

When is the Author?

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For all that he offered the world of cultural theory, Roland Barthes is perhaps most remembered for a dastardly plot of homicide hatched in 1967. Concerned that no adequate theory of textuality could be formed until the text had been unmoored from the imposing figure of the author, Barthes proposed, in “The Death of the Author,” to kill the author so that the reader might live and thrive.¹ The fact that Barthes’ plot has continually received so much attention across the humanities, and has not simply been written off as peculiar hyperbole, should signal the degree to which the author both matters a great deal, and remains such a problematic entity to textual studies. As a centering figure for notions of textual creation, the author wields enormous control over discourses of meaning, beauty, and power. Thus, while academics are rarely known for plots of murder, many theories and understandings of how meaning is created and of what roles texts play in our lives labor in the shadow of this figure, such that Barthes’ plot has been regarded by many as one against a cruel tyrant. As with all cases of regicide, palace coups, and assassination, though, we must ask who or what will replace the author when gone. On this, Barthes was somewhat vague. While he notes that “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author,”² he is not entirely clear on whether the reader will replace and usurp the author, or whether the reader will merely breathe freer and be a better reader in the author’s absence. Indeed, if Barthes is often cited in discussions of authorship still, this might indicate that we have not yet worked out what to do when the author dies, whether of murder or of natural causes.

Clearly, some model of textual creativity is still required, and clearly authority (if not *authorship*) will still be wielded by some more than others. And thus this chapter aims to map out what a post-author world might look like, and to offer a notion of authorial clusters that are always operating and in flux, never finished. I will suggest that a key problem with the theory of the author as controller and

creator is a temporal one, wherein texts are erroneously imagined to *be*, rather than imagined to be *becoming*. If we see texts as always in the process of becoming, however, we can not only reframe the traditional author's role in that process in a way that does not allow the figure undue power, but also be encouraged to look for and examine the many other figures in the many other moments that author a text. Asking *when* the author is, in other words, may help us to answer the thornier question of *what* an author is.

First, I will set the scene with a brief, selective overview of recent debates over authorship in critical theory. Then, as a way to advance through this impasse, I will propose an analogy: a text's meaning, I argue, is akin to a person's identity. Since cultural theorists in recent years have achieved slightly more consensus on how each one of us "authors" our identities than on notions of textual authorship, perhaps a simple answer to the role of the author of texts can be found through exploring this analogy. This leads to my proposal of a notion of authorial clusters and of a phenomenological model of textuality that poses creation as always in process, and authors as always present. The plural is important in that previous clause – while I may use "the author" to discuss one in a collective, in truth no text ever has a singular author, and by proposing authorial clusters, I mean to turn attention away from the rather boring game of ascertaining which author "counts," and instead to the more fruitful task of examining how authorship is contested, granted, claimed, denied, fought over, and/or shared. Authorship occurs over time, not in a blast of creative energy at the beginning of a text's life, and if we acknowledge this, we free ourselves to discuss multiple nodes of authorship and the sociality of authorship to a greater degree. If studying the author when we thought there was only one required us to work out when s/he was born, what life-changing events occurred when s/he was a teenager, and so forth, a notion of authorial clusters working over time demands instead that we examine the social tensions, power differentials, jostling, management, and collaboration between authors, and that we look not only to the biographies of any given author or cluster, but to the interactions between authors of the "same" text and to production cultures. Just as Roland Barthes noted in his essay "From Work to Text" that the artistic work is meaningless until used by someone, at which point it truly becomes a text,³ so too are authors meaningless until they are used. How and when this use occurs is the subject of this chapter.

A Recent History of the Author

Barthes may have proposed the death of the author, but by the point of his essay's publication, the author had already fallen upon somewhat hard times in the university. New Criticism in the United States and Practical Criticism in the United Kingdom had both de-emphasized the author, and had reached a peak of sorts when, in 1946, W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley proposed in their now

famous article, “The Intentional Fallacy,” that “the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work.”⁴ Critical inquiries, they further noted, “are not settled by consulting the oracle,”⁵ and thus the author’s intentions, they contended, are of no utility to the critic attempting to ascertain meaning. Before the author could be killed, in other words, Wimsatt and Beardsley had suggested the author was already little more than a ghost.

Subsequent waves of poststructural theory further destabilized authors’ grasps on “their” texts, as the text’s presence was posited to owe a great deal to its intertextual forbearers, and the Romantic myth of the Great Author speaking Truth and Beauty to the world was dismissed as nonsense. If Percy Bysshe Shelley had earlier noted in a moment of Romantic excess that the author was a higher being, an Aeolian lyre (or wind harp) played by divinity itself, and through which meaning entered the world,⁶ a long string of critics and theorists later countered by arguing that all texts borrowed from and built themselves upon other texts. To Julia Kristeva, the text is “a mosaic of quotations”;⁷ to Jacques Derrida, all meaning is structured within a system of “différance” and thus constructed outside the text and beyond the author’s control more than by either;⁸ or, to John Frow, texts “are not structures of presence but traces and tracings of otherness. They are shaped by the repetition and the transformation of other textual structures.”⁹ To take *Hamlet*, therefore, William Shakespeare’s plot was borrowed/copied, his characters had archetypal resonances that allow us to make sense of them, and each and every word spoken had a history in other texts and contexts before Shakespeare’s use of them, but the text also continued to amass intertextual value and meaning after Shakespeare’s involvement, as subsequent invocations and borrowings of the plot or characters, development of the archetypes, and evolution of the words stand between Shakespeare and our reading or viewing in ways that add considerably to the meaning therein. Shakespeare can only be considered a singular author of *Hamlet* if we foolishly imagine the text to have no past or future. Such a model of poststructuralist, intertextual meaning diminishes the author considerably, often rendering him or her little more than a nuisance.

