Multicultural Odysseys

Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity

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a multicultural state acknowledges the ~~~~
to minority/non-dominant groups by these policies of assimilation and exclusion, and manifests a willingness to offer some sort of remedy or rectification for them.

These three interconnected ideas—repudiating the idea of the state as belonging to the dominant group; replacing assimilationist and exclusionary nation-building policies with policies of recognition and accommodation; and acknowledging historic injustice and offering amends for it—are common to virtually all real-world struggles for 'multiculturalism'.

Varieties of Liberal Multiculturalism

These points of commonality are very abstract, and as soon as we look at the details of specific countries, enormous differences emerge. The precise way in which minority groups wish to be recognized and accommodated, or to have their historic injustices amended, varies greatly from country to country, as well as between different minorities within a single country.

It would be impossible to provide a comprehensive overview of the different forms that multiculturalism can take, but for the purposes of illustration, let me focus on three general trends within Western democracies.

(a) *Indigenous peoples* The first trend concerns the treatment of indigenous peoples, such as the Indians and Inuit in Canada, the Aboriginal peoples of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand, the Sami of Scandinavia, the Inuit of Greenland, and Indian tribes in the United States. In the past, all of these countries had the same goal and expectation that indigenous peoples would eventually disappear as distinct communities, as a result of dying out, or intermarriage, or assimilation. A number of policies were adopted to speed up this process, such as stripping indigenous peoples of their lands, restricting the practice of their traditional cultures, languages, and religions, and undermining their institutions of self-government.[4]

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[4] For the similarities and differences in policies of Aboriginal assimilation across the New World settler states, see Armitage 1995.

However, there has been a dramatic reversal in these policies, starting in the early 1970s. Today, all of the countries I just mentioned accept, at least in principle, the idea that indigenous peoples will exist into the indefinite future as distinct societies within the larger country, and that they must have the land claims, cultural rights, and self-government rights, needed to sustain themselves as distinct societies.

Consider the constitutional affirmation of Aboriginal rights in the 1982 Canadian Constitution, along with the establishment of a land claims commission and the signing of new treaties; the revival of treaty rights through the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand; the recognition of land rights for Aboriginal Australians in the *Mabo* decision; the creation of Sami Parliaments in Scandinavia, the evolution of 'Home Rule' for the Inuit of Greenland; and the laws and court cases upholding self-determination rights for American Indian tribes. In all of these countries there is a gradual but real process of decolonization taking place, as indigenous peoples regain rights regarding their lands, legal norms, and self-government (Havemann 1999).

I will call this a shift towards a more 'multicultural' approach, although this term is not typically used by indigenous peoples themselves, who prefer the terminology of self-determination, treaty rights, and aboriginality or indigeneity, for reasons explored in Chapter 7. My colleague Keith Banting and I have developed a 'Multiculturalism Policy Index' which attempts to measure the extent of the shift (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). We first came up with a list of specific policies which can be taken as emblematic or representative of the new multicultural approach. In the case of indigenous peoples, this list includes the following nine policies:

(1) recognition of land rights/title;
(2) recognition of self-government rights;
(3) upholding historic treaties and/or signing new treaties;
(4) recognition of cultural rights (language, hunting/fishing);
(5) recognition of customary law;
(6) guarantees of representation/consultation in the central government;
(7) constitutional or legislative affirmation of the distinct status of indigenous peoples;
(8) support/ratification for international instruments on indigenous rights;
(9) affirmative action for the members of indigenous communities.

We then attempted to identify which of these policies were in force in which Western democracies in the period 1980 to 2000, and on that basis placed countries in one of three categories: those that had decisively shifted towards a multicultural approach, by adopting six or more of the nine policies; those that had made a more modest but still significant shift, by adopting between three and five of the nine policies; and those that had barely shifted in this direction, if at all, with two or fewer of these policies. Of the nine Western democracies with indigenous peoples, we concluded that four could be categorized as strongly multicultural (Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, United States), three were modestly multicultural (Australia, Finland, Norway), and only two had barely shifted (Japan, Sweden).[5] This is admittedly a rather crude way of trying to measure the extent to which Western democracies have adopted a more multicultural approach regarding indigenous peoples, but it does give some indication of a widespread if uneven trend.

(b) Substate/minority nationalisms The second trend concerns the treatment of substate 'national' groups, such as the Québécois in Canada, the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium, the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol in Italy, and Puerto Rico in the United States.[6] In all of these cases, we find a regionally concentrated group that conceives of itself as a nation within a larger state, and mobilizes behind nationalist political parties to achieve recognition of its nationhood, either in the form of an independent state or through territorial autonomy within the larger state. In the past, all of the above-mentioned countries have attempted to suppress expressions of substate nationalism. To have a regional group with a sense of distinct nationhood was seen as a threat to the state, putting into question the state's legitimate right to rule all of its territory and population. Various efforts were made to erode any sense of distinct nationhood, often using the same tools that were used against indigenous peoples—for example, restricting minority language rights, abolishing traditional forms of

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[5] For further details of how we assigned these scores, and the complications involved, see Banting and Kymlicka 2006: chap. 2.

