e u r o p e a n j o u r n a l o f
https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549420919876
European Journal of Cultural Studies
2021, Vol. 24(5) 1160­–1179
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1367549420919876
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Invented religions and the
conceptualization of religion
in a highly secular society:
The Jedi religion and the
Church of Beer in the
Czech context
Dušan Lužný
Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic
Abstract
This study illustrates the need to develop efforts that define scientific terms, namely,
‘religion’. Despite the fact that such efforts may seem to be practically unattainable,
current phenomena testify to the need to continually improve standardized scholarly
terminology (such as Invented Religion, Parody Religion). Using specific material (of
new religious phenomena in the Czech Republic, specifically the Jedi religion and
the Church of Beer), the study identifies several key ambiguities stemming from the
cultural and social context in which both contemporary new religions and academic
study of religions coexist. The study concludes that in a highly secular society, where
the continuity of religious memory is disrupted (as in the Czech Republic), the
academic study of religions plays an important role, functioning as an authority for
the decision-making of state institutions.
Keywords
A highly secular society, invented religion, Jediism, parody religion, religious
memory, the Church of Beer, the Czech Republic
Introduction
Czech society displays a low level of religiosity in many respects. The findings of the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey and the European Values Study
(EVS) as well as census results illustrate this fact. Both Czech authors (e.g., Hamplová
and Nešpor, 2009; Havlíček, 2006; Havlíček and Lužný, 2013; Lužný and Navrátilová,
Corresponding author:
Dušan Lužný, Palacký University Olomouc, 771 47 Olomouc, Czech Republic.
Email: dusan.luzny@upol.cz
919876ECS0010.1177/1367549420919876European Journal of Cultural StudiesLužný
research-article2020
Article
Lužný	 1161
2001; Nešpor, 2010; Váně et al., 2012) and foreign authors (e.g., Ančić and Zrinščak,
2012; Borowik, 2006; Lambert, 2006; Müller, 2009, 2011; Norris and Inglehart, 2004;
Pollack, 2003) have commented on the low level of religiosity and religious laxness and
the high amount of secularization in Czech society (as well as in Lithuania, Estonia
and the eastern part of Germany). The EVS results demonstrate that belief in God as a
person decreased from 12 to 6 percent in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 1999
(similar to Lithuania’s decrease from 12% to 8%), whereas in neighbouring, equally
post-communist Poland, there was an increase from 79 to 82 percent (Pollack, 2008:
178). The Czech Republic, along with Estonia, is therefore an example of ‘extremely
high non-confessional identification’ (Zrinščak, 2004: 229) and a ‘unique case of secularization’
(Froese, 2005: 270).
Even for those who follow, however, developments on the contemporary Czech religious
scene more closely, two controversial events in recent years may be surprising.
During the 2011 census, the media reported on an organized group of people who had
decided to declare their religion as Jediism on the census form. A Facebook group called
‘Na sčítání lidu 2011 napíšu do svého náboženského vyznání víru Jedi’ [On the 2011 census
I’ll fill in my religion as Jedi] was created. It had more than 30,000 members in 2011.
As a result of this campaign, a total of 15,070 people declared Jediism as their ‘religion’
on the census form. At first glance, this may seem a low number, but when compared with
other religions, it is not a negligible result. Using the census data to create a scale of the
largest religious groups in the Czech Republic, Jediism would score the fifth place – following
the Roman Catholic Church, the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, the
Czechoslovak Hussite Church and the Orthodox Church in the Czech Lands.
These results should not be viewed as an expression of the growing popularity of a
new religion which could over the course of a few years or decades become the prevalent
faith in the Czech Republic. Although at first glimpse it might seem that the Czech
population, despite its secular nature (or perhaps due to it), may be susceptible to such
religious experiments and that it could realize its latent religiosity in this futuristic version
of spirituality, such developments do not appear to be very likely. Czech society
is merely following the example of other countries – as 2001 census data demonstrate,
a similar growth in the Jedi religion has occurred in other countries as well (e.g. in
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Great Britain) (Lewis, 2004). It is probable, however,
that the development in the Czech Republic will be similar to that in other countries,
where a decrease occurred in the following censuses – in the 2011 UK census, the
Jedi religion was declared by 176,632 people (0.3%) compared to 390,127 (0.7%) in
2001; a similar situation occurred in Canada, where the number decreased from
approximately 20,000 in 2001 to approximately 9000 in 2011. In contrast, the number
of Jediists seems to be relatively stable (ca. 0.4%–0.3 %) in Australia (Davidsen, 2017;
Singler, 2014; Voas, 2012).
In the Czech Republic, as a consequence of the relative success of Jediism in the census,
an initiative to establish an official structure and to officially register this structure
as a religious organization was launched.
Another similar occurrence was the attempt to officially register the ‘Church of Beer’
(in Czech Pivní církev). The media reported on these efforts in a manner similar to how
they reported on Jediism – that it was a joke and the adherents of these religions were not
serious.
1162	 European Journal of Cultural Studies 24(5)
These cases clearly illustrate a basic principle that the liberal state and the academic
study of religion share. This principle is respect for the religious faith of individuals and
groups and respect for the value of religious freedom. In other words, the academic study
of religion and the modern liberal state share a common ideological foundation in terms
of respect for freedom of belief, even if this belief seems very bizarre to most people.
Jediism and the Church of Beer pose several important questions and dilemmas for
the academic community studying religions (i.e. primarily for researchers in the fields of
religion studies, sociology and cultural anthropology), illustrating the ambivalence of
today’s (post)modern society and the difficulty of successfully and adequately dealing
with such ambivalence in academic studies. The most important and difficult task is
answering the question of what is religion and who is entitled to answer this question.
This study draws from two broad theoretical concepts: modernization theory and the
concept of cultural memory. It also takes into account the debate on the place of religion in
a consumer society, a frequent area of focus for researchers studying such phenomena. This
study attempts to interconnect the concepts of ‘invented religion’ (Cusack, 2010, 2013),
‘hyper-real religion’ (Possamai, 2003; Possamai and Lee, 2011) and cultural (or more specifically
religious) memory (Halbwachs, Assmann and others). The study is based on the
perspective which sees religion as well as the academic study of religion, as connected with
the discourse and practice of power, that is, with a specific sociocultural situation (as proposed,
for example, in Asad, 1993; Wijsen and Stuckrad, 2006; and others).
