Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement
Author(s): Jiping Zuo and Robert D. Benford
Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Winter, 1995), pp. 131-156
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese
Democracy Movement
Jiping Zuo*
St. Cloud State University
Robert D. Benford
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Using a multimethod strategy, we identify and analyze mobilization processes associated
with the rapid emergence of the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement. We propose that the
confluence of macro-, meso-, and micromobilization processes and linkages among them
provide a more robust model for understanding social movement dynamics. While the
Chinese Democracy Movement was facilitated by economic reforms, regime crises,
delayed repression, and the presence of foreign journalists, institutional forces were not
sufficient in explaining the rapid and extensive mobilization. Students were able to overcome
deficits in organizational and media resources by co-opting extant networks and by
developing resonant collective action frames. Their frame alignment strategies and nonviolent
direct action tactics tended to resonate with ordinary people's observations and experiences
as well as with traditional Chinese narratives of Confucianism, nationalism, and
communism. State reactions and counterframings, on the other hand, failed to sway the
masses. Instead, participation spread from a few hundred college students to millions of
citizens and ended, tragically and ironically, with the "People's Army" slaughtering its
own people around Tiananmen Square.
While grassroots social movements constitute significant and pervasive forces for social
change in the contemporary Western world, they are new phenomena in communist China.
The succession of political movements launched during the Mao era (1949-1976) lacked the
extra-institutional character of Western mass movements inasmuch as they were essentially
state-orchestrated (cf. Aguirre 1984). Mao Zedong used these totalitarian movements, along
with his charisma and coercive power, to remove political rivals and ideological dissidents
(Ladany 1988; Liu 1989). In contrast, the Democracy Movement (April 17-June 4, 1989)
represented a genuinely grassroots attempt to reform the Chinese state. It was the largest,
most enduring, and best organized antiestablishment campaign since the founding of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) (Shi 1990). Initiated by a few hundred college students in
Beijing during the economic reforms, the movement rapidly swept throughout the country
and, in the course of a few weeks, mobilized millions of ordinary citizens. Considering the
power of China's authoritarian party-state, it was an extraordinary series of events.
*Direct all correspondence to: Jiping Zuo, Sociology, St. Cloud State University, St. Cloud, MN 56301-4498
The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 36, Number 1, pages 131-156.
Copyright ? 1995 by The Midwest Sociological Society.
All rights of reproduction in any form requested.
ISSN: 0038-0253.
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132 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
Under communist rule, any type of unauthorized social movement, particular
of the presiding government, has not been tolerated in China (Chow 1993). T
controls all major social, economic, administrative, and cultural resources. T
structure had effectively thwarted the emergence of grassroots movements
Prior to 1989, university students initiated several attempts to organize prot
dictatorship. In each instance authorities repressed organized dissent before it
and Thompson 1989). Under such a limited political opportunity structure, in
episodic outburst of collective action would be an extremely difficult task; sus
ment for just a few days seemed impossible.
Some may suggest that given its brief duration ending with the June 4th
Tiananmen Square, the Democracy Movement was an abysmal failure (e.g.
But given the political opportunity structure, particularly the omnipotence of
authority, what is most remarkable is that collective action occurred at all. Ho
movement emerge under brutally, oppressive conditions? What factors con
movement's rapid and extensive mobilization? We focus on these and relate
examining the nexus of macropolitical opportunities, meso- and microlevel
structures, and micromobilization processes. In so doing, we analyze cultural
tutional forces associated with collective action in China.
DATA AND METHODS
We employed a triangulated research strategy involving multiple data sources, methods,
spectives, and theories (Denzin 1989). The data include observations of action and inter
(before, during, and after the June 4th massacre), talk of participants and bystanders, the d
experience of Jiping Zuo, and a variety of primary and secondary electronic and print so
These data were gathered by way of participant observation, semi-structured, formal
views (face-to-face and telephone), guided conversations, unobtrusive conversational l
ing, and "interviewing by comment," as well as from analyses of private letters, prin
electronic news media accounts, computer bulletin boards, and published secondary sou
The bulk of the data were gathered by Zuo, a native Chinese who came to the United S
to pursue graduate studies in the 1980s. In the spring of 1989, (coincidentally just prior
dramatic confrontation at Tiananmen Square), Zuo returned to Beijing to visit famil
friends.2 From shortly after her May arrival until her late June departure, she observed
ous activities associated with the movement, the most noteworthy of which were the eve
and around Tiananmen Square preceding the June 4th massacre. She conversed directly
approximately twenty-five participants, bystanders, and sympathizers in Beijing during
and June.3 Additionally, she visited and interviewed students and faculty at four univer
Beijing University, Beijing Language Institute, Beijing Teachers' College, and Beijing
mal University. Throughout this period she kept a journal of her observations, interview
personal reflections. She decided to leave this document in China due to the well-fou
fear of being searched and permanently detained by Chinese officials. Upon returning t
United States, Zuo reconstructed her notes from memory.
During the ensuing four years, Zuo interviewed twelve Chinese who immigrated t
United States after the crackdown. Most were active participants in the Democracy
ment, and a few were core activists.4 Secondary source material included books and a
written by movement activists and eyewitnesses, Chinese and United States newspaper,
and television accounts, as well as computer bulletin board postings.
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 133
In addition to employing several data sources and methods, our analysis was informed by
multiple theories and perspectives. While we will elaborate on our theoretical orientations
below, one caveat is worth mentioning here. Although we draw on several social movement
theories to illuminate the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, all are Western theories. We
thereby run the risk of perpetuating Orientalism, that is, Western colonialist representations
(Chow 1993).5 We do not claim to have avoided this problem altogether. We did, however,
seek to mitigate it in two ways. First, by virtue of the authors' distinctive biographies, we
sought to strike a balance between nativism and Orientalism, between an insider's and outsider's
views. Second, the types and varieties of data sources and methods we employed
enabled us to develop a comprehensive understanding of indigenous perspectives, especially
how Chinese people from a variety of backgrounds and contexts viewed history, the political
and economic climate of China in 1989, the student movement, and their roles in these events.
Taken together these multiple sources, methods, and perspectives contribute to a more holistic
understanding of the Chinese Democracy Movement than would have been obtained
from employing a single source, method, or viewpoint.
TOWARD A MORE ROBUST MODEL OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
The advent of resource mobilization theory sensitized a generation of social movement sc
ars to the importance of interests, opportunity, constraints, organization, resources, and p
in collective action (Tilly 1978). These contributions notwithstanding, resource mobiliz
theory also deflected attention away from the mobilizing role of grievances and ident
(Benford 1993b; Buechler 1993; Hunt 1991; Hunt and Benford 1994; Snow and Oliver fo
coming; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; Taylor and Whittier 1992). After m
than a decade of debate among resource mobilization, new social movement, and social
structionist scholars (Cohen 1985; Ferree 1992; Ferree and Miller 1985; Jenkins 1983; K
1980; Turner 1981; Turner and Killian 1987; Zald 1992; Zurcher and Snow 1981), a pr
matic theoretical synthesis appears to be emerging, one that draws on the conceptual
empirical contributions of each of these paradigms (Gamson and Meyer 1992; Gerhard
Rucht 1992; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Klandermans 1992; McAdam, McCarthy
Zald 1988; Melucci 1988; 1989; Snow and Benford 1992; Tarrow 1989; 1992). This hyb
perspective views collective action as emerging from a confluence of macro-, meso-,
microstructures and forces, all of which must be considered in order to explain mobilizat
demobilization, or inaction.