[6] The French and Italian minorities in Switzerland could also be considered here, although some commentators dispute whether they display a 'national' (or 'nationalist') consciousness. I would argue that insofar as they have not displayed such a national consciousness, it's partly because (unlike virtually every other national minority in the West) they did not need to mobilize along nationalist lines in order to achieve territorial autonomy and official language status. Had federalization and multilingualism not been part of their initial terms of entry into the Swiss state, I suspect that they too would have developed the sort of nationalist political mobilization that we see elsewhere in the West.

regional self-government, and encouraging members of the dominant group to settle in the minority group's homeland in an effort to outnumber the minority even in its traditional territory.

However, there has been a dramatic reversal in the way Western countries deal with substate nationalisms. Today, all of the countries I have just mentioned have accepted the principle that substate national identities will endure into the indefinite future, and that their sense of nationhood and nationalist aspirations must be accommodated in some way or other. This accommodation has typically taken the form of what we can call 'multination and multilingual federalism': that is, creating a federal or quasi-federal subunit in which the minority group forms a local majority, and can thereby exercise meaningful forms of self-government.[7] Moreover, the group's language is typically recognized as an official state language, at least within their federal subunit, and perhaps throughout the country as a whole.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, only Switzerland and Canada had adopted this combination of territorial autonomy and official language status for substate national groups. Since then, however, virtually all Western democracies that contain sizeable substate nationalist movements have moved in this direction. The list includes the adoption of autonomy for the Swedish-speaking Aland Islands in Finland after World War I, autonomy for South Tyrol and Puerto Rico after World War II, federal autonomy for Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain in the 1970s, for Flanders in the 1980s, and most recently devolution for Scotland and Wales in the 1990s.

Indeed, if we restrict our focus to sizeable and territorially concentrated national minorities, this trend is now essentially universal in the West. All groups over 250,000 that have demonstrated a desire for territorial

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[7] In Spain, Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland, territorial autonomy for national minorities was achieved through a federalizing of the state, so as to create a federal subunit that was dominated by the national minority. The United Kingdom, by contrast, did not federalize the entire country, but created quasi-federal forms of territorial autonomy for Scotland and Wales. A similar quasi-federal autonomy regime exists for the Swedes in Finland, the Germans in South Tyrol, and for Puerto Rico in the United States. I use the term 'multination federalism' to cover both federal and quasi-federal forms of autonomy. It is important to distinguish such 'multination' federations from other federal systems where internal subunits are not designed to enable minority self-government, such as the continental United States, Germany, Australia, and Brazil. In these countries, none of the subunits was designed to enable a national minority to exercise self-government over its traditional territory, although it would have been possible in the American case. Indeed, in the United States, internal boundaries were deliberately drawn in such a way as to prevent the possibility of a minority-dominated subunit. For more on the difference between multination federalism and other forms of federalism, see Kymlicka 2001, chap. 5.

autonomy now have it in the West, as well as many smaller groups (such as the German minority in Belgium).

This, then, is the second major trend: a shift from suppressing substate nationalisms to accommodating them through regional autonomy and official language rights. Amongst the Western democracies with sizeable national minorities, only France is an exception to this trend, in its refusal to grant autonomy to its main substate nationalist group in Corsica. Even here, however, legislation was recently adopted to accord autonomy to Corsica, although this was struck down by a controversial ruling of the Constitutional Court.

There are some other potential exceptions. Northern Ireland is difficult to categorize, since Catholics are clearly a national minority, but are not territorially concentrated, and so the model of multination federalism is not available. Even here, however, we see clear movement in the direction of greater recognition of minority nationalism. Northern Ireland has recently adopted a peace agreement that explicitly accords Catholics a number of guarantees in terms of representation, and acknowledges their identification with co-nationals in Ireland.

Another complicated case is the Netherlands, where the sizeable Frisian minority lacks territorial autonomy or significant language rights, although this is largely because (virtually alone amongst such sizeable national minorities in the West) the group has not in fact mobilized along nationalist lines to acquire such rights. It is not clear that the Netherlands would reject such claims if clearly supported by most Frisians.[8]

Amongst Western countries, perhaps the only country that remains strongly and ideologically opposed to the official recognition of substate

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[8] It is entirely appropriate, from a liberal-democratic point of view, to ensure that minority claims for territorial autonomy are only accepted when they do in fact have genuine support, as reflected for example in consistently high levels of support for politicians or political parties that campaign for it. As the Frisian example shows, not all national minorities are mobilized in this way. National minorities do not enter the world with a fully formed nationalist consciousness: they are constructed by political actors who seek to persuade enough of their members that it makes sense to mobilize politically as a national minority for national goals. In the Frisian case, these attempts to generate a nationalist consciousness amongst the members of a minority have failed. From a historical viewpoint, the Frisians have as much claim to be a distinct 'people' as any other ethnonational group in Europe. Yet attempts by Frisian elites to persuade people of Frisian descent or people living in historic Friesland that they should support nationalist political objectives have repeatedly failed. This is fully acceptable from a liberal point of view. National minorities may have a right to claim territorial autonomy, but they certainly have no duty to do so. Whether or not a national minority claims territorial autonomy should be determined by the wishes of the majority of its members, as shaped and expressed through free democratic debate and contestation. Where this mobilization has been successful, the clear trend in the West has been to accommodate claims for territorial autonomy and official language status.

national groups is Greece, where the once-sizeable Macedonian minority has now been swamped in its traditional homeland.

