Panofsky's Concept of "Iconology" and the Problem of Interpretation in the History of
Art
Author(s): Keith Moxey
Source: New Literary History, Vol. 17, No. 2, Interpretation and Culture (Winter, 1986),
pp. 265-274
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/468893
Accessed: 11-10-2019 12:43 UTC
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Panofsky's Concept of "Iconology" and the
Problem of Interpretation in the History of Art*
Keith Moxey
R_ ATHER THAN ATTEMPT to define and discuss the variety of
peculiar problems that confront the contemporary interpreter
of the visual arts of the past, these remarks are intended
as a consideration of the interpretive system devised by Erwin
Panofsky. Panofsky's contribution to art historical theory has recently
attracted considerable attention. His work has been the subject of a
new book, a symposium at the Centre Pompidou in Paris, and a session
at the 1985 College Art Association annual meeting in Los
Angeles. 1
What prompts this renewed interest in Panofsky's contribution to
art historical studies? While it is hard to find a conclusive answer to
this question, there seem to be a number of factors involved. First,
American art history has become increasingly self-conscious about the
theoretical assumptions underlying its scholarly productions. In the
context of the radical and far-reaching theoretical transformations
that swept anthropology, history, and literary studies in the 1960s
and 70s, art history seemed attached to eternal verities. There has
been very little discussion of theoretical issues and those attempts that
were made to raise them often appeared isolated and tangential to
the main concerns of the profession.2 However, it was perhaps the
adaptation of philosophical and linguistic theories by literary critics
that ultimately proved most influential. Criticism has always played
a prominent role in art historical interpretation so that the development
of critical theories inspired by the model of literary studies was
not an entirely unexpected development.3 The application of critical
strategies to the interpretation of the visual arts of the past, that is,
the identification of significant intrinsic formal qualities in the works
of art under discussion as the basis for interpretation, has necessarily
* This paper has benefited greatly from conversations and debates with David Summers
which helped clarify my ideas on a number of different issues. I am particularly
indebted to Joan Hart for having shared her paper on Panofsky's relation to hermeneutic
theory with me prior to its publication. In addition I am grateful for careful
readings and suggestions by Paul Barolsky, Herbert Kessler, Donald Posner, Holly
Wright, Peter Parshall, and Suzanne Guerlac. I must, however, accept full responsibility
for the views articulated here.
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NEW LITERARY HISTORY
called into question Panofsky's "iconological" method w
to understand the work of art within the conceptual f
the historical period in which it was produced.4
Second, there has been an increasing dissatisfaction w
of art historical interpretation that has resulted from
of Panofsky's concept of "iconology."5 Too often th
restricted itself to the analysis of "iconography," that is, t
of the pictorial traditions on which a given work of ar
neglected the more ambitious "iconological" project of
visual traditions to the broader cultural context in which the work
was produced.6 In those cases where "iconological" interpretation has
been attempted this has often taken a highly speculative form that,
more often than not, cannot easily find justification in historica
terms.7 Alternatively this approach has resulted in a kind of "contextual"
art history in which the interpreter's task is often regarded a
complete once the work has been embedded in its historical setting.
Such writing in fact eludes the demand for interpretation altogethe
by failing to specify the ways in which the visual arts intersect with
other aspects of the culture of which they formed a part. However,
it would be unfair to consider Panofsky's interpretive theory in the
light of its influence. The following comments are meant on the on
hand to describe the way in which his "iconological" method fails to
do justice to a genuinely historical understanding of the art of the
past and, on the other, to suggest ways in which it can still hav
meaning for us today.
I. The "Archimedean Point"
Panofsky's theoretical writings represent the search for what
called an "Archimedean point" from which to build a systematic
terpretation of the visual arts. That is, they represent a search
means of building a set of principles with which works of art o
ages could be analyzed and interpreted. This search depended
his notion of the work of art as an object that transcended the
torical moment of its creation as a consequence of its aesthetic v
The opening words of his analysis and critique of Riegel's concep
Kunstwollen, or the "will to art," complain that it is both the curs
the blessing of art history that its objects, the works of art, cann
interpreted as if they were wholly historical phenomena.8 He goe
to explain that the "blessing" of the work of art is that it is a wo
art and not a historical object, while the "curse" lies in the theore
problems posed by the work of art's aesthetic values which must
essarily be defined in terms that transcend its historical context.