Yet the author survived and persisted. S/he can perhaps thank the difficulty of the prose often used to propose his/her death, since that turgidity restricted the prose from reaching high-school art and literature classes, where the author could still reign supreme. Belittled, ignored, or plotted against by theorists in post-secondary institutions, the author still commanded many a high-school homework assignment or lesson plan on Shakespeare, Keats, or other “Great Minds.” Authors might also thank nascent academic disciplines within the humanities, such as Film Studies, for the author proved a useful tool for establishing the medium’s artistry and hence the legitimacy of studying the medium. “Auteur theory,” as it came to be known, grew from François Truffaut and André Bazin’s writings in *Cahiers Du Cinéma*¹⁰ to posit the idea of singular artistic geniuses with coherent visions behind true film. Film needed – or so it seemed – authors/auteurs to dodge the charge of

being yet more mass culture, and so the author was given a second chance at a happy life by Film Studies.¹¹

And, of course, the other humanities had not entirely bowed down to the likes of Barthes, Wimsatt and Beardsley, Kristeva, Derrida, and Frow. Some doggedly refused to engage with critical theory and preferred to keep with business as usual, while others offered sound reasons to keep the author around. Most notably, many feminist, anti-racist, and postcolonial critics argued that the presence of a woman, person of color, or (post)colonial subject writing was important to both a text's politics and a reader's experience of the text, and that authoricide risked silencing previously marginalized writers and creators just at the point when they were becoming especially visible and audible. After noting that Barthes' "destabilization of the paternal – patriarchal, really – authority of authorship (Milton's for example) brought about through deconstruction has been an enabling move for feminist critics," Nancy K. Miller then distinguishes between the male/"universal" author, as historical beneficiary of power and authority, and the female author which is an altogether different entity:

The postmodernist decision that the Author is Dead and the subject along with him does not, I will argue, necessarily hold for women, and prematurely forecloses the question of agency for them. Because women have not had the same historical relation of identity to origin, institution, production that men have had, they have not, I think, (collectively) felt burdened by *too much* Self, Ego, Cogito, etc. Because the female subject has juridically been excluded from the polis, hence decentered, "disoriginated," deinstitutionalized, etc., her relation to integrity and textuality, desire and authority, displays structurally important difference from that universal position.¹²

As Kristina Busse in this volume suggests, there are many instances when *who* is writing/filming/creating is politically and ethically important, and thus perhaps some authors need killing while we might still have uses of others.

Michel Foucault also countered Barthes' and others' attempts to dismiss the author by noting that regardless of what we do with the actual author and his/her intentions, as critics we should not ignore the considerable *use* that readers and society at large have for authors. Writing of "the author function," Foucault stated that the author is a projection, not a reality,¹³ but our reasons for projecting need to be taken seriously: "it is not enough to declare that we should do without the writer (the author)," he wrote.¹⁴ He noted, for instance, that we use authors to indicate "a constant level of value," "a field of conceptual or theoretical coherence," "a stylistic unity," and "a historical figure at the crossroads of a certain number of events."¹⁵ They mediate and contain texts for us, in other words. And we need authors for disciplining functions, so that we know who to credit or blame for their activities in the world at large. Applying Foucault to *Star Trek's* "author" figure, Gene Roddenberry, Henry Jenkins argues that invocations of Roddenberry help audiences to determine communally what counts as *Star Trek* and what

doesn't, to see a consistency of values, themes, and aesthetic moves in this and other works by Roddenberry, and to demand a certain level of quality of the show. Jenkins writes, "Seeing *Star Trek* as reflecting the artistic vision of a single creator, Gene Roddenberry, thus allows fans to distinguish it from the bulk of commercial television which they see as faceless and formulaic, lacking aesthetic and ideological integrity,"¹⁶ so that just as Film Studies used authors/auteurs to legitimate itself as subject, one might argue, so too some audiences use the author to legitimate *Star Trek*, to draw textual boundaries, and to create meaning for the text. Certainly, the struggle to legitimate almost every medium – from film, with the likes of D.W. Griffith or Sergei Eisenstein, to comic books, with the likes of Stan Lee or Frank Miller, and from television, with the likes of Norman Lear or Steven Bochco, to videogames, with the likes of Sid Meier or Shigeru Miyamoto – has been accompanied by the nomination of multiple author figures.

Clearly, then, it would be hasty to participate in Barthes' murderous plot. I empathize with his desire to move beyond Romantic narratives of genius figures, to subject these to critical scrutiny, and to free the text from the power of the singular author. But all of this can be achieved without bloodshed. Indeed, and following numerous others, I propose not the diminishment but the pluralization of the author. No text has a single author, and any theory of authorship that does not wish to trip over its own shoelaces must first come to terms with the profound multiplication of authorship. However, while this observation has often meant simply that it takes more than one person to make a movie, television show, videogame, or even a novel, I want to move beyond this to discuss the text as a continuous and continuing entity that comes to be over time, and hence that will require, invite, and be subjected to authorial interventions as long as it exists. A fundamental problem with many theories of authorship, whether homicidal or celebratory, is that they posit the author as genesis, but if we realize that textual creation is never complete, and hence that authorship continues, we might find better ways to envision authors as those who variously maintain or augment texts, not simply as those who wave them into being with a flourish of the pen, camera, or binary code. Elaborating upon this theory of textuality, I will note authors' roles in this process, before later considering how to study authors as I am describing them.

Many Authors

While by no means a quick fix to all concerns with theories of the singular authorial genius, theories of authorial multiplication have significantly refined and sophisticated how we think of audiences. These theories are perhaps most easily illustrated with a profoundly collaborative medium such as film, television, or videogames. If auteur theory posited a lone figure behind the camera, production cultures research has given us a considerably more complex and elaborate image

of how film gets made. To credit the director with authorial status requires an odd and indefensible amnesia towards the scriptwriter, the cinematographer, the actors, the editor, and countless other individuals and teams (see, in this volume, Brisbin on production designers, Johnson's interview with Bear McCreary on music composers or Caldwell on "below-the-line" workers, for instance). Similarly, even while penning a book about television that aimed "to shatter the anonymity" of television production by focusing on producers, Horace Newcomb and Robert Alley were careful to open *The Producer's Medium* by counseling against seeing television as the prerogative of these figures alone, instead noting that it is "a highly collaborative medium."¹⁷ Media and cultural studies work on production has increased exponentially in recent years, with a resulting chorus of scholars noting the various contributors to the process of creation. Meanwhile, the participatory and mash-up cultures, and digital multi-layered new media environments that surround us have understandably invited a boom in explorations of networked authorship and of collaborative creativity.¹⁸

However, collaboration and the multiplication of authorship is no less a reality for seemingly more solitary arts, as noted in Jack Stillinger's *Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius*. Stillinger takes on numerous sacred literary cows, with detailed accounts of John Keats' borrowings and assistance, of Harriet Mills' central role in her husband John Stuart Mill's writings, of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's plagiarism, Ezra Pound's contributions to T.S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*, Shakespeare's many contributors, and more. In concluding, he notes that while defenders of intentionality, anti-intentionalists, and "author-banishers" alike all seem united in thinking of *one* author, allowing for multiple authors in turn allows for greater complexity of meanings and intentions.¹⁹ Indeed, as noted above, intertextual theory has also deeply challenged the notion that anyone even *could* write something "alone" or that, should they find a way, their product be consumed without other texts, structures, and meanings (from other authors) playing a key role in interpretation. All authors learn from and are influenced by countless others, borrow knowingly and unknowingly/subtly from them, and their readers will make sense of what is before them within the context of that which they already know. As Mikhail Bakhtin wrote, no speaker "is the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe,"²⁰ as all ideas must come from and build upon others.