In the case of China, a focus on the structural and historical conditions alone is not ade
to the task of accounting for the rise and fall of the student Democracy Movement. Ye
bulk of the post-Tiananmen literature has concentrated on macrolevel changes and ins
tional conditions that facilitated mass collective action (Ashley and Ji 1991; Chen 1990;
and Vogel 1990; Smith and Pagnucco 1992; Zhou 1993). While these studies shed consid
ble light on the institutional forces precipitating the rise of grievances and mass mobiliz
they fail to illuminate the processes by which students were inspired to take action in the
of extraordinary costs and risks and how the movement expanded to include the active co
butions of millions of other citizens. A more robust understanding of the dynamics of
mobilization requires attending to interpretive as well as institutional factors. This m
focusing not only on changes in the political opportunity structure but also on how
changes were interpreted and articulated such that activists' claims resonated with the ex
iences and cultural narratives of Chinese citizens (Snow and Benford 1988). It further
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134 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
gests the need to identify the role of networks, organizations, and media in
construction and diffusion of injustice frames (McAdam 1982; Molotch 197
Snow Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). With these considerations in mind, w
minate the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement by attending to the macro
micromobilization processes as well as the linkages among them.6
GRIEVANCES AND OPPORTUNITIES: MACROMOBILIZATION
Economic reforms that began in the early 1980s yielded tremendous progress in the Chinese
economy and standard of living. These reforms, which began a transition from a planned to a
market economy, gave rise to the emergence of new grievances as well as indirectly affecting
opportunities for the expression of grievances.
The Rise of Grievances in the People's Republic
The relaxation of economic restraints and improvements in the economy not only created
rising expectations but also dissatisfactions when those expectations were not met (Mu and
Thompson 1989). Moreover, economic reforms were not matched by similar political reforms.
While the market economy implied privatization of ownership, limited competition
under the guidance of law, and a certain level of democracy in leadership, state elites sought
to sustain autocratic political power over market forces. By 1989, the majority of the economic
sectors remained under the control of the state, which ran the economy on its own
terms, invoking policies that lacked stability and consistency. Even the private sector continued
to be dominated by the capricious authority of state officials rather than by legal-rational
mechanisms, as illustrated by the popular aphorism: "The Party's policies are like the moon
which looks different every day." Moreover, decision-making powers were never extended
beyond Party leaders.
Apparent contradictions between the political and economic structures resulted in the abuse
of power by elites in the form of what ordinary people called "official profiteering" (guan
dao). Guan dao gave rise to the ascension of a new elite class comprised of officials at
various levels, particularly those at the top (Shi 1990). Institutional contradictions also led t
a dual price system, a high free market price and a low state-fixed price, that only yielded a
few successful entrepreneurs (wan yuan hu) and left the majority of Chinese citizens, who
lived on fixed salaries or retirement allotments, to suffer from inflated prices (Liu 1989; Shi
1990; Yu 1990). Meanwhile, other forms of corruption, such as bribery, extortion, and "entering
by the back door," were widely distributed among all levels of officials. As the corruption
at the top spread, discontent at the bottom grew. Ordinary people complained about the unequal
access to opportunities and skyrocketing prices.
The growth of discontent was facilitated by an increase in press reports of corruption. Even
positive media reports on the economic reforms tended to stimulate a sense of relative deprivation
among those who had not been able to profit from the changes. Rumors (xiao dao xiao
xi) about high-ranking leaders and their families reaping enormous profits further contributed
to the discontent.7 Many workers and professionals looked forward to corresponding political
reforms that might complement a "free market" economy (Han 1990).
These perceived structural contradictions were accompanied by the rise of grievances
among Chinese intellectuals concerning the repression of democracy and freedom of speech
During the previous forty years, the Party had launched numerous sustained political cam
paigns to persecute intellectuals and political dissidents (Ladany 1988; Liu 1989). NineteenThis
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 135
eighty-nine marked three major anniversaries that aroused emotions: the two hundredth anniversary
of the French Revolution, the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement,
and the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Many intellectuals
wondered why China had not achieved the humanistic ideals advocated and symbolized
in those three historic events. For the first time in their lives, several well-known intellectuals
wrote open letters to the Central Committee and the State Council requesting the release of
political prisoners. These requests fell on deaf ears (Dittmer 1990; Liu 1989).
College students began to raise similar objections concerning a system that deprived them
of the right to vote or speak freely. Inequities precipitated by the economic reforms also
exacerbated students' concerns regarding the state's failure to invest in education, the inadequate
university facilities, and a rigid job placement system controlled by the central government
(Liu 1989; Mu and Thompson 1989).
But it was the death of Hu Yaobang, former General Secretary of the Party, that ignited the
explosion of grievances. In the eyes of most Chinese, especially college students, Hu symbolized
reforms, justice, and political tolerance (Chow 1993; Mu and Thompson 1989). The 1986
purge of Hu by the Gang of Old marked a setback in the course of reforms and aroused
concerns. The death of Hu further generated feelings of grief and a loss of hope.
In short, by the late 1980s grievances were on the rise among a number of sectors of the
population. Many of these grievances were amplified by rising expectations stimulated by
reforms (Davies 1969). However, a mere widespread discontent in China was not a sufficient
reason for the emergence of this unprecedented Democracy Movement. Popular discontent
and grievances had existed during a number of periods in the Mao era but had failed to yield
mass movements. To understand the outburst of collective action in China more fully, we
must also examine changes in political opportunities.
Changes in the Structure of Political Opportunities
Considerable literature suggests that favorable changes in the structure of political opportunities
can facilitate movement activity (Barnes and Kaasse 1979; Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and
Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978). Structural
changes conducive to collective action may arise due to political and/or economic processes
initiated by the polity, changes in the stability of political alignments, or regime crises that
improve the relative position of challengers by undermining the unity and hegemony of previously
dominant groups (McAdam et al. 1988; Tarrow 1989). Closely related to regime crises
is the absence of repression during such times due to the inability or hesitancy of elites to take
repressive action (Koopmans 1993; Skocpol 1979). By the 1980s, these forces had yielded
major shifts in the structure of political opportunities for those disaffected with the Chinese
state. In this section, we explore political developments that contributed to the emergence of
the Democracy Movement.
China has been governed by state socialism characterized by the dictatorship of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). Under state socialism in China, the party-state seeks to control all
aspects of individual lives, particularly ideological domains. The party-state has "effectively
monopolized resources for social mobilization and denied the legitimacy of any organized
interests outside its control" (Zhou 1993, p. 55).
Although no major changes took place in the structure of the political system during the
1980s, the Chinese government relaxed its control in the ideological field (Whyte 1990).
Compared with the Mao era, political study sessions were less intense and less frequent. HetThis
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136 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
erodox views were less subject to sanctions such as denouncement and imprison
loosening of ideological shackles provided increased opportunities for critical v
shared beyond the boundaries of primary groups. College students, for example, f
participate in unauthorized political activities on campus. A few unofficial organiza
established in early 1989 and intellectuals began to mobilize and prepare for c
1990). The exposure to Western ideas due to the "open-door" policy in the 1980
new awareness of political and cultural alternatives.8 In the meantime, central g
unity began to erode. The leadership was divided between the "reformers" and
liners," which in turn created opportunities for the gathering momentum of the
Movement. The failure to suppress the student movement at the earlier stages r
fractured leadership split between "reformers-sympathizers" and "hard-liners" (Dit
Liu 1990; Smith and Pagnucco 1992; Tsao 1991).
While factions within the central leadership contributed to an opportunity struc
favorable to mass mobilization, it was not the primary precipitating event. Th
ousted Hu Yaobang indicated that greater difficulties in sustaining reform mom
ahead. As hard-liners continued to seek to repress ideological diversity and to p
status quo, concern grew among reformers and activists that the window of oppor
about to be slammed shut. It was under this desperate set of circumstances fol
Yaobang's death, that students, inspired by a sense that something should be done,
protest against the government.