Here again, I call this a shift towards a 'multicultural' approach to substate national groups, although this terminology is rarely used by these groups themselves, who prefer the language of nationhood, self-determination, federalism, and power-sharing. To measure the extent of this shift, Banting and I identified the following six policies as emblematic of a multicultural approach to substate national groups:

(1) federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy;

(2) official language status, either in the region or nationally;

(3) guarantees of representation in the central government or on constitutional courts;

(4) public funding of minority language universities/schools/media;

(5) constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of 'multinationalism';

(6) according international personality (e.g. allowing the substate region to sit on international bodies, or sign treaties, or have their own Olympic team).

Of the eleven Western democracies that contain sizeable national minorities (over 100,000 people), we concluded that eight have moved in this direction, five of them strongly, and three of them more modestly. The strongly multicultural countries are Belgium, Canada, Finland, Spain, and Switzerland; the modestly multicultural countries are Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, while the three hold-outs are France, Greece, and Japan. Here again, we see a clear trend, but with important variations in its depth or scope.

(c) *Immigrant groups* A third trend concerns the treatment of immigrant groups. Historically, the most important 'countries of immigration' (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) had an assimilationist approach to immigration. Immigrants were encouraged and expected to assimilate to the pre-existing society, with the hope that over time they would become indistinguishable from native-born citizens in their speech, dress, recreation, voting patterns, and way of life generally. Any groups that were seen as incapable of this sort of cultural assimilation were prohibited from emigrating in the first place, or from becoming citizens. This was reflected in laws that excluded Africans and Asians from entering these countries of immigration for much of the twentieth century, or from naturalizing.

Since the late 1960s, however, we have seen a dramatic change in this approach. There were two related changes: first, the adoption of race-neutral admissions criteria, so that immigrants to these countries are increasingly from non-European (and often non-Christian) societies; and second, the adoption of a more 'multicultural' conception of integration, one which expects that many immigrants will visibly and proudly express their ethnic identity, and which accepts an obligation on the part of public institutions (like the police, schools, media, museums, etc.) to accommodate these ethnic identities.

These twofold changes have occurred, to varying degrees, in all of the traditional countries of immigration. All of them have shifted from discriminatory to race-neutral admissions and naturalization policies. And all of them have shifted from an assimilationist to a more multicultural conception of integration. There are important differences in how official or formal this shift to multiculturalism has been. In Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, this shift was marked by the declaration of an official multicultural policy by the central government. But even in the United States, we see similar changes on the ground. The United States does not have an official policy of multiculturalism at the federal level, but if we look at lower levels of government, such as states or cities, we often find a broad range of multiculturalism policies. If we look at state-level policies regarding the education curriculum, for example, or city-level policies regarding policing or hospitals, we'll often find that they are indistinguishable from the way provinces and cities in Canada or Australia deal with issues of immigrant ethnocultural diversity. As in Canada, they have their own diversity programmes and/or equity officers. As Nathan Glazer puts it, 'we are all multiculturalists now' (Glazer 1997), although this perhaps understates the considerable variation across cities and states in the US in their commitment to multiculturalism policies.[9]

Similarly, in Britain, while there is no nation-wide multiculturalism policy, many of the same basic ideas and principles are pursued through their 'race relations' policy.[10] All of these countries have accepted

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[9] See also Joppke 2002, who notes that many countries have accommodated diversity claims without this being 'written on the forehead of the state' (Joppke 2002: 250). Experts in immigration and integration issues have repeatedly demolished the mythical contrast between the American 'melting pot' and the Canadian 'mosaic', yet the myth endures in the popular imagination. For more on variation in multiculturalism policies at the state level within the United States, see Hero and Preuhs 2006.

[10] For the British model of multiculturalism through race relations, see Favell 2001; Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000. Rights of entry into Britain maintain a degree of racial bias, as witnessed by the debate about whether 'British subjects' in Hong Kong would have the right to domicile in the UK itself.

the same twofold change—adopting race-neutral admissions and naturalization policies, and imposing on public institutions a duty to accommodate immigrant ethnocultural diversity—although the degree and formal recognition of the latter change vary from country to country.

This trend applies primarily to countries of immigration—that is, countries which legally admit immigrants as permanent residents and future citizens. Amongst such countries, the main exception to this trend is France, which retains an assimilationist conception of French republican citizenship.[11] It is a different story, however, in those countries that do not legally admit immigrants, such as most countries of northern Europe. These countries may well contain large numbers of 'foreigners', in the form of illegal economic migrants, asylum-seekers, or 'guest-workers', but these groups were not admitted as part of a deliberate immigration policy. As it happens, even some of these countries have adopted aspects of a 'multicultural' approach (e.g. Sweden and The Netherlands). But in general, the trend from assimilation to multiculturalism is one that has taken place most strongly within countries of immigration.

What are the specific policies that reflect this shift in approach? Banting and I identified the following eight policies as the most common or emblematic forms of immigrant multiculturalism:

(1) constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the central and/or regional and municipal levels;
(2) the adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula;[12]
(3) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing;
(4) exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation etc. (either by statute or by court cases);
(5) allowing dual citizenship;
(6) the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities;

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[11] As evidenced by the refusal to allow Muslim girls to wear headscarves to public school.