The aim of this study is to analyse specific forms of new religions viewed as expressions
of a culture in which cultural memory has been weakened by modernization. These
new forms of religion are not only results of certain sociocultural conditions, but they
also challenge the theoretical and methodological foundations of the academic study of
religion. My basic thesis is that specific sociocultural conditions, including the configuration
of religions (e.g. the relationship between the state and religion, or the predominant
ideology) under these conditions, are directly reflected in the methodology of social
sciences that deal with religion.
Although the study is quite theoretical, empirical material has been used to illustrate
the analysed problems (ambiguities) that are associated with the definition of ‘religion’.
General ambiguities have been illustrated using the example of two new religious groups
– the Jedi religion and the Church of Beer. Different genres were used for the analysis:
mainly web pages and printed texts. In addition, an interview with a representative of the
Church of Beer was conducted, but its content was not directly used in the study (in the
form of citations) with regard to research ethics. The interview helped, however, at
reaching a better understanding of the context of the Church of Beer’s efforts to register
with the state. The author’s experience as an expert consultant in this area was also used
in the study, but specific information from the individual proceedings could not be
explicitly mentioned in the text, as this is against the rules for expert consultants.
Authority and ambivalence in amnestic modernity –
theoretical bases
In many regards, modernity theories vary in their perspectives as well as in their conclusions
(whether thinking about the classical sociological theories of Max Weber, Karl
Lužný	 1163
Marx, Emil Durkheim or Georg Simmel, or the contemporary theories of Ulrich Beck,
Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas, George Ritzer, Ronald Inglehart, Frederic
Jameson, Immanuel Wallerstein, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Zygmunt Bauman or Mike
Featherstone), but they also concur on many significant points. Thus, here I shall present
in brief a few select characteristics of the current phase of modernity that are
important for the topic at hand.
Above all, a radical recognition of differentness has emerged (a recognition of the
right to be different), and the idea of universalistic, legitimizing ‘grand narratives’ has
collapsed (Lyotard). We therefore find ourselves in a state where the real plurality of
lifeworlds is reflected upon, and this plurality is no longer significantly doubted; the
social system (law, politics, education, culture, including religious life, etc.) is built upon
the principle of the recognition of the right to be special. This is manifested in the predominant
discourse, which affects all areas of life – a specific example being respect for
cultural differences (the principle of cultural relativism) and the right to self-expression.
Of course, this condition does not mean (and considering the nature of contemporary
society cannot mean) the universal and unifying legitimization of ideas, attitudes and
lifeworlds (e.g. through universalist multiculturalism). Therefore, an integral part of this
condition is its opposition, that is, criticism from traditionalist and fundamentalist individuals
and movements. These critics rightfully point out that the radical recognition of
plurality and difference can lead (and is leading) to the relativization of all values and
worldviews, and thus to the loss of a fixed point and a central or dominant authority.
In addition, there has been a radicalization of the basic principles of modernity in the
current phase of modernity: rationality, reflexivity and individualization. Rationalization
leads to the domination of ends-based rational action that gradually pushes out valuesbased
rational action (although both forms of action are rational) and introduces a calculating
element to social action. This change, in turn, significantly supports reflexivity, as
calculation involves the conscious consideration of various aspects of action, including
considering the context of action and the consequences of action. Moreover, reflexivity
adds into the mix an effort to consider (at least hypothetically) unintended consequences
and thus supports imagination, and of course particularizes the legitimacy of such action.
It is also clear that the reflexive cannot be without the rational and that there can be no
rationalization and reflexivity without individualization. These three concepts are elements,
factors or aspects of the contemporary phase of modern society that are interdependent
and act together. As Ulrich Beck, Zygmunt Bauman and others have pointed out
in their works, people in such a society are under constant pressure to make choices (both
rational and reflexive), which are based on individual preferences and worldviews (or
their hybrid forms), and one’s way of life, as well as one’s entire life history (biography),
becomes an individual reflexive project (e.g. Bauman, 2001; Beck, 1992, 2010; Beck
and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).
Plurality and individualization lead to greater insecurity because plurality and individualization
cannot provide a firm foundation for the plausibility of any definition of
reality. At the same time, however, it is clear that the individual or individuals as well
as a social group or groups need some kind of agreement as to what is real (they must
create a certain worldview) and they need conditions (structures) under which they can
confirm this concept of the real. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their classic
1164	 European Journal of Cultural Studies 24(5)
book The Social Construction of Reality call this social foundation for preserving an
image of reality a plausibility structure (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 174–182). This
confirmation does not apply, however, to one’s worldview as a whole, but to its individual
parts or conglomerates thereof. In other words, the worldview of an individual
or group does not consist of an internally coherent whole, and it is not possible for it
as a whole to be made legitimate or credible – confirming its credibility and achieving
legitimacy are possible only partially and are arbitrary. Worldviews are more modular
in nature – based on current needs, the parts of the worldview that are at the moment
understood as legitimate are activated.
This clearly illustrates the disunity of life conditions (and their reflection) in contemporary
modern society. The modular nature of the worldview means that individual modules
and their components do not need to create a congruent whole and may be in
principle ambivalent. This ambivalence, however, is only fulfilled ‘in principle’, that is,
without considering concrete situations and context. In other words, based on a given
situation, only one module or its components are used, which does not elicit ambivalence
(in the given situation it is always necessary to make a clear decision – ‘to marry a certain
woman’, ‘to turn left’, ‘to buy a bottle of a certain type of wine’). Ambivalence arises
only upon reflection on this action or decision.
The consequences of the uncertain nature of a pluralistic and individualized society
for religion are clear. The result is the disruption of the legitimizing force of religious
memory, as religious memory is pluralized and individualized, and its ability to credibly
connect the past with the present is weakened. A plurality of memories, without the support
of power structures and firmly established authority, leads to a culture without
memory, that is, to a situation where elements of the past can be randomly reconfigured
without regard for their internal continuity and interconnections. Religious memories
are thus internally ambivalent, lead to new ambivalences, or they are the results of
already existing ones.