Of course, unauthorized collective actions under totalitarian regimes are likely
pressed, as had historically been the case in communist China. Students were not ig
the risks associated with initiating the Democracy Movement. But, more import
were well aware of their historical positions in taking the lead in promoting so
(Han 1990; Li 1990). Chinese students and intellectuals have had a long history of
"the conscience of the nation" in advocating and disseminating new ideas (Chow
and Thompson 1989; Niming 1990), as illustrated by May Fourth Movement, a pa
dent movement in 1919, which partly contributed to the founding of the CCP
propaganda, students were portrayed as young, innocent, brave, and promising-the
China. As a result, students were presumably less subject to state social control
example, used students to help him purge his opponents during the Cultural Revolu
ically, the success of state propaganda also instilled in students a strong sense o
responsibility for the prosperity of China, which inspired and provided a justificati
to oppose the dark side of the communist regime.
One final factor contributing to the political opportunity structure was the pres
unusually large foreign media contingency in the spring of 1989. Two major
historic visit of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Asian Development Bank's first mee
PRC-attracted throngs of international journalists to China. Cognizant of the fa
whole world would be watching and that state authorities would feel somewhat con
exercising repressive force, student activists seized upon this unique opportunity f
stage. In the final analysis, foreign media played a crucial role in the mobilizatio
by reporting events to their audiences back home, but more importantly by also k
nese citizens informed regarding movement developments (Calhoun 1989a; 19
Smith and Pagnucco 1992).
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 137
NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS: MESOMOBILIZATION
The notion that pre-existing social networks and indigenous organizations are required
erate and sustain collective action has been widely supported by students of Western
ments (McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Morris 1984; Snow et al. 1980; cf.
and Cloward 1977). We know far less about the role of networks and organizations
the West. In the case of the Chinese Democracy Movement, there were no pre-existing
ment organizations, indigenous or professional (Niming 1990; Wang 1992; Xiong 1
Although a few interim movement organizations were founded at the outset of the mo
(Li 1990; Shi 1990; Zhou 1993), these were relatively powerless, poor associations com
to the formidable state structures that student activists confronted.
Nevertheless, mobilization occurred in spite of deficiencies in capital and mass me
cess, resources primarily under state control. Citizens and overseas Chinese donated
food, tents, and transportation. Students disseminated information via their own br
station established in Tiananmen Square, street posters, mimeographed leaflets printed
dorms, sympathetic Chinese and foreign journalists,9 as well as by word of mouth (Han
Liu 1989; Mark 1991; Yu 1990). The grassroots character of this mobilization effort w
much more arduous and resource-poor than is typically the case in Western countries.
with Western movements, the rapid expansion of the Chinese Democracy Movem
pended on the strategic use of social networks, informal groups, and a few incip
organizations.
Social Networks and Organizational Features
Prior to the 1989 movement, the dominant student organization on campuses was the student
union which, as with other organizations, was a formal affiliate of the CCP. The only
existing voluntary associations comprised of students were academic study groups, each of
which contained five or fewer members. In some instances these study groups served as
"movement halfway houses" (Morris 1984) by providing students with a place to discuss
grievances and to develop resonant collective action frames grounded in traditional Chinese
values (see below). Although some student activists emerged from these contexts, the small
campus study groups were not structurally linked to one another or to other organizations. In
sum, the Chinese Democracy Movement lacked organizations comparable to the United States
civil rights movement's Highlander Folk School, African American churches and colleges,
and the NAACP to serve as communication and coordination networks (cf. Killian 1984;
Morris 1984).
Geographical proximity represented one of the movement's few pre-existing organizational
advantages. All ten major universities are concentrated in one Beijing district. Furthermore,
90 percent of all college students live on campus. As Smith and Pagnucco (1992, p. 176)
note, students, who were packed six to eight to a dormitory room, "were necessarily connected
to dense webs of informal interpersonal networks. Such structural arrangements
helped to make the rapid mobilization of protesters possible."
At the outset of the 1989 movement, student activists from each university abandoned the
official student union, established interim student body organizations, and elected representatives
who assumed movement leadership roles. Representatives of forty-one universities in
Beijing formed the Federation of Beijing Autonomous College Student Unions-Interim
(FBASUI), which became the student movement's policy-making body (Ming Pao News
1989). FBASUI also coordinated the autonomous student unions at Beijing universities, the
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138 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
basic units that carried out movement tasks. Subsequently, student activists fr
inces formed a Federation of Foreign-Province Autonomous College S
(FFASU) to work with FBASUI.
Movement coordination was initially difficult due to a deficit in communicat
The "illegitimate" status of the student protests precluded student activists
major media outlets such as newspapers, television, and radio. During the "c
even cut off student telephone and telegram services for several days in some
sities (Ming Pao News 1989). To cope with communication problems, stude
vised a number of means of communication including protest notices pos
building walls and bulletin boards, posters reporting the latest movement de
gestions, bicycles as a means of communicating between campuses, and on-c
and press conferences seeking additional support. Throughout the entire period
ers remained at the forefront of the movement, mobilizing and deploying res
and directing strategies and tactics, maintaining adherence to nonviolent pr
ganizing and coordinating protest activities.
The ultimate success in organization, however, hinged not simply upon a f
interim movement groups but on the conscientious commitment of tens of th
dents and their persuasive articulation of shared grievances to the masses.'0 In
the students' well-developed sense of duty to society and their role in the gen
resonant collective action frames, it is doubtful that the narrow opening in
political opportunity and the movement's paltry organizational resources cou
so many to take to the streets in the face of such extraordinary risks and cos
FRAME ALIGNMENT AND FRAME RESONANCE: MICROMOBILIZATION
Thus far we have outlined the macro- and mesolevel structural conditions and forces that
facilitated the rapid mobilization of the Chinese Democracy Movement. We conceive of these
"objective" conditions as necessary but insufficient catalysts of collective action. In order for
potentially favorable macro- and mesostructures and processes to be translated into mass mobilization,
individuals must be inspired to act collectively toward correcting an "injustice" and
achieving perceived shared interests.
Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that a variety of interacting actors ranging
from movement protagonists to their antagonists to audiences socially construct a sense o
injustice (Hunt et al. 1994; cf. Benford and Hunt 1992; Capek 1993; Piven and Cloward
1977). The resultant "injustice frame" includes an elaboration of the problem, attributions of
blame, solutions, strategies, and rationales for action (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982
Snow and Benford 1988). Whether or not the injustice frame stimulates collective action
hinges in part on the apparent alignment of individual interests, values, and beliefs with
social movement organization's goals and claims (Snow et al. 1986). Although the achievement
of frame alignment is fraught with a variety of difficulties and hazards (Benford 1993a;
Benford and Hunt 1994; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Snow and Benford 1988), successful mobilization
depends on the persuasive articulation and amplification of shared grievances
(Snow and Benford 1992) as well as the development of compelling vocabularies of motive o
rationales for taking action (Benford 1993b).
While this line of inquiry has recently stimulated considerable research, there has been a
growing recognition that framing processes do not occur in a social or cultural vacuum (Gamson
1992; Klandermans 1992; Snow and Benford 1988; 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1992). For
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 139
one, movement actors must respond effectively to antagonists' "counterframings"-that is, to
opponents' attempts to rebut, undermine, or neutralize the movement's collective action
frames-by developing compelling "reframings" (Benford and Hunt 1994). Whether or not
movement actors' initial framings and subsequent reframings or their opponents' counterframings
resonate depends on the extent to which the claims (or counterclaims) are consistent
with what targets of mobilization know and believe about the world based on their observations,
experiences, and cultural wisdom (Snow and Benford 1988). It is these micromobilization
processes that have been neglected in previous analyses of the Chinese Democracy
Movement to which we now turn our attention.
