Chapter 5 The formation of the 'major independent' Miramax, New Line and the New Hollywood Justin Wyatt While much of the economic film history of the New Hollywood has focused on the conglomeration of the industry and the globalization of media production, the industrial structure has changed not just for the major studios, but also for those distributors on the margins, the independent film and video distributors. In this chapter, I intend to analyse how the marketplace for independent film (films not released by the majors) has shifted in the past two decades by considering the development of the two largest independent companies, New Line Cinema and Miramax Films. The case studies of New Line and Miramax illuminate the diverse distribution, marketing and advertising methods developed and co-opted by the independents to weather an increasingly competitive economic climate. Perhaps strongest evidence of the two companies' success in traversing the marketplace can be seen by the recent mergers between these independents and major companies which have provided both New Line and Miramax with substantial financial backing-In terms of independent production, the video and cable boom initially seemed to create an increased demand for product. As one industry analyst commented in 1987, Why are there suddenly so many new companies joining the low-budget bandwagon — companies like Cinecom and Island, Goldwyn and Alive, Skouras, Cineplex, Atlantic, Vestron and Spectrafilm? The answer is home video. For one thing, the independent home video companies need products to fill their pipelines. Since the studios already have their own video companies, new movie forces need to be created.1 This boom can be evidenced through the dramatic increase in independent production in the second half of the 1980s, particularly from 1988 on. Considering all films receiving MPAA ratings, independent films increased from 193 in 1986 be 277 in 1987 and to 393 in 1988.2 The figures for 1989 through 1991 also remained close to the 400 mark. The formation of the 'major independent' 75 is period of increased production was marked by a substantial growth in me costs and by the widespread failure of most independent films: between jog 1989, the years coinciding with the film production boom, negative SDubled, while film rentals for independent companies dropped 33 per •.-.jse companies which were able to launch one or more breakthrough ji. extended their assets and weakened their longevity in the marketplace. about $63 million in domestic gross for Dirty Dancing in 1987, but . :ed to double production. With failures ranging from art house films ~- _ ■ . - Gothic (1986), John Huston's The Dead ( 1987)) to teen pics (Dream '. 1989), Biß Man on Campus (19S9)), the company had financing cut - .-.v. Pacific National Bank, and was forced to shut down production and r ~ in 1989.'' Similarly, Cinecom, after A Room With a View (1986), and iiter My Life As a Dog (1987), were unable to replicate their initial major Other independent companies, such as New Century/Vista, Circle, Odeon, Spectrafilm and Weintraub Entertainment Group, could not cwen one breakthrough success. _?o has proven to be an unreliable market for the independents. Indeed, ii and 'sell-through' (purchased directly for the home) videos have been ■jed as 'A' title businesses. As Strauss Zelnick, former president and ating officer of Twentieth Century Fox, comments on this video is released after theaters, the success in video tracks the ss in theaters like every other market. Certain pictures outperform ;»aceo, but that would never induce you to make a picture because if it m at the box office, video will not 'fix' the failure. A movie will u&alu in accordance with its performance at the box office which BBS tou won't make enough money to justify the decision.3 S3, successes drive the push at every additional market window so that 'A' we most likely to translate to video and cable successes. Consider that NBe top ten sell-through titles in 1991, five were distributed bv Buena Vista ^Classics), with the remaining titles all grossing over S75 million theatri-"*"h^e the video market expanded, independent companies were not the : • : this growth in the long run. Part of this phenomen : D :; rxphfawH msr: towards sell-through spending in the video market: while rental spend-■ increased between 1985 and 1992, the amount allocated to sell-through multiplied seven times during the period.7 Only certain titles are launched ■i-through approach: namely those videos which have already proven their a: tr.-e theatrical box office. Films that are star based and famihv oriented ■xctore possess repeatability in home use) also have a greater chance of 76 Economics, industry and institutions being sell-through items.8 These factors tend to privilege in the video market major releases with a track record of box office performance. Consequently, many of the independent companies initially 'helped' by video and cable eventually severely cut production (for example, Cinecom and Cannon) or exited the market altogether (for example, Island, Alive, FilmDallas, Skouras, Vestron, Atlantic Releasing, Avenue, DEG). By 1992, the top-grossing imports were distributed only by New Line, Miramax, Goldwyn, and the dying Orion Classics.9 New Line and Miramax have been able to withstand this shakeout by consistently developing movies with the potential to cross over beyond the art house market. The companies differ in the methods employed for long-run survival though. Whereas New Line has continually favoured gradual expansion and diversification only following breakthrough successes, Miramax's presence is based much more on marketing and targeting audiences beyond a narrow art house niche. In the process, both companies have been able to develop respectable market shares and some commercially impressive cross-over films. New Line Cinema and franchising Formed in 1967 by Robert Shaye, New Line Cinema began as a non-theatrical distributor focusing on the market for 'special events' on college campuses. Through such films as Reefer Madness (1936) and Sympathy For the Devil (1970) and a lecture series representing among others William Burroughs, Norman Mailer and R.D. Laing, New Line maintained a constant presence until 1973 when Shaye decided to open a theatrical distribution arm.10 Shaye targeted his product narrowly, distributing, as described by Variety, 'arty and freak' films. 