266
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PANOFSKY'S CONCEPT OF "ICONOLOGY"
As a result of Panofsky's concern for the content of the work of
art as much as with its formal qualities, a concern which had led him
to reject the purely stylistic interpretive system developed by Heinrich
Wolfflin,9 he developed a theory based on the intrinsic formal qualities
of the work of art in which the organizing principle was the
relation of form to content.10 This system consisted of opposing qualities
such as optic/haptic, depth/surface, fusion/distinction, and time/
space which were thought to interlock in such a way as to control the
relation of form to content. Despite the importance ascribed to content
in this scheme, the theory did not transcend the limits imposed
by a consideration of the formal qualities of the work of art.
Panofsky's concern with content was deepened by his association
with the Warburg Library after his appointment to the University of
Hamburg.ll During this period he came into contact with the work
of Aby Warburg who was concerned to view the work of art in terms
of its social and cultural functions.12 Furthermore, he is thought to
have been much affected by developments in historical hermeneutics.
Nineteenth-century theories of hermeneutics, a school of interpretation
first developed for the understanding of biblical texts, affirmed
the importance of the historical distance separating the interpreter
from the subject of his interpretation, emphasizing the arduous and
painstaking nature of any attempt to recreate the meaning of a work
within the historical circumstances in which it was produced.13 In the
earliest formulation of his "iconological" method, Panofsky recognized
the difficulties confronting all attempts at interpretation. Panofsky
was prepared to admit the way in which the act of interpretation
is compromised as a result of the interpreter's own position in history.
To this effect he quotes a passage from Heidegger's book on Kant,
in which Heidegger discusses the difficulties of interpretation: "If an
interpretation merely reflects what Kant expressly said, then it is by
definition not an explanation; for the task of any explanation is to
make visible what Kant's foundation brought to light over and above
the literal formulation. Such an interpretation does not enable Kant
to say more, for in any philosophical insight what is decisive is not
what the articulated sentences say but the unsaid that is laid before
the eyes by the said ... And, to be sure, since the words surround
that which they want to say, every interpretation must use force."14
In order to counteract the interpreter's necessary use of "force" Panofsky
suggested a system of checks and balances by means of which
the interpretation could be evaluated. While he included the formal
aspects of the work of art in this description of the interpretive process,
the main thrust of his "iconological" method was to be the interpretation
of content. The highest level of interpretation, that for
267
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NEW LITERARY HISTORY
which he coined the term "iconology," was that which
"general history of the human spirit."
In spite of Panofsky's replacement of a historically s
meneutically inspired theory dealing above all with the
work of art for a theory dealing with its intrinsic form
search for an "Archimedean point" was not entire
During the 1920s he was much impressed by the work
sirer, a senior colleague at the University of Hamburg
user of the Warburg Library. During this period Cassi
the three volumes of his most important work, The Philoso
bolic Forms. According to Cassirer "symbolic forms" we
means of which areas of human knowledge were or
basis of a Kantian epistemology. They depend on t
human knowledge of the world is a function of the
structure of our minds somehow corresponds with ou
it. "Symbolic forms" are thus the means by which m
sensual experience: they constitute the fabric of huma
In Cassirer's theory of "symbolic forms," Panofsky f
of putting together his theory of the way in which the
of the work of art interlock to control the relation of form and content
with the desire to do justice to the content of the work in its historical
context. In his essay "Perspective as Symbolic Form," the structure
of pictorial space was used as a means of gaining access to the "essence"
of the civilizations of antiquity and the Renaissance.15 A formal
principle was thus abstracted from its historical context, accorded the
privileged status of a "symbolic form," and used as a means of elucidating
cultures belonging to different periods. The adoption of this
strategy, however, conflicts with the historicist concerns of the hermeneutic
school of interpretation which, we have seen, had decisively
colored Panofsky's scheme of "iconological" interpretation. While
perspective as a spatial structure was undoubtedly freighted with
meaning in the setting of Renaissance Florence, its use in a diachronic
system of interpretation serves only to privilege the Renaissance
above all other periods under consideration. The selection of a characteristic
of the culture of one period as a means of understanding
and evaluating others does violence to the historical "horizons" in
which those cultures are situated.16
Despite the fact that in Panofsky's later work his conception of the
"iconological" level of interpretation depended little on Cassirer's notion
of "symbolic forms," language associated with this theory is an
important feature of his definition of the "iconological" method. This
level of interpretation, which is to be dedicated to the study of the
"general and essential tendencies of the human mind" (Panofsky's italics),
is equated with "what may be called a history of cultural symptoms or
268
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PANOFSKY S CONCEPT OF "ICONOLOGY"
symbols in Ernst Cassirer's sense .. ." (p. 16). The rhetoric of the "Archimedean
point" is thus written into what is an otherwise straightforward
description of a hermeneutic interpretation. It is the rhetoric,
the references to "intrinsic meaning," for example, rather than
the method itself that has invested the system with an air of authoritarian
finality. The tone of Panofsky's writings and those of many of
his followers has a lapidary quality that suggests that the reader is
being vouchsafed eternal truths. Panofsky's rhetoric seems to imply
that the meaning of a work of art is accessible to the historian in the
same way regardless of his own position in history and that it is therefore
possible for his interpretation to be valid for all time.