The first ambivalence: respect for religious freedom and its
impact on the academic study of religions
Liberalism (based on the assumption of individual rights and freedoms) and secularism
(guaranteeing the separation between church and state) are two of the basic principles
upon which the modern state is built. Both of these ideas encompass the principle of
religious freedom, which in practice means that every individual (either separately or
organized in groups) may (but does not have to) believe in any religion. He or she may
therefore believe in and practice a religion that other people do not consider to be a religion
(for many reasons) or even a religion that elicits aversion in other people.
The thorough application of respect for religious freedom should lead to completely
giving up on judging the ‘religiousness’ or ‘non-religiousness’ of the given activities or
teachings and to leaving everything up to the declarations of the people who do these
activities, or consider a certain teaching to be true, or who declare themselves to be
adherents of the given activity or teaching. This would mean being completely engulfed
by the emic approach – that is, by viewing things from the perspective of social actors.
Lužný	 1165
In other words, if someone says that he believes our universe is guided by the Flying
Spaghetti Monster and that this opinion is a ‘religion’, then we have no other choice but
to respect this opinion and accept it as legitimate, just as if someone else says that her
religion is based on worshiping a single, all-powerful God, who created the world in
6 days and who wants to save us all with His love.
It is a legitimate question to ask why, when studying religion, should we as scholars
view things from the actor’s perspective (the emic approach) and use it as the basis upon
which we create an analytical concept of religion. Should we view both of the above
declarations of religiosity made by social actors equally? Should this also be the case
especially when both sides are in opposition to each other, denying one another’s claim
to religiosity and rejecting the legitimacy of the other side’s opinion?
The magic of anthropology of religion, or rather its basic attribute, consists in the art
of switching between different perspectives (including the perspective of various
actors); this does not mean, however, absolute deference to the emic approach and the
loss of the researcher’s own analytical, critical and reflexive thinking. The art of the
emic approach certainly is part and parcel of postcolonial anthropology and is certainly
a major advantage of an anti-positivist, interpretive (understanding) research methodology.
It cannot, however, mean a conscious and targeted resignation of one’s own scholarly,
and therefore etic, opinion. Another question arises here though: What if our own
opinion (even if it is based on solid research) is in conflict with the principle of religious
freedom? Imagine a situation where an anthropologist comes to the conclusion that
what the actors themselves consider a religion is not a religion. In contrast, can social
science examine a phenomenon from a religious perspective even if the actors involved
do not view it as a religion (i.e. they refuse to call it a religion and speak instead of a
‘path’, ‘an effort at self-understanding and self-improvement’ or ‘a way of life’)? Is this
a particular example of the discursive power of science and the asymmetry about which
Latour (1993) speaks critically?
In this context, let us examine Czech Jediism. The website www.jediismus.cz
defines Jediism as a ‘spiritual movement based on the philosophy of the Jedi knights’,
which ‘may be perceived as a life philosophy, or as a religion. Opinions about which
is better vary, so therefore it is good to guide yourself based on your own opinions and
ideas’ (Úvod, 2012). The creators of this website, fully in the spirit of the postmodern
approach drawing from the reality of religious plurality and in the spirit of the latemodern
principle of individualization, leave the decision-making up to every single
actor and do not particularly emphasize the use of the term ‘religion’ (they speak more
about a ‘spiritual movement’ and a ‘life philosophy’). They do not assert the exclusivity
of this movement and declare that ‘we definitely do not want to convince anyone
that Jediism is the only true path. It is just one path which a person may travel along’
(Úvod, 2012).
From this perspective, Jediism falls precisely under the New Age category in which,
thanks to religious (or spiritual) bricolage, elements of various religions are combined,
with the key theme being self-understanding and self-development, or rather finding and
understanding latent powers and potencies and subsequently (or concurrently) developing
them (Heelas, 1996 and others). The following proclamation, contained on the website’s
introductory page, is crucial:
1166	 European Journal of Cultural Studies 24(5)
The basic elements of Jediism are belief in the Force and living up to the code. In Jediism the
Force is understood as being made up of three aspects. The Personal Force, which determines
the energy of a given person (aura), the Living Force created by all living creatures, which
permeates all things, and the All-Unifying Force which determines everyone’s fate. In other
religions, the All-Unifying Force is called God, Goddess, Gods, the Devil, Chi, Energy, etc. In
our opinion the name is not important, and thus we simply believe in the Force. The Force
guides us, helps us, and reveals some of life’s secrets. The code consists of a few important
fundamentals that every Jedi must abide by. Other elements are the development of qualities
and abilities that every Jedi should have and the improvement of various skills that could come
in handy in life. Because we view Jediism as a means of self-improvement, you will also find
on these pages information about magic, philosophy, psychology, healthy lifestyles and other
things. (Úvod, 2012)
Symptomatic of this type of ‘religiosity’ or ‘creation of religion’ is a situation where
the individual (either alone or in a group) perceives elements of the surrounding world
(including cultural and religious elements) as freely ‘floating’ in space, without links to
any clear and defining context (detraditionalization), uses these elements in a creative
(imaginative) manner and assembles them into new configurations (bricolage). It is clear
that this approach to religion can be applied primarily in environments and situations in
which cultural (and religious) memory has been weakened, authority has been weakened
and where the significance of tradition has decreased. Religion, or rather DIY religion,
has become an integral part of consumer culture, and not just as an object to be manipulated,
but also as the result of such manipulation (creation). Elements of mass consumer
culture, such as books, television, films and the Internet, have become an important
source for creating religion. The inevitable result (one of many) is the shattering of the
legitimacy of using the term ‘religion’ because this term carries with it a certain cultural
heritage and calls up its dominant traditional use, although what this term currently
entails (i.e. ‘religion’) has changed significantly. The question remains, however, whether
changes in what this term entails are so fundamental that we have to fully take on the
emic approach and reject the etic term religion as outdated.
