century.[16] The famous piper Pronomos sits at the very centre of a cast portrait upstaging poet, choreuts, and actors on an Attic vase painting of about 400 (Fig. 6; presumably a copy of a votive painting commemorating a dramatic victory).[17] The fact that the name of Pronomos' son, Oiniades, is inscribed, uniquely for a piper, with patronymic on two Athenian monuments, shows just how much clout the new professional dynasts could wield.[18]

Pipers are the unsung heroes of the New Music. They most felt the economic pressures for virtuosity and innovation which characterized New Music, and it was doubtless these (for the most part anonymous) professionals who introduced many of the technical innovations in music and instruments which ancient tradition ascribes to the better-known poets: at any rate, the pipers Pronomos and Antigeneidas were credited with the most significant technical innovations to the pipes.[19] Because pipers never specialized in any single theatrical genre, as did almost all other theatre professionals—poets, actors, and chorus trainers—they were ideally placed to transmit musical ideas between genres, and in particular between nome, drama, and dithyramb.[20]

FIG. 6 The 'Pronomos' vase, an Attic red-figured volute-krater (*c.*400), found in Ruvo di Puglia.

[16] Wilson (2000*a*) 214.

[17] Naples, NM H 3240; *ARV*^{2} 1336 (Pronomos Ptr.); see most recently Krumeich, Pechstein and Seidensticker (1999) 562–5, with further bibliography.

[18] Wilson (2000*a*) 215.

[19] Landels (1999) 29–30, 36, and further bibliography, below, n. 54.

[20] 'There is no certainly attested case in antiquity of the same poet writing in both tragedy and comedy: see Seidensticker (1982) 14 (no sure counter-example arises from Rothwell (1994); see the reply by Olson (1997)). We hear of some poets who produced both tragedy and dithyramb or both comedy and dithyramb: Ion of Chios

Theatre changed music as it changed the piping profession. Aristocratic patronage was tradition-bound and more 'sponsor-directed'.[21] It was replaced by a complex consortium of interests which paid the piper, but lacked sufficient coherence to call his tune. It was rather the dictates of the 'star-system' which demanded novelty and virtuosity in conspicuous display. 'New Music' was chiefly characterized by innovation, variety, versatility, and a highly 'theatrical' performance style. The piper was no longer content to serve the chorus and the actors as an invisible backdrop, or to limit music's contribution to a mere accompaniment.

The rage for innovation resulted not only in technical improvements to increase the range and versatility of the pipes, kithara and lyre, but a large number of formal innovations which increased music's variety and subtlety of expression.[22] Musicians added new notes and intervals to the traditional scales, introduced new modes, and created two new octave species or genera. At the same time they broke free of traditional rules of consistency and formal symmetry. They dissolved the unity of the vocal and instrumental lines, allowing themselves some room to experiment with harmonic effects, counterpoint and ornament.[23] They moved freely from one mode to another, and from one rhythm to another, within a single composition.[24] Versatility was enhanced by discarding the structure of strophic responsion in favour of an astrophic 'free' verse. An ancient theorist speaks of liberating the music for the greater mimetic powers of professional actors and musicians (Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 918^{b}).

Because dithyramb was by nature more musical than drama, it hosted the most radical innovations. It freely borrowed musical

(*TrGF* 19 Test. 2a–b, 3); Hippias of Elis, a famous Jack-of-All-Trades (Plato *Hipp. Min.* 368c–d); Anaxandrides (Chamael. fr. 43 Wehrli); Dicaeogenes (Harp. *s.n.* Dikaiogenes; Suda d 1064; Philod. *De Poem.* 4 col. X). It is not until 100 that we find actors performing in both tragedy and comedy (Seidensticker (1982) 15–16; Ghiron-Bistagne (1976) 135). Even whole theatrical families seem never or almost never to have mixed dramatic genres (Sutton (1987) 10). Pipers by contrast specialized late and far less: see Scheithauer (1997) 113–14.

[21] Bremer (1991) 59.
[22] The best general survey is West (1992) 356–72.
[23] Barker (1995).
[24] Rhythm: Ar. *Thesm.* 121; D.H. *Comp.* 19; Kugelmeier (1996) 228–9 (with further literature on rhythmic shifts); West (1982*b*) 136–7.

ideas from nome, which allowed greater scope for musical virtuosity, since it was either purely instrumental (auletic and kitharistic nomes), or, if it involved solo song by the musician (kitharodic nome), or an accompanist (aulodic nome), it nonetheless came to include large segments of purely instrumental music. The nome first developed an astrophic and polymetric 'free' form at a time when all choral genres had strophic responsion. Melanippides, who composed in both genres, is said to have been the first to abandon strophic responsion in dithyramb and vary the choral performance with instrumental and vocal solos, including solos accompanied by the lyre in place of the traditional pipes.[25] But for its narrative and performance style, New Music borrowed directly from drama. Boardman ((1956) 19) argues that Melanippides first incorporated instrumental solos into *Marsyas*, a dithyramb narrating the contest for musical supremacy between Apollo and Marsyas, in turn displaying the god's virtuosity on the lyre and the satyr's skill on the newly invented pipes. If so, the mythical contest was not merely narrated by the chorus, but acted by the musician in the style of a dramatic *agōn*. This would be the first known occurrence of a general trend towards dramatic mimesis in choral and musical performance. Dramatization offered musicians an opportunity to display their virtuosity *conspicuously*, standing, virtually as actors, at the focal point of the narrative as well as the performance.

Musicians were eager for a larger presence in the theatre and a larger share of the audience's attention. Theophrastus names the pipers Andron of Catane and Kleolas of Thebes as the 'first inventors' of the rhythmic gyrations of the body which became commonplace by his day.[26] Pronomos is said to have 'delighted his audience somewhat excessively both with his facial expressions and with the movements of his entire body'.[27] Some pipers used dramatic effects to insert themselves more fully into a dithyrambic narrative. Timotheus' piper imitated a storm, at the climax of *Nauplios*, the screams of a woman in labour, in the *Birth Pangs of Semele*, and made a mime of dragging off the *koryphaios* in *Skylla*, doubtless while reproducing the monster's wild hisses and roars

[25] Arist. *Rh.* 1409^{b}; Barker (1984) 93; West (1992*a*) 205–6.
[26] Thphr. fr. 92 Wimmer; Stephanis (1988) 50, 262.
[27] Paus. 9.12.5–6.

through his instrument.[28] Aristotle (*Poet.* 1461^{b}30) complains of 'vulgar' pipers who wheeled about in imitation of a discus, and elsewhere (*Pol.* 1341^{b}15–18) blames such showmanship upon the tastes of 'a vulgar audience, [which] tends to debase music, so that it makes even musicians performing for it take on a certain character and transforms their bodies through movement'. Even the piper's costume could play a mimetic role: Antigeneides is said to have worn appropriately effeminate shoes and a *krokotos* while piping for Philoxenus' *Komast*.[29]

The poets encouraged this kind of role-playing by musicians. It offered them an opportunity to incorporate musical ideas which were beyond the range of the average large volunteer chorus (as all choruses were at Athens, at least, until 317). The Pratinas fragment, which should probably be dated to the late fifth century, presents a self-referentially musicological *agōn* in which the piper contends with a chorus of satyrs for the hegemony of music over words.[30] In Aristophanes' *Birds* the piper took on the role of the nightingale: an explicit parody of the New Musical style of performance, as Barker shows elsewhere in this volume. Late fifth- and early fourth-century comedy shows a clear trend towards 'metatheatrical' inclusion of the piper in the performance.[31]

Dithyrambic poets experimented with other means of enhancing the musical and dramatic quality of their compositions—generally at the cost of the chorus' traditional unity. In the dithyramboid hymn by pseudo-Arion, an 'Arion', possibly the *koryphaios*,

[28] Ath. 338a, 352a; D. Chr. 78.32; Arist. *Poet.* 1461^{b}30. Cf. the νύγλαροι with which Timotheus is said (by Pherecr. *PCG* fr. 155) to have filled Music. On νύγλαροι, see Restani (1983) 186–90; West (1992*a*) 362 and n. 26. The nome had already developed some trivial forms of performative mimesis. As early as 586, Sakadas displayed his virtuosity in performing the *Pythikos Nomos* by imitating the sounds of gnashing teeth and hissing serpents on the pipes when narrating Apollo's battle with the snake Pytho: see West (1992a) 213–14.

[29] Suda *s.n.* 'Antigeneides'. Cf. West (1992*a*) 367. For komastic transvestism, see Miller (1999).

[30] *TrGF* 4 fr. 3. For a late 5th-cent. date, see Lloyd-Jones (1966); Webster in Pickard-Cambridge (1962) 17–20; Zimmermann (1986), (1989) 29–30; Hamilton (1990). An early date is supported by Seaford (1977–8), (1984) 13–14, (1994*a*) 268 n. 349; van der Weiden (1991) 5–7; Ieranò (1997) 219–26 and Napolitano (2000). The piece is described as a 'hyporcheme' by Athenaeus who quotes it (617b–f). In Plato's *Ion* 534c, where the term is first attested, this is not a genre but a mode of composition which includes dithyrambs, enkomia, epic and iambic poetry.

[31] Taplin (1993) 70–8.

seems to interact with the rest of the chorus who play the part of dolphins.[32] Role differentiation is also apparent in the lyric duet sung by 'Agathon' and his chorus in Aristophanes' parody of Agathonian New Music in *Thesmophoriazusae*.[33] In his *Cyclops* Philoxenus went a stage further in introducing an actor to play the part of the Cyclops and sing a monody to the kithara (which he pretended to play), a duet with the chorus, and possibly a duet with a second actor playing Odysseus.[34] Aristophanes' parody of this dithyramb has the actor switching from the role of Polyphemus to that of Circe, while the chorus switch from the role of Polyphemus' sheep and goats to that of Odysseus' companions turned into pigs.[35] Dithyrambs had become fast-clip operatic drama.

Crexus mixed genres still further by introducing the recitative verse of drama into dithyramb.[36] Even the kitharodic nome became more dramatic, and certainly more dithyrambic. Timotheus added extra strings to the kithara to give it the same musical range as the pipes;[37] he altered the kitharodic nome's stately language to give it the pathos and volubility of the dithyramb;[38] he even gave it a chorus.[39] Plato, in his complaint about genre-mixing in *Laws* 700d, specifically mentions 'poets who imitated pipe-music on the kithara'. The influence of drama is also apparent in the preference of New Musical nome and dithyramb for dramatic narrative in direct speech, developing a feature of dithyrambic narration which goes back at least to Bacchylides.[40] Small wonder then that Aristotle lumps the nome and dithyramb together with tragedy

[32] *PMG* 939. See Bowra (1963) 128–9. Bowra supposes that the part of Arion is played by an actor.

[33] Ar. *Thesm.* 101–29. Cf. Mureddu (1982–3) 84.

[34] *PMG* 819, 820; Ps-Plut. *De Mus.* 1142a = Ar. *PCG* fr. 953; Sutton (1983).

[35] Ar. *Pl.* 290–321; Mureddu (1982/33) 79; Dobrov and Urios-Aparisi (1995) 168–72.

[36] Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1141a–b; Philod. *De Mus.* 4.6 (Neubecker, = X 1 ff. Kemke); Pickard-Cambridge (1962) 52; for a different view of the Philodemus passage, see Neubecker ad loc.

[37] Pherecr. *PCG* fr. 155; Paus. 3.12.9–10; Ath. 636e; Procl. *Chrest. ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 320a33 ff.; Nicom. *Harm.* 274.5. This change left no record in the artistic representation of the kithara: see Maas and Snyder (1989) 167.

[38] Plut. *De Mus.* 1132d; already begun by Phrynis according to Schönewolf (1938) 28.

[39] Clem. Al. *Strom.* 1.79.1.

[40] Direct quotation in New Music: Bassett (1931) 161; Kranz (1933) 259; Brussich (1970) 76–7; Panagl (1972); Herington (1985) 154, 156–7; Zimmermann (1989) 30; Porter (1994) 203.

and comedy in classifying mimetic arts which use all the modes of musical mimesis, or that he freely cites examples from dithyramb in his discussion of dramatic mimesis.[41]

Even dramatic music became more mimetic and more histrionic. The late plays of Euripides contain frequent astrophic and polymetric monodies. As the Aristotelian *Problems* (918b) observes, the greater complexity of astrophic and polymetric music favours trained actors over amateur citizen choruses. The extant Sophocles has no or little actor's monody; Euripides has one or two in all but six tragedies, mostly from plays datable to the late 420s onwards.[42] There is also an increase in duets between actor and chorus, and particularly an increase in astrophic and freely structured lyric exchanges: Popp finds the later forms of Euripidean exchanges 'strongly influenced by monody', and characterized by 'mimetic elements and musical effects'.[43] Doubtless the actors were as keen as the musicians to display their musical talents. These developments go a long way towards explaining the dwindling importance of the dramatic chorus to late fifth-century drama. But even the choral odes came under the spell of New Music. Astrophic choral song appears in later Euripides and is ascribed to Agathon by Aristophanes' parody in *Thesmophoriazusae*, while strophic stasima have increasingly lengthy astrophic epodes.[44] The poetry of many later Euripidean odes exemplifies the New Musical style, as we know it from the fragments of dithyramb and nome, the information given by the critics, and the comic parodies. I will argue that this New Musical style, to which we now turn our attention, is conditioned, even in its more minute idiosyncracies, by the material and economic conditions of theatre-performance in the later fifth and fourth centuries.

II PIPE MUSIC *OR* THE POETICS OF NEW MUSIC

Economic forces encouraged theatre pipers to develop their showmanship, originality, and virtuosity in performance. This meant an

[41] Arist. *Poet.* 1447^{b}24–7, 1454^{a}30–1. Cf. Kirkwood (1974) 87.

[42] See Csapo (2000) 407; Pintacuda (1978) 165–6; Privitera (1991) 153.

[43] Popp (1971) 229, 264–73 (quotations from p. 273). Sophocles has only two astrophic exchanges (*Tr.* 871–95, *TrGF* fr. 210.29–56 [*Eurypylus*]) and two astrophic epodes following strophic exchanges, both from his latest plays (*Ph.* 1169–1217, *OC* 208–53).

[44] Csapo (2000) 407.

enormous expansion in dithyramb and drama of the range and intensity of those effects which only music, and especially pipe-music, could produce. New Musical poets attempted to maximize the musical element in song, both by giving the musician free rein to strut his expertise, and by writing in a style calculated to complement and often to highlight the music, encouraging mimetic play between voice and pipes, words and sounds, verse and musical form.

The double-aulos ('pipes') might be called the 'material cause' of the new style. Wilson ((1999), (2000*b*), and in this volume) shows how stark a contrast Athens drew between the pipes and stringed instruments, especially the lyre. Though heavily overdetermined by ideological divisions within Athens, the opposition was not without some foundation in the real or perceived nature of the pipes. They were contrasted with strings both for their limitations and their versatility.

The main limitation is that pipes, unlike strings, stop the mouth. This could be interpreted as robbing a performer of his speech, of *logos*, and hence of the instrumentality of the free citizen: Aristotle objects to the use of the pipes in education because pipe music is 'orgiastic' and because 'it hinders the use of one's *logos*'.[45] But pipes also disfigure the face: the lips are puckered, the cheeks bloated, so that one becomes unrecognizable—one can be thought to lose one's identity; indeed the voice of another, of the pipes themselves, is said to emanate from the player's mouth (the reed, called 'tongue' is inserted into the player's mouth), while the piper's face is bloated until it takes on the appearance of a mask, or gorgoneion, expressing a form of Dionysiac possession.[46] The pipes thus obliterate both reason and individuality. They protrude awkwardly from the body, and set it in motion, like a tail wagging the dog, or, rather, like the Dionysiac phallus, invading and taking control of its possessor.[47] Stringed instruments by contrast embellish the voice of the player, sit with Apollonian grace upon the

[45] Arist. *Pol.* 1341^{a}; Wilson (1999) 85–95.

[46] See esp. Plato *Symp.* 215c; Arist. *Pol.* 1342^{b}; Wilson (1999). For the analogy between the mask, the gorgon and the piper: Csapo (1997) 257.

[47] For the phallic conception of the pipes: Wilson (1999) 69–70, 72, 85. For the Dionysiac conception of the phallus: Csapo (1997). Note that ancient theorists thought erections caused by an influx of air: Hopfner (1938) § 2.2.

body, decorously respect its contours, and extend, rather than diminish, its control.

The critics of New Music developed these oppositions. They treated it as a reversal of the traditional hierarchy of *logos* (= word/logic/argument) over sound. 'A song is *logos*', Plato insists, 'and mode and rhythm are to follow the words' (*Rep.* 398d). Music was, and should be, nothing more than a 'sweetener' added to language (Ar. *Poet.* 1449^{b}28–9). The opposition of song and music appears already in the 'hyporcheme' ascribed to Pratinas (*TrGF* 4 fr. 3.4–5): 'The Muse made song queen. Let the pipes dance in her train. It is a servant.' We should be cautious about thinking that the author concurs with this vindication of the sovereignty of the verbal over the musical line. The piece is written in a New Musical style, and probably a dithyramb.[48] The words are spoken by a chorus of satyrs who are better suited to parody elite critics than to serve as bona fide champions of Apollonian *logos*; moreover, the claim that the Dorian mode (or style?) is most appropriate for Dionysus has troubled many scholars who are inclined to take the satyrs' criticisms at face value.[49] The fragment preserves only the chorus' side of a debate with the piper, who may well have clinched the argument by responding with a virtuoso performance.

Most of the specific differences manifested by pipe music reveal its far greater versatility. Pipes offer a much greater range and variety than strings. Stringed instruments have only a limited number of notes (in performance musicians normally did not change the length or tension of their strings which they played open). Even a standard concert kithara had only seven strings (which the New Musicians increased to eleven or twelve). By contrast, a piper could produce many times that number of notes; while his lips and breath worked together to produce a far greater range in volume and tone colour.[50] Plato knew the pipes as the

[48] For the genre of the Pratinas fragment, see Webster in Pickard-Cambridge (1962) 20; Seaford (1977–8) 84–94; Zimmermann (1986) 145–6; Napolitano (2000). See n. 30 above.

[49] Cf. Wilson's similar caution against taking the fragments of Melanippides' *Marsyas* as representing the poet's point of view: (1999) 63. The chorus of the 'hyporcheme' are surely satyrs, *pace* Ieranò (1997) 218–26. See, most recently, Schloemann in Krumeich, Pechstein, and Seidensticker (1999) 81–7. For the values implicit in 'Dorian dance-song', see below.

[50] Landels (1999) 34–6; Barker (1987) 106–7 (referring esp. to Aristox. *Harm.* 43.1–6; Theophr. *HP* 4.11.1–7).

'most many-noted' of instruments.[51] Indeed, their range was perceived as not merely great, but absolute: the pipes were thought capable of imitating all sounds and voices, and as a result they were also deemed the most mimetic of instruments.[52] The New Musicians took advantage of the pipes' natural versatility: Euripides is said to have 'first used a large range of notes' and 'many more genera and more variety than his predecessors'.[53] Pronomos further enhanced the versatility of the pipes by a device which permitted quick shifts, possibly a rotating collar which blocked and opened holes, so that the same pair of pipes could play in all modes.[54]

Closely related is a third distinctive feature of the aulos, its volubility. Once the lyre or kithara was tuned, each string produced a clear, distinct and invariable sound. But the advance tuning of the aulos through the adjustment of the reed was just one of several factors contributing to the pitch and quality of its notes. Unlike strings, the sound produced by pipes, notoriously, depended on factors present only at the moment of performance: not just the fingering, but the pressure of the performer's breath, and the tension and position of the lips on the reed.[55] These factors were variable from moment to moment and so too were the actual sounds produced when one attempted to 'capture' a note. Aristoxenus finds the pipes useless for the theoretical study of harmonics since pipers 'for the most part fail to attain the proper tones', and indeed 'every sound produced by the pipes alters in accordance with the agencies through which it is produced'.[56] To Plato, this volubility in performance made the 'whole art of pipe-playing' a matter of practised guesswork involving 'a great deal that is uncertain/indistinct (τὸ μὴ σαφές) mixed into it and little that is sure/stable (τὸ βέβαιον)'.[57] The pipes' reputation for indistinctness

[51] Plato *Rep.* 399d. Cf. Pind. *Ol.* 7.11–2, *Pyth.* 12.19–21, *Isth.* 5.27; *PMG* 947 (Simonides?); Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1141c.

[52] Wilson (1999) 92–3; Pindar (*Pyth.* 12.19) calls the songs of the pipes 'every-voiced' (πάμφωνον).

[53] Anon. *On Tragedy* 5.39 (Browning).

[54] Paus. 9.12.5; Ath. 631e; West (1992*a*) 87; Landels (1999) 29–30, 36. A technical enlargement of the aulos' range is also attributed to the Theban Diodorus of unknown date (Poll. 4.80).

[55] Barker (1987) 106–7.

[56] Aristox. *Harm.* 43.10–24 (adapting the translation of Barker (1989) 158).

[57] Plato *Phlb.* 56a7, with the crucial discussion by Barker (1987).

and instability was only made worse by the remarkable fact that, by contrast to the distinct and clearly articulated tones of stringed instruments, the pipes glide from one note to another, giving the impression of a constant and confused flux of sound. Plato likened pipe music to a beast in flight: 'the whole art of pipe-playing hunts the proper pitch of each note (i.e. of each and every note during actual performance) by shooting at it as the note moves'.[58] 'Pipes are in flux and never stay the same'—says Aristoxenus—'more than any other instrument they wander, because of the craft of pipe-making, because of manual techniques, and because of their own peculiar nature' (*Harm.* 43.12–24). There are thus two types of perpetual movement which characterize the pipes: one arising from an inability to control the production of notes to reproduce exact tones; the other arising from the constant flux of sound as it glides from one note to the other. By nature Dionysiac, the pipes are like satyrs, the auletes of myth, whom Lissarrague ((1993) 212) describes as being in 'perpetual movement, as though they were incapable of controlling their bodies'. In contrast to the pipes, the notes of strings were thought stable and precise: the Aristotelian *Problems* (922a) recommends pipe-accompaniment to the voice, especially for bad singers, since the dissimilarity and precision of the lyre would make the singer's errors more conspicuous, as if measuring them against a 'yardstick'.

The fourth distinctive feature of the pipe music is its many-voicedness, its polyphony, or more strictly speaking, its diphony, since it is the double-pipes that were the standard instrument for theatrical performance. There is controversy about the relationship of the sounds produced by the two pipes, but vase paintings 'of auletes . . . almost always seem to show the fingers of both hands as equally busy, as though both were playing quite complex patterns of notes', and Pseudo-Plutarch's *On Music* speaks of the interplay of the pipes and the 'conversations' (διάλεκτοι) they hold with one another.[59] The pipes were thus 'many-voiced' by their very nature.[60] It is true that ancient music did not make

[58] Plato *Phlb.* 56a5–6 (trans. Barker (1987) 109, with minor adjustment).

[59] Barker (1995) 45–6, (1984) 227, n. 140, and 243; Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1144e, 1138b.

[60] It was also, of course, possible to strike several strings at once on the lyre or kithara, indeed, the pipes were even more restricted by nature since the aulos produced only two sounds simultaneously. But the number of chords available to the player of seven to eleven open strings, was very limited, and they seem not to have been used with great frequency. For chords on the kithara accompanying song, see Barker (1995) 49.

extensive use of harmonics or polyphony, but the common impression that they were totally absent or at best marginal is wrong, and largely due to the silence or hostility of our sources, since this was another realm of New Musical experimentation.[61]

A fifth distinctive feature was the aulos' capacity for uninterrupted play, that is, a capacity to sustain a single tone, or to move without pause from one tone to another. In the fifth century professional pipers developed this capacity of their instrument. Ancient sources usually explain the use of the halter or *phorbeia* by professional pipers as an aid to breath-control, designed to help regularize the flow of breath into the pipes.[62] This has long been received as evidence that the *phorbeia* helped produce softer and longer (continuous) tones (or series of notes) by preventing loss of breath around the sides of the mouthpiece and/or by helping the musician to maintain even pressure.[63] Comparative evidence suggests that the *phorbeia* did more than permit the lengthening of notes: it facilitated the technique of circular breathing, by which breath stored in the cheeks is pushed through the mouthpiece while the piper inhales through the nostrils, with the result that a piper can play indefinitely without pausing for air.[64] Vase painting frequently shows the piper's cheeks—even without the *phorbeia*—puffing up like a chipmunk's. So long as instrumental music merely followed song, pipe music's potentiality for sustained tones or phrases remained undeveloped.

New Musical verse expressed its essential musicality—indeed its essentially auletic form of musicality—at all levels of language: the phonic, the syntactic, and the semantic.

[61] Barker (1995) esp. 50.

[62] Schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 582; Suda (s.v. φόρβιον); Plut. *De Cohib. Ira* 456b–c; Simonides (cited by Plut. *loc. cit.*) fr. 177; Soph. *TrGF* fr. 768. Plutarch's alternative explanation, that the *phorbeia* was a purely cosmetic device to prevent the cheeks from puffing out indecorously, seems to owe a lot to a poetic conceit of Simonides, who recounted the story of Athena's rejection of the pipes (invented by her) when ridiculed for the way they made her cheeks puff out.

[63] Purser (1890) 357; How (1926) 104; MacDowell (1971) 211 (ad Ar. *Vesp.* 582). Howard (1893) 29–30 reasonably points to the *phorbeia*'s additional benefit in aiding to support the pipes, leaving the hands freer for play.

[64] Sachs (1956) 36; Romer (1983) 141; Paquette (1984) 33; West (1992*a*) 106–7. Cf. Canthar. *PCG* fr. 1.

Phonemes

Play with the sound of words or syllables for rhythmic or harmonic effects is found in all Greek lyric, but the purely phonic aspects of language gain unprecedented importance in New Musical verse. In part this may simply be explained through the centrality of dithyramb, since the repetition of words or syllables, for example, is typical of hymn and cultic song, especially Dionysiac song.[65] New Dithyramb and New Music conspicuously revived this feature of old cultic dithyramb.[66] Repetition is both relatively rare in Sophocles, and especially characteristic of Euripides' late style (most notably in corresponding parts of strophe and antistrophe).[67] The style also cultivated the sound echoes of homoioteleuton, assonance and alliteration.[68]

'Sound figures' generally form part of the emotive and mimetic programme of New Music. Repetition can imitate and intensify the emotional hue of the verse: in late Euripidean lyrics repetition is typical with words of high passion or urgency.[69] Mimetic intentions are often evident in the sound-play of the verse: in *Phoenissae*'s ἐκάλεσ' ἐκάλεσα βαρβάρῳ βοᾷ, ἰώ, βαρβάροις λιταῖς. βᾶθι βᾶθι (678–81) the anadiplosis, anaphora, and alliteration combine in imitation of the barbarian barking of which they speak.[70]

[65] Norden (1927) 136–7; Dodds (1960) 80; Barrett (1964); Henrichs (1982) 156; Bornmann (1993) 565–6, 574–6.

[66] Anadiplosis in New Dithyramb: Tim. *PMG* 791.129; Pratin. *TrGF* 4 fr. 1.3; Diagor. *PMG* 738.1 (Diagoras is called a διθυραμβοποιός by Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.53). Repetition was also characteristic of nome: see Procl. *Chr.* in Phot. *Bibl.* 320b12; Fleming (1977) 224. Anaphora, often together with anadiplosis: e.g. Tim. *PMG* 791.76; Pratin. *TrGF* 4 fr. 1.3; Eur. *El.* 169, *Ph.* 679–80, 686, *Or.* 323, *IA* 785, *Ba.* 143–4.

[67] Sophocles: Burton (1980) 24 (and index *s.v.* repetition); Bornmann (1993) 566–8. Euripides: Kranz (1933) 231; Breitenbach (1934) 234 ff.; Dodds (1960) 80; Bornmann (1993) 569; Porter (1994) 179.

[68] Brussich (1970) 66; Zimmermann (1992) 121; for Euripides, see Breitenbach (1934) 214 ff. This feature of New Music is parodied in Ar. *Av.* 1374, 1376, 1384–85, 1396–97, 1400.

[69] e.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 525; *El.* 585; *Ion* 1066, 1231; *Tr.* 804, 806, 840, 1066, 1077, 1090; *IT* 402; *Hel.* 118, 1118, 1163, 1462, cf. 1341; *Ph.* 679, 681, 819, 1019, 1030, 1054, 1286; *Or.* 324, 339; *IA* 183, 587; *Ba.* 68, 83, 107, 116, 152, 163, 986; and the parodies at Ar. *Ra.* 1336, 1352–5, on which see Zimmermann (1988) 42. The style is not always appreciated by modern textual critics, who, like their ancient counterparts, find the New Musical style weak in sense and syntactic economy, and are, for that reason, too ready to suspect diplography or intrusive glosses. Mastronarde (1994) (see ad *Ph.* 679) is an exception.

The prioritizing of sound over sense can be found in another feature of New Music. Traditional music is said to have respected the verse in fixing the quantity of notes, one per syllable. New Musicians notoriously assigned two or more notes to a syllable of verse ('melism'), or two or more syllables to a note. The Rainer Papyrus of Euripides *Orestes*, which probably goes back to Euripides' original score, freely stretches single syllables over two notes, as do the C group of musical fragments of tragedy, citharodic nome, or dithyramb, recently published by West.[71] In *PBerol* 6870, which according to Bélis ((1998), esp. 86) contains part of the *Mad Ajax* of Timotheus, the natural quantities of the verse are so altered by melism and silences, that scansion is of little relevance to the musical rhythm. The effect is parodied in the 'Euripidean' monody of *Frogs* (1314, 1348) where a line from *Electra* has its first syllable repeated anywhere from five to seven times. There can be little doubt that melism appeared in the Euripidean original, though Aristophanes surely exaggerates the number of repetitions.[72]

The prioritization of sound over sense can also be exemplified by the treatment of pitch accent. Dionysius cites the parodos of *Orestes* to illustrate violation of the principle that 'music thinks it proper to subordinate the words to the tune and not the tune to the

[70] Paronomasia is very common in jingling puns, esp. where sound mimics sense: see e.g. Melanipp. *PMG* 759, 761; Licymn. *PMG* 770a–b; Eur. *Hel.* 1344, *Ph.* 808–11; and the parodies at Ar. *Av.* 1401, *Ra.* 1334.

[71] West (1999) 48, 50, 53–65. The Rainer papyrus is generally accepted as evidence for Euripides' music. Anderson has recently voiced radical doubts, but his arguments are not strong, in particular his insistence that 'entries in a dramatic competition were intended for that occasion and no other' ((1994) 118, cf. 220–1). This is certainly not true of plays performed in 408. See now, Taplin (1999). The other main objection that we know of no system of musical notation from this period ((1994) 220), greatly overestimates the significance of silence, while underestimating the power of oral (and aural) tradition. But even this point is dubious. There are good reasons to date the beginning of instrumental notation to 'not much later than the mid-5th cent. and perhaps somewhat earlier' (West (1992*a*) 261), and of vocal notation to 'the late fifth or the fourth century' (West (1992*a*) 263).

[72] See esp. Pöhlmann (1960) 29–48; Borthwick (1994) 31–2. Five notes to a syllable is extravagant, and not paralleled until much later in ancient music: *POxy* 4466 has a six-note melism, *PCtYBR* 4510 has a nine-note melism (see Johnson (2000) 75).

words' (*Comp.* 11). He describes a number of instances where accented syllables are sung to the same note or a lower note than adjacent syllables. The musical papyri of *Orestes*, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, and West's 'C fragments' also show violations of speech tones, while in *PBerol* 6870 (Timotheus' *Mad Ajax?*) the music violates natural pitch nine out of ten times![73] In the parodos and first stasimon of *Orestes* the lack of strict corresponsion between pitch accent and musical tone may not indicate a stylistic variable, since the odes are strophic songs and it is generally assumed that strophic songs do not normally correspond in accent as well as metre. However Walström's study of early lyric (select odes of Sappho, Alcaeus, Alcman, and Pindar) argues that these earlier composers did tend to place words with the same accent in the corresponding parts of a strophic composition.[74] More recently a study of three tragic odes by Comotti (1989*b*) shows a tendency to preserve accent-pitch in Aeschylus and Sophocles and a relative but measurable tendency to ignore it in Euripidean drama. Landels ((1999) 124–8) makes a particularly helpful contribution to this question: he demonstrates an essential correspondence between strophe and antistrophe in the 'Ode to Man' of Sophocles' *Antigone* and concludes that in early strophic lyric generally 'some compromise was made, by delaying or advancing rises and falls of pitch in the *antistrophe*, so that essentially the same melodic outline was adapted to the different words'. The controversy does not, in any case, affect the *Iphigenia at Aulis* papyrus, which may also go back to Euripides' original, since it belongs to an epode (and is hence not strophic). In all three cases where the melodic line for an entire word survives the melody does not respect the spoken accent. Further indications of New Music's indifference to the constraints of spoken language may be apparent in the development of the new genera, if Nagy is right to claim that the intervals of the traditional enharmonic genus respected speech melody in a way that other genera did not ((1990) 102–3).

The musical papyri reveal yet another way in which the music differed from the verbal line. The *Orestes* papyrus includes

[73] For transcriptions, see West (1992*a*) 284, 286, and West (1999) 53–65 (cf. 50). For *PBerol* 6870.16–23, see Bélis (1998) (transcription, 82–2). Surviving scores (all later) appear to respect pitch accent about 85 per cent of the time (Gamberini (1962) 23–66). For pitch-accent in general, consult Allen (1973) 231–4.

[74] Wahlström (1970). But Anderson (1994) 95 analyses Pind. *Ol.* 2 and finds no pattern. Background to the question in Pintacuda (1978) 67–72.

notation for both instrument and voice and they are different.[75] The polyphonic character of the pipes was thus further extended in the relationship between the voices of the pipes and the voice of the singer, which offers a further example of a violation to the unison between voice and instrument which the critics ascribed to tradition.[76]

Syntax

The syntax of New Musical verse expresses the new priority of music over verse in other ways. The new style shows a clear preference for long periods (very often the length of the entire verse stanza), with few strong sense-pauses. Aristotle draws an explicit analogy between the 'continuous style' in prose composition (λέξις εἰρομένη) and New Dithyramb.[77] The critics regularly describe New Music, apparently both verse and music, as loose and wandering. They compare it to the unending, formless, and circuitous movements of ants.[78] A general lack of correspondence between musical rhythm and word- or phrase-ending doubtless heightened the effect.[79] New Musical syntax might best be described as agglutinative. The verse was infamous for its extravagant compounds,[80] concatenations of adjectives, nouns, or participial phrases, the stringing of subclauses, usually paratactically, often asyndetically.[81] Rejecting the logical organization and syntactic variation of hypotaxis, the poets of New Music preferred paratactic strings of parallel syntagms, as they preferred

[75] West (1992*a*) 277–8, 284–5; Barker (1995) 47.

[76] Pratin. *TrGF* 4 fr. 3.12 (with Barker (1995) 46–7, 55–6); Plato *Leg.* 812d–e.

[77] Arist. *Rh.* 1409^{a}, cf. 1409^{b}24–30; Fowler (1982) 91. Note that Demetrius uses λελυμένη for λέξις εἰρομένη: Fowler (1982) 93–4. For the use of musical terminology in rhetoric, see Chailley (1956) 151 n. 4; Restani (1983), esp. 152–4.

[78] Ar. *Thesm.* 99–100; Suda *s.v.* 'Philoxenos'.

[79] Webster (1967) 20; Porter (1994) 203.

[80] Antiphanes *PCG* fr. 205; Plato *Crat.* 409c; Arist. *Poet.* 1459^{a}8, *Rh.* 1406^{b}1–2; Demetr. *de eloc.* 91; Schol. Philost. *Vit. Apoll.* 1.17. Parodied: Ar. *Nu.* 332 ff., *Pax* 831, *Av.* 1380, 1384–5, 1389–90, 1393 ff., *Ra.* 1336 (with Dover (1993) ad loc.). See Wilamowitz (1903) 45–6; Bowra (1963) 125–6; Brussich (1970) 71–6; Collard (1991) 187 (ad Eur. *Hec.* 1056–1106); Nesselrath (1990) 243–4; Zimmermann (1992) 121. Unlike the 'heavy, powerful, and carefully managed' compound of poets like Aeschylus or Pindar, these compounds are 'Mittel, ein intellektuell Geschaffenes in die Höhe des mitreissenden Dichterpathos hinaufzusteigern': Schönewolf (1938) 25.

[81] Arist. *Rh.* 1409^{a}24; Kranz (1933) 239–30; Brussich (1970) 65; and in comic parody: Hunter (1983) 167; Zimmermann (1988) 39; Nesselrath (1990) 244. This feature dithyramb may have borrowed from nome: see Fleming (1977) 225.

concatenating strings of different rhythmic metra, to achieve an incantatory effect, accelerating or adding to the impetus of the music. By amassing short phrases and postponing the marked pause of the period, the poet abandoned natural speech rhythms in imitation of the rapid short cola and longer periods of pipe music. In this way New Music exploited the potentiality of the pipes for indefinitely sustained tones and phrases, echoing and amplifying the new auletic virtuosity in the winding and agglutinative style of its verse.

Semantics

The priority of music over logic is also apparent at the semantic level. Aristotle found the agglutinative style ugly and formless because not goal-oriented and not permitting the normal anticipations which facilitate comprehension.[82] To be sure, the style is not well-adapted to the efficient transfer of information, but this was never the objective. New Music's verse style aimed at a more musical or poetic form of communication.[83] The longer syntactic units added to the impetus of the music; they compelled the intellect to press onwards, with the surge of the music, in search of elusive grammatical closure. Unsuited to the development of clear logical progressions, the new verse cultivated a (more musical) logic of association, bypassing the intellect and appealing to the senses, the subconscious and the emotions. As the Stagyrite himself (*Pol.* 1341^{b}11–12) puts it, the professional music composed for competition was geared more to pleasure than self-improvement, just as pipe music aimed at 'a flushing of emotions (*katharsis*) rather than instruction (*mathēsis*)' (*Pol.* 1341^{a}23–4).

New Music placed a higher premium on the connotative values of words. Its vocabulary was far-flung, its expression riddling and circumlocutory.[84] It cultivated an agglutinative semantics to match

[82] Arist. *Rh.* 1409^{a-b}; Fowler (1982); cf. Restani (1983) 152.

[83] To use Jakobson's precise formulations, the new style is set towards 'emotive' and 'poetic' rather than 'referential' communication (1981) 21–9.

[84] Especially rich in archaism, glosses, and neologisms: Antiphanes *PCG* fr. 205; Schol. Ar. *Nu.* 335; Brussich (1970) 70–6; Nesselrath (1990) 250–1; Zimmermann (1992) 145–6. For its riddling language: Waern (1951) 92–104, 132–8; Brussich (1970) 67–9; Hunter (1983) 155; Nesselrath (1990) 259–64; Kugelmeier (1996) 262–4. The enigmatic style may be a development from traditional dithyramb and Dionysian art, cult, and mysteries generally (though not exclusively, since it can also

its syntax, amassing images, rather than naming concepts. For 'arrow' Timotheus says 'slender-winged, bronze-headed, string-tautened things' (*PMG* 791.30–1). The pseudo-Arion does not say 'dolphin', but 'floating, lightly leaping, snub-nosed, ruffle-necked, swift-running, whelps, beasts, music-loving marine nurslings of Nereids' (West (1982*b*) 8–9). The preference for images to concepts is typically combined with an appeal to the senses, especially to the ears and eye of the mind.[85] The imagery is sumptuous, seductive, luxurious, contributes to the aesthetic effect referred to since ancient times as *poikilia*.[86] The poetic ornamentation of the new style was conceived of as 'colours'.[87] The term reveals a further homology between poetic and musical styles. In music the term came to refer to the subtle effects produced by the use of microintervals in the new scales developed by New Musicians and later incorporated into the 'chromatic genus'.[88] Aristotle (*Pol.* 8.7.6) approved them for the gratification of the inferior audience of mechanics and labourers who could only respond to music at an emotive level. The *poikilia* of the verse was directed to the same end as the 'colours' of the music: an intoxication appropriate to Dionysiac art.

Above all it was the volubility of the verse which defied ready intelligibility. Its structural freedom permitted all manner of lurches and leaps. Sentence structure not only meandered but was susceptible to grammatical derailment: the subjects of potential main clauses were sometimes left hanging and verbless, forgotten as the verse ambled into a series of dependent relative or participial clauses.[89] A much more common and serious obstacle

be found in lyric poets like Pindar and Simonides): see esp. Seaford (1976), (1977–8), (1981) 254–5, (1986) 19–20; Casadio (1994) 96–9; and Tsantsanoglou (1997) 95, 120–3.

[85] Images: di Benedetto (1971–4). Ornamental epithets: Brussich (1970) 66. Sounds: Kranz (1933) 243; Zimmermann (1986) 150.

[86] Kranz (1933) 242–3; Zimmermann (1992) 123–4.

[87] Plato *Rep.* 601a–b, *Gorg.* 465b and *Phdr.* 239d (where the terms seem to be used with an eye to rhetoric); Hermog. *Stat.* 5 (Rabe), *ibid.* 278 (Rabe); Cic. *Brut.* 87, 298, *De Orat.* 3.25.100, ad *Quint. fr.* 2.15; Ernesti (1795) 384–5; Lausberg (1960) 511, sec. 1061; Restani (1983) 180–83; Kugelmeier (1996) 235–9. Cf. χρωννύειν and the Latin rhetorical terms *pingere* and *ornare*.

[88] Restani (1983) 177–85.

[89] Compare Eur. *El.* 432–41 and Ps.-Arion 1–21 in West (1982b) 8–9. Both cases exaggerate a tendency of hymnic invocation (cf. Mantziou (1989) 232: 'This . . . produces an unfamiliar type of hymnic invocation . . . as it starts with epithets of Poseidon and proceeds to a long reference to the dolphins').

to intelligibility were the rapid changes in both music and verse, which produced an effect of *heteroglossia*, analogous to the many-voicedness of the pipes. Because of its frequent shifts in mode, metre and manner of delivery the musical style came to be described as 'fragmented' (*melos kelasmenon* or *epikeklasmenon*).[90] The epithet might just as well have been applied to the verse, with its penchant for sudden changes of speaker through the use of direct quotation, which also entailed sudden shifts in vocabulary and diction, because of the New Music's greater interest in *ethopoeia*.[91] Plato was particularly upset by the use of direct speech in poetic narrative, alleging that it required 'all modes and all rhythms if it is to be delivered properly, since it involves all manner of shifts' (*Rep.* 397b). Indeed, the plurality of instrumental and human voices mixed freely together: instrumental solos followed, or even disrupted song.[92] The new style also cultivated abrupt shifts in narrative place, time, and mood.[93] Taken altogether, the voluble rhythm and melody, the strange vocabulary, the chaotic syntax, the vague but emotionally nuanced and coloured language, the sudden ruptures in the music, song, and narrative, and the displacement of linear argument with often rapid and baffling concatenations of images—all could conspire to create a dizzying effect of giddiness, if not outright hysteria.

The critics especially attacked New Dithyramb for volubility, volatility, lack of substance, and aimlessness. Plutarch speaks of dithyramb as 'full of shifts which contain wandering and wrenching displacement' (*Mor.* 389a). Aristotle warns speech writers away from the style of dithyrambic prologues because 'the undefined wanders aimlessly' (*Rh.* 1415[a]). The comic poets especially ridiculed the songs for lightness, airiness, and mistiness.[94] The 'Spartan Decree' against the New Music of Timotheus condemns his music's 'emptiness'.[95] Aristotle remarks that it is 'full of noise';

[90] Ps.-Plut. *de mus.* 1138c. For experiment with forms of delivery, see on Crexus, above, n. 36.
[91] See n. 40, above.
[92] As appears to happen in *PBerol* 6870. See Bélis (1998) 78–85 (cf. also above, p. 223).
[93] Panagl (1971) 235–6.
[94] Ar. *Pax* 827, *Nu.* 332 ff., *Av.* 1388–90 (with scholia); Schol. Ar. *Thesm.* 100; Ath. 551d. Cf. Zimmermann (1992) 119–21; Kugelmeier (1996) 231–5.
[95] See Marzi (1988) 268.

Dionysius that it is 'full of sound and high sentence, but signifies little'.[96] It told tales like an idiot: the expression 'you make even less sense than a dithyramb' was apparently proverbial.[97]

III 'PEOPLE'S MUSIC' *OR* THE POLITICS OF NEW MUSIC

It would be difficult to argue that politics motivated New Music in any fundamental way. The poets and musicians were mainly interested in exploring the potentialities of musical form. But politics was very much part of New Music's reception. Growing up, as it did, in the polarized atmosphere of Athens' 'radical democracy', New Music's programme of 'liberating' music and its rejection of tradition was more than a little suggestive.

A political interpretation of New Music was encouraged, above all, by the language used to describe its innovations. The boldest of these were marked by terms like *polychordia*, *polytrētia*, *polymetria*, *polyharmonia*, *polychrōmia*, *polykampteia*, *polyeideia*, *polyphōnia*, which stressed the way that New Music was pluriform and broadly inclusive.[98] Nearly as common are words like *metaballein*, *kamptein*, *aiolein*, *poikillein*, which stress the music's heterogeneity, variability, and adaptability.[99] The character of the New Music was typically described by words like *apolelumenos* or *eklelumenos* which signified the 'liberation' of the verse from formal structures such as strophic responsion, or by words like *aneimenos* and *chalaros*, which are used of the loosening of the strings of the *kithara*, and hence of the tunings and modes based on these shorter intervals, but imply a release from constraints or a loosening of

[96] Arist. *Rh.* 1406[b]1 f.; D.H. *De Admir. Vi Dicendi in Dem.* 7, cf. 24, *Ep. ad Pomp.* 2 and Plato *Phdr.* 241e.
[97] *PCG* fr. adesp. 843.
[98] *Polychordia*: Plato *Rep.* 399c–d, *Leg.* 812d; Artemon *ap.* Ath. 636e; 'Spartan decree' *ap.* Boeth. *De Inst. Mus.* 1.1; Psel. *De Trag.* 5 Browning; cf. Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1136d. *Polytrētia*: Poll. 4.80. *Polymetria*: Ath. 608e; cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1447[b]21, 1460[a]2. *Polyharmonia*: Plato *Rep.* 399c–d; *Polychrōmia*: Psel. *De Trag.* 5 Browning. *Polykampteia*: Poll. 4.66. *Polyeideia*: Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 918[b]16; Phld. *Mus.* col. IB 40 (= p. 64 Kemke); Psel. *De Trag.* 5 Browning. *Polyphōnia*: Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1141c; 'Spartan decree' *ap.* Boeth. *De Inst. Mus.* 1.1; cf. Plato *Leg.* 812d (*heterophōnia*).
[99] Tim. *PMG* 802; Ar. *Nub* 869–70; Pherecr. *PCG* fr. 155.14–15; Plato *Leg.* 812d; Arist. *Metaph.* 993b15; Ps.-Plut. *de mus.* 1141c, 1142d; Abert (1899) 81–2; Winnington-Ingram (1936) 19–21; Düring (1945) 184; Restani (1983) 157–77; Zimmermann (1992) 140–1, (1993) 52; Kugelmeier (1996) 212–16, 249–53. For the meaning and use of *aiolos*: Dyer (1964) 127–9; Anderson (1994) 90–2.

bonds.[100] If the terminology does not go back to the innovators themselves, there can be little doubt that they embraced it, since, for the broader public, pluralism, change, and liberation had positive value in late fifth-century Athens (and other parts of Greece touched by democratic ideology). New Musicians employed the terms to flag the abundance, variety, and variability in their verse.[101]

It was the critics who politicized the music. Though their attacks on all aspects of New Musical performance are as multifarious and inventive as the New Music itself, there are three strategies of defamation which seem to dominate the written record of their struggle. One is play with language. The critics contested New Musical terminology, cultivated its negative ethical and political meanings, and twisted 'liberation' words in the direction of 'indiscipline' and 'anarchy', 'change' words in the direction of 'lack of control' and 'revolution', and 'plurality' words in the direction of 'excess' and 'mob-rule'. The second is theoretical speculation on the ethical and political effects of music. The elite theorists characterized New Music and its practitioners as effeminate, barbarous, and vulgar, and likely to produce these same qualities in its audiences. The third is historical fiction. The critics invented a timeless musical tradition opposed to New Music in every way: manly, very Greek, and noble.

Male vs. Female

About 440 Damon claimed that music affects the movements of the soul and thereby affects character, for good or ill. Aristides Quintilianus reports that Damon labelled specific notes male or female according to their ethical effects, and specific scales male or female according to the proportion of male or female notes. If not Damon himself, then Damon's followers—the music professors (*harmonikoi*), Plato, Aristotle, Heraclides, Aristoxenus, and Diogenes of Seleucia—all accepted a gendered classification of

[100] Düring (1945) 180; LSJ *s.v.* ἀνίημι II 6, 7; Pherecr. *PCG* fr. 155.4; Arist. *Pol.* 1340^{b}3–7, 1342^{b}22; Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1126e, 1136e; Heph. *Poem.* 3.3; Suda *s.v.* Ἀγαθώνιος αὔλησις.

[101] e.g. Tim. *PMG* 791.232, 221; Telest. *PMG* 805c (on which see Wilson (1999) 68), 806.3, 808.4; *PBerol* 13270, l. 8, with Bravo (1997) 72–99. Pratin. *PMG* 712 (doubtless the New Musical Pratinas) puns on αἰολίζειν and the Aeolian mode. Cf. comic parody, e.g. Ar. *Ra.* 245, 247–8.

modes or genera.[102] To this Damonian chorus Philodemus justly adds 'the comic poets' (*De Mus.* 4.8 Neubecker).

We are fortunate to have remnants of both sides in the debate on the ethical effects of music. A papyrus preserves a protest, by a theoretician, probably of the fourth-century, who attacks the *harmonikoi* for claiming that 'some melodies make people disciplined, others make them sensible, others just, others manly and others cowardly'.[103] The view that music has no ethical, only an aesthetic function, was probably picked up by the Epicureans, but the tradition does not resurface in extant literature before Philodemus.[104]

Both modes and genera remain at issue throughout the long history of the debate. Though earlier theorists seem to have located the chief expression of music's ethical quality in the modes, later theorists, particularly after Aristoxenus, placed it in the genera.[105] The Hibeh sophist also names the genera as specifically at issue: '[The *harmonikoi*] are hardly conscious of the fact that the chromatic genus could not produce cowards any more than the enharmonic could make its users manly' (15–17).