[12] Not all forms of education that teach about immigrant cultures qualify as 'multicultural education'. In Germany, for example, special education arrangements were set up for the children of Turkish guest-workers with the goal of preparing them to return to their 'home' (even if they were in fact born in Germany), on the assumption that they did not really belong in Germany. This sort of 'preparationist education' clearly differs from what is typically understood as 'multicultural education', and does not count as a multiculturalism policy. As discussed earlier, multiculturalism policies are policies that seek to recognize and accommodate ethnic diversity as a fact of society, not policies that seek to encourage ethnic groups to leave.

(7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction;
(8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.[13]

We then attempted to determine which countries had shifted in the direction of these policies, either strongly (by adopting six or more of the eight policies), or modestly (by adopting three to five of the eight policies). By our calculations, all four of the traditional countries of immigration have made this shift, some strongly (Australia, Canada) and others modestly (New Zealand, United States). However, if we look beyond these traditional immigration countries, the remaining seventeen Western democracies in our study offer a different picture. Of these, none has shifted strongly towards multiculturalism, and only four have made a modest shift (Belgium, The Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom), while the vast majority have essentially resisted the trend (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland).

So the shift to multiculturalism in this context is obviously more contested than in the case of indigenous peoples or substate nationalist groups. Whereas the majority of Western countries have made either a decisive or modest shift towards a multicultural approach for the 'old' minorities, the evidence is more mixed for immigrant groups. While there is a clear trend towards a more multicultural approach in the case of

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[13] Some commentators have suggested including a ninth policy—namely, a policy of admitting large numbers of immigrants as permanent residents and future citizens. Some people view a pro-immigration policy as itself a form of multiculturalism policy, on the assumption that only a country that is willing to accommodate diversity would voluntarily admit immigrants as future citizens. However, the link between immigration policy and multiculturalism is complex. Some critics of multiculturalism policies are in fact defenders of more open borders: they are happy with the idea of greater ethnic and racial diversity in the population, but simply oppose any government recognition or accommodation of this diversity through multiculturalism policies. This is a long-standing view amongst libertarians. Conversely, in some countries, support for multiculturalism policies is dependent on sharply limiting the number of new immigrants who can take advantage of these policies. This is often said to be the case in Britain. The quasi-multiculturalism policies adopted in the 1970s (under the heading of race relations) were part of a package in which the government said to Britons: 'we will close the door to new immigrants; but we expect you to accept and accommodate the immigrants from the Caribbean and South Asia who have already arrived'. Re-opening the door to immigration was seen as undermining the tenuous support for multiculturalism policies. We see a similar complex relationship between multiculturalism policies and refugee admission policies. While there is a tendency for pro-multiculturalism countries to have more generous policies on the admission of refugees (Kate 2005), this is not always the case, as witnessed by the harsh treatment of refugees in Australia, compared with the (formerly) generous openness to refugees in Germany, even though the former is pro-multiculturalism and the latter not. Policies about whether to admit people as immigrants or refugees, and policies about how to accommodate them once admitted, raise quite distinct issues. I am focusing on policies that concern the treatment of immigrant groups that already reside in the territory of the state, such as the eight policies listed above.

the traditional New World countries of immigration, it has been largely rejected elsewhere, and there are several high-profile cases of a 'retreat' from multiculturalism, to which I will return in the next chapter.

In one sense, it should not be surprising that the idea of multiculturalism for migrant communities has not taken root outside the traditional countries of immigration. After all, the idea of adopting a multicultural conception of citizenship presupposes that the newcomers are in fact 'citizens', rather than simply 'guests', 'visitors', or 'foreigners'. Yet this is precisely what was contested in many countries of continental Europe, until recently. As I noted earlier, post-war migrants in Europe were not typically admitted as permanent residents and future citizens under an explicit immigration policy. Rather, they entered under a variety of other guises. Some migrants entered a country illegally (e.g. North Africans in Italy), others as asylum-seekers (e.g. Kosovars in Switzerland), and yet others as students or 'guest-workers' who renewed (or overstayed) their initial visa (e.g. Turks in Germany). When they entered the country, these people were not conceived of as future citizens, or even as long-term residents, and indeed they would not have been allowed to enter in the first place if they had been seen as permanent residents and future citizens. However, whatever the initial expectations and official rules, they have settled more or less permanently. In principle, and to some extent in practice, some of these migrants may face the threat of deportation if they are detected by the authorities, or if they are convicted of a crime. But they nonetheless form sizeable communities in certain countries, engage in some form of employment, legal or illegal, and marry and form families. Borrowing a term from Ancient Greece, Walzer calls these groups 'metics'—that is, *de facto* long-term residents who are nonetheless excluded from the polis (Walzer 1983).

