The Convert as a Social Type
Author(s): David A. Snow and Richard Machalek
Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 1 (1983), pp. 259-289
Published by: Wiley
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This essay treats the convert as as social type with four specifiable
formal properties: biographical reconstruction;
adoption of a master attribution scheme; suspension of analogical
reasoning; and embracement of the convert role.
These properties are derivedfrom the talk and reasoning of
converts to a culturally transplanted Buddhist movement
and from accounts of other proselytizers and converts. We
conclude that it is the convert's rhetoric rather than institutional
context or ideological content that denotes the convert
as a social type.
%9S
THE CONVERT
AS A SOCIAL TYPE
David A. Snow
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS,
AUSTIN
Richard Machalek
TRINITY UNIVERSITY
The widespread appeal of numerous religious and personal
growth movements during the past decade (Lande, 1976; Richardson,
1978; Robbins and Anthony, 1979; Wuthnow, 1976) has stimulated
considerable discussion and research about the phenomenon of conversion.
Heirich (1977) has suggested that an understanding of conversion
requires consideration of both its nature and its causes. To date, however,
the bulk of the research has concerned itself with the causes and
stages of conversion (Balch, 1980; Bromley and Shupe, 1979b; Lofland,
1978; Lofland and Stark, 1965; Richardson and Stewart, 1978; Snow
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Sociological Theory
and Phillips, 1980). Although this research has helped to specify the
relative influence of various social, psychological, and situational factors
in relation to the conversion process, conversion itself is vaguely
conceived. Just how one might identify the convert is never clearly
explained. Instead, the characteristics of the convert are typically taken
for granted. This is a serious oversight, especially since an understanding
of the conversion process presupposes the ability to identify the
convert.
In this chapter, therefore, we propose a more formal and explicit
theoretical explanation of the convert. Specifically, we treat the convert
as a social type with identifiable formal properties. Following Simmel
(Wolff, 1950), we focus on "the typical characteristics of a person when
engaging in various sorts of interaction" (Levine, 1965, p. 101) in order
to delimit the properties of the convert as a social type. Rather than
deriving the properties of the convert from the overt behavior of religious
group members and participants in other movements, however,
we focus on their talk and reasoning. In keeping with Simmel's formal
sociology, we listen not only with an ear for the content of conversion
claims but with an ear for the characteristic form of conversion rhetoric.
Hence we argue that it is by the form of converts' talk and reasoning
that they can be distinguished from other social types.
This line of analysis was suggested during the course of an
ethnographic study of the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement in
America.l As a participant observer of the movement for a year and a
half, the senior author had numerous opportunities to observe and
informally converse with movement members in various situations.2
After a period of time it became clear that the talk and reasoning of
some members varied considerably from the rhetoric of others. Further
investigation revealed discernible patterns in this talk and reasoning.
These observations provided the impetus for our study. Our analysis is
thus grounded in and illustrated throughout by the talk and reasoning
of members of Nichiren Shoshu of America (NSA). These accounts are
supplemented with examples drawn from other proselytizing movements
and from the biographical accounts of both proselytizers and
converts.
We begin by evaluating existing conceptions of conversion. We
then propose four formal properties of the convert as a social type.
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Convert as Social Type
Finally, we discuss the theoretical and methodological implications of
the formulation.
Common Conceptions of Conversion
Travisano (1970, p. 600) has suggested that the convert is recognizable
by his piety. While this may be true, we are still left with the
problem of recognizing piety. There are, however, a number of other
characteristics used by laypersons and social scientists as a basis for
identifying converts. Since these common conceptions have serious
deficiencies, it is necessary to examine them critically.
Physical Aberrations. Some would have us believe that the convert
has a characteristic phenotype, a sort of Cain's mark. Delgado
(1980, p. 22) cites several adjectives used by psychiatrists, psychologists,
and other observers to describe those who convert to cults-autisticlike,
zombie-like, programmed, glass-eye stare, fixed facial smile, and
stereotyped, robot-like responses. Hargrove (1980, p. 20) reports similar
adjectives-a glassy-eyed thousand-mile stare, for example. Many laypersons
too believe that converts can be detected by such physical attributes.
As an irate parent of a member of the Unification Church was
heard to comment at an anticult rally in Dallas in 1976: "You can tell if
sonieone has been brainwashed by looking in their eyes. Haven't you
noticed how Moonies seem to look right through you?" However
vivid such descriptions, there is little scientific basis for using them as
indicators of conversion. Moreover, as Cox (1978) has warned, such
beliefs have frequently functioned historically to sanction religious
persecution.