It is fairly clear that much of the elaboration of Damonian theory was directed against New Music's experimentation with 'colours', adding new notes, mixing scales, and especially its emotionalism and sensuality. 'Colours' were particularly associated with women and with Agathon. Plato complains of mixing men's speech with 'women's colours and songs' (*Laws* 669c). Plutarch identifies Agathon's introduction of the chromatic genus into tragedy as the chief reason for the general censure of Agathon's music as effeminate.[106] Philodemus (*De Mus.* 4.8 Neubecker) would later protest against the views of Diogenes of Seleucia, and (through him) against Heraclides and the whole Damonian tradition, that:

> Music in itself does not produce the effects that he asserts as if an absolute certainty, and it does not tempt men or women to disgraceful forms of intercourse, nor tempt adolescent youths to adopt the female role. Neither

[102] See Wallace (1991) 48–9.

[103] *PHibeh* 13. See West (1992*b*). The *harmonikoi* are probably to be equated with 'the followers of Damon': Wallace (1991) 44 and n. 42.

[104] See Rispoli (1991).

[105] Thorp (1991).

[106] Plut. *Mor.* 645e. Psellus (*De Trag.* 5 Browning) says that no one used 'colour' before the time of Euripides.

he nor the comic poets have shown anything of the sort in the music of Agathon or Democritus; they merely allege it.

Indeed the comic poets leave no doubt that Agathon was part of this debate by the late fifth century. They ridiculed Agathon 'for softness and effeminacy' (εἰς μαλακίαν ... εἰς θηλύτητα, *TrGF* 39 Test. 11, 12). Doubtless this had something to do with the fact that Agathon was a famous *pais kalos* in his day, but the caricature owes just as much to contemporary music criticism. In *Gerytades* Aristophanes appears to have called effeminate pipe music 'Agathonian'; the expression apparently became proverbial for music that was 'soft and loose' (μαλακὴ καὶ ἐκλελυμένη).[107] In *Thesmophoriazusae* it is not just Agathon, but his song that is 'womanish' (131). The response of the Inlaw to the sound of Agathon's song makes it likely that Aristophanes is drawing upon Damonian theory: listening to its erotic and effeminate tones caused 'a sexual itch to enter into [his] very fundament' (*Thesm.* 133).[108]

Greeks vs. Barbarians

In Greek taxonomies *genos* tends to refer to the broadest categories: in biology, it divides the animal kingdom into male and female; in music the division into *genē* cuts across the system of modes. The names of the musical modes are ethnic, but gendered language usually expresses their ethical values. Modes with Greek names were more manly; modes with eastern names were effeminate. Plato saw the Dorian mode as 'the only true Greek mode', an expression of manliness, nobility, and self-control.[109] To these he opposed the Mixolydian, Tense Lydian, and Ionian as effeminate, vulgar, and self-indulgent, 'useless', he says 'even to respectable women, let alone men' (*Rep.* 398d). For Aristotle this is not schematic enough. He protested that Plato was willing to allow

[107] Ar. *PCG* fr. 178 where several sources specify Agathon's pipe music as the object of criticism, while others abbreviate to Agathon himself.

[108] Ar. *Nub.* 648–51 also makes comic use of Damonian theory. See Wallace (1991) 46.

[109] Plato *Lach.* 188d (quotation), 193d, *Rep.* 398e–9c, *Ep.* 7.336e. Pindar is said to have called Dorian song 'most dignified' (fr. 67 Snell). Damon, or Pythagoras, is said to have quelled a riot by ordering music to be played in the Dorian mode (the drunken youths had been incited by listening to the Phrygian mode). See Pagliara (2000) 193–201.

the Phrygian mode into his republic although 'among modes the Phrygian has the same effect as the pipe among instruments: both are orgiastic and emotional' (*Pol.* 1342^{a}32–^{b}3) in explicit contrast, of course, to the Dorian, which is 'most steadfast and has an especially manly spirit' (1342^{b}13).

Critics forced a stark opposition between the Dorian and Phrygian modes. The two ethnic labels, placed in opposition, had enough mythical and historical resonance to give critics a convincing symbolic template for shaping broad ethical distinctions between New Music and 'tradition'. Plato was not too subtle to accept the division between Greek and Asiatic modes, or to reduce the only 'real Greek' mode to the Dorian, but he knew too much about musical practice to allow the Phrygian to stand as the Asiatic mode *par excellence*.[110] But earlier critics may already have achieved a final reduction of musical modes to this overarching opposition, and it is, in any case, well-prepared by the dithyrambic poets themselves: Melanippides' contest between Apollo on the lyre and the Phrygian Marsyas on pipes (mentioned above, p. 213); Pratinas' opposition of New Music to 'Dorian dance-song' (*TrGF* 4 fr. 3.17); and Telestes' praise of the 'Phrygian', who, (somewhat confusingly) 'first composed the Lydian song as a rival to the Dorian Muse' (*PMG* 806). A reductive binarism in the theory of modes was certainly commonplace by the time of Aristotle, when 'some thinkers', to Aristotle's evident approval, opposed the Dorian and Phrygian as the only 'pure' modes, and regarded all others as mere variations on one or the other (*Pol.* 1290^{a}19–29). The schematism had advanced so far that Aristotle could claim that dithyramb, like the pipes,[111] was 'a Phrygian thing by general consensus'.[112] He cites unnamed experts who illustrate this

[110] On the 'contradiction' in Plato, see most recently Gostoli (1995), Pagliara (2000). Scholars tend to assume that Aristotle and others are accurately reflecting, not actively creating, the character and meaning of the Phrygian mode.

[111] The sources insist upon a Phrygian origin for the pipes: Huchzermeyer (1931) 14, n. 57. Cf. West (1992*a*) 330–1. Athenaeus exercises a well-trained scholarly reflex in citing *Iliad* 18.495 to show that 'Homer ascribes the pipes to the barbarians' (i.e. 'Phrygian' Trojans). The actual origin of the pipes is not all that clear, see West (1992*a*) 81–2. There were competing, but evidently less attractive, traditions which localized the origin of the pipes in Greece: e.g. Troizen (Paus. 2.31.3), or Thebes (see Wilson (1999) 61).

[112] Arist. *Pol.* 1342^{b}7. Cf. *Vit. Soph.* 23 (citing Aristoxenus), and Anon. *De Trag.* 5 Browning where Sophocles is said to have used the Phrygian mode in a 'more dithyrambic style' (but this treatise is considerably less schematic than Aristotle,

proposition by asserting that no one could possibly compose a dithyramb in the Dorian mode: of this, says Aristotle, Philoxenus is proof because he attempted to do just this with *Mysians*, 'but failed and fell naturally back into the Phrygian as that suitable for his composition' (1342^{b}8–12). Apparently, for Aristotle and his sources, Dorian and Phrygian were so mutually exclusive that to prove the dithyramb unDorian was tantamount to proving it very Phrygian. Aristotle's student Heraclides of Pontus attained the ultimate seamless perfection in his ordering of ethno-ethical oppositions. He assigns pristine virtue to the Dorian, Aeolian, and Ionian modes and claims that the Phrygian and Lydian were brought to Greece by barbarian immigrants: ethically best, of course, was the Dorian, most 'manly and grandiose, not diffuse or giddy, but sombre and severe, not embellished (*poikilon*) and variegated (*polytropon*)'—not, one need hardly say, like the New Music.[113]

The critics pursued this cultural work with little regard for musical reality. It is, incidentally, not true that dithyrambs could not be written in the Dorian mode and also not true that Philoxenus failed in the attempt.[114] Aristoxenus, who was generally more interested in technical than ideological argument, protested against the critics' claims that it was only late degenerate tragedians who introduced the Asiatic modes, or that the Dorian mode was always controlled, unemotional and manly. He pointed out, on the one hand, that early tragedy used Mixolydian, Ionian, and Slack Lydian modes, and, on the other, that the Dorian mode was used for maiden choruses, tragic laments, and love songs (fr. 82 Wehrli).[115] Not that Aristoxenus rejected the theory of music's ethical effects. In the spirit of Hellenism he shifted the ethical burden from race to class, and from mode to genus. The threat of cultural barbarization was entirely internalized: in his *Sympotic Miscellanies* Aristoxenus' cultivated 'few' share fond memories of what music was like in the good old days, so very different from the

since it identifies the Hypophrygian and Hypodorian as most suited to dithyramb, and claims Agathon first introduced them to tragedy; cf. Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 922^{b}5).

[113] Heraclid. Pont. fr. 163. Cf. Ath. 624b.

[114] See West (1992*a*) 181, 364–5. A choregic epigram from the early 5th cent., before such things were problematized, commemorates a dithyramb accompanied by 'pure Dorian pipes' (*Anth. Pal.* 13.28.7–8).

[115] Cf. Anon. *De Trag.* 5; Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1137a.

degeneracy of the present 'now that the theatres have been thoroughly barbarized and this "People's Music" (πάνδημος μουσική) has advanced to massive corruption' (fr. 28 da Rios).

Old Oligarchs vs. New Democrats

Plato's political discourse is filled with metaphors from music. We need a close study of his application to democracy of the standard terms used to characterize New Music—like ποικίλος, and πολυειδής (e.g. Plato *Rep.* 557b–c). Or should we call it metonymy rather than metaphor, since Plato, like Damon, ascribed to music and dance the primary responsibility for instilling ethical qualities into people and classes? In the ninth book of his *Republic*, Plato describes his ideal state as a concord between the three divisions of the citizen body, which depends on the concord between the three parts of the soul in the individual constitution of the members of each class, and this in turn depends on training, especially musical education. Here and elsewhere, Plato repeatedly employs musical terms for 'harmony' and 'disharmony' both in the individual soul and in the hierarchy of the state.[116] The homology between music, the soul, and the state has most to do with the hierarchy of control: the words of the song must rule the music, the logical part of the soul must rule the emotional, and the educated elite must rule the masses. In each case *logos* must keep in check the forces of disorder: the purely aural parts of music, the appetitive part of the soul, and the disorderly masses.[117] It does so by enlisting the aid of the middle term in each of these hierarchies: that part of music, the individual, and the state which belongs to the higher emotions, and is responsible for action. Plato's relentlessly schematic logic directly connects dance, individual valour, and military efficiency. Not all these associations are original with Plato; in large part he merely elaborates the equation between musical and political revolution which he ascribes to Damon

[116] For συμφωνεῖν and cognates meaning to be self-consistent: Plato *Lach.* 188c–d, 193d–e; *Cra.* 433b; *Ep.* 7.332d–e; *Leg.* 689d. For συμφωνεῖν and cognates used to refer to the concord of the bodily passions with the reason: *Rep.* 430e, 591d; *Leg.* 653b; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1334^{b}10. συμφωνεῖν used of the concord of the state or confederacies: Plato *Leg.* 691a, 693. διαφωνεῖν or ἀσυμφωνεῖν and compounds: Plato *Gorg.* 482b–c; *Leg.* 689a, 691a. πλημμέλεια and its cognates used of social discord and discord within the individual: Plato *Leg.* 689e, 691a. See also Murray in this volume.

[117] Plato *Rep.* 424c–444e, 543a–592b; *Leg.* 669–70a, 689a–e; *Plt.* 291a–b.

(*Rep.* 424c): 'One must beware of changing to a new form of music, since this puts at risk the entire social structure. For the forms of music are never disturbed without unsettling the very constitution of the state. So says Damon and I believe him.'

Plato makes no secret of his tastes in music. If there is one thing that characterizes them all, it is violent antipathy to every feature of New Musical style. In his ideal state he would ban: pipe music (*Rep.* 399d, cf. *Gorg.* 501e), musical innovation (*Leg.* 816c), Dionysiac music and dance (*Leg.* 815c–d),[118] music unaccompanied by words (*Leg.* 669d–70a), mode and rhythm which does not follow the verbal line (*Rep.* 400d, *Leg.* 669e), the use of more than one note per syllable (*Leg.* 812d), direct speech or vocal mimesis (*Rep.* 392c–96e), modulations in music or violent changes in the motion of dance (*Leg.* 814e–16c), polyphony (ἑτεροφωνία) or any sort of embellishment (ποικιλία) in melody or rhythm (*Leg.* 812d–e), and specifically polychordia (*Rep.* 399c), polyharmonia (*Rep.* 397c, 399c), polymetry (*Rep.* 397c, 399e), and 'colours' (*Leg.* 655a).

New Music had become a symbol of all that was ill in democracy. It is easy to see why. In an age where elite wealth and leadership were increasingly subject to democratic control, the maintenance of class distinction depended increasingly upon claims of ethical and cultural superiority. But elite cultural superiority, at least, was threatened by the rise of professionalism in many branches of the arts, and especially the music of the theatre. By the later fifth century a gentleman's musical accomplishments looked slim beside musicians from plebeian backgrounds, who acquired both wealth and fame by performing to the assembled demos in the theatre. The elite could only maintain their claim to cultural superiority in this domain by separating 'good' from 'bad' music, which they did, not only by questioning the musical and ethical values of every innovation, but also by demonizing the instrument, performers, and audiences of New Music. Wilson examines the demonization of the aulos in this volume and elsewhere.[119] Auletes were accused of effeminacy, luxuriance, corruption, incontinence, uncontrolled and irrational behaviour, even brain-damage from blowing too much.[120] Professionalism itself was the object of most particular contempt: it was a touchstone of vulgarity to play an instrument 'too well', or for money, or for theatre audiences.[121] The attitude is well summed up by Pseudo-Plutarch, *On Music* 1135c: 'Crexus, Timotheus, and Philoxenus and the poets of that generation became more vulgar and innovative, pursuing what is now called the "popular" and "mercenary" style.'[122] Ultimately it was the masses themselves, who, in the Old Oligarch's words, 'destroyed respect for those practising music'; Plato firmly blamed the 'theatre mob', coining the phrase 'theatrocracy', for cultural democracy; Aristotle assigned the degeneration of music to the tastes and needs of the audience of 'handworkers'.[123]

The protestations of these touchy aristocrats reflect more upon their own ideological makeup than upon musical realities. Scholars would do well to be more sceptical of what they say, not only about New Music, but about musical tradition. The elite critics invented a musical past in which all was simplicity and order: the catchwords 'simplicity' (*haplotēs*), and 'good order' (*eutaxia*, or *eukosmia*) stand in diametric opposition to New Music's language of plurality, complexity, and liberation.[124] Few doubted the general scheme of this myth-history: even pipe music according to Pseudo-Plutarch 'changed from a more simple to a more complex form' (1141c,

[118] Note that, nonetheless, some provision is made for Dionysiac choruses, but of old men only, to help renew the fire of youth (*Leg.* 665a–666c).

[119] Wilson (1999) and this volume; Zimmermann (1986) 152–3, (1992) 125. Note the implicit opposition of *logos* to pipe music in the famous anecdote about Alcibiades' rejection of the pipes (Plut. *Alc.* 2; cf. Plato *Alc.* 1.106e; Pamphila *FHG* 3.521.9): αὐλείτωσαν οὖν Θηβαίων παῖδες· διαλέγεσθαι γὰρ οὐκ ἴασιν. The opposition of Theban piping to Athenian *logos* was a cliché: Wilson (1999).

[120] Phryn. Com. *PCG* fr. 67; Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 956^{b}11; Ath. 337e–f.

[121] Pratin. *TrGF* 4 fr. 3.14 (with Hartungs's emendation *thes*, worker for a daily wage, used of the pipe—Ath. 617b claims that Pratinas composed the piece through indignation at the way 'wage-earning' pipers and choreuts invaded the dancing places); Arist. *Pol.* 1341^{b}8–18 (cf. 1337^{b}1–21, 1339^{b}5–10, and Plato *Leg.* 809e–810a); Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 956^{b}; Ath. 631f; Plut. *Per.* 1.4–5; Suda *s.v.* 'Arabios angelos'; Apostol. 3.70.71. The 'vulgarity (*amousia*) of the aulete' became proverbial (Lucian *Astr.* 2).

[122] The word θεματικόν here translated as 'mercenary', literally refers to musical and dramatic contests which offered straight cash prizes, rather than crowns. Though 'thematic' contests might be disprized as contests for money rather than honour, the difference was more ideological than real, since even winners of crown-contests would normally melt down the (gold or silver) crowns to recover their cash value.

[123] Old Oligarch, *Ath. Pol.* 13. For the translation, cf. Henderson (1990) 278 and n. 16. Arist. *Pol.* 1341^{b}7–18. For the citation of Plato, see below.

[124] One might also note the use of *oligo-* compounds to counter the *poly-* compounds of New Musical terminology. In Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1135d, for example, New Music is said to have wrecked the *oligochordia* of the 'noble' ancient music.

ἀφ' ἁπλουστέρας εἰς ποικιλωτέραν); 'even the dithyramb was orderly (*tetagmenos*)' before Philoxenus, Timotheus, and Telestes (Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 19). The Greater Argument of *Clouds* characterized the music of the previous generation as 'orderliness' (*eutaxia*) consisting in the singing of songs and modes handed down by 'our fathers', who rewarded with a sound thrashing any who attempted a modulation *à la* Phrynis (963–72). In Pherecrates' *Cheiron* the change in Music is pictured as a loss of innocence after a series of violent rapes by Melanippides, Kinesias, Phrynis, and Timotheus (*PCG* fr. 155).

The words for 'order' used by the Greater Argument, *taxis*, *kosmos*, and other words from the same roots, appear with great frequency in discussions of music and its ethical effects from the time of Aristophanes until late antiquity. Their appearance in musical discussions has less to do with their appropriateness to music or dance, than to the words' moral, military, and political connotations. In these domains they are generally used of the subordination of the individual and his emotional impulses to a preordained or ideal 'order'. For classical Greeks this was archetypically the order of the hoplite battle line. *Eutaxia* and *eukosmia* therefore implied knowing one's place and keeping to it through the proper exercise of self-control and self-denial.

Eutaxia and *eukosmia* were crucial to the self-conception of the ancient elite. By contrast, elites represented the *demos* as completely lacking in this quality, through deficiency of both nature and education. The Old Oligarch, significantly, joins 'wickedness', 'lack of education', and 'lack of order' (*ataxia*) as the qualities which best characterize the Athenian *dēmos* (*Ath. Pol.* 5). 'Lack of order' is also characteristic of the depraved and the young.[125] Plato especially regarded dance and song as the primary vehicles for teaching the young 'good order'.[126] His musical reforms were designed precisely to put *taxis* back into music.[127] *Taxis* was deemed crucial to hoplite warfare, indeed its necessary condition,[128] and so an elaborate analogy was developed between choral formation and hoplite formation, freely trading vocabulary and tactics from one sphere to another.[129]

'Order' was the outward, public manifestation of *sōphrosynē*, 'self-discipline', which was the aristocratic virtue *par excellence*—the word is used *tout court* to denote oligarchy—and little wonder, since no social hierarchy could survive without it: *sōphrosynē* meant knowing your place and acting accordingly.[130] *Sōphrosynē* also distinguished men from women and Greeks from barbarians. The lack of this quality among the democratic plebs made them dangerous even to themselves, morally obliging their betters to impose discipline for everyone's good. And just as discipline meant submission to the laws of tradition, music too had its *nomoi* (both 'laws' and 'traditional melodic patterns', viz. nomes).[131] The critics claimed that the same word meant both 'nome' and 'law': because early nomes were in fact 'laws' in some sense; because the first laws were sung for mnemonic reasons (allegedly still a practice in Crete); because the melodic patterns were protected by law against innovation; or because traditional nomes helped establish the rule of law.[132] The pun, if not the theoretical baggage, has been traced as far back as Aeschylus; it is

[125] Plato *Leg.* 664e–65a, 840e, 897d.

[126] See esp. Plato *Rep.* 401e–403a, 413e, 425a; *Leg.* 659d–60a, 664e–65a. Cf. 'Cheiron' *ap.* Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1146b. At some point grammarians adopted the belief that in Dorian lands schools were called 'dancing places' (*choroi*) and schoolmasters 'dance-masters' (*choregoi*): see Poll. 9.41. The ideas possibly go back to Damon or the *harmonikoi* (see the language of Ath. 628d, who may still be citing 'the students of Damon').

[127] See esp. *Leg.* 802c.

[128] Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.7; Arist. *Pol.* 1297^{b}18–22.

[129] See Winkler (1990*a*) 50–3; D'Alfonso (1994) 27. Also probably relevant (but unavailable to me) is Koller (1954) 25 ff. The degree to which *taxis* was necessary to naval warfare was hotly contested: Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.5.6), who was a military man, recognized the importance of *taxis* in naval manoeuvres and describes sailors as attentively waiting for commands 'like choreuts'; but elite voices from the last quarter of the fifth century onwards regularly characterize the navy, the military arm of the lower classes, as an undisciplined mob: see Thuc. 8.72.2, 48.3, 86.5; Eur. *Hec.* 607 (Hecuba speaks), *Tr.* 686–93 (Hecuba again); Plato *Leg.* 706c–707b; Arist. *Pol.* 1291^{b}20–24, 1304a22, 1327^{b}7–8; Strauss (1996), esp. 316–17. Note that Aristophanes' 'Aeschylus' specifically blames Euripides for the indiscipline of contemporary sailors (*Ra.* 1069–1073; cf. Csapo (2002) 132). Rancière (1995) 1 is of the opinion that 'the whole political project of Platonism can be conceived as an anti-maritime polemic'.

[130] North (1966) 44, 102, 111–12. Plato's oligarchic man prides himself on being 'exceedingly obedient to his commanders, but eager to command' (*Rep.* 549a). For the link between *eutaxia*, *eukosmia* and *sōphrosynē*, see esp. Thuc. 1.84.3, Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.21, Aeschin. 1.22. At Plato *Prt.* 326a it is the function of the music teacher to teach *sōphrosynē*. Cf. Ar. *Nub.* 962–4.

[131] West (1992*a*) 215–17; Anderson (1994) 119.

[132] Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 19.28; Ael. *VH* 2.39; Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1133c, 1146b; Plato *Rep.* 424d, *Leg.* 700b, 799e; Phld. *De Mus.* 18.31–5, 85.49–86.19 Kemke; Plut. *Lyc.* 4, 21; Suda *s.v.* μετὰ Λέσβιον ᾠδόν; *EM s.v.* νόμος.

a little more surprising to find it in the Phrygian eunuch's song in *Orestes*, and the reference to *eunomia* which ends Timotheus *Persai*, and one can only suppose that, in these flagship New Musical performances, Euripides and Timotheus are taunting their critics.[133]

The utopic impulse which inspired these various explanations of the homonomy of 'law' and 'nome' also inspired the invention of a musical prehistory, which placed the nome at the very heart of the socially and ethically perfect music wrecked by the New Musicians, and which could justify, when needed, a systematic opposition of nome to dithyramb.[134] Plato's *Laws* (700a–701d) describes how the New Music's transformation of the nome was at the same time a transgression against natural law as embodied in traditional music and in traditional society.[135] Earlier Athenians had been 'willing slaves to the *nomoi*' (698b) at a time when Athens had a moderate constitution and when the genres and forms of music were fixed and non-transferable. Audiences had once been governed by internal and external discipline: in the old days 'the majority of the citizens wished to be governed in an orderly fashion' (700d). But then, buoyed by success in the Persian Wars, Athens 'pushed the majority towards every form of liberty' (699e). Traditional music and dance changed because of a search for new and 'disorderly' pleasures (657b). The poets themselves were 'the originators of this amusical lawlessness', because they were 'excessively given to the pursuit of pleasure' (in *Gorg.* 501e–502c pipe music, dithyramb, kitharistic, Kinesias and tragedy, are all specifically condemned for 'gratifying the mob'; in the pseudo-Platonic *Minos* (320 f) tragedy is 'most delicious to the *demos*'). The poets mixed genres, imitated one instrument with another, and mixed everything together. They claimed that music had no standard of correctness, but the listener's pleasure. As a result, the plebs in the theatres turned from a silent congregation to a shouting mob as if they knew what was *kalon*. 'Instead of an

[133] For Aeschylus, see Fleming (1977); Eur. *Or.* 1426, 1430 (cf. Comotti in de Finis 57 f.); on the pun in Tim. *PMG* 791.240, see discussions by Bassett (1931), Korzeniewski (1974) and (against any political connotation) Jannsen (1989) 20, 148. Purely innocent punning on *nomos* can be found at Ath. 352b and Eub. *PCG* fr. 106.3 (though in a dithyrambizing context: see Nesselrath (1990) 264).

[134] Of which we have a very garbled echo preserved in Procl. *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 5. 320a–b, 161, 12–30 Henry. See Ieranò (1997) 155–9.

[135] Cf. Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1132e.

aristocracy, a corrupt theatrocracy came into existence' (701a). And from this, thinking they knew something, the plebs became fearless and audacious and ceased to be governed by their betters.

Musical self-indulgence was thus not only endemic to democracy, it actually created democracy; theatrocracy and democracy are necessarily linked, since the former is the cultural and the latter the political face of the indiscipline which arises when the masses (the analogue of the appetitive portion of the soul)[136] are permitted to run amuck. Democratic culture was responsible for the degeneration of music everywhere except in Sparta (*Leg.* 657b, 660b). Nostalgic and embittered elites throughout Greece, encouraged doubtless by Sparta's extreme cultural conservatism, its rigidly hierarchic social and political structure, and its occasional support for oligarchy, elected Sparta (and often also Crete) to serve as an antidemocratic utopia and a remnant of bygone order and simplicity in politics, ethics, and music—indeed the paradigmatic proof that good politics, good ethics, and good music were mutually implicative.[137] Political order and moral discipline presupposed an orderly and disciplined music: for the ancient critics, as Nagy ((1990) 367–8) observes, 'the very constitution of society, as visualized in the traditions of . . . Sparta, is choral performance'.

There are doubtless some abused historical truths at the core of these idealizations of Sparta and Crete, but it is much easier to spot the abuse. Relatively few outsiders had direct contact with these remote and closed societies, and little real knowledge needed obstruct the creative fantasy of elite ideologues, but the credibility of their theories was certainly enhanced by their focus upon the one form of Spartan music that was widely known, because the one form of music Sparta exported: ancient discussions of Spartan music deal exhaustively with its military music and little else.[138] Some claimed that Lycurgus permitted music no function except military; others believed that Sparta (and Crete) conscripted dancers as it conscripted soldiers, or that it disciplined choreuts like soldiers, penalizing deserters from the choral ranks with the death penalty as if they deserted from battle.[139] All Sparta's (and Crete's) putative military and political orderliness (*eunomia*) were

[136] Plato *Rep.* 559d–563e (discussed above); *Leg.* 689b.
[137] Ath. 628b, 632f–633a. [138] Gostoli (1988) 321.
[139] Plut. *Inst. Lac.* 238b; Lib. 64.17.

thanks to mulish adherence to these still more putative musical traditions.[140]

The critics enshrined the marching song, or *embatērion*, as the archetype of all Spartan music.[141] It offered a brilliant antithesis to New Music and all that it symbolized. The marching song, which might, it seems, be called a *nomos*,[142] stood for old-fashioned simplicity and good order, precisely because Spartans knew, as the Athenian demos did not, how to keep their place and receive direction from their betters. Discipline, in its rawest and most coercive military form, was presented as the original and highest function of music and choral dance.[143] Here all motion, music and words were ideally joined to the single purpose of instilling a manly resolve, setting a steady and controlled pace, and maintaining order in the hoplite line.[144] For this reason some supposed that pristine music concentrated on rhythm, as opposed to 'modern' music's concentration on melody.[145] Rhythm could make music 'rough and stimulating' (τραχὺ καὶ κινητικόν), while melody was 'soft and pacifying' (μαλακὸν . . . καὶ ἠρεμαῖον).[146] Aristides Quintilianus reports that 'some of the ancients called rhythm male, and melody female' (1.19).

Many myths were created to reinforce this image of Sparta as a paragon of musical discipline. Certainly, the subordination of

[140] Ps-Plut. *De Mus.* 1146b–c; Lib. 64.17.

[141] Gostoli (1988) 231, with references; cf. West (1992*a*) 34. The 'ancient Cretans' are said to have preserved the same custom, and Polybius ascribes the high reputation for virtue of the Arcadians in his own day in part to the continued custom 'nobly conceived by their ancestors' of 'practicing *embatēria* to pipe music'. (Polyb. 4.20.1–6, 21.12). Athenian hoplites probably did not march to the pipes, but the evidence precludes certainty; see Wilson (1999) 81, n. 88.

[142] Thuc. 5.69. See Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1970) 118, who take 'nomos' to refer to custom/law. Gostoli (1988) 235–6, n. 12 and the scholiast take it in the musical sense. Both meanings produce somewhat strained Greek, but perhaps Thucydides is straining to allow both meanings.

[143] Cf. Chamael. ap. Ath. 628e 'for the style of dancing used in choruses was elegant and stately and just like an imitation of the movements of men in arms'; 628f 'dancing was almost like a military exercise'. Cf. Phillis *ap.* Ath. 21f–22a.

[144] Plut. *Lyc.* 21.1; Gostoli (1988) 232.

[145] Aristoxenus in Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1138b–c.

[146] Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 19.49, 922^{b}30–32. This level of schematization risked tying the theoreticians up in serious contradictions, as can be seen from their counterfactual claim that when the pipes and lyre are played together, it is the pipes' lower tones that establish the melody and the lyre's higher ones which establish the rhythm. The belief seems inexplicable except for the ideological assumption that pipe music must belong to the side of the soft, and the lyre, associated with 'noble' music, belongs on the side of the 'rough and stimulating'. See the discussion in Barker (1995) 56.

music to military ritual allowed little room for innovation. Plutarch even claims that Spartan law proscribed innovation in music or dance.[147] By contrast, 'the greatest possible innovation' characterized the works of Timotheus and Philoxenus.[148] On his own testimony, Timotheus was persecuted by the Spartans on the grounds that 'I dishonour the more ancient Muse with my new hymns' (*PMG* 791.206–12). The mysterious 'Spartan Decree' against Timotheus testifies to the (later?) Spartan connivance in this reputation for musical conservatism.[149] The description of how Timotheus 'dishonoured the ancient Muse' and 'polluted the hearing of youth', makes liberal use of the language of classical criticism with complaints about the *polyphōnia*, *polychordia*, and emptiness of his songs; his use of 'ignoble and intricate' instead of 'simple and orderly' music; his 'colours', modulations, and avoidance of the enharmonic genus and strophic responsion. Nothing offered so fine a contrast to Spartan simplicity as the works of Timotheus, which Aristoxenus (fr. 26 da Rios) deemed 'supremely intricate' (τὰ ποικίλτατα).

Ideology transferred all the virtues of Spartan discipline to the Dorian mode. As early as Pratinas (probably a late fifth-century lyric poet) the Doric mode is 'tense' (σύντονος) while the Ionian mode is 'slack' (ἀνειμένος).[150] The words refer in the first instance to the tenseness or laxness of a string on a musical instrument, but transferred to moral or military contexts they came to connote 'strict discipline', as opposed to 'flabbiness and dissolution'.[151] When Aristotle compares two binarist tendencies, on the one hand to classify all political constitutions as

[147] Plut. *Inst. Lac.* 238c. Cf. Ath. 633b.

[148] Aristoxenus fr. 26 da Rios. Cf. Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1135c where Crexus, Timotheus, and Philoxenus are described as 'very vulgar and innovative'!

[149] For text and discussion: Marzi (1988). Cf. also the *intervento* by Cassio (Gentili and Pretagostini (1988) 286), which would date the inscription to the beginning of the 2nd cent. AD, but base it on much more ancient material. For Spartan involvement in the myth of Spartan music: cf. Ath. 628b.

[150] *PMG* 712. Heraclides interpreted σύντονος as referring to the Dorian mode. Page deletes the reference to the Ionian mode (ἰωστῑ) in the text preserved by Athenaeus (cf. Pratin. *TrGF* 4 fr. 5), partly no doubt because of its ascription to the early fifth-century Pratinas, who is early for adverbs of this sort. If it is a gloss, it is certainly on the right lines. For the general interpretation, see Anderson (1994) 88–93.

[151] Most commonly ἀνειμένος: see Thuc. 1.6.3, 5.9.6; Plato *Rep.* 410e, 412a, 549d7, 573a; Arist. *Pol.* 1270^{b}32, 1290^{a}28; Theophr. *CP* 5.4.4, 5.7.1. Cf. ἀνίημι: Thuc. 4.27.1 (relaxing one's guard); Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.70 (neglecting military exercise);

varieties of 'oligarchy' or 'democracy', on the other to view all musical modes as variations on the Dorian and the Phrygian, his own only-slightly-less-reductive trinary solution, includes a comparison of oligarchic constitutions to the 'tenser and more masterful modes' (συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικώτερας), viz. the Doric 'varieties', and a comparison of all the democratic constitutions to the 'slacker and softer' varieties (τὰς δ' ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακάς), viz. the Phrygian (*Pol.* 1290ª). To make a constitution συντονωτέραν meant to key it up from democracy towards oligarchy (1304ª21).

Conservatives fantasized about subjecting New Musicians to military discipline. Later historians claimed that Spartan ephors cut the excess strings off the kitharas of Terpander, Timotheus, and Phrynis.[152] A South Italian vase (Fig. 7) preserves a scene from a comedy, possibly Eupolis' *Demoi*, in which a reluctant Phrynis, still holding his lyre, is being dragged off by the old-fashioned Athenian general 'Myronides' (an apparent ἀπαγωγή).[153] Plato yearns for the 'disciplining rod' which once checked the 'museless shouts' of the theatre audience (*Leg.* 700c). But when the dream of disciplining the mob seemed hopeless, the critic turned his lust for law and order inwards upon his students and upon himself. Aristoxenus, alienated by the 'effeminized music' of the mob and the theatre, encouraged his students to pursue the traditional 'manly' forms, and he himself 'indifferent to the contempt of the demos and the mob, preferred art to popularity, since it was not possible to obey the laws of the art, and also sing what pleases the many'.[154] But unlike Plato, Aristoxenus did not find discipline and manhood in the 'simple and noble' diatonic genus (fr. 29 da Rios), but in the enharmonic, a genus of such complexity that it could only be mastered with hard work and perseverence, while the other genera apparently served as a default style for the lazy and self-indulgent (fr. 102 da Rios). So much

Eur. *Or.* 941 (laws becoming impotent); ἄναπις: Ath. 633c (contrasted with *sōphrosynē* both musically and ethically). For σύντονος, e.g. Plato *Rep.* 619b. For τείνω and compounds used of discipline, e.g. Plato *Rep.* 410d, 412a.

[152] Artemon *ap.* Ath. 636e; Cic. *De Leg.* 2.39; Plut. *Agis.* 10.6, *Inst. Lac.* 17, *Prof. Virt.* 13; Paus. 3.12.9–10; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 1.308.

[153] Salerno Pc 1812. See Taplin (1993) 42.

[154] Aristox. fr. 29 da Rios. Cf. Crexus, Timotheus, and Philoxenus pursuing the 'φιλάνθρωπον and mercenary style' in preference to the noble simplicity of ancient music (Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1135d). The word φιλάνθρωπον implies *publikumswirksam* (Richter (1974) 1456).



FIG. 7 Paestan bell-krater by Assteas (mid-fourth century) with a scene from a comedy (Eupolis' *Demoi*?) in which the *kitharōidos* Phrynis, still holding his instrument, is being dragged off by the Athenian general Myronides.

moral training was required that Aristoxenus feels it necessary to warn that sudden exposure to the enharmonic genus could cause the unmanly and dissolute to vomit bile (fr. 100 da Rios). Not surprisingly Aristoxenus found the enharmonic genus ideally suited to the Dorian mode, while the diatonic was ideally suited to the Phrygian (fr. 103 da Rios).

IV CONCLUSION

Economic and social conditions in the second half of the fifth century brought a class of independent and competitive professional musicians together with mass audiences eager for virtuosity and novelty. A desire to develop and promote music's contribution to the performance of nome, dithyramb, and drama lies behind the great variety of features that characterize the new style. The result was a music of unprecedented power and complexity, which

took musical accomplishment well beyond the range of amateur talents.

The music criticism of the day gives us a much distorted picture of these developments. They characterized New Music's 'liberation' of music as a rejection of traditional forms of control, whether the laws of genre, the words of the song, or the requirements of dance. The critical assault took a pattern familiar to fifth-century ideological debate, tainting the New Music as effeminate, barbarous, and self-indulgent. The diatribe expressed the hostility of a class which felt the loss of its ascendancy in matters of culture, as in so much else. Similar reactions by elite thinkers could be described for a great many arts and crafts that flourished under the Athenian democracy, especially those connected with the theatre industry.[155] But from the violence of the reaction, the tendency of the arguments, and the structure of the debate, it is apparent that New Music came to symbolize the most threatening and unpleasant features of democracy itself. This is confirmed by explicitly political commentary on various features connected with the New Music and most impressively, by Plato's history of music's degeneration. Not by chance, the heyday of New Music coincides with the time of greatest political polarization in Athens, during the radical democracy and on through the years of revolution and counter-revolution.

The form of the hostile criticism has much to do with Damon's theory that music was directly, perhaps primarily, responsible for the psychological formation of the citizen and the political formation of the state. Equally if not more influential were the conditions of New Musical performance, the theatrical setting of dithyramb and tragedy, before the assembled demos, enjoying the licence of the Dionysiac festival, and indulging in rapid succession the most violent emotions of pity, fear, scorn, and ridicule. In contrast to the New Music the critics invented a musical utopia, in the past and in Sparta, all based on the implausible assumption that ancient music, Spartan music, and elite music sought nothing but the improvement of the soul, and New Music nothing but the titillation of the masses. Just how much of the alleged musical tradition

[155] See Rouveret's excellent discussion ((1989) 115–27) of the violence of elite reaction to new painterly techniques and *skēnographia* in particular; Csapo (2002) on acting.

really was tradition will escape us without a serious attempt to outline the systematic distortion encouraged by this ideological debate. It is worth remembering that the New Musicians were also driven to invent a tradition of their own, in which ritual Dionysiac music is particularly prominent, as are appeals to founding figures like Orpheus, Olympus, or the Korybants.[156]

It remains to ask just what effect this diatribe had upon the practitioners of New Music. Evidence of frustration might be found in 'Telestes' attempt to debunk the myth about Athena's rejection of the pipes, or in Timotheus' complaints about Sparta, the anecdotes about his attempted suicide, or the removal of many of the greatest innovators to Macedonia—but doubtless there was more pull than push involved in this move.[157] If the poetic remains are any indication, the critics' influence, though great upon theory, was slight upon practice. Their claims probably even enhanced New Music's allure for the masses by articulating its democratic values.

Far from contesting the critics' charges about the ethos of music, New Music cultivated its womanly and barbarian associations, its reputation for high-emotion, and Dionysian hysteria.[158] The lyrics are filled with feminine, orientalizing, and Dionysian imagery. Most striking are the *personae* chosen for the choruses and soloists of New Musical odes. With the probable exception of *Archelaus*, every known Euripidean play after *Heracles* (*c.* 418) has a female chorus. And from the late 420s onwards the choruses tend not only to be women, but frequently Asiatic women, or if not Asiatic, then Greek captives in Eastern lands. The greatest New Musical monodies of the era, in Timotheus *Persians*, and Euripides' *Orestes*, used delirious, panic-stricken Persians and Phrygian eunuchs, and in *Hecuba* a blinded bestial Thracian, crawling on all fours, and howling with grief and rage. Such characters and situations maximized music's potential for expressing powerful and raw emotion. These scenes might also seem calculated to taunt and infuriate the Damonian eccentrics. They could not have been staged in front of an audience seriously anxious about musical emasculation. Indeed for most Athenians, even for most even-tempered, non-theoretical

[156] Tim. *PMG* 791.221–2; Telest. *PMG* 806, 810.
[157] Telest. *PMG* 805 (cf. Zimmermann (1986) 152 f.); *POxy* 1176, fr. 39, col. 22.
[158] See Csapo (2000) 415–26.

elites, the political fervour inspired by the New Music was forgotten by the late fourth century, when even Timotheus' dithyrambs acquired the institutional stature of musical classics.[159]

[159] Wilson (2000a) 227; West (1992*a*) 371–2, 381–2.

9

Damon of Oa: A Music Theorist Ostracized?

Robert W. Wallace

Damon of the Attic deme Oa is best known as a theorist of music and poetic metre in the pages of Plato's *Republic*, and as a teacher and adviser of Perikles.[1] If extant texts are representative, Damon's main research interests lay in music and metre's psychological effects and hence behavioural consequences. He developed what was later called the ethos theory of music, which remained important and controversial down through antiquity. Isokrates remarked that he was thought to be 'the most intelligent' (φρονιμωτάτου) Athenian of his time (15.235). According to other sources, Damon was no less important in Athenian politics. In the *Life of Pericles* 4 Plutarch suggests that Damon's music research was in fact a camouflage, to hide his political and sophistic activities:

> Damon appears to have been a sophist of the highest order, who hid behind the name of music, concealing his cleverness from the people. He associated with Perikles, as it were that athlete of politics, as a rubber and trainer.

Aristotle credits Damon with the idea of providing pay for serving in the public courts, a milestone in the growth of fifth-century democracy (*Ath. Pol.* 27.4). *Ath. Pol.* also says that Damon was 'thought to be the proposer of most of Perikles' measures, and for that reason was later ostracized'.[2]

[1] Further discussion of many of the issues raised here will be found in a volume currently in preparation: *Damon of Oa. Music, Philosophy, and Politics in Ancient Athens*.

[2] Although *Ath. Pol.* mentions not Damon but 'Damonides' (the name of Damon's father), it identifies 'Damonides' as an adviser of Perikles who was later ostracized. Both points are elsewhere attested for Damon, as for example in Plutarch *Pericles* 4. Because it can scarcely be that both Damon and his father were Perikles' advisers and later ostracized, *Ath. Pol.*'s 'Damonides' is most likely an error for Damon. In addition to confusing Damon's name, *Ath. Pol.* has probably mistaken his deme, which was more likely Oa (Steph. Byz., *s.v.*) than the larger and important Oe.

The sources for Damon thus attest what many have thought was a career with two distinct and even unrelated tracks: research in music and metre, and political advising. In his book on the Greek ethos theory, Warren Anderson states that Damon's 'political counseling had no essential relationship to his musical theorizing' ((1966) 76). Confronted by Damon's two-track career, some have promoted either politics or music as his principal focus. This approach began as early as Plutarch's *Pericles*, as we have seen. Paralleling a conceit in Plato's *Protagoras* (339a–e), Plutarch says that Damon *concealed* his political and sophistic activities behind the 'name' of music. More recent scholars have adopted the alternative position of minimizing Damon's role in politics. They reject *Ath. Pol.*'s statement that Damon proposed 'most' of Perikles' measures as slander by Perikles' enemies, seeking to insinuate that Athens' leading politician was not intelligent enough to have ideas of his own.[3] Similar criticisms may certainly be found in contemporary sources.[4] Kallias's *Pedetai* (fr. 21 K.–A.) joked that Aspasia taught Perikles rhetoric. Eupolis's *Philoi* called her Perikles' 'Cheiron' (fr. 294 K.–A.). Probably exploiting comic sources, Aeschines of Sphettos (fr. 23 Dittmar) said the same of Aspasia and 'the sheep seller' Lysikles. According to the historian Herodotos (8.58), Mnesiphilos suggested to Themistokles the Greek strategy at Salamis. Plutarch (*Them.* 2.6) describes Mnesiphilos as 'not a *rhētor* nor a physical scientist, but a cultivator of what was then called *sophia*, although it was only political cleverness and practical sagacity' (. . . ἀλλὰ τὴν τότε καλουμένην σοφίαν, οὖσαν δὲ δεινότητα πολιτικὴν καὶ δραστήριον σύνεσιν).

As for Damon's ostracism, a number of scholars, including Jerome Carcopino, Harold Mattingly, Martin Ostwald, and Kurt Raaflaub, have thought it sufficiently strange that a music philosopher should be ostracized—a procedure otherwise directed only against politicians, as far as we know—that they have sought to discredit the evidence for it.[5]

[3] Cf. e.g. Rhodes (1981) 342.

[4] See Schwarze (1971) 160–4.

[5] Carcopino (1905); (1935) 125–42. Mattingly (1971) 287 and (1991) 22 rejects Damon's and other obscure ostracisms because of their 'dubious literary sources'. For Ostwald on the purpose of ostracism (to choose between competing political visions), see *CAH* 4².334–46. *Per litteras* he argues that Damon does not fit this criterion. Day and Chambers (1962) 15, also call Damon(ides)' ostracism 'dubious'. Raaflaub's essay is forthcoming.

Despite Plutarch, a significant group of texts including Plato's *Republic* establishes that Damon was an important music theorist. And even if we doubt that Damon proposed 'most' of Perikles' measures, a second group of fifth- and fourth-century sources make it difficult to deny that Damon had close ties with Perikles and was ostracized. In *Pericles* 4 Plutarch cites a passage from Plato the fifth-century comic poet (fr. 207 K.–A.) where someone inquires of Damon, 'first then tell me, I ask, since they say you are the Cheiron who nurtured up Perikles'. Damon's link with Perikles is reported in detail in *Ath. Pol.* 27.4, written in the 320s by Aristotle or in his school. It is also mentioned in *First Alcibiades* 118c, a fourth-century philosophical dialogue possibly written by Plato. In this passage Alcibiades states that Perikles did not achieve his wisdom independently, but by associating with Anaxagoras and Pythokleides. 'And now, old as he is, he spends time with Damon just for this purpose.'

Finally, a number of testimonia document Damon's ostracism, including *Ath. Pol.* as we have seen. Plutarch mentions Damon's ostracism in three separate *Lives* (*Per.* 4, *Arist.* 1, *Nic.* 6). In a passage not previously adduced in this connection, Libanius' *Defence of Sokrates*, a response to Polykrates' attack on Sokrates in the later 390s, addresses Polykrates' comments on Damon:

> And as for Damon, if he did wrong, he was rightly thrown out (ἐκβέβληται). But if he was falsely accused (ἐσυκοφαντεῖτο), it was no better that he should have suffered for it than that on his account Sokrates suffered also. And yet he [sc. Polykrates] says that Damon was driven out (ἐξελαθῆναι) on less serious accusations (αἰτίαις), and was not accused by his enemies with destroying the democracy, as is the defendant today. This is proof that Damon had enemies more moderate (μετριωτέρων) than Sokrates'. (1.157)

Damon's ostracism finds some contemporary confirmation in the discovery so far of four ostraka inscribed with Damon's name—at least two of them apparently written by the same hand.[6] To be sure, as Raaflaub points out, four is no decisive number. On the other hand, only forty-seven ostraka survive from the ostracism of Thucydides son of Melesias, and only three from

[6] *IG* I³.912; F. W. Hamdorf in Hoepfner, ed. 1976: 210 K 100. As yet unpublished, two other ostraka from the Kerameikos are mentioned to me by Peter Siewert.

the ostracism of Hyperbolos (Mattingly (1991) 12–16). The remainder of Damon's ostraka will turn up. Whatever the original or subsequent purposes of ostracism, this procedure provided a way to banish dangerous undesirables who nonetheless had committed no crime.[7] The very improbability of ostracizing a music theorist itself gives credence to the tradition. Why should this have been invented? And why 'rectify' the sources to eliminate the unexpected?

The most likely date for Damon's ostracism is 443 or 442. As I discuss in greater detail in my book on Damon, a number of Platonic dialogues set in years from 432 or 431 represent him as being in Athens (*Alcib.* 1 118c [432 or 431], *Lach.* 197d [424], *Rep.* 399e–400b [421 or later]). Although the chronological settings of Plato's dialogues are sometimes unreliable, this confluence of data seems significant. By contrast, Damon is not mentioned in any account of Perikles' troubles before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 (Ar. *Ach.* 515–30, *Peace* 605–15; Diod. Sic. 12.38–40; Plut. *Per.* 29–32). On the other side, *Ath. Pol.* 27.4 says that Damon recommended dikastic pay, an institution probably of the 450s, and one of his ostraka comes from a pot dated around 450 (Hamdorf, n. 6 above). We shall shortly see other reasons why Damon's ostracism might have followed that of Thucydides son of Melesias in 444 or 443.

Now, *why* did the Athenians ostracize Damon? And why was ostracism an appropriate device to use against him? The explanations of Aristotle and Plutarch both prove important. According to *Ath. Pol.* 27.4, Damon was ostracized 'because he was thought to be the proposer of most of Perikles' measures'. In *Life of Aristides* 1, Plutarch says that Damon was banished because he was 'too intelligent', τὸ φρονεῖν . . . περιττός. In *Life of Nicias* 6 he says that the demos was always suspicious of those who were clever (ὑφορώμενον δ' ἀεὶ καὶ φυλαττόμενον τὴν δεινότητα καὶ κολούοντα τὸ φρόνημα . . .), and therefore they ostracized Damon. Finally, in *Life of Pericles* 4, he calls Damon 'a sophist of the highest order, who hid behind the name of music, concealing from *hoi polloi* his cleverness (πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν δεινότητα).

[7] Cf. Rhodes (1994) 97: 'There was a need to deal with politicians whose influence was dangerous but who could not be proved guilty of offenses against the laws, as narrowly understood.'

He associated with Perikles, that athlete of politics as it were, as a rubber and trainer', but was caught out and ostracized as 'a great meddler (μεγαλοπράγμων) and lover of tyranny (φιλοτύραννος)', and 'became the butt of the comic poets'. Plutarch then quotes Plato Comicus, calling Damon Perikles' Cheiron.

These explanations all resonate with fifth-century concerns. They indicate that Damon's ostracism resulted from the impact of four different issues, linked to Damon's association with Perikles and the nature of his research.

First, the charge that Damon was φιλοτύραννος echoes contemporary accusations that Perikles and his ἑταῖροι were 'Peisistratidai', 'sons' of Athens' tyrant Peisistratos (Plut. *Per.* 16.1). Plutarch says that after the ostracism of Thucydides son of Melesias in 444 or 443, people urged Perikles to swear not to become a tyrant, because his preeminence was too oppressive and incommensurate with democracy. Damon could certainly be regarded as one of Perikles' *hetairoi*. The charge of φιλοτύραννος fits in this context, and begins to supply a political context for Damon's ostracism. In conjunction with the other chronological data, this argument encourages a date for Damon's ostracism of 443 or 442. As Mattingly (1991) 12 points out, in 472 Themistokles' accomplishments were celebrated in Aeschylus' *Persians* which won first prize, but the next year he was ostracized, according to Plutarch (*Them.* 22) because of incessant self-glorification.