The issue of adopting multiculturalism can barely arise until such groups move out of the category of temporary foreigners and move into the category of permanent residents and citizens,[14] which is indeed what many of these groups have sought. But this has not been an easy transition to make. Some countries have no established process or infrastructure for integrating immigrants, and so resist accepting that they are now *de facto* 'countries of immigration'. Moreover, many of these metics have

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[14] As I noted in n. 12, a form of pseudo-multiculturalism has sometimes been adopted for metics, on the assumption that encouraging the members of a group to maintain their language and culture will make it more likely they will return to their country of origin. But this 'preparationist' form of multiculturalism is the antithesis of the idea of multicultural citizenship developed in the traditional countries of immigration.

either broken the law to enter the country (illegal immigrants), or are seen as reneging on their promise to return to their country of origin (students, guest-workers, asylum-seekers), and so are not viewed as worthy of citizenship. Moreover, countries with no tradition of accepting newcomers are often more xenophobic, and prone to view all foreigners as potential security threats, or as potentially disloyal, or simply as unalterably 'alien'. In these countries, of which Austria and Switzerland are the best-known examples, the official policy has not been to try to integrate metics into the national community, but to get them to leave the country, either through expulsion or voluntary return. In short, the hope was that if metics were denied citizenship, so that they only had a precarious legal status within the country, and if they were told repeatedly that their real home was in their country of origin, and that they were not wanted as members of the society, then they would eventually go home.

But it is increasingly recognized that this approach is not viable. Metics who have lived in a country for several years are unlikely to go home, even if they have only a precarious legal status. This is particularly true if the metics have married and had children in their adopted country. At this point, it is their new country, not their country of origin, which has become their 'home'. Indeed, it may be the only home that the metics' children and grandchildren know. Once they have settled, founded a family, and started raising their children, nothing short of expulsion is likely to get metics to return to their country of origin.

So a policy based on the hope of voluntary return is unrealistic. Moreover, it endangers the larger society. For the likely result of such a policy is to create a permanently disenfranchised, alienated, and racially or ethnically defined underclass. Metics may develop an oppositional subculture in which the very idea of pursuing success in mainstream institutions is viewed with suspicion. The predictable consequences can involve some mixture of political alienation, criminality, and religious fundamentalism amongst the metics, particularly the second generation, which in turn leads to increased racial tensions, even violence, throughout the society.

To avoid this, there is an increasing trend in Western democracies, even in non-immigrant countries, to enable metics to regularize their status and to naturalize. Asylum-seekers whose refugee claims are accepted are granted permanent residence and access to citizenship, and not required to return to their country of origin even when the danger of persecution has passed. Guest-workers who have renewed (or overstayed) their visa are often able to gain permanent residence. Periodic amnesties are offered for illegal immigrants. In effect, long-settled metics are increasingly treated as

if they had initially arrived as legal immigrants, and are allowed to follow the immigrant path to integration. In some cases, this integration process has been revised in a more 'multicultural' direction—Sweden is a prominent case, declaring 2006 to be The Year of Multiculturalism—although this remains uncommon outside the traditional countries of immigration.

Three Key Features of Liberal Multiculturalism

In relation to indigenous peoples, substate national groups, and immigrants, then, there has been a shift away from historic policies of assimilation or exclusion towards a more multicultural approach that recognizes and accommodates diversity. As we will see in Part III, each of these trends has, to varying degrees, shaped emerging international norms— most strongly in the case of indigenous peoples, more modestly regarding substate national groups, and quite minimally for immigrant groups. Various aspects of this shift will be explored throughout the volume, but for our immediate purposes, three points are worth highlighting, in order to forestall misunderstandings—first, about the different categories of minorities; second, about the content of the rights that are accorded to these minorities; and third, about the relationship between multiculturalism and nation-building.

First, as this brief survey suggests, liberal multiculturalism in the West is highly group-differentiated, or to use the terminology I introduced earlier, it is highly 'targeted'. Liberal multiculturalism guarantees certain generic minority rights to all ethnocultural groups, but it also elaborates a number of targeted categories of minority rights. The precise categories differ from country to country, but they typically fall into the same basic pattern. The most common distinction is between 'old' minorities, who were settled on their territory prior to it becoming part of a larger independent country, and 'new' minorities, who were admitted to a country as immigrants after it achieved legal independence. But within the category of 'old' minorities, a further distinction is typically drawn between 'indigenous' groups and other historic minorities, often called 'national minorities' or 'nationalities'.

We see this basic threefold pattern in several Western democracies. Finland, for example, accords different rights to the Sami, as an indigenous people, than to the Swedes, who are a traditional cross-border national minority, and both of these 'old minorities' have a different set of minority rights from those of 'new minorities' established through recent

migration. Similarly, Denmark distinguishes the rights of the indigenous Inuit in Greenland from the rights of the (cross-border) German national minority, and distinguishes both of these from the rights of new immigrants.[15] Canada distinguishes the rights of the indigenous Aboriginal peoples (Indians, Inuit, and Métis) from those of the historic French colonial settlers of New France (Quebec) whose presence predated the British colonization of North America, and distinguishes both of these old minorities from the multicultural rights accorded to ethnic groups formed by immigration to the country. In the United States, indigenous Indian tribes have a different legal status from the historic Spanish colonial settlement of Puerto Rico conquered by the Americans in 1898, and both of these are distinguished from the legal status accorded to immigrant ethnic groups.

Of course, not all countries have all three types of ethnocultural diversity. Australia and New Zealand, for example, have both indigenous peoples and immigrant ethnic groups, but no substate nationalist groups. Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, and Britain, by contrast, all have issues of substate nationalism and immigration, but no indigenous peoples. In all of these cases, however, the framework of liberal multiculturalism remains group-differentiated. Britain, for example, distinguishes the rights of its historic substate 'nations' (the Scots, Welsh, and Irish) from its immigrant-origin 'minorities'.