Nothing has a single author. However, as important as this recognition is, it is only a natural conclusion based on a more profound modification that we must engage. Namely, that acts of authorship cannot be located in any one time or place, as instead they are always a process that occurs over time and across space. To note collaboration is to note at the very least that a text has moved back and forth between at least two creative entities, constituted in and by the act of movement, and it is likely that the process was considerably more complicated. Barthes' notion of the text only coming into being when it has a reader²¹ similarly implies a transitive model wherein creation occurs in between two or more forces.

There is no such thing as a text that simply *is*, therefore; there are only texts that *become* and that will continue to become. We may find it expedient and helpful to discuss what a text “is” at any given moment in time, and in any situated place and context, but that text will always keep moving and keep becoming. Thus, if authorship is seen as an act of creation, once we recognize that texts never stop being created, and once we respect the phenomenology of textuality, it follows naturally that textual creators – authors – exist across a text’s life span. The author’s role is not limited to the “beginning” of a text, unless we allow that no text ever truly finishes, thereby meaning that texts are always perpetually beginning, and never move beyond this stage of development.

Here it may help to compare a text to the postmodern subject. We could see authors themselves as postmodern subjects, and their ideas, vision, and intentions would be obscured to do so, as we would then cease to see them as immutable, and instead accept more simply that they will change over time, but also and more complexly that they may conflict and lack coherence even within any moment in time. However, for now I am not as interested in the *author* as postmodern subject as I am in the *text* as postmodern subject. Postmodern, poststructural theories of identity posit that it has never been set in stone, and that it is always ongoing, a project. As Stuart Hall writes, the postmodern subject has:

no fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes a “moveable feast”: formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us. It is historically, not biologically, defined. The subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent “self.” Within us are contradictory identities, pulling in different directions, so that our identifications are continuously being shifted about. [...] The fully unified, completed, secure and coherent identity is a fantasy. Instead, as the systems of meaning and cultural representation multiply, we are confronted by a bewildering, fleeting multiplicity of possible identities, any one of which we could identify with – at least temporarily.²²

What I am today need not spell out what I am tomorrow. The self must be performed, moreover, and the performance is constitutive of identity. We *are* in the acts of our becoming. Importantly, developmental psychologists may point to specifically rich, important moments of becoming, sociologists and education theorists may point to moments when we are especially open to authoring from our parents, teachers, or environment, and cultural theorists such as Judith Butler remind us that our performances are circumscribed and delimited, so that we are constantly aware of “expectation[s] that [end] up producing the very phenomenon that [they] anticipate.”²³ But there is never a point when we’re simply done, authored, and written.

So too with texts. When a writer sits down and pens a poem, that is indeed an important moment of its creation, just as might be the months of filming that a director and others put into making a film, or the long process of developing a videogame may be. But as a postmodern subject, the text will always continue to

become. After all, like people, texts are intrinsically social entities, and hence their meanings and impact are social and cultural, *and socially and culturally established*. Texts too must perform their identities, and must be performed by others, with these performances proving constitutive of who and what they are. The contexts in which their performances occur, though, will always be circumscribed and determined as much, if not considerably more, by acts of authoring that take place after the text has initially appeared as by acts that took place before that appearance. To think that a poem is what it is after a poet is done with it, or that a film is what it is after a director steps back from it, would be as misguided as to suggest that a person is who they are at the moment of conception.

The case of *Blade Runner* is especially illustrative here. In an earlier study, conducted in 2005, I examined what seemed an oddity to me then – fans of *Blade Runner* who united around the idea that the true, director’s cut of the 1982 film had never been released. The so-called Director’s Cut of the film had been revealed not to be director Ridley Scott’s preferred version, and fans had long mobilized to encourage the various rights holders of the film to allow for a “definitive” director’s cut to be released. Though this supposed cut was eventually released on DVD and Blu-ray in 2007 in the presumptuously titled *Blade Runner: The Final Cut*, at the point that I studied these fans we had something of a paradox: longtime, devoted fans of a film that they argued had never truly been released. What this incident illustrates, though, is how texts are always open, always becoming. *Blade Runner* was released in 1982, but clearly many viewers regarded it as “unfinished” until 2007. Not only, though, was there a text in the process of becoming for 25 years in between, but it continues to become. With each new framing of *Blade Runner*, each new edit (for television, for an airplane), with discussion of a remake, or such, the text continues to become and to mean more, to mean differently than it did before.²⁴ While that process of textual becoming is especially evident with *Blade Runner*, with other “Director’s Cuts,” or with George Lucas’ continued tinkering with the *Star Wars* franchise, for instance, it is no less the case with any text. Certainly, franchises and remakes and adaptations further develop texts, but anything can change meaning and value over the course of its life. Television series, for instance, illustrate textual becoming quite beautifully on a weekly basis, yet they are also repositioned with each subsequent screening. And thus, as Derek Kompare has shown, each cable channel that plays a television series reframes its meaning to suit its branding purposes, and each DVD release further transforms the meanings of the series, in some cases elevating it from being mundane television to being a part of “television heritage.”²⁵ Lest this process appear wholly corporate, moreover, Annette Kuhn’s research into octogenarians discussing film stars they have loved since their teens reveals that audiences are constantly making or finding new meanings in texts, never necessarily “done” with them.²⁶

In this respect, following the analogy of text as postmodern subject, sociology has proven considerably more developed and complex a discipline, in its acceptance that people are authored and continue to author themselves across their lives,

than many disciplines within textual studies, with their dogged insistence that conception and initial appearance are the bulk of what matters. Granted, the analogy between people and texts may appear to break down when we consider the agency and unpredictability of people, for texts surely lack sentience, feelings, and free will. Texts don't make choices. And yet if the social sciences en masse have proven anything, surely it is that free will, agency, and choices only explain so much. A text may be seen to have a purpose, encoded at first by its initial authors, and it is unlikely to interact with its environment in as wholly vibrant a manner as will the postmodern subject. But just as postmodern subjects' decisions, performances, and identities are constructed often in large part by pressures and affordances external to the subjects themselves, texts too are still surrounded by many potential authors, and by processes that will impact their meanings and uses on the one hand, and their performances and presentation on the other. In the case of *Blade Runner*, the rights holders, the fans who campaigned for the "final cut," the critics who hailed the film and called for yet more versions of it, the DVD/Blu-ray production team, and others played just as much of a role in authoring the text as did Ridley Scott.