Second, the accusation that Damon proposed 'most' of Perikles' measures echoes Athenian complaints against the practice by politicians of using surrogates. Andokides complains that politicians do not dare to 'stand in the middle, fearing refutation', but 'send others who are shameless' (2.4). Demosthenes used his associate Timarchos to strike at Aeschines in 345, thus provoking Aeschines' attack on Timarchos (Aeschines 1). In the *Life of Pericles* 7.7–8 (see also 9.5), Plutarch comments on how often Perikles made use of associates: 'He did not choose to speak on every question, but reserved himself like the state galley, the Salamina, as [the second-century Peripatetic] Kritolaus says, for great occasions, and allowed his *philoi* and other *rhētores* to deal with other matters.' In *Mor.* 811c–13a Plutarch includes a lengthy discussion of this phenomenon in fifth-century Athens, quoting from a comedy that criticized another of Perikles' *hetairoi*, Metiochos,

otherwise known as an architect (Poll. 8.121, Bekker *Anecd.* 309.17) and political counsellor (Phot. s.v. *Metiocheion*):

> Metiochos is general, Metiochos inspects the roads, Metiochos inspects the bread, Metiochos the flour, Metiochos takes care of all things, and Metiochos will come to grief (οἰμώξεται). (Com. Adesp. 741 K.–A.).

Plutarch comments, 'He was one of Perikles' *hetairoi*, and used the power he got through him, it seems, in such a way as to arouse odium and disgust'.

Like Metiochos, Aristotle reports that Damon's political work for Perikles provoked hostility from the demos. Also indicating hostility, Plutarch says that Damon was thought to have *concealed* his political activities for Perikles behind the screen of music.[8] Again, a political context and popular suspicion are indicated.

According to Plutarch a third main factor behind Damon's ostracism was the Athenians' suspicion of his 'cleverness', δεινότης. The intellectual openness and curiosity of the Athenian demos—farmers, shoemakers, and sailors—are abundantly documented, especially during the second half of the fifth century. In a well-known passage, Thucydides' Kleon complains to the Assembly about their fascination with clever words and new, paradoxical arguments:

> Spectators of words and hearers of deeds, you consider future actions according as skilful speakers say what is possible, and consider what has already been done on the basis of eloquent verbal invectives . . . You are best at being deceived by novelty of argument, and at not wishing to follow what has been approved, being slaves of each new paradox and suspicious of what is customary. Above all, each of you wishes to be able to speak himself, or if not, to compete with those who say such things by seeming not to lag behind them in intelligence, but to praise in anticipation some smart statement . . . In a word you are in thrall to the pleasures of listening, and are more like spectators of sophists than those who deliberate about the *polis*. (3.38.4–7)

This fascination with the clever and novel was often remarked. According to Diodoros (12.53), when the Sicilian sophist Gorgias arrived in Athens in 427, 'he dazzled the Athenians, who are by

[8] It is interesting to note that Metiochos built one of the *dikastēria* (Bekker ibid., Hesych. *Metiochou*), while Damon proposed dikastic pay.

nature clever and lovers of words, by his exotic speech (τῷ ξενίζοντι τῆς λέξεως), . . . he was wondered at for his rhetorical skill (ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ῥητορικῇ)'. The Athenians' intellectual openness attracted philosophers from around the Greek world. Plato's Hippias calls Athens 'the very town hall of wisdom in Greece' (*Prot.* 337d). The on-going engagement of mass theatre audiences with complex intellectual, political, and theological issues is a cultural phenomenon virtually without parallel. The intellectual engagement of ordinary citizens must rank among Athens' most extraordinary qualities. The outlook endured. 'For all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else but either to tell, or to hear some new thing' (*Acts of the Apostles* 17:21).

At the same time, the demos's intellectual acuity was sometimes manifested by a counterbalancing suspicion of cleverness. This suspicion is best documented in connection with the sophists and speech (see Ober (1989) 165–74; Halliwell (1997) 121–6). The demos knew that words can mislead as well as inform. The Assembly began with a curse against anyone who deceived the people (Ar. *Thesm.* 356–67, Dem. 18.282, 23.97). Thucydides says that the sophist Antiphon never spoke in public because he was mistrusted for his cleverness, (ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος: 8.68.1). Euripides' Medea says, 'If you bring novel wisdom (καινὰ . . . σοφὰ) to fools, you will be regarded as useless, not wise, and if the city regards you as greater than those with a reputation for knowing something ποικίλον, you will be thought vexatious' (298–301). Suspicion of the archetypally sophistic skill of 'making the worse *logos* seem the better' sprang from similar sentiments. Demosthenes states, 'I never reproached my enemy for being a sophist and paying silver to Isokrates, but people should not look down on others and covet the property of others, trusting in *logos*. That is the part of a rascally sophist, who should be made to suffer for it.' His opponent, he says, is *deinos* and 'trusts in speaking and in the 1000 drachmas he has paid to his teacher' (35.40–3). Aeschines called Demosthenes 'the pirate of politics, who sails on his craft of words over the sea of state' (3.253). Demosthenes retorted that Aeschines 'bids you be on your guard against me, for fear that I should mislead and deceive you, calling me a clever speaker, a mountebank and a sophist and so forth'. Demosthenes admits his own

cleverness (δεινότητα), which he renames ἐμπειρία, and says he uses it only to benefit the demos (18.276–77).[9]

Plutarch indicates that Damon, despite his best efforts and unlike Antiphon, failed to conceal his cleverness from the demos. Their suspicion led to his ostracism.

Finally, if Damon was ostracized just after Thucydides son of Melesias, factional politics must have played a role.[10] Opposition to Perikles will have driven some supporters of Thucydides against Perikles' associate.

The preceding discussion sets out some political dimensions of Damon's ostracism, and addresses the issue of the appropriateness of the political procedure that was used against him. We now may turn to the question of whether Damon's music theorizing was relevant to his political activities. For this, both the nature of Damon's research and the date of his ostracism are significant.

For three reasons, understanding the nature of Damon's research proves to be complex. First, as I argue elsewhere ((1991) 43–4), Damon appears to have left no written work. Second, after him there arose a school or schools, variously called the *harmonikoi*, or οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα, or the Δαμώνιος αἵρεσις, which Aristoxenos wrote about in the later fourth century, and which continued into the Hellenistic period.[11] These followers of Damon appear to have written copiously, and they sometimes mentioned their master. However, they had no texts by Damon to control what they attributed to him. A similar problem is presented by the figures of Sokrates and Pythagoras. Third, Plato's endorsement of Damon's work inspired various later philosophical writers to attribute alien doctrines to him, or else to claim that

[9] See also Dem. 51.20–2; Aesch. 1.173–5; Isai. 10.1; Isokr. 15.4–5; Hyper. *Eux.* 25–6 and fr. 80 Jensen (*rhētores* are like snakes); and also the many dramatic references in Halliwell (1997) 131 n. 34.

[10] See e.g. Ehrenberg (1954) 93; Comotti (1989*a*) 30–1; and Stadter (1991) 117–18.

[11] Porph. *Comment. in Ptol. Harmon.*, ed. Düring 1932, p. 1: 'While there are many schools of music about harmony, Eudoxias, one could suppose that two are of the greatest importance, those of Pythagoras and of Aristoxenos, schools whose philosophical views are clearly preserved even up to the present day. For we could mention that more schools existed, some before Aristoxenos, such as those of Epigonos, Damon, Eratokles, Agenor and some others, which Aristoxenos himself mentions, and some after him, which others have described . . . *PHibeh* 1 13 (Barker (1984) 183–5), mentioning Damonian *harmonikoi*, probably belongs in the early 3rd cent., as I hope to argue elsewhere.

others had anticipated his approach. The result is that the sources for Damon are marked by an extraordinary contamination of Damon's theories with later philosophical materials, in particular from neo-Platonist and neo-Pythagorean traditions. In particular, as I make clear in my book on Damon, scholars should approach virtually everything in Diels–Kranz's version of Damon with the utmost caution.

My reconstruction of Damon's work is based largely on Plato's testimony, for several reasons. Plato is our earliest source for Damon, and a near contemporary. His uncle Charmides was known as Damon's friend, according to Ps.-Plato *Axiochos* 364a, a late Hellenistic dialogue demonstrably well informed about Damon (Wallace (1992) 332). Plato's music teacher Drakon is reported to have been Damon's student (Anon. *Proleg. Plat. Phil.* 2.28–30, ed. Westerink), although this report could represent an improper deduction from Damon's prominence in Plato's dialogues. Finally, Plato was an intelligent professional philosopher. Bertrand Russell once said that he would far prefer that his views 'be reported by my bitterest enemy among philosophers than by a friend innocent of philosophy' ((1967) 82). If we doubt Plato's testimony, Damon is unknowable.

By all accounts the most important discussion of Damon occurs in Plato's *Republic* 399c–400b. In discussing which types of rhythms imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) which sorts of life, Sokrates remarks to Glaukon with his usual dry humour,

> Well, on these matters also we shall take counsel with Damon, as to which steps are appropriate to ungentlemanly behaviour (ἀνελευθερίας) and *hubris* or *mania* and other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites. I think I have heard him obscurely naming a metre 'in armour' (ἐνόπλιον) [a composite], and one called 'finger' (δάκτυλον) and a 'heroic' which he somehow arranged and made equal up and down, passing into a short and a long, and, as I think, he named something an iamb and something else a trochee, and he added longs and shorts. And in some of these he criticized or praised the tempo of the foot no less than the rhythms themselves, or else some combination of the two; I can't say. But let these things, as I mentioned, be postponed for Damon's consideration, for to determine the truth would require no little discussion. Or do you think otherwise?

Four points are clear from this passage. First, according to Damon as Plato represents him, certain rhythms or steps, βάσεις, 'are

appropriate to' or 'fit' (πρέπουσαι) certain psychological states or modes of behaviour. Second, Damon studied the technicalities of rhythms and metres. As Martin West has noted, this passage provides our first evidence for the division of metrical feet into segments: (1984) 216. In Aristophanes *Clouds* 648–51, Strepsiades asks 'How will *rhuthmoi* help me in terms of barley?' and Sokrates replies, 'First of all you'll be polished at parties, if you can tell which of the rhythms is "in armour" and which a finger—δάκτυλον.' Along with Wilamowitz ((1921) 59, 65) and others, I agree that Aristophanes echoes Damon's teaching: Damon was active in Athens in the later 420s when *Clouds* was first produced, and in Classical Greek δάκτυλος occurs as a metrical term only here and in *Republic* 400. Strepsiades replies that he certainly knows about *this* finger, making a gesture that, in his commentary on *Clouds*, Dover charmingly associates with little boys.

A third conclusion from Plato is that Damon was concerned to name or label rhythms. The concern with names is a well-recognized phenomenon of the late fifth century, characteristic especially of Prodikos but also of others. Plato's *Cratylus* deals with the subject. In Plato *Laches* 197d, in a debate with Nikias on the definition of courage, Sokrates tells Laches to say nothing, 'for in fact you seem to me to have failed to perceive that Nikias has acquired this wisdom from Damon, our good friend; and Damon constantly associates with Prodikos, who is thought to be the cleverest of the sophists at distinguishing terms like these'.

A final point from *Republic* 400 is that Plato found—or rather, pretended to find—Damon's metrical research obscure.

A second important passage for understanding Damon occurs a little later in the *Republic*, at 424c. Here Sokrates observes, 'never are the *tropoi* of music changed without [changing] the most important *nomoi* of the city, as Damon says and I believe him'. The probable meaning of *tropoi* in this context is musical 'styles', as Anderson (1966) 25 has shown, while *nomoi* can refer either to the laws of the *polis* or to something broader, for example 'political and social conventions'. The translation 'rules' may retain something of this ambiguity. So: 'never are musical styles changed without changing the most important rules of the city'. It follows that in Damon's view (as Plato represents it), musical styles not only 'fit' behaviour, they also determine or shape it, both for individuals and for society. Following a suggestion by Kroll, Rostagni saw that the same view may be echoed in Gorgias' *Helen*, applied to speech or *logos*.[12] In Gorgias the force of *logos* works immediately on the psyche: it 'can make any impression it wishes on the psyche' (13), 'the power of *logos* over the constitution of the psyche can be compared with the effect of drugs on the bodily state' (14), it 'changes the psyche into another state' (10). 'All poetry can be called speech in metre. Its hearers shudder with terror, shed tears of pity, and yearn with sad longing; the soul, affected by the words, feels as its own an emotion aroused by the good and ill fortunes of other people's actions and lives' (9). Damon's influence on Gorgias may explain Isokrates' perhaps rather fulsome praise, that Damon was 'the most intelligent Athenian of his time', if in fact Gorgias was Isokrates' teacher (Ps.-Plut. *X Orat.* 836 f, 838d).

Notoriously, Plato does not mention Damon in connection with the *harmoniai* suitable for his ideal *polis* (*Rep.* 398c–399e), even though the basis of his discussion of *harmoniai* is precisely those ethos correlations for which Damon was famous. However, a second, substantial albeit later group of sources attests this aspect of Damon's work. Since *harmoniai* were the basis of fifth-century music (and not of music by the end of the fourth century), and since some of Damon's followers called themselves the *harmonikoi*, the sources on this point have some claim to credibility. Aristeides Quintilianus, a music theorist probably of the third century AD, states that a number of *harmoniai* were 'handed down' by Damon (*De Mus.* 2.14). In his commentary on Plato's *Republic*, Proclus refers to certain of Damon's *harmoniai* while discussing a controversy over which *harmoniai* Plato allowed in his *polis*. Except for those *harmoniai* which produce lamentation and drinking songs, Proclus writes, 'certain people think that [Sokrates] accepts as proper for education the other *harmoniai*, the Phrygian and the Dorian, of those which Damon taught' (*In Rempubl.* I p. 61.19–24 Kroll). If we accept Proclus, this text adds the important information that Damon studied *harmoniai* of all types, not simply those which Plato accepted for his *polis*. Furthermore, according to Ps.-Plutarch *De Musica* 1136e, Damon invented a *harmonia* called the 'relaxed Lydian', which Plato expressly banned from his *polis* as 'soft and sympotic' (*Rep.* 398e–399a). We may reserve judgement

[12] Kroll (1911) 168–9; Rostagni (1922) 149 = (1955) 2.

as to whether Damon did invent this *harmonia*. It is nonetheless interesting that Plutarch's tradition associates Damon with a *harmonia* that Plato condemned. Finally, in an anecdote reported by Galen (*De Placit. Hippocr. et Plat.* 5) and Martianus Capella (*De Nupt. Philol. et Merc.* 9.926), some drunken youths were acting crazy to the Phrygian tune of an aulos player. Damon had the aulete change to a Dorian *harmonia* and the youths were calmed.

The nature of the early *harmoniai* which Damon studied remains obscure. Scholars generally agree that they were distinctive scales, or 'tunings' of an instrument, each constituted from different sequences of intervals (see esp. Barker (1984) 163–8). In practice at any rate, particular pitches or rhythms may have been involved. They may well have been performed in different musical styles. Each of these *harmoniai* was associated with a particular people: Dorians, Phrygians, Lydians, and so forth. They were also very old, as the references to them by Stesichoros (fr. 35 Page), Pratinas (fr. 4 Dichl), Lasos of Hermione (fr. 1 Page), and Pindar (fr. 67 Snell–Maehler) indicate. If Damon thought about *harmoniai* in the way he did about metres, presumably he systematized them in some coherent order, he may have named some of them (possibly formulating the harmonic categories 'hyper-' or 'hypo-', as in 'Hyperdorian'), and he correlated them with different psychological states or modes of behaviour. As for the kinds of psychological states or types of behaviour that Damon thought *harmoniai* could produce, Plato limits us to examples from rhythms: physical violence (ὕβρις), disgraceful behaviour (ἀνελευθερία), madness (μανία), and their opposites. It remains unclear how Damon believed that *harmoniai* produced psychological states or modes of behaviour. According to Plato (*Rep.* 395c–d) and Aristotle (*EN* 1152ª30–3), effects were produced by habituation: after long imitation one assimilated the behaviour in question. However, this may not have been Damon's position, if he formulated one.

To understand the significance of Damon's research in the context of fifth-century Athens, it is necessary to keep in mind the complex, multifaceted role of music in Greek society. As many scholars have now said, for the Greeks music was an experience profoundly different from the essentially passive thing it has become in western societies. Greek music was communal, present at almost all social gatherings, and often performed by everyone

together. In the private sphere, the symposium was a focal point of elite cultural life and a microcosm of the *polis*, with its own 'archon' as *magister bibendi*. At the start, a paean was sung by all participants together. Each guest then sang in turn simple stanzas, holding a myrtle branch. Individual performances followed, as symposiasts with particular musical abilities sang monodic poems while accompanying themselves on the lyre. As Oswyn Murray's *Sympotica* volume reveals, many scholars believe that virtually all archaic poetry for solo delivery was originally intended for the symposium.

By contrast, choral poetry was group poetry, present at many group functions: festivals such as that of Dionysos at Athens; *thiasoi*, female cultic associations for which Sappho wrote her poems; communal prayers to the gods including hymns, paeans, and *parthenia* (maiden songs); funerals with their *threnoi*; marriages with their *hymenaioi*; *epinikia* to celebrate victories; *prosodia* or processional hymns. Calame (1997) 25 notes that music for female choruses marked the major moments (as traditionally conceived) in a woman's life: puberty, marriage, and childbirth. Athens' dithyrambic performances are especially striking. Every year at the festival of Dionysos, a thousand Athenians, men and boys in groups of fifty, performed in this event. Calame, Gentili (e.g. 1988), and others have made the central observation that archaic and classical Greek poetry was not the private, silent, elitist experience that poetry became in and after the Hellenistic age. In an oral society, poetry existed in the voices of its performers. The people sang, they *became* the poet and said his words as their own. The poetry produced for these occasions reflected the needs and concerns of the people who performed it. Poetry was, also, inextricably linked to the social occasions for which it was produced.

Poetry's public and communal quality was reinforced diachronically by the role of *mousikē* in education, through the traditional songs taught together with gymnastics, transmitting basic social ideologies. Plato remarks, ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος: one who cannot sing and dance in a chorus is uneducated (*Laws* 654a–b).

No less significant was the communal role of music in the military, in the use of music to fire the troops' enthusiasm before battle, in the marching paians sung when Greek phalanxes approached the enemy, in the *hypothēkai* performed during the intervals of battle, and the aulos music which orchestrated the movements of rowers on board ship. Herodotos reports that

every year Alyattes invaded Milesian territory during harvest time, 'marching in to the music of syrinxes, harps, and high- and low-pitched *auloi*' (1.17). The Greeks had a complex series of war dances which often armed men performed to music. The *pyrrhichē* is only the most famous of these. According to a late report (Aelian *VH* 3.8), the poet Phrynichos was elected *stratēgos* because he wrote good pyrrhics.[13] The *gymnopaidikē* was a dance imitating wrestling and the *pankration*. In a scene of competitive war-dancing performed by the troops in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (6.1), one dance simulated a fight between a robber and a ploughman protecting his field. Those who fought in the front lines were called προορχηστῆρας (Luc. *Salt.* 14). In all of these instances, music shaped the rhythms essential to the safety of the city. Just so, communal dexterity was required of 170 men to row a trireme, oars moving as one. Lengthy hoplite battle lines, sometimes four men deep, had to turn in unison during battle. Alan Boegehold (1991) has suggested that these rhythmic abilities were born through communal dancing that was so pervasive an element in Greek daily life. The fourth-century Peripatetic Chamaileon (*ap.* Athen. 628 f) attributes to Sokrates the judgment that the best choral dancers are also the best men in war. In *Laws* 803e Plato states that 'we must spend our whole lives playing at certain games—sacrifice, singing and dancing—so as to win the gods' favour, protect ourselves from our enemies, and conquer them in battle'.

Finally, the Greeks recognized the great power of music, first expressed for us in the myths of musical magic: the Sirens, Orpheus, Arion and his dolphins. By playing his lyre Amphion raised the walls of Thebes. The Greeks knew of the powers of music to entrance. Pindar calls song a φίλτρον <ἐν> θυμῷ (*Pyth.* 3.64), Aeschylus (*Eum.* 306) calls it a δέσμιον, 'a binding spell'. Music was thought to have the power to heal. Theophrastos reported the belief that if aulos music with a certain *harmonia* was played over a limb afflicted with sciatica, the limb would heal.[14] The psychological affects of music were especially well known. In the Homeric

[13] On pyrrhics, see above all Ceccarelli (1998) and in this volume.
[14] Theophr. frr. 87, 88 (Wimmer) *ap.* Athen. 624a–b; Plin. *NH* 28.4; and Aul. Gell. 4.13.

Hymn to Hermes (lines 416–96), the young thief-god placated Apollo by means of the lyre.

In the light of the public qualities of Greek music and the widespread perception of its power, music's ability to change or disturb the social order was also widely recognized, in anecdote, poetry, and philosophical discussion. We are told, for example, that in listening to the songs of Terpander the Spartans grew unified in concord: 'they were entirely changed, embracing and tearfully kissing one another', as Diodoros imagines (8.28). By contrast, Plutarch (*Lyc.* 28.9–10) reports that the helots were forced to perform grotesque dances and songs, so as to remain in a state of subjection. Pindar expressly formulated the concept: by his kithara Apollo 'brings *eunomia* without discord into the hearts of men' (*Pyth.* 5.66–7).

As a consequence of music's power and social importance, some Greeks feared or rejected musical innovation. Plutarch writes that Terpander was condemned by the ephors at Sparta because he added an eighth string to the lyre, to obtain a wider variety of music; the ephors wanted only simple songs (*Inst. Lac.* 238c). A similar anecdote is told of Timotheos in the early fourth century. He turned up at Sparta's Carnean games with a nine-string lyre, whereupon an ephor came up to him with a knife, asking from which side he should cut two strings, so that Timotheos not corrupt Spartan society.[15] Precisely because these anecdotes are unhistorical, the attitude behind them is significant. In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, 'Just Logos' longs for the good old days, when no musical innovations were permitted (963–74). In Plato's *Republic*, Sokrates warns most earnestly against musical innovation: 'the overseers of our state must be watchful against innovations in music that are counter to the established order . . . We must not praise that sort of thing. For a change to a new type of music is something to beware of as a danger to the entire *politeia*' (424b–e). Thus for the Greeks music was essentially a political phenomenon, of direct concern to the *polis*.

Three points expressly link Damon, music, and politics. First, Plato states that Damon made the connection between music and politics explicit. 'Never are musical styles changed without

[15] Plut. *Agis* 10.6, *Inst. Lac.* 238c; Boeth. *De Mus.* 1.1, Athen. 628b.

changing the most important rules of the city. So Damon says and I believe him.'

Second, important evidence indicates a deep interest in the music of the *polis* by Damon's student Perikles, just in the period of Damon's ostracism. In the *Life of Pericles* 13 Plutarch writes,

> The Odeion, many-seated and many-columned in its interior arrangement, and with a roof with a circular slope from a single peak, they say was an image and a copy of the Persian King's tent, and that Perikles oversaw construction of it. For this reason Kratinos again made fun of him in *The Thracian Women*: 'This onion-headed Zeus comes, | Perikles, bearing the Odeion on his head | Since the ostracism has passed by (παροίχεται).' Ambitious for honour, Perikles then first had a decree passed to establish a music contest at the Panathenaic festival and, elected steward of the games (ἀθλοθέτης), himself prescribed how the competitors should play the aulos or sing or play the kithara. Both then and later the people watched the musical contests in the Odeion.

The context of this passage is the reconstruction of Athens' public buildings after 449, which Perikles promoted and his opponents, led by Thucydides son of Melesias, contested. (Kratinos compared the odd shape of Perikles' helmet, fitting his oversize head, with the peculiar lines of the Odeion.)[16] A date in the 440s for the reconstruction of the Odeion is plausible and widely accepted (Stadter (1989) ad loc.). The Plutarch passage quoted reports a decree by Perikles establishing a music contest at the Panathenaia. In fact, as Alan Shapiro ((1992) 58) and others point out, Perikles must have merely reformed this event, rather than introduced it. The ostracism Kratinos mentions is generally thought to be that of Thucydides son of Melesias in 444 or 443. This would certainly suit Plutarch's context: now that the principal enemy of Perikles' building programme is out of Athens, Perikles can appear, 'bearing the Odeion on his head'. Given that context, however, one cannot help speculating whether the decree Plutarch mentions may have been one of those proposed by Damon on Perikles' behalf, and whether the ostracism Kratinos mentioned was actually Damon's, missing Perikles himself. Dikastic pay, a proposal by Damon, was intended to permit as many Athenians as possible to take part in

[16] Kratinos' play is commonly dated to the 430s, because it mentions the younger Kallias III (fr. 81 K.–A.), born *c.*450 (Davies (1971) 263), and in it Perikles († 429) comes on stage. See Geissler (1925) 21–2.

legal proceedings, where they could listen to the rhetoric of opposing litigants. The Odeion did the same for music, providing a place where music could work its effects.

Finally, in a testimonium not included in Diels–Kranz, the sixth-century Platonic commentator Olympiodoros remarks, 'Perikles learned from Damon the songs through which he harmonized the city' (*In Plat. Alcibiad. Comment.* 138.4–11 ed. Westerink). It is unclear what Olympiodoros could have known. His report is nonetheless consistent with what must have been a principal link between a music theorist whose work concerned the behavioural consequences of music, and a democratic politician who wanted to influence the demos.

The later 440s seem to have been important for music at Athens in other ways as well. Shapiro ((1992) 58) notes the exceptionally large number of vases depicting musical scenes from this period. At the same time, however, these years were also characterized by political and intellectual uncertainty and conservatism. Although Perikles prevailed against Thucydides son of Melesias, the struggle itself indicates a state of some ambivalence. Probably sometime around 444 Sophokles staged *Ajax*, an ambiguously anti-progressive play that (among other points) disputes the notion of 'living as you wish' (lines 1073–88), a cardinal point of democratic ideology championed by many including Thucydides' Perikles (2.37).[17] The community's ruler Menelaus argues in defence of the 'ship of state'. The aristocrat Ajax, however, refuses to submit to the community's leaders or the people's vote—τοὺς πολλοίσιν . . . κριταῖς, 'the masses who judge' (1243), an explicit democratic reference (cf. 440–9, 1135–7). Ajax despised the people's judgement in awarding Achilles' arms to Odysseus. He went on a rampage, to slaughter the army and its leaders. He destroyed undistributed (the text is specific) community property and its guards (26–8, 54, 148). Ajax's brother Teuker also defies the community's rulers (1093–1117, 1266–1315, 1415–18), claiming that Ajax was never subject to them and stressing, along with the chorus (158–71) and Ajax's own enemy Odysseus (1332–1345), that Ajax was a 'noble man', ἐσθλὸν ἄνδρα (1352). Without their leader, Ajax's Athenian crew (201) are frightened

[17] For a discussion and summary of views on the date of *Ajax*, see Garvie (1998) 6–8. Garvie opts for the mid-440s.

'like timorous doves' (140). 'Great and little together is best. The great do well when the little are there to help them' (155). Despite his outrageous crimes against the community, Ajax receives an honourable burial which the play presents as worthy of approval. Although we cannot determine the popular reaction to this politically conservative drama, the following year Sophokles was elected *hellenotamias*, treasurer of the Athenian alliance.

In 442, Sophokles staged *Antigone*, in many ways also a conservative text. In his opening speech, Thebes' new ruler Kreon proclaims: 'I could never make that man a friend of mine who menaces our country, knowing this, that our country *is* our safety. Only when it sails upright can we establish true friendships' (187–90, trans. Fagles). Antigone champions the right to burial of her brother Polyneikes, even though Polyneikes had attacked his own city and (Sophokles specifies) tried to burn its temples (line 199). In *Antigone* Kreon learns that his attitude must be modified, to honour a family member whom the play itself presents as a traitor. We are told that as a result of this play, Sophokles was elected general (*hypoth.* Aristoph. Gram. *ad Ant.*). We have no reason to think that the playwright possessed financial or military credentials. The parallel is striking that in 412, again in a complicated period for Athens, Sophokles was chosen *proboulos* to counsel his city.

Finally, in 440 the Athenians voted μὴ κωμῳδεῖν: in some way to restrict comedy (Schol. Ar. *Ach.* 67). Although everything about this measure is obscure, it is probably best seen as a temporary response both to the war with Samos and to pressure from Perikles, in a climate of caution about ridiculing Athens and its politicians during wartime (Halliwell (1991) 58–9). The provision was repealed in 437.

Damon's ostracism fits in a climate of political and intellectual suspicion, which elsewhere also as we have seen sometimes directly targeted musical innovation. Whatever the truth of the accusation, one principal reason for Damon's ostracism may have been that, in an ambiguously conservative climate of suspicion and tension, his musical investigations could be represented to the demos as a 'concealing', 'clever', and 'meddling' (μεγαλοπράγμων) attempt at innovations they neither liked or understood. They therefore drove him out.

Thus as a political phenomenon, music itself is one bridge between Damon's political and his intellectual activities, linking the two tracks of Damon's career. Damon studied the behavioural and hence political implications of music systematically, describing and naming different *harmoniai*, rhythms, and metrical feet, and correlating these with conduct and ethos. The earliest and best sources for Damon's philosophical activity give no sign that he promoted certain types of music for their positive ethical consequences. This may explain why Plato seems not to have wholly approved of him. We also have no evidence that he took sides in two great musical controversies of his day, the rivalry between the aulos and the kithara and the emergence of New Music, written about elsewhere in this volume. His work was oriented toward music and humanity, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον in Thucydidean terms, and his approach was not negative, sceptical or relativist: the ethical consequences of *harmoniai* and metre were the same for each individual. Damon applied his interests to the practical manipulation of immediate experience, not through rhetoric (although Gorgias had similar thoughts, and may show Damon's influence) but through music and poetic metre. Since this manipulation could have broader political uses, politicians took an interest in Damon's work, and learned from him the techniques of musical politics. These political connections then led to Damon's ostracism.

10

Athenian Strings

Peter Wilson

HOMERIC STRINGS IN HELLENISTIC ATHENS

Buried in the scholia on the *Odyssey*, there rests a precious testimony to the 'musical mentality' of that indefatigable Athenian scholar, philosopher, and statesman who seems doomed to remain in the shadows of his intellectual predecessors, lost in the gloom surrounding the fall of Athenian power and democratic independence with which he is associated—Demetrios of Phaleron. The line under the Hellenistic scholar's gaze is the one which introduces the nameless 'singer man' Agamemnon had left behind in Argos to guard his wife:

> and moreover by her there was a man who was a singer (ἀοιδὸς ἀνήρ), to whom the son of Atreus had given many instructions to restrain his wife when he went to Troy. (*Od.* 3.267–8)

This singer did not remain nameless long. Demetrios was probably not the first to have a stab at identifying the mythical *aoidos* assigned the task of deploying his musical talents to fend off Klytaimestra's moral decline. But his commentary is especially illuminating for the ways in which myth, cultural and political history, and literary criticism were inextricably interwoven in Hellenistic scholarship. And it illustrates the special fascination with matters musical that was characteristic of the intellectual traditions within which Demetrios worked: 'The greater number of the pupils of Plato and the better students of the school of Aristotle wrote learned works on ancient music.' (Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 3. 1131f)

Along with his brother Agamemnon, 'Menelaos', writes Demetrios,

> went with Odysseus to Delphoi to consult the god about the imminent expedition to Troy. At that same time Kreon was the official in charge of the eight-yearly competition of the Pythian Games. Demodokos the Lakonian won first prize—a student of Automedes of Mykenai, who was the first to write in epic verses about the battle of Amphitryon against the

Teleboans and the strife between Kithairon and Helikon . . . Agamemnon took Demodokos to Mykenai with him and set him the task of watching over Klytaimnestra.

People used to have vast respect for singers as teachers of matters divine and of the noble deeds of men of the past, and among the instruments they most prized the lyre. Even Klytaimnestra demonstrates her respect for the 'man: for she gave orders not for his slaughter but his banishment . . .[1] And the music of the *kitharōidoi* was so closely connected to matters political that they say that the Spartan city-state was given assistance in the most important affairs by these men both to assist its civic unity and to safeguard its laws (τοσοῦτον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ διέτεινεν ἡ τῶν κιθαρῳδῶν μουσικὴ ὡς τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν τὴν πόλιν ὠφελεῖσθαι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν νόμων φυλακήν).[2]

A fine example this of Hellenistic scholarship generating mythology through its moralizing reading of ancient poetry, coupled with the 'hard', scientific studies of its cultural historians. The enigmatic singer of *Odyssey* 3 is explained by this invented story of a visit to the musical and mantic god, Apollo. Odysseus is one of the chosen participants in this otherwise obscure enterprise, perhaps by virtue of his own expertise in *aoidē*: this, after all, was the hero who can tell his tale 'with the skill of an *aoidos*' (*Od.* 11.368) and who, during a festival to Apollo, was to restore order domestic and political to Ithake with a bow that sang like a newly re-strung lyre at his touch (*Od.* 21.404 ff.) But Demetrios offers a characteristically pragmatic explanation of Odysseus' presence at Delphoi. He is to pick up one *Phemios* there—who, as it turns out, is the brother of Demodokos.

Demetrios shifts smoothly from the mythic to the scholarly register with his reference to the agonothete, Kreon; in the detail that the Pythian Games were at this time held every eight rather than four years, and so on. Everything suggests that he has examined the work for which its creators, Aristotle and Kallisthenes, were crowned and lauded by the Delphians, only to have the honorific inscription physically obliterated when anti-Macedonian

[1] Gostoli (1986) argues convincingly that the immediately following remarks should also be ascribed to Demetrios, but they are not included in the recent edition of *SOD*. See Scully (1981) for a discussion of the *Odyssey* passage.

[2] Demetrios of Phaleron fr. 144 *SOD ap.* Schol. Hom. *Odyssey* 3.267, p. 143, 15b Dind. Cf. fr. 146 *SOD*.

sentiment grew—that is, the record of Pythian victors and officials.[3] It may be, as Gostoli suggests,[4] that Demetrios had earnestly consulted this work and found a Demodokos from Sparta listed at the head. If so, the coincidence was irresistible. But I think Demodokos was always likely to be a Spartan from the pen of the Hellenistic scholar.

Spartan citizenship for the lyre-playing guardian of the epic moral order is entirely consistent with the dominant cultural and historical fictions about the place of music—especially music of the kithara and lyre—in Greek society and politics.[5] Spartan conservatism—in particular, Spartan *xeno-* and *kaino*-phobia—were both neatly encapsulated in stories such as that of the way the Spartans refused to allow Timotheos to play at their state festivals with a lyre that had more than the traditional number of seven strings. On the concert podium, the innovative musical outsider was asked by the presiding ephor from which side of the lyre he should shear off the offending extra strings. A similar story is told of the great singer of Lesbos, Terpander himself, who some two hundred years earlier, was fined for having one string too many on his lyre.[6]

Demetrios' commentary has an air of wistful nostalgia, of hankering after cultural and political practices lost in a non-existent other time and other place. But Demetrios was also that rare figure of a philosopher given the opportunity to turn theory into practice. And it is clear that, as one arm of his major political reforms at the end of the fourth century, he overhauled the public *musical* culture of Athens. For one thing, he introduced the office of agonothete,—a powerful, elite manager of the city's leading cultural events.[7] And he is also credited with the introduction of a new style of rhapsodic contest to the theatres—and part of the novelty seems to have lain in having rhapsodes set and perform

[3] Dittenb. *Syll.* 3, I, 275. [4] Gostoli (1986).

[5] *Kitharoidia* was at the heart of the musical, political and poetic culture of Sparta (at least as it was imagined by others: see Csapo above): the first kitharoidic *agōn* at the Karneia of 676–3 was supposedly won by Terpander, who also worked on the first musical *katastasis* of Sparta: Hellan. *FGrH* 4 F 85; Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 9.1134b–c with Gostoli (1990).

[6] Timotheos: Artemon of Kassandrea *FHG* 4. 342; Plut. *Inst. Lak.* 17, 238c; Terpander: *ibid.*; cf. Plut. *Agis.* 10.5–6.

[7] Wilson (2000*a*) 271–6, 307–8.

their Homer to the music of the 'noble lyre'.[8] Demetrios evidently felt that the city of Athens as a whole could do with the kind of musical moral instruction that Agamemnon had tried to organize for his wife.

Demetrios stood in a philosophical tradition that had in profound ways been shaped by the musical practices and politics of classical Athens. These forces had already seen Plato purge his ideal city of every musical instrument except the kithara and lyre: triangles, harps—they all had to go; and above all so too did the aulos, the piercing reed instrument associated with Dionysiac and orgiastic cult and described in a revealing metaphor as the 'most many-stringed' instrument of all (*Republic* 399c–d). And the musical education on the kithara and lyre specified with such monomaniacal zeal in his *Laws* was to furnish the very moral and political foundations of the perfect society. Aristotle went on to strike even the kithara from his very short list of acceptable instruments. The reason is that the kithara could not be made to shed the reputation it had acquired between his master's day and his own as a 'technical instrument' (τεχνικὸν ὄργανον *Politics* 1341ª15),[9] like the aulos. By his day, the noble instrument of hero and god—which had always demanded a long and arduous apprenticeship—had become the preserve of the concert star, and—what pained these thinkers most—a means of social and economic mobility for men whose fathers had never so much as strummed a lyre. And so it had become, by contamination, a threat to the 'free men' for whom Aristotle was writing,—presenting the dreaded slur of *banausia*. For these two great reactionary thinkers, then, 'purified' strings had offered the promise of a means to return to a pre-lapsarian social order: and 'pre-lapsarian' also meant a 'pre-', or at least a 'non-*democratic*' social order.

DEMOCRACY AND THE LYRE

In this chapter I want to turn back to the age whose end these men in some way represent. And I want to look, in a highly selective way, at the place 'strings' occupied in democratic Athens' musical

[8] Athenaios 14.620b; cf. Eustathius *Comm. ad Hom. Il.* 24.482, Ὁμηριστὰς καλουμένους, οἳ ἐμελῴδουν τὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου (= fr. 55A+B *SOD*).

[9] Cf. Plut. *De Rect. Rat. Aud.* 17, 47b; Dion. Hal. *Comp. Styl.* 6.25.

culture and psycho-social profile. The frequency with which the Greeks link their music and their politics is matched by the way modern scholars efficiently separate the two. Think for instance of the way Plato designs his ideal city from the dance-floor up; or how he unambiguously states, in a famous passage of the *Laws* (701), that changes in musical practice actually *caused* the growth of radical democracy. Few modern histories of ancient Greece give much space to the musical origins of democracy.

Stringed instruments were traditionally instruments of elite culture. And so, tracking their placement in an effusively democratic city is a promising device for exploring relations between the cultural and the political, for identifying areas of tension, resistance, of adaptation and appropriation. For this was, well into the later fifth century, a city where 'to play the lyre', to 'know one's strings', could mean 'to have culture', 'to be properly educated'. And yet this kind of education was only available, in the words of the Platonic Protagoras, to 'the most powerful people'; 'and the richest are the ones with the most power' (Plato *Prot.* 326c). A synoptic approach to 'strings' thus offers insights into the changing contours of cultural, educational and political capital in Athens; and a richly symbolic point around which a complex set of issues—religious, economic, intellectual, personal and political—organize themselves.

Taking a synoptic approach to 'strings' risks the accusation of a kind of 'sub-Neitzschean' thinking, and of reductive polarization. But I would suggest that 'strings' and 'the aulos' do form a more or less distinguishable pair and polarity in Greek culture; a pair, moreover, onto which the divine pair of Apollo and Dionysos can *sometimes* be mapped. Of course an instrument is never a clear and simple symbol of any one thing in Greece; their use, their histories mythic and real are much more matters of constant contention and argument. There are few fixed meanings—aesthetic, moral or broadly ideological. And one can readily punch holes in the string—aulos polarity. For instance, the fact that the two were certainly played together in a number of contexts shows that their usage was not systematically demarcated, that they were not defined by mutual opposition. Yet probably the most prominent context for their joint use—the wedding procession—might end up saving the general phenomenon. For this was after all the ritual and social occasion aimed at producing a unity and harmony

between forces regarded as potentially or actually in strong opposition—man and woman; two previously independent houses. 'Harmony' at the instrumental level is here surely meant to evoke, and to create, a harmony at the social level.

Easier to pull apart is any claim for Dionysos' monopoly on the aulos, Apollo's on the stringed instruments. One can point for instance to the *barbitos*, the deep-toned long-armed bowl-lyre virtually always found in sympotic, and more especially, komastic and erotic contexts. For this 'drinking man's lyre' is much used by Dionysos and his entourage. I am however going to persist with this polarity, partly to test its heuristic value, but largely because, whatever its complications and inversions, it did exist in certain quarters. As much is shown by the fact that one (fictive) ancient scholar, the Soterikhos of the pseudo-Plutarchean treatise on music, has to expend considerable time and ingenuity arguing that Apollo is the master of the aulos as well as the strings (*De Mus.* 14 = *Mor.* 1135e–1136a). He cites, among other things, the fact that the *daphnephoros* from Tempe was accompanied by an aulete, and that a famous Delian statue of the god has him holding the Graces in one hand, one of whom is playing auloi. Soterikhos has done his homework—and it shows.[10]

APOLLO *VS* MARSYAS: ICONIC VICTORY OR OPEN QUESTION?

We should start with a myth that loomed large in the last quarter of the century in Athens—the myth of Athena, the satyr Marsyas and

[10] The objection (aired at the Warwick conference) that Apollo was elaborately honoured by the music of auloi at his greatest festival, the Delphian Pythia can be countered by two considerations: in the contest of *aulētikē*, it was the god's primordial enemy, the Pytho, who was most intimately – and mimetically – associated with the music of the aulos (and that, in his defeat); while it is reported that the contest in *auloidia* was removed from the programme after its introduction because it was 'not a well-omened thing to listen to': Paus. 10.7.4–6. For the *barbitos* see Maas and Snyder (1989) 113–38. There is a small group of vase-images dating from the first quarter of the 5th cent. which depict Orestes' revenge on Aigisthos, who holds a *barbitos*: Griffiths (1967); Snyder (1976). Scully (1981) 70 thinks this draws on the literary tradition of *Od.* 3 and serves as a symbol of the action that led to the adultery. This however neglects the distinctive attributes of the *barbitos* (Scully refers throughout to a 'lyre'), which Aristotle rejects as of no educational value: *Politics* 8.6, 1341^{a}16–^{b}18. The point lies in an ethical contrast between the 'eastern', sympotic and 'erotic' *barbitos* and the more 'public' *phorminx* or lyre used by the *aoidos anēr*.

Apollo. Its outlines are simple: Athena invents the aulos. She tries it out, and sees in a reflective surface the image of her distended features as she plays. Horrified, she casts the instrument away, and what the civic goddess banishes from the realm of appropriate decorum, the satyr Marsyas adopts as his own. Famous works, poetic and plastic, focused on this part of the myth, which seems to perform an important double task: the aulos is 'officially' banned, rejected by Athena herself. Yet at the same time, it is *incorporated*, with all its disruptive but immensely *useful* powers, into the heart of civic life, in the realm of the Dionysiac.[11]

There was, however, a second act to the story. Elated by his new possession, Marsyas was led into hybris, and so came into musical conflict with Apollo, thus setting the aulos directly against the lyre. Marsyas played well, apparently holding his own against the Olympian and enchanting his hearers, among whom we often see the Muses.[12] But Apollo never loses. Marsyas is defeated and skinned alive from a pine tree. Just when this brutal loser's prize first appears is not certain. Predictably, the Romans found it congenial and produced endless representations. But at least by the early fourth century we sometimes find a Skythian holding a knife lurking between Apollo and Marsyas, or even Apollo himself fingering a blade, as Marsyas plays.[13]

Here, we might think, is the iconic victory of lyre over aulos. That is how the Platonic Sokrates uses—or abuses—the myth. Having just 'purged the luxurious city' of all traces of the aulos and, along with them, those *aulopoioi* who scratched a living by manufacturing the things, Sokrates makes very tendentious use of this myth when he says: 'So, we are not innovating at all, my friend, in judging Apollo and the instruments of Apollo above Marsyas and his . . .' (*Rep.* 399e).

[11] Wilson (1999).

[12] See *LIMC* s.vv. Marsyas e.g. E19; Mousa, Mousai IV A–E; Queyrel (1984) 144–56; Castaldo (2000) 34–7; Beschi (1991).

[13] One of the earliest extant representations is a mid-4th-cent. marble relief from Mantinea, perhaps from the workshop of Praxiteles, on one side of which Marsyas plays vigorously while Apollo sits opposite him, kithara on his knees and a Skythian between them holding a knife: (Athens, Nat. Mus. MN 215.216.217. On each of the other two sides there are three Muses). Perhaps this version found fertile soil in the conservative musical context of Arkadia. A (?3rd-cent.) kithara might have a relief image on it of Marsyas being punished after the contest: Bélis (1995) 1039.

However, fifty years before Plato was trying to reduce myth to a simple form of social control in this way, things are not so straightforward. For a start, it is probably not an accident of survival that it is the first, not the second act of the story which leaves more substantial traces in the classical period. A satyr-play on the subject-matter of the musical contest and its consequences has been hypothesized, but I do wonder whether we can seriously imagine a satyr-play in which one of the species' most prominent members ends up flayed alive.[14] More importantly, the manner of Apollo's triumph raises some serious questions.

It seems Apollo's victory was secured by a challenge to Marsyas to accompany himself with song as he played—an impossibility, of course, with the mouth-filling aulos. But the strategy asserts the superiority of a whole set of standards, aesthetic and moral, of musical performance. These centre on an elite ideal of the body of the performer, and of the relation between body, word, and instrument. In the string-player a harmony is established between the player and his instrument—in 'somatic' terms, the lyre 'fits well'. Unlike the aulos, which disrupts, overruns, and distorts the body, the lyre creates 'good *skhēma*', and 'good rhythm'—the kind of thing evident in the fluid and highly aestheticized lines of the early vase-images of Apollo and concert *kitharōidoi*, later given formal analysis by the philosophers.[15] For the string-player, word and music are properly in accord—a point upon which much is made to hang by the youthful Alkibiades, who supposedly refused to play the aulos at school because of the mess it made of the bearing, the appearance, and the discursive powers of the noble man:

> the use of the plectrum and lyre, he argued, wrought no such havoc . . . the lyre blended its tones with the voice and song of its user, while the aulos blocked up and barricaded the mouth, robbing its master both of voice and speech. 'So let the sons of the Thebans play the aulos,' he said, 'for they do not know how to converse. But we Athenians . . . have Athena as foundress and Apollo as our family god, and the former threw away the aulos, while the latter flayed the aulos-player.' (Plut. *Alc.* 2.5–6)

But how much confidence can be had in a victory which prizes these ideals when their ascendancy is achieved by what amounts to

[14] Froning (1971) 34–5.
[15] See Fig. 8. On the importance of the visual aesthetic see Bélis (1995) 1045–6.

a trick? In another version Apollo challenged the satyr to invert his instrument and play it: again, something possible on the 'harmonious' lyre, but not on the unidirectional aulos. One starts to sense a degree of bad faith in Apollo's behaviour. And perhaps for its classical Athenian viewers this iconic conflict in fact re-established the musical hierarchy only at the cost—or perhaps we should say with the benefit—of a very serious questioning of the bases on which it rested. The aulos is certainly not ascendant in this story. But neither is there much confidence, let alone any euphoria, in the victory of the lyre. For all its ostensible triumphalism, this story does not have the air of mythic history composed by the victors. It surely registers the turbulence in the realm of *mousikē* so characteristic of its period, rather than simply restating an untroubled order.[16]

NO ATHENIAN DRAMATIC LYRIC, NO LYRIC CIVIC IDENTITY

And when we turn to Athens' elaborate festival culture, a certain ambiguity as regards Apollo and his instruments persists. Strings are striking primarily for their *absence*. We can excavate as many as fifty or sixty choruses that sang and danced at major Athenian festivals every year to the sound of the aulos; but no single case of lyre- or kithara-accompanied collective, public song and dance. Tragedy, comedy, and dithyramb were all instrumentally supported by the aulos: in this sense, there is no such thing as dramatic '*lyric*'.[17] A 'technological' argument might be offered for this prominence of the aulos in Athens' public musical culture—namely, that strings could not make themselves heard in the open air, above the noise of a massive audience and the voices and feet of, for instance, fifty dancing-and-singing boys. This may carry some weight, but the noise produced by a kithara, with its enormous resonating sound-box and the use of a plectrum made of a hard material, like horn or metal, was regarded by the Greeks as

[16] Queyrel (1984) 146 remarks that much of the imagery of Marsyas and Thamyris in contest with Apollo suggests a preference for their incredible defiance against the Olympian over the latter's inevitable triumph. See Leclercq-Neveu (1989); cf. Griffith (1990).
[17] Even at Apollo's great urban festival, the Thargelia, we find no sign of the lyre – nor even of the god's preferred hymn, the paian.

potentially very loud and formidably strident.[18] But the technological explanation cannot be adequate in itself. And one of the points telling against it leads us in an interesting direction. Centuries after the classical period, we find Athenians performing choral paeans at Delphoi, in one case with a *megas khoros* of seventy-four members, accompanied by five kitharists, three *potikitharizontes* plus six auletes.[19] So we find Athenians doing two things at Delphoi in a later age we never see them engaged in at home in the classical period: performing choral paeans and accompanying them with strings (even if the strings were bolstered by auloi). And these performers were drawn from the very upper crust of the Athenian aristocratic old guard. Members of the Kerykes, the Euneidai, Pyrrakidai, Eumolpidai, Erysikhthonidai and the Eupatrids are all prominent, and the Athenian mission to Delphoi had for all its history been in the hands of this class of Athenian. Robert Parker describes its leaders in 326 as reading 'like a roll-call of the Lykourgan establishment'.[20] Nor is this prominence of members of an elite of birth in what might loosely be called Athenian traditional 'religious music' restricted to this case. It is clear that various Athenian *genē* controlled important cultic music. And, though being a member of a *genos* did not of itself necessarily imply wealth and power in the city, it at least implied the power of antiquity, of respected familial traditions. Nicholas Jones has convincingly argued that participation in *genē* activities, as in various other clubs and associations, served as an 'ideological haven' for beleaguered Athenian aristocrats.[21]

[18] Maas and Snyder (1989) 33, 54, 65.

[19] In 97/6; Bélis (1988).

[20] Parker (1996) 250. Cf. e.g. Agenor the Eumolpid (Stephanis (1988) 36) who graduates from being a boy pythaist on a number of occasions in the 2nd cent. to playing the kithara for the god. The situation is similar for Delos: in 426/5 the Athenians restored a musical *agōn* to the Delia: Thouk. 3.104; and in the 4th cent. Athenians trained kitharists for performance for Apollo there: *ID* 46 = *SEG* 14, no. 493; cf. Stephanis (1988) no. 2684; Rutherford in this volume.