Student Frame Alignment Strategies
From the earliest days of the movement, student activists walked a dangerous tightrope. On
the one hand, if they framed their grievances in [counter]revolutionary terms, they were certain
to elicit a violent response from state officials, and the movement would have been
crushed before anyone beyond their immediate networks learned of their existence. Indeed, if
the state was successful in labeling student protests as "counterrevolutionary," repression
could easily be legitimated. On the other hand, if the students failed to frame their grievances
so as to strike a familiar chord among the masses, in all likelihood their claims would have
been dismissed as the immature whining of impetuous youth. Thus the major framing task
was to win sympathy and active support from bystander audiences while earning understanding
and tolerance from state authorities, or at least to neutralize the legitimacy of any official
pretense to using repressive force.
The students achieved and sustained this delicate balance by developing an ingenious, complex
set of frame alignment strategies. First, they constructed cogent critiques of the injustices
and improprieties resulting from the economic reforms. These framings tended to resonate
because they were consistent with citizens' observations and experiences. Second, students
grounded their claims in three Chinese cultural traditions or narrations: Confucianism, communism,
and nationalism. Although these three traditions reflect distinctive, even opposing,
belief systems, they were intertwined and finally unified by an imposed centralized culture
(Chow 1993). Confucianism is a traditional moral philosophy that requires, among other
things, obedience and loyalty to superiors. Under communism, Confucianism translates into
devotion to communist practices in China (i.e., nationalism). Since communist authorities are
portrayed as leaders in the Chinese communist movement, devotion to communism and nationalism
also requires loyalty to the communist leaders." By grounding the student movement's
collective action frames in all three of these traditions, activists were able to deflect
any state attempts to impugn their collective character, particularly attributions regarding their
"patriotism" (cf. Benford and Hunt 1994), while simultaneously providing other students and
ordinary citizens compelling reasons for supporting their campaign. Third, students initiated a
set of direct action tactics including a hunger strike and mass demonstrations at Tiananmen
Square, which citizens tended to interpret as validating activists' claims of sincerity regarding
their commitment to traditional Chinese values of community devotion and self-sacrifice. At
each critical juncture, until the final massacre, this strategic web was reinforced by the ineffective
reactions and counterframings of state authorities.
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140 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
Empirical and Experiential Resonance of Student Injustice Frames
According to Snow and Benford (1988), "empirical credibility" and "experiential
surability" constitute two crucial factors related to the resonance of movement f
sessment of empirical credibility entails assessments by the targets of mobiliza
material/factual basis of movement claims. Experiential commensurability refers to
to which movement claims seem consistent with one's biography. The two dime
frame resonance tend to work hand-in-hand.
In the case of the Chinese Democracy Movement, student framings regarding c
profiteering, and the creation of new inequalities tended to fit with what most c
observed and experienced. Official counterframings, on the other hand, tended to
lacking empirical or experiential resonance. Economic reforms had created an enviro
which official profiteering and corruption were common place among elites (Mu an
son 1989). Although these reforms provided a few opportunities for upward mob
ranking officials and their families benefited disproportionately from the reforms
due, of course, to their unequal access to power and scarce resources, especially th
production of profitable enterprises. Taking advantage of their fathers' high positi
elite offspring were soon promoted to the ministerial level. Many more engaged in
lucrative businesses and enjoyed exorbitant profits from their business activities
Mu and Thompson 1989). Informal interviews conducted by Zuo with Beijing resid
cated that ordinary citizens were aware of such patronage and the potential for the
to spread:
You don't know how bad corruptions and social morality were before the outburst of student
protests. High-ranking officials placed their children in important positions. Some of
them sent their children abroad. They also opened accounts in Swiss banks in their children's
names. Now they have nothing to worry about. What can ordinary people do? We
just followed their examples: to make money by abusing our positions. Just a few months
ago, our society was full of cheating, bribery, distrust, and hostility. Now things seem to
be changing in a positive direction. Students have brought about hope for change.
The perception that the official reformers had failed to address the essence of their
problems and the hope that students would be able to lead the forces of "real reform" were
widely shared among those we interviewed before and after the June 4th massacre. Frequently,
citizens posted their grievances on poles and walls throughout Beijing. These postings
not only constituted a protest tactic, they also served as surrogate newspapers, often
taking the form of journalistic accounts and interviews, as reflected in the following poster
observed on a Beijing building wall:
GRADUATE STUDENT: Do you think the students are right?
PEASANT: Absolutely right. It's about time to make some noise. The officials are just too
much. Right now, township [officials] are not doing anything for production, but every
township government has one or two cars. . . and this is all at the expense of us peasants
.... I think China must go through some big changes. How can a government like this
not collapse? (quoted in Han 1990, p. 184)12
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 141
As implied in this excerpt, most citizens recognized that they were not structurally situated
to take advantage of the reforms. Since the central government decided which sectors of the
economy would be decentralized, those who did not happen to work in the decentralized
sectors remained relatively deprived. School teachers were among those suffering the most
from unequal economic opportunities. Whereas people in private business made as much as
1,000 yuan (US $270) or more a month, teachers lived on fixed salaries averaging 150 yuan
(US $40) at the college level and only 80 yuan (US $21) at the elementary and secondary
levels. Moreover, teachers' salaries failed to keep pace with a skyrocketing inflation rate of
18.5 percent in 1988 (Liu 1989; Mu and Thompson 1989). Comments displayed on a Beijing
wall poster protesting such conditions conveyed the level of despair felt by most teachers as
well as support for the student movement:
Teachers in China have always been known for their "other worldness," their "genteel
poverty," their "slender" physique and "long-suffering" temperament.... They leave their
lives to benevolent or heartless hands, and have little but tears to swallow. They dare
neither to be angry nor to speak out.... Coming home from work with a rumbling stomach,
they sink into deeper depression as they count the coins in their pockets, take a glance
at the food on the table and then at their crowded, shabby dwelling. Other things make
their hearts sink, too: living apart from their wives or husbands [because their schools have
no jobs and no space for their spouses], they prepare late into the night, staring at a solitary
lamp to see their own shadow.... He [teacher] is hoping that the students will go a little
further this time and put more pressure on the government. (quoted in Han 1990, p. 176)
Even the chief beneficiaries of economic reforms, such as farmers and private entrepreneurs,
were plagued by problems associated with corruption. For example, given that the state
controlled the supply of fertilizer, which was low in price but high in demand, many farmers
either had to bribe the officials in charge of fertilizer supplies or turn to the black market
where they sometimes found that the "fertilizer" for which they paid an exorbitant price was
fake and had ruined their harvests. Entrepreneurs also found that in order to maintain their
business licenses, they had to bribe officials regularly. Moreover, the variability of governmental
policies generated uncertainty and insecurity among most private business persons.
For instance, whereas taxi drivers were permitted to retain a portion of their profits, bus drivers
were not afforded the same privilege.