'Arty' translates to films by Lina Wertmuller (The Seduction of Mimi (1974)), Claude Chabro! (Wedding in Blood (1973)) and Pier Paolo Pasolini (Porcile (1969)), while 'freak' would include Reefer Madness, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (1974) and Pink Flamingos (1972). Shaye opened some of these films, such as Pink Flamingos, in a midnight screening pattern, followed by a larger theatrical release. By 1974, the New Line Cinema distribution slate mixed foreign, sexploitation, gay cinema, rock documentaries and 'midnight specials' reserved exclusively for midnight exhibition. The intent behind these choices was to tap those markets which would be ignored by the majors, and to maximize the difference of New Line's product from more traditional commercial film. In 1978, New Line began a limited policy of film production inspired by two major factors. As the market for art films became more established, a greater number of distributors entered the marketplace and competition became more intense within this market. As a result, 'the bidding auction' for film distributior. encouraged the price to rise. New Line had already begun to advance money The formation of the vmajor independent' 77 ■Ver the small amount of $150,000) in pre-production deals to acquire the ■■meted pictures for distribution.11 Shaye's decision to enter production was bv access to a fresh source of production funds: Chemical Bank and a — _r :: rrivate investors supplied a $5 million loan based on New Line's consist :.< record.12 Vowing to limit budgets to under $2 million, Shaye maintained IK kis decision to enter production was also motivated by the growing rs__: .-• jf money from television, syndication, foreign territories and other osrv markets.13 ■er die next decade, New Line continued to augment their distribution slate miups, often forming long-term alliances with production companies. For New Line signed an exclusive three-year deal with the British company Tide Productions giving New Line all North American rights, excluding :nr Pictures.15 During the decade, New Line also managed to translate the Kjzrt: exploitation film A Nightmare on Elm Street (1985) into a wildly profit-ci-rart series by developing the iconic value of Freddy Krueger. Breaking ±je expected decay from film to film in a series, Nightmare III (1987) grossed m3on more than Nightmare II (1985) and Nightmare IV (1988) grossed $7 e more than Nightmare III. Revenue from the franchise was funnelled back fee company rather than into hasty and sizeable production and distribution s<:c: as Shaye commented, 'We are a highly efficient operation with signifi-ir*- overhead. One Elm Street annually suffices to pay for it. We do not need pictures merely to support our distribution apparatus, so we can be me in our judgments'.1 e '•-.zhtmare franchise was augmented by New Line's most successful film — cs successful independent film ever made — Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, Bsc Si35 million in 1990. The film moved New Line from a loss position in — i $5.3 million profit for the first half of 1990.17 Picking up the completed Vf« Line's share of ticket sales amounted to only 15 per cent, yet this tided to the Nightmare franchise, transformed the company.18 Based on a about crusading radioactive reptiles, the film possessed a wide level of given the comic book and a host of assorted merchandised items: in tir prior to the film's release, over 100 companies licensed Turtles axiise totalling approximately $350 million. Immediatelv on release, New executives began referring to the Turtles as a franchise — Turtles II was a vear after the first film and Turtles III two years later. The lag on the Em did not lower the box office revenue. As New Line marketing and ■Don president Mitchell Goldman described at the release date of Turtles III, 's no question that we knew the turtles weren't what thev once were. 78 Economics, industry and institutions However, there's a second generation of children who are 3 or 4 years old and who love the turtles. We knew the videocassettes, TV show, and toys were still selling well.'19 New Line's franchises recall Paramount's adherence to 'tent pole' movies: in the mid-1980s, Paramount built their release schedule around commercial tent poles, like the Indiana Jones, Star Trek and Beverly Hills Cop movies, which could support less viable projects.20 For New Line, the franchise permitted two developments: the creation of a home video division and a separate distribution arm, Fine Line Features, devoted to more specialized, hard-to-market films. While many New Line films had been distributed through RCA/Columbia Pictures Home Video, the benefits of retaining video rights were clear: control of another window of release and the advantage of further coordination of the theatrical-video release programme. As early as 1983, New Line announced that they would split their product into mainstream and speciality items.21 Ira Deutchman, former marketing and distribution president of independent distributor Cinecom, was chosen to be the president of Fine Line