Critical theory is full of examples of subjects, communities, and texts being authored, and gaining identity, across time as a process, and not merely at the moment of conception. Of identity and representation, Stuart Hall reminds us that representation is constitutive, setting parameters for identity and identification.²⁷ An especially acute example of this notion is provided at length by Edward Said in his famous work of postcolonial scholarship, *Orientalism*. Said notes how "the Oriental" was created and contained by the Occident, and by countless novelists, travel writers, politicians, academics, and so forth. Said argues that this authorship of the Oriental worked largely in order, in turn, to author the West by comparison. So, in other words, the Arab mind was said to be incapable of complexity, prone to barbarism, and conniving by nature, so that the European mind would appear, by contrast, to be gifted with a proclivity to comprehend complexity, to be civilized and human, and to be rational and fair. The Middle East and Asia become "a theatrical stage affixed to Europe,"²⁸ reflecting flattering images of the European subject and culture back on themselves. However, over centuries of repetition of such tropes, an image of the Oriental and of the Arab calcified, and became a knowable object – one even that had its "experts" in Oriental Studies programs in major world universities, and/or who regularly advised governments when they contemplated policies regarding the Middle East. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak examines in her essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", voice is robbed from colonized subjects, as the West has come to see itself able to speak for them.²⁹ In other words, authorship rights to speak the self no longer belong with Arabs themselves, as instead a whole cadre of supposed experts and intellectuals have created a popular discourse that authors the Arab. Said writes that the Orientalist's "effort was to deny Oriental culture the right to be generated, except artificially in the philological laboratory,"³⁰ thereby offering the Oriental "a limited terrain

in which to operate: no matter how much a single Oriental can escape the fences placed around him, he is *first* an Oriental, *second* a human being, and *last* again an Oriental.³¹ “It is Europe that articulates the Orient; this articulation is the prerogative, not of a puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries.”³² And lest we feel that one could simply respond by asserting that this discourse was “wrong,” and shrug it off, its impacts were very real, as noted by Said when he explains how this discourse became the justification for military and political action and control. Or, examining more intimate, personal impacts in *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon explores the psychological damage done to colonized subjects taught to revile and disidentify with their cultural backgrounds.³³

What such work shows us, then, is that the individual is never his or her own author alone. Forces, individuals, and communities outside the individual will always play constitutive roles in fashioning the self and its identity, limiting its freedom of movement, and at times – as noted by Fanon – hijacking control over identity from the individual outright. Judith Butler notes a similar process at work in the construction of gendered identities, wherein “the very thinking of what is possible in gendered life is foreclosed by certain habitual and violent presumptions,” such that we never have complete control over who we are. Butler’s particular concern is with how these dominant constructions of gender restrict anyone with a non-conforming sexual identity, as she observes “the terror and anxiety that some people suffer in ‘becoming gay,’ [and] the fear of losing one’s place in gender or of not knowing who one will be if one sleeps with someone of the ostensibly ‘same’ gender. This constitutes a certain crisis in ontology experienced at the level of both sexuality and language.”³⁴ Of course, some will resolve or otherwise navigate their ways through the crisis, and/or find savvy ways to subvert the labels and expectations placed upon them. But to consider identity something that we and we alone dictate for ourselves would be a remarkably naïve move, as instead those around us play a hugely important role in determining who we are allowed to be.

To shift to the identity of *texts*, critical theory is no less resolute in illustrating that identity is always created externally as much as internally. Pierre Bourdieu’s *Distinction*, for instance, examines how judgments about a text, genre, or practice are created, and he attributes significant *authorial* value to the prevailing class system.³⁵ Certain texts, genres, and media, therefore, come to be coded as lower, whereas others are regarded as higher. These determinations will always be beyond the individual creator’s powers, and they will always curtail the possibilities for meaning. A soap opera or a teen drama, for instance, faces a steeper slope to climb if it is to be considered “great art” than a piece of classical music or an independent film. However, as Jason Mittell reminds us, genre is itself not even inherent, as it too is socially and discursively constructed,³⁶ so to even call something “a soap opera” or “an independent film” is to superimpose certain expectations and allowances

upon it that were not endemic to the text itself. Call *The Wire* or *Lost* a soap opera (as indeed, both are highly melodramatic, focusing on the social relations of a set group) and one would burden them with a very different set of expectations, and they could mean some things more easily and struggle to mean other things more definitely, than if one instead called them complex dramas. Meaning and value, in other words, are often attributed to texts and genres, not simply born alongside them. Indeed, in responding to the thorny question of what is and what is not art, Howard Becker offers the much-cited response that art is whatever the art world says is art.³⁷ To call something art is to invoke an entirely different identity than to call it something other than art, and thus Becker's formulation reminds us once more that identity, value, and meaning – *textuality* – are always determined externally, not just internally.

Clearly these external processes are already being taken very seriously in academia; however, what I am arguing here is that we start to take them more seriously as *authorial*. I would call this “authorship after the fact,” except for the postmodern insistence that there is no fact except the conditional and situational, and hence for the desire to avoid inordinately privileging an earlier moment of authorship as “fact”-producing. We must even be careful to avoid calling subsequent acts of authorship “re-authorship,” lest this again privilege an earlier act and rank it as more important. Authorship is never complete, so it can never be “done over.”

Incomplete Authorship

To be clear, I do not see myself as conceiving or giving birth to this notion of authorship. I may be enunciating it, framing it, and contextualizing it in a certain way, but as with all texts, this one too has multiple traces, precedents, and fore-parents elsewhere. My authorship of this idea, in other words, is the type of authorship that I am arguing is commonplace beyond the acts of conception and birth.

