PSYCHOLOGY:
A PRESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE
ROBERT I. WATSON
Northwestern University
IN a recent analysis of the dynamics of the history
of the older, more mature sciences Kuhn
(1962, 1963) holds that each of them has
reached the level of guidance by a paradigm. In
one of its meanings a paradigm is a contentual
model, universally accepted by practitioners of a
science at a particular temporal period in its development.
With this agreement among its practitioners,
the paradigm defines the science in which
it operates. In a science where a paradigm prevails,
one recognizes that a particular paradigm
concerns chemistry, astronomy, physics, or the
biological science. Illustrative in astronomy is the
Ptolemaic paradigm which gave way to the Copernican
paradigm, and in physics is the Aristotelian
paradigm which gave way to the Newtonian dynamic
paradigm, which, in the relatively recent
past, was superseded by the paradigm provided by
Einstein and Bohr. The great events of science
which occur when a new paradigm emerges Kuhn
calls a revolution.
The historical sequence Kuhn holds to be as
follows: As scientists go about the tasks of normal
science, eventually an anomaly, i.e., a research
finding, which does not fit the prevailing paradigm,
is obtained. A normal science problem that ought
to be solvable by the prevailing procedures refuses
to fit into the paradigm or a piece of equipment
designed for normal research fails to perform in
the anticipated manner. Eailures in science to
find the results predicted in most instances are the
result of lack of skill of the scientist. They do
not call into question the rules of the game, i.e.,
the paradigm, that the scientist is following.
Reiterated efforts generally bear out this commitment
to the accepted paradigm that Kuhn calls a
dogmatism. Only repeated failure by increasing
numbers of scientists results in questioning the
paradigm which, in turn, results in a "crisis"
1
Address of the President of the Division of the History
of Psychology at its charter meeting at the American Psychological
Association in New York City, September 1966.
During 1966 earlier versions of the paper were given at
colloquia at Cornell University and Knox College.
(Kuhn, 1963). The state of Ptolemaic astronomy
was a recognized scandal before Copernicus proposed
a basic change, Galileo's contribution arose
from recognized difficulties with medieval views.
Lavoisier's new chemistry was the product of
anomalies created both by the proliferation of new
gases found and the first quantitative studies of
weight relations. When the revealed anomaly no
longer can be ignored, there begin the extraordinary
investigations that lead to a scientific revolution.
After sufficient acceptance of this anomaly is
achieved from the other workers in the field, a new
paradigm takes the place of the one overthrown
and a period of normal science begins. Since a
paradigm is sufficiently open-ended it provides a
host of problems still unsolved. In this period of
normal science the task of the scientist is to fill out
the details of the paradigm to determine what facts,
perhaps already known, that may be related to the
theory, to determine what facts are significant for
it, to extend to other situations, and in general to
articulate the paradigm. In short, it would appear
that the activities of normal science are a form of
"working through" in a manner somewhat akin to
that task which occupies so much time in psychoanalytic
psychotherapy.
When a new anomaly appears and is given support,
the cycle then repeats.
The bulk of Kuhn's monograph is taken up with
a historical account of the events leading up to
scientific revolutions, the nature of these revolutions,
and the paradigmatic developments thereafter,
with many familiar facts of the history of
astronomy, physics, and chemistry cast in this
particular perspective. It is here that the persuasiveness
of his point of view is to be found. The
test of the correctness of Kuhn's views rests upon
the fit of his data with the available historical materials.
Kuhn uses the key concept of paradigm
in several degrees of breadth other than contcntually
defining and it is difficult to know precisely
what differentiates each of the usages. Fortunately,
I can leave to the specialist in the history
of the physical sciences the evaluation of the cor-
435
436 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST
redness of his reading the details of their history
and the various meanings of paradigm, for I am
more concerned with what can be drawn from what
he has to say about other sciences that he contends
lack a contentually defining paradigm.
In all of its meanings, a paradigm has a guidance
function. It functions as an intellectual framework,
it tells them what sort of entities with which
their scientific universe is populated and how these
entities behave, and informs its followers what
questions may legitimately be asked about nature.
What are the consequences in those sciences that
lack a denning paradigm? Foremost is a noticeable
lack of unity within a science, indications of which
Kuhn acknowledges as one of the sources for his
paradigmatic concept, which arose in part from
his being puzzled about "the number and extent of
the overt disagreement between social scientists
about the nature of legitimate scientific methods
and problems [1962, p. X|" as compared to the
relative lack of such disagreement among natural
scientists.