In the ideological field, Chinese citizens had long endured a party-state that was oppressive
beyond what Westerners could conceivably imagine (Chow 1993). The CCP exercises strict
control over the social and personal lives of Chinese (Zuo 1991). People are compelled to
conform to the official belief system and to abandon other ideologies. The state-controlled
press serves primarily as a propaganda tool of the Party (Mark 1991). Ideological freedom is,
therefore, strictly prohibited and dissidents are subject to persecution. There have been numerous
state-orchestrated movements against heresy since the PRC's founding (Ladany 1988;
Liu 1989). The main victims of these political movements have been intellectuals whose only
"crime" was the expression of their opinions. Tens of thousands of innocent intellectuals have
been denounced, tortured, exiled, imprisoned, murdered, or "suicided" over the past fifty
years. The purge of Hu Yaobang and the neglect of intellectuals' requests to release political
prisoners signaled that the state would not stop persecuting intellectuals in the future, a realization
that amplified discontent and anxiety among intellectuals. Moreover, many academics
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142 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
sensed a general decline in the cultural value attributed to intellectual work, sen
by an intellectual with whom Zuo spoke:
Today you can hardly carry out research of your own interest without censorship
request to translate a book can take years to approve. Although the government ha
ised to improve intellectuals' lives, I don't see much change taking place. On the co
I have seen that the notion of 'worthlessness to get an education' [du shu wu yong
regaining in popularity. This notion was popular during the cultural revolutio
schools were shut down.
Given the experiences of most Chinese citizens, it is little wonder that the student framings
resonated. Initially, however, students did not frame their shared grievances in alignment with
ordinary citizens. The 1989 movement began with student protests against the party-state.
But the purpose of the protest was not to deny the leadership of the CCP. Instead, students
sought to aid the Party in leading China in the course of "four modernizations." Toward that
end, students advocated more democracy, an end to the persecution of political dissidents, and
other political reforms they believed would better suit the emerging social and economic
structures. They plastered walls and telephone poles on Beijing campuses with pro-democracy
slogans: "DOWN WITH BUREAUCRACY!," "LONG LIVE DEMOCRACY!," "FREEDOM
OF PRESS!"
Students were also aware of several other major concerns of people: official profit
rampant corruption, and inflation. In fact, they found that these issues were more appe
the masses because they spoke directly to people's daily lives. To gain momentum f
movement, students decided to subordinate their own specific concerns about democra
educational reforms while focusing on issues they perceived to be more salient to the m
Subsequently, activists extended their framings beyond pro-democracy claims to inclu
reformist demands. By displaying posters with slogans such as "STOP POLIT
FROM ENGAGING IN ILLEGAL TRADE!" and "ELIMINATE CORRUPTION!" in more
conspicuous places (e.g., along main vehicular and pedestrian arteries) and by aligning their
frames with the vocabulary of the masses, student activists hoped to expand the movement's
populist appeal.
They even targeted their framing tactics at soldiers (whom students considered citizens
rather than agents of the state). One Beijing University handbill, for example, was titled
"Soldiers, Look How Profiteering by Government Officials Is Eating You Up":
What does it mean when people talk about "profiteering by government officials"? To
describe it simply, it refers to officials using their power to acquire things such as goods at
low state-fixed prices, import and export licenses (or documents), loans, and foreign currency
at special low exchange rates so that they can reap huge profits ....
Why is China's economy such a mess? Why does the daily stipend of a soldier remain at
1.65 yuan [US 43 cents] after all these years, despite rocketing prices? Nowhere else can
one find the answer to these questions except in the word "official." One official takes the
lead, another follows, and very soon each official acts as a protective shield for another's
crimes. (quoted in Han 1990, pp. 28, 31)
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 143
From the outset the student protest garnered positive reactions from a wide audience. A
professor of medicine from another province whom we interviewed reflected:
At the beginning of the student protest, student claims resonated with what I wanted to say
to the government. I hoped this was going to work and the government would take further
steps toward reform. Unfortunately, what I learned from the [CCP] news editorials was the
deliberate avoidance of the government to deal with the student requests-a lack of sincerity
to solve its own problems-which disappointed me.
Despite such disillusionment, people saw in students the hope for the dismissal of corrupt
officials, for reforms, and for China (Liu 1989). Student framings regarding democracy and
anticorruption resonated with the observations and experiences of the masses. Hence, it was
not surprising that even in the early days of the movement student protests garnered popular
support, although Beijing citizens were primarily bystanders at this stage. Civilians lined
miles and miles of roads leading from the universities to Tiananmen Square, shouting, "Long
live the students!" A bond between students and civilians was thus established from the outset
and solidified throughout the mobilization period (Liu 1989; Tsao 1991). Later, thousands
of civilians donated food and money and held pro-student demonstrations as expressions of
their support. During this period Zuo observed private entrepreneurs transporting food and
drinks to Tiananmen Square via tricycle carts and others bringing drinking water, clothes,
blankets, bicycles, and money. Some informed us that they deposited their entire monthly pay
checks in students' donation boxes. In the meantime, pro-student demonstrations were held
almost every other day. On demonstration days, tens of thousands of civilians gathered at
Tiananmen Square, while vehicles carrying demonstrators moved toward the Square. With
few exceptions, the schedule of the demonstrations was disseminated via word of mouth
through personal networks. One notable exception was the Science and Technology Daily
News which broke with official censorship policies by reporting student movement events.
This remarkable development contributed significantly to information dissemination and facilitated
mobilization processes.
In sum, the evidence we gathered indicates that the student framings struck a responsive
chord among many people from various walks of life. The circles of participation and support
rapidly expanded from the original small core of student activists to thousands of other students,
workers, peasants, entrepreneurs, and professionals, and even to some Party members
and government officials (Han 1990). The students thus forged a link between the masses and
the movement, bringing together previously unmobilized sentiment pools and providing the
basis for successful micromobilization.
Student Framings and Chinese Cultural Narrations
Authorities did not take these developments lying down. They launched a massive counterframing
effort aimed at discrediting the student movement and its claims. The Party's official
newspaper, People's Daily, immediately labeled student demonstrations as "turmoil," "upheaval,"
"a violation of the constitution," "a plotted conspiracy" "instigated by a handful of
people" (April 26, 1989). Similar counterthemes were espoused around the clock on state
radio and television networks. Students realized that the movement would not achieve its
goals without a careful reframing effort directed toward the government. The key to avoiding
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144 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
suppression was to frame the movement's ideology so as to appear congruous w
ical propaganda while continuing to amplify traditional Chinese values.
That's precisely what the activists did. Every student movement framing
informed by and grounded in one or more of three traditional Chinese narrati
ism, communism, and nationalism. Together, these cultural narratives tended t
with patriotism and the way in which it was defined and dramatized.
Owing to their central positions in traditional Chinese society and to Confuc
influence (Weber 1964), intellectuals long ago developed a collective sense of
bility. They consider it their calling to oppose political and social injustic
Confucian tradition, the main ideology to which most Chinese intellectuals adh
ciples are normally followed in regard to patriotism: (1) "Every individual is
the rise and the fall of the country" (Tian xia xing wang, pi fu you ze), (2)
virtue/justice" (Sha shen cheng ren), and (3) "Remonstrate with one's super
(Jian). Sense of responsibility, self-sacrifice, and remonstration with the em
prosperity of the country have been emphasized and passed on over several gen
form of novels, poems, folktales and legends. These themes figured prominent
movement's collective action frames.13
While the frames constructed by the students were often inspired by Confu
were aligned with and constrained by contemporary political ideologies as w
outset, students avoided radical or "unpatriotic" framings such as calling f
restructuring of the polity or expanding the number of political parties, dema
have been considered violations of the "Four Basic Principles of the Party"
Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought, to the Party's leadership, to p
torship, and to socialism). Instead, students pointed out that the governmen
both economic and political reforms. Accordingly, the main message that st
to the government was to urge them to act in a socially responsible manner
official profiteering and corruptions.