An especially helpful precedent here exists in the *Writing Culture* anthology of postmodern ethnographers.³⁸ While literary and other textual studies had been veritably saturated by discussions of authorship, this collection of scholars arrived at the topic of authorship from a discipline that, as their anthology powerfully contends, had ignored and assumed the powers of authorship. The anthology therefore wrestles with the politics and poetics of writing ethnography. In doing so, the writers respond to postcolonial criticism from the likes of Said, Spivak, and Fanon that often charged ethnography and anthropology with being deeply racist exploits. As alluded to above, what concerned anthropology's postcolonial critics is not so much the notion that Western intellectuals would dare to speak of others, but rather their concern is precisely one of *authority*, whereby those intellectuals had on the one hand *claimed* the rights of author, purporting to “know” the

colonized subject and his or her culture, and often deigned themselves the only individuals with “expertise” enough to constitute that subject in language, and on the other hand had been *given* such authority by readers, for whom the colonized subject is quite literally brought into being via the reading process. In opening the *Writing Culture* anthology, James Clifford similarly castigates the “monophonic authority” of a “science that has claimed to *represent* cultures.”³⁹

The challenge for Clifford and his colleagues in *Writing Culture* is thus to see if ethnography and anthropology can or should continue in the wake of such crimes. Clifford holds on to the potential for good ethnographies to capture something of the truth, but as he notes, “all constructed truths are made possible by powerful ‘lies’ of exclusion and rhetoric. Even the best ethnographic texts – serious, true fictions – are systems, or economies, of truth. Power and history work through them, in ways their authors cannot fully control. Ethnographic truths are thus inherently *partial* – committed and incomplete.”⁴⁰ As such, much of the crime of authorship, as Clifford sees it, lies in the “monophonic” attempt to be the only author, and he turns to a model of dialogic authorship as preferable. Clifford calls for ethnographers to invite informants to become co-authors, and sees considerably more hope in dialogic authorship to approach truth. As he later concludes, his theoretical attempt is “to dislodge the ground from which persons and groups securely represent others. A conceptual shift, ‘tectonic’ in its implications, has taken place. We ground things, now, on a moving earth.”⁴¹

Exporting and applying Clifford to the text may seem clumsy or even offensive, given that texts are not people to whom symbolic and real violence is done when others choose to author them. This clumsiness may seem especially operative when we speak of authorship of texts that do not ostensibly make truth claims – i.e., to fiction – given that the representational mode might seem significantly different from that of the ethnographer trying or not trying to capture an intrinsic truth. Yet Clifford’s answers are no less compelling when applied to other forms of authorship, and much of the theory still applies. After all, his theory is based on the notion of authorship as always doomed to incompleteness. Everything, as he notes, is a system or economy of truth, and there will always be more to the story, more to tell, and more that the previous speaker alone could not tell.

As to the seemingly more sticky case of fiction, fictional texts still have their own truths to tell and represent, even if these are thematic more than factual. At the level of plot, no text could ever exhaust the potential and fullness of any given set of characters and their narrative world. Meanwhile, at the level of theme, it would be sheer bravado to suggest that any author captured the complete truth of a subject. Thus, to take *Harry Potter* as an example, J.K. Rowling was not faced with the taxing job of representing an already-existent Harry, Hermione, and Hogwarts when she penned *Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone*. But at the level of plot, seven long books later, many more stories could still be told, and the “truth” of her characters is hardly exhausted. At the level of *theme*, regardless of whether we were to posit that the books are about courage, about growing up, about encountering

and coming to terms with difference, or about anything else for that matter, Rowling has not written the book (nor the seven books!) about any one of these issues. That which she is trying to represent is thus still interminably incomplete. Moreover, to invoke a *series* of texts here is to add another wrinkle, namely that when Rowling put pen to paper to write the second and subsequent installments of the series, one might regard those characters, plot, world, and themes to then have previously established truths that she might misrepresent. It would be too kind to Rowling to assume that she could maintain complete and utter consistency as a writer, and indeed with any series – by which I mean to include sequels, prequels, franchises, adaptations, and all sorts of other intertextual links – we must allow for imprecision on the creative team or individual’s behalf at capturing the “truths” already set down. Instead, then, as with Clifford’s postmodern ethnographer, once again we have authors of the incomplete.

In applying Clifford’s discussion of ethnography to texts, we might even see his comments as applying to a greater degree than to living humans. Unlike the Nuer or the Trobriand Islanders, texts exist only in textual form. And yet, because they are only texts in the first place by nature of being of use to one or more people, rather than see this as a barrier to the application of Clifford’s ideas, we might instead see their truths as more malleable, as always-already incomplete, and as never pinned down. No one person could ever capture the entirety of their use value, and so they are similarly incomplete, in need of extra authors, and waiting for them. Texts too exist “on moving earth,” always in motion and never truly stable. Any model of authorship that hopes to operate on firm ground will do nothing more than tell us a bit about a given text at a very specific, situated point in time, but if we wish to know about its further travels across the moving earth, we must allow not only for readers but also for more authors.

Many Readers or Many Authors?

The tension and perhaps lack of distinction between author and reader must now be addressed, lest I seem to be proposing that all readership is authorship. Nowhere is the tension between author and reader more clearly evidenced than in Barthes’ aforementioned notorious article, “The Death of the Author.” Barthes writes from a concern with how “tyrannically centered” literary studies have been on authors, and yet he insists that “it is language which speaks, not the author,”⁴² so that “[l]inguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing.”⁴³ Here, Barthes evokes in part a Bakhtinian/Derridean notion of all texts already having been written through intertextuality, multi-dimensional spaces “in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.”⁴⁴ But his prime concern appears to lie with how authors limit texts by placing them, fixing their meaning, and freezing them in time. Instead, he prefers open texts, ones for which meaning can always be created anew. Temporally, he notes, a “text’s unity lies not in its origins, but in its destination,” and in what the reader does with it,

what meanings the reader creates. With rhetorical flourish, then, he ends his essay by stating that the reader requires the death of the Author.⁴⁵ A transference of power is suggested, as such, whereby the reader takes at least some of the author's powers, assuming the author's former role at the center of meaning.

Following Barthes, then, why bother with authors, and why not see everyone as readers, nobody as authors? To begin with, as noted above, we still have uses for authors. Thus, on one level, we cannot kill the author since hordes of critics, readers, and others regularly offer themselves up as human shields. Moreover, Foucault points out the continued *discursive* value of authors. As long as authors are being used, talked about, and listened to, we not only must study them if we are serious about studying culture, but we risk indulging in an odd form of academic vogon if we create an alternate reality in which authors do not exist.

But on another level, I still see significant value in distinguishing between authors and readers. Not all readers *claim* authority, nor are all readers *given* authority by others, and herein lies a critical distinction between readers and authors. As Barthes, John Fiske, Janice Radway, Henry Jenkins,⁴⁶ and many others have shown, readers are constantly creating meaning for texts in ways that go well beyond the seeming apparatus for interpretation set up by a text's initial authors. But in the face of all this active audiencehood, we still find ourselves able to talk about texts with many others in ways that often take a great deal for granted as agreed-upon. If I have compared textual ontology and phenomenology to the identity of a postmodern subject, we should realize that a text's "identity" is similarly public and performed, not wholly private. Stanley Fish notes that one *can* take a poem to mean absolutely anything, and yet most texts have "normal" or expected meanings and readings, because of the authority of interpretive communities. The interpretive community, to Fish, is:

made up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions. In other words, these strategies exist prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than, as is usually assumed, the other way around.⁴⁷

But Fish is slippery in creating the term "interpretive community" yet not suggesting where one might begin, nor in contemplating the internal dynamics of such communities. Authors by my definition here, though, are those who have authority within an interpretive community, and thus have greater abilities to establish the meaning of a text and to append meanings to that text. Moreover, this authority and these abilities will fluctuate with time, in an evolving, processual way, as they are struggled over, claimed, gifted, and contested by various members of the communities or by other communities. I do not see authors as needing an entire reading populace to honor or heed their authority, but they are those who in some way, and to some community of readers or potential readers at a given (even if fleeting) moment in time, can change texts and create meanings for others as well as themselves.

