CHAPTER THREE: Building a Taiwanese Republic: THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, 1945-PRESENT STEVEN PHILLIPS T HE POSSIBILITY of Taiwan's f()f]l1al and permanent independence from Chin,1 is a source of international Icnsions in East Asia, the c Statements by President Harry S Truman in june 1<)50 and the peace treaties formally concluding World War II in the Pacific in 1951, however, suggested that the island's status awaited final resolution. 17 Nevertheless, other than a short period of time when the survival of the Nationalist regimc on Taiwan was in doubt, the Americans ac/ed as though they accepted Chiang's control over the island, and that his government represented China. The early champions of independence discovered that America's oc~ casional ambiguity never translated into steady support. The nascent Taidu movement stood on the sidelines even as instability again threat~ ened to weaken the island's tics with the mainland. In the late 194os, ru~ mors abounded about possible foreign intervention on the island or the overth row of Chiang by other Nationalists. IHOther gossip suggested that the island would enjoy independence with United States support, a Unit~ cd Nations trusteeship, or even the return of the japanese-none of which the Americans considered seriously.IY As early at August 1<)47, Spe~ cial Envoy to China General Albert Wedemeyer reported to the Secretary of State: There were indications that Formosans would be receptive toward the United States guardianship and United Nations trusteeship. They fear that the Central Government contemplates bleeding their island to sup~ port the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine and I think their fears are well founded. 211 Yet, the possibility of independence depended upon events across the Strait, not on the island itself, much less the wishes of a few Taiwanese. In December 1947, American officials considered the possibility of an inde~ th ""; pendent Taiwan only if the Nationalist government collapsed on the main~ land and could not control the island.21 Three interrelated bctors prevented Taiwanese separatists and Ameri~ can diplomats from cooperating. First, many Americans saw Chiang Kai~ shek as the only figure with any chance of preserving a unified, noncom~ Illunist China. In effect, they accepted and approved of the Nationalists' political agenda for China both before and after the regime's mainland de~ feat. For example, in mid~I<)48, an American official in Nanjing wrote It may conceivably get so bad that the Gimo may, by one means or an~ other, be removed frolll the scene. Yet the CilllO seems to be the only el~ ement holding this vast country together, and should he go there would be a very strong chance that we would see a return to regionalism, lllak~ ing the pickings much more easy for the COlllmunists.22 Even as the Nationalists collapsed on the mainland, they continued to en~ joy the support of staunchly anti~comlllunist politicians and publicists in the United States. Most Americans accepted, or simply did not address, the Nationalists' political agenda as it related to the Taiwanese. Sccond, the United States felt publicly obliged to uphold the status of Taiwan as a territory returned to its rightful ruler after World War IIY For example, the Central Intelligence Agency stated that although technically T,liwan's fate was not final until a peace treaty was signed with japan, the Cairo and Potsdam declarations made independence unlikely.2'1 The United St,ltes was not eager to become embroiled in an issue of China's territorial in~ tegrity-a problem that could only invite comparisons to the era of un~ equal treaties."' Third, the Americans described the Taiwanese as "politically immature" and unlikely to overthrow the Nationalists.2 t> Further, Taiwanese and Americans had little contact prior to 194'5. Islanders usually spoke japanese or one of several local dialects, not Man(brin (GlIOYII), and thus had a dif~ tlcult time cOlllmunicating with America's China experts. In Tokyo, few Americans were interested in Taiwanese affairs or the machinations of a few exiles. Islanders had more specitic "defects." American military intelli~ gence officials in Tokyo revealed that many Taiwanese in japan had entered that country illegally and that "the activities of the League IFormosan League for Re~emancipationl in japan arc financed by hl1·ge~scale penicillin smuggling."2; For the next five decades, American otllcials monitored the Taidu movement's activities and met with its leaders, but refused to make any commitments of support.2H TIM IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES Other activists would t()l1ow Liao's example as they struggled to organi:;,e while avoiding Nationalist pressure upon friends or relatives on the island, and to publicize