That psychology lacks this universal agreement
about the nature of our contentual model that is a
paradigm, in my opinion, is all too readily docu-
mented.2
In psychology there is still debate over
fundamentals. In research, findings stir little argument
but the overall framework is still very much
contested. There is still disagreement about what
is included in the science of psychology. In part,
at least, it is because we lack a paradigm that one
psychologist can attack others who do not agree
with him as being "nonscientific" or "not a psychologist,"
or both. Schools of psychology still
have their adherents, despite wishful thinking.
And an even more telling illustration, because it is
less controversial, is the presence of national differences
in psychology to such an extent that in the
2
Others have expressed themselves about the lack of unity
in psychology. If one were asked what is the most comprehensive
treatment of psychology since Titchener's
Manual, the answer must be the multivolumcd Psychology:
A Study of a Science, edited by Sigmund Koch (19S9).
Its general introduction makes considerable capital of the
diversity of tongues with which psychologists speak and
the preface comments that psychology proceeds along "several
quite unsure directions, |p. V]." To turn to but one
other source, Chaplin and Krawicc (I960) close their
recent book on systems and theories with the prophecy that
the task of the future is "to integrate all points of view into
one . . . ."; to provide "a comprehensive theoretical structure
with the integrating force of atomic theory . . . . [pp.
454-4S51."
United States there is an all too common dismissal
of work in psychology in other countries as quaint,
odd, or irrelevant. National differences, negligible
in the paradigmatic sciences such as physics and
chemistry, assume great importance in psychology.
A provincialism in psychology in the United States
is the consequence, provincialism on a giant scale,
to be sure, but still a provincialism which would and
could not be present if a paradigm prevailed.
Before its first paradigm had served to unify it
and while still in "the preparadigmatic stage" each
physical science was guided by "something resembling
a paradigm," says Kuhn. Since it was
outside his scope, Kuhn said hardly more than this
about the matter.
Psychology has not experienced anything comparable
to what atomic theory has done for chemistry,
what the principle of organic evolution has
done for biology, what laws of motion have done
for physics. Either psychology's first paradigm
has not been discovered or it has not yet been recognized
for what it is. Although the presence of an
unrecognized paradigm is not ruled out completely,
it would seem plausible to proceed on the assumption
that psychology has not yet had its initial
paradigmatic revolution. The present task is to
answer the question—if psychology lacks a paradigm,
what serves to take its place?
It would seem that it follows from Kuhn's position
that whatever provides the guidance could
not have the all-embracing unifying effect of defining
the field in question since if it did so, a
paradigm would exist. What seems to be required
is some form of trends or themes, numerous enough
to deal with the complexity of psychology and yet
not so numerous as to render each of them only
narrowly meaningful. Those which I have isolated
follow:
THK WiESCRU'TIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY ARRANGED INCONTRASTING
1'AIRS
Conscious mentalism-Unconscious mentalism (emphasis on
awareness of mental structure or activity—unawareness)
Contentual objectivism-Contentual subjectivism (psychological
data viewed as behavior of individual—as mental
structure or activity of individual)
Determinism-Indeterminism (human events completely explicable
in terms of antecedents—not completely so ex-
plicable)
Empriricism-RationaUsm (major, if not exclusive source of
knowledge is experience—is reason)
FunctionaUsm-Structuralism (psychological categories arc
activities—are contents)
PSYCHOLOGY: A PRESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE 437
Inductivism-Deductivism (investigations begun with facts
or observations—with assumed established truths)
Mechanism-Vitalism (activities of living beings completely
explicable by physicochemical constituents—not so ex-
plicable)
Methodological objectivism-Methodological subjectivism
(use of methods open to verification by another competent
observer—not so open)
Molecularism-Molarism (psychological data most aptly described
in terms of relatively small units—relatively
large units)
Monism-Dualism (fundamental principle or entity in universe
is of one kind—is of two kinds, mind and matter)
Naturalism-Supernaturalism (nature requires for its operation
and explanation only principles found within it--
requires transcendent guidance as well)
Nomotheticism-ldiographicism (emphasis upon discovering
general laws—upon explaining particular events or in-
dividuals)
Periphcralism-Centralism (stress upon psychological events
taking place at periphery of body—within the body)
Purism-Utilitarianism (seeking of knowledge for its own
sake—for its usefulness in other activities)
Qiiantitativism-Qualitativism (stress upon knowledge which
is countable or measurable—upon that which is different
in kind or essence)
Rationalism-Irrationalism (emphasis upon data supposed to
follow dictates of good sense and intellect—intrusion or
domination of emotive and conative factors upon intellectual
processes)
Staticism-Developmentalism (emphasis upon cross-sectional
view—upon changes with time)
Staticism-Dynamicism (emphasis upon enduring aspects —
upon change and factors making for change)
The overall function of these themes is orientative
or attitudinal; they tell us how the psychologist-scientist
must or should behave. In short, they
have a directive function. They help to direct the
psychologist-scientist in the way he selects a problem,
formulates it, and the way in which he carries
it out.