II. The Humanist Bias
One of the consequences of Panofsky's view that the "blessing
the work of art consists in its status as an ahistorical object wa
"curse" of attempting to define the nature of the aesthetic valu
allowed it to escape time and place.17 For all their abstractio
ofsky's definitions of the formal structures that control the rela
form and content, whose balance was regarded as the hallm
the "great" work of art, were decisively colored by his experie
a historian of the Italian Renaissance. Panofsky was, of course,
aware that different historical periods held very different view
what constituted a work of art and that these were quite distinct
those we hold today. Nevertheless his own prejudices are clearly
vealed in his selection and treatment of the artists and works he chose
to discuss.
A prime example of his humanist bias is found in his interpretation
of the work of Albrecht Diirer.18 The central thesis of his book is that
Diirer's experience of Italian art was responsible for deepening a
dualism inherent in his nature and that this found expression in his
artistic production. According to Panofsky, this dualism was to be
accounted for in terms of Diirer's striving after the artistic ideals of
the Italian Renaissance, on the one hand, and by his inability to put
them into practice, on the other. Diirer's desire to obtain theoretical
insight is thought to have clashed with his talent for empirical observation
in such a way as to produce tensions that may be traced in the
products of his hand. Panofsky's characterization of the "dualism"
of Diirer's personality does more than simply characterize the nature
of his artistic achievement. The emphasis he places on Diirer's theoretical
interests is intimately associated with an alleged desire to attain
the ideal beauty of High Renaissance art. According to Panofsky,
Diirer's obsession with theory marks him as a member of the hu-
269
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manist tradition, thus enabling him to transcend the German culture
of which he was a part.
Another manifestation of Panofsky's humanist bias is found in the
subject matter he chose to discuss. His choice of subject matter tends
to coincide with the values of the academic "hierarchy of the genres"
adopted by Renaissance and baroque theorists of art.19 This hierarchy,
which depended on a Renaissance revival of ancient art theory,
tended to prefer allegory and history painting over landscape, still
life, scenes of everyday life, and portraiture. Panofsky's commitment
to these values may be discovered in his assertion that landscape, still
life, scenes of everyday life, and portraiture were in fact "non-subjects,"
in which there existed an identity between the subject of the
work and the subject represented (p. 8). This bias in favor of the
subjects most highly regarded by the humanist tradition served to
eliminate the others from the field of art historical interpretation. It
has been the task of more recent scholarship to show that far from
being devoid of intellectual content such subjects as landscape, still
life, scenes of everyday life, and even portraiture were packed with
references to both humanist and nonhumanist values.20
When not invoking the humanist canon for the selection of works
of art worthy of consideration, Panofsky relied expressly upon "tradition."21
By "tradition" he meant those works of art which had traditionally
received the approval of informed taste. In other words
the selection was based on a tradition of aesthetic judgments dating
mainly from the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The consequences
of the use of such a principle is particularly evident in Early
Netherlandish Painting where he is concerned principally with the
"founders" of Flemish painting, Robert Campin, Jan van Eyck, and
Roger van der Weyden.22 Little attention is paid to the interpretation
of the work of artists traditionally regarded as aesthetically inferior
to those named above even though, by his own admission, they included
some of the most popular and successful painters of the age.
Nothing is more revealing of his attitude than the chapter entitled
"Epilogue: The Founders' Heritage," a chapter that includes a summary
account of the achievements of Petrus Christus, Dirk Bouts,
Geerteen tot Sint Jans, Hugo van der Goes, Hans Memling, and
Gerard David.
