

16. MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT IS THE GUIDE TO ACTION IN THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is imperative to hold aloft the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought and put proletarian politics in command. The movement for the creative study and application of Chairman Mao Zedong's works should be carried forward among the masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers, the cadres and the intellectuals, and Mao Zedong Thought should be taken as the guide to action in the Cultural Revolution.

In the complexities of the current Cultural Revolution, Party committees at all levels must study and apply Chairman Mao's works all the more conscientiously and in a creative way. In particular, they must study over and over again Chairman Mao's writings on the Cultural Revolution and on the Party's methods of leadership, such as *On New Democracy*, *Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art*, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, *Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work*, *Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leaderships, and Methods of Work of Party Committees*.

Party committees on all levels must abide by the directions given by Chairman Mao over the years, that is, that they should thoroughly apply the mass line of "from the masses, to the masses" and that they should be pupils before they become teachers. They should try to avoid being one-sided or narrow. They should foster materialist dialectics and oppose metaphysics and scholasticism.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is sure to achieve brilliant victory under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party headed by Comrade Mao Zedong.

22.5 Deng Xiaoping: Self-Criticism

... My recent errors are by no means accidental or disconnected; they have their origins in a certain way of thinking and a certain style of work which has developed over a considerable period of time. Ideologically, I must confess that not only have I not raised high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought, but that I have not even lifted this banner up. As my office is very close to the Chairman, theoretically I should have ample opportunity to receive personal direction and help from him. However, I have a very inadequate grasp of Mao Zedong Thought, do little to propagate it and am not practiced at applying it in my work. Mao Zedong Thought is the soul of all of our work, and an aptitude in it or otherwise is the standard by which to judge the depth of a person's knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and the amount of a person's proletarian thinking.

If one does not make progress, then one will regress. If one does not study Mao Zedong Thought, then it is inevitable that the non-proletarian things in one's thinking will increase. The results of this is that one will make mistakes, and if unchecked, one will commit errors of a right opportunist tendency. In retrospect, my last few years have been marked by a steady regression and due to my laxity in the study and use of Mao Zedong Thought, I have made a number of mistakes. As the person in charge of the Secretariat of the Central Committee I must admit that the work of this department has been very badly done and that the areas of greatest error and fault are those departments under the direct leadership of the Secretariat. In matters concerning class struggle and struggle within the Party, I have consistently shown rightist tendencies. I am partly responsible for the rightist tendencies committed in 1962 which Chairman Mao mentioned in his big-character poster. Similarly, I must take some responsibility for the seemingly leftist but in essence rightist excesses of 1964, for though I was not in full agreement at the time, my objections were still not in compliance with Mao Zedong Thought. I also want to take this opportunity to make a thorough criticism of the numerous errors I made prior to 1962. My distancing myself from the masses and lack of contact with reality is directly connected with my failure to follow Chairman Mao and my lack of proper study. As a result, I have become accustomed to lording it over others and acting like someone special, rarely going down among the people or even to make the effort to contact cadres and other leaders so as to understand their working situation and problems. I have not been exacting in the execution of my office, continually failing to mix with the people and carry out investigatory work. The manner in which I deal with everyday problems has been too simplistic and sometimes quite inflexible. It is due to the above attitude that I have imprisoned myself in a mesh of subjectivism and bureaucracy over the past years. As a corollary to this 'imprisonment' I have made ideological and administrative errors with greater frequency and of increased gravity. A prolonged neglect of Mao Zedong Thought in the past has now developed into a salient opposition to it. Till recently I have not been aware of my attitude and still felt myself superior and infallible. Affected by such a viewpoint, I naturally have not taken great care in doing my work. Rarely did I ask for help or advice from other comrades or the people. Worse yet still is that I have rarely reported to and asked advice from the Chairman. Not only is this one of the main reasons for my errors, but is also a serious breach of Party discipline. In late 1964, Chairman Mao criticized me for being a kingdom unto myself. At first, somewhat shaken by this, I, however, consoled myself with the thought that I was neither a greedy person nor a power seeker, therefore delved no further into the origins of my faults. Thus unchecked, it was inevitable that I would commit an error involving political line, now or in the future. In the final analysis, my way of thinking and style of work is completely incompatible with Mao Zedong Thought. I have not raised high the great banner of Mao Zedong Thought, nor