their efforts ill the bce of apathy among non-Taiwanese. In 19,)0, Liao established the Taiwan Democratic I wall rninzhu ell/lidang) in Kyoto. Most of his backing came from Taiwanese who had been educated during the colonial era, many of whom had that retrocession would enable them to enjoy greakr rights and intlucncc than they had undn Japanese rule. Personal rivalries and issues of funding were constant problcms.'Y In order to invigorate their efLiao and his Provisional Government f()r til{' I{('public of Taiwan (Taiwan gOllglicgllO tillS/Ii zliclIg.fiI) ill 1956. Liao w()uld submit dozens of petitions to thc United Nations or to American diplomats, all seeking support in the name of national self-determination. Rdlecting a key aspect of separatist thought, he llsed history in the service of nation building.51 Liao, as president of the provisional government, declared that his was the third attempt at creating a Taiwanese nation and that his dforts built llPon Zheng Chenggong's re 111()val of the Dutch in the l660s and the short-lived lH95 rellublic. In Taiwan was already a nation, the prohlem was upon ideas first expressed in Hong Kong, Liao often evoked America's independence struggle and Wilsonianism. 12 However, know whether this was done out of sincere belief that Taiwan's was that similar to thaI of the United States, or out of more cynicalmolivl's. To the Americans, he look every opportunity to claim that Taiwan's status was "undecided" and thaI the people of the island would enthusiastically "We Formosans maintain that Ithl'l independence movement for Formosa is ah!->olutely not treason or criminal. It is a patriotic action." I.iao recognized the cold war priorities of the United States, and he worked hard to convince the Americans that his anti-Nationalist cf forts were in no way pro-Communist.ll In light of President Truman's movement of the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Slr,lit and President Eisenhower's mutual security trealy with the ROC, activists realized that America's relationship with the Gener,llissimo was growing stronger, not weaker, after the retreat to Taiwan. Liao was attacked by the Nationalists as an American or Japanese pup~ pet and by younger Taiwanese as one of the older gentlemen who came of age under rule-relics (yivvu) as one author calls thell1.14 In bct, most inde\Jendence leaders bad to contend with ,\ that they were pawns of foreign powers dedicated to conta ining or humiliating China. That these activists were often foreign educated and .upport only served as fodder for antithe 1960s, Liao's movement seemed "tired" as new leaders with tics to students ill nen t. Contact between his government and supporters on Taiwan and Liao's relatives on the island were under cOllstant surveillance or inwrisoned reneatedlv. l ; The Dresi In 11)6'), he agreed to come home. The provisional government wonld «mtinue for decades, but would slide into obscurity. Proindependence historians have written that although Liao's endeavor [ililed, he created a legacy of resistance, and his surrender opened the door to the next generation of activists. IH New voices in the Taiwanese commu nomic concerns to the (Wang Ymlc, shifted the movement's focus from the Ill' 196o, and be'[i/iwtfll ScillCil '[i/iwoll (/illglliwi in Chinese, translated as Forlllosoll You/h).I'! His goal was to work among Taiwanese students in Japan ami to intlllcncc internatiollal public opinion. The society, like all Taidu groups, sought to build its presence on Taiwan with little success. III By the mid-196os, this organi/atioll demonstrated publicly as the h)[l110San Youth IndependClH.:e League (Taiwan L/illgflitlfl tiuli !i1/III1/ellg).11 Shih Ming (Shi Ming) amI other activists in Japan made socialism one bcet of the independence agenda, a development that would provide an ideological framework for some Taidu supporters, but would drive others away. l.ike Liao's Shih Four flu/lilred Yellr Ilis/ory of the /<'OrllIOS1Jll in Japan in 1962, became an I11SplratlOll to many sepa ratists was banned on the island itself!. This book combined Marxist~ connected Nationalist rule that national liberation and class went hand in haI1l..1.,12 Shih and other leftists encountered two with this approach. i:Jirst, the Japmlesl' Socialist Party and the Communist P~lrty were eager to sec their nation CLit diplomatic tics to Chiang's which meant party members had IittIe rcason to support an agenda tlwt was sure to enrage Beijing. Second, land reform and other Nationalist policies brought economic development and a distribution of wealth to the island. Most Taiwanese had little in terest in class struggle or revolut ionary violence. During the 1950S, influence over the TIM shifted toward the United States as more Taiwanese studied or immigrated there. In 1955, Taiwanese including