While Panofsky's humanist bias was undoubtedly related to his vie
of the work of art as an object invested with more than histori
significance, the treatment of the work of art as a wholly historic
object does not in itself afford the interpreter with an alternative
means of selecting and ordering the artists and works he wishes to
discuss. On the other hand a selection based on a historical understanding
of its status would have to come to terms with more th
270 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
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PANOFSKY'S CONCEPT OF "ICONOLOGY"
the meaning of the work for the patrons who commissioned it. It
would, in other words, have to account for the role of the work of
art in its social setting. One of the features of Panofsky's "iconological"
method is its focus on the "intention" underlying its creation.23
More often than not this has meant a careful study of (1) the biography
of the artist including his artistic training; (2) the social and
cultural makeup of the patrons for whom the work was undertaken;
and (3) the historical circumstances in which the work was carried
out. While it is clear that much of what is known as the "reception"
of the work of art, that is, the way in which it was understood by
different individuals, groups, or classes, is included in Panofsky's account
of the work's "intention," the theoretical bias in favor of the
latter has led to a neglect of the study of the work's interaction with
its audience after its completion. The focus on the "intention" of the
work of art assigns it a "terminal" role in the life of culture, a location
representing a synthesis of the ideas current in the culture of the
patron or patrons who commissioned it.24 It ignores the life of the
work of art after it has entered a social context. By concentrating on
the way in which the work of art "reflects" the life of its times, the
preoccupation with "intention" fails to recognize the function of the
work of art as an actor in the development of cultural attitudes and
therefore as an agent of social change.25
III. Conclusions
Panofsky's most important contribution to art history as a d
was undoubtedly his concern to incorporate a discussion of th
tent of the work of art within the parameters of art theo
concern with content was the means by which he was able to
with the formalist theories that dominated art historical sch
in his youth. While never abandoning the idealist view of the
of art as a transcendental object, his sensitivity to the work's h
location enabled him to explore hermeneutic theory as a m
developing an interpretive system. The critique of Panofsky's
logical" method from a historicist position does not, as is oft
gested, write art out of the work of art by refusing to cons
aesthetic implications. It merely consigns questions of aesthet
the history of reception or to the history of taste. In seeking
uate the work of art within the context of its status and function for
the age in which it was produced, a historicist perspective attempts
to emphasize its radical alterity. The problem of interpretation, in
other words, lies in confronting the "otherness" of a different histo
ical moment. The system of checks and balances that characteriz
Panofsky's "iconological" method has proven to be the door through
271
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NEW LITERARY HISTORY
which it has become possible to essay an interpretation of wo
art that does justice to their complex historical particularity. S
of its daunting rhetoric associated with Cassirer's theory of "s
forms" as well as of its humanist bias, Panofsky's "icono
method still offers the discipline one of the most sensitive ap
to the understanding of the art of the past.
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
NOTES
1 See Michael Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History (It
London, 1984), which concentrates on his early writings. The same period
sky's career is discussed by Michael Podro in his The Critical Historians of
Haven and London, 1982), ch. 9. The papers delivered at the Centre Pomp
been edited by Jacques Bonnet, Pour un temps / Erwin Panofsky (Paris, 1983
treatments of Panofsky's work are to be found in the collection of articles e
Ekkehard Kaemmerling, Ikonographie und Ikonologie. Theorien, Entwicklung,
(Cologne, 1979) and in the book by Renate Heidt, Erwin Panofsky. Kunstth
Einzelwerk (Vienna, 1977).
2 See, e.g., Leo Steinberg, "Objectivity and the Shrinking Self," Daedalus,
824-36; Paul and Svetlana Alpers, "Ut Pictura Noesis? Criticism in Literary St
Art History," New Literary History, 3 (1972), 437-58; Kurt Forster, "Critical H
Art or Transfiguration of Values?" New Literary History, 3 (1972), 459-76; J
Ackerman, "Toward a New Social Theory of Art," New Literary History, 4 (19
30; David Rosand, "Art History and Criticism: The Past as Present," New Li
History, 5 (1974), 435-45; Svetlana Alpers, "Is Art History?" Daedalus, 106 (1977), 1-
13; Michael Baxandall, "The Language of Art History," New Literary History, 10 (1979),
453-65. It is significant that none of these articles appeared in art historical journals.
3 For the equation of art historical interpretation with criticism see Rosand, "Art
History and Criticism."
4 Two of the most ambitious recent critical readings are by Michael Fried, Absorption
and Theatricality: Painting and the Beholder in the Age of Diderot (Berkeley, 1980) and
Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (Chicago,
1983). In both cases historical evidence is marshalled to support the interpretation of
what are regarded as important formal qualities of the works of art under discussion.
5 For Panofsky's definition of the aims and methods of "iconology," see his Introduction
to Studies in Iconology (1939; rpt. New York, 1967), hereafter cited in text. This
essay was republished virtually unaltered as the first chapter of Meaning in the Visual
Arts (New York, 1955). Some of the ideas contained in this piece are already found in
Panofsky's article "Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsdeutung von Werken
der bildenden Kunst," Logos, 21 (1932), 103-119. This is included in the useful collection
of Panofsky's theoretical essays edited by Hariolf Oberer and Egon Verheyen,
Erwin Panofsky: Aufsitze zu Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft (Berlin, 1980), pp. 85-97.