The other essential characteristic is that of being
capable of being traced historically over some appreciable
period of time. On both counts, the term
prescription seems to have these connotations.3
It
3
A fortunate historical precedent for using prescriptions
in this way is to be found in a quotation from Leibniz in
his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1949).
It may help to make clear what is meant. "The discussions
between Nicole a
and others on the argument from the great
number in a matter of faith may be consulted, in which
sometimes one defers to it too much and another does not
consider it enough. There are other similar prejudgments
by which men would very easily exempt themselves from
discussion. These arc what Tcrtullian, in a special treatise,
calls Prescriptiones . . . availing himself of a term which the
ancient jurisconsults (whose language was not unknown to
him) intended for many kinds of exceptions or foreign and
is defined in the dictionaries as the act of prescribing,
directing, or dictating with an additional
overtone of implying long usage, of being hallowed
by custom, extending over time.*
predisposing allegations, but which now means merely the
temporal prescription when it is intended to repel the demand
of another because not made within the time fixed by
law. Thus there was reason for making known the legitjate
prejudgmenls both on the side of the Roman Church
and on that of the Protestants [Book IV, Ch. 15, pp.
S30-S31]."
4
Something akin to the prescriptive approach has been
suggested in the past. In the early part of the last century
Victor Cousin (1829) followed by J. D. Morell (1862)
developed a synthetical system of the history of philosophy
based upon a division into the four aspects of sensationalism,
idealism, scepticism, and mysticism.
In (he '30s, Kurt Lewin (1935) was groping toward
something similar in his discussion of the conflict between
the Aristotelian and Galilean modes of thought. Lcwin's
shift of modes of thought from the Aristotelian to Galilean,
although admitting of partial overlap, impress me as too
saltatory, too abrupt in movement from qualitative appearance
to quantitative reality, from search for phcnotypes
to search for genotypes, from surface to depth, from
disjointed descriptions to nomothetic search for laws. They
are, in my opinion, not so much a matter of qualitative
leaps as they arc gradual changes with the older views still
very much operative. Lewin's conceptualizing in relation
to the historic facts seems similar in spirit to Piaget's brilliant
strokes on the process of development. I suspect that
if we were to take Lewin as seriously, as did the American
investigators who followed the leads of Piaget into painstaking
detailed research, we would find that there was
much blurring and overlap of these Lewinian shifts, as
there seems to be at the Piagetian levels.
In applying the shift in modes of classification from the
Aristotelian to Galilean syndrome, Brunswik (1956) placed
psychology as showing the shift between Titchener in 1901
and Lewin in 1935. It is unfortunate that an arbitrary
impression of finality emerges. Prescriptions, at any rate,
are not conceived as emerging with such definitiveness; the)'
appear gradually and tentatively to disappear and then to
reappear.
Brunswik (1955, 1956) also casually used the term,
"Thcma" in somewhat the same broad sense that I use
prescription, hut without working out its meaning or scope.
He also used the same term to apply to the seeking of
analogical similarity to (he content of another science
(1955) and even to psychological content, as such (1956).
In his Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology
through the 1932 revision but not his 1949 revision,
Murphy (1932) in his summing up of the decades of 1910
and 1920 utilized quantification as the integrating theme
to unify psychology but gave previous consideration to
problem trends over the time expressed such as from
structural to functional, from part to whole, from qualitative
to quantitative and experimental to genetic-statistical.
It is important to reiterate that these were used as guiding
themes only for a summary of 2 decades, and not for the
438 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST
It is for the reason of persisting over relatively
long periods of time that prescriptions can be of
historical moment. In fact, in choosing the particular
prescriptions with which I deal the presence
of historical continuity over at least most of
the modern period was a major decisive factor.
