III. Democratization and Multi-party Competition Effect on Political outcome in Japan (and increasingly in Taiwan) • Today’s Faction: Small and numerous, flexible membership. • Party Centralization Public Financing: mandated all private contributions only to parties, Not to individuals • Importance of party leadership: the rise of Koizumi and his relationship with the media Related YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UJYUG1o22DI Page 1 Electoral Reform aaa New rules for Choosing leader Ignoring boss 1995 Intra-faction Competition 1998 Result: - Instant changes in in Individual electoral campaign, party leadership selection - Later change in post allocation: Koizumi’s meritocracy ⇒ Today’s Faction: Small and numerous, flexible membership. IV. Japanese Developmental Model and its Variants Theory: if factions are by-products of intra-party competitions, it should be eliminated. 1. Fate of Factions IV. Japanese Developmental Model and its Variants 2. Party Centralization 1) Public Financing: mandated all private contributions only to parties, Not to individuals 2) Nomination: each party nominates only one person per district, Stricter rules for the electability of its field of candidates (two chances) ⇒ Voters are now freed of choosing between same party competitors, can rely on the general reputations and platforms of parties to guide their decisions. Party now choose leaders who best represent and articulate unified message of the party. Eg. Koizumi IV. Japanese Developmental Model and its Variants 2. Party Centralization 3) Prime-ministerial leadership: increased authority and resources of prime-minister (logical adaptation by politicians to new rule, institutional inter-complementarity) - Eg. Revising cabinet law to empower prime minister to oversee the line ministries Several new advisory councils responsible directly to PM Administrative Reform: - Big Bang Reforms (1996): permits any type of financial institution to provide banking, brokering, investment, or insurance; brokers’ commissions deregulated, entry into the currency exchange business was liberalized. IV. Japanese Developmental Model and its Variants Before: MOF guaranteed bank solvency by limiting competition among financial institutions. Consolidate the convoy system at the time of crisis. 3. The Big Bang Banks sold large portions of their stable holdings of firm share. Firms sold bank share as well. Foreign ownership increase,. ⇒ More exits to external bonds and stock market, Negative correlation b/w main bank and corporate profits (lowproductivity firms depending on banks) New Corporate Governance Labor Markets IV. Japanese Developmental Model and its Variants No more long-term access to fund caused no more longterm contract ⇒ Especially in service sector companies in banking, insurance, and commerce. Manufacturing firms continue lifetime employment for their core workers as an incentive. Easy hiring and firing practice led the increase of women employment WEEK 3: MASS MEDIA, VOTING BEHAVIOUR, AND PUBLIC OPINION IN NORTHEAST ASIA Government and Politics in Northeast Asia (by Jaemin Shim) II. MEDIA AND POLITICS: BASIC IDEAS  Importance of Media in Politics  People actually visit government web-pages or receive government publications to update themselves ?  Agenda power and Framing  “What” and “how” certain things are presented  The media can exaggerate, add, and remove certain facts to make readers recognise reality in the way they want II. MEDIA AND POLITICS: BASIC IDEAS  Agenda power and Framing  People take in the “framed reality” without being critical (Nimmo and Combs, 1990)  Discourses reflect certain groups’ power and, at the same time, can be used to exercise their power (Foucault , 1981)  Examples based on my own work  Work 1: Effect of media on inequality perception  Work 2: Media and legislature on social policy issues in Korea II. MEDIA AND POLITICS: BASIC IDEAS  Examples based on my own work  Effect of media on inequality perception  Inequality is equally worsening in South Korea and Japan in the past two decades (measured by the GINI index)  But various surveys show Koreans “perceive” the current level of inequality much more “less acceptable” and “unfair”  Why? II. MEDIA AND POLITICS: BASIC IDEAS  Agenda power and Framing 0 200 400 600 800 Right-wing, Korea 0 500 1000 1500 Left-wing, Korea 0 200 400 600 800 Right-wing, Japan 0 200 400 600 800 1000 Left-wing, Japan II. MEDIA AND POLITICS: BASIC IDEAS 0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 Right-wing, Korea (%) 0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 Left-wing, Korea (%) 0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 Right-wing, Japan (%) 0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003 Right-wing, Left (%) III. MEDIA AND POLITICS: KOREA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN  Restrictions?  Korea > Japan > Taiwan  TV ads, Radio ads, Print Ads  Campaign and expenditure restrictions  Internet campaign restriction?  Pros?  Cons? III. MEDIA AND POLITICS: KOREA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN  Americanization of media and politics?  Election campaign advertisement…  Korea: https://youtu.be/JOuTgtGCCts  Taiwan: https://youtu.be/tv1ZCDoiovA  How about Japan?  Presidentialization of Japan after the electoral reform…  Evidence? III. MEDIA AND POLITICS: KOREA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN  From issue to person III. MEDIA AND POLITICS: KOREA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN  From logos (logic) to pathos (emotion), e..g political style of Koizumi  Koizumi spoke to the public in a clear-cut language dubbed ‘one-phrase’  His penchant for casting issues as matters of good and evil  Press briefings were held twice a day, once at midday and once in the evening (then broadcasted on the evening news programmes)  Koizumi favoured the weekly tabloid magazines and sports newspapers  Forced the cabinet press club to admit sports newspapers. III. MEDIA AND POLITICS: KOREA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN THE END!!! Government and Politics in Northeast Asia (by Jaemin Shim)