[21] Jones (1999) esp. 294–7. A particularly interesting case of these 'sacerdotal musicians' is the Euneidai, a *genos* 'of dancers and kitharists' (Hesykh. ε 7007) named after the Lemnian king Euneus the son of Jason, for whose activities in Athens Euripides may have provided an aetiology at the end of the *Hypsipyle*. The Euneidai are said to have provided kitharodes for 'sacred service' (Harp. s.v. Εὐνείδαι), and that service probably included Dionysos as well as Apollo. In the Roman period at least, one of the priests of Dionysos Melpomenos (whose cult was an important home for the Muses in Athens) was a Euneid. See Parker (1996) 297–8; Burkert (1994); Cassio (2000). Other possible providers of 'sacerdotal musicians' in Athens include the Eumolpids, Kerykes, perhaps also the Pamphidai (if the activities of Pamphos – Paus. 9.27.2, 9.29.8, 7.21.9 – can be connected to the *genos* Pamphidai: Parker (1996) 307).

And *within* Athenian poetry itself? The representation of Apollo and his music in Athenian public poetry is too large a subject to explore here (and I shall touch on an important if eccentric example from Timotheos' *Persians* at the close of this chapter). However, a fair if unsurprising generalization would be that tragic Apollo is hardly all sweetness and light. The bow is very much more his attribute than the lyre, and it is sometimes used very vindictively. To judge from a tiny fragment of Sophokles' *Lokrian Aias*, the god may have actually used his kithara to drive that hero to his terrible crimes.[22] In Euripides' *Ion*, Apollo's solo paean to his own accompaniment on the kithara is a perversely autistic performance—and it is evoked by Kreousa powerfully to capture his evasion of moral responsibility:

> I poor wretch bore you a son, and with the fear of a mother I cast him out in the place where you lay with me, coupled with me in a miserable, miserable union. . . . but you just keep screeching on the kithara, singing paeans . . . (Eur. *Ion* 897–906)[23]

Even the resolutions offered in the *Eumenides* receive no support from a lyre-playing Apollo. When he first appears from his temple he threatens the Erinyes with 'a winged, gleaming snake, sped from the beatengold bowstring' (*Eumenides* 181–2: πτηνὸν ἀργηστὴν ὄφιν |χρυσηλάτου θώμιγγος ἐξορμώμενον). No golden *phorminx* here to bring Apollonian order: a golden θώμιγξ (*thōminx*) instead—and in this we are surely encouraged to hear an echo of the absent, much more familiar word and attribute. In fact, in tragedy the lyre and kithara are marked for their absence, and in a powerfully over-determined manner. From Aiskhylos to Euripides the lyre most often appears under the sign of its negation or absence, in the term ἄλυρον—'lyreless'—a word that becomes an iconic marker of the tragic *per se*, and often translated rather weakly as 'mournful' or 'sad'. At the same time it hints at the presence of the lyre's rival at work in the orkhestra, the aulos.[24]

[22] Fr. 15: τί σοι ὁ Ἀπόλλων κεκίθαρικεν;

[23] See Rutherford (1994–5); Furley (2000) 188–92.

[24] ἄλυρος: cf. Aiskh. *Ag.* 988–91, *Eum.* 332–3; Soph. *O.K.* 1222–3, *Trakh.* 643, Soph. fr. 849; Eur. *IT* 144–7, *Alk.* 447, *Helen* 185–7, *Phoen.* 1025–7, 1033–4; the related terms ἀκίθαρις, ἀντίλυρος fit into the same pattern. See Segal (1993) ch. 2;

Nor do we find any symbolic, foundational role for stringed instruments or for their divine, heroic, or historical players in shaping other collective representations of Athenian identity. The fact is all the more marked by comparison with what went on elsewhere.[25] A recommended tourist destination in nearby Megara was the stone on the Akropolis on which Apollo laid his kithara when helping Alkathoös build the walls—'and if you happen to hit it with a pebble, it sounds just like a kithara when struck'.[26] I have already mentioned Sparta's famed attachment to the old ways of string-playing. So closely was the city open to identification with the instrument that a statue of a woman holding a lyre at Amyklai could come to represent Sparta itself.[27] Central to the political mythology of Thebes was the fact that the city walls came into being under the lyric power of its music-hero Amphion.[28] To add an eloquent (and only recently unearthed) example form the world of fifth-century politics: when the Sicilian city of Kamarina was refounded around 461, the new system of phratries that divided up and distributed the citizenry was modelled on the strings of a lyre. Citizens are described in public documents as belonging to the phratry called 'shortest string', or 'three from the shortest string', and so on. Moreover, this same

Loraux (2002) ch. 5, esp. 62 (in the original 1999 French ed., p. 95: 'le genre tragique pense sa propre musicalité sous un signe négatif'); Wilson (2000*b*) 443. By contrast, outside tragic (and comic) poetry, poets seem to have been more closely identified with strings than with the performance instrument of their genres. That they composed on strings rather than the aulos will not altogether account for this phenomenon. Cf. e.g. Sophokles, lyre in hand, dancing a paian after Salamis (Athen. 1.37.16, cf. *Vita* 3) and later taking the tragic rôle of the kitharist Thamyris and perhaps represented thus in the Stoa Poikile (*Vita* 5); representations of the heroized poet in Neoptolemos' monument for Asklepios may have had him holding a lyre (Beschi (1982); Connolly (1998) *contra*); Kratinos as a worn-out lyre (Arist. *Knights* 531–6); and note the proximity of a lyre to the tragic poet Demetrios on the Pronomos vase (Naples Mus. Naz. 3240), on which the idealized Athenian youth (and khoreut?) Kharinos also holds a lyre. There is also the tradition that Dionysios of Syracuse purchased and dedicated Euripides' ψαλτήριον: *Life* 27.

[25] The significant exception is the role played by the 'Athenian Orpheus' Musaios, father of Eumolpos (Beschi (1991) 42–3); and to a lesser extent by Orpheus himself.

[26] Paus. 1.42.1–2.

[27] Paus. 3.18.8: the statue is said to be by Aristandros of Paros, as part of a dedication from the spoils of Aigospotamoi, and hence a symbol of Spartan mastery over Athens.

[28] Hes. fr. 182 M.–W.; see Rocchi (1989) esp. 47–56.

pattern of division by strings may also have provided the ground plan for the physical division of the city itself.[29]

THE KITHARA IN ATHENS: A HISTORY OF DECLINE OR A RISE TO FAME?

The site where the public performance of stringed *mousikē* certainly took place in Athens was the *mousikos agōn*.[30] Here individual (as opposed to group, choral) musicians competed in instrumental playing of the kithara—*kitharistikē*—and in singing to the kithara—*kitharōidia*. The two foremost occasions in all Greece for such string contests were the Pythia at Delphoi and the Karneia in Sparta, both in honour of Apollo and both reflecting the intimate relation between god and instrument. It might thus once again seem curious that in Athens Apollo appears never to have received this kind of worship whereas, in addition to the magnificent musical elements of the Panathenaia for Athena, his rather unmusical brother Herakles was in fact honoured by *mousikoi agōnes*,[31] as were the deities of Eleusis;[32] those remembered at the Epitaphia;[33] and probably Hephaistos too.[34] As I have already noted, politics conspired with piety to see Apollo honoured in both agonistic and non-agonistic formats by the Athenians *abroad*, on Delos and at Delphoi.

That the kithara-events at these festivals maintained a preeminence of prestige—in particular alongside the aulos-based contests in *aulōidia*, *aulētikē*, and *synaulia*—seems clear. As much is at least suggested by the prizes awarded at the Panathenaia in the early fourth century. There *kitharōidia* is unchallenged at the top of a hierarchy whose bottom is occupied by *auletikē*, Marsyas' expertise of purely instrumental aulos-music. The difference, in hard

[29] Cordano (1994); Helly (1997).

[30] On *mousikoi agōnes* and *kitharōidia* see: Vos (1986); Herington (1985); Larmour (1999); Kotsidu (1991); Shapiro (1992); Moretti (2001). Iconographic evidence suggests that contests for lyre-playing by young boys took place at the Anthesteria. This may have remained a home for the 'amateur ideal' of public string performance.

[31] At Marathon: Wilson (2000*a*) 327 n. 177. Herakles as a *mousikos*: Dugas (1944).

[32] Ps.-Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 54.7; *SEG* 16, no. 55.

[33] *IG* 1^3.2.523–5.

[34] *IG* $1^3$82.14, 31–3, with *SEG* 47, no. 60.

cash terms, is between 1,500 and 300 drachmas for the first prizes in each—and what is more, 1,000 drachmas of the kitharoidic prize come in the highly symbolic, aestheticized form of an olive wreath in solid gold.[35] But just what the nature of the prestige for the music of the kithara was in Athens deserves closer study, more than I can give it here. Even after its condition as 'base coin' had been partially erased by conversion to a gold wreath of olive, this prize remains an economic return—and a very substantial one at that. And the receipt of coin is precisely what distinguishes the Platonic Sokrates' 'gentleman string player' from the abhorred professional.[36] The point is that, over the course of the fifth century, the arts of the kithara, like other musical *tekhnai*, became increasingly lucrative for their virtuosi, as a new economy of *mousikē* grew voraciously in fifth-century Athens.[37] However unlike *aulōidia* and *aulētikē*, the kithara brought with it an ideological inheritance that made its transformation into an instrument of profit much more challenging to the old guard. The fear of contamination by *banausia* was so great that Apollo himself abandoned close association with the instrument in certain quarters.

The pattern can be most immediately seen by tracing the imagery of Apollo and the mortal *kitharōidos* across the fifth century. In the early decades, the iconography shows the performer, with his elaborate and magnificent robes, possessed of the form and much of the majesty of the god Apollo *kitharōidos* himself, who is often depicted handling the instrument in just the same manner (Fig. 8).[38] By the time of the Persian Wars, Apollo is still shown in the company of the kithara, but he rarely has it in his hands—a

[35] *IG* 2^2.2311. Much the same hierarchy is reflected in a prize-list from the festival of Artemis in Eretria of *c*.340: *IG* 12.9, 189: first-prize for boys' *aulōidia* (there seems to be no men's event) is 50 dr., for *kitharōidia* 200 dr. Iconographic representations of aulos-based contests (especially *aulōidia*) are few in comparison with kithara-contests, but they increase after *c*.450: Vos (1986). In *aulōidia* it seems that only the singer received a prize: Athen. 14. 621b. For the claimed pre-eminence of *kitharōidia* over *kitharistikē* see further Aelian *VH* 4.2: the kitharist Nikostratos said of the *kitharōidos* Laodokos that he was 'small in a great *tekhne*, while he himself was great in a small one.' As Stephanis (1988) 333 suggests, the story ought perhaps to be referred to Stratonikos of Athens. Cf. Cic. *Pro Mur.* 29: 'Ut aiunt in Graecis artificibus, eos auloedos esse, qui citharoedi fieri non potuerint.'

[36] Plato *Protagoras* 312b.

[37] Csapo above and Musti (2000).

[38] Maas and Snyder (1989) 58. For the importance attached to the robes of musicians see also the requirement of the Eretrian decree regulating the festival of Artemis that 'all those competing in the musical contests should perform a *prosodion* at the sacrifice in the courtyard wearing the *skeuē* which they wear in the contest' (*IG* 12. 9, 189.12–14); cf. Plato fr. 10 K.–A. for the ἐπιπόρπαμα worn by

FIG. 8 Attic red-figured amphora (*c*.480) with concert *kitharōidos*

distancing between god and instrument that can only have been caused by mortal means.[39] The evidence suggests that this development is at base a sociological issue, and reflects the increased involvement of 'non-traditional' players in the arts of the kithara. At the very start of the fifth century a number of *kitharōidoi* at least made dedications on the Athenian Akropolis which may have included large bronze statues of themselves—or their god—in action as *kitharōidoi*, by the finest artists of the day. Even if the objects erected in this way were tripods rather than statues, they will have represented prestigious commissioned works, and an ability and desire to spend in this way.[40] Fine and costly statues need not entail *kaloikagathoi* dedicators, but at this period, they certainly point in that direction.[41]

By around 470 there are signs of change. It is, as I noted, in this decade that Apollo starts to become iconographically distanced from the kithara. And Aristotle famously attributed to an upsurge of self-confidence in the victorious post-Persian Wars generation of Greeks an uncritical enthusiasm for all manner of learning—including even the art of playing the aulos (*Pol.* 1341°26–39). If, as Aristotle implies, well-born Athenians had taken to playing the

kitharōidoi. For the visual near-assimilation of mortal competing *kitharoidos* to Apollo *kitharoidos* see esp. the black-figured Amphora in the British Museum, B 260 = *CVA* 4, 64, 1 with Castaldo (2000) 28.

[39] Sarti (1992) esp. 99. A full study of *kitharōidia* and *kitharōidoi* is much needed; cf. Bélis (1995). Timothy Power is currently preparing an important contribution.

[40] The dedications: *IG* 1^3.666 (*c.*510–500) and 754 (*c.*500–480). Of the former Raubitschek (*DAA* 91) writes: 'It may be assumed that the complete pedestal was made in the shape of a βῆμα with curved back, supporting the bronze statue of a kithara player.' The inscription reads: 'Alkibios the *kitharōidos* set this up *Nesiotes* (Νεσιότες)'. The last word is likely to mean either that the singer came from the small island Nesos, near the home of *kitharōidia*, Lesbos; or that the sculptor of the work was Nesiotes, best known for his later collaboration with Kritios: this latter is Raubitschek's view. In this case the commission would be a very distinguished one indeed. The latter inscription reads: 'Ophsi[os the *kith*]*arōidos* set [me up in] Ath[ens].' *IG* 1^3.753 is in the same hand, and is often associated with 754. It reads: 'Kalon the Aiginetan made [this].' Kalon was admired in Pausanias' day for his fine tripods, which are almost certainly of the kind that enclosed or were supported by sculptured artworks: Musti and Torelli (1991) 235. Cf. Kotsidu (1991) 78. Nothing comparable exists for auloides or auletes.

[41] On the other hand, it may be noteworthy that these two late archaic inscriptions do not give the patronymic of the singers, and it is possible that even in the early part of the century skilled practitioners of humble origins raised themselves economically and socially by virtue of their skill.

aulos in this period, we can assume that the kithara had reached the hands of more than its usual practitioners. When, in the (?) 430s, Herodotos writes that Arion the Lesbian *kitharōidos* 'made a great deal of money' (1.24.1) on tour in Italy and Sicily, he is almost certainly retrojecting contemporary musical practices and mentalities, telling us nothing about late-sixth-century *kitharōidia* but throwing some light on the much increased professionalism of his own day. This period also saw the building of the great Periklean Song-hall, the Odeion. If, as seems likely, the principal *raison d'être* behind the construction of this extraordinary building was to house the musical contests burgeoning across Athens in a physically superior environment,[42] the enormous scale of expenditure (risking accusations of delusions of personal grandeur: cf. esp. Kratinos fr. 73 K.–A.) suggests the immense value attached to them, along with a desire to make this sort of music more widely enjoyed.[43]

By the time of the Peloponnesian War, competitive performances on the kithara by a new breed of international star were thus being enjoyed by mass Athenian audiences on numerous major festival occasions across the year. And among the pieces heard will have been jewels of the avant-garde of 'new' musicians, kitharoidic nomes like Timotheos' *Persians*—for, along with the dithyramb, the nome was the home of radical innovation in this period, and its instrument was becoming embroiled in the musico-social maelstrom studied in this volume by Csapo.

With these changes in mind, we should think again of the iconic *agōn* between Marsyas and Apollo: for at exactly this period we find Marsyas with his old enemy's instrument in his hands (both lyre and kithara appear) (Fig. 9). Rather than interpreting this as a chastening—remedial training in the lyre for the base

[42] On the Odeion: Miller (1997); Mosconi (2000).

[43] See Mosconi (2000) for extended argument that the construction of the Odeion represented a policy of 'music for the masses' that effectively democratized one of the pleasures previously largely the preserve of the élite symposiastic class. Mosconi (2000) 277–80 for detailed discussion of the Kratinos fragment. The association in it between the Odeion and ostracism is very revealing (ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς δδὶ προσέρχεται | <ὁ> Περικλέης τὠιδεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρανίου | ἔχων, ἐπειδὴ τοὔστρακον παροίχεται, 'Here comes the squill-head Zeus, Perikles, with the Odeion on his head, for the ostracism has passed'). If a particular ostracism is intended, is it that which fell on Damon: had he taken the fall for the tyrannical aspirations imagined behind the building?

FIG. 9 Red-figured volute-krater (late fifth century) showing the satyr Marsyas playing the kithara in front of Athena; Apollo observes from a reclining position to the right-hand side.

beginner—Sarti has very plausibly argued that these images reflect the accommodation of the instrument to the satyr, perhaps even its appropriation.[44] This goes much further than the doubts I aired above about the hollow triumphalism of Apollo's musical victory. It represents rather a defeat of the old guard, just at the moment of their apparent triumph—a defeat that drives home the degree to which the *kakoi* had well and truly made the instrument of the *kaloikagathoi* their own. Something similar may have been going on in the Athenian theatre for some time. Satyrs as a group had had their hands on musical instruments normally the preserve of their 'betters', as the wonderful 'Singers at the Panathenaia' krater of *c.*425 beautifully demonstrates. And part of the amusement—or horror, as one's politics inclined—of Phrynis' innovative nome the

[44] Sarti (1992) 101; Boardman (1956) argued for the 'remedial training' interpretation.

Kyklops was its presentation of this icon of anti-culture *playing the kitharōidos*.[45]

It is little surprise then that New Music was depicted as an assault on strings. The trope of the lyre with too many strings became a potent symbol, an expression of the unnatural development of the instrument's proper range, and by easy extension, of the breaking of all aesthetic and social boundaries. The perceived fate of strings was thus an important focus of the criticism directed against the New Music. Indeed, it was an important cause of it. The point is most graphically and famously illustrated in the fragment of Pherekrates' *Kheiron* (K.–A. 155) where *Mousikē* essentially depicts herself—before Justice—as a set of strings manhandled and raped by the innovators Melanippides, Kinesias, Phrynis, and Timotheus.[46] Accusations of sexual excess may always have hovered around those involved extensively in *mousikē*, given its close proximity to the realm of (sympotic) pleasure, but it is only from the later fifth century that 'completely kitharoidic' (Eupolis fr. 311 K.–A.) can serve as a term of abuse.[47]

STRINGS AMONG THE INTELLECTUALS

Eric Csapo discusses the economic, sociological, performative and poetical significance of the New Music in great detail above, and I shall return briefly to the role of the stringed instruments in the system of self-representation adopted by Timotheos below. I want

[45] New York Met. Mus. of Art 25.78.66 = *ARV*[2] 1172, 8. The presence here of an 'official' aulos-player indicates that the scene is to be imagined as a theatrical piece: see Krumeich, Pechstein, Seidensticker (1999) 201. It is at least clear from the inscription ΟΙΔΟΙ ΠΑΝΑΘΕΝΑΙΑ that the khoros of Silenoi is in some sense parodying the musical competitors at the festival. Who exactly is the butt of the parody is difficult to tell: it could be the old guard or the new wave. Satyrs had been used to explore Athenian *mousikē* since at least the 6th cent.: see *ABV* 285, 1 with Lissarrague (1993) 208–9; the Attic red-figured column-krater of *c.*460 (Ferrara Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Spina 4110) shows a satyr in full dress as concert *kitharōidos*, with Dionysos and Hermes sitting by in judgement. This has the air of a positive, if playful, proclamation of the increased assumption—from 'below'—of a proud place in the *tekhnē*, and one in which the influence of Dionysos was increasingly felt. Phrynis' *Kyklops*: Schol. Ar. *Wealth* 290 ff. Parodists of *kitharōidia* existed at least from the later 5th cent.: see Athen. 1.20 and 14.638b on Oinopas the Italian.

[46] On this fragment see Hall (2000); Conti Bizzarro (1999) 130–71.

[47] Cf. Aiskh. *in Tim.* 41 with Fisher (2001) 171–2.

now to draw attention to a related way in which strings were felt by some to be under assault in classical Athens. In a curious echo of Pherekrates' *Mousikē*, the Sokrates of the *Republic* speaks with sarcasm of 'those worthies who vex and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs' (*Rep.* 7.531b: τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας). The object of Sokrates' sardonic ire are not apparently the new musicians of Plato's childhood. They seem rather to be the pioneers of the 'harmonic' project, the attempt that began late in the fifth or early in the fourth century to (among other goals) find the principles that related the profusion of existing modes or scale-forms, to work out ways to codify, relate and organize them. We glimpse the same or a related group of theorist-practitioners attacked in similar terms in a (?) fourth-century diatribe that criticizes them for, among other things, 'having the effrontery to waste [their entire life] on strings. They play on strings [much worse than real instrumentalists], they sing much worse than real singers, and in their critical comparisons they do everything worse than any orator one might come across'.[48]

These attempts to analyse and systematize existing musical practice were based on the empirical perception of sound (which is in part what, to the Platonic mind, made this abuse of strings bad philosophy[49]) and consequently, they were heavily dependent on the lyre (rather than the aulos), since the lyre was deemed much better suited to produce clear, distinct and invariable notes. In a musical culture with no keyboards and no notation capable of representing the relative size of intervals in the way the modern stave does, the lyre thus took on a huge importance as the instrument of experimental study. 'Strings' had thus become the object—and symbol—of contention in a newly critically conscious environment.

[48] *PHibeh* lines 23–26: εἰς τοσ]ο῀ῦτο δὲ ἔρχονται τόλμης ὥστε χ[ρόνου πολὺ]ν κα[τα|τρίβ]ξιν ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς, φάλλοντες μὲν [πολὺ χ]ε῀ί[ρον τῶ]ν | ψαλ]τῴν, ᾄδοντες δὲ τῶν ᾠδῶν, συγκρίνοντες δὲ καὶ | τοῦ τ]ῃγόντος ῥήτορος, πάντα πάντω[ν χεί]ρον ποιοῦντες. Those criticized are described as ἁρμονικοί and interested in scale-intervals and rhythms, but they are also ascribed views that are clearly of Damonian inspiration: West (1992*a*) 18. On the *harmonikoi*: Barker (1978).

[49] On the role of αἴσθησις in harmonic analysis see Theophrastos fr. 716 *FHS&G*, with Barker (1978) 8.

The study of *mousikē* is in fact one of the (neglected) core concerns of those involved in the explosion of critical analysis and intellectual investigation in Athens of the later fifth century. Bob Wallace has drawn attention to the prominence of those who studied music from new perspectives among the earliest 'sophists'. This group as a whole comes to be identified with the stringed instruments: a gloss in Hesykhios defines 'sophists' as 'those who concern themselves with *mousikē* and sing to the kithara'.[50]

To an important extent this did not represent an entirely new phenomenon. Stringed instruments had played an important part in the more mathematical approach of the Pythagoreans from the sixth century. The central Pythagorean concern to study the numerical ratios of the harmonic intervals was almost certainly advanced through empirical experimentation on strings. And the lyre (and/or kithara) was also a deeply charged symbol for the Pythagoreans, as for the Orphics, at what some might wish to call the less scientific end of their spectrum of thought. The idea of a cosmic lyre is at least as old as the fifth century, as is its role in systems of eschatological belief.[51] And in their own age, the new *harmonikoi* had to contend with others for the symbolic mastery of the lyre: for strings were also at the heart of the other most prominent school of musical thought, the so-called 'ethos-theory' (see below).

In fact, the echo of Pherekrates in Sokrates' words may turn out to be not entirely accidental. For I would argue that the practices of the New Music went hand-in-hand with the new theory. The practitioners were very interested in expanding the range of notes available for performance, in deploying a wide range of scale-types, and in modulating between them in performance. As I have noted, the holy grail of harmonic analysis was to establish a relation (and so to move between) the modal scales, and some argue that those string torturers of the *Republic* were trying to find

[50] Hesykhios Σ 1371: τοὺς περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ μετὰ κιθάρας ᾄδοντας. Wallace (1998); Conti Bizzarro (1999) 41–3. Athenaios (14.632c) quotes an intriguing fragment of Aiskhylos (Aisk. fr. 314 N) to support the point that in ancient times, σοφιστὴς was used of those who engaged in the *tekhnē* of *mousikē*: ἔστ' οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παρῆν παίων χέλυν.

[51] Evidence for the 'Orphic' poem the *Lyre* in West (1983) 29–32; 5-cent. idea of a cosmic lyre: Skythinos *IEG* fr. 1, with Hardie above.

the smallest musical interval—a search of obvious relevance to those in pursuit of *polykhordia*.[52]

A particularly interesting instance of the overlap between performers and theoreticians of strings is the flamboyant but forgotten Stratonikos, an Athenian of Euripides' old age. His specialty, the pure instrumental music of the kithara (*kitharistikē*) did not lend itself to preservation. There are clear indications that he was an admirer (if in fact he had the faculty of admiring others) of Timotheos, and may more generally have been in sympathy with that group so efficiently erased from poetic history.[53]

Stratonikos clearly regarded himself as *the* master of strings in the Greek world. His aspirations to panhellenic stature are clear from the stories of his travels, his associations with leaders and communities all over the Greek world, and from his rebarbative denunciation of virtually every other contemporary competitor in his field.[54] He was above all a performer, on both the agonistic and epideictic circuits. But he was also a teacher—both of concert performers and as a 'lecturer' on τὰ ἁρμονικά. In his case, theory and practice certainly irrigated one-another. The near-contemporary peripatetic Phainias reports in the same breath, that he 'introduced *polykhordia* into pure instrumental kithara-music and was the first person to take students in *harmonika* and to construct a diagram': an innovator in practice, teaching, and theory, then. The 'diagram' will have been designed to establish a relation (and

[52] West (1992*a*). Barker (1978) 11 suggests that the process of theoretical codification initiated by the *harmonikoi* in turn triggered a process of rigid standardization that seems to have migrated back into the realm of practice over the next half-century. If I am right, the practice of the new musicians may itself have been a prior trigger to the impulse to codify in the first place.

[53] Our evidence may derive from the recorded ἀπομνημονεύματα of Stratonikos himself: full documentation in Stephanis (1988) 407–9; West (1992*a*) 367–8; cf. Gilula (2000). Stratonikos was said (Athen. 8.352b) to have retorted punningly to Phainias after the latter boasted that his student Philotas had defeated Timotheos: αὐτὸς μὲν [sc. Philotas] ψηφίσματα ποιεῖ, Τιμόθεος δὲ νόμους. Like Philoxenos, he was said to have been imitating Simonides in his witty repartee (Ephoros περὶ εὑρημάτων 2) and I suspect that the Kean was to some extent appropriated as a figurehead or model by the New Musicians: see further below.

[54] Stratonikos is reported to have performed in: Korinth, Sikyon, Seriphos, Pella, Abdera, Maroneia, Kaunos, Byzantion ('the armpit of Hellas', according to Stratonikos: Athen. 8.351c), Phaselis, Kypros, Syracuse (sources in Stephanis (1988)).

so move between) the modal scales—the holy grail of harmonic analysis and one of the defining characteristics of *polykhordia* in performance.[55]

The evidence gives us a strong impression of a leading light in the new breed of musical virtuosi emerging at the end of the fifth century. Some of the anecdotes have the air of genuine repartee from the concert-hall, or the parties afterwards: the offer, during a concert performance in Byzantion when a musician had played the introduction well but muffed the rest, of a thousand drachmas to the person 'who could uncover the *kitharōidos* who had sung the *prooimion*' (Athen. 8.350a); or the polemical quotation, on hearing another *kitharōidos*, of *Iliad* 16.250—'the father gave him the one thing, but denied him the other'—glossed to his hearers that the musician had been given the power to play badly, but not to sing well. Quite apart from hinting suggestively at the obsessive and insecure world of the concert stars of the age, this sort of material should serve to remind us that lyric performers and poets, like their comic counterparts whose behaviour is well documented, constantly engaged in a kind of staged, performative rivalry. The *sphragis* of Timotheos' *Persai* shows him involved in a similar strategy of aggressive self-promotion, as does his unabashed poetic victory-announcement (fr. 802 *PMG*): 'You were blessed, Timotheos, when the herald said: "Timotheos of Miletos is victorious over the son of Kamon, the Ionian bender".' As an instrumental kitharist rather than a *kitharōidos*, Stratonikos could not have engaged in this level of 'paragonistic' struggle within his performed works. This might in part explain the extraordinary degree of acidity in his wit, as well as his evident eagerness to circulate it.

Whether Stratonikos was elite by birth, or rose socially on the back of his career, is extremely hard to say. He certainly came to consort with kings—indeed, his excessive familiarity with Nikokles of Kypros is said to have led to his death.[56] And some of his abuse of his fellow-performers played into the old elite's notions of what the 'proper' performer ought to look and

[55] Performance teacher: Athen. 8.348d, 349f; Philetairos fr. 14 K-A; lecturer and theoretician: Phainias fr. 32W of his *On Poets*; cf. his aggressive treatment of a rival teacher, the unhappily named Zethos: Athen. 8.351b.

[56] Athen. 8. 352d. He was also familiar with the king of Pontos, Berisades (Athen. 8.349d) and with Ptolemy (Athen. 8.350c).

sound like.[57] That is not a guarantee that he himself was of elite background—far from it. For on the other hand, Stratonikos appears to have been unconcerned to conceal the economics at the base of his career. When asked why he led such a peripatetic life, he is reported to have claimed that he 'received all the Greeks as my *telos* from the Muses', and 'exact payment from them for their lack of culture' (παρ' ὧν πράττεσθαι μισθὸν ἀμουσίας: Kallisthenes *FGrHist* 124 F5 = Athen. 8.350e). Stratonikos very much has the air of a new-style cultural performer attempting to appropriate the modes of an old-style cultural capital.

As I noted, the symbolic mastery of the lyre between rival thinkers (and performers) was also contested by proponents of the so-called 'ethos-theory'. These predecessors of Demetrios of Phaleron deemed strings the only suitable instrument at the moral or *ethical* level.[58] Of greatest interest is the intriguing figure of Damon, an Athenian-born intellectual who extensively theorized about music, and was ostracized, very probably in some connection with that theorizing (see Wallace above). Damon's name is intimately associated with the 'ethos-theory'—a development and codification of the traditional idea that *mousikē shaped* people, that different kinds of music did different things to people, such that individual and collective psychologies and moral dispositions could be formed by the use of the right tunes, both as practitioners and as audience. One of the very few remarks attributed with any confidence to Damon is that 'a boy, in singing and playing the kithara, should reveal not only his manliness and self-control, but also his *justice*' (fr. 4 D.–K.: προσήκειν ἄιδοντα καὶ κιθαρίζοντα τὸν παῖδα μὴ μόνον ἀνδρείαν ἐμφαίνεσθαι καὶ σωφροσύνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ δικαιοσύνην). This is most striking for the way it introduces the preeminently social and *political* virtue of justice to the list of those more traditionally 'displayed' by the young man playing the lyre.

Most famously of all, Damon is credited by Plato (*Rep.* 4.424c) with the statement that 'The styles of music are never altered without fundamental change in the greatest laws of the city'—

[57] He criticized the Rhodian Kitharōidos Tropis for being 'big in size' but 'bad in his *tekhnē*, and inferior to his body and voice' (ἐλάττονα τοῦ σώματος): this seems to assume a persistent élite ideal of a perfect conformity between body-type, voice, and ability.

[58] See esp. Anderson (1966).

and Sokrates at least affects to agree with him. One could scarcely imagine a more powerful expression of the perceived causal link between musical and political culture.[59] But precisely what Damon was proposing for both the Athenian political and musical realm is as good as lost to us. He was depicted in comedy as the lyre-playing educator Kheiron to Perikles as his Akhilleus (Plat. Com. fr. 207 K.–A.[60]); and he was, intriguingly, said to have '*used the lyre as a cover*' for his big ideas and tyrannical aspirations (Plut. *Per.* 4). At an absolute minimum, here is a major fifth-century musical theorist and 'practical philosopher' identified in the popular imaginary by strings. The lyre in Damon's clever hands is a symbol of an intellectualization of poetico-musical culture with strong hints of social control of an anti-democratic odour—or perhaps the ideological tenor of this prescriptive musical culture is rather that of the sort of 'aristocratic democracy' most commonly associated with the leader. As Wallace has brought to our attention elsewhere in this volume, one late antique commentator on Plato leaves us with the suggestive statement that 'there are tunes that harmonize the citizens, which Perikles had from Damon and which helped him harmonize the city' (Olympiodorus *Comm. in Plat. Alk.* 138.4–11d).

Comedy continued to keep the figure of the musical theorist in its sights. Ameipsias' *Konnos* (which placed second above Aristophanes' *Clouds* in 423) had a chorus of 'thinkers', among whom was Konnos himself, the kitharist who tried to teach Sokrates how to play the lyre at an inappropriately advanced age. 'Konnos' is likely to have given lessons in *mousikē* to his avid chorus of students, Sokrates among them. Turning philosophers (or sophists, as one's bias demands) into a chorus was a comic ploy to which Plato himself was not above stooping.[61]

[59] Musti (2000) 21 argues that the order of causation is the other way around, translating: 'non ci sono cambiamenti nella musica senza che vi intervengano le leggi', but his case is not convincing.

[60] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μοι λέξον, ἀντιβολῶ σὺ γάρ, | ὅς φασι, Χείρων ἐξέθρεψας Περικλέα.

[61] See *Protagoras* 314e–315b: at the house of Kallias, where Protagoras is in residence, the participants in the dialogue find τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ. Protagoras is the chorus-leader, behind whom the circle of listeners gracefully fall into formation whenever he turns aside. The choral metaphor here works with a corrosive sarcasm. It probably recalls comic choruses of 'thinkers' like that of the *Konnos*, and harnesses their critique to the representation of those here (while editing Sokrates out of their dance); and it at any rate demotes this group

A rather less obviously 'musical' figure of the later fifth century—Kritias the Athenian, enemy of democracy, tragedian, political theorist, elegist, and eventual tyrant—also devoted some attention to the appropriate techniques and terminology for performance on strings (frr. 88 B 57, 67 D–K). And he too deployed stringed instruments with a more charged political symbolism. He described the great sixth-century lyric poet Anakreon as an 'enemy of the aulos, lover of the *barbitos*' (fr. 88 B 1.1 D–K), adducing the authority of the Tean poet and friend of his grandfather in some (largely unrecoverable) connection with the late-fifth-century opposition between lyre and aulos.[62] It is an intriguing set of allusive links that may put Kritias in the company of Perikles in the matter of musical politics. Kritias became a tyrant; Damon, Perikles' teacher and collaborator in his musical politics, was exiled for trying to become one.

THE OLD GUARD, NEW CHALLENGES

As I argue elsewhere, Kritias responded 'musically' to the democratic conditions around him, using musical means to get his political message across rather more than the avenues of 'straight' democratic politics, which he found repellent. His response was polymorphic, and saw him enter the realm of public poetry (tragedy) as well as renovating the somewhat moribund form of exclusive sympotic elegy with political bite. He gives us the best evidence for an active, engaged musical 'counter-culture' in Athens, and it is telling that a significant part of the battle he fought involved reclaiming or 're-signifying' the meaning of strings.[63]

The principal home of strings in Athens was of course the symposium, and what was effectively its educational adjunct, the school-room of the hired kitharist who taught the young boys of the rich their strings. But in the last decade of the fifth century, the cultural struggle over strings was also registering itself very

of quasi-philosophers to the rank of 'ordinary' musicians, as opposed to the 'true musicians' of (Sokratic/Platonic) philosophy: see Murray below. Comic attack on musicians: Winnington-Ingram (1988).

[62] DK 88, B1 = West 1, Gentili-Prato 8; see Wilson (forthcoming *a*).

[63] Wilson (forthcoming *a*).

conspicuously in this one-time enclave of reactionary culture and politics.

We have good evidence for the continued importance throughout the democratic period of the training 'young Athenian gentlemen' received from their kitharist—'not', as the Platonic Sokrates puts it, 'with a view to becoming a professional, but as befits a private gentleman'. The distinction, with all its performative and ideological ramifications, is crucial (though the fact that it needs to be made so emphatically demonstrates a degree of anxiety). The professional plays before 'all Greece', for remuneration in fame and coin; the *eleutheros* plays before, or rather *among*, his peers in the closed space of the symposium, in an exclusive demonstration of his 'Culture' (*Protagoras* 312b, cf. *Gorgias* 501e). In the elite vision, the lyre so used helped to shape a somatic, aesthetic, and ethical ideal at the heart of the socio-political notion of *kalokagathia*. This training is to familiarize the boys' bodies and souls with the rhythms and harmonies that will make them 'more gentle'; and by becoming 'more rhythmical and harmonic' they will be 'more efficient in speech and action. For the whole of man's life requires the graces of rhythm and harmony'. (*Protagoras* 326b). The material for this amateur performance is a canon of 'good' lyric poets, many of whom in the later fifth century were not only over half a century old but carried the imprint of their older and undemocratic contexts of production: Simonides' epinikian for the Aiginetan boxer Krios 'the Ram', for instance, that Strepsiades wants his son to sing, lyre in hand, in the *Clouds* (1355 ff.).

Of course that and other texts emphasize the extent to which the conservative ideal of lyric formation and sympotic performance was open to challenge at the end of the century. Pheidippides tells his father how out of date it is 'to play the lyre and sing when you are drinking, like an old woman grinding barley' (1371 ff.). It is becoming increasingly clear that the symposium was not simply a place of reactionary musical and political refuge. A compelling case has been made for the widening of access to sympotic pleasures over the course of the century.[64] This will have increased exposure to a broader culture of *mousikē* among a larger constituency than the traditional elite, and so helped in turn to fuel the growing musical and theatrical economy in the wider public sphere. This

[64] Fisher (2000).

historical development and symbiotic relationship help explain the otherwise curious fact that, in musical terms, the symposium of the later fifth century shows marked features of innovation as well as of conservatism.[65]

What is more, there are clear signs that the Old Guard—men like Kritias—were by no means simply privately replaying the lyric classics of their aristocratic forebears and dreaming of better days. As I have remarked, Kritias was re-energizing sympotic elegy—restoring to it much of its political 'bite' and using it to express his interest (to put it mildly) in the practical operation of alternatives to democracy. He famously 'performed' his relationship with Alkibiades through elegiac means, and in a manner that shows his deep engagement not only in the political but in matters of musical—and specifically metrical—'research' very much of his own age (DK 88, B4–B5). He wrote a number of *Politeiai* (see DK 88, B 6–9), and some at least of these were produced poetically, in elegiac form: our source describes them as Πολιτείας ἐμμέτρους, which may mean '*Well-balanced Constitutions*,' or '*Constitutions* in metre'—or, as I would prefer, something in-between: '*Constitutions* of good measure', with an easy slide between the formal and descriptive. The works are both formally metrical and their subject-matter, the Constitutions, are 'in tune'.[66] And I have also remarked on the way in which he reinterpreted the lyric classic Anakreon so as to align him with the true sympotic 'string-lovers' against the proponents of the aulos. We may see something similar, if rather less formal, in an Attic *skolion* (900 *PMG*) that has its singer wish for a transformation into an ivory lyre carried in the hands of beautiful boys—'to a Dionysian chorus' (ἔνθε λύρα καλὴ γενοίμην ἐλεφαντίνη | καί με καλοὶ παῖδες φέροιεν Διονύσιον ἐς χόρον). Erotic and aristocratic tones converge here in a recharging of an old image of the lyre as the 'good' boy's instrument. But by envisaging the performance-

[65] Experimentation: see esp. Amphis 14 K.–A. with Wilson (2000*a*) 69–70; e.g. fr. 910 *PMG*; Rossi (1988). For a classification of sympotic song based on a hierarchy of difficulty of performance see Dikaiarkhos fr. 88W, from his *On Mousikoi Agōnes*.

[66] An Alexander is said to have claimed that the Kritias who was one of the Thirty wrote nothing other than the *Well-Balanced Constitutions*: DK 88, A 22 = Philoponos on Ar. *De An.* 89, 8. The elegiac fragments of the *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians* (DK 88, B 6–9) are doubtless from this work. Kritias was not alone: on the similar work of Dionysios 'Khalkous' see Miralles (1993).

destination of this lyre to be a Dionysian chorus—where in Athens at least, the aulos was overwhelmingly the normal accompaniment—we may be able to detect beneath the playful tone a note of polemic expressed thus instrumentally.

All the same, it is clear that to know one's strings was a form of cultural capital that remained in place in fifth-century Athens despite very considerable challenges—in particular, from the vastly increased power derived from learnt rhetorical skills, generated by the democratic institutions of the city. It is not always easy to assess the quality and significance of the abiding cultural prestige of strings. But it is at least clear that there was no longer a seamless slide between 'being a gentleman of cultural accomplishments' and being a person of political power—that is, that there had been a wedge firmly driven here between cultural and political capital.

A scene from the *Wasps* illustrates this contestation of the meaning of a 'lyric formation' most spectacularly. Bdelykleon has set up a domestic court-room to help his father Philokleon cold-turkey from his jury-addiction. The first case the old man judges is that of Labes the dog, arraigned for theft of a Sicilian cheese from the kitchen. Whatever the relation of this comic scenario to a real trial of the general Lakhes, one argument used in the dog's defence by Bdelykleon stands out: 'He fights for you, he keeps guard on the door, and quite generally he's an excellent dog. If he did pinch the cheese, forgive him: he doesn't know how to play the lyre' (κιθαρίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταται: 957–9).

Where does the comedy lie? Not, I think, in the very idea that the argument itself might be mobilized in a democratic court. Indeed, it may be that such an appeal to a defendant's 'lack of strings' was familiar, or perhaps famous from some particular, recent occasion.[67] The idea of a lyre-playing dog is of course funny, but especially so in a culture where playing the lyre was a socially and politically charged practice. A comparable product of the same cultural and socio-political forces is the proverbial expression, ὄνος λύρας.[68] This conjures the image of an ass

[67] MacDowell (1995) 167. Sadly it seems impossible to make any connection with the case behind Lysias' περὶ τοῦ κυνὸς ἀπολογία (Thalheim LXXXI).

[68] It dates from (at least) the late 5th cent.: see Kratinos fr. 247 K.–A, also from the *Kheiron*; Stratonikos the kitharist was reported (by Makhon fr. 11.1.137–40 Gow *ap.* Athen. 8.348d) to have wittily redeployed it against Kleon 'the Ox'. See also Menander *Mis.* 696 Arnott, fr. 460 Koerte; later sources in Gow (1965) 88–9.

appreciating the music of the lyre, and may have roots in Aesopic fable. If so, the thrust of the critique may be 'from below', pricking the pretensions of the lyre-playing class rather than mocking the *amousoi*. In the democratic court, this sort of argument could be worked in a number of ways. It could head off suspicions of elite privilege in the case of a person for whom such an education might be expected; while, for a less 'well-educated' speaker, it could generate a sense of shared underprivilege or exclusion. If we are to think of Lakhes the general behind Labes the dog, it may be relevant that, despite an elevated social background, he comes across as very much the 'simple soldier' and not a man of obvious cultural attainment.[69]

We might then be tempted to read Bdelykleon's argument as a comic appeal to elite inadequacy, to sympathy for a lack of the cultural attainments naturally expected of his kind. But that we are closer to the second, 'demotic' reading is suggested by the way Philokleon aggressively recycles the argument soon after. Encouraged by his son to cast his vote for acquittal, the old man replies: 'No. I don't know how to play the lyre either' (οὐ δῆτα· κιθαρίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι, 989). The force of this seems to be something like 'I too don't have the advantage of an élite education; but I'll use what I *do* have—the power accorded me by the democratic court—to lord it over anyone who comes before me.' And so the hard foundation of demotic political power asserts itself, if only comically, over the mystifying claims of elite cultural power.

Ironically, Philokleon *does* go on to receive a rapid education in the ways of elite culture, and much of the rest of the play is spent enjoying the grotesque spectacle of what a 'Kleon-lover' does with it. So in the end, the political capital achieved through holding democratic citizenship alone emerges as no easy 'victor' from this comic contest of paradigms. Indeed it looks rather more as though

[69] In the Platonic dialogue named after him (*Lakhes* 188d), Lakhes produces his own definition of the *mousikos*: 'Such a man is exactly what I understand by "*mousikos*",—he has tuned himself with the most beautiful harmony, not that of a lyre or other childish instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds, not in the Ionian, no, nor the Phrygian nor in the Lydian, but simply in the Dorian mode, which is the only Hellenic mode.' For this Lakhes, true 'musicality' has nothing to do with the ability to play a musical instrument.

the dénouement stages an argument for the equivalence between cultural, social and political capital so wistfully longed-for by the Old Guard.

STRINGS AND *BILDUNGSROMAN*

The relation of the prominent Athenian politician to his strings is a persistent, and polymorphic, topos of the kind of *Bildungsroman* that attaches itself to leading individuals of Athenian history. The fact is indicative of the prominent place this musical formation occupied in shaping the identities and in telling the lives of individuals; and equally, of some of the ways the ideology of musical formation was under pressure in Athens.

We could start with Theseus, that model proto-democratic king. In the sixth century, Theseus is often a leader who plays the lyre, in particular at the head of the youths and maidens of Athens to or from their Kretan ordeal.[70] But his musical career comes abruptly to an end in the classical period. We might well suspect the influence of democratic culture on this re-imaging of Theseus as the great mythical synoicist of Attike. Not for him or his citizens a city brought together on the strings of the lyre.

The next important Athenian with a story of strings attached to his name is Themistokles. Tradition reports the demotic leader's embarrassment at not having had a decent musical formation, unlike his political rivals. Ion of Khios preserved his famous rejoinder to the criticism that he had never learnt to sing or play the lyre—that is, 'Maybe not', but that he 'knew how to make a *polis* mighty and rich' (Ion *FGrH* 392F13 *ap.* Plut. *Kimon* 9.1: ἐκεῖνον γὰρ ἄιδειν μὲν οὐ φάναι μαθεῖν οὐδὲ κιθαρίζειν, πόλιν δὲ ποιῆσαι μεγάλην καὶ πλουτίαν ἐπίστασθαι). This self-justification on collective, civic, standards rather than by the ideals of elite culture is highly illuminating, as is the way Themistokles' response dislodges wealth from its usual, integrated place among the attributes of the lyre-playing class. I would suggest that we ought to read this anecdote of *amousia* alongside the story in Plutarch—described as 'pointless' by a recent commentator—of the way Themistokles demonstrated his personal ambition that 'surpassed all other men's' by 'prevailing on Epikles of Hermione,

[70] Maas and Snyder (1989) 37–8; this attribute brings him, in the words of Claude Calame ((1990) 208), 'strangely close to contemporary images of Apollo'.

a kitharist who was eagerly sought after by the Athenians, to practice at his house, because he was ambitious that many should seek out his home and come often to see him' (Plut. *Themistokles* 5.2.3).[71] What Themistokles did not have in terms of musical upbringing he tried to *acquire* for himself—not altogether unlike tyrants of an earlier generation, who also targeted *mousikoi* from Hermione. This acquisition of cultural capital suggests a different response from the 'civic' message recorded by Ion. Using the famous kitharist to attract prestige and attention centred on his own *home* shows us a Themistokles operating more in conformity with a dominant cultural ideology formed along elite lines. The two vignettes seem to testify both to the existence and the contestation of this ideology in the early democracy. Whatever its historicity, the tradition that Themistokles built the Athenians their first concert-hall, the Odeion, might fit nicely between them, if, as is likely, this was in some sense envisaged as the city's first place of 'music for the masses'.[72]

The noble Kimon, whose close association with the—now lyreless—Theseus is well known, was also said to lack musical finesse:

> He acquired no musical education, nor any other educational accomplishment that was suited to free men or distinctively Hellenic . . . he lacked entirely the Attic cleverness and fluency of speech. . . . in his manner there was much nobility and truthfulness, and the *skhēma* of the man's spirit was, rather, Peloponnesian . . . (Stesimbrotos of Thasos *FGrH* 107 F4 *ap.* Plut. *Kimon* 4.4)

No explicit link is made here between Kimon's *amousia* and his 'Peloponnesian soul', but the two are presented as entirely compatible. And the style of Kimon's soul is evidently meant to mirror the style of his politics, with its characteristic introduction of 'good, old-fashioned' aristocratic *noblesse oblige* into the democratic context. Athens is on its way to being identified as the leading Hellenic city in terms of *mousikē*, and in contrast to Peloponnesian culture. But that musical proficiency is still something in part defined and contested as an attribute of the city's elite. That one of the staunchest representatives of the old-style elite is seen not to have the attributes of the clever Attic tongue nor of traditional musical attainment may owe as much to the way that

[71] 'Pointless': Frost (1980) 88.
[72] Vitruv. *De Arch.* 5.9.1 with Mosconi (2000) 250–70.

the culture of *mousikē* in Athens was no longer unequivocally in the hands of such *kaloikagathoi* as it does to the realities of Kimon's accomplishments on the lyre.

I have already said something of Alkibiades' schoolroom manifesto for the lyre over the aulos. We might expect such a tale to attach itself to the *Bildungsroman* of the renegade young aristocrat in the advanced democracy. But the claim put in his mouth that 'we Athenians, as our fathers say, have Athena as foundress and Apollo as our family god, and the former threw away the aulos, while the latter flayed the aulos-player' (Plut. *Alk.* 2.5) flies in the face of the conspicuous place accorded the instrument of Dionysos in the formation of Athenian identity. And moreover civic definition by appeal to Apollo Patroos probably reflects a more hierarchical vision of citizenship, for though the paternity granted via Ion and thus Apollo in some sense gave all Athenians access to a special sense of being Athenian, in practice tendance of the cults of this 'god who gave access to political office'[73] may have remained predominantly a matter for the *genē*. We can certainly point to no known role of Apollo Patroos in the musical 'formation' of 'the Athenians' at large.[74]

We may not normally think of Sokrates as a musical man. We are however told—by the man himself, as it were, through Plato—that he had tried to remedy the deficiencies of his upbringing by joining the boys in the schoolroom of the kitharist at an advanced age (*Euthydemos* 272c, 295d). Although in this passage Sokrates affects to be the butt of the humour—where he becomes the slow, late learner of a skill easily acquired by the boys under the guidance of the *gerontodidaskalos*—it is easy to divine under that diversion an attack on a discipline of study still perceived as a rival (see Murray below). Although it is only a fleeting appearance, the topos of 'string formation' in the life-story of Sokrates thus serves an important rhetorical function: it chips away at the educational capital that still attached to *kitharistikē* among the elite, helping to undermine the claims of *mousikē* as a source of *sophia*. Plato's practice of alleging that some men used *mousikē* 'as a cover for sophistry' is much the same.[75]

[73] Parker (1996) 64.
[74] See Ps.-Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 55.3, with Rhodes (1981) 617–18 for signs of exclusivity; cf. Dem. 57.67.
[75] e.g. *Protagoras* 316e.