Features, the specialized division of New Line launched in 1990. Distancing himself from the failed 'classics divisions' of the major studios, Deutchman highlighted the market appeal of the potential Fine Line films: 'We're looking for films that perhaps take a little more immediate special attention to launch them into the marketplace, a little more time to find their audiences, but they have more market, more crossover potential than classics-oriented films.'2" The move has allowed New Line to produce more commercial fare and to hire stars as insurance for their films. Most conspicuously, in 1994, New Line's product included two Jim Carrey vehicles, the comedy/special effects movie The Mask and another film for which they paid $7 million for his talents, Dumb and Dumber. Ridiculed in the press at the time (Carrey had appeared in only one successful film, Ace Ventura: Pet Detective (1994), when the deal for Dumb and Dumber was signed), both films became blockbusters, with The Mask making $119 million and Dumb and Dumber $127 million domestically.23 Fine Line Features enjoyed earlv success with the art house hit by Robert Altman, The Player ($21.7 million) in 1992, but their track record since has been less auspicious: top grossers for each year include Altman's Short Cuts ($6.1 million in 1993), the documentary Hoop Dreams ($7.8 million in 1994), The Incredibly True Adventure of Two Girls in Love (a dismal $2.2 million in 199S), and finally a breakthrough hit with Shine at the end of 1996 ($36 million). Shaye vowed to concentrate on acquiring distribution rights for Fine Line Features, rather than being an active producer.24 This decision was motivated by the lower revenue potential associated with specialized art house films. By separating product between the two arms, Shaye has been able tc create a market identity for each companv and to allocate advertising/distribution expenditures consistent with each film's potential pay-off. The formation of the 'major independent' 79 liramax Films and marketing media controversies Films, run by Harvey and Bob Weinstein, also started by mining the college . through booking rock concerts and roadshow concert movies.2S Their ce in film distribution began with acquiring distribution rights to films st the right pickup price, would enable them to reap at least a small profit. Billie August's Twist and Shout (1986): with the North American rights - S 50,000, Miramax was able to nurture the film to about $1.5 million r«:x office.26 I've Heard the Mermaids Singing (1987), Working Girls^ (1987) and te Imqueror (1988) were all successes for Miramax in the mid-1980s. x became more visible with the acquisition of Steven Soderbergh's sex, '-.deotape, which they advanced $1.1 million for the North American i rights alone. Appropriately enough the film was produced through pre-ae video rights to RCA—Columbia Home Video. Winning the Audience - tne Sundance Film Festival and the Palme d'Or at Cannes, sex, lies was hr Miramax as a sexy and intense comedy about relationships: ad images Peter Gallagher and Laura San Giacomo embracing, and James Spader MacDowell about to kiss. Highlighting the critical acclaim also, realized a gross of over $26 million domestically. The film's success can to its topicality: many critics considered the film as primarily >n the relationship between culture and technology in the age of 'safe Graham (James Spader) videotaping interviews by women talking zxir sex lives and his professed total reliance on masturbation as a sexual — e film represents the intersection of the latest 'new technology' with —tr.er with a form of sex that is completely safe. As Karen Jaehne astutely >:-derbergh wants Graham to explode the neo-conservative Eighties with Ae wav David Hemmings did the swinging Sixties with photography in Soderbergh's technique was to start by exploring the limited sexual 5 available in the 1980s, a move that was calculated to some extent by rrror. When queried on the difficulty of the project in terms of funding, rn explains, 'Well, on the one hand, it may seem like a risk. On the -trr.ember that we've got four relatively young people drenched in sexual-i rim that can be made for $1.2 million.'28 Given the critical triumph, ir.z aggressive marketing by Miramax, the gross destroyed the previous nir.< :or an art house hit. Independent marketing executive Dennis O'Con-itz has worked at Strand Releasing and Trimark Pictures, believes that the ~.ice for independent or specialized film has changed drasticallv since the : 11 August 1994, p. Bl. i-dia Eller, 'Media's mega-deal makers', The Los Angeles Times, 18 July 1996, [ BL D6. r.i Springer, ' Sell it again Sam', American Film, March 1983, p. 55. E. Frook, 'Call Harvey Mickey Mouth', Variety, 29 November 1993, p. 75. l: >. Glucksman, 'The state of things', Filmmaker, Fall 1994, p. 29. .-. Brodie, 'Harvey's hefty cash lends fest some flash', Variety, 23 May 1994, I P- 63- " tzar. Dart, 'Protest delays wide release of Priest', The Los Angeles Times, 25 March 1995, x Metro 1. '. \sne\ link to assailed movie spurs Dole's wife to sell stock', The Los Angeles Times, _-.e'l995,p. A16. -- Hirschberg, "What's the matter with kids today?', New York, 5 June 1995, i pp-36-41. 3 EMm Dutka, 'Miramax circumvents kids controversy', The Los Angeles Times, 29 June '^"fS. p. Calendar 2. 90 Economics, industry and institutions 59 Warren Berger, 'A harsh story finally avoids a harsh fate', The New York Times, IS December 1996, p. H37. 60 Turner's reported pricing of New Line stalled some potential bidders for the company; see Dan Cox and Martin Peers, 'New Line goes back in time',' Variety, 10 April 1997, p. 1. 61 Claudia Eller, 'Miramax's production duo extending run with Disney', The Los Angeles Times, 10 May 1996, p. 5.