Group Membership or Participation. A second line of thinking
equates conversion with membership or participation in new or fringe
groups. If one is a member of such a group, whatever the criteria of
membership, one is thereby regarded as a convert. Probably for purposes
of convenience, social scientists often treat membership, especially
in "deviant" religious groups, as an indicator of conversion
(Enroth, 1977; Harrison,1974; Heirich, 1977; Lofland and Stark, 1965;
Richardson, Stewart, and Simmonds, 1978). To equate membership
and conversion, however, strikes us as a questionable assumption. It
ignores the sociological axiom that people can be members of the same
group or movement in different ways and with varying degrees of
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commitment (Etzioni, 1975; Kanter, 1972;Turner and Killian, 1972).
Evidence also suggests that membership in religious groups is much
too heterogeneous to justify its use as a reliable indicator of conversion
(Bultena, 1949;Fichter, 1954;Ebaugh, 1977). As Nock (1933) observed
some time ago, people often participate in religious rituals and activities
without fully adopting the group's value orientation.3 Balch's
(1980) recent study of a millenial UFO cult similarly indicates a tenuous
link between participation and conversion. Such observations thus
suggest that while membership may be necessary for conversion, it is
seldom, if ever, a sufficient condition.
Demonstration Events. A third factor commonly treated as an
indicator of conversion is the demonstration event. A demonstration
event is essentially a social display of conversion. It may be institutionalized
and routinized, as in the case of confirmations and testimonies,
or it may be spontaneous and dramatic, as in the case of glossolalia and
other ecstatic utterings and trances. Whatever its exact nature it is
thought to symbolize what Lang and Lang (1961, p. 157) call the
moment of awakening. It is partly for this reason that many religious
proselytizers and groups place a premium on demonstration events.
Such events ostensibly provide them with a benchmark for distinguishing
the novitiate from the convert.4
Social scientists also frequently rely on demonstration events to
identify converts. Zetterberg(1952, p. 159), in his study of a fundamentalist
revival group, identified the convert as one who had openly confessed
communion with God or had pursued the same. More recently,
Heirich (1977, pp. 660-661) operationally defined the Catholic Pentecostal
convert as one who not only avowed membership but who also
reported receiving the baptism of the Holy Spirit. On the other hand,
some social scientists have urged caution about relying on demonstration
events as valid indicators of conversion. Noting that religious
groups frequently apply considerable normative pressure, often in
emotionally charged situations, for potential converts to demonstrate a
conversion experience, Clark (1958, p. 204) has observed that many
avowed converts show very little permanent behavioral evidence of
personality change. Bergerand Luckmann (1967, p. 158)have similarly
observed that a conversion is nothing much: "The real thing is to be
able to keep on taking it seriously; to retain a sense of its plausibility."
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Convert as Social Type
Many religious proselytizers also harbor skepticism about taking
demonstration events too seriously. Rather than relaxing their vigilance
after the prospective convert's spiritual awakening, the more
successful proselytizers try to reinforce the demonstration experience
with a social infrastructure. John Wesley, the principal founder of
Methodism, seemed keenly aware of the fragile relationship between a
demonstration event and a sustained conversion. One of Wesley's biographers
(Doughty, 1955, p. 57) observed that "from the outset he
realized the comparative futility of merely preaching to a miscellaneous
crowd of people and leaving the matter there. He realized that
individuals needed to be befriended, shepherded, instructed, and
encouraged, and hence arose the societies which became the nuclei of
the Methodist church."
George Whitefield, an eighteenth-century Calvinist, similarly
spent much of his life preaching in England, Scotland, Wales, and the
United States. Whitefield was content merely to preach and hope for
the best; Wesley, however, declined to preach where it seemed impossible
to consolidate his evangelical efforts. When writing from Haverfordwest
in August 1763, for example, Wesley noted: "I was more
convinced than ever that preaching like an apostle, without joining
together those that are awakened and training them up in the ways of
God, is only begetting children for the murderer[the devil]" (Doughty,
1955, p. 57). Whitefield ultimately realized the genius of Wesley in this
regard. Toward the end of his life Whitefield admitted: "My brother
Wesley acted wisely. The souls that were awakened under his ministry
he joined in class, and thus preserved the fruit of his labor. This I
neglected, and my people are a rope of sand" (p. 57).