Indeed, I'm not aware of any Western democracy that relies solely on generic minority rights to govern its ethnocultural diversity, without any element of targeted minority rights. Moreover, this targeted element is not marginal or peripheral. On the contrary, the entire infrastructure of liberal multiculturalism is often built around it. In most countries, the different forms of ethnocultural diversity are governed by different pieces of legislation, which are administered by different government departments, using different concepts and principles. Indigenous peoples, substate nationalist groups, and immigrants all form their own policy 'tracks', and one of the most striking aspects of liberal multiculturalism in the West is how separate these targeted tracks are from each other, administratively and legally.[16] Countries can and do move at very different speeds

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[15] For details of how all four Nordic countries distinguish these three categories of indigenous, national minorities, and migrants, see Hannikainen 1996.

[16] In the Canadian case, for example, the guiding concepts used in articulating and negotiating claims within the Aboriginal track include treaty rights, Aboriginal rights, common law title, *sui generis* property rights, fiduciary trust, indigeneity, self-government, and self-determination. The main concepts used in articulating and negotiating claims within the French-Canadian track include bilingualism, duality, (asymmetric) federalism, distinct

along the different tracks. A country can be a trail-blazer in one mode of multiculturalism while a hold-out in another. For example, compared to its Nordic neighbours, Sweden has been unusually supportive of multiculturalism for immigrants, but unusually resistant to land claims and self-government rights for the indigenous Sami. Switzerland has been a model for the accommodation of substate national minorities through official language rights and regional autonomy, but has been perhaps the most exclusionary country in Europe in its treatment of immigrants. Countries can be advancing along one track, while retreating along another.

It is quite surprising how little interaction or spillover there is between these different policy tracks. And when the various struggles for multiculturalism do interact, they are as likely to conflict as to cooperate. Immigrants, national minorities, and indigenous peoples may all seek to challenge their historic subordination to the dominant group, but they don't necessarily support each other's struggles. Immigrants may not instinctively support demands by indigenous peoples and substate national groups for greater self-government, and these historic minorities in turn may not instinctively support demands by immigrant groups for multicultural citizenship (Medda-Windischer 2004). Liberal multiculturalism as it has evolved in the West is the outcome of multiple struggles by different types of ethnocultural groups, mobilizing along different legal and administrative tracks, and not a single unified struggle in the name of 'diversity'.

We cannot hope to understand the theory and practice of liberal multiculturalism without coming to grips with its targeted or group-differentiated character. Any attempt to articulate liberal multiculturalism as if it were purely a matter of generic minority rights is doomed to failure. The logic of liberal multiculturalism cannot be captured in the form 'all minorities have a right to X' or 'all persons belonging to minorities have a right to X'. Different types of minorities have fought for, and gained, different types of minority rights, and this group-differentiated targeting is key both to understanding the challenges involved in adopting liberal multiculturalism and to evaluating its successes and limitations to date. Unfortunately, as we will see in Part III, international organizations, for reasons of both principle and expediency, have had difficulty acknowledging the targeted nature of liberal multiculturalism.

society, and nationhood. And the main concepts used in the immigrant track include multiculturalism, citizenship, integration, tolerance, ethnicity, diversity, and inclusion. For a more detailed discussion of the legal and political separation between these tracks or 'silos' in Canada, see Kymlicka 2007.

The second key point I want to emphasize concerns the content of the minority rights found within Western liberal multiculturalism. Many commentators discuss multiculturalism as if it were primarily focused on issues of symbolic recognition, and hence disconnected from issues regarding the distribution of material resources or political power. It is common, for example, to say that multiculturalism reflects 'the politics of recognition' as opposed to the 'politics of redistribution',[17] or to say that it pursues 'the politics of identity' as opposed to the 'politics of interests'.

These distinctions between 'recognition' and 'redistribution', or between 'identities' and 'interests', are useful for some analytic purposes. But it should be clear that liberal multiculturalism as it has evolved in the West is not restricted to questions of symbolic recognition or identity politics. Liberal multiculturalism also addresses issues of power and resources. This is particularly clear in relation to national minorities and indigenous peoples, where states have been restructured to create new political units that enable minority self-government. In relation to these groups, Western democracies have moved away from older models of unitary, centralized nation-states, and repudiated older ideologies of 'one state, one nation, one language'. Today, virtually all Western states that contain indigenous peoples and substate national groups have become 'multination' states, recognizing the existence of self-governing 'peoples' and 'nations' within the boundaries of the state. This recognition is manifested in a range of minority and indigenous rights that include regional autonomy and official language status for national minorities, and customary law, land claims, and self-government for indigenous peoples.

In the case of immigrants, the changes may be less obvious, since we do not see the same type of devolution or federalization of state power to minority-controlled political units. But if we return to the list of immigrant multiculturalism policies in the West (see p. 73 above), several are intended to enhance access to state power, public services, and economic opportunities. These include affirmative action policies, mechanisms for political participation and consultation, and the development of health care and social service delivery models that are adapted to the needs of minorities.

Taken together, these trends represent a dramatic transformation in the relationship between states and ethnic groups. These changes are not purely token or symbolic. On the contrary, they often involve a significant redistribution of economic resources and political power—something

[17] For the *locus classicus* of this distinction, see Fraser 1995, 1998, 2000.

close to a genuine sharing of power—as well as giving non-dominant groups enhanced access to state institutions.