As above, I am working here with an implicitly Foucauldian notion of power as discursive.⁴⁸ Texts are discursive entities, and as such they change over time. To understand a text's authority, we must perform a genealogy of power that examines the discursive shifts and flows of the text over time. Authors are those figures who exert particular power across a text's life to change its meaning and character. Jeffrey Nealon notes in his account of Foucault's theory of change that we are invited to concentrate on "intensifiers" and mutaters of power more than on the "creation" of discourse per se, and authors are a text's key intensifiers and mutaters.⁴⁹

Clusters of Authorship

We can therefore look to multiple sites where authors might be found. This task should definitely include the usual suspects – poets, directors, showrunners, and such – but since they have received no shortage of attention, first I will discuss other clusters. Though academia has more regularly seen poets, directors, and showrunners as beginning the story of authorship, if a text only becomes a text in the process of being read, viewed, listened to, consumed, and/or played, in truth poets, directors, and showrunners are often late to the party. Instead, we must ask where audiences first encounter the text. And while the answer to that question will vary, it will nearly always involve paratexts. Coined by Gerard Genette to describe the multiple textual fragments that surround a text but that are not often seen as "the text itself,"⁵⁰ paratexts include everything from book covers to movie posters, ads in magazines to trailers, critical reviews to alternate reality games, special edition DVDs to spinoff toys, roadside billboards to fan fiction and film, and more. Not all of these precede our interaction with a text, but a considerable number do. As I have argued in *Show Sold Separately: Promos, Spoilers, and Other Media Paratexts*, textual meaning, power, and value often begin with the paratexts, as they establish characters, plots, genre affiliation, themes, and identificatory possibilities sometimes long before we have encountered them in "the text itself."⁵¹ If I place "the text itself" in scare quotes, though, this is because paratexts challenge us to realize that while they may not be part of *the work*, they are not only part of *the text*: they are often constitutive parts of it. After seeing a trailer for a movie, reading a review and a "behind the scenes" sneak-peek in *Entertainment Weekly*, seeing ads on television and under bus shelters, seeing interviews with the cast on late-night talk shows, and seeing its official web site, for instance, one likely has a keenly realized sense of what to expect, and textual interpretation and identification have likely already begun. This chapter has already argued for the importance of approaching textuality phenomenologically, seeing how it becomes rather than foolishly believing it ever simply "is," and paratexts are often an all-important first outpost in creating the text.

Given paratexts' importance, and the significant potential they hold to set our initial expectations for a text as well as our frames for understanding it, a paratext's creators are often strong authorial clusters. A trailer might tell us what genre a text "is," introduce us to several characters and set the groundwork for how we react to them, create a tone and timber for the storyworld, and give us suggestions of what, at a broader level, the text is "about."⁵² Thus we should ask more questions about how trailers are created, who makes them, and how choices about what to say, show, and suggest are made. Or beyond the single paratext, we might ask how entire release strategies and marketing plans are created, tying paratexts together so that their individual acts of creation of value and meaning are coordinated and complementary. Those behind release strategies hold considerable power to author the text, as further illustrated by Aswin Punathambekar in this volume. Certainly, more people will always see the hype and paratextuality that surround and precede a film, for example, than will see the film itself; thus, the popular and public meaning of that film may often stem more from the film's paratextual entourage than from the film itself, thereby relegating the director to having less of a direct role in the authoring of the public text than has long been assumed. *Authorship* is quintessentially about authority, and for some readers it may seem bizarre to suggest that a trailer editor, for instance, has authority over a text. But if a text is what it means, trailer editors and other paratext creators have significant authority over it. Or, rather, they are *given* authority, which requires us to ask who has given this power, what parameters – if any – they have set, and how they in turn control the distribution, exhibition, and/or circulation of those paratexts. A great deal of authorship, therefore, will be determined in contracts and companies' flow charts of who does what, and will be determined across the marketing and management sectors of the content industries that have long been seen as entirely secondary to the creative sectors when critics, scholars, and audiences have attempted to ascertain authorship.

Authorship can be seen to cluster around paratexts experienced before a film, poem, television show, or so forth, but it also clusters around paratexts experienced later on. If we take the example of a DVD commentary track on a television show, likely few audience members experience this before the television show itself, and it will rarely be what I have called an *entryway* paratext.⁵³ Rather, it is more likely to work *in medias res*, after we have already seen numerous episodes and been moved to buy or rent the DVD and dedicate the time to listening to the commentary track. But the commentary track's potential abilities to change our understanding of the text are no less profound than a trailer's. After all, the commentary track may pose new ways to make sense of a character, it may explain plot holes, it could suggest deeper resonances, or it might even lead us away from other earlier interpretations. In each case, the text changes as we watch. And if the text is changing, for us and for other viewers, we can once again see this as a moment of authorship, when the DVD commentary track creates anew or transforms meaning. Hence the DVD

commentary track's creators – those speaking, those who recorded the material, and those who edited it and chose what to put on the track and where to put it, and those who commissioned it and paid for it in the first place – have formed another cluster of authorship. Derek Kompare examines showrunner podcasts in this light and concludes by repurposing the common criticism of serial television that writers are “making it up as they go along,” to argue that they indeed continue to write and to “make it up” through such venues.⁵⁴

The understanding of authorship that I am offering significantly expands the roster of who “counts,” not only opening up the entirety of people listed in a film's credits, for instance, but also adding the marketing team(s) that are entrusted with positioning or re-positioning the text. However, I do not mean to suggest that authorship exists wholly within a tidily coordinated realm of production. Rather, we may often see clusters of authorship working against each other, in conflict, and/or working at crossed purposes. We will also see audiences enabled as authors. Paratexts can be created by audiences, and they are often produced or shared with explicit intent to work against other clusters of authorship, and to take authorial control of a show. Fan studies have continually illustrated how audiences, through fanfic, vids, role play, discussion forums, and other means have authored texts in their own ways.⁵⁵ Of particular interest to me is the fannish term “fanon,” referring to parts of a text or ways of understanding a text that originate from fans not the official producers, that have become widely accepted and known by other fans. Fanon is fannish canon. If a meaning, character, or theme can become so widely known and accepted that it is no longer simply a personal response, I argue that this is authorial, and that we might therefore examine the processes by which individual responses become communal and fanon becomes authorial. Alongside the content industries' own paratextual creators, then, fan vidders, “Big Name Fans,” prominent fan fiction writers, official recappers and reviewers at sites such as *Television Without Pity*, *The Onion AV Club*, or so forth, and the multiple systems and individuals that manage them, should all be seen as clusters of authorship too.