Like Wesley, many contemporary religious proselytizers seem
suspicious about the connection between demonstration events and
sustained conversion. They also seem to have grasped the importance
of establishing a plausibility structure (Berger and Luckmann, 1967,
p. 158)in orderto secureand stabilizeconversion experiences.The leaders
of the Unification Church, for example, make certain that such experiences
are immediately succeeded by a series of workshops during
which an intensive study of the theology of the movement is pursued,
"thus allowing a firm intellectual faith to support the insight of the
first moment" (De Maria, 1978, p. 110; also see Bromley and Shupe,
1979a, and Lofland, 1977, 1978). Nichiren Shoshu leaders are equally
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Sociological Theory
skeptical about the value of a demonstration experience in the absence
of sustained interaction with authentic converts. As one leader
explained:
It's fairly easy to do Shakubuku [proselytizing]
and get a person to attend an NSA discussion meeting.
And that person may decide to receive his Gohonzon
[sacred scroll] and start practicing. But the real test comes
after he receives the Gohonzon and starts practicing. The
important thing is whether the individual can at least
grasp a little of the significance of chanting. This is why
attending NSA meetings on a regular basis is so
important.
A theological understanding of conversion is not a social scientific
understanding. Nevertheless, if the devotees of a religion are reluctant
to accept at face value a demonstration event as a valid and reliable
indicator of conversion, we think the social scientist may be well served
by exercising equal caution.
Conversion as Radical Change. If there is one point about
which students of conversion seem virtually unanimous, it is that conversion
involves a radical change in a person's experience. James (1958,
p. 162), for example, described conversion in terms of new or peripheral
ideas that come to "form the habitual center of [one's] energy."
Others have referred to it as a "drastic transformation in behavior
patterns" (Shibutani, 1961, p. 523), "a complete turnabout in central
values" (Lang and Lang, 1961, p. 153), and "a fundamental and
wholehearted reversal of former values, attitudes, and beliefs" (Turner
and Killian, 1972, pp. 388-389). Some scholars would reserve the term
for sudden changes, others would include gradual changes, and still
others would include multiple or serial changes (Clark, 1958; Parrucci,
1968; Richardson, 1980; Richardson and Stewart, 1978; Zetterberg,
1952). Nonetheless, the idea of radical change is at the core of all
conceptions of conversion.
Taken by itself, the view of conversion as radical change is not
particularly helpful. Two problems are immediately apparent. First, to
argue that the conversion must be drastic, complete, or dramatic does
not specify, either conceptually or operationally, how much change is
enough to constitute a conversion. Several students of conversion have
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Convert as Social Type
implicitly addressed this problem by proposing continua for distinguishing
radical and comprehensive changes. Travisano (1970, p. 598)
separates conversions from alterations, which he defines as reversible
and less drastic: "Complete disruption signals conversion while anything
less signals alternation." Similarly, Gordon (1974) distinguishes
conversion, "a radical discontinuity in the person's life," from less
extreme identity changes.5 While these conceptual distinctions may be
useful in defining what conversion is not, they provide no unambiguous
criteria for identifying complete disruptions or radical discontinuities.
Hence the refinements proposed by Travisano (1970) and Gordon
(1974) are no more satisfactory than the earlier discussions of
conversion.
If we were to solve the problem of designating the degree of
change required for conversion, we would be left with a logically-prior
question: Exactly what is it that undergoes radical change? Is it beliefs
and values, behavior and identities, or something even more fundamental
that changes? A simple declaration of conversion as radical
change in belief or behavior does not solve the problem. Questions
pertaining to the kinds of belief or behavior that change, the direction
of change, and the indicators of change still remain. To raise these
questions is not to take issue with the basic conception of conversion as
radical change. Rather, it is to insist that the character of that change
be specified.
Conversion and the Universe of Discourse. To the extent that
conversion is viewed as a radical change, we propose that it is the
universe of discourse which changes. As "a system of common or
social meanings," a universe of discourse provides a broad interpretive
framework in terms of which people live and organize experience
(Mead, 1962, pp. 88-90).6 It constitutes the source of what has been
variously referredto as one's sense of ultimate grounding or root reality
(Heirich, 1977, pp. 553, 674-676), one's center of energy (James, 1958,
p. 162), or one's paradigm (Jones, 1978). To experience a radical and
fundamental change in one's universe of discourse is therefore no
casual change of attitude, opinion, or belief. It is not merely a matter of
rearranging the trivial elements of one's consciousness as one rearranges
furniture. Rather, it entails the displacement of one universe of
discourse by another and its attendant grammar or rules for putting
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things together. Perhaps this is why Jones (1978) finds it useful to
compare conversion to Kuhn's (1962) idea of paradigm shift.