The self-portrayals of the creators of www.jediismus.ic.cz are illustrative. The first
person is Jana /Jane/, who makes the following claims about herself:
My name is Jana, I am 20, and I live in a small village a few km from Brno. I am interested in
everything that involves perception, dreams, auras, Jediism, psychology, philosophy, history,
magic, nature, the people around me and people from different cultures, drawing, reading
(sometimes I read with my legs up and notice it after a while :), writing stories, music, family
and mainly my friends. My dream is to use the Force to understand the world and help it. I’d
say about myself that I am an introverted optimist. My favourite food is great granny’s potato
pancakes (even though gramps’s are not so bad either :), I like dandelions, cartoons (mainly
Krakonoš), Mr. Bean, and Denmark (probably because in winter 2001 I fell into the sea there
and my shoes dried for two days and I cleaned my trousers with paper tissues :) I like to go to
the theatre, take photographs, ice skate, swim and run around in the mountains :) I honour the
Jedi code and therefore may the Force be with you. . . :).
The second person is Filip, whose statement reveals a more explicit identification
with religion:
Lužný	 1167
My name is Filip, I am 20, and I live in Pardubice. I began to be interested in magic when I was
about 15. I unconsciously used intuition and telepathy and after a while realized what exactly
that was. I began to seek out information about magic and found my way to Wicca. I was quite
captivated by it and began to read all kinds of websites and books. Since then I have studied
Wicca as well as magic and other fields. I was particularly captivated by mediation, trance,
astral projection, lucid dreaming, perception of energies, auras, and chakras, telepathy,
telekinesis and other things. After about a year and a half, when I had already seen some Star
Wars movies for perhaps the millionth time, I began to think about the Jedi knights. About their
composure, calmness and abilities. It occurred to me that there must be some ‘madman’ :) who
had the idea to take this philosophy and make a real religion out of Jediism. I began to look for
information, at first on Wikipedia (the English version), where I learned that this religion really
does exist and what’s more that it had hundreds of thousands of followers. It wasn’t a problem
to find more pages and I began to study intensively everything I came across . . . (O nás, 2012)
What can be concluded from the above proclamations made by the creators of the
main Czech Jediism websites? They are (a) young people, who (b) were most likely
brought up in a non-religious environment, (c) do not feel the need to come to terms with
existing religious traditions, (d) are interested in ‘mysterious’ and unknown sides of
existence, (e) want to understand the world around them and (f) want to help this world,
and (g) their image of the world, including religion, is created randomly according to
whatever they had access to (bricolage). In other words, religious de-monopolization and
pluralism allow practically anyone to become a ‘religious’ leader; at the same time, it is
apparent that the importance of the ‘layperson’has grown significantly and the influence
of ‘religious professionals’ (i.e. trained representatives of a given religious hierarchy)
has been put on the back burner.
This fact means a growing uncertainty, for applying the emic approach where the activities
and statements of actors are equal in the eyes of the anthropologist, and also means
giving up on a more general, systemic analysis; the goal becomes to reconstruct the actor’s
world. It is apparent, however, that the actions of all the actors (including their statements)
have the same social impact and that the identical activity of two different actors has differing
results. It is therefore an illusion that all social actors’ activities and statements are
equal. Cultural anthropology can thus be viewed as a way to acquire the ability to uncover
this illusion and reveal hidden motifs and determinants of human behaviour. Without the
etic approach, however, all this is impossible. Should we then take the phenomenon of
‘Jediism’ as seriously as possible? The answer is simple: yes, certainly. In order to do so,
however, we need to deal with another problem – defining ‘religion’.
The second ambivalence: ‘what is religion?’
With all due respect to the emic approach, I do not assume that social actors’ proclamations
of their religiosity should be the only criterion for understanding certain cultural
phenomena as religion. In order to consider a particular phenomenon, whether physical
or verbal, as ‘religious’, at least a working concept of ‘religion’ is needed.
It is therefore apparent that we cannot avoid providing some kind of definition (although
it will certainly not be generally valid and shared by all). Let us try to illustrate the disunity
of scholarship on religion by providing at least the three most commonly mentioned
1168	 European Journal of Cultural Studies 24(5)
textbook examples of definitions of religion. First, we (along with Emil Durkheim) could
define religion as ‘a unified system of beliefs and practices to sacred things, that is to say,
things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community
called a Church, all those who adhere to them’(Durkheim, 1995: 44).Asecond definition
is offered by Milton Yinger (1970), who understands religion as
a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with ultimate
problems of human life. It expresses their refusal to capitulate to death, to give up in the face of
frustration, to allow hostility to tear apart their human associations. The quality of being
religious, seen from the individual point of view, implies two things: first, a belief that evil,
pain, bewilderment, and injustice are fundamental facts of existence; and, second, a set of
practices and related sanctified beliefs that express a conviction that man can ultimately be
saved from those facts. (p.7)
Or we can take the position of Clifford Geertz and view religion as
1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods
and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4)
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations
seem uniquely realistic. (Geertz, 1993: 90)
These three definitions are well known; now let us try to apply them to the Jedi religion
and the Church of Beer.
According to the first definition of religion, some elements of faith and theology (i.e.
what people believe in), elements of religious behaviour (rituals, religious acts, songs,
prayers, etc.) and collective forms (i.e. more-or-less institutionalized relationships, forms
of communication, organizational structures, networks, etc.) must be present, or more
simply, we need to study what people believe in, how they behave and how they join
together. At the same time, a key element to religion here is sacred things, towards which
members of a given community behave significantly differently (taboos, worship) than
to other things. Thus, at the core of the ‘religiosity’ of a given phenomenon (such as a
community) lies the concept of the ‘sacred’.