I have been attempting to expand the pantheon of who counts as an author, but I do not mean to relegate the usual suspects to the sidelines, as they regularly form key clusters of authorship too. Poets, showrunners, directors, game designers, recording artists, and other authors in the traditional definition of that phrase are often given inordinate power and control over a text's meaning and value, such that we as analysts would be naïve to imagine that we could separate them from that power. One might complain that listening to Joss Whedon's views about his films and television programs gives him too much power, and thus one may choose to ignore that claim to authority. But that claim is heeded by others (a considerable number in the case of Whedon!). As such, his intentions, public statements, and biography become discursively valid and important for an exploration of the text's meaning. I am sympathetic to the (symbolic) homicidal urge behind Barthes' desire to remove this figure so that viewers' own opinions are given more authority and validity, but as long as other viewers keep him alive,

and as long as viewers give him special authority to dictate meaning, it would be cavalier to pretend that he is dead.

As such, some studies of authorship should on one level continue in approach, if not always in theoretical underpinnings, in the footsteps of much of the work already conducted on authors and auteurs. Asking where such figures got their ideas and how they aimed to communicate these are still important and valuable endeavors. However, rather than restrict our understanding of these figures' authorial roles to the contained act of writing a poem, filming a movie, writing a television show, or so forth, we must also explore how they continue to lay claim to authorial power over the life of a text, and what other individuals or organizations variously give them such power, manage this power on their behalf, or challenge it and try to wrestle it away. Rather than kill such figures, my model calls for us to see how and why they are often still relevant and important long after the most staunch defenders of authorial genius have since discarded authors and seen their job as over. Authors can exert power over texts while writing them, but they can also exert as much if not more power when they interact with marketing teams, licensees, fans, and other clusters of authorship.

Along this line of argument, Warren Buckland even posits that the contemporary filmmaker must always already engage in some such tasks to still count as an "auteur." An auteur "in contemporary Hollywood," he writes, "is a director who gains control over all the stages of filmmaking: not just film production, but also distribution and exhibition. In other words, he or she attempts to vertically integrate (or reintegrate) the various stages of filmmaking."⁵⁶ Drawing on Susan Gillman's analysis of the publishing industry,⁵⁷ he further notes that "in the age of mass production, internal authorship – mastery of the writing process – is necessary but no longer sufficient in the creation of authorship. External control – that is, control of the immediate organizational and economic environment – is also necessary."⁵⁸ Buckland therefore looks to figures such as Steven Spielberg, who have been able to exert a large amount of "external" control over their films. But surely Spielberg does not execute all these tasks himself, and not even Spielberg can control the entire economy; though he is given significantly more authorial control than the hypothetical trailer editor alluded to above, he too is only given certain powers, not all. Thus, while Buckland does not state as such himself, his work ultimately suggests the impossibility of any one person maintaining authorial power. His work also raises the question of why such practices of vertical integration count as authorial only when performed by the lone figure of the director. If distribution, advertising, and promotion are authorial when performed by Spielberg, they are no less authorial when performed by others, regardless of whether they are acting on behalf of Spielberg, in spite of his preferences, or without his knowledge. And thus I do not share his reentrenchment of the solitary auteur, albeit a more powerful one than in earlier versions. However, he is right to draw our attention to these other acts and clusters of authorship, and his case study of Steven Spielberg offers us an example of how much more authorial power some figures can horde when

they realize the importance of marketing, distribution, and vertical integration as sites of authorship. Kristin Thompson provides another such example in *The Frodo Franchise*, as she notes Peter Jackson's wide-ranging authorial power over *The Lord of the Rings*, which extended to involvement in the production of the DVD bonus materials, the videogames, and more, while Denise Mann examines the contemporary television showrunner as simultaneously a brand manager, not "just" a writer/producer.⁵⁹

However, given that the understanding of authorship that I propose here is interested in authors as individuals who *have been given authority*, this demands that we shift focus to exploring who decided that they get authority, what methods they or others working on their behalf used to obtain that authority, what processes are in place to gain authority, and what institutions hoard authority. Similarly, though, since the traditional author figure is reduced in this understanding of authorship to being yet one among many authors, we are also invited to think of authorship as contested and to chart changes over time, to see who rises or falls as authors over a text's life, and to look for sites other than the Writer's or Director's Guild of America wherein authorship "happens." And it is a theory that demands a great deal of research into production cultures, as we see how authority is granted, claimed, or ceded in the content industries, and how texts are maintained and who is granted custodial rights over them. But it is also a theory of interpretive communities that takes audience studies as vital. If I have proposed a distinction between authors and readers, we must ask who is able to "cross over" and how they get to this point, how readers nominate authors, and how they interact with them. The *management* of authority is, as such, a prime area for study.

Similarly, we must also see who is restricted from being an author. By defining authorship as requiring an interpretive community as audience, I do not mean to diminish the importance of individual readers' interpretations. On the contrary, I would hope that this schema directs attention to the processes by which some readers gain authority, and some are denied it. In recent years, it has become trendy to point out the existence of "participatory cultures" wherein fans go online, post about shows, engage in alternate reality games, and in small ways direct the future flow of their beloved texts. It has also become just as trendy to look askance at participatory cultures, seeing in them instead free research and development, unpaid labor, and strictly limited and contained interaction. But a theory of authorship as elaborated above draws a finer-grain distinction between readers and authors and thus asks about who is truly able to inflect a text for a wider audience.

Following Foucault's insistence that authorship is primarily discursive, and that the author, or "author function" as he calls it, exists only inasmuch as it is of use, we could also continue the impressive work already being conducted within production cultures research in media studies of examining how discourses of authorship are constructed, and how they set the rules of authorship. Which sites "count" as authorial, which do not, and what changes have we seen in these

configurations over time? What counter-discursive moves have existed, both over time, and at any given moment in time, to propose new configurations for who is an author, what powers that gives these figures, and what relationship that predetermines between them and their audiences? And at a simple level, who is talked about as authors with any given text and why? What *function* does focusing on that individual serve, in other words? For example, when Joss Whedon features so prominently in fan and academic discussion about *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, *Firefly*, *Angel*, and *Dollhouse*, why is this? When a group of academics form an association called The Whedon Studies Association, complete with its own journal and conferences, what discursive function does “Joss” serve here, and what is being said – about the media, about television aesthetics, about power relations between academics, texts, and Hollywood – by such an act?