The case of Perikles is particularly interesting. There can be no doubt that the young Alkmeonid received the very best education in strings available, but the fact does not register directly in our sources. These do have a good deal to say about *mousikē*, but it is overwhelmingly a matter of politics and policy rather than of personal formation, something approaching a 'musical' arm of his political leadership. Such education as we hear of suggests the company of philosophers of music whose ideas may well have filtered through to his policy: Damon is the most important of these, but when we also hear that he was 'taught *mousikē*' by Pythokleides of Keos, it is probably the latter's interest in theory rather than his skill on the aulos that influenced Perikles.[76] All the same, the fact that he did consort with a famous player of the instrument despised by some in this period is suggestive.[77] Perikles clearly sought to help shape the character of the city and of its citizens through *mousikē*. And we find the same potential divergence of interpretation of this as of the more traditionally conceived areas of his politics: did these 'not unmusical pleasures' (Plut. *Per.* 11.4) represent the permissive exploration of the common man's powers and pleasures, or should we detect a degree of social control incompatible with such an overtly demotic vision?

That such a political approach to the interpretation of individual leaders' actions in the musical realm is apposite is confirmed by my last case—the 'new politician' Kleon. Dislike of his political style finds expression in terms of his musical formation. His 'pig-culture' (ὑομουτία) is disparaged by the chorus of *Knights*,—who ought to know what they are singing about. The young Kleon, they claim, could only ever tune his lyre to the Dorian mode (τὴν Δωριστὶ μόνην <ἂν> ἁρμόττεσθαι θαμὰ τὴν λύραν, 989–90), and his infuriated teacher sent him away 'because the boy is unable to learn anything other than the bribery mode—*dorodokisti*' (985 ff.). How one tunes and plays one's strings is an index of one's moral—and political—qualities. It seems that the

[76] See Wallace above; Musti (2000); Mosconi (2000). Likely elements of a Periklean musical politics include the construction of the Odeion; the elaboration of the Panathenaic and probable establishment of other *mousikoi agōnes* and doubtless of further festival events; the introduction of theoric payments. Perikles probably authored the decree that extended the high honour of permanent *sitesis* in the Prytaneion to include musical victors in the games of the circuit: *IG* I^3.131, *c.*440–432? with Morrissey (1978) 122.

[77] Arist. fr. 401 = Plut. *Perikles* 4.1.

normally positive ethical evaluation of the Dorian mode is here sidelined to achieve the pun with the word for gift or bribe, δῶρον.[78] Clearly audible at any rate is a note of disdain from the long-haired *hippeis* at the lack of accomplishment from the interloper in their midst and at the improper relation between money and culture that his career in this view represents. The same point was in effect made at the start of the comedy when Demos explained to the Sausage-Seller that a lack of *mousikē*, along with a lack of breeding, was the perfect basis for a political career: 'Demagoguery is not something for a cultivated man, nor a man of honest ways, but the ignorant and disgusting.' (ἡ δημαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ | ἔτ' ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους, | ἀλλ' εἰς ἀμαθὴ καὶ βδελυρόν, *Knights* 191–3).

NEW MUSIC: DEMOTIC STRINGS?

I have left myself very little time for a very large topic, but Csapo in this volume has treated the 'New Musical' dimension in a manner that makes extended discussion here unnecessary. I shall confine myself to a few general remarks and consideration of a specific use of 'lyric' representation from the heart of the New Musical scene. The technical and social developments known as the 'New Music' took root in the virulent Athenian genre of the dithyramb, the aulos-based form that spread all over the city's festival culture, but soon spread also to the kithara-based forms of the *nomos*. Much of the 'newness' of the new music consisted in exploring the full potential of the aulos as an instrument.

Something Csapo's study makes abundantly clear is that the New Music fed a growing professionalism and specialization within music, creating a whole new economy of theatrical performers and consumers. Musical skill, and the very considerable wealth that could go with it, were now largely divorced from their traditional social roots, much to the horror of Plato and his kind—though, typically, he expressed his revulsion in moral rather than economic terms. Thus, much of the orientation, as well as the aesthetic, of the New Music was 'demotic'. It clearly appealed to

[78] Barker (1984) 102 n. 13.

and drew its strength from its success among the Athenian demos. The intense criticism by which we know of the New Music is largely the work of a conservative elite, and of some comic poets, whose opposition to the development may have had as much to do with agonistic poetics (the New Music's very claim to demotic inclusivity will have been a threat) as politics.

An important focus—or cause—of this criticism was, as we have seen, the perceived fate of strings. The 'New Musicians' were rapists of *Mousikē*, abusers of her 'strings' (Pherekrates' fr. 155 K.–A.). Its practitioners took techniques developed in aulos-music—seen as detrimental enough there—and transferred them to string-based performance.[79] This in turn had the effect, to many eyes, of further 'banausifying' the kithara: we saw that Aristotle had been led to ban even this traditional instrument from the hands of his 'gentlemen'.

The ideological colouring of many of the key terms in this debate is clear: the practice, concept and language of 'mixing'—of generic forms, of *harmoniai* and so on—also has a democratic pedigree, at least since the days of Kleisthenes' great 'mixing' of the population of Attike. The central notions of assertive newness or innovation (see esp. *PMG* 796); and of heterogeneity, of *poikilia*,—were also clearly fundamental to the values of democratic culture and politics. The 'multiple man' was perhaps a Periklean ideal, and certainly a Platonic nightmare.[80] And, in the opposition between *many* strings and *few* strings—between *polykhordia* and *oligokhordia* (e.g. Ps.-Plut. *De Mus.* 1135d, 1137a)—it is certainly possible to hear the echo of a wider contrast between the 'many' and the 'few'.

Our sole surviving, free-standing example of the New Music of any length is the two hundred and forty lines of Timotheos' song for the kithara, the *Persians*.[81] Here we find the radical Milesian innovator performing an act of extremely delicate, if extremely boastful, poetic and political self-positioning. The dramatic narrative of the sea-battle of Salamis ends with the victorious Greeks setting up their trophies and dancing a choral paean (196–201). The poetic voice then moves instantly to address 'Paian' on his own account, at the start of what is commonly called the *sphragis* or poet's *apologia*: 'Ah, you who foster the new-fashioned muse of the golden kithara, come, healer Paian, as helper to my hymns . . .' (ἀλλ᾽ ὦ χρυσεοκίθαριν ἀέ|ξων μοῦσαν νεοτευχῆ, |ἐμοῖς ἔλθ᾽ ἐπίκουρος ὕμ|νοις, ἰήτε Παιάν). This juxtaposition has the effect of assimilating his aspirations for the success of his emphatically new kitharoidic hymn with the iconic Greek—and, in particular, *Athenian*—success over the Persians, and the more 'demotic' of the Greek victories, since it was the navy's achievement. At the same time, it annexes the helping and hymnic god of the musical Old Guard—Pythian Apollo the *kitharōidos* (cf. esp. Pind. *Pyth.* 1.1; 5.66–7)[82]—as the divine patron of the New Muse.

By this move Timotheos effectively appropriates for himself the position of an 'honorary Athenian', a position powerfully reinforced by the way he then proceeds to recount his poetic maltreatment at Spartan hands, in an act of poetic and political polarized self-definition:

> for Sparta's great leader, well-born, long-lived, the populace riotous with the flowers of youth, buffets me, blazing hostility, and hounds me with fiery censure on the grounds that I dishonour the older muse with my new hymns . . . (206–12)

[79] The development is associated in particular with Epigonos and Lysander of Sikyon: Philokhoros *FGrH* 328 F 23; Barker (1982); West (1992a) 341–2; Csapo above. A further development in the fourth century, in which musical virtuosi are said to have displayed their new wealth by having their actual instruments made from precious materials, is also claimed to have spread from the aulos to the kithara: Pliny *NH* 37.3.

[80] Thoukydides 2.41.1; Plato *Rep.* 397d, 561c.

[81] See now Hordern (2002) with earlier bibliography.

[82] Rutherford (2001*a*) 121–2 treats the transition from Apollo as war-god to Apollo as healer as a case of paeanic ambiguity. The use of the word ἐπίκουρος (204) is doubtless an allusion to the 'auxiliary Muse' ([κικλήισκω] σ' ἐπίκουρον ἐμοί, π[ολυώνυμ]ε Μοῦσα fr. 11.21W) of Simonides' Plataia elegy—a point I owe to Ian Rutherford. The intertext also marks the shift in the site of poeto-polemic 'assistance' from the 'Spartan' to the 'Athenian' scene of victory: whereas Simonides had called on the 'Auxiliary Muse' in a highly 'Spartan-friendly' context, Timotheos' 'new musical' Apollo is an auxiliary *against* his traditional favourites, the Spartans, in the context of the 'Athenian' victory of Salamis. See Hunter (2001) 244; Steble (2001). It seems that the 'New Musicians' may have looked to Simonides as a precursor or model of sorts: see n. 53 above and Hordern (2002) 145 for evidence of 'Simonidean' language in the *Persians*.

It has been argued that the 'Asian kithara' which rises to prominence in the last third of the century in association with Orpheus, Eunous, and Dionysos may have 'New Musical' associations of some sort. Webster ((1967) 18) argued that in the case of Euripides' usage, it was a 'hommage' to the 'Asian' Timotheos, but less *ad hominem* associations are likely. The (slim) evidence suggests associations of both innovation and tradition. Perhaps it is another case of the innovators developing an archaizing tradition for their instrument: Cassio (2000) has a balanced assessment.

The kitharoidic persona puts great stress on the 'democratic', open quality of his poetic practice. It is extremely inclusive, open to all ages—'I keep neither young man nor old man nor my peer at a distance from these hymns' (ἐγὼ δ' οὔτε νέον τιν' οὔ|τε γεραὸν οὔτ' ἰσήβαν | εἴργω τῶνδ' ἑκὰς ὕμνων 213–15)—and it is sharply opposed in this to the aggressive conservatism of the Spartan aristocracy. In a neat revaluation of old and new in the stewardship of the Muses' arts, Timotheos constructs his conservative critics and their poetic allies as destroyers of the (true) old Muse. He thereby positions himself as its defender: 'it is the corrupters of the old muse that I fend off, debauchers of songs, uttering the loud shrieks of shrill far-calling heralds' (215–20) while going on to give what might be mistaken for a 'traditional' lyric heritage to his own 'new' Muse (221–6: Orpheus—Terpander—Timotheos).[83] Whether (as I think is likely), this song was designed for first performance in Athens, it very cleverly creates for its performer the identity of a democratic *kitharōidos* in tune with the finest traditions of Athenian democratic culture.[84] And it ends by claiming for Athens what must have been a musical and political last straw for men like Demetrios of Phaleron: in the closing phrase of his *nomos*, he images his eleven-stringed kithara, under Pythian Apollo's care, as effectively an instrument for the good civic order—the *eunomia*—of the democratic city (240), effectively filching from his Spartan enemies—perhaps at the city-gates at this very moment—the key term of their political and cultural heritage.[85] That most conservative of all lyric and political images had at last been appropriated for the most *poikilos* of cities.

[83] Orpheus' music is given the key new musical term *poikilos*: ποικιλόμουσος (221), or -ον with Wilamowitz' <χέ>λυν, Jurenka's <λύρ>αν or Hutchinson's <τέχν>ην (222); while the seven strings normally on Terpander's lyre become ten (225–6). In 231 Timotheos uses the archaic word κίθαρις of his own eleven-stringed instrument. Hordern's interpretation of μουσοπαλαιολύμας as 'ancient (old-fashioned) corrupters of the Muse' ((2002) 239) fails to recognize the complexity of Timotheos' appropriative 'conservative innovation.'

[84] Cf. the excellent discussion of Nieddu (1993) esp. 526–7.

[85] Bassett (1931); cf. Csapo above: 'it is a little more surprising to find [the pun on *eunomia*] in the Phrygian eunuch's song in *Orestes*, and the reference to *eunomia* which ends Timotheus' *Persai*, and one can only suppose that, in these flagship New Musical performances, Euripides and Timotheus are taunting their critics.'

Part IV

MOUSIKĒ AND *PAIDEIA*

11

Catharsis: The Power of Music in Aristotle's *Politics*

Andrew Ford

My purpose in this paper is to put the music back into *Politics* 8, which will surprise those who already appreciate that text as 'the most valuable single treatment of musical paideia and paideutic ethos that has been preserved to us'.[1] Certainly, there is no missing the importance of *mousikē* in this discussion of education: of its seven chapters, 8.3 adduces *mousikē* as the prototypical liberal art, and the book ends (or fails to end) with three long chapters (8.5–7, introduced as if a treatise περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς, 1339[a]11) on how music should be regulated in schools and in the city generally. The problem is that many current readings of the work take the *mousikē* under discussion in the broadest terms possible, trying to elicit Aristotle's ideas about the use of literature and poetry in forming citizens for his 'best' state. I argue here that such readings are untenable and that they obscure the importance of music in its specific sense for Aristotle's political thought. Only by putting the music back into Aristotle's *mousikē*, which means kicking out words where they don't belong, can we see the special problems that rhythms, modes, and melodies posed to the political philosopher.

The root of the problem may be traced to the notorious discussion of catharsis at *Pol.* 8.7 (1341[b]32 ff.) where the word describes a pleasurable emotional experience that certain *melē* and *harmoniai* can effect. Aristotle refers to 'the work on poetics' for fuller discussion, and of his extant writings on that topic the relevant passage is *Poetics* 6, where a '*katharsis* of pity and fear' is defined as the implicit aim (*telos*) of tragedy (1449[b]24–8). Catharsis is a

My brief but warmest thanks to Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson and to all participants at a most harmonious and improving occasion.

[1] Anderson (1966) 123. I cite the *Politics* from the edition of Dreizehnter (1970), noting significant differences from Ross (1957).

shibboleth for interpreters of *Poetics* because opposite views of the purpose of art derive from whether the word is read as the pleasurable 'purging' of emotions or their intellectual 'refinement' (both possible senses of *katharsis*). The former view was influentially argued by Jacob Bernays on the basis of *Politics* 8, which he took to conceive catharsis as a physiological experience analogous to the removal of waste matter from the body. Such 'outlet' theories, long prevalent, have come under a concerted attack over the last fifteen years for their negative, un-Aristotelian idea of emotion as something that needs to be purged, and for failing to see that the emotions have a cognitive component for Aristotle.[2] Of more import for the present discussion, *Politics* 8 is invoked by some of these revisionist scholars to attribute to Aristotle the view that tragedy provides its audience with something like a public education in ethics: the poet's artfully constructed 'representations' of reality can guide spectators to form and enjoy 'correct' cognitive and emotional responses to the events portrayed so that they might carry these attitudes over into real life. This edifying 'purification' or even 'clarification' of the audience's emotions is said to be what Aristotle signalled by *katharsis*, and the view of catharsis as a harmless release of emotion has been declared 'officially dead'.[3]

If scholars who teach literature discern in Aristotle a theory that literature teaches, then for political philosophers too literature may become especially interesting when it is said to have powers to benefit state and society. Here Carnes Lord's *Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle* led the way in offering a detailed reading of *Politics* 7–8 in these terms.[4] Richard Janko has extended Lord's views and applied them to the *Poetics*. Both take *Politics* 8 to recommend that, just as tragic and other poetic texts were used in schools to educate future citizens, so public theatre

[2] Golden (1976) 351–9, (1992) 5–29; Halliwell (1986), 184 ff., esp 198–9; see 190–8, 353–4 against Bernaysian views. Other important accounts: Janko (1984) 139–42, (1987) xvi–xx and (1992); Nussbaum (1986) 378–94; Belfiore (1992) ch. 10, esp. 345–53.

[3] Janko, Review of Halliwell, *Aristotle's Poetics*, *CP* 84 (1989) 156. For recent attempts to weld an emotional–affective element back onto catharsis as learning: Segal (1996), esp. 153–7, and the response of Easterling (1996), esp. 173–4.

[4] Lord's educative view of poetry taken up by: Swanson (1992) 151–4; Nichols (1992) 161 and 217 n. 51; Salkever (1986), who argues, mostly based on texts outside the *Politics*, that *Poetics* is a continuation of the unfinished discussion of political education in *Politics*. Depew (1991) 346–80 takes a compatible view, following Nussbaum.

should continue to train them in virtue as adults. Although the *Politics* seems to me to pose insurmountable obstacles to taking catharsis as a kind of learning and to attributing to Aristotle the belief that theatre improves the audience's character, my concern here is neither to settle what *katharsis* means in *Poetics* 6 nor even to offer a precise model for musical catharsis in *Politics* 8.[5] What needs clarification at present is Aristotle's sustained focus on technical questions about music in its narrower sense. Noting when this specific meaning of *mousikē* is in view allows us to see that the agenda of *Politics* 8 is less concerned with using literature to facilitate intellectual and moral development than to discover the powers (*dunameis*) that rhythms, *melē* and *harmoniai* have to shape the political animal. Controlling these fundamental powers is at the heart of Aristotle's plans for civic culture, a specially trained sensibility and set of musical practices that will distinguish citizens from slaves on the one hand and from virtuoso performers on the other.

The text that has drawn the most attention is the discussion of musical catharsis in 8.7, but Janko has well highlighted the centrality of 8.5, where Aristotle describes the usefulness of *mousikē* for ethical training in school. This will be the centre of my analysis as well, though I will surround it with shorter discussions of its lead-in (8.1–4) and consequences (8.6–7). The text is very difficult at points, and simply following its meandering argument leaves little space to treat many problems fully. My focus will be on what is meant by *mousikē* at each stage, leaving many issues to play counterpoint, as it were, in the notes.

8.3: *MOUSIKĒ* AS A LIBERAL STUDY

Politics 8 is part of a comprehensive discussion begun in Book 7 of how to breed, rear, and educate citizens for the best state.[6] This is a fundamental shaping of mind and body, beginning with a scheme of eugenics and proceeding through some very illiberal

[5] I have discussed these aspects of the question in Ford (1995); see Lear (1988) for an important 'non-cognitive' account of catharsis. A different direction is Ferrari (1999).

[6] At *EN* 1.1 1094ª28 Aristotle assigns to the political art the task of determining which subjects to study and how far to pursue them.

recommendations for child rearing in the first seven years. Book 8 is concerned with formal education, and begins by establishing (8.1) that education should be public and should have a common curriculum designed to equip future citizens to engage in 'excellent activities' (πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις, 1337[a]21).[7] In 8.2, Aristotle begins to specify the subjects to be taught, but this becomes complicated for he has to confront both the confusing educational practices of his day (1337[a]40) and a theoretical debate about whether education should aim at inculcating virtue (*aretē*) or at imparting skills useful for 'the best life'.[8] He thinks that some useful things must be studied, but cautions against learning banausic skills (βαναύσους . . . καὶ μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας) because such study warps the body and stunts the intelligence (1337[b]4–15). This worry over making future citizens servile (θητικὸν καὶ δουλικόν, 1337[b]21) is very important for Aristotle:[9] the vulgarizing potential of musical education will be addressed in 8.5 and again in 8.6, where it will also set the agenda for 8.7. At present, Aristotle devotes the rest of 8.2 to describing how education can avoid descending to the banausic.

Having circumscribed the practical benefits to be sought from liberal studies, Aristotle returns in 8.3 to the subjects most commonly taught in his day and asks whether they are useful or lead to virtue. Reading and writing (*grammatikē*) are clearly useful, as is drawing (*graphikē*: cf. 1338[a]17–19, 1338[a]41–1339[b]2); and gymnastics clearly leads toward the virtue of courage (1337[b]23–7). But classifying *mousikē* in these terms turns out to be difficult. Aristotle's view (1338[a]9–30) is that, while most people engage in *mousikē* for the pleasure it gives, it was originally incorporated into *paideia* in response to a natural impulse to be able to occupy leisure in a 'noble' way (σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς, 1337[b]31–2), that is, in a way at once non-utilitarian and worthy of free men (cf. 7.14 1333[a]35–6). These considerations suggest that music may be studied in school with a view to its later use in 'spending time in cultivated leisure' (πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν).[10]

For Aristotle to include *mousikē* among leisure activities is high praise since he thought that leisure (*skholē*) and not political or practical activity was the *telos* of civic life. In *Politics* 7 he had established that educating citizens to be able to occupy their leisure in a 'fine' way was one of the legislator's most important tasks, for occasions of leisure best afforded opportunities for exercising certain essential virtues—among which is *philosophia*.[11] Here Aristotle observes that people introduce *mousikē* into occasions of leisure they consider to befit free men, which he calls *diagōgē* (1338[a]22–4). Interpreters who hold an educational view of poetry take *diagōgē* as a specially high form of leisure, e.g. philosophizing. Yet what Aristotle seems to have in mind is a more general 'love of learning' that can be exemplified in the use of song at banquets and symposia.[12] This is suggested by the 'testimony of the ancients' (1337[a]35–6) he goes on to adduce: (pseudo- and) Homeric tags show the singer/musician (*aoidos*), 'who gives pleasure (τέρπῃσιν) to all', was thought worthy to be invited to feasts.[13] Aristotle also quotes Odysseus' praise of men at feast taking 'cheer' (εὐφραινομένων) in the singer (*Od.* 9.7–8) as a description of 'the best form of *diagōgē*' (1338[a]28). We will return to the use of song in *diagōgē* but note here that it need not be philosophic conversation: as a pleasurable activity but one worthy of free men, it need only be a clear cut above dicing or drunkeness.[14] As Aristotle put it in Book

[7] At 7.13 Aristotle stipulated that the best political system will aim at the *eudaimonia* of its citizens, and this means equipping them to act virtuously (1332[a]7–21).

[8] 8.2 1337[a]37–8. Cf. 8.3 1337[b]26–7 and ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν at 1337[b]23 with Newman 3.510. On the other hand, 8.2 identifies *three* kinds of subjects in educational practices: τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττὰ (1337[a]41–2).

[9] Nightingale (1996), esp. 29–34.

[10] 1338[a]21–22; whether we rewrite πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν at 1338[a]10, the idea seems to be the same in both places.

[11] On leisure, cf. 7.14, 15 and the passages collected by Newman 3.442–3; for *philosophia*, 7.15 1334[a]23, 32; cf. 2.5 1263[b]40 and Kraut (1997) 140, 143. Solmsen (1964) importantly shows that Aristotle does not intend to establish the *bios theōrētikos* as the goal of every citizen's life. Further discussions at Kraut (1997) 85–6 with references, Swanson (1992) 155 ff., Simpson (1998) 241–2.

[12] Because 'all agree that common meals are useful to the state' (7.10 1330[a]13–15), Aristotle sets aside a part of public land to support common dining for magistrates and poorer citizens.

[13] On the verses, see Seymour (1903) 22–3.

[14] Lord (1982) 76–82 is right to be concerned that Aristotle's citation of Homeric feasts as *diagōgē* works against his assumption that 'true *diagōgē*' (81) must have a moral or political purpose as well as pleasure. Accordingly, he takes the reference to Homer as rhetorical (76), with the implication that heroic entertainments were a form of 'play' that mistook itself for the end (82 n. 21, citing Newman on 1338a 22). While Aristotle thinks better people (people whose *hexeis* have been better formed) take their pleasures in finer things (1337[a]6–9), he does not imply that Homeric feasts

7, 'it would be disgraceful if, having secured peace and prosperity, we were no better than slaves in our leisure' (7.15 1334[a]36–40).

Mousikē thus shows that there is at least one branch of traditional education that can be justified not as useful or necessary but as a liberal art (1338[a]30–2). Aristotle leaves open the question of whether there are other such subjects (1338[a]32–4), though he mentions that even useful skills like reading or painting can be studied with a view to more than their practical benefits.[15] With this principle in place, he can go further into the curriculum, starting with gymnastics in 8.4 because education should start with forming *ethos* before influencing *dianoia* (a preliminary question raised at 8.2, 1337[a]38–9). Aristotle's conviction that character must be formed by habituation before the intellect is instructed—a conception he shares with Plato—will be important to bear in mind when considering ethical training through music.[16]

With gymnastics discussed, and no further mention of *grammatikē* or *graphikē*, Aristotle takes up the details of *mousikē* in 8.5 and it will dominate the rest of the book as we have it. From this point interpretations diverge radically depending on whether *mousikē* is interpreted narrowly as the business of *harmoniai* and *rhuthmoi* (which I will refer to as 'music'), or broadly as 'the Muses' arts', which can include poetry.[17] The word is certainly ambiguous enough in itself and Aristotle does use it in both senses. Always seeing poetry in Aristotle's *mousikē* intellectualizes musical education as a form of ethical instruction through literature. But this flattens out the argument by neglecting Aristotle's keen and sustained attention to the powers of music itself.

are play rather than *diagōgē*; indeed, his reading *diagōgē* into *Od.* 9.7–8 depends on Odysseus' reference to the feast as a *telos* (*Od.* 9.5), which is what distinguishes *diagōgē* from *paidia*: cf. Ford (1999) 121–2. Cf. Anderson (1966) 122, Newman 3.515.

[15] *Grammatikē* is worth studying not only for its utility ('for financial transactions, for managing one's household, as well as for learning and for sundry political activities', 1338[a]15–17) but also because it is possible to learn other things through it (1338[b]39–40). Similarly, *graphikē*, as discussed below. Cf. Kraut (1997) 183.

[16] Cf. *Laws* 653a–c where children must be habituated to feel pleasure and pain rightly from earliest youth, so as to 'harmonize' (συμφωνῆσαι) with *logos* when it arrives. The passage is cited with approval at *EN* 2.3 1104[b]8–12. Further at n. 24 below.

[17] So Lord (1982) 29, 86; Janko (1987) 181. The assumption that *mousikē* includes poetry is crucial to the analyses of Sherman (1989) 81; Swanson (1992) 153 (with out-of-context tags as evidence).

When Aristotle first discussed *mousikē* in 8.3 it was as one of the four subjects commonly taught (1337[b]23–8). As such, it referred to the curriculum provided by *kitharistai* as distinct from the *grammatistai*. This included what we call poetry or, in terms of the *Poetics*, representations of moral action in words (*logoi*), *rhuthmoi* and *harmoniai*. Singing or listening to such 'songs' (*melē* in the sense of 'words and music') is doubtless part of what Aristotle envisions going on in noble leisure. (Aristotle himself composed and sang at the Lyceum a high-minded skolion on *aretē*: 842 *PMG*.) But (recited) poetry was also taught by the *grammatistēs*.[18] *Mousikē* was chosen to exemplify liberal education not because of the instructive content of its words but because it was not obviously practical; it was a cleaner example of liberal study than *grammatikē* which imparted useful skills of writing and reading. However, from 8.5 through the end of our text Aristotle bears in on *mousikē* in its narrower sense, 'consisting of the composition of tunes and rhythms' as he defines it in 8.7 (μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιΐας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, 1341[b]23–4). Thus, if Aristotle first approaches *mousikē* as a traditional social and educational practice, to understand its proper uses in the city he considers it as a natural phenomenon to be understood in scientific terms. Andrew Barker has well described Aristotle's 'scientist's eye for biological and physical subject matter' in approaching questions about music.[19] In *Politics* this means discovering the 'powers' or capacities (*dunameis*) that inhere in rhythms, *harmoniai*, and *melē* ('tunes' rather than 'songs') in themselves, for 'music by nature belongs to the things we find pleasant, and there is an apparent affinity [between our souls] and rhythm and *harmoniai*'.[20] The somewhat mysterious but undeniably potent resonance between sheer sounds and psyches will open a deep vein of reflection for the political scientist.

[18] See Plato *Prot.* 325e–326b; Xen. *Lac. Resp.* 2. Cf. *Laws* 669b, 670e.

[19] Barker (1989) ch. 3, esp. 77–80.

[20] *Pol.* 8.5 1340[b]16–18 (ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. καί τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι). In *Poetics* the two 'natural causes' (αἰτίαι φυσικαί) of poetry are innate and universal instincts to 'imitate' (τὸ μιμεῖσθαι) and take pleasure in imitations (τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας, 4.1448[b]4–9); but for poetry to take the form it does (i.e. 'sweetened' speech) depends also on a human affinity for music and rhythm (κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ, 1448[b]19–20).

8.5: MUSIC IN SCHOOL

As can be seen from the passage which begins the argument of 8.5, Aristotle proceeds by defining the *dunameis* of music (τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν... διελεῖν) to determine its uses in civic life.[21] These are three (1339[a]14–26).[22] One use of music, not very admirable (οὐδὲ τῶν σπουδαίων) though doubtless common, was for play (*paidia*) and recreation (*anapausis*); this use exploits music's natural pleasantness which is at the same time an ability to put an end to care (ἡδέα καὶ ἅμα ἀναπαύει μέριμναν, 1339[a]18–19), like sleeping or drinking wine.[23] Because education is not play, this does not by itself warrant music's inclusion in education. A second possibility is that habituation through music can lead somehow to virtue because of its capacity to affect the soul as gymnastics affects the body (1339[a]21–5: ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς). As ethical 'habituation' will eventually be one of the reasons Aristotle gives for teaching music in school, it is noteworthy that he presents the process not as a matter of intellectual development but as analogous to picking up dumbbells: as repeated lifting cannot fail to change the body, repeated exposures to music will shape the soul in conformity with the music's character.[24] Intellectual development through *mousikē* is included in Aristotle's third possibility, that music 'makes some contribution to cultivated leisure and the exercise of wisdom' (πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν, 1339[a]25–6).[25] But this contribution is far from clear.

[21] 1339[a]14–15. The vocabulary recurs methodically and will be underscored.

[22] 1339[a]16–26. The triad of possible uses of music is not consistently expressed, see n. 55 below.

[23] Dreizehnter *et al.* mark the Euripidean quotation by placing a comma after ἡδέα, but we should not infer two distinct *dunameis* here: music's 'sweetness' was closely associated with its banishing care, e.g. Hesiod *Theog.* 97–103.

[24] *Pol.* 7.15, esp. 1334[b]12–29, cf. 8.3 1338[b]4–6. For habituation and experience as a necessary prerequisite for ethical instruction, see esp. *EN* 2.3 1104[b]3–13 and 10.9 1179[b]4–31 with Burnyeat (1980). Sorabji (1980), esp. 214–18 argues for 'a major role' of the intellect in virtuous action, which requires that the good be chosen and for the right reasons (esp. *EN* 2.4 1105[a]28–33). But that does not make habituation an essentially discriminating, reflective and critical process for the 'habituatee', *pace* Sherman (1989) ch. 5, esp. 181–3.

[25] e.g. Kraut (1997) 178 'this implies that making music is a way of exercising the virtue of wisdom, and that this role is distinguished from the contribution it makes to ethical training'. Cf. 141–2.

Since *diagôgē* can refer to anything from passing the time to philosophical contemplation, and *phronēsis* can range from prudence to philosophical thinking (*sophia*), those who hold that poetry is educative envision 'musical' education as the study of poetry so that, later on, citizens can discuss it philosophically at leisure.[26] In this view, *mousikē* develops practical intelligence (*phronēsis*) as students evaluate the words of songs. At present Aristotle only comments that *diagôgē* is an end (*telos*) and young people are not fitted for the end, though he leaves open the possibility that children should work hard at *mousikē* in preparation for 'playing' with it as adults (ἡ τῶν παίδων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν, 1339[a]31–3).[27]

Before considering the *dunamis* of music in *diagôgē*, the issue of vulgarization imposes itself again (1340[b]20 ff.). Even if we are prepared to assume that students should study music for any of the three purposes advanced, Aristotle asks whether they should do so by playing and singing themselves or should simply take the benefits of music by having 'others' perform (esp. 1339[a]26–39[b]6). The threat is, as in 8.2, vulgarization, for to argue that citizens should learn to provide their own music is perilously close to suggesting they should learn how to cook as well (1339[b]6 ff.).[28] Aristotle observes that the poets' Zeus doesn't sing and play the harp, and 'we call those who do so servile, and think it unmanly to do so unless drunk or playing'.[29] This is also a political question, for the models for having 'others' provide music are the kings of Asia and the Spartans. In line with his general aim to seek the best city in the mean between extreme oligarchy and democracy,

[26] On the broad uses of *diagôgē* (e.g. at 1336[a]40 of children), see Kraut (1997) 144, 178, Anderson (1966) 136, and 269–70 n. 51. Insisting on one use of *diagôgē* for 'intellectual culture' (Susemihl and Hicks (1884) 542, 585), Golden (1992) 9 with n. 6, 20 takes it always as 'the highest level of intellectual activity and enjoyment'. On music's contribution to *phronēsis*, cf. Kraut (1997) 139–40, 187; Anderson (1966) 136, and 269–70 n. 51.

[27] 'Play' here (*paidia* 1339[a]32) must be a paraphrase for *diagôgē*, a *jeu de mots* with *spoudē*.

[28] Among the many definitions of *paideia* by Plato, note *Symp.* 187c–d: 'the proper use of melodies and rhythms *composed by someone else*'. For lyre-playing leading to 'womanish and submissive' character, Hdt. 1.155.

[29] 1339[b]9–10: βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος. This suggests singing at symposia, often figured as *paisdein*, 'sporting' (e.g. Theognis 567, Ion of Chios 27.7, Anon. eleg. 27.4 *IEG*). In less exclusive contexts it is best to have 'others' perform.

Aristotle will conclude that citizens ought to play a little when young because actively engaging with music will make them better judges (*kritai*) of music when they grow up (cf. 1340^{b}36–40). Whatever intellectual virtues this ability to 'judge rightly' will entail, Aristotle is very clear about defining its social role: a hands-on but not professional training on the lyre will give citizens a musical culture that places them above non-citizen craftsmen and foreign professionals, but not so far above as to fall into Eastern hubris or the Spartan neglect of all non-bellicose culture.

From this digression he returns in 8.5 to the *dunameis* of music to conclude that all three of its possible uses in schools appropriately employ its powers (1339^{b}11–24): music's pleasingness and ability to banish care make it useful (*khrēsimon*, 1339^{b}41) and appropriate not as play (*paidia*) but as recreation (*anapausis*), a kind of 'cure' for the toils of learning (λύπης ἰατρεία, 1339^{b}17).[30] As for its use in *diagôgē*, the capacity to 'cheer' that inheres in rhythms and *harmoniai* is a good reason for including music at parties and occasions of *diagôgē* (διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν, 1339^{b}22–4). Music would appear to supply the pleasure (τὴν ἡδονήν) that is one component, along with the fine (*to kalon*), of the happiness that belongs to noble leisure.[31] Again, by stressing the intellectual element in the phrase '*diagôgē* and *phronēsis*' (1339^{a}25–6) and stressing the *kalon* in noble leisure, one might take Aristotle to envision happy leisure as a seminar in the criticism of lyric poetry. Personally, I would not entirely disagree. But it is fatal to such readings that Aristotle goes on to note that the 'very great pleasure' music offers *diagôgē* inheres in 'bare music' (as in instrumental music) even without words: τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελῳδίας.[32]

[30] For study being painful, cf. 1339^{a}28–9 (μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις).

[31] Cf. 1339^{b}17–19: τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν.

[32] 1339^{b}20–1. So Barker (1984) 174 n. 8 and Susemihl and Hicks (1884) 588. The passage is distorted by Lord (1982) 86 who, incredibly, glosses *mousikēn*... *psilēn* as poetry unaccompanied by music. The (predominantly Platonic) passages cited in Lord's n. 28 do nothing to diminish the perfect clarity of *psilē* for 'bare', whether to describe words bare of melody (e.g. *Poet.* 1447^{a}29, cf. *psilometrian* 1448^{a}11), or (as here) melody bare of words.

Since the beginning of 8.5 Aristotle has been interested in the difficult problem of determining the *dunameis* of music in itself, apart from whatever words it may accompany. He is after something more fundamental than ethical discussions of poetry: he wants to base his legislation on a scientific consideration of the qualities this activity uniquely provides. Aristotle had argued in 8.3 (1337^{b}40–38^{a}12) that since pleasure is an element appropriate to both play and cultivated leisure (*diagôgē*), music is naturally suited to these ends. To be sure, Aristotle would not identify music's capacity to please as the sole justification for its presence in cultivated social gatherings, for *diagôgē* is *kalon* as well as pleasant. But since the use of music as an accompaniment to noble leisure is both reasonable and traditional, this is enough to justify its use in education as a preparation for later *diagôgē*. For children at school (too immature for *diagôgē*), the only quality of music he demands is that it belong to the 'harmless pleasures' (ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων, 1339^{b}25–6).

Of the three possible uses of music enumerated at the beginning of 8.5, what has not been discussed so far is music's potential for moral training, and with a new argument (1339^{b}42–40^{a}40) Aristotle goes on to support this use as well by arguing that the 'nature' of music is more 'honourable' than indicated so far (τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις, 1340^{a}1) because it also has the *dunamis* to affect the soul and put it into certain ethical states. Music's capacity to reach the soul and the character (1340^{a}6) is distinct from its natural ability to stop pain and bring cheer. The latter is a natural phenomenon to be reckoned with—ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ ἡδονὴν φυσικήν (1340^{a}3–4)—but does not contribute to social and political distinction: it is a 'common' part of music, enjoyed by children, slaves, and even animals (8.6. 1341^{a}14–17). As we unpack the nobler, ethical power of music we will see that it depends, *pace* Lord and Janko, on properties of music in its narrow sense, on certain natural effects of rhythms and *harmoniai*.

In outline Aristotle argues that (*a*) since music can directly put our souls in certain painful and pleasurable emotional states, and (*b*) since virtue consists in feeling delight and repulsion at the right actions and characters, then (*c*) the selective use of music in elementary education can help habituate children to the right emotional attitudes, which will lead to their forming the right character and being virtuous in real life. In this argument, premise (*b*) is taken on

definition. It is premise (*a*) that needs to be established, and the main theme of 8.5 as a whole is proving the *dunamis* music has to a unique degree among the imitative arts to affect the character of the soul.[33] The topic was raised early in ch. 5 (1339^{a}23–4: τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν δύνασθαι) and is reiterated just before the chapter's end (1340^{b}10–12: δύναται ποιόν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν).

The arguments for this proposition are part of what Janko has called a 'vital passage' of *Politics* 8 (1339^{b}42–40^{a}27). It is certainly a difficult one. Aristotle first adduces the auletic tunes (*melē*) of Olympus, which were acknowledged to make listeners 'enthusiastic' or ecstatic (1340^{a}8–14). With the observation that enthusiasm is a condition of the character pertaining to the soul (i.e. not a bodily or mental phenomenon), these (wordless) *melē* prove that music in and of itself can affect our souls in their ethical aspect.[34] But then Aristotle adds a remark that seems irrelevant: 'moreover, all people, when they listen to imitations, experience the pathos [represented], even apart from the rhythms and melodies used' (ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν, 1340^{a}12–14). Up until now Aristotle has been concerned to define the powers of music whether or not words are added to it (again, 1339^{b}20–1); in just a few lines he will be discussing the power of rhythm and *melē* to communicate states of character (ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος κτλ., 1340^{a}18–21). Hence the effect of 'representations' (*mimēseis*) apart from their rhythms and melodies, while doubtless very great (as *Poetics* remarks on the effects of merely hearing a good tragic story), is not at issue.

Aristotle would, however, be making a relevant point if he said the opposite of our transmitted text, and a lacuna in the Latin transmission has led some to emend along such lines as Susemihl's: audiences of *mimēseis* are affected 'by the rhythms and tunes even apart from the words' (καὶ χωρὶς [τῶν λόγων διὰ] τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ

[33] Contrast, e.g. *P. Hibeh* 13, arguing that music is irrelevant to character. See West (1992*a*) 31 ff. on contemporary theories of music's effects on character.

[34] So Newman 3.536. Kraut (1997) 193 explains the power of the tunes of Olympus with an 'outlet' theory.

τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν).[35] We could illustrate this from the imitative arts described in *Poetics* that employ language, rhythm, and *harmonia* all together (1447^{b}24–8). As emended, 1340^{a}12–14 would say that in complex musical arts (e.g. dithyramb, aulodic and kitharodic nomes) the rhythm and melody have an effect on the soul even apart from the plot or action represented in the words. This would be a reasonable Peripatetic observation and would, *pace* Lord, make sense as a supplementary (N.B. ἔτι δὲ) argument: it is very much to Aristotle's point if it be allowed that, even in the case of musical arts which, unlike auletic nomes, use *logoi* in addition, the music of such compositions creates a *pathos* in us apart from that produced by the words.[36] A reference to such popular forms also provides evidence that the power of music applies to all (γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς), which would be relevant if the tunes of Olympus, like the 'sacred' and 'kathartic' *melē* discussed in 8.7 (1342^{a}4 ff.), were especially affecting to certain people.

Aristotle does not need the verbal arts to argue for the ethical influence of music, for the *Poetics* can simply assert that 'most' of the instrumental arts are imitative in the sense of expressing action and character.[37] Moreover, to bring in the discursive content of songs here tangles Aristotle's argument needlessly. Those who reject Susemihl's emendation are confronted by difficulties in trying to give examples of these sympathy-inducing *mimēseis* without music. Ernest Barker's translation follows Newman and the paradosis: 'We may add that, in listening to mere imitative sounds, where there is no question of time or tune, all men are moved by feelings of sympathy.' But I then fail to see any relevance of the remark to music, which is nothing without time and tune.[38]

[35] Susemihl (1867) esp. 411–14. Followed by Anderson (1966) 126, 186–8 and apparently Halliwell (1986) 68 n. 29, but not by Ross or Dreizehnter. Susemihl took *mimēseis* to refer to vocal as opposed to instrumental music, but this is never an analytic distinction for Aristotle.

[36] Aristotle says something similar in *Rhet* 3.1408^{a}23–5: 'when someone speaks with pathos, the listener always experiences a similar feeling, even if the speaker says nothing; hence many speakers astound their hearers by making a lot of noise' (συνομοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μηδὲν λέγῃ. διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες). *Pace* Lord (1982) 88–9.

[37] 1.1447^{a}13–16. As, e.g., Sacadas' Pythian nome was held to imitate Apollo's conquest of Pytho simply by the sounds of the aulos: cf. *Poetics* 1448^{a}9–10.

[38] Newman 1.362; cf. 3.537; Plato condemns popular 'low-born' imitators who use *phōnē* to imitate 'all kinds of noises (*prophous*)—thunder, wind, axles and pulleys, and the sounds (*phōnas*) of all the instruments' (*Rep.* 396c, cf. *Laws*

A completely different construction is put on the transmitted text by Lord and Janko who understand *mimēseōn* as referring to epic and tragedy.[39] Taking this sentence to affirm that verbal *mousikē* also has an ethical influence on us clears the way for adding moral instruction in 'literature' to the *Politics* and for reading learning into the function of poetry in the *Poetics*. Janko calls this a vital passage because it alone 'provides the link between mimesis and catharsis', thus implying that the latter term can describe a process of ethical instruction.[40] For support, Janko looks to the argument that follows our crux: 'Since music happens to be something that is naturally pleasing, and since virtue is in feeling pleasure, affection, and hatred correctly, it is clear that nothing is more important to learn and become habituated to than judging rightly and taking pleasure in good characters and fine deeds' (1340^{a}14–18).

For Janko, 'decent characters and fine actions' (χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν) gloss the earlier mysterious *mimēseis* as tragedy and epic (cf. *Poetics* 1448^{a}1–18); accordingly, '[t]his passage gives clear support to the view that Aristotle thought that poetry, and not only music, was important in moulding character'.[41]

There are problems with this view: the first is that nothing in the context requires us to think of tragedy (and far less of epic, which was not taught in *mousikē* but in *grammatikē*). Glossing *mimēseōn* with these genres is inapt in Aristotelian terms: epic uses no *melos*, and tragedy uses it only in parts, while both use rhythm throughout. They are thus doubly unhelpful as examples of *logos* 'apart from rhythm and *melos*'. If we are to keep the transmitted text, dithyramb or sung nomes would again be more suitable examples:

669c–d). But these noises have little pathos or character in them (even of ethically charged instruments, qua imitation of instruments). For Aristotle, properly artistic imitation goes beyond 'mimicking' to representing character (*ethos*), the moral qualities of agents as revealed by their choices and actions (*Poetics* 1448^{a}1, 1449^{b}36 ff.). Such pyrotechnics (what Plato calls *thaumatourgia*) should not properly be included among the mimetic arts.

[39] Lord (1982) 83–9, cf. 269 n. 12: 'poetic imitations in the broadest sense' with reference to *Poet.* 1447^{a}8–16; followed by Janko (1987) 182.

[40] Janko (1984) 156–7.

[41] Janko (1987) 182. Kraut (1997) 194 also thinks Aristotle is talking about *logoi* here.

such works were allowed to be very affecting,[42] and indeed, the relative contributions of words and music had been an explicit theme of such songs at least from the later fifth century when the 'new music' prompted objections that *logos* was being drowned out by the din of music.[43]

But the most serious problem with bringing in epic or tragedy here (or even tragic odes) is that the whole point of the immediately ensuing discussion (1340^{a}18 ff.) is to highlight the strong resemblances (*homoiômata*) between real emotions and those conveyed by *rhythms and tunes* (1340^{a}19). Aristotle holds that that *melē* and rhythms communicate character more strongly than do impressions directed at the other senses (*ta aistheta*, 1340^{a}28) such as sight and taste, and he closes this argument by affirming that 'there are *mimēseis* of character *in tunes themselves*' (1340^a 38–9: ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς).[44] To bring in words obscures Aristotle's focus on music as a sensory phenomenon, a uniquely potent influence on the system.[45]

[42] Moreover, if one is considering the effects of musical instruction on citizens, dithyrambic performances were more frequent and involved more citizens learning songs (500 boys and 500 men for the Dithyrambic contests at the Greater Dionysia alone) than tragedy or comedy.

[43] In support one may note that the only poet-composers adduced in *Pol.* 8 (apart from passing citations of Musaeus [8.5 1339^{b}21–2] and Euripides [8.5 1339^{a}18–19] and Homer [8.3] as authorities) are such lyric poets, and they are cited on narrowly musical issues: the 'new' dithyramb of Philoxenos (1342^{b}9), and Spartan and Athenian *chorēgoi* (including the comic poet Ekphantides) who played the pipes for their own choruses (1341^{a}33–6). If, as Napolitano (2000) has re-argued, Pratinas' '*hyporkhēma*' (*PMG* 708) should be dated to *c.*500, the 'word *vs* music' argument is, in some form, that much older.

[44] The strong emphasis in this text has been emended away by Kassel (1963), whose ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτῶν ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν ('imitations of characters themselves [i.e. rather than the signs of character] in tunes') is printed by Dreizehnter. But αὐτοῖς makes good sense and there is an exact parallel of expression just above at 1340^{a}26 for the influence on a viewer of a sculpture's shape 'in itself' (διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν) apart from what is represented. Plato makes a very similar point about music in the same words: *Rep.* 601 a–b: οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα [sc. μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ ἁρμονίας] μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν.

[45] Over-reading learning-from-imitation into musical *homoiômata* (1340^{a}18, 29) or replicas (*mimēmata*, 40^{a}40) of character misconstrues Aristotle's analogy with portraits (*eikones*) to explain how musical habits are carried over into life: they show that if we are pleased by the mere shape of a face (διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν, 1340^{a}26), it will please us whether in life or on a pot. This basic pleasure in non-narrative form is like that afforded by the 'drip paintings' of *Poetics* 1450^{a}39–50^{b}3: 'very beautiful colours' applied at random can please (εὐφραίνειν) us, albeit less fully than a figure drawing (which can suggest character and action, i.e. *mimēsis*).

Aristotle's focus on perception here suggests the only defence I might give of the paradosis at 1340ª12–14: if we put the stress on its opening word, *akroômenoi*,[46] Aristotle could be anticipating his argument from the senses by adding to his observation about the ethical effect of the tunes of Olympus the point that poetic *mimēseis* also effect *sumpatheia* through our sense of hearing.[47] To note that this effect of verbal imitation is one that passes through the ears prepares us for the following argument that sound has the most potent effect on our character. This point is made less emphatically within that argument when Aristotle observes at ª22–3 that certain ethical *harmoniai* 'change the states of our souls when we listen to them': μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων. Whether we emend or not, I do not think that the crux at 1340ª12–14 establishes a link between character-building and poetry; it assumes a link between represented *pathos* and the audience's *pathos* and goes on to show how heard representations achieve this most strongly. The difficult *mimēseon* at 1340ª12 should not be pressed so as to make Aristotle change his focus from the strictly musical component of traditional instruction in *mousikē*. The nobler mission for music depends, no less than the ones commonly allowed it, on natural powers of rhythms and *harmoniai* to move the soul.[48]

[46] Cf. Plato *Rep.* 603b where poetry is that branch of ἡ μιμητική which appeals to our ears rather than eyes (ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἣν δὴ ποίησιν ὀνομάζομεν). So Aristotle in *Poetics* allows that tragic *opsis* has a potent effect on the spectator in addition to that of the *muthos* (1450ᵇ16–20 and esp. 1453ᵇ1–3).

[47] Conversely, Gorgias *Helen* 9 points out that listening to poetry (*logos*-with-metre) induces *pathē* in the audience (ἧς τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής, ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπραγίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχή).

[48] Aristotle does not give enough information for us to decide how he saw this working, but perhaps he traced it to a kinship between musical and psychological 'movements' (*kinēseis* as changes in states over time), cf. *De Anima* 1.4 408ª6 ff. Such is the explanation in *Problems* (19.27 919ᵇ20 ff.: Διὰ τί τὸ ἀκουστὸν μόνον ἦθος ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ᾖ ἄνευ λόγου μέλος [cf. Susemihl's emendation], ὅμως ἔχει ἦθος· ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐδὲ ὁ χυμὸς ἔχει. ἢ ὅτι κίνησιν ἔχει μόνον οὐχί, ἣν ὁ ψόφος ἡμᾶς κινεῖ; similarly, *Problems* 19.29 (920a5 ff.). Plato explained the calming effect of Coryhantic music as an 'opposite movement' (τοὐναντίον κίνησιν) overcoming undesirable movement within: *Laws* 790d–91b; cf. *Timaeus* 47d. In *Politics* 8 we find *kinēsis* used of a kind of musical form: (1342ª8–9: ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως [i.e. ἐνθουσιαστικὴ ἁρμονία] κατοκώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν) and, psychologically, of 'release' (*anesis*) as a kind of

That Aristotle's discussion centres on the power of music without words is confirmed by his next argument which begins at 1340ª40–3. The comparison of music's ethical impact with that of other sense impressions is followed by separate discussions of each of music's components: first a consideration of how replicas (*mimēmata*) of different characters inhere in tunes (*melē*) and in their naturally distinct modes (ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε ἡ φύσις, 40ª40); this is followed by a brief but explicit discussion of the character of various rhythms (stately or motile, moving in vulgar or free fashion: 1340ᵇ7–10). The upshot of these several arguments in 8.5 (1340ª14–40ᵇ10) is to show the power inherent in musical modes and rhythms to 'produce a certain quality in the soul' (1340ᵇ10–12). This recapitulates Aristotle's opening suggestion at 1340ª7–8 that 'we clearly become of a certain quality because of it [*mousikē*]'.