Students' subsequent actions and framings, which were consistent with both
communist culture, represented attempts to demonstrate further their patrioti
on the national mourning day for Hu Yaobang, students sent representatives t
steps to the Great Hall of People, where the Party was conducting the official
for Hu Yaobang. As they knelt, student representatives held petitions above th
ing for Premier Li Peng to accept them. Students carefully staged this scen
recreation of traditional encounters in which subjects sought to persuade an em
just policies. While some may have interpreted this as parody intended to
leaders in the personae of aging and decadent emperors, we doubt that thi
demonstrators intended. Rather, the students were quite cognizant of the dan
they walked and thus would not have jeopardized the entire movement for the
fun at the leaders' expense. A poster crafted by a Qinghua University stude
contention that this event was staged to demonstrate the activists' sincerity
(Ming Pao News 1989, p. 14). Beneath a large photo of three students kneeli
of the Great Hall, the poster's caption read:
CRYING FOR FREEDOM;
KNEELING FOR DEMOCRACY;
THE REPUBLIC WILL NEVER FORGET!
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 145
Students also attempted to counter allegations that they were unpatriotic by amplifying
patriotic themes. In their all-night sit-ins at Tiananmen Square, for instance, they sang an
officially recognized song, the "Internationale" (Li 1990). Following the state's April 26 People's
Daily editorial labeling the movement as "turmoil" and "a planned conspiracy," students
waved a pro-Party banner: "SUPPORT THE CORRECT LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY" (Mu and Thompson 1989, p. 30). Students employed similar reframing and
altercasting tactics when they confronted police and army personnel during marches. Students
shouted: "Long live policemen," and "People's police love the people" (Ming Pao News
1989, pp. 28, 47).
Not all framings were so restrained, however. The handbill directed at soldiers cited above,
for example, was much more strident, albeit still grounded in Confucian philosophy:
In whose hands shall China crumble? "No corrupt officials, no revolt," as the saying goes.
We want to build our country and we want to bring prosperity to the people, but allowing
these corrupt officials to have their way will reduce all this to empty rhetoric. Trees must
be chopped down if they are rotten, and parasites exterminated. My dear soldiers, let me
ask you: if the people say no, if history says no, will you still allow this situation to go on?
(quoted in Han 1990, p. 31)
It was not coincidental that the students' rally on May 4 at Tiananmen Square corresponded
with the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, the first large-scale patriotic
student movement, one highly valued by the CCP. By selecting May 4, students claimed
justification for the 1989 Democracy Movement and attempted to demonstrate their sense of
national responsibility (Yang 1991). One of the day's most impassioned speeches ("New May
Fourth Manifesto"), made by a core activist, typified attempts to align their collective action
frames with traditional cultural narratives:
Fellow students, fellow countrymen [sic]: Seventy years ago today, a large group of illustrious
students assembled in front of Tiananmen, and a new chapter in the history of China
was opened. Today, we are once again assembled here, not only to commemorate that
monumental day but more importantly, to carry forward the May Fourth spirit of science
and democracy. Today, in front of the symbol of the Chinese nation, Tiananmen, we can
proudly proclaim to all the people in our nation that we are worthy pioneers of seventy
years ago....
At present, our country is plagued with problems such as bloated government bureauc
serious corruption, the devaluation of intellectual work, and inflation, all of which se
impede us from intensifying the reforms and carrying out our modernization ...
Fellow students, fellow countrymen [sic], the future and fate of the Chinese nati
intimately linked to each of our hearts. This student movement has but one goal, that
facilitate the process of modernization by raising high the banners of democracy and
ence, by liberating people from the constraints of feudal ideology, and by promoting
dom, human rights, and rule by law. To this end, we urge the government to accelera
pace of political reform, to guarantee the rights of people vested in the law, to imple
press law, to permit privately run newspapers, to hasten the establishment of an hon
democratic government, to value education, to respect intellectual work, and to sa
nation through science. Our views are not in conflict with those of our governme
Prosperity for our nation is the ultimate objective of our patriotic student mov
(quoted in Han 1990, pp. 135-137)
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146 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
Action/Inaction as Framing
To this point our analysis of the micromobilization processes associated w
Democracy Movement has focused on student framings as manifested in w
words. We suggested that the activists' claims effectively mobilized unprec
because they resonated with the observations, experiences, and cultural n
masses. But the social construction of oppositional frames does not necessa
words. It can also depend on the action and/or inaction of the parties engage
a consideration overlooked in the framing literature. Of course, how such act
or omission are individually and collectively understood depends on the s
and cultural contexts that mediate the interpretation of collective action fra
In the case of the Chinese Democracy Movement, students developed a set
tactics and restraints (e.g., nonviolence) that complemented and dramatized
injustice frames, thereby enhancing the movement's apparent legitimacy. Re
the state, on the other hand, failed to respond in ways that resonated with p
tions regarding how the state ought to respond. Taken together, the actions
the activists and their state opponents contributed to the rapid spread of the
to other segments of Chinese society.
Throughout the movement, protesters had remained calm, restrained, an
spite violence from the police and army (Li 1990; Liu 1989; Mu and Thom
the public's perspective, students' actions appeared to have been initiated
indicated by citizens' remarks such as the one Zuo overheard: "What can st
this? They could join the elite in the future since they are educated people. T
speak out for us, for the whole country." The government's response-l
students' requests, and counterinsurgency tactics (Ming Pao News 1989; c
contrast, seemed to be based on outdated and unreasonable attitudes. The st
their failure to develop compelling counterframes contributed to the emer
sense of injustice among the masses, a sense that the state had violated bo
communist codes of ethics pertaining to leaders.
The students' patriotic spirit was further dramatized by their hunger st
1989). In light of the state's attempt to discredit the movement in People
and the government's refusal to engage in substantive dialogues, students de
a hunger strike. They hoped this drastic act would demonstrate that the
patriotic and nonviolent. They also hoped to sustain the movement's mome
ing an even deeper commitment to Confucian principles (Chai 1990). They
two days before Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China, because they correct
officials would not take extreme measures during this period and that the
opportunity to embarrass authorities into engaging in a dialogue (Li 1990
ment of the May 13th Hunger Strikes," students wrote:
We commence our hunger strike in the lovely May sunshine. In the full bloom o
however, we leave beautiful things behind, but with great reluctance.
Yet the condition of our country is one of rampant inflation, economic specu
officials, extreme authoritarian rule, serious bureaucratic corruption, a drain of
and people to other countries, social confusion, and an increase in the number of
acts. It is a crucial moment for the country and its people. All compatriots w
science, please heed our call:
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 147
The country is our country.
The people are our people.
The government is our government.
If we do not cry out, who will?
If we do not take action, who will? ...
We do not want to die .... No, we are not seeking death; but if death could lead to
improved conditions and prosperity for our country, then we ought not shun it ...
Death awaits. Farewell. To our colleagues who share our loyalties. To our loved ones,
whom we would rather not leave, but whom we must. To our mothers and fathers, for
whom we cannot be both patriotic and filial at the same time. To the people of our country,
from whom we ask permission to pursue this final act of loyalty. (Yu and Harrison 1990,
pp. 96-97)
To frame their tactic more succinctly, several hunger strikers wore white vests with slogans
such as "I STARVE FOR CHINA; I CRY FOR CHINA" and "MAMA, I AM HUNGRY,
BUT I CANNOT EAT." Their willingness to sacrifice their young lives to promote political
reforms resembled the principle "remonstration with death" (si jian) applied in traditional
Chinese society and deeply struck a responsive chord among Beijing residents.