Answering these questions will require a wide range of methods, and will cover an equally wide terrain. Authorship is about authority, power, and meaning, so a study of how authorship is attributed and denied must cover all sites for the construction of meaning. On the one hand, for instance, one might consider Derek Johnson’s and my attempts to interview some figures working within the industry for this collection, some of which were stymied by their employers’ paranoia regarding what they might tell us and subsequent insistence that talking to us would violate their contracts’ non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). Ironically, then, while in some cases we hoped to interview these figures precisely to open up notions of who is an author, they were quite literally not allowed to be authors. NDAs, how they work, who must sign them, and who is allowed to violate them under what circumstances, might therefore be a ripe site for the analysis of authorship. Or the recent attempts by the United States Congress to rewrite copyright law for an internet era, which deserve close analysis for who they say is an author and when. Or, we might look to an entire educational apparatus set up around the discussion of “Great Authors,” and analyze the taste cultures, classed, racial, and gender politics that surround such canon formation. Or, rather, since we are hardly on virgin ground here, let us analyze the excellent work already conducted into such issues in many different disciplines and bring it together.

Cluster Flux: A Conclusion

If conclusions are traditionally for answers, buoyed by the knowledge that this chapter will appear near the beginning of a collection full of fantastic answers, I instead wish to end by discussing questions and the lack of conclusion. Ultimately, what I am proposing in this chapter is that while the questions that have consumed the debate over authorship have often been those of “who is the author?” and “what is an author?”, both of those questions may be more profitably answered by asking instead “when is the author?” and “how does authorship happen?” By virtue of being a text, not just a material object (a “work,” in Barthes’ terms⁶⁰), any text

is always open, never concluded or complete, and thus any notion of authorship based on the assumption that the text has already been created is a problematic one. Instead, the text will continue to happen, requiring us to ask when it happens and who are the individuals, teams, and/or communities who are active in its creation at those moments. Moreover, though, because authorship is not only about meaning, but also, and importantly, about authority, control, and power, this question of “when?” requires that we also ask “how?” Who *gives* authority? Who *claims* authority? And how is authority managed, distributed, hoarded, and shared? How, too, is it effectively challenged, taken away, and contested? I offer the idea of clusters of authorship – their composition in ever-changing flux – to focus attention on the multiplicity of authors that attend any given text, and to the clustering of their activity around specific moments and times in a text’s life: the moments of its authoring. A text’s identity is never set, since not all of the text is ever already there. How the rest of the text gets there, who puts it there, who is *allowed* to put it there, how it interacts with what is already there, and the times and places when and where this process occurs are all questions that lead us to finding the always shifting authors.

Notes

- 1 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in *Image/Music/Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (Glasgow: Fontana-Collins, 1977), 142–8.
- 2 Barthes, “Death,” 148.
- 3 Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text,” in *Image/Music/Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (Glasgow: Fontana-Collins, 1977), 155–64.
- 4 W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in W.K. Wimsatt, Jr., *The Verbal Icon* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1954), 3.
- 5 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” 18.
- 6 Percy Bysshe Shelley, *A Defence of Poetry*, in *Criticism: Major Statements*, 3rd edn, ed. Charles Kaplan and William Anderson (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991), 311.
- 7 Julia Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, Novel,” in *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*, trans. Thomas Gora et al., ed. Leon Roudiez (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 66.
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- 9 John Frow, “Intertextuality and Ontology,” in *Intertextuality: Theories and Practices*, ed. Michael Worton and Judith Still (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 45.
- 10 See André Bazin, “On the *Politique des auteurs*,” trans. Peter Graham, in *Cahiers du Cinéma: The 1950s, Neo-Realism, Hollywood, New Wave*, ed. Jim Hillier (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Jim Hillier ed., *Cahiers du Cinéma: The 1950s, Neo-Realism, Hollywood, New Wave* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); David A. Gerstner, “The Practices of Authorship,” in *Authorship and Film*, ed. David A. Gerstner and Janet Staiger (New York: Routledge, 2003).

- 11 For a theory of American auteurism, see also Andrew Sarris, *The American Cinema: Directors and Directions, 1929–1968* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1968).
- 12 Nancy K. Miller, *Subject to Change: Reading Feminist Writing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 104–6.
- 13 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism*, ed. Josué V. Harari (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 150.
- 14 Foucault, “What is an Author?”, 144.
- 15 Foucault, “What is an Author?”, 151.
- 16 Henry Jenkins, “‘Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations’: Genre and Authorship in *Star Trek*,” in John Tulloch and Henry Jenkins, *Science Fiction Audiences: Watching Doctor Who and Star Trek* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 188.
- 17 Horace Newcomb and Robert S. Alley, *The Producer’s Medium: Conversations with Creators of American TV* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), xii.
- 18 See, for instance, John Caldwell, *Production Culture: Industrial Reflexivity and Critical Practice in Film and Television* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything* (New York: Portfolio, 2006); Axel Bruns, *Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From Production and Producership* (New York: Peter Lang, 2008); Mark Deuze, “Convergence Culture in the Creative Industries,” *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 10.2 (2007), 243–63; Terry Flew, “Creativity, the New Humanism and Cultural Studies,” *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 18.2 (2004); John Hartley, ed., *Creative Industries* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005); David Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker, *Creative Labour: Media Work in Three Cultural Industries* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Henry Jenkins, *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide* (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Derek Johnson, Derek Kompare, and Avi Santo, eds, *Intermediaries: Management of Culture and Cultures of Management* (New York: New York University Press, 2014); Derek Johnson, *Media Franchising: Creative License and Collaboration in the Culture Industries* (New York: New York University Press, 2013).
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- 21 Barthes, “From Work to Text”; see also Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
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- 25 Derek Kompare, *Rerun Nation: How Repeats Invented American Television* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
- 26 Annette Kuhn, "'That Day Did Last Me All My Life': Cinema Memory and Enduring Fandom," in *Identifying Hollywood's Audiences: Cultural Identity and the Movies*, ed. Melvyn Stokes and Richard Maltby (London: BFI, 1999); see also Barbara Klinger, *Beyond the Multiplex: Cinema, New Technologies, and the Home* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), Ch. 4.
- 27 Stuart Hall, "The Work of Representation," in *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, Hall ed. (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1997).
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