If we view Jediism from this vantage point, we can state that its core teaching is the
idea that a superhuman (and thus superindividual) universal ‘Force’ exists:
The Force is an energy that creates everything, binds everything, and creates balance among all
beings. It is the energy of every living being as well as of every non-living entity. We can call
this energy God, Goddess, the Universe, Energy, Love, the Highest Principle, . . . whatever we
want to. For the Force contains all, it cannot be described, grasped, or even comprehended. We
therefore use the word ‘force’ due to its relative emotional neutrality. The Force is perceived
very individually. May everyone find their own path to the Force and the Force will join our
paths into one. (Manifest Společenství Cesty Síly, 2012)
This description of the ‘Force’ demonstrates the hierarchical place of human beings
under this force and enables this ‘Force’ to be understood as a transcendental power. For
this reason, Jediism might be construed as a religion.
Lužný	 1169
There is no such element of the sacred or the transcendental, in contrast, in the Church
of Beer.At first glance, it might seem that beer could be the sacred element that the members
of the Church of Beer are convinced is a ‘holy’ drink, but not a ‘sacred’ one. Beer is
understood as a tool for relaxation and a means for people to meet:
Fellow believers meet regularly in moments of rest in order to gain new strength together.
Drinking beer has a beneficial effect in this regards and fellow believers are of the opinion that
it is a holy drink, for it best calms the bodies and minds of people at times of rest and rouses
them to exceptional performance in the future. (Základní charakteristika Pivní církve, n.d.)
This ‘non-sacred’ view of beer is commensurate with its consumption in commercial
dining establishments and with the consumption of mass-produced beer. If members of
this church truly viewed beer as a sacred drink, it is more than likely that they would
produce this drink in some special way themselves and would consume it only in symbolic
quantities. Although the Founding Document of the Church of Beer does speak
about a ‘Creator’, it does so only very vaguely:
A crucial element of the ontology of fellow believers is the immanent concept of the Creator.
Fellow believers consider themselves to be creationists . . . Fellow believers reject the atheist
concept of the creation of the world as a mere coincidence. They do not, however, personify the
Creator, but view him as an intelligent, everpresent constant. (Základní charakteristika Pivní
církve, n.d.)
Although the official theology of the Church of Beer (in its concepts of the Creator
and the sacred) is not adequately articulated or described publicly, this fact is not evidence
for doubting its religious nature. Nonetheless, if a basic assumption in this definition
of religion is some kind of concept of the ‘sacred’ or the transcendent, then we can
legitimately ask to what extent this concept should be explicit and comprehensive. And
who determines this extent?
In order to meet the second definition of religion, there has to be an interest in the ultimate
problems of human life in the teachings and practices of the given community and
strategies for their universal (not only individual) solution. In addition, there must also be
rituals that serve this ‘strategy of ultimate victory’. In other words, from this perspective,
the core of ‘religiosity’is any concept of ‘salvation’as a definitive solution to the ultimate
problem of human existence (problems of overcoming human life’s finiteness, that is,
overcoming death, and questions about the existence of good and evil, that is, overcoming
this duality or the ultimate victory of good over evil). The teachings of the Church of Beer
that have been made public (and thus their only known teachings) do not contain these
themes, and the main dualism of these teachings is the dichotomy of value-creating activities
(in other words, work) and leisure activities, or rather the switching back and forth
between the two. Members of the Church of Beer consider ‘poorly spent relaxation time’
to be something negative (read ‘evil’), and they view drinking beer together as a way to
regenerate the strength necessary for the ‘effective creation of values’:
The teachings accepted by fellow believers . . . work with the concept of life as a cycle of
‘work and reward’ . . . This cycle of activities is performed in order to have a value-creating
1170	 European Journal of Cultural Studies 24(5)
activity followed by a leisure activity of the creator so that the entire cycle is quickly closed and
restored. This is considered negative as it disturbs attributive harmony, and makes it impossible
to meet the goals of the Creator, for he assigned man the task of effectively creating values
because man is a value in himself. (Základní charakteristika Pivní církve, n.d.)
It is therefore apparent that the Church of Beer does not meet the second definition of
religion either.
In contrast, Jediism displays characteristics of the second definition, although they are
not always clear-cut. The concept of salvation and dealing with the ultimate problem of
human existence are not fully explicit, although the duality between good and evil (the
Light and the Dark) is linked to the concept of the Force, imbuing this duality with a
superhuman, transcendental nature (although this duality is understood in terms of ontological
monism as illusory, or rather, it is related to a limited point of view):
The Force is divided into two sides: the Light and the Dark. It is important, however, to realize
that this division is merely our view, the view of people, a kind of concept, a tool, for grasping
reality. The Force contains all values imaginable and at the same time does not distinguish
between values; it cannot be objectively divided up. Nonetheless, what should guide our
actions? We have therefore defined the Dark and Light Side of the Force. [. . .] The Dark Side
of the Force are actions that cause harm and everything that leads to such actions. The actions
of the Dark Side of the Force culminate in destruction, pain, suffering, unhappiness, and injury
to others or those who commit them . . . The cause always lies within us, in qualities such as
fear, anger, hatred, rage, envy, malice, laziness, pride, insatiability, egoism, selfishness, etc.
These characteristics must be controlled, just like our actions. Jedis try to avoid the Dark Side
and follow what is called the Light Side of the Force. The Light Side of the Force is actions that
create and spread harmony and happiness all around, that do not hurt and do not destroy, as well
as everything that leads to such actions. Actions of the Light Side require developing qualities
including justice, patience, loyalty, generosity, honour, humility, empathy, courage, compassion,
tolerance and respect . . . We identify the Dark Side with Evil and Evil with the Dark Side,
whereas a synonym of the Light Side is the Good. The Dark Side is connected with negative
energy and the Light with positive. Both energies are part of the Force, although it is important
to realize that no ‘part’, no level of the Force can be negative or positive in itself. The Force is.
(Manifest Společenství Cesty Síly, 2012)
Is, however, the language and style Jedis use to describe their beliefs a sufficient reason
to recognize Jediism’s religious nature?
For the third and final definition of religion, it is important to identify, in the teachings
and practices of a community, the idea that the world has an order (or Order) from which
one can derive how the life of an individual and of society should be organized. Religion
thus functions as a ‘model of something’and also as a ‘model for something’with significant
legitimizing and normative power and may serve as the framework of a lifestyle. It
interconnects individual life episodes into a unified, meaningful whole. In light of the
fact that the teachings and practices of the Church of Beer do not demonstrably substantiate
the idea of a universal world order that could organize the lives of individuals and
determine social and moral order, the Church of Beer cannot be considered a religion.