prolific Taidu author Loo TSlI-yi (LlI Zhuyi, pen name: Li Tianfu), organized America's first Free Formosans' For­ 11105<1 (Taiw(lllren de became the United For mosans for Independence in 1958 under ch,lirman Ch'en I-te was secret during the early ye,lrs due to fe,lfs of N,ltionalist reprisals members on Taiwan, or possible arrest when members returned to the island. In 1961, because UFI ,1clivists saw the need to court support from the American media and public, and determined that returning home was illl~ went public with their efforts. Ch'en organized United Formosans in All1eriG1 for Independence (UFAI, Qua/lMei raiwil/l dilli iiallin 1965 ill order to unify the growing number or groups, particularly Taiwanese student associatiolls at major research universities. Acadelll ia beea me a battlcgroulld for Taid1I advocates. Un ivcrsities were vitalli)r the recruitmcnt of supporters, offered a forul1l for and employmellt for activists, and presented an opportllnity to study of the island by American scholars. UFI began holding conferences at universities in 1<)61 and the University ofWiscollsin became home to the Taiwan Studies Association ('/'aiwrlf/ yalljiullUi) in 1<)65. There existed con stant conflict on campuses between Taiwanese and the better funded proNationalist student groups.(By the l<)Hos, growing numbers of Illainl,llldborn students would join the fray.) Among the students and {'migrcs were Taiwanese who supported the Nationalists as well as Nationalist intdli gence agents who monitored political activity. This led to the arrest or some Taiwanese upon their return to the island, limited the efh.'ctiveness of the groups Oil Taiwan, and deterred many from participating in the movement. The Nationalists constantly monitored overseas critics of the preparing blacklists of dissidents banned from the 1960s, the pursuit of among Taiwanese to seeking support from the American press and In 1961, the first public protest occurred in the United States, as a handful of activists del110nstrated during Vice President Chen Cheng's visit.44 UFI led a series of protests at the ROC embassy in Washington on the anniversary of the February 28 Incident. Independence groups also began to del11onstr,lte against the PRe alld its claim to Taiwan in the 19705. Publications represented another key aspect of separatist efforts. The Independent Form.os(1, a joint publication of lapan's Formosan Youth Independence the Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe, and United Formosans in America for Independence, was indicative of the genre. This journal, and its successors, became one of the best ways to obtain information on the arrests of dissidents on Taiwan.45 reprinted any article or letter they could find that suggested their cause. 16 Although a few Japanese or Americans, such as State Department official turned scholar (~eorge Kerr, voiced support for independence, most people knew little of Taiwanese aspirations for national self determination. I! Much of the American criticism of the Nationalists focLlsed less on self-determination for islanders than 011 the authoritarian nature of the As W~lS the case in Japan, American leftists had more interest in building relatiolls with the People's Republic than in a small and struggling movement led by the Taiwanese. independence group labored to establish all on Taiwan."w It is impossible to know to what extent Taiwanese t~lVored independence during the ll1arti,J! law era, and or ganized activity was extremely d,lI1gerous. The Military Police, Military tdligence Bureau, Taiwan Carrison Command, Investigation Bureau, and National SeCllrity Bureau searched for any sign of dissent and sent thousands to jail. Even possession of works by overseas activists such as Liao Well-i or Shih Ming could lead to lengthy prison sentences. Next to allega tions of cOllllllunist conspiracies, independence plots were the main justi ficatioll for arrests during the White Terror that began in the late 1<)40S. On a lCw occasions, however, T,liw<1nese took extraordinary risks by Taidu 011 the island.'I'! It is difflcult, however, to connect the eft()r\s or exiles to indq)('ndellce activity on the island during the martial law era. For example, in 1<)64, Peng Ming~lllin became one of Ihe most famous kadel'S of the TIM. His lite and writings ofkr One biographer claimed later that Kuo's no Illass base, but was a vital conduit for information about events Oil Taiwall. llsu took a more hardline stance on independence. He had heen a sllccessful Taiwanese politician within the Nationalist Party. In 1977, he mn for office and won without the party's endorsement, and thus moved into the ranks of the opposition. When the Nationalists made clear that viewed IlslI as a trouble-maker and independence advocate, he fled to the United States in 1979. There, he would