have I followed Chairman Mao closely, therefore I cut myself off from the leadership; in addition, my contact with the masses is infrequent and I am isolated from reality. I have shown myself not to be a good student of Chairman Mao and am absolutely unsuited to my present position of responsibility. Recent events have revealed me as an unreformed petit-bourgeois intellectual who has failed to pass the tests posed by socialism. Seeing myself thus reflected in my actions I am overwhelmed. I feel it would be damaging to the Party and the people for a person with my ideological level and political understanding to continue in my present position. What I need to do is reflect on my past actions, I need to earnestly study Chairman Mao's works, reform myself and correct my mistakes. By so doing, I hope to be of some use to the Party and the people in the latter years of my life and make up, in some way, for my past misdeeds. I firmly believe that with the help of my comrades and with my own determination, I will be able to correct my mistakes. Though I have gone astray on the road of politics, with the radiance of Mao Zedong Thought lighting my forward path, I should have the fortitude to pick myself up and go on....

The above is a preliminary self-criticism. I hope all comrades present will give their criticisms and suggestions.

Long live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!

Long live invincible Mao Zedong Thought!

Long live the great teacher, the great helmsman and the great leader Chairman Mao!

22.6 AND 22.7 LIN BIAO'S FALL

The fall of Lin Biao was the result of a power struggle that pitted Mao Zedong's anointed successor against the chairman. Although important aspects of this bitter conflict remain murky, evidence indicates that there was tension between Mao and Lin almost from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. In part, these ill feelings were the product of their separate visions of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, but a more practical source of tension was the political ambition of Lin Biao.

The largely invisible battle of political moves and countermoves by Mao and his "close comrade-in-arms" arrived at its sanguinary denouement in September 1971 with the death of Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, and their son Lin Ligu. The circumstances of their deaths are still far from certain, but their departure from life and politics marked the definitive victory of the Maoist forces.

The two documents that follow highlight the transformation of Lin Biao's reputation from honored political and military hero to the vilest specimen of traitor and hypocrite. The party spread elaborate explanations of Lin Biao's sins, as can be found in the communiqué of the Central

Committee concerning the September 12, 1971, "anti-party" incident, with its charges of skulduggery and complicated betrayals. The terse order from the Central Committee concerns the disposal of Lin Biao's literary legacy. It shows how the party leadership strove to abolish all memory of Lin and his crucial role in facilitating Mao Zedong's triumphs in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. In countless artifacts of the Cultural Revolution, the ex-"close comrade-in-arms" Lin Biao was immortalized as a defender of Mao and the revolution. As this document suggests, the process of de-immortalization was, likewise, directed energetically and with scrupulous attention to detail.

22.6 *Official Explanation of Lin's Death*

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CONCERNING LIN BIAO'S
"SEPTEMBER 12" ANTI-PARTY INCIDENT (1971)

TOP-SECRET DOCUMENT

On September 12, when Chairman Mao was making an inspection tour in the South, Lin Biao took advantage of the opportunity and attempted to blow up the train in which Chairman Mao was riding near Shanghai in order to accomplish his objective of assassinating Chairman Mao. When the plot failed and was exposed, Lin Biao hurriedly left Peking on the afternoon of September 12 and boarded a British-made Trident jet military transport, with the intention of surrendering to the enemy and betraying his own country. After crossing the national border, his plane crashed near Undur Khan in Mongolia. Lin Biao, Ye Qun, Lin Ligu, and the pilot were all burned to death.

Lin Biao, by his act of surrendering to the enemy and betraying his own country, invited his own destruction. Yet his death could not redeem his crime, and his notoriety will last for ten thousand years to come. What has been most intolerable is that Lin Biao stole a huge quantity of secret documents and foreign currencies and shot and wounded one of his long-time bodyguards. Lin Biao's sworn followers, Yu Xinye, Zhou Yuzhi and Chen Liyun took off separately in two military helicopters in an attempt to escape from the country. They were intercepted by the Air Force units of the Peking Region. Yu Xinye and Zhou Yuzhi shot the pilots to death and then committed suicide. Chen Liyun put up a fight and was seriously wounded. All the documents they had attempted to take with them aboard the two aircraft were recovered.

Lin (Toutou), daughter of Lin Biao, placed national interest above filial piety by refusing to escape with Lin Biao, and she reported the situation to the premier in time, which led to the foiling of her father's monstrous conspiracy. Lin (Toutou) has thus performed a great service to the Party and the state and