References to the Creator, the rejection of the ‘atheist concept of the creation of the world
as a mere coincidence’ or the idea of a ‘cycle of activities performed in order’ is not an
Lužný	 1171
adequate basis for demonstrating the existence of the church’s ‘theology’ or cosmology
(or cosmogony).
In contrast, based on this definition, we can also identify a religious plane in Jediism’s
teachings, as Jediism contains instructions for proper behaviour and an order to the
world. One of the principles of Jediism is to maintain ‘the code’. Suggestions, instructions
and proclamations for behaving properly appear in many places in Jediism’s teachings
and are related to a superhuman element (in this case, the ‘Force’). The tenets of
Jediism include the following:
A Jedi knows, is, and works in keeping with the Force. A Jedi studies the Force, uses it, and
helps increase it. A Jedi is guided, influenced and strengthened by the force, and also relies on
it. / A Jedi maintains the code, or something similar that contains the same principles. / A Jedi
must uphold the principles that derive from the qualities that determine who we are through
action and words. Although once again they may be expressed in another form, they must
remain in the heart of every Jedi. / A Jedi clings to individual freedom. Freedom is the trait of
deciding for oneself. To deny somebody a choice is against what the Jedi stand for. / A Jedi only
rejects violence, cruelty and similar punishments. / A Jedi recognizes democracy, both political
and religious. / A Jedi does not just study Jediism and the Force but must learn about all parts
of life as it may someday be useful. (Jediismus, 2012)
Applying the preceding arguments, we realize that this study has so far focused on the
teachings of Jediism and the Church of Beer, or rather on some of the declared aspects of
their teachings, and has neglected religious practice, particularly rituals. It is here that we
specifically see the most distinctive and effective tool for evaluating the religiosity of a
certain group of people. Simply stated, if jointly conducted rituals, which can be labelled
‘religious’, are absent in the life of a group that declares itself to be religious, the religious
character of such a group is debatable. This statement requires further clarification
(on at least two points). First, there is a need to differentiate between religious and nonreligious
rituals, for all social relations as well as many aspects in one’s life as an individual
are ritualized. Not all of these rituals are, however, necessarily of a religious
nature. In order to identify the religious dimension of rituals, it is important to take into
account all three of the definitions of religion discussed above at the very least. Second,
religious rituals must display a certain regularity (e.g. one group ceremony per year is not
enough) and they must significantly structure an individual’s time throughout the day,
the year and life (e.g. an individual or group; morning or evening prayers, meditation, or
worship ceremonies; weekly attendance of group ceremonies; the celebration of various
holidays throughout the year); a religious group must perform these rituals collectively
(collective rituals are the most effective tool for creating and maintaining a group or
individual’s religious identity).
If this principle is applied to the current form of the Czech Church of Beer and Czech
Jediism, it is apparent that both practically lack a ritual plane, as meeting (even regularly)
and drinking beer cannot be considered a religious ritual, and wider social significance
cannot be attributed to individuals training to develop the Force.
What if, however, the Church of Beer and Jediism represent a new form of religion (or
religiosity) that does not necessarily correspond with traditional forms and which create
the foundation for an academic definition of religion?
1172	 European Journal of Cultural Studies 24(5)
The third ambivalence: does religious change also require
a change in the definition of religion?
In this article, I focused on two examples of efforts to legitimize a certain phenomenon:
religion. The two cases differ greatly. The Church of Beer can be considered a ‘parody
religion’ (just like the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster or Pastafarianism) – in
other words, a religious joke. Religious parody should be viewed as a form of religious
criticism in a given society, as parody belongs to the anthropology of the field of religion.
The Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster was created in response to the Kansas State
Board of Education’s decision to allow intelligent design (a new version of creationism)
to be taught in high schools as a theory as equally valid as Darwin’s theory of evolution.
It reflects the specific situation of the culture wars currently being waged in the United
States. The Church of Beer is, in contrast, a reflection of the specific conditions in Czech
society, in which beer is thought of as a part of national traditions and in which traditional
religion is on the decline.
The existence of groups such as Jediism that clearly have their roots in science-fiction
(whether Scientology, on the one hand, or Heaven’s Gate or Church of All Worlds, on the
other) leads anthropologists of religion to attempt to categorize these phenomena.
Markus Altena Davidsen has introduced, for example, the category of ‘fiction-based religion’(Davidsen,
2013), which is a ‘religion in which fictional texts are used as authoritative
texts’, with fiction defined as ‘any literary narrative which is not intended by its
author to refer to events which have taken place in the actual world prior to being entextualised’
(Davidsen, 2013: 384). The religious aspect of these literary narratives stems
from the action of supernatural agents and the consequences of this action in the real
world. Religious narratives place supernatural agents in the real world and claim that the
supernatural is real, whereas fictional narratives leave the supernatural in the fictional
world. Most traditional religious narratives (myths, legends, etc.) proclaim a link to
human history and are thus historical narratives. Such religions can then be called ‘history-based
religions’.