This linking of identities and interests within multiculturalism policies should not surprise us, since it mirrors the way identities and interests are linked in the nation-building policies to which multiculturalism is a response. State nation-building is not just about recognizing a particular majority identity—although it is indeed an example *par excellence* of the 'politics of identity'—but also about building public institutions around that identity, so that it becomes a source of economic opportunity, political power, and social prestige. Liberal multiculturalism has the same aspiration to link identities and interests. It not only recognizes particular minority identities, but seeks to transform the economic opportunities, political powers, and social status available to bearers of that identity.

The precise ways in which 'recognition' and 'redistribution', or 'identity' and 'interests', are combined varies from one multiculturalism policy to another, and from one group to another. If it's a mistake to treat multiculturalism as purely a matter of symbolic recognition, it would equally be a mistake to treat it as purely a disguised form of class politics. While it is common for minorities to suffer simultaneously from political, economic, and cultural exclusion, the links between these different forms of exclusion are complex, and multiculturalism policies track this variability.

Some groups, like indigenous peoples, are disproportionately concentrated in vulnerable economic positions, politically marginalized, and subject to demeaning or silencing cultural representations—and their claims address these multiple forms of subordination. But there are other groups that combine cultural and political exclusion with economic privilege. A striking example is Chinese minorities in South-East Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, or Thailand. In each of these countries, the Chinese minority forms a small percentage of the population, yet often owns a large part—perhaps even the dominant part—of the economy. In Indonesia, for example, the Chinese minority forms around 3 per cent of the population, but is estimated to control 70 per cent of the private economy. Yet, despite their economic privileges, they have faced serious cultural exclusions. Until recently, Chinese-language education was restricted; and it was forbidden to publish in Chinese, or to put Chinese characters on shop signs. In Thailand, the Chinese were pressured to adopt Thai surnames. More generally, Chinese groups in the region are often still defined as 'foreigners' who do not really

belong, even if they have been living in the country for generations; they are invisible in the public sphere, and excluded from state symbols and national narratives.[18]

The case of economically privileged but culturally stigmatized traders may seem like a peculiarity of the 'crony capitalism' found in authoritarian regimes (Chua 2003; Riggs 1994). But there are many cases within the established Western democracies of groups that are culturally stigmatized without suffering economic exclusion. A non-ethnic example is that of gays and lesbians in most Western democracies, who enjoy similar per-capita levels of income or education as heterosexuals, but are targets of homophobia. Some well-established immigrant or religious groups, like Arab-Americans, enjoy higher-than-average levels of education and income, but are culturally marginalized or stigmatized. They are typically invisible in public space, except when presented in the media or Hollywood as terrorists or religious fundamentalists.

Or consider a substate nationalist minority like the Catalans. They enjoy the same standard of living as the majority—in fact, somewhat higher—yet they have suffered from cultural exclusion, as their language and culture have been stigmatized as inferior by the majority. They resent the way their language and traditions have been marginalized by the central government, and have mobilized for regional autonomy (or even independence).[19]

So not all multiculturalist claims involve a demand for economic redistribution. But even in these cases, multiculturalism is not purely 'symbolic'—it still centrally involves issues of political power and representation (such as the Catalan demand for autonomy). To be sure, as we will see next chapter, there are political actors who would like to reduce multiculturalism to mere symbolism. In many cases, political elites and government officials may have hoped and expected that token reforms would be sufficient. They may have hoped that it would be enough to put a few words of a minority language on the state currency, for example, or to put an indigenous historical figure on a postage stamp, and this would satisfy aspirations for 'recognition'. However, whatever the original intention of government officials, non-dominant groups have

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[18] In the Indonesian case, for example, the Chinese are invisible in the authoritative state representations of national history at the main independence monument (Monas) or at the 'Taman Mini' complex that illustrates the cultures of the country. For a general overview of the status of Chinese in South-East Asia, see Ho 2000.

[19] For a refutation of the common view that these movements are a reaction to economic underdevelopment, see Connor 1993.

used multicultural reforms as a springboard for negotiating significantly enhanced access to public resources, powers and offices.

The success of these struggles for a more substantive form of multiculturalism will be evaluated in Chapter 5. But for now, the key point is that multiculturalism is not inherently about recognition rather than redistribution or identities rather than interests. The sorts of policies listed in this chapter cut across these distinctions, addressing issues of legal rights, political decision-making, economic resources, and public services. Indeed, this is why multiculturalism in its various forms has been so controversial, both in the West and in the rest of the world. We can't hope to understand these controversies if we assume in advance that multiculturalism is just about symbols.