establish a plethora of groups while the opportunity to return to the island. At a 19ii.1 meeting at the University of Delaware, leading independence advocates demonstrated the conflicts endemic to the movement, Besides personal rivalries and personality clashes, the role of socialism and democracy were contentiolls isslles. Ijsu Hsin-liang, who f':Kused on his future career on Taiwan, emphasized that his goal was to advance the revolutionary resistance movell1ent 011 the island itself.79 He assured pants that thc current stage of revolution was democratic, not socialist.Ho activist Shih Ming noted that the class conilict cd in socialist theory was different on Taiw:lI1, as it was a colony tinder Nationalist rule. The primary con1radiction was the natiomll (lI1iIlZU) prob!em, not class conf1ict.~1 Nevertheless, Shih was accused or communism.x2 The \VUfJ representative claimed that his main goal was "comprehcnsive wart~lrc" (zany-liz/wn). Although not the possibility of armed struggle, he encouraged activists to engage in a legal, democratic, and f~)rcign atl1irs struggle in order to promote the cause.HI HSlI was subtly port raved as an interioDer. One WUH leader claimed that officers in their not 1heir age or reputation.H 'l He noted that HSll advocated but that organizations with internal democracy, slich as WUFl, provided the best example and guarantee of successful political change on the is­ land.R5 WUFI participants also called attention to their long-standing dedication to the cause and systematic ctforts to build up the organization on 1he island itself. As evidenced by the 1984 elections, however, WUFJ was not democratic fiJr some of its members. The organization as some of those who lost resigned, attacking Chang Ts'an-hung and other leaders as undemocratic and incffective.Kl1 WUFI survived these conflicts to remain the largest and 1110st promi­ nent Taidu organization, and to expand its efforts. The "foreign afl~lirs" referenced by I,i became a key aspect of the TIM even as Americans . more receptive to Taiwanese dissidents. The end of official ties to Taipei in 1979 caused a few 1110re Americans to acknowledge the pos­ of the island's Dermanent senaration from China. The arrests after leader Lin Nan murder also 1110re criticism of Nationalists and advocacy of democratic reform on the island.xl In 1<)82, the Pormosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA, TlliwallfCII g,onggong slliwl/ xielwi) was established ill the United States as an offshoot of WUFI. This group focllsed on lobhying American politicians to support democracy and self-determination for Taiwan. The Association's activities would highlight another shift in the TIM. The decline of the ROC's intcfllational position and the PRe's power made Beijing's claim to Taiwan a growing problem. FAPA's one spokesman noted, was to prevent the Chinese Communists from invading the island.H~ In 1<)8.l, one FAPA representative decried America's acceptance of Beijing's claim to the island while ignoring the desires of the Taiwanese people.H~ Whatever the logic of FAPA's arguments, the island's f~ltc remained hostage to larger geopolitical and economic concerns. While the Nationalists' Chilla Lobby had largely hIded away, a formidable array of husiness leaders, scholars, diplomats, and otficials were determined to improve PRe-US relations by supporting the one China policy. INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS IN POWER: PRAGMATISM AND COMPROMISE Despite arrests after the ncident and continued non-Kllomintang politicians and intellectuals grew more 986 formed the D],P (Minzhu jinblldal1{!), the first the sertiveness coincided with the Nationalists' had recognized the need to legitimize the regime by wanese into the Nationalist Party and government ranks, and steps toward political reform. Through a process known as Chiang promoted native-born Nationalists, such as Lee Denghui), to higher ranking positions.YO With the end of martial law in 1987, the relaxation of controls over the press, groupS.'l1 In this environment, the DPP expanded its int1uence from towns, to districts, to the province, and to national~kvel bodies.92 Separatists played Divotal roles in the DPP and some of its most adamant support. The new party, however, made independence only one of many issues in its platform, amI its leadership /Jerce ly debated how to prioritize the quest t()r international recognition, democratization, rule of law, economic development, environmental protection, and a host of other domestic problems. The party was divided betw('en the Formosa faction and the New Tide faction----both of which were more firmly rooted on the island than most of the diaspora activists. The Formosa faction, which grew out of the leadership of Mcilidao l11agawas more moderate on the independence issue, and