If it is the universe of discourse that undergoes radical change
during conversion, can that change be specified? In short, what can be
said to characterize the talk and reasoning of the convert? In the
following pages we propose four key properties by which to define the
convert: biographical reconstruction, adoption of a master attribution
scheme, suspension of analogical reasoning, and embracement of a
master role.
Properties of Conversion
Biographical Reconstruction. In The Varieties of Religious
Experience James (1958, p. 177) observed that when one undergoes
conversion "a complete division is established in the twinkling of an
eye between the old life and the new." While not all conversions occur
in the twinkling of an eye, there seems to be little question but that they
all involve a division between the old and the new. This division
involves the dissolution of the past, on the one hand, and its reconstitution
on the other. The dismantling process is clearly illustrated by the
Italian writer Ignazio Silone's account of his conversion to communism
in the 1930s:"My own internal world, the 'middle ages,' which I
had inherited and which were rooted in my soul . . . were shaken to
their foundations, as though by an earthquake. Everything was thrown
into the melting-pot, everything became a problem" (Crossman, 1952,
p. 87). But the past is not only shattered; the disjointed pieces are
reassembled in accordance with the new universe of discourse and its
grammar. Some aspects of the past are jettisoned, others are redefined,
and some are put together in ways previously inconceivable. One's biography
is, in short, reconstructed. As Silone went on to note, "Life,
death, love, good, evil, truth, all changed their meaning or lost it
altogether" (p. 87).
James is not the only student of conversion to have alluded to
this process of biographical reconstruction. In fact, it is the one property
of conversion that is acknowledged with some frequency in the
literature (Beckford, 1978; Berger, 1963; Berger and Luckmann, 1967;
Burke, 1965;Gordon, 1974;Jones, 1978;Shibutani, 1961;Taylor, 1976,
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1978;Travisano, 1970). Perhaps this is because it is such a prominent
feature of the talk and reasoning of converts. Converts seldom seem to
tire of reminding others of how they have changed, how their life has
improved, how they not only see things more clearly now but also
differently. Moreover, from the convert's viewpoint such changes are
rendered reasonable and understandable by two "facts"about the past.
First, the convert's former understanding of self, past events, and others
is now regarded as a misunderstanding. Following the formula "then I
thought ... now I know" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 160), previous
motives, feelings, and evaluations are regarded as misguided or
erroneous. As the following comments of Nichiren Shoshu converts
illustrate, converts talk as if they suffered false consciousness if not
actual blindness:
Male, white, single, under30: At the time Ijoined I
was involved in a hippie-type philosophy, and consequently
I felt that I had no need for any material belongings
in order to attain happiness. It seems unbelievable
now, but because of my erroneous concept of a happy life
I was totally blind to my actual condition, which was
miserable.
Female, white, single, under 30: Chanting has
cleared up my mind enough to see that in the yearsbefore
I chanted I had many misconceptions about life.... I
avoided looking at this until chanting brought out the
wisdom that could help me see such problems.
Married couple, white, 30-40: Where we thought
we were happily married before, we found that therewere
many barriersbetween us, many illusions hiding our true
selves from ourselves and each other.
Gripped by the realization that preconversion interpretations
were erroneous, the convert comes to redefine the past "correctly." Old
facts and aspects of one's biography are thus given new meanings. Not
only are former identities evaluated negatively but the course and character
of the convert's life history is typically reconstructed as troublesome,
misdirected, even loathsome. The talk of Nichiren Shoshu
converts abounds with examples of this process:
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Female, white, single, under 30: Approximately a
year ago [before conversion] ... I was going around
screaming and protesting for what I thought was the
right cause. Little did I know that I wasn't making the
right cause and that I was creating so much antivalue in
my life.
Female, white, single, 16: Before discovering NSA
I almost flunked out of school. All I ever thought about
was the weekend, the guy I was going out with, and
getting high with my friends. I was really a bum.
. . What I thought was the real cool way to be was really
very phony.
Male, white, single, 29: Once I began to chant I
came to realize that sometimes behind what seems to be a
completely happy person there lie problems and limitations
that even the person himself is unaware of. Now,
after thirteen months of practice, I can look back and see
what the true state of my life was.