A third potential misunderstanding concerns the link between liberal multiculturalism and nation-building. I said earlier that multiculturalism, in all of its different forms, involves a repudiation of older models of homogeneous nationhood. One might assume, therefore, that multiculturalism and nationalism are sworn enemies and inherently contradictory ideologies, and that support for one entails repudiation of the other. On this view, there is a zero-sum relationship between multicultural policies and nation-building policies, such that multiculturalism can only take root in a 'post-national' state and society. In reality, however, the sort of multiculturalism that has emerged within the West has transformed nation-building, not replaced it. All Western countries continue to adopt a range of policies to inculcate overarching national identities and loyalties, including the mandatory teaching of the nation's language, history, and institutions in schools, language tests for citizenship, the funding of national media and museums, and the diffusion of national symbols, flags, anthems, and holidays, to name just a few. This is as true of countries that qualify as 'strongly' multicultural in my lists above as of countries that have made little if any shift in a multicultural direction. However, where multiculturalism policies have been adopted, they operate to supplement and transform these nation-building policies so that the latter are less likely to marginalize or stigmatize minorities—for example, by ensuring that nation-building policies do not exclude metics and racial caste groups, or coercively assimilate immigrants, or undermine the self-government of national minorities and indigenous peoples. In those Western countries that have strongly moved in the direction of multiculturalism, the resulting approach is best described as one in which robust forms of nation-building are combined and constrained by robust forms of minority rights.

My assessment of the strength of multiculturalism in various countries therefore does not track the extent to which these states have repudiated nation-building, but rather, the extent to which nation-building has been transformed in a more pluralistic direction. In this respect, my conception of the difference between 'strong', 'modest', and 'weak' multiculturalism differs from the way these terms are sometimes used. David Miller, for example, also distinguishes between stronger and weaker forms of multiculturalism, which he labels 'radical' and 'moderate'. But on his view, 'radical' multiculturalism involves a commitment to accommodating minorities without simultaneously promoting an overarching identification with (and loyalty to) the larger political community and state (Miller 1995, chap. 5, 2000: 105–6, 2006). He distinguishes this from a 'moderate' multiculturalism that combines multiculturalism with nation-building policies that seek to inculcate an overarching political identity and loyalty. In the British context, for example, moderate multiculturalism would tell citizens that there are many different and legitimate ways of 'being British', and that being British is not inconsistent with the public expression and accommodation of other identities, including 'being Muslim' or 'being Scottish', whereas radical multiculturalism would absolve or discourage minorities from adopting such a pan-ethnic super-ordinate political identity.

This distinction between radical and moderate multiculturalism may be useful for some analytic purposes, but all actually existing forms of multiculturalism in the Western democracies qualify as 'moderate' in Miller's sense, operating to transform rather than repudiate nation-building. No Western democracy has abandoned nation-building policies, whether in the field of official languages, core curricula in schools, citizenship requirements, state symbols, public media, and so on. But these nation-building policies have, to varying extents in different countries, been qualified and transformed by multiculturalism policies.[20]

What we see in the 'real world of liberal democracies', therefore, is a complex dialectic of state nation-building (state demands on minorities) and minority rights (minority demands on the state). The choice

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[20] Indeed, in the context of substate nationalist groups and indigenous peoples, we can say that multiculturalism has actually multiplied nation-building projects. By acknowledging the presence of these 'nations within', and according them self-governing powers, liberal multiculturalism enables them to adopt their own (substate) nation-building projects, subject to the same limitations and qualifications needed to protect 'internal minorities' within these self-governing territories. For a fuller discussion of how multiculturalism both enables and constrains these nation-building projects, at state and substate levels, see Kymlicka 2001.

is not between nationhood and multiculturalism, but between different packages of policies that combine the enduring aspirations and functional needs for nation-building with the equally enduring demands to accommodate diversity.[21]

In short, liberal multiculturalism is a more complicated phenomenon than many people realize. It is not a single principle or policy, but an umbrella of highly group-differentiated approaches. And each of these approaches is itself multidimensional, incorporating economic, political, and cultural elements in different ways. Each also has its own complex links to policies and practices of nation-building. There is a natural tendency to want to simplify this complexity, and to reduce multiculturalism to a single principle or dimension, as if it was all really about, say, 'protecting endangered cultural traditions', or 'validating stigmatized identities', or 'repudiating nationalism'. But we need to avoid these simplifying presuppositions, and to examine in a more open-minded way why these various policies emerged, what they were intended to achieve, and how they are operating in practice.

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In this chapter, I have tried to outline some of the main forms of liberal multiculturalism in the West. I have not yet shown that they are 'liberal' in any meaningful sense, beyond the fact that they emerged within the framework of Western liberal democracies. To show this requires examining the nature of the mobilization that gave rise to these reforms, and the actual effects (intended and unintended) of adopting them. That is my goal in the next two chapters.

Defenders of these reforms have argued that they are needed to overcome deep-seated forms of exclusion and stigmatization, helping Western democracies to become freer, fairer, more inclusive, and indeed more

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[21] Far from being inherently mutually contradictory, it might be more accurate to view nation-building and multiculturalism as providing the legitimating conditions for each other. Were it not for the presence of nation-building policies that potentially harm minorities, many claims for multicultural rights would appear as simply 'privileges' or 'special interests'. Conversely, were it not for the presence of minority rights, many nation-building policies would appear as unjust privileges for the majority. After all, we cannot simply take for granted that it is legitimate for liberal-democratic states to insist on common national languages, education systems, citizenship tests, and so on, and to impose these on minorities. As I discussed earlier, there are certain valid purposes that are promoted by nation-building policies, such as civic solidarity. But it is not legitimate to pursue these goals by assimilating, excluding, or disempowering minorities, or by imposing costs and burdens on groups that are often already disadvantaged. Unless supplemented and constrained by minority rights, state nation-building is likely to be oppressive and unjust.