The government, on the other hand, refused to talk to the students until the sixth day of the
hunger strike when many fasting students were in critical physical condition. The dialogue
ended without any concrete results. The unyielding attitudes of the government incurred the
wrath of Beijing citizens who perceived the government as neither benevolent (ren) nor righteous
(yi) (Confucian moral codes for the ruler). We interviewed a Chinese professor from a
distant province who recalled her reaction to the hunger strike and the state's response:
The hunger strike sponsored by the students touched me deeply, while the martial law
imposed by the government irritated me. What a contrast! And then one day some of my
students came back from Beijing telling me what they saw when they had just arrived at
the Beijing Railway Station where hundreds of Beijing citizens gathered. They asked
them: "Now the government has declared martial law, and the army may occupy
Tiananmen Square anytime. It is dangerous to go there at this point in time. Are you sure
you still want to go?" My students answered firmly, "Yes, we do!" The Beijing citizens
applauded and welcomed the students as if they were heros. I was deeply touched and got
very excited! Students were using their young lives to touch the government! Had I not had
a four-month-old son, I would have been there to show my support!
Citizens subsequently entered the drama on the students' side, converting from bystanders
to movement supporters. A civil service officer told Zuo that he disapproved of students'
actions at the beginning of the movement, believing that student protests would only invite
trouble. Later he was so deeply moved by the hunger strikers that he wanted to join them.
Another woman, whom we interviewed during her recent business trip to the United States,
reflected:
I considered myself a bystander at the beginning of the movement. I thought that students'
claims to fight corruption were right, but that maybe they did not have to protest. But later
on when I saw that the government failed to respond to students in a timely manner and in
an appropriate way, I was disappointed with the government. I thought it was definitely
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148 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
wrong for the government to repress the movement with the army and bullets w
dents had good intentions of helping the government.
Approximately one million civilians visited the students in the Square, donatin
ing, and money. Some even joined the encampment (Li 1990).
At this stage, an identification with students and a collective consciousness
ing among the citizens, frames which undermined government efforts to tarni
the student movement. For example, when the Beijing municipal government w
fic and security police in an attempt to create a chaotic situation that could
handy pretext for clearing Tiananmen Square and thus crushing the movement
zens saw through the ploy.14 They allowed students to assume traffic officers
in maintaining social order (Yang 1991). The attempt to organize a counterstude
in the outskirts of Beijing also failed. Farmers in the counterstudent movem
reporters that officials had paid them to do so, thereby severely undermining s
restore its own definition of the situation (Liu 1989).
Frustrated with the loss of legitimacy of their framing efforts, the governm
clared martial law (beginning on May 20, 1989) in hopes that armed forces
"order." They sent troops to the Chinese Central Broadcasting and Televisio
ple's Daily, and other Beijing publications, ordering editors to publish article
hard-liners' position (Mark 1991). Meanwhile, they ordered troops to occu
Square. To civilians, the imposition of martial law meant that the government
stand in opposition to its own people. The official response not only outrag
thousands of citizens, it drove more civilians to the students' side, marking a
movement. From that point on, Tiananmen Square became the symbol of d
justice, a source of strength and spirit among the masses. Zuo heard one citizen
at the Square: "Don't withdraw! We will lose hope if you do."
Zuo observed people of all walks of life join the student rally. They inclu
teachers, business people, journalists, retirees, and even government officers a
bers. In order to prevent the government from finding any evidence of "riotin
tion for cracking down on the movement, most Beijing residents stood at their
day, maintaining a normal social order. But in the evening, millions of them su
the major access routes to the Square in order to prevent the troops from e
proper. They not only blocked the roads with obstacles, they also engaged
dialogues, persuading them to withdraw. Students and citizens pointed out t
of using the "people's liberation army" to suppress its own people. Many cit
and water to the soldiers as a gesture of friendliness, demonstrating the
noncounterrevolutionary nature of the movement. Civilians stayed on the stre
Then they removed the obstacles and went to work. When asked: "Do you get
replied: "We take turns resting at the work unit."
In one of history's most remarkable achievements in nonviolent direct ac
people won the first confrontation with the military. The troops finally retr
successful framing effort of students and citizens. The victory marked the su
power." To further deflect the "riot" label, students returned to police all wea
by the soldiers who had attempted to occupy Tiananmen Square.
Realizing that they were losing the framing contest and concerned that their
rapidly eroding, Chinese leaders decided to force their way into Tiananmen Sq
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 149
bullets, and troops transferred from other provinces, soldiers who had had no contact with the
students and Beijing citizens. During the final stage of the movement, Beijing citizens had
become the major forces in the movement. They not only outnumbered the students, but also
fought in the battle's front lines, protecting the students in Tiananmen Square. On the night of
June 3, 1989, Zuo observed private entrepreneurs who owned motorcycles organize the "Flying
Tiger Motor Brigade" to provide students at the Square with information about troop
movements. Meanwhile, Voice of America continued to broadcast news to residents beyond
the reach of the motor brigades. Young workers formed a "Dare-to-Die Squad" to meet the
troops; doctors rescued the wounded; thousands of people blocked the roads to the Square
with obstacles and their bodies; and a million more protesting civilians stood along the access
routes. The human barricades were simply no match for the steel tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and automatic weapons. In the early morning hours of June 4, the movement's most
sacred symbol, "The Goddess of Democracy" statue, was smashed to smithereens and with it
the hopes of the movement. Hundreds of civilians lay dead among the rubble and thousands
of others were injured.
In order to justify the crackdown, Chinese officials denied the killing and fabricated "facts"
for television news reports. Zuo observed televised accounts in which the June 3-4 sequence
of events was reversed. State television reported that "the government repressed a counterrevolutionary
turmoil and brought back the social order necessary for the four modernizations,"
supported by a video sequence showing: (1) soldiers being killed by demonstrators, (2) students
setting military vehicles ablaze, and (3) soldiers opening fire in apparent self-defense.
Foreign media personnel and eyewitnesses to the slaughter interviewed by Zuo reported a
reverse temporal order: "They [the government] can lie to the people outside Beijing and the
world, but they are unable to lie to us Beijing citizens, or to those eyewitnesses along
Chang'an Boulevard."'5 But mostly, citizens expressed their disbelief, pain, and anger:
* I can't believe this has actually happened! They are fascists!
* I thought those were rubber bullets, but then found out that they were real explosive
bullets.
* How cruel of the army to shoot unarmed people!
* I am totally disillusioned of the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army.
* There won't be peaceful petitions as such any more. What awaits the government next
time will be revolution!16
The irony of the "People's Army" unleashing such ruthless force on its own citizens in the
name of the People's Republic and then seeking to deceive the world further amplified the
emerging injustice frame. The words of one Chinese woman now living in exile poignantly
summarize sentiments shared by most Chinese today: "It is the government who produced
'turmoil,' who 'plotted conspiracy,' who 'violated the constitution.' Therefore, 'the Chinese
People's government' is no longer 'people's government!' Likewise, 'the Chinese People's
army' is no longer a 'people's army.' "
CONCLUSION
Although the 1989 Democracy Movement was brutally repressed by the state, it
an unprecedented success in Chinese participant mobilization. For the first time
authoritarian China, a grassroots movement galvanized and activated a large propo
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150 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
populace. Prior to the "Beijing Spring," the pervasiveness and omnipotence o
made the prospects of the rapid diffusion of such a movement seem unimag
mary impetus for the massive participant mobilization was a regime crisis
democratic ideals precipitated in part by changes in the political opportunity
even the shared recognition of an opening in the window of opportunity, no m
or narrow it is, is not sufficient to trigger mass mobilization.