Chapter 8.5 thus establishes, on the basis of a new set of powers inherent in *melē* and rhythms, that music may have a nobler function in education than to provide a break in routine or a preparation for later leisure. The special use of music for ethical training is based on a combination of its natural pleasingness (ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, 1340ª14) and its ability to produce ethical states in listeners.[49] The following discussion in 8.6 provides guidelines for exploiting this power in school.

8.6–7: MUSIC, CATHARSIS AND LEARNING

With the analysis of 8.5 in view, the endlessly debated evidence of 8.6–7 can be presented briskly. Having added ethical training to the uses of *mousikē* in school, Aristotle turns once more in 8.6 to ask whether to play instruments or not and which ones to play. One observation he makes in this discussion would seem to settle what he means by catharsis in the famous passage of 8.7: Aristotle

'movement' of the soul after the 'contractions' (*suntonia*) of toil (1337ᵇ42). Cf. 1341ᵇ19 (of the vulgar and corrupting movements of professional musicians) with Kraut (1997) 181, Newman 1.367.

[49] Lord (1982) 83 takes συμβέβηκεν to indicate that the use of music for pleasure is a mere 'accident of its nature' as opposed to its essential moral influence. But Aristotle seems to mean that music just happens to be pleasing to us; it might have been something naturally bitter (cf. *sumbebēke*, 1339ᵇ51, 1340ª1).

decides that *auloi* should not be used in schools because, among other reasons, 'they produce a passionate rather than ethical experience in their auditors and so should be used on those occasions that call for catharsis rather than learning' (ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν, 8.6 1341[a]17–24). Here the 'separation of catharsis from *paideia* is so compellingly clear that one has difficulty grasping how, after the hundreds of years that clear-thinking men have concerned themselves with this, anyone can continue to bring Aristotle's musical-poetic catharsis into connection with ethics'.[50] It only remains to add that, since the aulos was the regular accompaniment to tragic songs, '[w]hen Aristotle denies that the aulos is moralizing or ethically effective, he really denies these qualities to tragedy as well'.[51]

Banishing *auloi* from the classroom, however, is not enough to lay to rest the vexing charge of vulgarization. To justify musical education Aristotle sets himself the task not only of limiting the degree of proficiency to be aimed at and the instruments to be used (both explained in 8.6) but also defines 'what sorts of tunes and rhythms they are to employ' (1340[b]40–1341[a]3). Thus is set the agenda for 8.7, which begins with *harmoniai* and rhythm in view (1341[b]19–20: σκεπτέον δ' ἔτι περί τε τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς). To decide whether all types of music are to be employed in education or only certain ones, and what to do about the others, Aristotle methodically bears in once again on the capacities of rhythm and tunes, since these are obviously what music consists of (1341[b]23–5: ἐπεὶ δὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων δ' ἑκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λελη θέναι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν).[52]

[50] Schadewaldt (1955) 153, quoted, to his credit, and translated by Lord (1982) 112 n. 15. Cf. Aristotle's remark that initiation into mysteries is not a matter of learning (*mathein*) but an experience (*pathein*) (fr. 15 Rose; cf. *Pol*, 8.7 1342[b]1–3). Halliwell (1986) 195 appreciates the difficulties, which Janko (1987) 182–3 tries to solve by taking *paideia* as the education of children (*paides*) in contrast to an educative catharsis for adults. The diction is forced, the idea of adult education illusory; see n. 61 below.

[51] Anderson (1966) 137. On the aulos see further Wilson (1999) esp. 87–94.

[52] *Pace* the forced interpretation of Lord (1982) 88–9 and 108–9: '"music" is not to be identified with "harmonies and rhythms" ' but *mousikē* in its broad sense only 'depends on them'.

Aristotle starts by accepting a division made by 'experts in musicology and musical education'[53] of tunes and *harmoniai* into the 'ethical', 'practical', and 'enthusiastic'—moral, invigorating and inspirational music (1341[b]32–6).[54] Having argued that music is to be used for more than one purpose, he will argue here that music may be used for '*paideia*, *katharsis* and thirdly (?) for *diagōgē*, both release and the cessation of tension'.[55] Accordingly, in his city he will employ all types of *harmoniai*, but he will use the ethical for education and the practical and enthusiastic for listening when 'others' perform (1341[b]32–42[a]4). The need to use modes selectively in education while allowing other kinds of music for other occasions is Aristotle's main argument and is repeatedly signposted (1342[a]1, 17, 24–8).

Among the three kinds of *harmoniai*, 8.5–6 has explained how the ethical may be used in education, and the practical are probably assumed to be useful (e.g. songs for rowing and military exercises).[56] What needs justification is retaining cathartic music (already characterized as anti-educational in 8.6) in the state.[57] In its favour Aristotle adduces certain 'sacred tunes' (among which are probably the *melē* of Olympus) which 'we see' set overly ecstatic people back on their feet as if they had availed themselves

[53] 8.7 1341[b]27–9; cf. 1342[a]31–2. Among these is probably Aristoxenus of Tarentum who remarked Pythagoreans effected '*katharsis* of the body by means of medicine and *katharsis* of the soul by means of music' (26 Wehrli); see Burkert (1972) 211 n. 1; cf. 376–7 and Halliwell (1986) 186–7 with n. 23.

[54] So Barker (1984) 179 glosses, with the stipulation (n. 31) that all convey character, but the *ēthikē* 'good' character (cf. 8.6 1341[a]17–18 for this nuance).

[55] 8.7 1341b38–41: καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως ... τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν. Although my broad interpretation of *diagōgē* might be supported by Aristotle's placing it next to relaxation and apart from *paideia*, the sentence is difficult and probably corrupt. Apart from the often-deleted 'thirdly', the purposes are hard to square with 8.5, esp. 1339[b]10–15 where the three benefits of music are (*a*) *paideia* (ethical training), (*b*) *paidia* (recreational 'play') and (*c*) [preparation for] *diagōgē*. At 8.5 1339[a]16–26 one may partake of music for: (*b*) *paidia* and *anapausis* (*a*) inculcating *aretē* like gymnastics, and (*c*) *diagōgē* and *phronēsis*.

[56] Reading the transmitted *kathartika* at 1342[a]15 (not Sauppe's *praktika*). As Newman takes it, Aristotle thus extends to sacred and cathartic *melē* his remarks on sacred/cathartic *harmoniai* (at 1342[a]1). Thus Aristotle does not explicitly discuss the *praktika* but lumps them together with the *kathartika* as opposed to the *ēthika*. For discussions: Ross' apparatus to 1342[a]1, Lord (1982) 132 n. 49, Janko (1992) 354 n. 14.

[57] Simpson (n. 11) 279–80 is I believe alone in thinking enthusiastic modes are to be included in education.

of a medical treatment (*iatreia*) and a 'purge' (*katharsis*). He reasons that a passion that is very strong in some people must exist to some degree in all (mentioning pity and fear along with 'enthusiasm') and so everyone gets 'a kind of *katharsis*' from such music, a feeling of relief accompanied by pleasure. Now it is hard to derive from this passage a clear model of how Aristotle thought catharsis worked, but the clear separation in 8.7 (as in 8.6) between educative music in schools and non-educative (including cathartic) music in public performances rules out idealizing tragedy as a form of moral education. As Aristotle goes on to say, theatrical audiences are composed partly of the free and educated but partly too of tradesmen and labourers and other such, whom he does not expect to have the same education as citizens (7. 1328^{b}24–29^{a}39). But, unlike Plato, Aristotle will allow kathartic music in the theatre (1342^{a}16–18, 26–8) because such people must be granted their traditional festivities as respite (*anapausis*, 1342^{b}22) from their labours: 'those competing before a spectator of this sort must be permitted to employ the corresponding [low] kind of music' (1342^{a}17 ff.).[58] In the theatre, then, poet-musicians are performers and entertainers, not teachers; they aim not at moral excellence but to provide the audience with a 'vulgar' (*phortikos*) pleasure, for the spectator 'tends to be vulgar' too (1341^{b}10 ff.). Aristotle stipulates that for those who are not using it therapeutically, the pleasure such music affords is harmless (1341^{a}16).[59] Thus the use of non-educational music in the theatre is like the use of schoolroom music as a 'cure' (8.5) from fatigue because it belongs to the 'harmless pleasures'.[60]

It is only by linking a series of implications that scholars have found a programme for higher adult education in *Politics*.[61] Yet

[58] See Anderson (1966) 122.

[59] Cf. Newman 3.535 on 1340^{a}2 and 1.363 n. 3.

[60] 1339^{b}15–17: ἥ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι, τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστιν. Janko (1987) 183 cites this mention of *iatreia* as analogous with his conception of catharsis as a *therapeia* that improves the soul, but fails to note that in context it is merely a 'remedy' for fatigue (cf. 1337^{b}41–2: φαρμακείας χάριν), having no sense of 'improvement'. The use of music to refresh students is quite distinct from its nobler use in ethical training.

[61] 'The possibility has been inferred from the remark that citizens 'must be taught while *paides* and in any other age that require *paideia*' (1333^{b}5), but this is probably by the laws: cf. *EN* 1.3 (1095^{a}6 ff.) where both the youthful in character as well as the young in years have difficulty attending to ethical instruction. For 'adult education': Newman 3.443 (citing 1336^{b}37), 1.370, 358 n. 2; Anderson (1966) 114, cf. 66, 131; Lord (1982) 107–8, (1990); Salkever (1986) 289; Nussbaum (1986) 390–1; Janko (1987) 182–3. For the contrary view, see Solmsen (1964); Lear (1988) 306, and David Rees' response to Lord (1990); see also Kraut in the two following notes.

Aristotle is a theorist of the whole state and not just of its philosophers, and he is convinced that not every citizen will be endowed with ability to reach speculative wisdom.[62] Richard Kraut entertains the possibility of a special course of studies to produce philosophers as far as he can, but since Aristotle's public education is uniform he concludes that philosophical studies will have to arise naturally among those so inclined without special arrangements by the state; Kraut has the evidence in his favour when he observes that 'in the ideal city music educates only children, not adults'.[63]

The closing summary of the argument reiterates that the topic is music (1342^{a}24–8, where *mousikē* is unpacked as *melē* and *harmoniai*). Words are not the main engine here. Janko, to be sure, takes the mention of *praktika melē* (at 1341^{b}34) as a reference to tragedy which the *Poetics* tells us represents the *praxeis* of men; he says this is 'proved' by the mention of pity and fear at 1342^{a}7. But *praktika* clearly means music that stimulates or accompanies activity, not the music that represents men acting (for the 'ethical' do this); 'practical' is not Aristotle's term but borrowed from the musicologists (1341b33). Moreover, Aristotle places 'practical' modes along with the cathartic as music that should be performed by 'others' (1342^{a}2–4); if it had educational value, schoolboys should be taught to appreciate it. As for pity and fear, these are commonly paired as paradigmatic emotions, as Halliwell points out, so no particular reference to tragedy is implied.[64]

We have traversed the discourse *peri mousikēs* in 8.5–7 with no need to extend the argument to poetry or literature—except perhaps in our crux—and often with the need to eliminate such distractions. (The subsequent discussion of 1342^{a}29–end is narrowly musical, disputing the *Republic* on which specific *harmoniai* have capacities that best suit education.) Of course, *Politics* 8 is apparently unfinished, but the possibility that some discussion of poetry followed 8.7 diminishes considerably when we compare the

[62] Cf. 7.14 1333^{a}27–30; Kraut (1997) 138, cf. 141–2, 192, 206. By contrast, virtue is attainable through education and training to anyone whose soul is not corrupt (*EN* 1.9 1099^{b}15–20).

[63] Kraut (1997) 204; cf. 139–41, 167.

[64] Halliwell (1986) 170 with n. 3.

sequence of topics treated in *Politics* 7–8 with Plato's discussion of primary education in *Republic* 2–3. Like Aristotle, Plato begins with birth and infancy and then turns to *mousikē* in its broad sense (i.e. education that is not *gumnastikē*, 376e). The first step in treating *mousikē* is to analyse it into its three component parts—*logoi* or *muthoi*, *rhuthmoi*, and *harmoniai*—and then to treat each in turn. The discussion of what Plato calls 'that part of *mousikē* which has to do with *muthoi* and *logoi*' is finished some 20 Stephanus pages later (398b: τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι); thereupon he turns to 'kinds of singing and tunes' (τὸ περὶ ᾠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν: 398b–c) by which he means *harmoniai* and rhythms (398d). This discussion ranges over a variety of modes and considers which instruments to use, just as Aristotle does in 8.5–6; Plato then briefly discusses rhythms (at 400, with reference to Damon), as Aristotle does with comparable brevity in 8.5 (at $1340^{b}7$–10). With the conspicuous difference of its detailed concern for *logoi*, the *Republic* shows the same organization of ideas as in *Politics* 8.[65] In fact, it is precisely this discussion of music in the *Republic* that is twice cited in *Politics* 8.7.[66]

It is striking how small a role *logos* plays in Aristotle's discussion of schooling. The place for him to talk about which texts to teach would have been apropos *grammatikē* in 8.3, but he had little to say beyond that *grammatikē* should continue: he notes that it is useful for practical purposes and for learning other things, but most such learning will surely take place after primary school. Lord quotes George Grube that 'poetry could hardly be left out of Greek education'.[67] Certainly not; but it could be taken for granted.

[65] I suggest this same template or agenda of topics (probably originating with the professors, cf. the switch in *Frogs* from critiquing prologues to *melē* at 1248–50) is what led Aristotle in 8.7 to make his unfulfilled promise to compare the relative importance of good *melos* and rhythm (καὶ πότερον προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὔρυθμον, $1341^{b}25$–6).

[66] $1342^{a}33$–$42^{b}1$ referring to *Rep.* 399a ff., and $1342^{b}23$–6, referring to *Rep.* 398c. See Barker (1989) ch 2, esp. 53–65. This is not to deny the influence of *Laws* 7, as stressed by Newman 3.478.

[67] Grube (1965) 67 n. 2, cited by Lord (1982) 29, who concedes that 'Aristotle appears to take little notice of poetry either in Chapters 5–7 or in Books VII and VIII as a whole', but urges that 'the entire discussion is fragmentary in nature' (86). Incomplete and not wholly satisfactory these books may be, but this long and continuous argument can hardly be called fragmentary and a discussion of poetry is not among Aristotle's unfulfilled promises (for which See Kraut (1997) 87).

Aristotle leaves his readers to assume that school texts would be, as teachers advertised, admirable praises of admirable men.[68] Doubtless Aristotle would not have wanted 10-year-olds singing scandalous words to his carefully censored tunes. Perhaps he thought that limiting music to ethically good modes would effectively eliminate depraved lyrics, for when Philoxenus tried to compose a dithyramb in the Dorian mode he found that the Bacchic movement drew him irresistibly back to the Phrygian ($1342^{b}3$–12).[69] In any case, Aristotle's experience of music and his familiarity with advanced theoretical work on the subject persuaded him that it was far more important to regulate the musical modes used in schools than the texts.

CONCLUSION: ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS OF MUSIC

It is time to pull the strands together (adding in a few details). Despite arguments that *mousikē* is a useless and in fact vulgarizing study, Aristotle argues that it is beneficial and appropriate in education for many reasons. Just as young children may be given rattles to give their busy hands something to do ($1340^{b}28$–31; cf. *Laws* 653b), students may take up the lyre at school; if properly regulated, music will not interfere with learning and its harmless natural pleasure is suitable for providing a refreshing break (*anapausis*) from work. Though not practically useful, *mousikē* will prepare students to enjoy and, if they choose, to sing and play songs appropriate to cultivated gatherings as adults. In addition, 'taking pleasure (*khairein*) in noble *melē* and rhythms' ($1341^{a}14$–15) prepares students for 'judging correctly' of its ethical character *when they grow older* ($1340^{b}36$–40). Hence '*mousikē* makes some contribution to *diagôgē* and *phronēsis*' ($1339^{a}25$–6).

Distinct from these benefits, in Aristotle's view, is the use of music as ethical training. It is through habituation, repeated exposure, that music can instil proper pains and pleasures in the young (cf. 7.17 $1336^{a}12$–19 on inuring children to cold by

[68] e.g. Plato *Prot.* 326a, Isocr. *Paneg.* § 159, both of which stress poetry's appeal to what Aristotle would characterize ($1334^{b}12$–28) as non-rational appetites (*oregetai*, *epithumomen*) in the young for virtue.

[69] In this passage *poiēsis*, sometimes daggered, means 'composition (of the *melos*)', as μελοποιίας in $1341^{b}23$–5, quoted above.

exposure). Aristotle's keen interest in the effects of music as sound and his clear separation of habituation from *diagôgē* and *phronēsis* show that he searches the music in *mousikē* not for its aesthetic or philosophical messages but for its acoustic and physiological powers. Of course, there will be words in the music class (it counts against the aulos that one cannot use it and speak at the same time: 1341^{a}25), not only the words of the songs but those of the teacher too. Aristotle's *kitharistes* may well use *logos* to direct the students' pleasure (which dominates the young: *EN* 8.3, 1156^{a}31–3) to the right objects. He may say that the pleasure in singing, e.g. the Harmodius skolion is that of noble friendship, love of freedom, and hatred of tyranny. The *ruthmoi*, *melē*, and *harmoniai*, and the *logoi* as well, must all work together and prepare one for the full acquisition of virtuous character. To 'harmonize' (1332^{b}5–8, 1334^{b}9–10) these forces, however, is not to homogenize them: music even without words provides a powerful ethical experience that enters directly into the soul. Whatever a teacher might say or a student be prepared to absorb, what music, qua music, uniquely allows the young to learn about virtue is that noble states are enjoyable.[70] Music exposes students, vicariously as it were, to emotionally charged ethical states which would not otherwise be available to them because of their immature natures and the restricted social roles open to them as yet.

The fact that in *Politics*, as in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, habituation is presented as addressed to the non-rational part of the soul indicates that Aristotle aims to prepare students for 'judging' by inculcating in them a basic faculty of discernment, of taste.[71] Just as one's taste in food (i.e. whether something is sweet or bitter) depends on the health and condition of one's physical constitution, so one's likes in music reflect one's character as formed by repeated exposure to certain music. In ethics as in politics, developing early habits of feeling pleasure and pain rightly makes all the difference (1103^{b}23–5), and is more important than learning or knowing (*EN* 1103^{a}14–17; 1105^{b}1–5). It is like preparing soil for seed (1179^{b}26), and 'imbues' the soul indelibly, as a dye (2.3 1105^{a}3,

[70] Cf. Burnyeat (n. 24) 76, 78, as opposed to the Pavlovian account of Simpson (1998) 270.

[71] Cf. the developed taste of the 'good man' in *EN* 9.4 (esp. 1166^{a}12) and 10.5 1176^{a}10–24, where Aristotle adds that the excellent person finds objectionable what pleases those whose taste has suffered corruption and damage. Cf. 3.4 1113^{a}25 ff.

ἐγκεχρωσμένον). Without early habituation, *logos* is of little use: 'it is not possible [for arguments] to turn the majority of men [*hoi polloi*] to the ways of a gentleman [*kalokagathian*]. . . . They pursue their own [suitable] pleasures and the means of getting them, and avoid any pains that lie in their way. Of the truly fine and pleasant they have not even the idea, never having tasted them [*ageustoi*]' (*EN* 10.9 1179^{b}10–15). In describing the souls of the unfree and uneducated (*Pol.* 8.7 1342^{a}19–31), Aristotle's diction shows how deeply seated these responses are: vulgar souls are said to be distorted (παρεστραμμέναι) by the constant exertions (*suntonia*) and toil (*ponos*) of their occupations (8.3), and so take pleasure in music that is distorted in the same way: παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα. By contrast, the constitution of the citizen will unfailingly respond with pleasure to noble tunes. Like 'the good man' in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, he will surpass the common run of men in his ability to judge 'correctly' what is noble and pleasant without being misled by pleasure (3.4 1113^{a}25 ff.).[72]

Theatrical music is harmless to the uneducated since their souls are already (mal-)formed. It is also harmless to the educated in the audience because their souls have been shaped nobly.[73] As Aristotle puts it in regard to comedy and licentious song, they will be 'immune' to the harmful effects of such things 'if in tender years we make depravity and malignity foreign to them' (1336^{b}22–3). Because education and nobility are not the criteria for such events, Aristotle can say, in another remarkable passage from the *Politics*, that the general public (*plēthos*) is a better judge of musical and poetic compositions [*erga*] than any individual, 'for some judge one part, others another, and collectively they judge the whole' (3.10 1281^{b}8 f.).[74]

[72] On different views of 'the highest good' as like perceptions affected by health or material circumstances, *EN*, 10.3 1173^{b}22–5; 1.4 1095^{a}22 ff.

[73] I confess to be puzzled about how Aristotle's educated citizen could have enjoyed spectacles where music was shaped to conform to vulgar souls (cf. 1342^{a}19–26). As nothing is said about such a radical departure from custom as having 'free' and 'unfree' theatres, I think he must have imagined that the educated would, in intervals between *askholia*, attend the theatre and take the natural, harmless pleasures of these occasions of *skholē* (not *diagôgē* to be sure). When Aristotle says boys shouldn't go to comedies until they are of age to drink at table, he implies they may go to them then once their education will have made them immune to any harm in the vulgar displays (see n. 75).

[74] I discuss Aristotle (and Plato) on 'judging' poetry in detail in Ford (2002), ch. 12.

My reading of *Politics* 8 will disappoint those who want to see Aristotle taking up Plato's challenge in the *Republic* to show in prose that poetry is not only a source of pleasure but also of benefit to political communities and human life (607d). But neither *Poetics* nor *Politics* addresses Plato's (deliberately outlandish I suspect) attack on conventional literature.[75] I maintain that my reading is truer to the argument and emphases of *Politics* 7–8, and submit that it is, for all its dubious assumptions, preferable as aesthetics and as cultural policy. The new consensus about poetry as moral education takes a narrower view of literature's uses than Aristotle's, and it is, paradoxically, very Platonic in insisting that even leisure serves learning. Plato was as aware as Aristotle of music's uniquely powerful charms, and, like Aristotle, he wanted to harness these pleasures to the good of the state. But only Plato formulates plans for lifelong education in virtue, one based on early habituation to (censored) music.[76] To respond that tragedy is 'educational' is not to defeat Plato but to capitulate to him. Aristotle's difference from Plato is not that he thought art should structure woeful stories to make them morally improving; it is just that he will admit non-educative music (and poetry) into city festivals.

The Aristotle that emerges from Lord is a super elitist: the philosophically gifted will be educated to the 'correct' way to enjoy art and so prescribe its uses for others.[77] Janko and others idealize him, ascribing to *mousikē* as 'literature' a role in public education that Aristotle would have considered naïve (cf. 1341^{b}27–9). I have presented Aristotle as a political theorist drawn to music because of the profound effects it obviously

[75] In fact, Plato's discussion of managing *muthoi* and *logoi* in *Rep.* 2–3 finds a generally sympathetic reception in that part of the *Politics* which discusses pre-school rearing: Aristotle agrees with Plato that officials should supervise the *logoi* and *muthoi* young children hear, with the idea of making early pastimes (*diatribai*) 'imitations of the serious occupations of later life' (7.17 1336^{a}30–4; cf. *Laws* 643b–c). Like Plato, he thinks children up to seven should be kept at home and as much as possible in isolation from slaves, foul language, indecent art, and performances of *iamboi* and comedy (7.17 1336^{b}12–23). But their *paideia* will make them ' "immune" to the harmful effects of such things if in tender years we make depravity and malignity foreign to them' (1336^{b}22–3).

[76] Against the use of music simply for pleasure instead of ethical training: *Laws* 655c–d; censoring educational and public music accordingly: 659c–660b, 667a ff., 798d ff. Cf. *Rep.* 401d–402a.

[77] Lord's 'aristocratic' view is diagnosed by Nichols (1992) 4–5.

has—effects 'we see'—on human souls and their character. His course is to analyse the *phusis* and *dunameis* of music to see how it may aid the political animal to actualize its capacities.[78] Of course, this is a political work and so Aristotle's empirical and scientific account of music ends up naturalizing basic social distinctions he foresees for his ideal city. Over and above music's universal appeal is discovered a special power to form virtuous souls, and the inculcation of fine musical 'taste' in school underlies the difference between a free and leisured class and the 'others' (foreigners, non-citizens, slaves) who provide them with pleasures it is demeaning for them to provide for themselves. From this flow social and political distinctions between the educated and the vulgar, dilettantes and professionals, citizen spectators and foreign players, the free and un-free. The same social and political agenda should inflect our estimation of the learning that takes place in *mousikē*. Aristotle's ideal citizen will be a trained and experienced aficionado of fine music. He will not be a practitioner but a knowledgeable enthusiast; he might dabble in playing at symposia, but has not contorted his soul by assiduous training to become a crowd-pleasing professional. The citizen will indeed judge rightly, but as a connoisseur, not necessarily as an expert in poetics or moral philosophy.[79]

The natural powers of music—of tunes, *harmoniai*, rhythms—thus dominate the discussion on education in *Politics* for important reasons. Aristotle's programme is accompanied by an unappealingly frank dismissal of popular art, but he is more snobbish than elitist since he aims to secure a shared level of culture among all those who count in the state, the citizens. What is more troubling is Aristotle's exclusion from education and citizenship of persons he thinks are simply too limited in their capacities—whether by birth or a corrupt upbringing (cf. e.g. 7.13 1331^{b}39 ff.). But this leads ultimately to his indefensible defence of slavery. Here I will conclude by noting that, within his citizen class, Aristotle provides for a liberal, democratic education in the Periclean tradition.

Within Greek political thought, Aristotle's musical culture represents a strain of enlightened liberalism that saw democratic culture as the dissemination of high or noble culture among the citizen body. Thucydides' Pericles praises Athens' 'liberal'

[78] Kraut (1997) 138, cf. 28.

[79] Cf. Garber (2000) Ch. 1.

(*eleutheros*, 2.37.2) way of life, including its use of *mousikē*: 'We have provided for the mind numerous refreshments from toil, establishing festivals and feasts through the year, and in our private lives the daily pleasure we take in distinguished furnishings drives away woe.' (Καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγῶσι μέν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίους νομίζοντες, ἰδίαις δὲ κατασκευαῖς εὐπρεπέσιν, ὧν καθ' ἡμέραν ἡ τέρψις τὸ λυπηρὸν ἐκπλήσσει, 2.38.1.) As Aristotle assigns theatre to *anapausis*, the modern reader views it (*agôsi* includes festival competition in tragedy and dithyramb) from a biological or anthropological perspective as a relaxation from labour. It is at the same time a refreshment for the mind, for this is leisure worthy of free men, democratized to a society that 'love the fine without extravagance and love wisdom [*philosophoumen*] without softness' (2.40.1). Like Aristotle as well, 'Pericles' incorporates *mousikē* into a broader vision of culture in which citizens can appreciate and take pleasure in the products of artists without producing them for themselves. We recall that for Aristotle *graphikē* teaches one to judge (not produce!) the works (*erga*) of craftsmen (1338^{a}17–19) and this is useful so that one will not be cheated when buying and selling art; but studying painting can also inculcate a sense of beauty (1338^{a}40–38^{b}2). (Plato, true to form, contemplated regulating the designs employed by furniture-makers, sculptors, and other craftsmen: *Rep.* 401a–d). But the most important commonality in the two writers is that both stress the ability of art to drive out care rather than to communicate deeper truths and values. By placing the arts in a less than highest class of human activity, both effectively shield it from the many demands of the state. What remains liberal in Aristotle, and enduringly valuable, is not insisting that all a citizen's activities and pleasures serve moral and political education.

12

Dirty Dancing: Xenophon's *Symposium*

Victoria Wohl

One doesn't normally think of Sokrates dancing. But in Xenophon's *Symposium*, we are given this picture: Sokrates alone in his house, moving to the beat. This incongruous image—a dancing philosopher—can be taken as a metaphor for Xenophon's text as a whole, a philosophical treatise in which philosophers dance and dancing becomes a topic of philosophical discussion. The rhythms of the dance punctuate the discourse and set the tempo for the party; they raise philosophical questions about the nature of beauty, the teachability of virtue, the varieties of desire. Moreover, it is a dance that ultimately ends the text and the party—a sexy floor-show that gets the symposiasts so aroused they must run off to seek satisfaction.

What are we to make of a Sokrates who dances? Of a symposium that climaxes with an erotic dance? What role does dancing play in Xenophon's *Symposium* and in the elite philosophical community it depicts? What does dancing do for—or to—philosophy? In this chapter, I look at dancing within the context of two interconnected sympotic themes: *paideia* and *erōs*. Symposia were implicitly educational, whether it was philosophical precepts being passed around with the wine or lessons on how to behave like a gentleman, a καλοκἀγαθός. In either case, the symposium taught through mimesis: younger members watched the older and learned from the actions and talk of good men how to be good men themselves. At the same time, symposia were also erotic, and that *erōs* was part of the curriculum, as the impressionable ἐρώμενος learned to imitate the good example of his older ἐραστής. It was essential, of course, that both the *erōs* and the mimesis be of the right sort—noble and virtuous, not vulgar or shameful. Plato's and Xenophon's symposia both go to some lengths to secure the distinction

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between good love and bad, to banish the debased pleasures of the latter and to enshrine the former—the spiritual love of good men—as the foundation of their philosophical *paideusis*.[1]

How does dancing fit within this nexus of *paideia* and pleasure? Dancing affords pleasure and evokes *erōs*, but are these the right sort of pleasure and *erōs*? Does dancing's pleasure reinforce the *paideusis* of the symposium or undermine it? Is its *erōs* compatible with the spiritual pederasty the philosophers prescribe? How does dancing help philosophy negotiate its own relation to pleasure? And if dancing is part of the *paideusis* of the symposium, then what are its lessons?

To introduce the complex relation between dancing, pleasure and *paideia*, we begin with Plato's *Laws*.[2] Plato situates the symposium within a discourse on pleasure and moderation: just as you expose young men to war in order to make them brave, you should expose them to symposia to make them self-controlled. Plato's *paideia* is above all a moral education: by encouraging a proper relation to pleasure and pain, it aims to instil ἀρετή (653b1–c4). At the same time, though, it is also a social education, producing a citizen who is simultaneously egalitarian ('he knows how to rule and be ruled justly', 643e4–6) and elite (for his is a 'liberal' education, not the 'banausic and illiberal' training of the trade-schools, 644a5). In this *paideia*, *mousikē* occupies a privileged position: the educated man is defined as one trained in song and dance (654a9–b1), and the laws (νόμοι) of the *polis* work their beneficent effect through the modes and measures (νόμοι) of song and dance.[3]

Mousikē achieves its educative effects through pleasure (655c8–d2), and for this reason requires special care from the legislator. Music is pleasurable: on that point the speakers all

[1] On sympotic *erōs* and *paideia*, see Bremmer (1990); Murray (1990*a*, 1990*b*); Halperin (1990); Pellizer (1990); Calame (1999*b*) 91–8.

[2] On the role of *mousikē* in Plato's *Laws*, see Morrow (1960) 302–18, 358–70; Lippman (1964) 78–86; Schoen-Nazzaro (1978); Stalley (1983) 123–36; Tecusan (1990) 244–57. In *Phaedo*, Sokrates proclaims philosophy the 'greatest *mousikē*' (*Phaedo* 61a), on which see Murray in this volume.

[3] Plato plays on the two meanings of νόμος at 657a–b, 700b–701c; see Anderson (1966) 82–3 and n. 33; and Csapo in this volume. At 654e3–8, the validity of the entire discussion of *paideia* is predicated upon the proper understanding of the various elements of *mousikē*. The pedagogical function of dance is emphasized by Lippman (1964) 45–86; Anderson (1966) esp. 64–110; Farnon (1985); Lonsdale (1993) 24.

agree.[4] But the law-maker must insure that it gives the right kind of pleasure. For a performance can be enjoyable while being morally despicable (656a1–2), and an individual may publicly decry a performance he secretly enjoys (656a2–5). For Plato this is not just a matter of hypocrisy, but a schism between knowing the good and desiring the good. Since we not only enjoy what resonates with our own character (655d5–e5), but even take on the character of what we enjoy (656b4–7), these secret pleasures are not just embarrassing but potentially damaging as well (669b8). *Mousikē* may threaten our souls with a pernicious pleasure, divorced from moral content and knowledge of the good.

The solution, Plato proposes, is to impose an authority to evaluate and regulate *mousikē*'s pleasure. This judge will be chosen from among the best and best educated, one outstanding in virtue and *paideia* (658c9–10). His job is twofold. First, he must make sure that performances depict edifying topics, in particular the happiness of the good man: as a practice *mousikē* should perform the equation of the good and the pleasurable that Plato's text as a whole works to effect.[5] But, secondly, he is to sit as judge upon the audience, to be their teacher, and oppose their improper pleasures.

> οὐ γὰρ μαθητὴς ἀλλὰ διδάσκαλος, ὡς γε τὸ δίκαιον, θεατῶν μᾶλλον ὁ κριτὴς καθίζει, καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενος τοῖς τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ προσηκόντως μηδὲ ὀρθῶς ἀποδιδοῦσι θεαταῖς. ἐξῆν γὰρ δὴ τῷ παλαιῷ τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῷ νόμῳ, <οὐ> καθάπερ ὁ Σικελικός τε καὶ Ἰταλικὸς νόμος νῦν, τῷ πλήθει τῶν θεατῶν ἐπιτρέπων καὶ τὸν νικῶντα διακρίνων χειροτονίαις, διέφθαρκε μὲν τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς—πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῶν κριτῶν ἡδονὴν ποιοῦντιν οὖσαν φαύλην, ὥστε αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ θεαταὶ παιδεύουσιν —διέφθαρκεν δ' αὐτοῦτοῦ θεάτρουτὰς ἡδονάς· δέον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βελτίω τῶν αὑτῶν ἠθῶν ἀκούοντας βελτίω τὴν ἡδονὴν ἴσχειν, νῦν αὐτοῖς δρῶσιν πᾶν τοὐναντίον συμβαίνει. (659b2–c5)

> It is not right for the judge to be the audience's pupil, but rather its teacher, and to oppose the viewers when they show inappropriately or improperly aroused pleasure. He used to be able to do this under ancient Greek law, but the modern custom in Sicily and Italy, by entrusting

[4] *Mousikē* is a gift from the gods to console us for our hard lives (653d); the chorus is so called for the χάρις it yields (654a5). The best performer is generally considered the one who can provide the most enjoyment. Cf. Schoen-Nazzaro (1978) 264–5; Anderson (1966) 69.

[5] The κριτής selected to judge the pleasure of musical competitions is conflated with the lawmaker himself, who is the ultimate judge of the value of any performance. Cf. *Laws* 801d, 802b–d.

judgment to the majority of viewers and determining the winner by a show of hands, has corrupted the poets themselves (for they compose trivial pieces to please the judges, with the result that the audience becomes their teacher) and has also corrupted the pleasures of the spectators. For they should always enjoy a superior pleasure by hearing about characters superior to their own—exactly the opposite of what happens now.

Under the guidance of this 'best' censor (βελτίστους, 658e9), the audience will experience a 'better pleasure' (βελτίω τὴν ἡδονήν, 659c4). His honesty and virtue (not to mention his discriminating taste) guarantee that the enjoyment of the performance will now be proper and fitting (659b4), that it will improve the audience, not 'corrupt' it (διέφθαρκε, 659b8, c2). This censorship moralizes pleasure and also imposes elite tastes upon it, curbing the more plebeian desires of the uneducated mob (659a4–5). Dancing, as Plato says repeatedly, is a natural act, a spontaneous expression of joie-de-vivre; but in order to be socially useful, it must be subject to νόμοι, laws and modes. In the ideal state, *mousikē* is natural pleasure tamed by νόμος.[6]

In that form, it becomes a vital tool of education. Education is here conceived conservatively as a project of social reproduction: the point is to make the young like the old, to make them share the same pleasures and displeasures (659d1–e1). This educational mimesis is produced through performative mimesis. It is not enough, then, for a performance to be pleasurable (ἡδύ); it must also be ὀρθόν and ἀληθές, accurate and true (667e10–68b7).[7] A good performance is the good imitation of the actions and characters of good men; the best performance is not that which gives the most pleasure, but 'that which resembles the imitation of the good' (ἐκείνην τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ

[6] Cf. *Laws* 802e4–6: πᾶσα δ' ἄτακτός γε τάξιν λαβοῦσα περὶ μοῦσαν διατριβὴ καὶ μὴ παρατυθεμένης τῆς γλυκείας μούσης ἀμείνων μυρίῳ.

[7] Poets should be persuaded or compelled to portray only men who are temperate, courageous and virtuous in every way (660a3–8); they should also depict the happiness of the just and unhappiness of the unjust (660e2–61a4, 662b4–c5). Thus the ἀλήθεια of performance is apparently an instrumental, not an absolute truth, for even if it were not actually the case that the just alone are happy, the lawmaker should institute this 'useful lie' in order to persuade people to be just (663d6–e1). The gap between truth and persuasion (663e3–4) is bridged by the lawmaker, who regulates persuasion (including *mousikē*) in the name of a higher truth.

μιμήματι, 668b1–2).[8] Plato imagines a total congruity between the ethos of the performer, the nature of what he imitates and the performance itself: *mousikē* is mimetic, he says, but ideally the original and the mimesis—goodness and the performance of goodness—are identical. Virtue and its mimetic staging are collapsed to squeeze out pleasure and leave only correctness and truth, ὀρθότης and ἀλήθεια.

But pleasure is not so easily done away with. It re-insinuates itself in the space between τὸ καλόν and the mimesis of τὸ καλόν, for there is always a danger that the performer will know what is good but not take pleasure in it, or else take pleasure in it but not be able to perform it skilfully (654c4–d2) and the corresponding risk that the audience will prefer a good performance to a performance of the good (654b11–c1). *Mousikē's* pleasure threatens to disrupt both philosophical mimesis (the performance of the good) and social *paideusis* (the child's imitation of its virtuous elders). This threat is articulated by Plato as a social miscegenation: poets make men sing in the modes proper to women or fit the dance-steps of free men to the rhythms of slaves (669c2–d2). This social cacophony is condemned as 'full of vulgarity' (ἀγροικίας μεστὸν, 669e5–6).

Ideally for Plato *mousikē* is a mimesis of the good that makes its audience embrace the good. It reinforces both moral values (showing the invariably happy lives of the virtuous) and social hierarchy (as the tastes of the well-bred critic educate those of the audience). Music's νόμοι are a model for the νόμοι of the state as a whole: they represent pleasure brought under control and made useful. At the same time, though, *mousikē* has the potential to disturb mimesis and, through the pleasure it affords, undo all of the lawmaker's hard work. Despite the νόμοι imposed upon it, *mousikē*

[8] The relationship between the good and the mimesis of the good is collapsed further at 817a–d: if tragedy is a mimesis of the best and noblest life, then all citizens are tragedians. That drama (or any performance) is a double mimesis, in which the performer who himself imitates the good then represents that imitation for an audience, is implied also at 668b1–2 in the tension between similarity (ὁμοιότητα) and imitation (μιμήματι). Lucian takes the blurring of mimesis and reality inherent in performance to a new extreme in the story of a man who, performing the role of Ajax, not only went mad himself, but infected the entire audience with madness; when he came to his senses, he was so distressed that he really did go mad (*De Salt.* 83–4).

can lead pleasure astray and 'corrupt' its audience. It can open a disastrous schism between knowing the good, performing the good, and enjoying the good.

These are the philosophical issues that inform Xenophon's *Symposium*. This text, we are told in the first line, is a representation of the actions of good and noble men (τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα, 1.1); thus as a text it enacts the same sort of performance that Plato requires of *mousikē*: it is an 'imitation of the good' (τοῦ καλοῦ μίμησις).[9] The nature of the 'good' it imitates is left open—Sokrates is certainly a different sort of καλοκἀγαθος from his wealthy host Kallias or the blue-blood Nikaratos; but in bringing these various characters together, Xenophon forges a καλοκἀγαθία not so different from that in Plato's ideal city: an elite of virtue, education, and wisdom.[10] Will the dances performed at this party consolidate that elite and represent its values to the next generation, personified in the youth Autolykos? Will the dances contribute to this boy's social and moral *paideia*, or will their pleasure lure him away—as Plato fears—from the discreet charm of the symposium and its 'imitation of the good'?

This is an important question in Xenophon since so much of the text is devoted to regulating pleasure, albeit in a more subtle manner than Plato's censor. A telling example comes early in the narrative. Sokrates praises their host Kallias for providing such a perfect meal, and such pleasant things to see and hear. Kallias answers self-deprecatingly: why don't we bring in perfume so that we can also enjoy sweet smells (2.3)? This sensory utopia is evoked only to be rejected: Sokrates immediately launches into an attack on perfume (2.3–4). What is his complaint against the innocuous unguent? It reads surprisingly like Plato's attack on musical miscegenation. Men should smell like men and women like women, Sokrates says. Women are sweet-smelling already,

[9] 'Learn good things from good men': Sokrates' citation from Theognis at 2.4 encapsulates the ruling principle of the party and of the text. Sokrates offers this principle as the only way of acquiring καλοκἀγαθία; likewise the reader will obtain καλοκἀγαθία from watching the drama of these καλοικἀγαθοί. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.18–21.

[10] On Xenophon's ideal of καλοκἀγαθία, see L. Strauss (1972) 158; Pangle (1994); Johnstone (1994); Huss (1999) 395–6.

and men should smell only of sweat and olive oil. Perfume, he continues, makes a slave and a free man smell the same, when the smells of a free man require liberal labours and habits cultivated over time. Men who are too old for the gym should smell of καλοκἀγαθία.

This odd excursus imposes νόμοι on smell in the same way that Plato's *Laws* impose them on *mousikē*. Smell is moralized (there are fitting and unfitting smells, the smell of good men and bad) and also mapped onto a social hierarchy, in which men and women, slaves and free men smell different and are different. Sensory pleasure is thus modulated: it becomes a part of the symposium's elite sociality and philosophy of σωφροσύνη, and its sex-appeal is transformed into a lesson in καλοκἀγαθία, capped with a quote from Theognis, the supreme arbiter of social goodness.

Not only does philosophy circumscribe sensory pleasures, it also establishes its own alternate pleasures. After one of the musical interludes, Sokrates remarks that although the musicians are able to delight them, since they, the philosophers, consider themselves better by far than the dancers, it would be shameful if they did not try to benefit and cheer one another (ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οἰδ' ὅτι πολὺ βελτίονες οἰόμεθα εἶναι· οὐκ αἰσχρὸν οὖν εἰ μήδ' ἐπιχειρήσομεν συνόντες ὠφελεῖν τι ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἀλλήλους; 3.2). The beneficial good-cheer (εὐφροσύνη) of the philosophers is set against the delight (τέρψις) of the dancers, and clearly above it.[11] The philosophers think themselves the better men (βελτίονες, just as the censor in Plato's *Laws* was 'best', βέλτιστος). The Syracusan dance-master picks up this agonistic idiom later when he expresses jealousy because the symposiasts are entertaining one another and ignoring his show (6.6). The dialogue stages a competition between the pleasure of dance and the pleasure of philosophical discourse.[12]

If philosophy wins this competition—and we won't know until the end whether it does—it is in part by drawing dance within its

[11] Εὐφραίνειν and εὐφροσύνη are repeatedly used of the pleasure of the symposium itself (e.g. 1.15, 3.2, 8.12; cf. Murray (1983) 262–3) as well as of the pleasure of the dance performances (2.2, 7.2).

[12] Lucian questions whether dance is a distraction from or alternative to philosophy (*De Salt.* 2–4); he argues that dance's τέρψις also educates and improves its audience (6, 23, 71) and that dance, far from being inarticulate movement, is in fact more eloquent than speech (63–4), a true example of the union between body and soul for which philosophy aims (69–72).

purview. That is, it transforms the pleasures of dance into lessons in philosophy. The girl's hoop dance occasions a discussion on the nature of women and the teachability of virtue (2.9–10); a girl jumping in and out of a hoop studded with swords gives rise to the observation that even courage is teachable (2.11–14); the suppleness of the boy's dance provokes thoughts on beauty in motion and at rest (2.16). By drawing these entertainments into philosophical discussion, Sokrates turns them into a μίμησις τοῦ καλοῦ: not mere marvels staged for money (2.2), but performances of virtue, courage, and beauty—philosophy in motion.

When dancing becomes philosophy, Sokrates becomes an arbiter of dance. Annoyed at the symposiasts' inattention, the Syracusan asks Sokrates whether he is that 'thinker' (φροντιστὴς) everyone talks about (6.6). Sokrates answers that perhaps he is, but what he's contemplating just now is how the dancers might with the most ease for themselves produce the most pleasure for the audience (νῦν γοῦν σκοπῶ ὅπως ἂν ὁ μὲν παῖς ὅδε ὁ σὸς καὶ ἡ παῖς ἥδε ὡς ῥᾷστα διάγοιεν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἂν μάλιστα εὐφραινοίμεθα θεώμενοι αὐτούς, 7.2). He rejects various acts as inappropriate or unenjoyable, and charges the Syracusan to do a number depicting the Kharites, Horai, and Nymphs. Sokrates thus takes on the role of Plato's censor, mandating the performance of a pious and cultured χάρις, a dance that displays the same sort of chaste pleasure as his own philosophy.[13]

Not just an armchair critic, though, Sokrates puts his theory into practice, for—as he tells us—he himself dances (2.16–20).[14] The thought of this prompts laughter from the symposiasts, but Sokrates' apology situates dancing within a familiar philosophical discourse of personal *askēsis*.[15] Dancing makes you sleep better and have a better appetite; it provides a vigorous workout that leaves you well-proportioned and well-toned; it can be done alone in the comfort of one's own home; it is also excellent for slimming a potbelly (2.19). Dancing when Sokrates does it is decidedly unsexy: it

[13] See Gilhuly (1999) 108–10 on Sokrates' objections to the Syracusan's dances. Cf. Lonsdale (1993) 5 and MacLachlan (1993) 47–9 on the dance of the Kharites.

[14] Huss (1999) discusses this scene and collects ancient references and modern interpretations. His own conclusion is that the scene is a joke, part of the text's characteristic mix of σπουδή and παιδιά.

[15] See e.g. Foucault (1985) 95–139. Xenophon praises physical education also at *Mem.* 1.2.4, 3.5.15; *Oec.* 11.11–20.

improves the dancer, it is part of a balanced life. It does carry with it a certain pleasure (ἡδέως, 2.16; ἥδιον, 2.17), but its pleasure is that of knowing you are leading a rational physical as well as psychic existence. When the philosopher dances, he turns dance into somatic philosophy.

A dancing Sokrates seems to symbolize Plato's ideal, in which the ἀρετή of the performer's character and the performance of that character are identical. This congruence of ethos and performance raises the question of the teachability of dance. Is dance innate or learned?[16] 'I too would be very happy to learn the dance steps from you, Syracusan', says Sokrates (2.16), but it turns out that he needs no schooling: he dances already. Kharmides, who catches him in the act, is moved to imitate him but does not dance—for he has never learned how, he says—and instead only moves his hands (2.19). Kallias is convinced by Sokrates' encomium to dance, and volunteers to take lessons with him, failing to understand that Sokrates dances without lessons (2.20).[17] The question of dance's teachability mirrors the traditional Socratic question of the teachability of virtue and wisdom. Does one need to employ paid teachers—sophists—in order to obtain σοφία, as Kallias does (1.5, 4.62)? Or does wisdom come from within, and a philosophical life reflect a philosophical soul? Just as sophists trade wisdom for money (1.5), the Syracusan puts on his shows for money (2.2), but Sokrates is buying neither. His request for the Syracusan's instruction merely highlights the fact that he does not need it: dance, like philosophy, is a natural activity for him, derived from within, a performance of the excellence of his character.[18]

[16] This question recalls the contrast in Plato's *Laws* between the spontaneous dance of the child and the heavily legislated dances of the well-governed city. Surprisingly, in Xenophon's text the verb μανθάνειν refers more often to dance than to philosophy (2.16.6, 2.14.3, 2.20.5–6, 2.19.7).

[17] Part of the appeal of the Syracusan's final performance is that the boy and girl dance not like those who have been taught their steps, but as if they were merely doing what they had long desired (9.6). I return to this below.

[18] The passage also emphasizes the self-sufficiency of Sokrates' dance, which takes place neither in the gymnasium nor at the symposium, but in a sympotic space (a seven-couch room) transformed into a private and solitary setting (2.18). It requires no special equipment, no special preparation, and no other people and thus is ideal for αὐτουργούς τινας τῆς φιλοσοφίας (1.5) like Sokrates. Kallias misunderstands this when he turns Sokrates' private *askēsis* into a line-dance that they will perform together (2.20).

Sokrates thus transforms the Syracusan's dancing sophistry into dancing philosophy. Though risible, his dance is no mere parody of the dancers' performance, but an appropriation of that performance for the purposes of philosophical self-improvement. The serious purpose of this dance (ἐσπουδακότι τῷ προσώπῳ, 2.17) is underlined by contrast with Philippos' obscene mimicry.[19] Imitating the skilful movements of the boy and girl, the buffoon changes the audience's praise into ridicule and replaces the grace of the dancers with lewd and laughable gyrations.[20] Philippos' parody of the dancers is also a parody of Sokrates' solitary dance, but while both visions may be ludicrous, they offer very different interpretations of the meaning and value of *mousikē*: whereas Philippos' uncoordinated flailings suggest the basest pleasures dance can give, Sokrates draws dance—with all its pleasure and corporeality—into philosophy, and makes it both an element and a symbol of the healthful regimen of a philosophical life.[21]

At the same time as philosophy appropriates dance, it also stages its own spectacle to set against that of the dancers, the spectacle of philosophical *erōs*.[22] The text is framed by two erotic spectacles. It closes with the dirty dance to which we will return later, a quasi-pornographic staging of the marriage of Dionysos and Ariadne. It opens, though, with an image of Autolykos, the beautiful young boy whose pankratic victory at the Panathenaia is the occasion for the party.