Apart from the concept of ‘fiction-based religion’, the other most influential concepts
in the field are ‘hyper-real religion’ and ‘invented religion’. Adam Possamai introduced
the term ‘hyper-real religion’ into the contemporary debate on modern (or postmodern)
forms of religion. He postulates that there has been growth in various forms of participation
in religion and that there has been growth in ‘ontological insecurity’ (as a consequence
of the late-modern reflexive condition), which has resulted in the creation of new,
innovative spiritual networks. Possamai uses the ‘term “hyper-real religions” to denote a
specific twenty-first century style of innovative spirituality’ that mixes ‘elements of religious
tradition with popular culture’:
These hyper-real religions are a simulacrum of a ‘traditional’ religion created partly out of
popular culture; popular cultural symbols and narratives provide inspiration for believers/
consumers. At one end of their spectrum can be found, for example, individuals rejecting
institutionalized religions and practising Jediism as appropriated from the Star Wars movies,
Matrixism from the Matrix trilogy, and neo-pagan groups using stories from The Lord of the
Rings and the Harry Potter series. At the other end of the spectrum, practitioners still involved
Lužný	 1173
in mainstream religions such as Christianity recount being influenced or inspired by, for
example, The Da Vinci Code. (Possamai and Lee, 2011: 229)
Another attempt at categorizing these (perhaps ‘borderline’) forms of contemporary
religiosity resulted in the concept of ‘invented religion’, which was introduced to the
academic study of religion by Carole M. Cusack and elaborated in greater depth by other
scholars (for instance, Taira, 2013). This is based on the idea that current forms of religion
are influenced by three key elements of today’s world: secularization, individualism
and consumer culture:
Invented religions are exercises of the imagination that have developed in a creative (though
sometimes oppositional) partnership with the influential popular cultural narratives of the
contemporary West, particularly film and science fiction. (Cusack, 2010: 7)
Invented religions are an inevitable outcome of a society addicted to the consumption of
novelties, in which the exercise of creativity and innovation in the development of products is
rewarded by wealth and fame. Inventors and entrepreneurs became valued during the industrial
revolution, when a stable agricultural society that had remained basically unchanged for
centuries was transformed by new technologies that radically altered the life patterns of people.
(Cusack, 2010: 18)
Invented religions are a new type of religion – they reject established ideological, historical
and religious authority, as well as continuity with existing religious traditions:
‘Invented religions also view fictions, the ludic and play as legitimate sources of ultimate
meaning; in no sense inferior materials upon which to base a religion than factual
accounts, attested experiences or historical events’ (Cusack, 2013: 371). It is a type of
religion ‘that explicitly and transparently emphasises story, play and creativity, whether
the religions are based on fiction is, ultimately, unimportant’ (Cusack, 2013: 374).
Religious innovation has been occurring since humans have existed. Understandably,
the academic study of religion (including the anthropology of religion) responds to it and
attempts to elaborate on its understanding of religion as well as on the definition of religion.
Do invented religions, however, such as Jediism and the Church of Beer represent
something significantly different? Do they differ in some key characteristics from other
past or present religious innovations? Traditional definitions of religion might not be
without flaws, for example, undue universalism, ahistoricism and de-contextualization,
or overlooking the issue of power. Nevertheless, we should not succumb to the ethnocentric
illusion that the current religions newly coming into existence are fundamentally
different forms of religious life.
Fourth ambivalence: why (and for whom) is the definition
needed?
The above-mentioned ambivalences lead us back to the key questions – in contemporary
liberal and highly secularized society, who has the authority and legitimacy to decide
what is and what is not a religion? And why is a decision needed in the first place? If one
takes Czech society as an example (of a liberal society of the Western type with certain
1174	 European Journal of Cultural Studies 24(5)
signs of post-communist society), two actors attempting to make such a decision can be
identified. One of these is the academic study of religion, while the other is the state.
Apart from them, there is of course a strong actor in the form of the media, which frame
the public discourse on religion. Nevertheless, media do not have the competence to
decide and thus function as a means of reproduction of already existing stereotypes or as
an instrument of reproducing the conclusions arrived at by the academic study of religion
or by the state.
In the context of science, that is, within the academic study of religion, scepticism
prevails as to the possibility of providing a universal definition of religion asAsad poignantly
stated in his criticism of Clifford Geerzt’s definition of religion employed earlier in
this article. Asad argues that it is impossible to understand religious symbols separately
from their historical relationships with non-religious symbols or, inAsad’s (1993) words,
their articulations in and of social life, in which work and power are always crucial. My
argument, I must stress, is not just that religious symbols are intimately linked to social life (and
so change with it), or that they usually support dominant political power (and occasionally
oppose it). It is that different kinds of practice and discourse are intrinsic to the field in which
religious representations (like any representations) acquire their identity and their truthfulness.
From this it does not follow that the meanings of religious practices and utterances are to be
sought in social phenomena, but only that possibility and their authoritative status are to be
explained as products of historically distinctive disciplines and forces. (pp. 53–54)
The discussion within the academic study of religion (religious studies, sociology and
anthropology of religions, etc.) has focused thus far on deconstructing the academic
manufacturing and usage of the concept of religion, including its definition. Such an
effort targets unmasking certain discursive manipulations of reality (of the world lived)
by the power of science. In connection with Foucault, the tradition of critical analysis of
the discourse of the study of religion has been formed, which indicates ethnocentric and
postcolonial elements in the conceptualization of religion in the academic study of religion
(e.g. Said, King, McCuttchen, Fitzerland, Asad and others). This article attempts to
point out a well-known (but not very frequently applied) fact that academic institutions
(and academic thinking) and the state as two forms of power (and not only a discursive
one), albeit formally independent, intersect and cooperate in reality. The state discourse
on religion and academic discourse occasionally need one another and mutually use the
legitimacy of the other, even in the case of a highly secularized society.
This can be seen in the case of the state recognizing a particular group as religious.
Both groups discussed in this article can be such cases. The Church of Beer has already
tried (and Jediism might eventually do so) to be officially recognized by the Czech state
as a religious group. What does the process of recognition look like?
Due to the fact that the Constitution of the Czech Republic (and ensuing legislation)
grants religious freedom (including no faith at all), everyone (as an individual or within
a group) can believe in and practice whatever they consider religion. Believers might
(but do not have to) form organizations. Such organizations, that is, groups with a certain
legal format, have two options: they can exist as civic associations (without needing
to declare their religious character) and become one of many non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), or they can try to be registered by the state (and thus gain an
Lužný	 1175
officially recognized religious character). To be registered (although not necessary for
the mere existence of the group) means that the state respects the association and recognizes
it as religious.
In the Czech Republic, the registering body is the Ministry of Culture. The Ministry
itself (with respect to the liberal principles of religious freedom) possesses no definition
of religion. It does have to, however, pass the final verdict as to whether a given group
applying for registration is or is not religious. How then is the decision arrived at?