If an instance of some conception serving a directive
function was of relatively short temporal dimension,
it was not considered a prescription. It is for this
reason that some prominent trends in psychology
today do not appear as prescriptions. Physicalism
and operationalism are very much part of the current
Zeitgeist in psychology but because they are
relatively new upon the psychological scene, they
are not considered prescriptions. Instead, they
serve as challenges to utilize the prescriptions for
their explanation. It is characteristic of prescriptions
that modern, more specifically formulated
versions of the more general historically rooted
earlier history of psychology. When Murphy faced the
task of summarizing from the vantage point of the late
'40s, he abandoned (his form of summarization.
Brunei- and Allport (1940) analyzed (lie contents of
psychological periodicals for the 50-year period, 1888-1938,
in terms of individual "author's problem, his presupposition
procedure, explanatory concepts and outlook in psychological
science [p. 7571." The material provided the
basis for Allport's 1939 Presidential Address to the American
Psychological Association. In his summarization, Allport
(1940) indicated that his survey showed an agreement
with an earlier one by Bills and not only stated that is
psychology "increasingly empirical, mechanistic, quantitative,
nomothctic, analytic and operational," but also pleaded
that should not psychology be permitted to be "rational,
leological, qualitative, ideographic, synoptic, and even nonoperational
[p. 261?" Thus, Allport and I show substantial
agreement since five out of six "presuppositions" as
he calls them, are among those in my schema of prescriptions.
The reason that one exception, operational-nonoperational
presuppositions, is not included in my schema is that
I consider it, as explained before, historically rooted in
other older prescriptions.
Allport and Bruncr's work cries out for follow-up and I
hope to have someone working on it in the near future.
Allport did, however, use something akin to his schema in
a comparison of American and European theories of personality
published in 1957.
A more recent related publication is that of ITcnry
Murray, who in the course of an overview of historical
trends in personality research, made a plea for "a comprehensive
and fitting classification of elementary trends"
(1961, pp. 15-16), which he then classified as regional,
populational, theoretical, lechnique, data ordering, intentional
(pure or applied), and basic philosophical assumplional
trends. This last, the basic philosophical assumption,
was not in any way spelled out so there is no way of
knowing what he had in mind.
ones may appear. Empiricism-rationalism have
modern descedents in environmentalism-nativism.
To arrive at a reasonably complete and appropriate
categorization of the prescriptions, I carried out
two separable, although actually intertwined steps.
[ considered the present scene, for example, in a
paper on national trends in psychology in the
United States (1965), in order to ascertain what
seemed to characterize psychology today, and then
turned to the very beginning of the modern period
in the history of psychology in the seventeenth
century to see if these themes were then discernible
in recognizable form. In the 300-page manuscript
that f have so far prepared, 1 can say that I find
encouraging indications of the historical roots of
these prescriptions somewhere in the contributions
of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz,
Locke, and Newton, and in those of the lesser
figures of the seventeenth century.
Turning to its directive-orientative function, it
will be remembered that this theory of prescriptions
is more than a classificatory system, more
than a convenient means for a particular historian
to order his account. These prescriptions were and
are part of the intellectual equipment of psychologists.
Psychologists are always facing problems,
novel and otherwise. They do so with habits
of thought, methodological and contentual, which
they have taken from the past. This applies today
with just as much force as it ever did in the
past. In short, they are dynamic because psychologists
accept, reject and combine prescriptions,
thus thinking in certain ways, and not in others.
In the above list, prescriptions have been presented
in one of the ways they function—as contrasting
or opposing trends.5
At some point in
r
> There is a precedent for considering the trends studies
in terms of antithetical pairs. In his critical study, Biological
Principles, J. H. Woodger (1929) considered the
problems of biological knowledge to center on six antitheses:
vitalism and mechanism, structure and function, organism
and environment, preformation and epigenesis, teleology
and causation, and mind and body. His emphasis was
upon examining the current views circa 1929. Although he
showed a lively appreciation of their historical roots, his
task was not essentially historical.
W. T. Jones (1961) also has developed a means of
evaluation of so-called "axes of bias" of order-disorder,
static-dynamic, continuity-discreteness, inner-outer, sharp
focus-soft focus, this world-other world, and spontanietyproccss.
Content high on the order axis shows a strong
preference for system, clarity and conceptual analysis while
that for disorder shows a strong preference for fluidity,
muddle, and chaos. Illustrative applications to samples of
PSYCHOLOGY: A PRF.SCKIPTIVK SCIKNCK 439
their history most of these prescription pairings
have been considered as opposed, even irreconcilable
for example, naturalism as opposed to supernaturalism,
and empiricism as opposed to rationalism.
A summarization, such as the list gives, inevitably
distorts its subject matter. [Especially
pertinent here is the false impression of tidiness
this arrangement of antithetical isolated pairs gives.