Αὐτόλυκος μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸν πατέρα ἐκαθέζετο, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ εἰκός, κατεκλίθησαν· εὐθὺς μὲν οὖν ἐννοήσας τις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἡγήσατ' ἂν φύσει βασιλικόν τι κάλλος εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἂν μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης, καθάπερ Αὐτόλυκος τότε, κεκτῆταί τις αὐτό. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ ὅταν φέγγος τι ἐν νυκτὶ φανῇ, πάντων προσάγεται τὰ ὄμματα, οὕτω καὶ τότε τοῦ Αὐτολύκου τὸ κάλλος πάντων εἵλκε τὰς ὄψεις πρὸς αὐτόν· ἔπειτα τῶν ὁρώντων οὐδεὶς οὐκ ἔπασχέ τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπ' ἐκείνου. οἱ μέν γε σιωπηρότεροι ἐγίγνοντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐσχηματίζοντό πως. πάντες μὲν οὖν οἱ ἐκ θεῶν του κατεχόμενοι ἀξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· ἀλλ οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ γοργότεροί τε ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ φοβερώτερον φθέγγεσθαι καὶ σφοδρότεροι εἶναι φέρονται, οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ σώφρονος ἔρωτος ἔνθεοι τά τε ὄμματα φιλοφρονεστέρως ἔχουσι καὶ τὴν φωνὴν πραοτέραν ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰ σχήματα εἰς τὸ ἐλευθεριώτερον ἄγουσιν. ἃ δὴ καὶ Καλλίας τότε διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα πράττων ἀξιοθέατος ἦν τοῖς τετελεσμένοις τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ. (1.8–10)

Then Autolykos sat down next to his father, and the others reclined on their couches. Anyone watching what was going on would consider beauty something royal in nature, especially when someone possesses it along with shame and modesty as Autolykos did then. When a light appears in the night, it attracts every eye; so, too, did Autolykos' beauty draw all eyes to himself. No one looked at him without feeling affected in his heart by him. Some fell silent; others gesticulated. All those who are possessed by a god seem worth looking at; but while those possessed by other gods are said to be grim to look at, with fearsome voices and violent bearing, those inspired by modest love have a friendlier look in their eyes and their voices become more gentle, and they make their moves more nobly. That was how Kallias, too, was acting because of love, and he was a sight to see for the initiates of this god.

The royal beauty of Autolykos, sitting there modestly next to his father, attracts all eyes. All the viewers are affected: some are silent, some 'gesticulate' (ἐσχηματίζοντο). The spectacle of this lovable boy soon yields to an even more remarkable vision: that of his lover, Kallias, divinely inspired by a chaste love (σώφρονος ἔρωτος) that renders him gentler in his look and voice and more noble in his movements (τὰ σχήματα εἰς τὸ ἐλευθερώτερον ἄγουσιν).[23]

[19] Contra Huss (1999) 389 n. 23: 'the hilarious dance-parody of Philippos . . . gives a nonserious context to the whole topic ' dance' .'

[20] 'This passage contains hints of κιναιδεία, lewd debauchery. Κινεῖν (2.22.3), although a generic verb for motion, also often carries a sexual connotation (Henderson (1975) 35, 151–3); likewise κύπτειν (2.22.6) can evoke the bent-over position of the recipient of sodomy (Henderson (1975) 178–80). On the κίναιδος, see Winkler (1990*b*) 45–70; Davidson (1997) 167–82.

[21] Sokrates likewise appropriates dance for philosophy at 6.4–5 when he suggests that the company augment the sweetness of their speeches by setting them to music. The Syracusan forestalls that philosophical musical with his jealous interruption, but the philosophers do sing at 7.1. On Philippos as a foil to both Sokrates and the Syracusan, see Gilhuly (1999) 89–91 and on the parasite's role at the symposium, Fehr (1990); Fisher (2000).

[22] 'The text itself is a show (δηλώσαι, 1.1) that stages the spectacle (ἐπίδειξις) not only of the dance (2.2, 2.13, 6.6, 7.3), but also of Kallias' σοφία (1.6, 3.3). In this latter drama, Sokrates is a central adornment (κεκοσμημένος, 1.4). Gray (1992) emphasizes the text as a performance of wisdom, including Xenophon's own.

[23] 'Ελεύθερος refers to a free man as opposed to a slave, but it also often connotes the 'liberality' of the social stratum that is truly free, the καλοκἀγαθοί. Thus when Plato raises against *mousikē* (*Laws* 669c2–d2) or Sokrates against perfume (*Symp.* 2.4) the charge that it makes ἐλεύθεροι (free men) indistinguishable from δοῦλοι (slaves), the condemnation simultaneously suggests a more nuanced social miscegenation: the confusion of the noble with the vulgar, the καλοκἀγαθοί with οἱ πολλοί.

The party thus begins, as it ends, with a spectacle of love. The theatrical nature of this vision is suggested by two surprising uses of σχήματα (figures, dance moves), a word common in theoretical treatises on theatre and dance.[24] This preliminary show is a dance before the dance, a philosophical pas-de-deux. But while the final dance is heterosexual and arouses physical passion, the opening spectacle shows a sublime philosophical desire: Autolykos' royal beauty, Kallias' gentle love; the courtship of a noble ἐραστής and his blushing ἐρώμενος. Their σώφρων ἔρως renders both alike 'worth looking at' (ἀξιοθέατοι, 1.10), and the overtones of mystery religion further elevate the spectacle, as if watching this genteel courtship will initiate the entire audience (both symposiasts and readers) into the mysteries of philosophical desire.[25] The pleasure of watching philosophers in love—which is, in a sense, the pleasure of this text—reinforces the symposium's 'imitation of the good', in both the social and moral sense. In this performance of a chaste and noble love, even Plato's censor could find nothing vulgar.[26]

This opening scene is the overture for a more elaborate staging of philosophical *erōs*. In his speech on love, Sokrates distinguishes between common, pandemic Aphrodite and sublime, ouranian Aphrodite, a distinction familiar from Diotima's speech in Plato's *Symposium*. Ouranian Aphrodite is not soft and luxuriant but full of force and manliness and moderation (8.8); it is free (μορφῇ τε ἐλευθερίᾳ), chaste and noble (ἤθει αἰδήμονί τε καὶ γενναίῳ, 8.16), and improves both lover and beloved. Above all, it is spiritual, the love not of the body but of the soul, and of friendship and noble acts (8.10). While the physical love of pandemic Aphrodite is

[24] See e.g. Xen. *Symp.* 7.5; Ar. *Pax*. 324; Plato *Leg*. 655a; Lucian *De Salt*. 10.17, 17.6, 18.5, 19.6, 27.1, 29.4; Arist. *Pol*. 1447ª19, 27, 1449ª6, b3; Aristoxenus *El. Harm*. 92.8 *et passim*, *El. Rhyth*. 3.5, 17.12–18, 18.1–5 *et passim*; Aristides Quint. *De Mus*. 1.8.37–9 *et passim*.

[25] A bright light appearing out of the darkness (1.9) is a common feature of initiatory narratives; the ritual silence (1.9, 11) prepares us for the reference to the initiates of *erōs* (1.11.1). Later Sokrates claims that 'we are all revellers in the rites of this god (*Erōs*)' (8.2). The initiatory language is picked up at the end in the Dionysiac drama staged by the Syracusan.

[26] B. Strauss, however, calls the scene 'syrupy' (1993) 76. Gilhuly (1999) 77–82 emphasizes the static nature of this tableau; not only is 'Autolykos' role as the object of his admirers' desire . . . reified by the dynamics of the gaze' (77), but also 'each onlooker is suspended in an atmosphere of aesthetic admiration and himself becomes an object to behold, . . . subsumed by the spectacle of paederastic desire' (78). Goldhill (1998) discusses the erotics of the gaze in Xenophon.

debased and short-lived and brings shame on both partners, the spiritual love of ouranian Aphrodite is pure and noble, binding the lover and the beloved in mutual and beneficial φιλία throughout their lives (8.15–18). The example Sokrates gives of this superior love is the pederastic relationship, for while women share in the joys of sex, he says, boys do not and only respond to a more spiritual devotion (8.21).[27] The love of Kallias and Autolykos schematizes this *erōs*: Sokrates has choreographed the σχήματα that he teaches them to follow. Watching this figuration of desire is watching a philosophical performance, a performance that imitates the good in showing good men in love.

In Sokrates' schema, sexuality is excised and ἀφροδίσια is redefined not as *erōs*, but as φιλία, fondness or friendship: the perfect lovers are ἐρῶντες τῆς φιλίας, lovers of friendship (8.18).[28] This ideal love is a pederasty so attenuated and intellectualized that it becomes hard to distinguish from a father's love for his son. Sokrates adduces mythology to prove the superiority of spiritual to physical *erōs* (8.29): those whom Zeus loved physically remained human after the affair was over; those he loved spiritually he made immortal. The former are unnamed women; the latter include Herakles and the Dioskouroi and (by some very special pleading) Ganymede. But Herakles and the Dioskouroi were made immortal not because they were Zeus' lovers, of course, but because they were his sons. In his tendentious use of mythology, Sokrates articulates pederasty to the model of paternity.[29]

This strange construction must be read in the context of the charge against Sokrates of corrupting the youth, a charge foregrounded by the presence of Lykon, the father of Autolykos and one of Sokrates' historical accusers.[30] In this treatise's contest of values (as each guest names his greatest source of pride), the bond

[27] It is unclear whether Xenophon advocates total abstinence or merely sexual self-control; cf. Xen. *Mem*. 1.3.8–15 and Hindley (1999) 79–99.

[28] For this phrase, cf. Archil. fr. 191W, on which Müller (1980) 90–1.

[29] Note, though, that this connection was already operative from the beginning: Autolykos attracts the desiring gaze of the symposiasts in part because of his demure position next to his father (1.8). Likewise at 3.12, the company looks toward him with pleasure when he blushingly states that he takes most pride not in his pankratic victory but in his father. Autolykos' close bond to his father only increases his sex appeal: when Sokrates links pederasty and paternity, then, he is preaching to the converted. Cf. L. Strauss (1972) 146.

[30] See Brickhouse and Smith (1989) 29; Huss (1999) 399 n. 55 on the identity of Lykon as Sokrates' accuser.

between father and son is an incontestable good, worth more than all the wealth of the King of Persia (3.12–13): it alone requires no justification.[31] It was this bond that Socratic teaching was thought to 'corrupt'.[32] The charge against Sokrates is here put in the mouth not of Lykon but of the Syracusan dance teacher: he is worried that his son will be corrupted by someone wanting to sleep with him (4.25). And, indeed, the Syracusan has some reason to fear, for Sokrates has already confessed to rubbing naked shoulders with boys in the library (4.27). He has also proclaimed that the skill he most prides himself on is his pimping (3.10, 4.56–62).

But Sokrates' pimping, it turns out, is not stealing boys from their fathers and selling them into prostitution, nor even matchmaking between students and teachers (as in Plato's *Theaetetus*[33]) but instead urging boys toward public office. In fact, far from corrupting the youth, Sokrates' *erōs* improves sons for their fathers and binds καλοικἀγαθοί to one another and to the *polis*. While pandemic Aphrodite corrupts boys (8.21), Sokrates' ouranian *erōs* embraces the paternal bond: it does nothing in secret from the father, and includes the father in the lovers' unions (8.11). His is also a civic-minded *erōs*.[34] Sokrates declares himself co-lover (συνεραστής) with the *polis* of those who are good in nature and

[31] L. Strauss (1972) 163; Gilhuly (1999) 102. Thus it is included in the round where each guest names the quality he prides himself upon (3.12–13), but not in the round in which each justifies his claim. The place Autolykos and Lykon should have occupied in that second round is instead taken by the Syracusan's concern for his son (4.52–4).

[32] On this accusation against Sokrates, see Brickhouse and Smith (1989) 36–7, 194–201; Morrison (1994). B. Strauss (1989) 199–209 considers the trial in light of the paternal bond. He argues that the charge of corrupting the youth stemmed from the challenge Socratic teaching posed to the authority of the father (see e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.49; Ar. *Nub.*). That social corruption is often represented as sexual corruption; both Plato's and Xenophon's *Symposia* defend Sokrates against the latter charge in order to acquit him of the former.

[33] In *Theaetetus*, Sokrates distinguishes between matchmakers (προμνήστριαι) and procurers (προαγωγοί). Sokrates compares his own 'matchmaking' to the former, which aims at lawful unions and true children (Plato *Tht.* 149d–151b). Xenophon uses the term προαγωγεία (4.62, 64), which in Plato refers to the 'unlawful and unskilled union of man and woman' (Plato *Tht.* 150a1–2), as well as the even more prejudicial word μαστροπεία (4.56, 57, 59, 60; 8.5, 8.42). Sokrates confesses to procuring young men for the *polis* (4.60, 8.42–3), but not to procuring teachers for students; instead it is Antisthenes, he claims, who introduces men in need of wisdom to those in need of money (4.62). See Morrison (1994) 198–9.

[34] Higgins (1977) 18. Gilhuly (1999) 57–122 examines the ways in which Xenophon aligns Sokrates with the interests and ideology of the *polis*. Cf. L. Strauss (1972); Pangle (1994); O'Connor (1994) 171–7; Goldhill (1998); Huss (1999) 401–2.

desire ἀρετή (8.41). He procures boys not for himself but for the city, encouraging Kallias to go into public life so that Autolykos will love him all the more (8.40–2). His love makes boys worthy of their beloveds, their fathers, and their *polis*. No wonder, then, that his speech on love is capped by a wholehearted endorsement from Lykon: 'By Hera, Sokrates, you seem to me to be a good and noble being' (Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλός γε κἀγαθὸς δοκεῖς μοι ἄνθρωπος εἶναι, 9.1). The text saves Sokrates from the charge against him, and forces his accuser to praise him.

In associating pederasty and paternity, Sokrates draws pleasure within philosophy and puts it to the service of an elite *paideia*. Sokrates' education does not corrupt boys' minds or bodies. Its pimping does not turn them into whores, but instead makes them καλοικἀγαθοί. Pederasty, linked on a sliding scale of desire to both pedagogy and paternity, itself becomes a mimesis of the good: the lover is virtuous, his beloved loves him for that virtue and imitates it himself. Ouranian love leaves no room for bad pleasures or bad performances, but instead reiterates in an erotic idiom the ideal mimetic schema Plato imagines for *mousikē*. Sokrates orchestrates a dance between youths in which elite *paideusis* is set to the rhythm of pederastic desire. True love, true philosophy, and true *paideia* are all collapsed in a true performance of the words, deeds and loves of good men.

Sokrates elaborates this ideal *erōs* against the backdrop of a more debased desire, represented by his rival and double, the Syracusan. Like Sokrates, the Syracusan is a philosopher: it is he, after all, who stages those performances of virtue and courage that Sokrates takes as the starting point for philosophical discussion. Like Sokrates, the Syracusan is a teacher, and one from whom even Sokrates might learn (2.16). Like Sokrates, the Syracusan is a purveyor of a spectacular *erōs*. And while Sokrates sets himself up as an arbiter of dance, the Syracusan fancies himself a critic of philosophy: when he sees the philosophers entertaining themselves rather than paying attention to his performances, he abuses Sokrates with all the familiar charges: studying things in the air, measuring fleas' feet, and so on (6.6–10). It is also he who brings up the charge of corruption of the youth.

But while the Syracusan gives voice to the historical accusations against Sokrates, within the text it is the Syracusan himself who is guilty of these crimes. Sokrates claims to pride himself on his

pimping, but it is the Syracusan who is the real pimp: he displays his children for money (2.1). His dancers are probably to be imagined as prostitutes—a fact that casts a rather different light on his fear that someone will corrupt his son.[35] Sokrates turns that charge back against the Syracusan, perversely suggesting that he himself corrupts him by sleeping with him: 'What is so special about your skin that you alone don't corrupt him by sleeping with him?' (4.54). It is the Syracusan's touch not Sokrates' that corrupts boys: even his own son is not safe.[36] Ouranian love unites father, son, and lover in a noble συνουσία (8.11). The word συνουσία is ambiguous—it is used both for the sympotic gathering of like-minded men and for the intimacy of lovers—but surely we are to suspect nothing untoward. With the Syracusan, however, the collapsing of paternity and pederasty turns the father's touch into an impure caress, and instead of paternity redeeming pederasty, pederasty taints paternity with a nasty hint of incest.

The Syracusan thus plays pandemic Aphrodite to Sokrates' ouranian. The distinction between the two is not as firm as we might hope, though. The Syracusan, a proud father and Sokrates' accuser, is also a double for Lykon, and his prostituted *erōs* casts doubts upon the paternity and pederasty that are offered as the quintessence of Socratic *paideia*. Xenophon's Autolykos is a paragon of chastity: in his modesty and shy beauty he is the ideal beloved. But when we meet Autolykos outside this text, he is not so chaste. In Eupolis' *Autolykos*, performed within a year of the supposed date of this party, Autolykos is nicknamed Eutresios, 'Well-penetrated' (Eupolis fr. 64 K.–A.). His lover—in Xenophon's account 'worth watching' for his gentle features and noble bearing—is likewise ridiculed in Eupolis' *Kolakes* as a profligate who squandered his huge inheritance 'in licentiousness'.[37] 'The affair of Kallias and Autolykos', as Bernhard Huss says, 'obviously

[35] On dancers as prostitutes see Starr (1978) 408–10; Davidson (1997) 91–7; Gilhuly (1999) 58–61. The association is ubiquitous in comedy; for example, at Ar. *Ran.* 513 ff., it is assumed that dancing girls (who are young and depilated) are available for sex.

[36] I assume that the παῖς is the Syracusan's son (since he sleeps next to him and his relationship to him is structurally parallel to that between Autolykos and Lykon), but the diction is ambiguous and it is possible that he is a slave in his employ.

[37] Ar. *Av.* 283–6 and schol., *Ran.* 429, *Eec.* 810 and schol.; Eupolis fr. 156–190 K.–A. See also Dover (1978) 146–7; Davidson (1997) 162–3.

was wild and known all over Athens.'[38] And if the lover and beloved are not so heavenly as Xenophon suggests, what about the father under whose watchful eye the courtship progresses? It seems that Lykon was significantly less wealthy than Kallias, and the abuse of Lykon and his family in comedy may indicate, as N. R. E. Fisher proposes, a perception that Kallias was to thank for the improvement in their affairs, and thus may imply that Lykon was seen as one of the parasites and flatterers who notoriously thronged Kallias.[39] Is the beautiful Autolykos the price of his admission to this party? Kallias pays cash for wisdom (1.5), for entertainment (2.2), even for justice (3.4–5, 4.1–4). What unspoken economics underlie his love-affair with Autolykos? Does the father pander the son to this wealthy patron, and if so, how is he different from that other proud father, the Syracusan?

Of course, Xenophon's text discourages such questions. There is no hint of scandal at this party and everything is all very proper. The Syracusan aids in this clean-up job; the charges of this déclassé foreigner are easily dismissed by the καλοικἀγαθοί with the implication that such dirty-mindedness is not the part of a gentleman. The sort of insinuations the comic poets make against Lykon and Kallias, Xenophon lays against the Syracusan, and thus his prostituted *erōs* helps to preserve the ouranian purity of Socratic pedagogy. But at the same time as the Syracusan protects the symposiasts from prurient slanders against their erotic σωφροσύνη, he also raises the possibility of a less generous reading of their love-affairs. He figures a site of the pandemic within this sublime soiree; his presence reintroduces base desires where they have explicitly been banned. The parallels between the Syracusan and Lykon suggest that it may be harder than Sokrates claims to segregate the chaste from the prostituted, the ouranian from the pandemic. But for the elaborate apparatus of apologetics—both Sokrates' and Xenophon's—is their dance as dirty as his?

[38] (1999) 400; cf. Higgins (1977) 17.

[39] Fisher (1998) 99; cf. Fisher (2000). Maximus of Tyre (test. iv ad Eup. *Kolakes* K.–A.) comments that Kallias was often surrounded by flatterers (κολακευόμενον) at symposia where there were all sorts of lowly pleasures (see Eupolis fr. 174 K.–A. for what these included). Lykon was ridiculed in comedy for his μαλακία (schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 1169), his promiscuous wife Rhodia (Eupolis fr. 58, 295, 232 K.–A.), and his poverty (Cratinus fr. 214 K.–A.). We hear a hint of Lykon's impecunity at 3.13, when he responds with surprise when Kallias asks him if he realizes he is the most wealthy of men: 'By Zeus, I do not know that!' he replies, before it becomes clear that the wealth Kallias means is his son.

With these questions unresolved we come to the last dance of the evening. Sokrates has sent the Syracusan off to work up a piece on the Kharites, Horai, and Nymphs; while he is gone, Sokrates delivers his speech in praise of ouranian Aphrodite, elaborating his ideal of a chaste and spiritual *erōs*. After he is done and has been proclaimed καλοκἀγαθός by Lykon, the Syracusan returns to display his final dance. The Syracusan and Sokrates, as we have seen, have been rivals throughout, competing in both entertainment and philosophy. The final scene brings their competition to a head: here the Syracusan not only presents a spectacle to answer that of Kallias and Autolykos, but also choreographs his own philosophy of *erōs* to set against Sokrates'.[40]

The Syracusan's philosophy is one of sex not friendship, bodies not souls. The spectacle—and the audience's excited response—are frankly carnal. The dance depicts the marriage of Dionysos and Ariadne. She waits for him anxiously; he comes to her; they kiss and embrace; they head off for bed.

ἐπεί γε μὴν κατεῖδεν αὐτὴν ὁ Διόνυσος, ἐπιχορεύσας ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις φιλικώτατα ἐκαθέζετο ἐπὶ τῶν γονάτων, καὶ περιλαβὼν ἐφίλησεν αὐτήν. ἡ δ' αἰδουμένῃμὲν ἐῴκει, ὅμως δὲ φιλικῶς ἀντιπεριελάμβανεν. οἱ δὲ συμπόται ὁρῶντες ἅμα μὲν ἐκρότουν, ἅμα δὲ ἐβόων αὖθις. ὡς δὲ ὁ Διόνυσος ἀνιστάμενος συνανέστησε μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν Ἀριάδνην, ἐκ τούτου δὴ φιλούντων τε καὶ ἀσπαζομένων ἀλλήλους σχήματα παρῆν θεάσασθαι. (9.3–5)

When Dionysos saw Ariadne, he danced over to her and sat on her lap as one would most affectionately, and he took her in his arms and kissed her. She seemed like a modest maiden, but nonetheless hugged him back dearly. The symposiasts clapped and cheered when they saw this. Then Dionysos stood up and raised Ariadne with him, and then you could watch them act at kissing and fondling one another.

The symposiasts watch this sexy scene aroused—literally 'aflutter' (πάντες ἀνεπτερωμένοι ἐθεῶντο, 9.6). The euphemism is transparent.[41] This dance presents a return of the somatic:

[40] Cf. Wiles (forthcoming): 'Le *Banquet* de Xénophon est structuré comme une compétition: d'un coté Socrates et la philosophie, d'autre le Syracusain et ses artistes; d'un coté l'amour pûr et homosexuel, de l'autre l'amour charnel, inférieur, hétérosexuel de préférence; de l'un coté la parole, de l'autre le théâtre.'

[41] 'The erect phallos is a winged phallos' (Arrowsmith (1973) 136, cf. 164–7; Henderson (1975) 128–9). This ending is all the more remarkable in light of the sympotic trope identified by Stehle ((1997) 249–54) of arousal without satisfaction.

banished from sympotic *erōs*, the somatic and the sexy return together in the form of that quintessentially somatic and sexy activity, dancing. The φιλία that Sokrates praised is echoed in this final scene in the repetition of the φιλ- root, but here φιλία is intermingled with φιλήματα, friendship with kisses.[42] Can you really separate φιλήματα from φιλία? Can you really take the sex out of *erōs*? This dance and the vehement physical reaction it produces suggest not.

The scene is not only sexual, but also heterosexual. Sokrates had implicitly condemned heterosexuality in the course of condemning pandemic *erōs*: it was associated with a scorned physicality (8.21).[43] When that physicality returns, it does so in the guise of heterosexual passion among both performers and—mimetically—spectators. When the symposiasts saw Dionysos and Ariadne embrace and go off to bed, 'the bachelors vowed to marry, and the married men jumped on their horses and galloped off to find their wives' (οἱ μὲν ἄγαμοι γαμεῖν ἐπώμνυσαν, οἱ δὲ γεγαμηκότες ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἀπήλαυνον πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν γυναῖκας, ὅπως τούτων τύχοιεν, 9.7). We might have expected shared arousal to consolidate the group of male symposiasts; instead it dissolves the group.[44] 'The discussion and the party are hastily adjourned as each man goes in search of satisfaction: 'this', Xenophon concludes, 'was the dissolution of the symposium' (αὕτη τοῦ τότε συμποσίου κατάλυσις ἐγένετο, 9.7).[45] Sokrates' spectacle of pederastic

[42] Kisses: 9.4.3, 9.5.2, 9.5.5; fondness: 9.4.2, 9.4.4, 9.6.2, 9.6.5. Cf. 4.26: 'Perhaps kissing holds more honour because of all sexual acts only this physical caress shares the same name with spiritual affection.' At *Mem.* 1.3.10–13, Sokrates expounds upon the dangers of a single kiss: it makes a free man into a slave, and consumes his time and money in harmful pleasures unfit even for a madman; it is like the tiny but fatal bite of a spider. Cf. *Symp.* 4.25–7.

[43] 'For a boy does not share with the man in pleasure during sex as a woman does, but like a sober man he watches one who is drunk with desire' (8.22). The text's first discussion of sensual (although not sexual) pleasure, the discussion of perfume at 2.3–4, figures that pleasure as heterosexual: brides have a natural perfume (2.3), while the manly scent of the gymnasium is 'sweeter to women than perfume when it is present, and more longed-for when it is absent' (2.4). Flacelière (1961) discusses heterosexual *erōs* in the *Symposium*.

[44] 'The symposium was the site *par excellence* of male homosocial bonding in Athens. Sedgwick (1985) has shown the role of heterosexual desire in mediating homosocial bonds. On this dynamic in the classical context, see e.g. Keuls (1985) 160–9; Stehle (1997) 213–61; Davidson (1997) 91–7.

[45] Κατάλυσις is a strong word, used for the disbanding of armies (Xen. *Cyr.* 6.1.13; Dem. 50.11) and overthrow of governments (Thuc. 1.18; And. 1.36; Lys. 13.20; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.47).

erōs bound καλοικἀγαθοί to one another in an educative and enjoyable συνουσία. All the men were held in thrall by the spectacle of Autolykos' beauty and Kallias' love for him; this vision united them as initiates into a common mystery (1.10). The dancers' final performance disrupts this communion. While it, too, evokes mystery religion (specifically fertility ritual), it does not unite its initiates, but scatters them.[46] In the place of the homosocial reproduction so carefully constructed and defended in the dialogue—lover teaching beloved, father teaching son—the final dance substitutes a more literal reproduction, as each καλοκἀγαθός goes off to perform his own fertility ritual. The ouranian *erōs* of pederastic *paideia* reaches its climax in the pandemic but productive sex of man and wife.

What are we to make of this hasty dispersal? On one level, the final dance seems perfectly in line with the text's apologetic project. Not only does Sokrates not corrupt young men, he turns them into law-abiding citizens. These excited revellers do not rush off to prostitutes; they do not form a drunken κῶμος and run wild through the streets of Athens; instead, they turn to the marriage-bed and its proper and legitimate pleasures.[47] If the goal of both the symposium and the text is the reproduction of the good, the end seems to offer the most literal fulfilment of that goal, the physical reproduction of the καλοί. At the same time, Socratic *erōs* would seem to be reconciled with the erotics of the *polis*, as the ideal of spiritual pederasty is shown to be compatible with the institutions of household and marriage. Xenophon plays it both ways. On the one hand, Socratic *erōs* does not preclude the 'normal' sexuality of the *polis*, but complements and supports it. On the other hand, Sokrates' ouranian *erōs* is kept pure to the end: while the others head off to their wives, Sokrates and his followers—including Autolykos and Kallias—take a leisurely stroll. He himself is unruffled by the dance (his sexual self-control was legendary), but more importantly, his advice to the young lovers seems to have stuck: in the face of the dance's arousal, their *erōs* remains σώφρων.

[46] This union evokes the 'marriage' of Dionysos to the wife of the Arkhon Basileus during the festival of the Anthesteria. See Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 3.5; [Dem] 59.73, 75.

[47] So Davidson (1997) 96: 'Xenophon tries to tame the naughty symposium, bringing it safely within the libidinal confines of the family.' No doubt many symposia did end 'naughtily': see, for example, the drunken rampage of Philokleon at the end of Aristophanes' *Wasps*; Murray (1983) 268–70; Fisher (1992) 16–17, 96–102, 203–7. The mutilation of the Herms was attributed by some to drunken symposiasts (Thuc. 6.28.1; Plut. *Alc.* 18.8, 19.1; And. 1.61; Murray (1990*b*)). Hubbard (1998) argues that the 'average Athenian' was in general suspicious of elite pederasty; but contrast Fisher (2000), who argues that the pleasures associated with the symposium were enjoyed, at least in some form, by the non-elite citizen.

We might read the final dance, then, in the same way that we did the scene of Sokrates' own dance, as mustering the pleasures of *mousikē* in defence of Socratic philosophy.[48] And yet this pornographic drama is hardly what Sokrates requested when he proposed a dance of the Kharites and Nymphs, and the carnal urges it arouses are far from the chaste and spiritual friendship he advocates. Given the competition between the Syracusan and Sokrates throughout the treatise, it is tempting to read this performance as the dance-master's answer to the philosopher's ἐρωτικὸς λόγος, and its carnality as a direct challenge to Sokrates' spiritual love. In this scene's arousal, does philosophy subsume dance or dance derail philosophy?

This final dance is not mere entertainment or titillation: it itself offers a theory of *mousikē* and a philosophy of desire. Returning to the philosophical issues of Plato's *Laws*, this sexy show develops its own theory of the relation between performance, mimesis, pleasure, and the good. What really turns the men on about this dance is that the performers seem not to be acting: it seems like they really are in love. At first Xenophon emphasizes the dance as a performance: Dionysos' appearance provokes applause for the dance master (9.3); Ariadne acted so that all could see her emotion, even though she said nothing (9.3); she seemed like a modest maiden (9.4); the symposiasts watched and cheered (9.4). We are reminded that this is a mimesis contrived by the Syracusan ὀρχηστοδιδάσκαλος. But as the scene progresses, the drama becomes less imitative and more 'real'.

> οἱ δ' ὁρῶντες ὄντως καλὸν μὲν τὸν Διόνυσον, ὡραίαν δὲ τὴν Ἀριάδνην, οὐ σκώπτοντας δὲ ἀλλ' ἀληθινῶς τοῖς στόμασι φιλοῦντας, πάντες ἀνεπτερωμένοι ἐθεῶντο. καὶ γὰρ ἥκουον τοῦ Διονύσου μὲν ἐπερωτῶντος αὐτὴν εἰ φιλεῖ αὐτόν, τῆς δὲ οὕτως ἐπομνυούσης <ὥστε> μὴ μόνον τὸν Διόνυσον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἅπαντας συνομόσαι ἂν ἢ μὴν τὸν παῖδα καὶ τὴν παῖδα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φιλεῖσθαι. ἐφκεσαν γὰρ οὐ δεδιδαγμένοις τὰ σχήματα ἀλλ' ἐφειμένοις πράττειν ἃ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν. (9.5–6)

[48] Gilhuly (1999) 110–22 sees in the mutual affection of the boy and girl the enactment of the reciprocal χάρις of Socratic eros. Bartlett (1996) 185 reads the final scene similarly. Contra Higgins (1977).

But when the spectators saw that Dionysos really was handsome and Ariadne young, and that they weren't joking but truly kissing on the mouth, they all watched, aroused. They heard Dionysos ask her if she was fond of him and she swore that she was, and swore in such a way that not only Dionysos but everyone present would testify that the boy and girl were dear to one another. For they were not like people who have been taught a role but like those allowed to do what they have long desired.

This is not the mimesis of love, but the real thing: true kisses, authentic passion, genuine desire. The dance is no mere act, but a performance of the truth, and it is precisely the truth of the performance that is arousing.

Furthermore, truth in this staging is on the side of desire not *paideia*: they were not like people who had been taught their steps, but like people doing what they had long desired. Like Sokrates, these dancers need no prompting, no instructor to teach them their moves. But whereas his healthful dance emanated from and reflected his well-balanced soul, their dance springs directly from their libido. The body dances its own desire, and there is no place or need for *paideia*. Plato had collapsed the performance of the good and the good itself—the mimesis and the essence—in order to eliminate the dangerous pleasures of *mousikē*. Here mimesis and truth are again collapsed, but what emerges is not virtue or wisdom, but instead pleasure pure and simple, pandemic *erōs*, the truth of the body. While Xenophon's text as a whole labours to align *erōs*, pleasure, *paideusis*, and mimesis—bringing pleasure within philosophy and welding pederastic *erōs* to paternal *paideusis*—this final dance undoes that alignment, setting the arousal of *erōs* against the *paideusis* of philosophy and staging a mimesis not of good and noble men, but of a boy and girl having sex. And it is this spectacle and not that of noble pederasty that provokes a mimetic response in the audience. They answer the real *erōs* of the dance with their own real arousal. Plato said that mimesis ought to be ἀληθές, not just ἡδύ. This mimesis unites truth and pleasure; its effect is not virtue, however, but an erection.

Thus the truth of this performance runs counter to the truth of Sokrates' philosophy. In retrospect, it also casts doubt on that truth. The text began with the royal spectacle of Autolykos, whose beauty is augmented by σωφροσύνη and αἰδώς. This modesty is partly what makes him the ideal ἐρώμενος, immune to base desires. The girl playing Ariadne, we are told, is 'like a modest woman' (ἡ δ' αἰδουμένῃ μὲν ἐῴκει, 9.4), but that likeness is merely an imitation; she is really in love with the boy and has been all along. Is this just proof of Sokrates' contention that women enjoy physical *erōs* while boys respond only to spiritual φιλία? Or does it suggest that for Autolykos, too, αἰδώς is an act that hides baser feelings? We are reminded of the 'well-penetrated' Autolykos of the comic poets. Has Lykon, like the Syracusan, staged a performance of his son's modest love for the titillation of the spectators? Why has it become so hard to distinguish the crass arousal of a dance of prostitutes from the pure *erōs* of Socratic philosophy?

It is perhaps fortunate that Autolykos isn't present for this final show: he is outside taking a walk with his father. If he were present, we might be forced to compare the didactic effects of the text's two διδάσκαλοι, Sokrates and the Syracusan. Plato said that when the audience was the teacher not the student, it corrupted (διέφθαρκε) both the poet and its own pleasure; his example was contemporary practice in Italy and Sicily (*Laws* 659b2–c5). Xenophon's Sicilian ignores the censor's request for a dance of Kharites, and instead stokes the viewers' pleasure. Is Autolykos removed from the scene to save him from dance's corruption? If he were there, would this dance undo philosophy's *paideia*, mounting an alternate philosophy of its own in its performance of true (ἀληθές) passion?

The text's final image—father, son, lover, and philosopher walking calmly together—seems to exempt these four, at least, from dance's potential corruption. Yet the visceral response of the other symposiasts invites us to take this performance seriously and inquire—as Plato does in the *Laws*—about the effect of dance on philosophy. When a philosopher dances and dancers perform philosophy, in the end, who trumps whom? Sokrates shows us in Autolykos and Kallias a mimesis of ideal philosophical *erōs*, a performance that imitates the good and—in theory—makes the spectators themselves imitate the good. But it is the Syracusan's dance not Sokrates' that is marked as true and that provokes a mimetic response from its audience. Dance seems to have here the effect that Plato foresaw and feared: its pleasure may disrupt philosophy and dissolve the community of good men. The philosopher does well to protect his protegé from this rival *praeceptor amoris*.

Moreover, if this sexy dance managed to arouse not only the text's characters but also its readers, then pleasure has also

insinuated itself between the ἔργα of the καλοικἀγαθοί and their literary representation at the level of the text. Xenophon has orchestrated for us a mimesis of Socratic teaching. This is a *mousikē* of which the Platonic censor would be proud: the imitation of good men who are happy, an extravaganza of song, dance, and discourse that should make us long to follow Sokrates' teachings. But it is hard to think about virtue when you are distracted by pornography, and the final dance diverts the readers' attention along with the symposiasts'. For us, too, the party is over, and we are left to take from it what we will: the wisdom of Sokrates or the flutter of the dance or (in keeping with the text's interplay of *paideia* and *paidia*) some combination of the two.

The unerotic *erōs* of Sokrates joins καλοικἀγαθοί to one another and procures them for the *polis*; the *erōs* of the dance dissolves the bond among these symposiasts, sending them off on their individual ways. What does it do for their relation to the *polis*? I'd like to end by speculating very briefly on the nexus of desire, pleasure, and *paideia* that characterizes dance in the civic sphere. This may seem like a leap, but in fact the political has been at stake from the beginning in this private party. The symposium celebrates Autolykos' pankratic victory at the Panathenaia, and thus its competitions of dance and philosophy continue that festival's displays of civic ἀρετή. As συνεραστής with the city (8.41), Sokrates procures boys not for philosophy but for the *polis*, and so we are justified in asking about the political dimension of this private discussion.

Then, too, in shifting from the private to the public along the axis of the dance, we are not making a radical break, but moving along a continuum. One of the dance acts at this party is a girl performing the pyrrhic—a performance that Antisthenes suggests would make a good lesson for Athenian soldiers (2.13). A hydria in Copenhagen shows us the erotic nature of such a dance, depicting a winged *erōs* lurking around a female pyrrhicist as she performs.[49] When we move to the more famous venue for the pyrrhic, the Panathenaia, we find male performers not female, but still an explicit eroticism, and an eroticism that is thematized, at

[49] On this hydria (*ARV*[2] 1032), see Poursat (1968) 596–8 and fig. 49; Ceccarelli (1998) 61–3; and Liventhal (1985), who believes that the hydria was a prize in a dancing competition among courtesans.

least in one literary representation, in terms remarkably similar to Xenophon's.[50]

In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, Just Argument laments the weakness and poor training of boys these days. He reproaches his opponent, Unjust Argument, with the effect of his education: 'These days you teach boys to wrap themselves right up in their cloaks, so that it chokes me when they have to dance at the Panathenaia, holding their shields in front of their thighs, in disrespect to Athena' (σὺ δὲ τοὺς νῦν εὐθὺς ἐν ἱματίοισι διδάσκεις ἐντετυλίχθαι, ὥστε μ' ἀπάγχεσθ' ὅταν ὀρχεῖσθαι Παναθηναίοις δέον αὐτοὺς τὴν ἀσπίδα τῆς κωλῆς προέχων ἀμελῇ τις Τριτογενείης, 987–9). The always prurient Just Argument is complaining that boys don't hold their shields high enough to let him get a peek at their genitals.[51] His desire—idiosyncratic and comic as it is—turns the pyrrhic into a dirty dance not unlike that which ends Xenophon's symposium. This dance, too, may be read against the background of *paideia* and mimesis. The pyrrhic is often seen as part of a civic education: the boys stage a show of civic unity, military bravery, and physical vigour for their own edification and the audience's.[52] Within Aristophanes' play, this fondly imagined dance is situated within a discussion of education that clearly echoes the concerns of Plato and Xenophon about the role of dance in the mimesis of τὸ καλόν and οἱ καλοικἀγαθοί.

Just Argument includes the pyrrhic in his nostalgic fantasy of an *erōs* that once unified the *polis* and bound καλοικἀγαθοί like himself to it. His ideal is the same modest beauty that Xenophon praises in Autolykos: boys who obeyed their elders, kept their eyes lowered and were (like Autolykos) all the more irresistible for their αἰδώς. This *erōs* was also part of a conservative *paideusis*, in which boys imitated their noble ancestors and 'learned to sing the songs

[50] Goldhill (1998) and Gilhuly (1999) 80 both argue for the continuity between a public culture of viewing and the sort of shows staged at symposia; cf. Lissarrague (1987) 95.

[51] Dover (1968) *ad* 988: 'Ostensibly with indignation at their feebleness . . . but we may be meant to infer also that the lowering of the shield deprives him of his favourite sight.' See also Dover (1968) *ad* 989; Henderson (1975) 129 and n. 115; Naerebout (1997) 405; Ceccarelli (1998) 31 and n. 21.

[52] Lonsdale (1993) ch. 5; Ceccarelli (1998). On the initiatory overtones of the pyrrhic, see Ceccarelli in this volume. Naerebout (1997) 375–406 analyses dance as a medium of public communication about collective and individual identities.

their fathers sang' (966).[53] Just Argument speaks in the voice of Plato's censor or Xenophon's Sokrates: he imagines a noble and pleasurable dance in which mimesis and *erōs* combine in the service of a virtuous *paideia*. Against this is ranged the 'new education': rhetorical sophistry, moral turpitude and Socratic philosophy combined under the banner of *Adikos Logos*. The new education, as Just Argument represents it, has a new dance and a new *erōs*, one that undermines civic unity and breaks the erotic and pedagogic bonds between generations. In his lament, modern boys are everything the beautiful Autolykos is not: they are weak and womanly and also shamelessly aggressive. The new education makes boys disrespect their fathers and prostitute themselves to their lovers; it has corrupted the youth and destroyed the *erōs* that in the past bound good men to one another and to the *polis*. Now when a καλοκἀγαθός like Just Argument watches boys dancing the pyrrhic, he is so disgusted, he can hardly get aroused.

All this is a joke, of course, because Just Argument is turned on by precisely what he condemns. But his comic plaint also suggests a serious distinction. Xenophon juxtaposed the carnal pleasure of the dance to the restrained, philosophical *erōs* of Sokrates. But from the perspective of the *polis*, Sokrates' 'new education' has the same pernicious effects as the Syracusan's dance: it breaks the ties between men; it disrupts elite *paideia* and its elite pederasty. Within Aristophanes' civic framework, Sokrates himself takes the place of the Syracusan: an outsider whose performances undermine the community and the mimesis of the civic good. What dance does to philosophy, philosophy does to the *polis*. It insinuates its own pleasure into the space between the good and the imitation of the good, between noble elders and their noble sons.[54]

[53] On Aristophanes' musical conservatism, see Anderson (1966) 60–2. The contest between traditional and novel education in Aristophanes also reflects contemporary ambivalence toward the 'new music', discussed by Barker, Wilson, and esp. Csapo in this volume. In Aristophanes, it is Sokrates who represents the 'new music', with all its perceived licence and subversiveness; in Xenophon, it is the Syracusan.

[54] In reading Aristophanes against Xenophon, I am perhaps reversing the more logical relation between the two. Xenophon's defence of Sokrates responds, in places quite explicitly (e.g. 6.6–10), to Aristophanes' representation of the philosopher. In this apology, the Syracusan plays the role both of Aristophanes (confronting Sokrates with his comic charges) and of *Adikos Logos*, thus allowing Xenophon to position Sokrates as *Dikaios Logos*.

Aristophanes in the end comes down firmly on the side of Just Argument, endorsing the old education and its traditional songs over the new education and its disgusting new dance. Returning to Kallias' dining room, where Aristophanes' charges are always in the air, we find another contest between the old and the new, the just and the unjust, but in this case it is surprisingly hard to tell who wins. In his defence of Sokrates, Xenophon does not censor the dance and its challenging philosophy. Instead he ends his text with that challenge, leaving it harder than we might have expected to judge the competition between philosophy and dance, or, indeed, even to separate the two. Sokrates dances: both in his performance and in his discourse he turns dance into philosophy. The Syracusan, meanwhile, turns philosophy into dance, and it is in this form—kinetic, seductive, somatic—that philosophy's truth inspires its audience. What is the difference between a dancing Sokrates and a philosophizing dance teacher? Between Sokrates and the Syracusan—both teachers, both pimps, both displayers of marvels, purveyors of desire, and educators (or corruptors) of youth—who is the philosopher and who the dancer?

Xenophon leaves the Syracusan and Sokrates dancing a pas-de-deux in which it is never clear who leads. Dance and philosophy are inextricably bound. It is fitting, then, that some scholars have seen in the Syracusan the presence of Xenophon himself. The Suda lists a Themistogenes of Syracuse as the author of the *Anabasis*.[55] Whether we entertain this identification or not, in Xenophon himself we have another dancing philosopher, who orchestrates both Sokrates' philosophical dance and the Syracusan's sexy philosophy. His *Symposium* is philosophy set to music and dance; it is simultaneously a complex dance of philosophical positions and perspectives. Leaving the reader both edified (like Sokrates' philosophy) and aroused (like the Syracusan's dance) Xenophon himself is the ultimate ὀρχηστοδιδάσκαλος.

[55] Suda s.v. Themistogenes: Συρακούσιος, ἱστορικός· Κύρου ἀνάβασιν, ἥτις ἐν τοῖς Ξενοφῶντος φέρεται; Plut. *De Gloria Atheniensium* 345e (Ξενοφῶν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ γέγονεν ἱστορία, γράψας, ἃ ἐστρατήγησε καὶ κατώρθωσε, [καὶ] Θεμιστογένει περὶ τούτων συντετάχθαι τῷ Συρακουσίῳ, ἵνα πιστότερος ᾖ διηγούμενος ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἄλλον, ἑτέρῳ τὴν τῶν λόγων δόξαν χαριζόμενος); cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.2. L. Strauss argues for the connection between Themistogenes and Xenophon ((1972) 178; (1983) 106).

13

The Muses and their Arts

Penelope Murray

The Muses have always been associated with poetry, but they are not simply goddesses of poetry. As E. R. Curtius long ago pointed out, 'In the view of Antiquity, they belonged not only to poetry but to all higher forms of intellectual life besides',[1] a view summarized in Strabo's words: πρόπολοι δὲ τῶν Μουσῶν οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι πάντες ('all educated men are servants of the Muses', 10.3.10, on which see also Hardie, above pp. 15, 22). The connections between *mousikē* and *paideia* have been discussed by several contributors to this volume, but I should now like to turn to the Muses themselves, the deities who preside over *mousikē* in all its forms. Their patronage of intellectual life and the central part they play in Greek culture has generally been taken for granted, but the question of what kinds of activities are presided over by the Muses (whether in classical antiquity or in the subsequent tradition) has never been seriously investigated. Such a study would not only shed light on what the Muses signify; it would also tell us something about the way in which the various arts with which they are associated are conceptualized, and how those arts have changed over time. Above all, if *mousikē* is to be understood as the realm that is constituted by the Muses' arts, then clearly a consideration of what those arts might be is crucial to our understanding of the meaning of *mousikē* in Greek culture.

In Homer the Muses are firmly associated with poetry and song: they are daughters of Zeus who live on Olympus, delighting the gods with their singing and dancing (*Iliad* 1.604). They also inspire bards, bestowing on them the divine gift of song, which includes the ability to sing of the great deeds of the past, the κλέα ἀνδρῶν, which it would be impossible for mortals to recall if the Muses did not impart knowledge of them to the bard. The Muses, being goddesses, know everything (*Iliad* 2.485), and they can also ensure everlasting fame for the deeds which are celebrated

[1] Curtius (1953) 228.

in song. These functions are, of course, very clearly related to the oral culture in which Homer's poetry was created. In the *Odyssey* (24.60) the Muses appear on earth when they lead the mourning at the funeral of Achilles, singing the θρῆνος, and here they are referred to for the first time as being nine in number.

Many of the traditional attributes of the Muses are already well established in Homer, but it is with Hesiod's depiction of the goddesses in the *Theogony* that their story really begins. Here they are presented as the archetypal female chorus—virginal, beautiful, associated with the wild, and somewhat mysterious, as befits these nymph-like goddesses; covered in mist they dance at night as they sing the praises of Zeus their father and the other Olympian gods. Helicon is their special haunt, and it was here, so Hesiod tells us, that they singled him out to be a poet, conferring on him a divine voice and the ability to delight the minds of mortals with their song, just as they themselves delight the gods. The Muses were born in Pieria, the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, Memory, bringing with them forgetfulness of cares for mortal beings and a rest from sorrow. For the Memory which their mother embodies, and which the Muses in turn bestow upon poets, includes not only the ability to recollect the past and preserve it for the future, but also the power to transcend the constraints of mortal time. In mythic thought, as Jean-Pierre Vernant has shown,[2] Memory enables the poet to see beyond the mortal world to the timeless realm of the gods; thus music and song, which are the Muses' gifts, enable human beings to communicate with the divine, to forget the limitations of ordinary human experience and to dwell for a moment with the gods.

The story of the Muses' birth (53 ff.) occupies the central position in Hesiod's address to them, as is appropriate in the introduction to a poem whose theme is that of creation and birth. Mnemosyne brought forth nine daughters, all of one mind (ὁμόφρονας), as Hesiod says (l.60), their carefree hearts set on song, and he goes on to name them for us (77 ff.): 'Clio and Euterpe, Thaleia and Melpomene, Terpsichore and Erato, Polymnia, Urania and Calliope' ('Fame-Spreading, Entertaining, Festive, Singing, Dance-Delight, Lovely, Rich in Themes,

[2] Vernant (1965) 1.80–107, 2.109. See also Detienne (1967) 22–7, 69–80; Thalmann (1984) 147–50; Nagy (1990) 58–60.

Celestial, Beautiful Voice', as West translates them).[3] The significance of this act of naming is well brought out by Walcot in his discussion of the passage, for, as he points out,

> The grant of a name represents an act of creation as the process of birth. Without their names the Muses have no real existence, and the grant of a name is virtually a re-enactment of their birth. . . . It is only when it is realized that the same act of creation is implied every time that Hesiod interrupts his narrative to produce a string of names that any meaning can be extracted from the catalogue of names of the Muses or the *Theogony* as a whole.[4]

Whether Hesiod invented these names or whether they are traditional we cannot tell, but each of them is suggested by words and phrases used in the preceding description of the goddesses' activities. Thus, for example, Clio picks up κλείουσιν in l.67, Euterpe τέρπουσι in ll. 37 and 51, and so on, so that, in effect, the names summarize the ideas about the Muses which the proem expresses.[5] But despite the individuality of their names, we cannot speak at this stage of single Muses having individual spheres of competence; rather they exist as a plurality, as like-minded sisters, one implying all the others. Thus the nine Muses collectively embody all the aspects of *mousikē* which came into being when they were born, with the emphasis on dance, song, poetry, and pleasure. The iconographical evidence confirms this conception of the Muses as a chorus who act together as performers and inspirers of the musical arts, without differentiation according to specific functions.[6] We

[3] M. West, *Hesiod, Theogony and Works and Days, translated with an Introduction and Notes* (Oxford 1988). I have based all translations of Hesiod in this paper on West's version.

[4] Walcot (1957) 44–5.

