Experimentální filosofie svobodné vůle


Prezentace: http://prezi.com/qwzeotxddw3d/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy&rc=ex0share


Literatura (pro zájemce o doplnění informací):


Apriorní přístup ke svobodné vůli a morální zodpovědnosti:

·        FISCHER, J. M., et al. (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Malden (MA): Blackwell Publishing,
2007.

·        FRANKFURT, H. G. (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. The Journal of
Philosophy. 1969, vol. 66, no. 23, s. 829–839 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2023833.

·        LYCAN, W. G. (2003). Free Will and the Burden of Proof. In O'HEAR, A. (Ed). Minds and
Persons. Cambridge (UK): CUP, 2003, s. 107–122 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné také z WWW:
http://people.nnu.edu/ktimpe/research/China/Lycan.pdf.


X-phi:

·        FELTZ, A. & COKELY, E. T. (2009). Do Judgments about Freedom and Responsibility Depend on
WhoYou Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions about Compatibilism and Incompatibilism.
Consciousness and Cognition. 2009, vol. 18, no. 1, s. 342–350 [cit. 2013-0504]. Dostupné z WWW:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001.

·        MANDELBAUM, E. & RIPLEY, D. (2012). Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral
Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 2012, vol. 3, no. 3, s.
351–368 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0106-3.

·        NAHMIAS, E. (2006). Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism vs.
Reductionism. Journal of Cognition and Culture. 2006, vol. 6, no. 1-2, s. 215–237 [cit.
2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853706776931295.

·        NAHMIAS, E., et al. (2005). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral
Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology. 2005, vol. 18, no. 5, s. 561–584 [cit. 2013-05-04].
Dostupné z WWW: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080500264180.

·        NICHOLS, S. & KNOBE, J. (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive
Science of Folk Intuitions. Noûs. 2007, vol. 41, no. 4, s. 663–685 [cit. 2013‑05‑04]. Dostupné z
WWW: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x.

·        SOMMERS, T. (forthcoming). Free Will and Experimental Philosophy: An Intervention
[online]. (forthcoming), In CLAUSEN, J. & LEVY, N. (Eds.). Springer Handbook of Neuroethics.
forthcoming [cit. 2014-08-31]. Dostupné také z WWW:
https://www.academia.edu/2127600/Free_Will_and_Experimental_Philosophy_An_Intervention.

·        WEIGEL, C. (2011). Distance, Anger, Freedom: An Account of the Role of Abstraction in
Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology. 2011, vol. 24, no. 6, s.
803–823 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.562640.