Consider the dichotemy, mechanism-vitalism. Does
this oppositional way of presenting them exhaust
the matter? By no means, mechanism bears relation
to molecularism, and molecularism may come
in conflict with supernaturalism, which in turn, relates
to certain forms of dualism.
Prescriptions are by no means simple, dominant,
isolated themes moving monolithically through history.
In a recent analysis of the history of mathematical
concepts in psychology, George Miller
(1964) warns expressly against this kind of oversimplification.
His treatment of what he calls the
"varieties of mathematical psychology" (p. 1),
that T consider to bear considerable relation to the
quantitavistic prescription, is further subdivided
into several categories and subcategories. As he
indicates, a more extensive treatment would require
still others.
Their oppositional character does lead to explication
of another characteristic of prescriptions. At
a time, past or present, when both of the opposed
prescriptions had or have supporters, it is possible
to make some sort of an estimate of their relative
strength; in other words, we may speak of dominant
and counterdominant prescriptions. Rationalism
dominated in seventeenth-century England; Locke
was nearly alone in advocating empiricism. Nomotheticism
dominates today in the United States; an
idiographic prescription is sufficiently viable to make
itself heard in protest against the prevailing state
of affairs. Hence, idiography is counterdominant.
The presence of dominant and counterdominant
prescriptions helps us to see how competitions and
conflict may result. Whether purism or utilitarianpoetry,
painting, and documents in the social and physical
sciences were made. Syndromes for the Medieval, the
Renaissance, the enlightenment, and the romantic periods
were developed. The last, receiving the most attention,
was characterized as showing soft-focus, inner-disorder, dynamic,
continuity, and other-world biases. The results so
far reported show it to be a promising technique.
Brunswik (1956) also speaks of the survival of dichotemi/.irig
doctrines, such as the four temperaments as
illustrative of a prescientific syndrome in psychology.
ism dominates in American psychology today, \
would be hard put to say, but we can be sure of one
thing—both prescriptions have sufficient protagonists
to make for a prominent conflict. Dominance
may shift with time; at one time supernaturalism
dominated decisively, there followed centuries of
conflict and today naturalism dominates almost
completely.
Although important, their oppositional nature is
not always present. Empiricism-rationalism has
been presented as a contrasting pair, yet at least
to the satisfaction of some psychologists and philosophers
of science, they have been reconciled today
at a higher level of synthesis. Induction and
deduction were also considered antithetical once.
In actual practice today, the scientist often sees
them as aspects of an integrated method which
permits him to weave them together. Sometimes
prescriptions, rather than being contradictory, are
contrary; there may be gradations, or relationships
of degree as seems to be the case with methodological
subjectivity-objectivity.
Reinforcing its directive character is the fact
that prescriptions sometimes are "prejudgments,"
presuppositions or preconceptions that are acted
upon without examination, that are taken for
granted.6
Some prescriptions are characterized by
their being tacit presuppositions taken as a matter
of course and even operating without explicit verbalization.
What psychologist today says to himself
that the problem he is considering is one that
I must decide whether I should or should not
quantify; instead he immediately starts to cast the
problem in quantitative terms without further ado.
Similarly, most psychologists are monists. That
many psychologists would react to being called
monists with a sense of incredulity and even resentment
nicely illustrates my point. We think
monistically without using the term. Similarly we
are apt to follow empiricistic and naturalistic prescriptions
without much thought to the fact that
6
Of course, implicitness of historical trends is not a
novel idea. Whitchcad (1925) remarked that when one is
attempting to examine the philosophy of a period, and by
implication to examine a science as well, one should not
chiefly direct attention to those particular positions adherents
find it necessary to defend explicitly but. to the
assumptions which remain iinstuled. These unverbalizcd
presuppositions appear so obvious to their adherents that it
may even be that no way to stale them has occurred lo
them. In similar vein, Lovcjoy (1936) has observed that
implicit or incompletely explicit assumptions operate in the
thinking of individuals and ages.
440 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST
we do so. But there was a time when the issues
of quantitativeness-qualitativeness, of monism-dualism,
of empiricism-rationalism, and of naturalismsupernaturalism
were very much explicit issues,
occupying the center of the psychological stage.
Often their implicit character seems to have come
about when one became so dominant that the other
no longer stirred argument. Sometimes no cleancut
agreed-on solution was verbalized, instead they
were allowed to slide into implicitness. A shift of
interest, rather than resolution with a clear-cut
superiority of one over the other seems characteristic.