[5] See West (1966) 32 and ad loc. for details. Havelock (1963) 111 notes that three of the Muses 'variously symbolise what might be called the psychological effects of minstrelsy: it "delights", it "gives enjoyment", it is "lovely" (Euterpe, Thaleia, Erato). Three perhaps suggest its themes, for it "celebrates" (that is, heroes) and it "hymns" (that is, the gods) whence also it is "heavenly" (Clio, Polymnia, Urania). Two are more technical, symbolizing the Song and Dance respectively that accompany a performance (Melpomene, Terpsichore). But only Calliope carries the name that identifies the verbal shapes which poetry commands.' The François vase in Florence (dating from *c.* 570 BC) depicts all nine Muses and labels them with the same Hesiodic names, except that Stesichore ('she who sets up the chorus') replaces Terpsichore ('she who delights in the chorus'). For discussion of the significance of this substitution see Stewart (1983).

[6] See Faedo (1981) 65–9 and *LIMC* on Mousa and Mousai.

occasionally hear of other names for individual Muses: according to Plutarch (743d), for example, the Muses are called Mneiai (Memories) in some places; and Pausanias (9.29.2) records that the three original Muses of Helicon were called Melete, Mneme, and Aoide (Practice, Memory, and Song). But it is Hesiod's list which becomes canonical, and when later authors ascribed different functions to individual Muses, they did so on the basis of the names that Hesiod gives them.

Apart from Hesiod's naming of the Muses, the other passage in the *Theogony* which raises some interesting questions about the nature of the Muses' activities and the way in which the tradition developed is that which immediately follows at lines 81 ff.: Calliope, she of the beautiful voice, is singled out as the most senior Muse, for it is she who has the special care of βασιλῆες 'princes'. Having singled her out in this way Hesiod then goes on to attribute the special gifts of princes to the Muses as a body:

> ὅντινα τιμήσουσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο
> γεινόμενόν τε ἴδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων,
> τῶι μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσηι γλυκερὴν χείουσιν ἐέρσην,
> τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα· οἱ δέ νυ λαοὶ
> πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας
> ἰθείηισι δίκηισιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύων
> αἶψά τι καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσε.
> τοὔνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὕνεκα λαοῖς
> βλαπτομένοις ἀγορῆφι μετάτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι
> ῥηιδίως, μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν.
> ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὣς ἱλάσκονται
> αἰδοῖ μειλιχίηι, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισι.
> τοίη Μουσάων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν. (81–93)

Whomsoever great Zeus' daughters favour among the princes that Zeus fosters, and turn their eyes upon him at his birth, upon his tongue they shed sweet dew, and out of his mouth the words flow honeyed; and the peoples all look to him as he decides what is to prevail with his straight judgements. His word is sure, and expertly he makes a quick end of even a great dispute. This is why there are prudent princes: when the peoples are wronged in their dealings, they make amends for them with ease, persuading them with gentle words. When he goes among a gathering, they seek his favour with conciliatory reverence, as if he were a god, and he stands out among the crowd. Such is the Muses' holy gift to men.

The oddity of these lines has been much discussed, both in antiquity and in modern times: the Muses are not elsewhere associated with princes, or with the gift of eloquence, and the lines sit somewhat awkwardly in the general context. The most likely explanation for their presence is no doubt, as West suggests, that they are introduced in order to praise the princes before whom Hesiod's poem was performed. But whatever the reason for their inclusion, the crucial point to note here is that the Muses' sphere is extended far beyond poetry; for the realm of the princes is the realm of *logos* (unless, with Havelock,[7] we imagine that the princes delivered their judgements in verse). Princes are able to maintain peace and order in society not only because they are figures of authority with the ability to make 'straight judgements', but also because they have the power of persuasion bestowed upon them by the Muses. Song and political discourse are seen as parallel activities because both depend on effective utterance, which the Muses confer on poets and princes alike. All this is, of course, well known, but it is worth drawing attention again to the highly unusual nature of Hesiod's description: this is the only time we hear of the Muses bestowing their gifts on a recipient who is not a poet, and it is not the gift of poetry that they bestow.

Hesiod's extension of the Muses' domain to include speech as well as song has been variously interpreted. According to one view Hesiod is merely articulating more fully a traditional conception of eloquence that is already implicit in Homer. In a famous passage in the *Odyssey* (8.170–3) that has often been compared with Hesiod *Theogony* 81 ff. eloquence is described as a gift from the gods, and elsewhere in Homer the mellifluous speaker is depicted in terms that are equally appropriate to the poet. Thus Nestor's voice 'flows from his tongue sweeter than honey' (τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή, *Il.* 1.249), a phrase which is echoed

[7] Havelock (1963) 108–9: 'Hesiod's language affirms that his political power has its source in his command of effective utterance, which utterance is to be in the strictly technological sense "musical". That is to say, the transactions of this society are not merely oral; they do not merely imply that the relationship between governor and governed is that between speaker and audience. They affirm that the speech of transaction must be metrical and formulaic, otherwise the utterance would not be the voice of the Muse . . . while in modern conception the prince's honeyed powers would be merely an extra talent which he may be gifted enough to exercise, we must urge that for Hesiod this talent was an inherent part of his job. He had to be able to frame executive orders and judgments in verse.'

by Hesiod in his characterization of the persuasive utterance of the singer ('the voice flows sweet from his mouth', γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδή, *Theog.* 97), the prince ('out of his mouth the words flow honeyed', τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα, *Theog.* 84) and the Muses themselves ('the voice flows untiring from their mouths, and sweet', τῶν δ' ἀκάματος ῥέει αὐδὴ ἐκ στομάτων ἡδεῖα, *Theog.* 39–40). The fact that the same terminology can be used of the utterance of the poet, the orator, and the Muses suggests that the gift they possess is essentially the same: what they share is the ability to charm the listener through the power of language.[8]

On the other hand it has been argued that Hesiod's conception of persuasive speech differs from that of Homer, for, despite the affinity between poetry and eloquence that we find in both authors, Homer's Muses never inspire speakers: whereas Homer seems to differentiate the persuasive speaker from the poet by ascribing the gift of eloquence to an unnamed god or gods, Hesiod expands the traditional sphere of the Muses to include rulers as well as poets amongst the recipients of their gifts. Furthermore, these gifts are hardly parallel, since the prince's relationship to the Muses is expressed in a different way from that of the poet's.[9] Unlike Hesiod whose poetic vocation resulted from the momentous occasion when the Muses met him on Mount Helicon and initiated him into their art, princes are endowed with eloquence at birth. They owe their power of gentle persuasion to the favour of the Muses' glance, but it is Zeus who is ultimately their patron (*Theog.* 82, 96); poets, on the other hand, belong to the Muses (94–5), and depend solely on them for their gifts. This ties in with a subtle difference between the Muses' gift of eloquence and the Muses' gift of poetry as Hesiod describes it. Andrew Ford has observed that when the Muses bestow a beneficent kind of speech on a prince, it is words, *epea*, that 'flow honeyed from his mouth', whereas what they bestow on singers is a voice, an *audē* that 'flows sweet from the mouth'. When they inspired Hesiod himself on Mount Helicon they breathed into him a divine voice (αὐδὴ θέσπις, 31–2). Ford suggests that 'the complex idea of a

[8] See e.g. Thalmann (1984) 139–43; Walker (2000) 1–7 with bibliography. On the double-edged nature of the gift of *logos* see Pucci (1977) 1–44.

[9] See Solmsen (1954); Laks (1996).

"divine *audē*" is the special mark of the singer . . . the restrictiveness of this phrase helps us to distinguish singing from other forms of eloquence, for no other figure in epic has quite the same gift'.[10] The divine aspect of the poet's voice includes the ability to sing of things that are hidden from mortal eyes, whether it be the deeds of long-dead heroes, as in Homer, or the origins of the gods themselves, as in Hesiod. The gift of persuasive speech, however, is of a different order, since it is essentially concerned with the practicalities of human life, whether it be giving wise advice in council or settling disputes amongst the people. Poet and speaker may share the ability to wield the power of language, but they operate in different spheres. In the words of Thalmann: 'Poetry works forgetfulness of the pain and sorrow that are part of being mortal, but it does so by turning its listeners towards a vision of ultimate truths that makes their immediate pains seem trivial by comparison . . . through song men can discover order in the world, gain knowledge and re-establish links long broken with the gods'.[11] The honey-sweet words of princes, by contrast, are directed firmly towards the human world. Thus song and eloquence, poetry and rhetoric, despite their similarities, are distinguished from each other from the start.

Whatever view one takes of the relationship between Homer and Hesiod, the crucial point for my present argument is that Hesiod establishes a connection between the Muses and eloquence. So the question which the passage raises concerns the extent to which the Muses' gift is one of speech, or, to put it another way, it invites us to think about the relationship between poetry and rhetoric, and even between *mousikē* and *logos*. The Muses' arts certainly include words; but it is not the case that all types of discourse fall under their aegis. It is striking, in particular, that despite the Hesiodic precedent, there is no Muse of rhetoric. Orators never invoke Muses and rhetoric is not numbered amongst the Muses' arts, at any rate in the classical period. When Gorgias extols the power of *logos* in the *Encomium of Helen* (8–11), he attributes to speech in general the magical powers of language traditionally bestowed by the Muses. But these goddesses are notably absent from his

[10] Ford (1992) 180 f. and (1997) 403, 406. The αὐδή at *Theog.* 97 may conceivably refer to princes as well as poets, if this general statement is taken to refer to both categories of people. But this is not a θέσπις αὐδή.

[11] Thalmann (1984) 147–8 and 149–50.

account.[12] Why should this be so? One obvious answer might be that the Muses' functions are related to poetry and song, and not to prose; but, quite apart from the problems involved in applying the modern categories of poetry and prose to ancient forms of discourse, the issue is complicated by the fact that the Muses are associated with philosophy, at any rate by Plato and the philosophical tradition which he inspired. The origins of this connection are not difficult to see, for before the existence of prose all speculation, including that which might later be termed philosophical, was expressed in poetry. The Muses were goddesses of poetry, but poetry itself encompassed a very wide domain. Many of the pre-Socratic philosophers (Parmenides, Xenophanes, Empedocles) expressed their thoughts in poetry, and Empedocles, at least, invokes the Muses for their aid.[13] Thus in fr. 131 he calls on Calliope to stand by him whilst he reveals a good *logon* about the blessed gods. And in other fragments he summons an unspecified Muse to tell him what it is right for men to hear (3.3–5), or bids his listener accept the trustworthy assurances of his Muse (fr. 4). Empedocles' use of the figure of the Muse should remind us of the range of the Muses' functions in the culture of early Greece: not only are they givers of pleasure who soothe cares and immortalize the deeds of men in song, as daughters of Mnemosyne they know everything about the past and the unseen world of the gods, and they are also authorities on ethical matters and wisdom generally.

In the song-culture of early Greece the Muses were the source of all knowledge and wisdom, and *sophia* was traditionally the province of poets. But with the advent of literacy and the breaking up of *sophia* into competing forms of discourse, new genres of literature were developed to challenge and replace the all-embracing authority of poets. By the fifth century BC, as Walker puts it, the domain of song 'had become an array of "spoken" metres, modes and strophic forms', a process which he explains thus: 'Once "song" is expanded into "poetry", and poetry divided into the sung and the "spoken", the spoken in turn divides into the

[12] As noted by Morgan (2000) 125–6. Cf. her remarks, ibid. 51, about Xenophanes' rejection of Muse-based inspiration.

[13] On the question of how we should understand these invocations see Morgan (2000) 61–2. On the union between poetry and philosophy, see e.g. Hardie (1986) 5–32; Most 1999.

metred and the unmetred. "Prose" thus emerges as unmetred "poetry", in other words a kind of free verse.' So 'in effect, the pre-Socratic philosophers developed a prose (or free verse) equivalent to Hesiodic wisdom-poetry; the historians an equivalent to Homeric tale-poetry; and the sophists, in occasion-bound sorts of epideictic like the *epitaphios*, an equivalent to lyric poetry'.[14]

The impact of literacy on the oral society of archaic Greece, and the transition from the dominance of song to that of the spoken word has been extensively studied, but no one has considered the role of the Muses in this process.[15] For the Muses do not simply disappear with the demise of the song-culture. Poets continued to invoke them long after the conditions which gave rise to their existence had disappeared, and poetry, whether sung, recited or spoken became the Muses' art *par excellence*, even when it had ceased to be a 'musical' activity in the narrow sense of the word. At the same time many other genres of discourse, which were fashioned at the time of transition from the song culture and very often in competition with poetry, dispensed with the Muses altogether. Invocation, amongst other things, implies presence, yet this performative aspect of the Muse was not adapted by orators, even though the appearance of spontaneity and improvisation was crucial to their art. Again, despite the later designation of Clio as Muse of history,[16] historians of the classical period never refer to the Muses or to their time-honoured commemorative function. As I have said, it might be tempting to explain this

[14] Walker (2000) 21 and 25 with bibliography. Cf. Nagy (1990) 19–30; Silk (2000) 11–13, who speaks of the 'momentous dissociation of sensibility' which took place in the fifth century BC; Goldhill (2002); Ford (2002) 131–57.

[15] See Havelock (1963); Herington (1985); Gentili (1988); Thomas (1992), esp. 108 ff. Despite its title, Havelock's book, *The Muse Learns to Write* (New Haven and London 1986) barely mentions the Muse. An exception is Small (1997) 72–8 who emphasizes the importance of the Muses' association with memory in the development of their role as goddesses of learning.

[16] Relevant to this development is the division of Herodotus' work into nine books, each one carrying the name of a Muse. This tradition is first attested by Lucian (*Herod.* 1; *De Hist. Conscrib.* 42), but it may go back to the 1st cent. BC (see P. Legrand's introduction to the Budé edn. of Herodotus (Paris 1955) 224–5). Possibly also dating from this period is an anonymous epigram in the Greek Anthology (9.160): 'Herodotus entertained the Muses', it says, 'and each in return for his hospitality, gave him a book'. Cf. Suet. *De Gramm.* 6. For Clio as Muse of history see *Anth. Graec.* 9.504–5; Schol. Ap. Rhod. 3.1; Schol. Luc. *Imag.* 16; Stat. *Theb.* 10. 630–1; Anth. Lat. 88, 664, 664a. On the iconographical evidence, Faedo (1981) 71, 109 ff.

situation on formal grounds, in terms of a distinction between poetry and prose. But that would be to ignore the Muses' connection with *sophia*. Gorgias and his fellow orators were more interested in persuading their audiences by means of their own deployment of *logos* than by appeals to a privileged source of knowledge, and therefore made no claims to divine inspiration or to the *sophia* which the Muses were traditionally believed to bestow. Historians, too, rejected the goddesses of poetry, and rather than appealing to the Muses as a source of authority, they name themselves as guarantors of the truth of what they tell.[17] Plato, by contrast, exploited these traditional associations, and it was Plato's appropriation of the Muses for the newly emerging discipline of philosophy that ensured their survival into the age of prose.

Philosophy is associated with the Muses in several of Plato's dialogues, as I have already discussed elsewhere.[18] Thus, for example, amongst the fanciful etymologies of the *Cratylus* (406a) we find that the Muses and music generally are named, apparently, from μῶσθαι, that is searching and philosophy (τῆς ζητήσεως τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας). And in several other dialogues Plato distinguishes between the ordinary Muses of poetry and a higher Muse whose province is philosophy. In the *Phaedrus* (259b–d), for example, Socrates produces an aetiological myth on the origins of *mousikē*, as he and Phaedrus converse in the heat of the mid-day sun, listening to the cicadas singing overhead. These creatures, he says, were once men, who lived at a time before there were any Muses. When music and the Muses came into existence, they were so overwhelmed by pleasure that they forgot to eat and drink, and actually died before they realized what was happening to them. From them arose the race of cicadas who sing constantly throughout their lives without any need of food or drink. When they die the cicadas report to the Muses on how each of them is honoured by men on earth: 'to Terpsichore they report those who have honoured her in the choral dance, to Erato those who have honoured her in the affairs of love, and to the other Muses similarly, according to the form of honour belonging to each; but to

[17] See Calame (1995*a*) 75–96.

[18] Murray (2002) where some of the material used here is discussed in greater detail.

Calliope the eldest, and to Urania who comes after her, they announce those who spend their time in philosophy, and honour the music which belongs to them—who most of all the Muses have as their sphere both the heavens and talk (*logoi*), both divine and human, and whose utterances are the most beautiful'.[19] So Socrates and Phaedrus should certainly try and converse in the mid-day sun rather than succumb to the cicadas' spell and fall asleep, in the hope that they too may win the favour of the Muses of philosophy.

In this myth we encounter for the first time the notion that different Muses have different provinces; and the Muses of philosophy are differentiated from, and elevated above, the more traditional Muses of poetry. Calliope owes this privilege, no doubt, to the prominent role she is given by Hesiod and his fellow poets, and Plato's phrase καλλίστην φωνήν (259d7) perhaps recalls the ὀπὶ καλῇ of Hesiod's *Theogony* (68), from which Calliope derives her name. Urania, who is next to Calliope in Hesiod's list, is also suited by her name to preside over the heavenly subject matter which comprises the philosopher's *logoi*.[20] The dialogue as a whole shows us that the genuine lover of the Muses, the truly musical man, is not the poet, but the philosopher, as we see from the discussion of the scale of lives at 248d, where the soul which has seen the fullest vision of the Forms on its journey before birth is incarnated in one who will become 'a lover of wisdom or of beauty, devoted to the Muses and to love'; by contrast, the life of the poet or imitative artist comes sixth in the scale of value.[21]

Musical themes and imagery play a significant part in the discussion of what it means to be a philosopher in the *Gorgias*. When Socrates contrasts his own way of life with that of Callicles, he declares that he is in love with philosophy (481d), a vocation which demands above all that he should be free from inner conflict and

[19] Trans. Rowe (1986).

[20] Cf. *Crat.* 396c where the name Urania is associated with 'looking at things above' ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω. In Hesiod the name seems to derive from the fact that the Muses sing of how Zeus οὐρανῶι ἐμβασιλεύει (*Theog.* 71). But also relevant is the tradition that the Muses were the daughters, not of Zeus, but of Uranos, as e.g. in Alcm. 67 or Mimn. 13. For the distinction between Muses see also Plato *Symp.* 187d–e. Urania as Muse of astronomy has a long history, which can seem puzzling to the modern reader. But cosmology and astronomy were considered perfectly suitable subjects for poetry, as the long tradition of cosmological poetry shows. See e.g. Hardie (1986) 5–32; Faedo (1981) 69–70, 74–5.

[21] See Rowe (1986) ad loc.; Ferrari (1987) 25 ff., 142–3.

live in harmony with himself (482c). In the ensuing dialogue, with its allusions to Euripides' *Antiope* and its reworking of the famous debate between Zethus and Amphion on the merits of the practical life of the man of action as opposed to the contemplative life of the intellectual, Socrates plays Amphion to Callicles' Zethus. By aligning Socrates with the mythical lyre-player, Plato uses the musician as an image for the philosopher, and the musical life becomes an analogue for the life of the mind.[22] At the same time he dismisses aulos-playing, lyre-playing, dithyrambic choruses and tragedy—all of which are, of course, branches of *mousikē* in the traditional sense—as a species of *kolakeia*, flattery, whose sole purpose, like that of rhetoric, is to gratify the whims of the masses (501e–502d). The *Gorgias*' implied contrast between the specious music of popular culture and the true music of philosophy is made explicit in the extended discussion of the philosophical life in the central books of the *Republic*, which culminates in the description of the philosopher as 'a true musician', who spends his life 'attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord of his soul' (591d).[23]

The prominent role which *mousikē* plays in the *Laws* has already been discussed by several contributors to this volume,[24] and I need not elaborate further on that theme beyond saying that here too the real musician proves to be none other than the philosopher. In Plato's Cretan city the entire educational system is based on *mousikē*, and it is through choral performance that citizens will learn to acquire *aretē*, the virtue on which a just and harmonious society depends. All members of the community must sing and dance, hence three choruses are set up, the first consisting of children, the second of those under 30, and the third of those between 30 and 60, sacred to the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus respectively. The third of these choruses, the 'finest element in the city' (665d), is not to be a chorus like the others, but will act as moral arbiters, dedicated to the mastery of 'a music that is nobler than the music of the choruses and the theatres' (667a–b). As

[22] See further Dodds (1959) 260, 275–6; Nightingale (1995) 60–92; R. Rutherford (1995) 166–8; and on Euripides' *Antiope* Wilson (2000*b*).

[23] For other musical metaphors of this sort see e.g. *Laches* 188d; *Rep.* 432a, 443d–e; *Polit.* 306–8; *Soph.* 259e; *Theaet.* 176a; *Phileb.* 67b; *Tim.* 47c–d; *Laws* 666d, and for discussion Anderson (1994) 142–69.

[24] Especially Kowalzig and Wohl, and see Lonsdale (1993); Calame (1997) 222–5.

expert judges members of this chorus will decide on the repertoire that is to be performed by the city at large, and this they will do on the basis of three types of knowledge: since music is an art of representation, they will need to know what is being represented, whether it is represented correctly, and, most important of all, the moral value of the representation (669a–b).[25] It is this expertise in moral judgement which is crucial to their role as educators and elevates these masters of music above ordinary musicians, including the poets. For although the poet must have a knowledge of rhythm and harmony and the technical aspects of music, there is no necessity for him as a poet to know 'whether the representation is noble or ignoble' (εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε μὴ καλὸν τὸ μίμημα 670e). By contrast the knowledge of the soberly intoxicated elders of the Dionysiac chorus will be based on the higher music of philosophy, the source of ultimate authority in Plato's Cretan city.

As we have seen, Plato makes copious use of the imagery of music throughout the dialogues, and the meaning of *mousikē* itself becomes highly contested in his work. This is nowhere more apparent than in the famous passage of the *Phaedo* (60d ff.) where Socrates describes a recurrent dream which he has had during his lifetime, urging him to compose and practise music (μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου). He had always thought that the dream was encouraging him to do precisely what he had spent his life doing, that is 'making music', on the grounds that 'philosophy is the greatest music'. But now as he awaits death he wonders if after all the dream might be urging him to make music in the popular sense (τὴν δημώδη μουσικήν). As Anderson observes, 'few statements could have made clearer the error involved in choosing the term "music" to render "*mousikē*"'.[26] The ambiguity is compounded by the fact that no Muses are mentioned in this dialogue: Socrates' music is the music of Apollo, and his final philosophical reflections, his swan-song as he calls it (85a–b), are dedicated to that god.[27] Whereas the *Phaedrus* differentiates

[25] See further Morrow (1960) 313–18; Saunders (1972) 9–10.

[26] Anderson (1994) 52–3. On philosophy as the greatest music see also Havelock (1963) 276–311.

[27] For Socrates as the servant of Apollo see e.g. 60d2, 61b2, 85b and Bacon (1990) 150–8 on the allusions to Apollo in the dialogue. The implication of the Muses' inferior status in relation to Apollo is already inherent in the ubiquitous portrayal of the Muses as a chorus with Apollo as their leader. See e.g. *LIMC* s.v. *Mousa, Mousai*; Ridgway (1990) 254; Calame (1997) 49–52, 72. An elaborate distinction

between Muses and makes Calliope and Urania the patron goddesses of philosophy, here it is Apollo who presides over the music of philosophy and the Muses have no role. Paradoxically, therefore, we are presented here with a concept of *mousikē* without Muses.

Plato's famous dictum, put into the mouth of Socrates in the *Phaedo* (60d), that philosophy is the highest form of *mousikē* was no doubt influenced by his interest in Pythagoreanism, and it is often claimed that Plato set up the Academy as a *thiasos*, a religious corporation dedicated to the worship of the Muses, along lines suggested to him by his contact with the Pythagorean brotherhood in S. Italy. But this idea, first put forward by Wilamowitz in his study of Antigonus of Carystus (1881), and further developed by Pierre Boyancé in his influential book, *Le Culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs* (1937), needs to be treated with caution. As Lynch has shown in his detailed critique, 'much of the evidence for a quasi-mystical dimension to Plato's Academy comes from Neoplatonic sources who were imposing their own ways of looking at philosophy on Plato',[28] and though there may be some truth behind the tradition of Pythagorean influence in this respect, there is no explicit evidence to support it. We cannot simply assume the existence of a Pythagorean cult of the Muses in the early period, or that worship of the Muses was a central feature in the organization of Plato's Academy from the start.

It *is* true, however, that both the Academy and the Lyceum contained *Mouseia*, sanctuaries with statues of the Muses, as is attested by Diogenes Laertius and several other sources.[29] There is conflicting evidence as to when such *Mouseia* were first established, but the real point of controversy is how we should interpret

between different types of music on the basis of the gender of the gods who preside over them is developed by Aristides Quintilianus in the *De Musica* 2.19 where Apollo's music is deemed to be educational because it is 'of the male sort', whereas music for pleasure is assigned to the Muse, Polymnia. See further Barker (1989) 493. On swans, music, Apollo and philosophy see the anecdote in Paus. 1.30.1: the night before Plato was going to become Socrates' pupil Socrates dreamt that a swan flew into his arms. And swans are famous for music because Kyknos, a king and musician, was changed into a swan by Apollo when he died. Cf. Diog. Laert. 3.5.

[28] Lynch (1972) 62, n. 35. See also Burkert (1972) 1–14. On the Muses and philosophical schools see Lynch (1972) 108–27. On the meaning and significance of the term *thiasos*, see Calame (1997) 208–10.

[29] Diog. Laert. 4.1 on the Academy and 5.51 on the Peripatos. Cf. Athen. 12. 547d; Diog. Laert. 4.19; Paus. 1.30, and see Lynch (1972) 114–16 for discussion.

the presence of the Muses in these particular philosophical schools (there is no evidence for *Mouseia* in either the Stoa or Epicurus' Garden).[30] For Lynch the *Mouseia* need signify no more than the Muses' patronage over the activity pursued, that is, *paideia*. *Mousikē* was, of course, the basis of the old education at Athens, as described in Plato's *Protagoras* (325c–326d) and in Aristophanes *Clouds* (961–1104), so that already in the fifth century the Muses were firmly associated with education. This educational role of the Muses is also reflected in the iconography of the period, when music became 'the queen of education' as Queyrel puts it in her *LIMC* article.[31] And that connection continues, at least in relation to elementary education: Aeschines *Against Timarchus* 10 refers to the regulation of *Mouseia* in schools, which in this context seems to refer to festivals at which pupils would perform songs and recitations before an audience.[32] One of Herodas' *Mimiambi*, *The Schoolteacher*, depicts a mother bringing her errant son to school to be flogged, and speaks of the Muses as if they were physically present to witness the event, a reference to the statues of the goddesses in the school (3.57). Likewise Athenaeus (8.343d) tells the story of a *kitharistēs* named Stratonikos who had nine statues of the Muses and one of Apollo in his school, but only two students.[33] Given the undoubted association between the Muses and education, Lynch argues that 'since the philosophical schools were as much concerned with *paideia* as an elementary school, there is no need to contrive a special explanation for the fact that they contained statues of the patron goddesses of education' (116). Even on this minimalist view, however, I find it hard to believe that the Muses' patronage of the Academy and the Lyceum has no other significance. It must at the very least suggest a certain conception of *paideia*, and one cannot ignore the association between philosophy and the Muses which Plato makes explicit in his work.

[30] In the case of Epicurus this is hardly surprising, given the Epicurean hostility to poetry and music. See e.g. Cic. *De Fin.* 1.2171–2 and Hadot (1984) 37, 59.

[31] A. Queyrel *LIMC* 6. 660, 674. See also Beck (1975) 17–20; Small (1997) 76–8.

[32] See Fisher (2001) ad loc. Cf. Theophrastus 22 where one of the characteristics of the stingy man is that he will not send his children to school when it is the feast of the Muses, but pretends that they are ill so that they do not have to contribute.

[33] Cf. the story in Diog. Laert. 6.69 about Diogenes the Cynic who visited a school where there were many statues of the Muses, but only a few pupils, and is said to have remarked, 'By the help of the gods, teacher, you have plenty of pupils'. Further evidence in Lynch (1972) 115–16.

Imaginative though Boyancé's picture of Muse cults amongst ancient philosophers may be, his basic thesis cannot be dismissed. For, as he says:

> Le choix des Muses comme patronnes signifie que la culture, la formation des esprits et des coeurs, ce qu'on appelle d'un mot intraduisible—intraduisible comme tous ceux où survit l'âme d'un peuple—la *paideia*, quel qu'y soit le role du *logos*, de la raison exprimée dans les mots, plonge ses racines dans une expérience, que nul autre peuple n'a poussée aussi loin, de la vertu de la musique, de l'ordre vivant, de la clarté émouvante qui lui appartiennent.[34]

However we interpret it, there clearly is a relationship between the Muses, *mousikē* and philosophy which makes the Muses much more than goddesses of poetry. So, to return to my earlier question, if they can be associated with prose, why is there no Muse of rhetoric? One reason must be that rhetoric is always regarded as a *technē*, a skill based on rational principles and designed to be teachable. For Gorgias and his fellow sophists persuasion is a technique that can be learned and owes nothing to divine inspiration. A honey-sweet tongue is no longer an exclusive gift bestowed by the Muses, but available to anyone who can pay for the privilege of acquiring the necessary skills. Thus the ability to manipulate an audience through the magical power of language depends not on the Muse, but on mastery of a technique which consists in the rational deployment of *logos*.[35] Similarly when Isocrates sets out the virtues of the particular type of 'philosophy' which he practises (and by 'philosophy' he means rhetoric), one of the proofs of its superiority is that it can be taught: it will be agreed by everyone, he says, that 'in all the arts and crafts we regard those as the most skilled who turn out pupils who all work as far as possible in the same manner . . . it will be seen that this is the case with philosophy' (Isocr. *Antidosis* 205–6). The basis of his apologia is that rhetoric is a *technē* par excellence, and since the Muses generally symbolize

[34] Boyancé (1937) 146, which can be roughly translated as follows: 'The choice of the Muses as patrons [of philosophy] signifies that culture—that process of shaping hearts and minds, which the Greeks called *paideia* (an untranslatable word, like all those which express the spirit of a people)—whatever may be the role of *logos*, of reason expressed in words, has its roots in an experience, which no other people has felt so deeply, of the power of music, and of the living order and emotional transparency which belong to it.'

[35] See Morgan (2000) 122 ff. with bibliography there given.

inspiration as opposed to *technē* it is hardly surprising that they do not feature in his discourse. Activities which claim, or are thought, to be wholly within the grasp of human competence do not need Muses. Painting and sculpture come into this category in antiquity,[36] but later on, from the Renaissance onwards, we find numerous depictions of the Muses of painting and sculpture, or of the artist and his (always his) Muse.[37] The changing status of these arts is reflected through their association with the Muse, and the Muse lives on as a general metaphor for artistic inspiration. So, rhetoric can dispense with the Muses because it is a *technē*.

My point is not that *gods* are never associated with rhetoric (Isocrates himself speaks of *Peitho* as a goddess to whom men make sacrifice every year at *Antidosis* 249), and the goddess Persuasion was said to have sat on the lips of Pericles;[38] it is specifically that the Muses are eliminated from rhetoric. Isocrates never refers to them, and for him *mousikē* is an irrelevant activity. He mentions it in passing at *Antidosis* 267 as something that boys learn at school together with *grammatikē*, but it is otherwise absent, even in places where we might expect to find it. For example, at *Antidosis* 180 ff. he talks about the history of *paideia*, observing in traditional fashion that human nature consists of two parts, the body and the soul. This being so our ancestors invented and bequeathed to us two disciplines, *gumnastikē* for the body, and *philosophia* for the soul (*philosophia*, not *mousikē*, as in Plato's well known formulation at *Republic* 376e). The task of philosophy, as Isocrates sees it, is to impart knowledge of what to do and say, and to teach men how best to manage the affairs of household and city.[39]

[36] See further Murray (1989) 22–5; Small (1997) 73–4; Himmelmann (1998) 27–8, 56–60.

[37] On this see Parker and Pollock (1981).

[38] Eupolis fr. 102.5–7 K.–A. Paus. 1.22.3 states that the worship of Peitho was established at Athens by Theseus and speaks of a statue of the goddess as once standing near the acropolis. See further Buxton (1982) 34–6, 42–5, 52–66; Stafford (2000), 111–45 on 'Peitho: the Seductive Power of Rhetoric'.

[39] See Nightingale (1995) 28. On the competing definitions of philosophy offered by Plato and Isocrates ibid. 13–59 with bibliography; Hadot (1984) 14–18; Walker (2000) 26–41. 'The classic formulation of the differences between the two forms of education is, of course, that of Marrou (1965) 144–7, and see 107: 'Classical civilisation was not restricted to one type of culture or one type of education; it was torn between two rival forms between which it never managed to make up its mind. One was philosophical and its protagonist was Plato; the other was rhetorical and its protagonist was Isocrates.'

The system of education he devised to achieve these aims centred on rhetoric, an all-encompassing λόγων παιδεία, or 'discourse education'. Thus the student 'must learn the different kinds of discourse, and be trained in their uses' (*Against the Sophists* 17–18), and the teachers of philosophy are to offer to their students a detailed analysis of 'all the forms in which language is used' (τὰς ἰδέας ἁπάσας αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος *Antidosis* 183–4). For Isocrates *philosophia* is a training in *logos*, in which *mousikē* plays no part. This vision could not be more different from that of Plato.

Rhetoric and philosophy, the disciplines associated with Isocrates and Plato respectively, are both heirs to and rivals of the once dominant authority of poetry. This is obvious in Plato, and is, I think, implicit in Isocrates' description (*Antidosis* 46–7) of the kind of writing to which he has devoted his life and which he is anxious to differentiate from that of his rivals. His discourses, his *logoi*, he says, are more akin to works composed in rhythm and set to music (τοῖς μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν πεποιημένοις) than to the speeches which are made in court. 'For they set forth facts in a style more poetic and more ornate (τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέραι καὶ ποικιλωτέραι); they employ thoughts which are more lofty and more original, and besides they use throughout figures of speech in greater number and of more striking character . . . All men take as much pleasure in listening to this kind of prose as in listening to poetry. . . .' Elsewhere he compares himself to Pindar (*Antidosis* 166), and in his encomium for Evagoras (8–11) he claims to be doing in prose what poets had previously done in verse.[40] Isocrates, following in the footsteps of Gorgias, treats poetry simply as a branch of *logos*; for him prose is the new poetry, but as a *technē* it needs no Muses. Whereas Plato appropriates the Muses, replacing poetry with the *mousikē* of philosophy, Isocrates writes artistic prose on improving themes and dispenses with the Muses altogether.

The presence or absence of the Muses in these competing forms of discourse is not merely a cosmetic issue; rather it is indicative of fundamental differences in the way in which the disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy are conceptualized. From

[40] Cf. *Against the Sophists* 12 where rhetoric is called a ποιητικὸν πρᾶγμα. See further Nightingale (1995) 99–100 with bibliography.

Gorgias onwards rhetoric is conceived of as a skill which lies wholly within the field of human competence. Since its object is persuasion rather than truth, the speaker has no need to claim authority from a higher power in order to establish his credentials, nor does his ability to charm his audience depend on a source of knowledge outside himself. Isocrates, like Gorgias before him, has no interest in any form of transcendental truth as a means of validating human knowledge: he accepts contingency as a fact of life and focuses on the pursuit of a practical wisdom, based on experience and good judgement, which consists in 'the power to speak well and think right' (*Antidosis* 277). For Plato, on the other hand, the goal of the philosopher is to achieve knowledge of a stable and unchanging truth that lies beyond the reach of the senses. *Mousikē* for the Greeks was always a means of communicating with the divine, and the Muses traditionally vouchsafed knowledge of things hidden from mortal eyes. Hence Plato's use of the imagery of *mousikē* and his appropriation of its deities for his own philosophical project.

I have said that the idea that different Muses preside over different activities appears for the first time in Plato's *Phaedrus*, but it is not until Hellenistic times that the idea begins to crystallize. The process of differentiating between Muses and ascribing specific functions and attributes to each of them was a product of Alexandrian scholarship with its penchant for categorization and order, and Hesiod's naming of the Muses in the *Theogony* played a key role in this process. The iconography of the individual Muses, though not firmly fixed until the Roman Imperial era, clearly derives from their representation in Hellenistic art, as, for example, in the famous relief by Archelaus of Priene, the *Apotheosis of Homer*, where all nine Muses with their individual attributes are depicted in a sequence which seems to reflect Hesiod's list.[41] Hellenistic tradition must also lie behind Diodorus' discussion of the Muses in Book 4, ch. 7 of the *Bibliothēkē*. Beginning with the Hesiodic names, Diodorus proceeds to explain their functions thus:

[41] Cohon (1991–2); Faedo (1981) 76–7. On the Archelaus relief see also Zanker (1995) 158–62. For the importance of Hesiod in Hellenistic culture see the essays of Calame, Hurst and Veneri in Hurst and Schachter (1996); Hunter and Fantuzzi (2002).

τούτων δ' ἑκάστηι προσάπτουσι τὰς οἰκείας διαθέσεις τῶν περὶ μουσικὴν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷον ποιητικήν, μελωιδίαν, ὀρχήσεις καὶ χορείας, ἀστρολογίαν τε καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. παρθένους δ' αὐτὰς οἱ πλεῖστοι μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὸ τὰς κατὰ τὴν παιδείαν ἀρετὰς ἀφθόρους δοκεῖν εἶναι. Μούσας δ' αὐτὰς ὠνομάσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μυεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ διδάσκειν τὰ καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων ἀγνοούμενα. ἑκάστηι δὲ προσηγορίαι τὸν οἰκεῖον λόγον ἀπονέμοντές φασιν ὠνομάσθαι τὴν μὲν Κλειὼ διὰ τὸ τὸν ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως τῶν ἐγκωμιαζομένων ἔπαινον μέγα κλέος περι ποιεῖν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις, Εὐτέρπην δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τέρπειν τοὺς ἀκροωμένους τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς παιδείας ἀγαθοῖς, Θάλειαν δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ θάλλειν ἐπὶ πολλοὺς χρόνους τοὺς διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐγκωμιαζομένους, Μελπομένην δ' ἀπὸ τῆς μελωιδίας, δι' ἧς τοὺς ἀκούοντας ψυχαγωγεῖσθαι, Τερψιχόρην δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τέρπειν τοὺς ἀκροατὰς τοῖς ἐκ παιδείας περιγινομένοις ἀγαθοῖς, Ἐρατὼ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τοὺς παιδευθέντας ποθεινοὺς καὶ ἐπεράστους ἀποτελεῖν, Πολύμνιαν δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδιὰ πολλῆς ὑμνήσεως ἐπιφανεῖς κατασκευάζειν τοὺς διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων ἀπαθανατιζομένους τῆι δόξηι, Οὐρανίαν δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τοὺς παιδευθέντας ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἐξαίρεσθαι πρὸς οὐρανόν. τῆι γὰρ δόξηι καὶ τοῖς φρονήμασι μετεωρίζεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς ὕψος οὐράνιον. Καλλιόπην δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ καλὴν ὄπα προίεσθαι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῆι εὐεπείαι διάφορον οὖσαν ἀποδοχῆς τυγχάνειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκουόντων.

To each of the Muses men assign her special aptitude for one of the branches of the liberal arts, such as poetry, song, pantomimic dancing, choral dancing, the study of the stars and the other liberal arts. They are also believed to be virgins, as most writers of myth say, because men consider that the high attainment which is reached through education is pure and uncontaminated. Men have given the Muses their name from the word *muein*, which signifies the teaching of those things which are noble and expedient and are not known by the uneducated. For the name of each Muse, they say, men have found a reason appropriate to her: Clio is so named because the praise which poets sing in their encomia bestows great glory (*kleos*) upon those who are praised; Euterpe, because she gives to those who hear her sing delight (*terpein*) in the blessings which education bestows; Thaleia, because men whose praises have been sung in poems flourish (*thallein*) through long periods of time; Melpomene, from the singing (*melôdia*) by which she charms the souls of her listeners; Terpsichore, because she delights (*terpein*) her disciples with the good things which come from education; Erato, because she makes those who are instructed by her desirable and lovable (*eperastous*); Polymnia, because by her great (*pollê*) praises (*humnêsis*) she brings distinction to writers whose works have won for them immortal fame; Urania, because those who have been instructed by her are raised aloft to heaven (*ouranos*), for it is a fact that imagination and the power of thought lift men's souls to heavenly heights;

Calliope, because of her beautiful (*kale*) voice (*ops*), that is, by reason of the exceeding beauty of her language she wins the approbation of her auditors.[42]

Here we see that each Muse's function is interpreted on the basis of the supposed etymology of their Hesiodic names. There is a strong emphasis on poetry, and on the Muses as patron goddesses of *paideia*, a function which is ascribed to them collectively as a group, and individually to Euterpe, Terpsichore, Erato and Urania.

How the *paideia* over which the Muses preside relates to what was actually done in practice—are the Muses, as it were, the patron goddesses of the national curriculum?—is an interesting question. The general consensus seems to be that the 'musical' element in *mousikē* (in the sense of singing, dancing and playing) is gradually excluded from the curriculum of Hellenistic literate education, with *grammatikē*, the learning of letters and the study of literature, taking over from *mousikē*, so that music in the restricted sense becomes a specialized activity separated off from general culture and education.[43] If this is true, then we have the paradoxical situation of the Muses presiding over an educational system which does not involve *mousikē*: the Muses become unmusical. But the Muses' significance in Hellenistic culture goes far beyond that of tutelary deities of the classroom, and it is with this wider perspective in mind that Diodorus' account should be read. The proliferation of artistic representations of the Muses and the cults of poets and intellectuals that were established in cities throughout the Hellenistic world are an indication of the immense prestige of literature, learning and the life of the mind during this period. The veneration of the classical past and the civilized values that the study of the great works of literature were believed to impart found powerful expression in the image of the Muses as patron deities of

[42] Trans. C. Oldfather, Loeb edn., Harvard 1935. For discussion see Camilloni (1998) 78–80.

[43] Marrou (1965) 206–17; Morgan (1998) 12–13, 17. On the school curriculum see also Cribiore (2001), who does not discuss music at all. For a different view see Hadot (1984) 27–9, 215. She argues that, despite the dearth of inscriptions relating to victories in musical contests, choruses of young people must have performed frequently at festivals and local cults, and that instruction in music must therefore have remained a part of Hellenistic education just as it had been in Classical times, as is reflected in the Diodorus passage.

a *paideia* which was designed to perpetuate the cultural memory of the Greeks which they themselves embodied.[44]

In effect what we see in the Hellenistic period is the separation of the Muses from *mousikē* (in all senses of the word), and the development of their role as goddesses who preside over education, scholarship and learning. Their patronage of learning and scholarly activity in general is, of course, exemplified in the founding of the Museum at Alexandria, which was organized as a centre for the cultivation and worship of the Muses, with a so-called 'priest of the Muses' at its head (Strabo 17.794c).[45] This intellectualization of the Muses is exemplified not only in the Museum, 'the Muses bird-cage' where cloistered pedants pursued their endless quarrels, as the Sceptic, Timon famously remarked,[46] but also by the scholarly nature of the poetry which they were alleged to inspire. Thus, for example, in the *Aetia*, where Callimachus imagines himself transported in a dream to Helicon to be instructed by the Muses like Hesiod before him, many of the individual *aetia* in the first two books are responses by the goddesses to questions asked them by the poet. Hesiod's scene of poetic initiation is transformed, as Richard Hunter has put it, into 'the continuous presence of the chatty goddesses, there to answer questions when the poet's own deep learning fails'.[47]

It is the Muses' association with learning, *paideia* and culture which lies behind Curtius' claim that, 'In the view of Antiquity, the Muses belonged not only to poetry but to all higher forms of intellectual life besides', quoted at the beginning of this chapter. As we have seen, the particular forms of intellectual life over which they presided ranged from *mousikē* in its totality to poetry, philosophy, and scholarship. But, despite the tendency towards systematization which is evident from Hellenistic times onwards, the functions of the Muses continued to be flexible. This is particularly evident in the case of rhetoric, which deliberately fashioned itself as an 'unmusical' art at the time of its invention. But the

[44] For the Muses in Hellenistic art see Faedo (1981) 69–70; Ridgway (1990) 246–74 with bibliography. On the cult of poets and intellectuals see Zanker (1995) 158–88. On *Mouseia* in the Hellenistic period, see Lamberton (1988); Knoepfler (1996); Hardie (1997).

[45] See Fraser (1972) 312–19; Hadot (1984) 34 and 58.

[46] *Suppl. Hell.* 786.

[47] In his 2001 Gaisford lecture on 'Hesiod and Hellenistic Poetry' (unpublished). I am grateful to Prof. Hunter for sending me the text of this lecture.

absence of an association between the Muses and rhetoric became problematic in the Second Sophistic when rhetoric rather than poetry or philosophy became the dominant art form. Thus Aelius Aristides defends rhetoric against Plato's attack by claiming (at inordinate length) that it is an inspired art, and he invokes Hermes, Apollo, leader of the Muses, and all the Muses to aid him in his work (*In Defence of Oratory*, 19). The use of Muse imagery amongst Platonizing writers keen to rehabilitate rhetoric and unite it with philosophy is beautifully illustrated by Apuleius' adaptation of a famous sympotic *topos* in the *Florida* (20), where he gives us all the elements of the Muses' arts arranged in ascending order, with philosophy at the top:

> There is a famous saying of a wise man on the pleasures of the table: 'The first cup is for thirst, the second for gaiety, the third for pleasure, the fourth for madness.' But one could say the opposite about the Muses' cup, for the more one drinks and the purer it is, the more it contributes to the health of the soul. The first cup, which is that of the 'litterator' (the school teacher) removes ignorance. The second, that of the 'grammaticus', (the grammarian), provides us with learning (doctrina). The third, that of the rhetor, gives us eloquence. This is the limit to which most people drink. But I have drunk others too at Athens: the elegant cup of poetry, the lucid one of geometry, the sweet one of music, the austere one of dialectic; indeed I drank the cup of philosophy in its entirety, which tastes of nectar, and can never be drained.[48]

Apuleius here presents himself as the complete intellectual, a devotee of the Muses and a product of the *paideia* over which they preside.

But it is Plutarch who draws attention to the problem of rhetoric and the Muses in his *Quaestiones Convivales* book 9, which, appropriately for that particular book, consists of conversations held at Athens during the festival of the Muses (736c). Question 14 is entitled 'Unusual observations on the numbers of the Muses', and is indeed largely taken up with learned and playful discussion around the topic of the Muses' number. It begins, however, with libations to the Muses and a paean sung to Apollo, followed by the assembled company singing Hesiod's verses about the birth of the

[48] *Florida* 20. I have based my translation on the Budé text by P. Vallette, 2nd edn. (Paris 1960). For comment see Hadot (1984) 93–5; Harrison (2000) 126–7. On the place of rhetoric in ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία see Morgan (1998) 193–7.

Muses. Herodes, a teacher of rhetoric, begins the discussion by complaining that Calliope has been dragged away from rhetoricians, even though Hesiod says she is to be found in the company of princes 'when they are engaged in the business proper to orators and statesmen' (743d). Of the other Muses, Clio presides over laudatory eloquence (τὸ ἐγκωμιαστικόν), 'klea' being an old name for praise. Here we have the same etymological interpretation of the Muse's name as that of Diodorus, but whereas Diodorus speaks of the praise bestowed by poetry, Plutarch's Herodes applies it to rhetoric. Polymnia, he continues, presides over τὸ ἱστορικόν, since she is the memory of many things (μνήμη πολλῶν). (Presumably τὸ ἱστορικόν here refers to a historical style of speech rather than to history *per se*, since the context is that *rhetoric* belongs to the Muses.) Herodes himself lays claim to Euterpe because she has as her province the pleasant (ἐπιτερπές) and delightful elements in conversation and informal talk which are as much in the orator's sphere as are litigation and public policy. Again the etymological explanation mirrors that of Diodorus, but it is related to orators rather than poets. Ammonius then joins in, saying that the reason why Zeus fathered many Muses and not just one was because he wanted everyone to 'draw unstintedly from the well of beauty', and because everyone has need of education and speech (παιδείας καὶ λόγου 743f). The Muses' association with *logos* is further underlined by Plutarch's brother, Lamprias, who says that the ancients originally knew of three Muses only, a tradition which he explains at 744d:

> In my opinion the ancients, observing that all branches of knowledge and crafts that attain their end by the use of words (διὰ λόγου) belong to one of three kinds, namely the philosophical, the rhetorical, or the mathematical, considered them to be the gracious gifts of three goddesses, whom they named Muses. Later, in Hesiod's days in fact, by which time these faculties were being more clearly seen, they began to distinguish different parts and forms; they then observed that each faculty in its turn contained three different things. The mathematical genus includes music, arithmetic, and geometry, the philosophical comprises logic, ethics and natural science, while in the rhetorical it is said that the original laudatory kind was joined first by deliberative, and finally by the forensic. Thinking it wrong that any of these branches should be without its god or Muse or deprived of higher control and guidance, they naturally discovered, for manufacture they did not, the existence of as many Muses as there are branches . . . I do not imagine, you know, that the poets and the astronomers will charge me with passing over their arts; they understand just as well as you do that astronomy goes with geometry and poetry with music.[49]

The hasty apologia at the end which mentions poets and astronomers simply draws attention to more traditional views of the Muses' functions, which are here being provocatively challenged. One of the most unusual features of this conversation about the Muses is its appropriation of the Muses for rhetoric, which is summed up by the claim put forward by one of the characters in the dialogue, Menephylus the Peripatetic, who says: μουσικὸν δ' ἡ Πειθὼ καὶ Μούσαις φίλον ('Persuasion is a musical thing and dear to the Muses', 745c).

Like many other Greek divinities, the Muses represent ways of structuring human experience. Their particular sphere is that of artistic and intellectual creativity, and they change with the changing forms of human creativity. From the song culture of early Greece to the prose-dominated centuries of the Second Sophistic their functions vary in accordance with the prevailing art forms of the period. They are also closely associated with *paideia*, so that their story is inextricably bound up with the history of education and of culture. But though they were institutionalized and systematized, pedants and pedagogues were never quite able to capture them and pin them down: whatever their role, they embodied a vital force, for it was through the image of the Muse, and the complex interplay of Muses, *mousikē* and *paideia* that Greek cultural values were articulated.

[49] Trans. F. Sandbach, Loeb edn. (Harvard 1961). Hadot (1984) 98–9 discusses this passage, but with a rather different emphasis from mine. She sees it as evidence of a new kind of interpretation of the Muses' activities from a Platonising point of view, pointing out that what links the various arts of the Muses here is their foundation in reason. Hence medicine and agriculture are explicitly excluded from their domain at 745a. For the Muses and rhetoric see also Paus. 2.31.3. Polymnia is designated Muse of rhetoric at *Anth. Lat.* 664a, on which see Faedo (1981) 75.

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