6 See Henri Zerner, "L'Art," in Faire l'histoire, ed. Jacques le Goff and Pierre Nora
(Paris, 1974), I, 183-202, 188.
7 This point was emphasized by Leopold Ettlinger in his unpublished talk, "Panofsky
Understood or Misunderstood," delivered at the 1985 College Art Association meeting.
8 Erwin Panofsky, "Der Begriff des Kunstwollens," Zeitschrift fur Asthetik und allgemeine
Kunstwissenschaft, 14 (1920), 321-39; also in Oberer and Verheyen, pp. 29-43.
272
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PANOFSKY'S CONCEPT OF "ICONOLOGY" 273
9 Erwin Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stil in der bildenden
Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, 10 (1915), 450-6
heyen, pp. 19-27.
10 Erwin Panofsky, "Uber das Verhaltnis der Kunstgeschic
Beitrag zu der Erorterung iiber die Moglichkeit 'kunstwi
griffe,' " Zeitschrift fur Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissensc
in Oberer and Verheyen, pp. 49-75.
11 For Panofsky's intellectual development during this peri
the Foundations of Art History, ch. 4.
12 See Ernst Gombrich, Aby Warburg. An Intellectual Biogr
13 The importance of the hermeneutical tradition of liter
creation of Panofsky's theory of "iconology" has recently
Hart in a paper entitled "Panofsky within the Hermeneut
for Art History," delivered in the seminar on "Intention
Association meeting.
14 Oberer and Verheyen, p. 92, my translation. The pass
Problem der Metaphysik (1925): "Gibt nun eine Interpretatio
Kant ausdricklich gesagt hat, dann ist sie von vornherein
einer solchen die Aufgabe gestellt bleibt, dasjenige eigen
Kant iiber die ausdrickliche Formulierung hinaus in sein
gebracht hat; dieses aber vermochte Kant nicht mehr zu s
in jeder philosophischen Erkenntnis nicht das entscheiden
den ausgesprochenen Satzen sagt, sondern was die als n
Gesagte vor Augen legt.... Um freilich dem, was die Wor
ringen, was sie sagen wollen, muss jede Interpretation not
I am grateful to David Summers for having drawn my atten
15 Erwin Panofsky, "Die Perspektive als 'symbolische For
liothek Warburg, IV (Leipzig and Berlin, 1927), 258-330; also
pp. 99-167. For an illuminating discussion of this article see
Foundations of Art History, ch. 5.
16 For the notion of historical "horizons" and the import
meneutical interpretation, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Trut
Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York, 1975).
17 See n. 8.
18 Erwin Panofsky, Albrecht Diirer, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1943). This has also be
by Svetlana Alpers who wrote, "If we turn to Panofsky's masterful study of
is characteristic that he sees Durer as a kind of captive of the alien northern
struggling toward the southern light" ("Is Art History?" p. 5).
19 See the account of Giovanni Bellori's artistic theory offered by Panofsky i
A Concept in the History of Art, tr. Joseph Peake (Columbia, S.C., 1968).
20 See Ingvar Bergstrom. Dutch Still Life Painting in the Seventeenth Century, tr
tina Hedstrom (New York, 1956); Eddie de Jongh, Sinne en minnebeelden in de
erkunst der zeventiende eeuw (Amsterdam, 1967) and Tot lering en vermaak: betek
van hollandse genrevoorstellingen uit de seventiende eeuw (exh. cat.) (Amsterdam
R. H. Fuchs, "Over het landschap. Een verslag naar aanleiding van Jacob van R
Het Korenveld," Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 86 (1973), 281-92; Lisa Vergara,
and the Poetics of Landscape (New Haven and London, 1982).
21 Erwin Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in Me
the Visual Arts, p. 18, n. 13. Panofsky fails to acknowledge the way in which th
tional canon of "great" works is subject to the vagaries of taste. For an excellen
of these fluctuations, see Francis Haskell, Rediscoveries in Art: Some Aspects
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274 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
Fashion and Collecting in England and F
social and political forces at work in ca
in the special issue of Critical Inquiry (
22 Erwin Panofsky, Early Netherlandis
23 Erwin Panofsky, "The History of
24 The way in which Panofsky's "icono
realities has been pointed out by Kurt
ration of Values?" 466-67.
25 For some brilliant analyses of the social function of the work of art, see W
Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, tr. Edmund Jephcott (New York, 1
and Theodor Adorno, Prisms, tr. Samuel and Sherry Welzer (Cambridge, Mass., 19
An exemplary treatment of the role of works of visual art in the context of s
change is provided by Timothy J. Clark, Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and
1848 Revolution (London, 1973).
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