Old prescriptions never die, they just
fade away. Naturally, at some times and to some
extent a prescription became less relevant to psychology,
but these are matters of degree.
Much of psychology's early history is, of course,
a part of philosophy. Many of these prescriptions
had their roots in philosophical issues, and are even
still stated in what is current philosophical terminology
as in monism-dualism and empiricism-rationalism
to mention the two most obvious. I do not
hesitate to use philosophical terminology because
psychology cannot be completely divorced from
philosophy either in its history or in its present
functioning. This state of affairs is cause for
neither congratulation nor commiseration. Psychology
is not the more scientific by trying to brush
this sometimes embarrassing fact under the rug as
do some of our colleagues by teaching and preaching
psychology as if it had no philosophically based
commitments. They are psychology's Monsieur
Jourdaines who deny they talk pyhilosophical
prose. Denying there is need to consider philosophical
questions does not solve the problem. The
very denial is one form of philosophical solution.
Since they were originally philosophical issues, it
will be convenient to refer to some prescriptions as
"contentual" problems. To bring home this point,
the areas of philosophy in which certain of the
prescriptions fall might be identified. Rationalism
and empiricism have their origins in epistemology,
monism and dualism in ontology (nature of reality),
and molarism and molecularism in cosmology
(structure of reality).
A major task in the history of psychology is to
trace how the field individuated from the philosophical
matrix. In this process, the prescriptions
that served as major guidelines in the emergence of
psychology as a separate discipline originally had
a philosophical character, which took on a general
scientific character with the emergence of the
physical sciences in general, and psychological
science in particular. It is in this sense that they
can be referred to as philosophically contentual in
character. Moreover, consideration by psychologists
and others in the sciences transformed them
sometimes in ways that only by tracing their history
can one see the relation to their parentage.
Often the traditional terminology used herewith,
for example, its clualistic and mentalistic locus has
had to give way to objectivistic and monistic
terminology. Confused and confusing though these
terms might be, they still referred to something
relevant to psychology. As they are formulated,
psychologists may be repelled by "old-fashioned"
air of the statement of many of the prescriptions.
Justification is found in the fact that these are the
terms in psychology's long history until a short
SO years ago.
Lacking a paradigm has meant that psychology
looked to other scientific fields for guidance. It is
characteristic of prescriptions that borrowing from
other fields has taken place. Psychology's heritage
from philosophy could be viewed in this manner.
But there are other forms of borrowing which
have entered into prescription formation. There
has been noteworthy borrowing from biology, physiology
in particular, signalized by Wundt's calling
his work "physiological psychology" in deference
to the methodological inspiration it was to him.
But physics, highest in the hierarchy of the sciences,
has just as often served as the model science.
Psychology has had its dream of being a changeling
prince. The rejected child of drab philosophy and
low-born physiology, it has sometimes persuaded
itself that actually it was the child of high-born
physics. It identified with the aspiration of the
physical sciences, and, consequently, acquired an
idealized version of the parental image as a superego,
especially concerning scientific morality, i.e.,
the "right" way for a scientist to behave.
Psychologists looked to these other sciences for
methodological guidance.7
This methodological
cast is particularly evident in the prescriptions concerned
with nomothetic law, inductivism-deductivism,
quantitativism-qualitativism, methodological
objectivism and subjectivism, and determinism-in-
7
It should be noted that this looking to other sciences
and finding evidences for prescriptions implies that paradigmatic
sciences arc not denied the presence of prescriptions.
Exploration is, however, outside of the scope of this paper.
PSYCHOLOGY: A PRESCKIPTIVE SCIENCE 441
determinism. It follows that these prescriptions
apply in varying degrees to other sciences. So, too,
does the puristic-utilitarian prescription, and working
through the naturalistic-supernaturalistic prob-
lem.
Some of the contentual prescriptions have counterparts
in other sciences. Salient to all biological
sciences are developmentalism-statisticism, funclionalism-structuralism,
mechanism in its various
guises, and molecularism-molarism. It is also at
least possible that many of these prescriptions
would be found to have counterparts in other nonscientific
areas of knowledge, such as literature, religion,
and politics. After all, man's reflective life,
as the "Great Ideas" of Adler and Hutchins and
their cohorts show, has much more interpenetration
into the various compartmentalization of knowledge
than is customarily recognized. But to explore
this further would be to extend discussion
beyond the scope of the paper.