instead focused on elections. More radical [)[1P leaders in the New Tide t~lCtion dem[1 leaders found that electoral victory, in island~wide COIl tests, often required downplaying separatism, as voters feared a mIlItary at·· tack from the PRe would result from a declaration of independence. Alto the threaten their hard~won the support of Taiwanese business leaders, many of whom wished to invest on the mainland, re(]uircd that DJ>P leaders emphasize their ability to protect the economic by Nationalist policies rather than to risk a violent confrontation with the PRC, During the 1990S, ])PP pragmatism on the peared to grow with dcctoral sliccess and the responsibility it \)fO ugill, as well as a generational change to the post~Meilidil() generation.'!3 Ofthose arrested after 1979'S Kaohsiung Incident, only Annette Lu remains Nevertheless, the UP]> became the single most important forum for further dissemination ofseparatist ideology, particularly as it used electoral victories to shape education, language, and cultural policies on the island. TIM leaders lobbied the [)PP more vocally to back independence, and to dect their strongest supporters.111 the need for vigilance against an aggressive In the rLll111p to the 2004 presidential election Chen began to take a more assertive stance toward independence, much to the of and Beijing. The President's policies seemed motivated by a mixture of cynical political opportunism and nationalist idealism. In light ofa high unemployment rate and questions over his administration's competence, he sought to sway voters by goading the mainland government into threatening the island as it had done during the 1996 election of Lee Teng-hui. Chen, f~lcing the last four years of his long po­ 1itical career, may have come to believe that he must secure his place in pushing the island toward permanl'nt separation from the mainland. Further, he and other DPP leaders may feel that Taiwan COI1sciousness has spread sufficiently as to support radical changes. Chen used an appeal to the del110cnltic process, an island-wide refcrendum, to pr01110te the principle that the island's people could vote on important isslles-thus opening the door to a vote on indcpendence in the future. After a great deal of heated debate, the erendul11 with the March 2004 presidential poll. Voters wne asked to decide whether to increase Taiwan's anti-missile defenses if the PRe rcfused to remove hundreds of short-range missiles pointed at the and whether to t~ntcr talks with the PRe based on an ill-defined peace and framework. Chen eked out a narrow victory with ,)0.1 percent of the vote, although the referendum failed to obtain the required support of half of the registered voters.lll~ I)cspite the lack of a clear mandate, Chen expressed greater dclertnination to push ahead with mcasures that will sorely test Beijing's patience, in c1uding a new constitution, to be voted upon in a referendum in 2006 and to go into effect in 1.008 (perhaps just bd()fc the Beijing Olympics). He claimed that this constitution would have no impact 011 relations with the mainland, but would focus on clarifying the duties of the president and the division of powers among branches of government. IO,! PRe officials feared that the process ofconstitutional revision, once begun, would grow to include pro-independence clauses sllch as changing the name of ROC to the Republic of Taiwan. To the mainland government, Chen's plans represented a clear timetable for independence. At the very least, the President is creating a framework t()r Taiwanese to make this choice. CONCLUSION In 19('7, rutenentlcllt Formosa noted that have endured a half of The time for should come when I) COllllTIunist China enters into the United 2) Chiang Kai·shek dies, 3) Troops on the island of and Matsu are withdrawn, or 4) America discontinues its aid to the Nationalist Chinese Covernment. The fourth is the least likely. I 10 Separatists witnessed all but one of these events, with few immediate results. -qle TIM experience is that of ,1 disorderly, faction ridden nationalist coalition lacking international support that is nevertheless stumbling tow,lrd success today. Political change on Taiwan did not meet independence adVOGltes' expectations, as it was marked by gradual ,lIld pe,lceful reform r,lther than sudden revolution. TIM leaders have [aced ,1 difllcult transition from exiled or underground conspirators to party politicians and For most of the movement's history, separatists assumed that a Taiwanese nation (here meaning a community of like·minded individuals) existed and that the Taiwanese would welcome a republic. Thus, independence required the overthrow of the Nationalist state. In the wake of democratization alld Taiwanization, however, TIM advocates now influence the state through the DPP, and appear to have an im:re