

- area since the 13th century. C. Cahen, 'Le Problème ethnique en Anatolie,' *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, 2: 2 (1954), 352 ff.
9. S. Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1971), 199.
 10. H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London, 1973), 129; B. Nölde, *La Formation de l'empire russe: études, notes et documents*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1952, 1953), ii, 141.
 11. W. J. Fischel, *Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam* (London, 1937), 30; S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2nd edn., vol. 16 (New York, 1976), 41; G. Deverduin, *Marrakech: Des origines à 1912*, vol. 1 (Rabat, 1959), 277; A. Sharf, *Byzantine Jewry from Justinian to the Fourth Crusade* (London, 1971), 98-9; A. J. Braver, *Galizien wie es an Oesterreich kam* (Leipzig, 1910), 82-91.
 12. S. Aamian, *The Armenian Community* (New York, 1955), 44; M. Ghigorian, *Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1977), 2 ff.; Nalbandian, 43 ff., 71 ff.
 13. On differences in diaspora adaptability to peculiar ethical contexts, see E. Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation* (Düsseldorf, 1970), 71; W. O. McCagg, Jr., *Jewish Nobles and Geniuses in Modern Hungary* (Boulder, Col., 1972), 53; F. Braudel, *Civilization material, économie et capitale, XV-XVIII siècle* (Paris, 1979), ii, 100, 127; iii, 415.
 14. C. Roth, *The House of Nasi* (Philadelphia, 1948), 19, 67; S. Getlach, *Tage-Buch* (Frankfurt, 1974), 155.
 15. G. Kisch, *The Jews in Medieval Germany* (Chicago, 1949), 318; S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, 2 vols. (Berkeley, 1967, 1971), i, 66.
 16. P. P. Argenti, *The Religious Minorities of Chios* (Cambridge, 1970), 172; M. Franco, *Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites de l'empire ottoman* (1897, repr. Hildesheim, 1973), 132, 160 ff.
 17. D. N. Wilber, *The Architecture of Islamic Iran: The Il Khānīd Period* (New York, 1955), 13; Fischel, 110; R. Brunschwig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsidés*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1940, 1947), i, 397; S. Mendelssohn, *The Jews of Asia* (London, 1920), 10, 81; G. Schlumberger, *L'Épopée byzantine à la fin du dixième siècle*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1896-1905), ii, 444. As discussed in ch. 3, the Castilians, despite their normal Mediterranean inclination to town life, adopted an antiurban ideology. The strong urban preference of the Italians, on the other hand, may have influenced their tolerance of Jews.
 18. Laurent, 133; Weber, 405.
 19. F. Valjavec, *Der Josephinismus* (2nd edn., Munich, 1945), 32; Braver, 104 ff.
 20. I. Beitel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung, 1740-1848*, 2 vols. (Innsbruck, 1896, 1898), ii, 170; P. Mitrofanov, *Joseph II*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1910), i, 267; G. Kisch, *Die Prager Universität und die Juden, 1748-1848* (Mährisch-Ostau, 1935), 53.
 21. R. Wallach, *Das abendländische Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein im Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1928), 49.
 22. Laurent, 145.
 23. Weber, 515; but see Richard, 92, on Gregorian efforts to proselytize Turkic groups.

Extract 23

DANIEL BELL: *Ethnicity and Social Change*

1. The range and extent of such plurality are striking. 'The largest countries in the world, India, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, are plural societies, as are most countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In fact, the relatively homogeneous society is the rare exception in the world—Japan (though it has a despised caste, the Eta); the Scandinavian countries, France (though with a strong Breton separatist movement), Italy (if we include Sicily as culturally 'Italian' and if we minimize regional particularism)—and even where there have been strong and established national political institutions, as in Great Britain, we find distinctive nationalist movements such as the Scottish and the Welsh, and the predictions that within a decade there may be a new federal structure to British political life, rather than the present-day control from Westminster. For a review of the problems of plural societies, see the issue of *International Social Science Journal*, 'Dimensions of the Racial Situation', 23: 4 (1971), especially the review article by Leo Kuper, 'Political Change in Plural Societies', 594-607.
2. As Pierre L. van den Berghe has written: 'The plural societies of Asia, Africa and Spanish America more recently studied by sociologists and anthropologists have, in fact, been far more typical of conquest states than the frontier immigrant and/or slave plantation societies which underpinned much of the previous ethnic relations literature. In the more classical case of the conquest state, the indigenous population is subordinated and exploited but neither exterminated nor enslaved; the dominant group remains a minority and is not supplemented by massive and continuous immigration after the conquest; cultural and social pluralism of the various ethnic groups is fairly stable and long-lasting; and much of the immigration which takes place subsequent to the conquest is likely to take the form of an interstitial pariah merchant class, ethnically distinct from both the indigenes and the politically dominant minority. This is the pattern characteristic of most empires, including most of the colonial territories of the European powers in Asia and Africa. The United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil and the West Indies are the exceptions, made possible by the low pre-conquest population density, low level of indigenous military and productive technology, and sensitivity of the natives to imported epidemic diseases.' 'Ethnicity: The African Experience,' *International Social Science Journal*, 23: 4 (1971), 508. To these patterns, one would have to add the Russian empire which represented a combination of conquest and amalgamation and which, in the Soviet form, despite the formal equality of the multiple peoples, still sees a Great Russian domination both politically (in that Russians occupy the key political positions in most of the constituent Republics) and culturally.
3. Émile Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1958), 10-11.
4. That romanticism, of course, is now channelled into the idea of 'liberation' and the renewed mystique of 'revolution'.
5. For a detailed discussion of the underlying structural changes in American society and the emergence of new social groups and constituencies, see my essay, 'Unstable America,' *Encounter* 34 (June 1970), 11-26.