In the preparadigmatic stage of a science, a
scientist may also become an adherent to a school,
that is to say, he may accept a set of interlocking
prescriptions espoused by a group of scientists generally
with an acknowledged leader. Functionalism,
behaviorism, Gestalt psychology, and psychoanalysis
are representative.
The orientative character of prescriptions is also
present in a school. As Marx and Hillex (1963)
recognize, each school seems to follow a directive—
you should be primarily concerned with the study
of the functions of behavior in adapting to the environment
and the formulation of mathematical
functions relating behavior to antecedent variables:
junctionalism—you ought to study the stimulusresponse
connections through strict methodological
objectivism; behaviorism—you can arrive at useful
formulations of psychological principles through
consideration of molar units of both stimulus and
response, i.e., configurations or fields; Gestalt—you
should be concerned with the interplay and conflict
of the environment and native constituents of the
disturbed personality with special attention to its
unconscious aspect, psychoanalysis.
Salience or nonsalience of particular prescriptions
characterize schools. Behaviorism is both contentually
objectivistic and environmentalistic (empirical).
However, the former is salient; the latter
is nonsalient. Contentual objectivism is central and
indispensable, environmentalism is not crucial to its
central thesis. Behaviorism would still be behaviorism
even if all behaviorists were nativistic in
orientation.
In broad strokes based on salient prescriptions,
functionalism is functionalistic, empiricistic, quantitativistic
and molecularistic. Behaviorism has as
salient orientative prescriptions, contentual objectivism,
and molecularism. Gestalt psychology may
be said to make salient molarism, subjectivism, and
nativism. The salient directive prescriptions of
psychoanalysis seem to be dynamicism, irrationalism,
unconscious mentalism, and developmentalism.
The differing patterns of salient prescriptions of
the schools serves also to make more intelligible
their differing research emphases upon particular
contentual problems—the functionalists with their
empiricistic salience upon learning; the behaviorists
with their peripheralism upon motor activity (including
learning); Gestalt psychology with its
molarism and nativism upon perception; and psychoanalysis
with its dynamicism and irrationalism
upon motivation.
There is an even broader level of prescriptions,
that of national trends exemplified by the Symposium
on National Trends at the XVIIth International
Congress to which reference already has
been made (Watson, 196S). Here greater diversity
than that of the schools is expected. Instead of
patterns, it is most meaningful to couch their discussion
in terms of dominance and counterdomi-
nance.
Immersion in the current scene as a participantobserver,
adds immeasurably to the already complicated
task of the historian who is apt therefore
to approach the present with a great deal of trepidation.
What will be hazarded is inclusive broad,
therefore, crude overall characterization of the current
scene of psychology in the United States. It
will serve as another exercise in the application of
the prescriptive approach. Although couched in
terms of a somewhat different array of prescriptions
than now is being used, for reasons explained
earlier, T will quote from the concluding summary
of my paper on this Symposium:
It has been seen that national trends in modern American
psychology follow certain dominant prescriptions. Determinism,
naturalism, physicalism and monism, although
very much operative, are judged to incite relatively little
opposition. Functionalism, operationalism, quantification,
hypothetico-deductivism, environmentalism, and nomotheticism
are likewise dominant, but there are counterprescriptions
which tend to oppose them. As for the
schools of psychology, psychoanalysis, very obviously, and
442 AMERICAN PSYCHOUJGIST
Cestalt psychology, less firmly, still stand apart. Serving
as countcrprescriplions to those dominant in psychology
are those calling for increased complexity in theorizing, for
an increased attention to philosophical mailers, for gen
oral acceptance of phenomenology, for increased atlcnfion
to existential psychology and in a somewhat amorphous
way almost all of the areas of personality theory calls for
counterprescriptions of one sort, or another [p. 1371.
It is important to note that most national prescriptive
trends have been stated in terms of dominance
and counterdominance, which reflects diversness,
not integration. Indeed, the highest, level of
integration in psychology is still that of the schools,
not that of the nation. Different patterns of
dominance and counterdominance are present in
different countries. For the sake of brevity, but at
the risk of oversimplification, methodological and
contentual objectivity, particularly in the form of
operationalism prevails in the United States, while
methodological and contentual subjectivity, especially
in the form of phenomenalism, does so in
large segments of Continental Europe.
It follows that patterns of dominant prescriptions
characterize a given temporal period and
geographical area. When we wish to emphasize
the then current intertwined pattern of dominant
prescriptions as having a massive cumulative effect,
we refer to the Zeitgeist. The Zeitgeist in
itself is empty of content until we describe that
which we assign to a particular Zeitgeist. The
strands that enter into the Zeitgeist include the
dominant prescriptions of that time. So the Zeitgeist
and prescriptive concepts arc considered complementary.