In contrast to most analyses of Chinese social movements, which have typi
ited to macrocontexts, we call attention to the confluence of and linkages
meso-, and micromobilization factors and processes. In particular, though s
substantial resources, indigenous organizations, or institutional protection, the
overcome mesostructural impediments by co-opting extant networks and or
cluding campus study groups, student unions, and dormitory networks. The
turn facilitated the social construction and dissemination of grievances throug
munity and beyond. But even these developments were not sufficient. Signific
people had to be inspired to act collectively, to take extraordinary risks for ab
like "justice," "democracy," and "modernization." Students fashioned a set o
ment strategies, grounded in traditional Chinese values and narratives, which
with the experiences and observations of most non-elites and effectively foiled
to discredit the movement. Meanwhile, students relied on nonviolent direct ac
complemented and reaffirmed their framings. State responses and counterfram
trast, failed to fit with what people believed and "knew." The series of punitiv
sures by authorities only served to reinforce the values and beliefs espoused
participants. In short, student-citizen-state interactions profoundly transform
ceptions of Chinese authorities from "our government" to "our enemy." U
factors combined to undermine the legitimacy of CCP rule.
One question that arises from our research is the extent to which distinctive
may have differential effects on mobilization processes. In a country like C
state dominates private and public domains, grievances must be widely shared
zation is likely to occur. While political opportunities and organizational fac
tant, both tend to be severely limited. Consequently, translating even wi
grievances into collective action requires more arduous micromobilization effo
essarily the case in other political contexts. It therefore seems reasonable t
under repressive and hegemonic conditions, micromobilization processes
greater significance than under less restrictive contexts. Not only is it essentia
ings resonate with the perceived social realities, daily experiences, and cultura
targets of mobilization, they must also effectively neutralize-at least long e
ize a critical mass-the counterframings of the targets of change, thereby u
legitimacy of their rationales for using repressive force against movement par
Paradoxically, once framings have been constructed and diffused, it may b
tralized, totalitarian systems to galvanize large numbers of participants on beh
We speculate that this is due in part to what Zhou (1993) refers to as the "
phenomenon. A totalitarian institutional structure such as Chinese state so
"reproduce large numbers of individual behaviors with similar claims, pattern
(p. 54). Zhou observes that "the bureaucratic apparatus in the workplace faci
numbers phenomenon by (1) directly linking local grievances to national p
creating similar bureaucratic problems and generating similar dissatisfactions
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 151
tions" (p. 59). Totalitarian state socialism tends to divide the entire population into the ru
and the ruled. Consequently, the ruled, regardless of occupations or social statuses, ten
many respects to share common everyday life experiences and grievances. Moreover,
the state directs private and public domains, large numbers of aggrieved people typically
to the state for solutions. Thus, collective action frames targeting the state are more like
resonate with most people's experiences in centralized systems than they would in sys
characterized by cross-cutting interest groups and multiple institutional layers.
Specifying the relationship between state structures, bureaucracies, "large numbers" of s
ilarly affected individuals, and collective action frames is beyond the scope of this article
have, however, sought to stimulate further research along these lines by attempting to ill
nate a few of the macro/meso/micro linkages associated with mobilization processes an
1989 Chinese Democracy Movement.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge Norman Denzin and several anonymous reviewers for the
sightful comments and suggestions, Ming Zhang for his valuable assistance and firm supp
and the many Chinese citizens with whom we spoke whose contributions to this project w
essential. We are deeply indebted to all who were tortured, exiled, or killed in the
Democracy Movement. Although our names are listed in inverse alphabetical order, our
tributions to this research are equal. An earlier version of this article was presented a
annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Pittsburgh, 1992.
NOTES
1. For an elaboration of the various techniques employed, see Denzin (1989); Feagin, Orum, and
Sjoberg (1991); Lofland and Lofland (1984); Snow, Zurcher, and Sjoberg (1982); Webb, Campbell,
Schwartz, and Sechrest (1966).
2. For ethical reasons, we are unable to provide additional biographical information.
3. Due to the fear of state persecution, citizens would not consent to formal interviews, especially
when conducted by a stranger. In consideration of these legitimate concerns, Zuo learned about citizens'
political attitudes and what, if anything, they had done to support the movement by listening to and
engaging in informal conversations.
4. We have disguised the identities of movement participants (some of whom emigrated illegally) in
order to protect them and their families who still remain in China.
5. We found Chinese social movement theories too limiting. Given the lack of academic freedom in
the People's Republic, only social movement theories that serve the interests of the party-state have been
formulated (citation omitted on the request of a Chinese scholar who has studied "social movements" at a
university in Beijing.)
6. We use the terms macromobilization, mesomobilization, and micromobilization to refer to the sets
of social movement related processes that tend to operate at the institutional (macro), organizational
(meso), and interactional (micro) levels. Macromobilization processes refer to institutional level changes
in power relationships and opportunity structures, which can stimulate, facilitate, and/or inhibit collective
action (Snow et al. 1986; Tilly 1978). Mesomobilization processes refer to the coordination, integration,
and/or activation of social groups, networks, and organizations for the purposes of collectively seeking or
resisting social change (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). Micromobilization refers to "the range of interactive
processes devised and employed by SMOs and their representative actors to mobilize or influence various
target groups with respect to the pursuit of collective or common interests" (Snow et al. 1986, pp.
464-465). While these are analytically distinct sets of processes, we demonstrate below the extent to
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152 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 36/No. 1/1995
which they are empirically linked and overlap (see also Klandermans 1992; McAdam
Zald 1988; Tarrow 1992).
7. Rumors in contemporary China often have a greater impact on perceptions of an ev
channels of communication, which tend to be viewed skeptically or ignored.
8. The advent of rock and roll music in China is illustrative of Western cultural influ
roll, which became quite popular on college campuses in the 1980s, functioned as a subst
of dissatisfaction with Chinese leaders and a longing for freedom (Chow 1993). Chow
Havel attributed a similar insurgent function to rock music in Czechoslovakia before th
communists.
9. Although various official Chinese media sources occasionally seemed to supp
protesters, only the Science and Technology News offered firm support throughout the
News 1989). In the early days of the student movement, People's Daily, CCP's ma
distorted news associated with the protests and published hostile editorials in opposition
For a few days during the student's hunger strike, sympathetic journalists expressed thei
demonstrators in People's Daily. Our sources suggest that the factions within the party
and the temporary disappearance of Deng Xiaoping led to a brief relaxation in state cen
America, various Hong Kong media outlets, and CNN also contributed to the instant dif
mation among movement participants and bystanders.
10. Calhoun (1989b, p. 31) observes that "while leaders played an important role in thi
ment, leadership was widely diffused. When one large character poster struck a posit
echoed it, people drew attention to them, and a collective action was born." We tend to
were spontaneous and emergent properties (Killian 1984; Zhou 1993) to the events
(some of which we point out below). Our primary objective, however, is to direct atten
ages between structural and interpretive factors associated with mass mobilization.
11. Throughout Chinese history, the legitimacy of the polity has been built upon
authority of the leaders by way of a strictly imposed hierarchical system (Weber 1964)
style did not change under the communists. The rule of the party-state is in essence th
individuals, a political dependence on strong leaders ideally conceived as mingzhu (en
and qingguan (uncorrupted officials) (Chow 1993, p. 81). According to Chow, the re
leaders has predetermined the despotic political structure in contemporary China.
12. This excerpt was from a two-hour interview conducted May 6, 1989. The gradu
conducted and posted the interview, wrote at the bottom of the poster: "Everything wri
The writer is willing to take full responsibility."
13. That sense of obligation to oppose injustice has not historically yielded challeng
Rather, strict adherence to Confucian principles requires that the intellectuals seek to a
restoring justice. It is this tendency that has led some critics to denounce Chinese i
"subalterns" of the ruling class in Chinese history (Chow 1993).
14. Beijing, a congested city of over ten million, relies on traffic and security police
order over the relentless flow of motorized vehicles, bicycles, and pedestrians. The a
police could have resulted in accidents and chaos, which in turn could have been used
for cracking down on the movement.
15. Chang'an Boulevard is a main avenue to Tiananmen Square.
16. The preceding quotes are from Zuo's reconstructed field notes.
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Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement 153
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