6. What modern society does, writes Dahrendorf, is to separate industrial conflict from political conflict. Or, as Anthony Giddens writes, in emendation of this idea, "conflict consciousness" is in a certain sense inherent in the outlook of the worker in capitalist society; "revolutionary consciousness" is not. See Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959), 271-7, and Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies* (London, Hutchinson University Library, 1973), 201-2.

What is striking in Giddens's effort to reformulate a theory of class in advanced industrial societies is the total absence of any discussion of ethnicity or ethnic divisions within the class structures. Truly, a one-eyed vision of modern society.

7. Whether the structural changes—the emergence of knowledge or skill as the basis of class—will bring a coherent class identity on the part of the new technical classes is an open question. The knowledge elites have long had a specific ethos, defined usually as 'professionalism.' And this conception of their role in the past has militated against a traditional class identification. Yet even though these groups are defined by a common ethos, in the post-industrial society, as I have argued, it is likely that the *situs*, or locale of work, such as a business corporation, the university, the government, or the military, may be more important than the *stratum* as the source for political organization and political claims for the elite constituencies so that politics, more likely than not, would be on corporative rather than class lines. Among the 'semi-skilled intellectuals,' like teachers, one finds an increasing readiness to accept trade unionism and forego the traditional guild and professional identification and this may represent a new kind of class organization. But it is doubtful whether this 'educated labor,' in the United States, at least, would become an active ideological force.
8. Involvement beyond the borders of the country—the Jews with Israel, the blacks with Africa, the 'new left' with national liberation movements—has been a conspicuous feature of the last decade, an 'internationalism,' again which contrasts with the small degree of internationalism of the trade-union movements in working-class issues.
9. For a discussion of this question see my essay, 'The Break-up of Family Capitalism,' in my *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960).

Extract 24

HERBERT J. GANS: *Symbolic Ethnicity*

1. See Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn. 1972), 114-15.
2. On the Jamaica Chinese, see Orlando Patterson, *Ethnic Chauvinism* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), ch. 5; on the Sydney Italians, see Rina Huber, *From Pasta to Pavlova* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), pt. 3.
3. For a study of one unsuccessful attempt to establish a community presidency, see Arthur A. Goren, *New York Jews and the Quest for Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
4. Charles S. Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1973), ch. 3. Liebman notes that the few elite rabbis who did

come to America quickly sensed they were in alien territory and returned to Eastern Europe. The survivors of the Holocaust who came to America after World War II were too few and too late to do more than influence the remaining Jewish orthodox organizations.

5. Gans, 'The Origin and Growth of a Jewish Community in the Suburbs,' in M. Sklare (ed.), *The Jews: Social Pattern of an American Group* (New York: Free Press, 1958), 205-48.
6. See Herbert J. Gans, 'American Jewry: Present and Future,' *Commentary* (May 1956), 422-30, which includes a discussion of 'symbolic Judaism.'
7. Unfortunately, too little attention has been devoted by sociologists to ethnicity among descendants of the old immigration.

Extract 25

WINSTON JAMES: *The Making of Black Identities*

1. It can hardly be over-emphasised the extent to which resistance was mounted by Africans in the Americas to their enslavement. The literature on the subject is a vast and growing one. Eugene Genovese has a detailed bibliographical essay in *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the New World* (Baton Rouge, 1979).
2. The distribution of migrants from the various territories during the early years of migration have been estimated to have been as follows: Jamaica, 1953-61: 148, 369, Barbados, 1955-61: 18,741. Trinidad and Tobago, 1955-61: 9,610. British Guiana, 1955-61: 7,141. Antigua, 1955-61: 4,687. Montserrat, 1955-61: 3,835. St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, 1955-61: 7,503. Dominica, 1955-61: 7,915. Grenada, 1955-61: 7,663. St Lucia, 1955-61: 7,291. St Vincent, 1955-61: 4,285. See C. Peach, *West Indian Migration to Britain* (London, 1968), 106-7.
3. K. Ramchand, 'The colour problem at the university: A West Indian's changing attitudes', in H. Tajfel and J. Dawson (eds.), *Disappointed Guests: Essays by African, Asian and West Indian Students* (London, 1965), 28.
4. A. M. Gomes, 'I am an Immigrant', in A. Salkey (ed.), *Caribbean Essays* (London, 1973), 53. Cf. P. Madoo, 'The transition from "light skinned" to "coloured"', in Tajfel and Dawson (eds.), *op. cit.*
5. P. Madoo, *op. cit.*, 61-2.
6. D. Pearson, 'West Indian communal associations in Britain: some observations,' *New Community*, 5: 4 (Spring/Summer, 1977), and *Race, Class and Political Activism: A Study of West Indians in Britain* (Farnborough, 1981).
7. For the qualified exceptions of Barbados and Grenada, see F. Henriques and J. Manjoni, 'Ethnic group relations in Barbados and Grenada', in UNESCO, *Race and Class in Post-Colonial Society: A Study of Ethnic Group Relations in the English-Speaking Caribbean, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico* (UNESCO, Paris, 1977).
8. Cited in D. Hinds, *Journey to an Illusion: The West Indian in Britain* (London, 1966), 11-12.
9. Hinds, *op. cit.*, 15. Cf. S. Patterson, *Dark Strangers: A Study of West Indians in London* (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1965), 15.
10. G. Lamming, *The Pleasurs of Exile* (London, 1984), 25-7.
11. N. Poner, *Jamaica Farewell: Jamaican Migrants in London* (London, 1979), 51. Cf. R. Sherwood, *The Psycho-dynamics of Race: Vicious and Benign Spirals* (Brighton,