One of the puzzling facets of the
Zeitgeist theory is just how to account for differential
reaction to the same climate of opinion.
The prescriptive approach may be helpful in this
connection. Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes and
Spinoza, Hume and Rousseau, each experienced the
same Zeitgeist but also had idiosyncratic, nondominant
prescriptive allegiances.
What I have said about prescriptions by no
means exhausts this complexity. Prescriptive
trends fall and rise again, combine, separate, and
recombine, carry a broader or narrower scope of
meaning, and enter into different alliances with
other prescriptions, change from impliciteness to
expliciteness and back again, and concern with
different psychological content and its related
theories. Beyond this, T hesitate to go, except to
say I am confident there are probably other as yet
unrecognized ramifications. Prescriptions endure
while the psychological facts, theories, and areas
which influenced their acceptance are ephemeral
and ever changing.
ff I have stressed the directing and guiding phase
of the effect of prescriptions on a scientist's thinking,
it is not because of blindness to the other side
of the coin, the originality of the scientist. A
scientist not only is guided by but also exploits
both paradigms and prescriptions. He does so in
terms of his originality, and other factors that
make for individuality.
My enthusiasm for prescriptions may have left
you wondering whether this is all that I can see
in the history of psychology. Let me reassure you
at this point. The usual contentual topics of psychology,
most broadly summarized as sensation,
learning, motivation, and personality and the hypotheses,
laws, and theories to which their investigations
give rise are still considered very much
a part of its history. As differentiated from philosophically
oriented contentual prescriptions, it is
these and related contentual topics which show
that a concern for psychology is the subject matter
of historical investigation. These contentual topics
are the vehicles with which all historians of psychology
must work. Even here there is another
point about prescriptions that I might mention.
There seems to be some historical evidence of an
affinity between certain prescriptions and certain
contentual topics, e.g., dynamicism with motivation,
developmentalism with child and comparative
psychology, personalism, idiographicism, and irrationalism
with personality, and empiricism with
learning. Individual psychologists who have been
strongly influenced by particular prescriptions are
apt to reflect them in their work. Although the
evidence has not yet been sought, it is quite plausible
to believe that, reciprocally, choice of problem
area may influence allegiance to certain prescriptions.
In similar vein, I suspect that prescriptions
tend to cluster in nonrandom fashion. Off
hand, acceptance of supernaturalism seems to have
an affinity for teleology, indeterminism, and qualitativism;
naturalism with mechanism, determinism,
and quantitativism; nomothesis with determinism;
rationalism with deduction; empiricism with in-
duction.
To return to extraprescriptive aspects of psychology,
the methods of psychologists—observation
and experiment—cannot be neglected in a historical
account. Psychologists' use of these methods are
PSYCHOLOGY: A FKKSCKIPTIVE SCIENCE 443
an integral part of that history. However, certain
prescriptions, particularly those identified earlier
as methodological in nature, allow casting considerable
historical material in the way that has
been sketched.
Any adequate history of psychology must reconsider
the personality characteristics of individual
psychologists and the extrapsychological influences,
such as social circumstance, which have been
brought to bear upon each psychologist. Can one
imagine that Hobbes' psychological views were independent
of his detestation of organized religion,
adoration of a strong central government, and fear
of the consequence of political disorders?
I would like to summarize briefly some of the
functions that I consider prescriptions to serve.
They provide classification and summarization
through a conceptual framework which can be applied
historically. Prescriptions provide principles
of systematization which are related to, and yet
to some extent are independent of, the particular
contentual or methodological problem of the individual
psychologist. They are also mnemonic
devices which make it possible to summarize and
convey a maximum of meaning with a minimumof
words. Going beyond anything even hinted at in
the paper, prescriptive theory might also help to
make history a tool for investigation of the psychology
of discovery, and also serve as a framework
for studies using content analysis applied to historical
documents.
Prescriptions are characterized by an oppositional
character manifested in dominance and
counterdominance, an implicit as well as explicit
nature, a philosophically based contentual character,
a methodological character borrowed from the
other sciences, a presence in other fields, an interlocking
in schools of psychology with some salient
and others nonsalient, a clash of prescriptions at
the national level and a participation of prescriptions
at the national level, and a participation of
prescriptions in the Zeitgeist. Since psychology
seems to lack a unifying paradigm, it would seem
that as a science it functions at the level of guidance
by prescriptions.
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