The applying group must meet certain conditions which are not necessarily connected
with their ‘religious’ character, for example, a certain minimal number of members. In
addition, it must submit information on its structure and functioning. Although the legislation
does not define religion directly, an implicit understanding is obvious from the
characterization of a church or a religious group:
a church or a religious association is a voluntary community of persons with its own structure,
body, inner regulations, religious services and manifestations of faith, established in order to
confess a certain religious faith, publicly or privately, and especially to organize meetings,
services, teaching and pastoral service. (Zákon o církvích a náboženských společnostech [The
Law on Churches and Religious Associations], §3)
It is clearly apparent from the above citation that the state considers ‘a community’
(somehow organized, structured), ‘religious rituals’ and ‘manifestations of faith’ as the
fundamentals of religion. In this way, the Czech legal demarcation of religion echoes
Durkheim’s definition. The Czech state does not define, however, what the adjective
‘religious’ means (unlike Durkheim who considers ‘sacred things’, that is, things ‘set
apart’ and ‘forbidden’, as the core of religion). How then can the Ministry’s officials,
responsible for the process of registration and for the legal decision, recognize that a
community is ‘religious’ with ‘religious rituals’ and that the community’s ‘faith’ is of a
religious character?
The Ministry’s officials obviously do not have the necessary competence to make
such a decision. They therefore address an expert system, specifically expert witnesses.
These are experts on religions, that is, academic institutions and scholars (such as religious
studies scholars, anthropologists of religion, sociologists of religion, as well as
theologians). The involvement of experts, that is, scholars, in the process of registration
and acknowledgement of the religious nature granted to certain groups works in various
forms in other countries as well, but is always problematic: cf. for instance the situation
in Finland – Mäkelä, 2018. Based on the submitted documents, their own field research
and other sources, the expert witnesses write their expert opinion in which they also
evaluate the religious (or lack thereof) character of the association. Importantly, although
these experts are fully aware of the difficulties of defining religion, they have to submit
an opinion allowing the Ministry to make a binary decision – to make a yes/no choice. If,
for example, the expert opinion of Jediism described the group as not religion but a
‘hyper-real religion’, a ‘fiction-based religion’ or an ‘invented religion’, the opinion
would be useless in the process of registration. Therefore, although academic discussions
on the definition of religion can be highly structured, social practice requires an unambiguous
verdict.
1176	 European Journal of Cultural Studies 24(5)
Conclusion
Using two non-traditional cultural phenomena, I have attempted to demonstrate how the
ambivalent conditions contained in modern society influence the discourse on religion,
including academic discourse. If a social environment featuring various forms of religion
and spirituality is in its principles liberal and secular, then decentralization of power and
the diffusion of authority occur, which significantly complicate any efforts at answering
the question of when we can (both publicly and academically) call some cultural phenomenon
religious and who has the legitimacy to legitimize them as such.
If religious memory has been disrupted or if groups exist that do not make connections
to existing religious memories and do not create their own religious memory, and
religious authority is diffused, the public significance of academic study of religions
grows.Ahighly secularized society needs a plausible definition of what a religion is even
more than societies where religion is firmly grounded, religious traditions are still strong
and where religion defines both public and private lives.
To think that any definition of religion temporarily agreed on by scholars from the
field of religion could dramatically influence religious life is certainly naive. In this
regard, the academic stage of religion is always secondary to real life. On the other hand,
it is obvious that the outputs from the academic study of religion become (more or less)
part of the discourse of power. If scholars adopt the broad (inclusive) definition of religion,
they open up an opportunity for legitimacy of various movements or groups previously
eliminated from the field of religion. In contrast, if they adopt the narrow (exclusive)
definition, they draw a sharp discursive border between ‘religion’ and ‘non-religion’,
help eliminate some groups from the field of religion, and thus may subsequently
strengthen the tendency to stigmatize them. An academic definition of religion may thus
become an element of a religious conflict or a cultural war, and may provide legitimacy
to either one party in conflict or the other.
In addition, in highly secularized societies and societies where a radical disruption of
religious memory has occurred (such as in some post-communist societies), the importance
of an academic definition of religion has another dimension. These societies manifest
the state of a certain religious anomy or loss of orientation and ground. Such societies
(Czech society being a unique example) lack an embeddedness in history. Their identity
is not only ‘fluid’ in a postmodern way, it is ‘fluttering’ – not embedded, not leading
anywhere and lacking any ambition to ‘belong’ somewhere or to become bonded to
something. In such a situation, the stabilizing and integrating potential of ‘expert systems’
(in this case, the academic study of religion) may be manifested, which may facilitate
fundamental comprehension of the situation, notwithstanding its internal
inconsistency. A definition, or rather several definitions, may help it.
The academic stage of religion may point out, for instance, that the state (i.e. the
Czech state authority) has not yet taken into account the actually occurring process of
individualization. This process involves, among other things, the weakening importance
of institutionalized forms of religion (i.e. the weakening necessity for an individual to
belong to a single religious organization), as well as the institutionalized individualization
(a state where the state authority considers religion primarily and with regard to all
related issues as a matter of a free individual, not as a matter of a community or a social
Lužný	 1177
group). Here, academic study of religion, being an expert system, may help the state
authority determine its policies. One thing is, however, certain: the state is a political
body and its decision-making is thus primarily political (governed by political practice,
political aims, and the legitimacy of the national tradition); thus, the expert systems (i.e.
scholars and their academic definitions of religion) will remain mere tools and legitimization
means of the national state’s policy.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation project:
Atheism, Freethought and Secularization in Central and Eastern European Countries in
the 20th and 21st Centuries (No. 8-11345S).
ORCID iD
Dušan Lužný https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4533-2319
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Biographical note
Dušan Lužný is a professor at the Department of Sociology, Andragogy and Cultural Anthropology,
Palacký Univerzity in Olomouc, Czech Republic. Main fields of interest include sociology of religion,
cultural memory, and new religious movements. He has contributed numerous articles to
scholarly journals and books, for example: Sect as a threat – cultural memory and the image of sects,
Politics, Religion & Ideology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2017.1330685.