That converts can look back and see the "true state" of their lives
prior to conversion is understandable considering that the past is
viewed from the vantage point of the enlightened present. Since the
present functions as the final arbiter of truth about the past, biographical
reconstruction may even involve the fabrication and insertion of
events "wherever they are needed to harmonize the remembered with
the reinterpreted past" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 160). In this
regard, Heirich (1977, p. 658) has suggested that the converts he studied
tended to exaggerate their preconversion sinfulness to increase the
power and value of their conversions. The senior author's association
with a number of Nichiren Shoshu converts revealed that their biographical
reconstructions too are frequently laced with exaggerations
and fabrications. To point to such observations, however, is not to suggest
that exaggerations, fabrications, and denials are intended to deceive.
The convert is not perpetuating fraud but aligning the past "with
the truth that, necessarily, embraces both present and past" (Berger and
Luckmann, 1967, p. 160). Ironically, the convert is not privileged to a
nonpartisan knowledge of his or her past. Conversion as biographical
reconstruction denies one an undistorted recall of the past. This situation
is not restricted, of course, to converts. It is virtually axiomatic in
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Convert as Social Type
phenomenology and in Mead's (1932, 1938) philosophy of the present
that personal biographies and identities are continuously redefined in
the light of new experiences. For the convert, however, this everyday
phenomenon is greatly amplified and intensified; the fact of conversion
represents the dominant feature of the convert's consciousness. It
provides the point of view in terms of which both life before and life
after conversion are interpreted. Hence the old and the new may bear
slight resemblance indeed to each other.
Adoption of a Master Attribution Scheme. The second formal
property of conversion involves the adoption of a master attribution
scheme. Attribution refers to the cognitive process by which people
form causal interpretations of the behavior of self and others and the
events in the world around them. Specification of the nature, causes,
and consequences of the attribution process has been a major objective
of much social psychological research and theorizing during the past
several decades (Jones and others, 1972;Shaver, 1975;Wegner and Vallacher,
1977, pp. 39-88). Although there are several distinct models of
the attribution process (Heider, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley,
1967, 1971),each restson a number of common assumptions and observations
that are germane to the argument being presented. First, attribution
is regardedas an everydaycognitive phenomenon deriving from
people's need to make sense of the world around them (Kanouse and
Hanson, 1972, p. 47; Shaver, 1975, pp. 4-5, 58). Second, it is assumed
that the causes of most behavior are attributed to internal or external
factors. To attribute responsibility to internal factors is to assume that
there is something about the actor's personal qualities and dispositions
that cause the action. To make an external attribution, on the other
hand, is to account for the action in terms of the environment, including
the actions of other persons. Third, it has been observed that attributions
tend to vary with differences in available information,
self-interest, and change in role and situation (Jones and Nisbett, 1971;
Shaver, 1975; Wegner and Vallacher, 1977). Fourth, attribution theorists
assume that people are basically rational problem solvers (Shaver,
1975, p. 58). People are seen as constructive thinkers searching for the
causes of the events confronting them in a logical way (Jones and
others, 1972, p. x). Kelley (1972) has cautioned, however, that causal
attributions are not merely a function of one's perceptual and logical
faculties. He argues that they are also circumscribed by causal
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schemata-the general conceptions people have "about how certain
kinds of causes interact to produce a specific kind of effect" (p. 151).
Kelley suggests that there aredifferent causal schemata and that people
typically draw on a number of these types when searching for causes.
Kelley's argument, in many respects, is consistent with Mills's
(1940) contention that causal attributions are largely derived from
vocabularies of motive. According to Mills, the motives people avow or
impute in response to questioned conduct or events are organized into
vocabularies that have currency only in certain social situations or
groupings. Hence different vocabularies of motive may come into play
in different situations and with different sets of actors.
In sum, then, the foregoing observations suggest that inferring
the causes of behavior is an invariant component of the interpretive
process, that the direction of causal inferences depends on role and
situation, and that attributional analyses are fairly rational but are
circumscribed by causal schemes or vocabularies of motive.
If these assumptions are correct, then we would argue that conversion
involves the adoption of a master attribution scheme. By this
we mean that one causal scheme or vocabulary of motives informs all
causal attributions. A single locus of causality is simultaneously sharpened
and generalized. Feelings, behavior, and events that were previously
inexplicable or accounted for by reference to a number of
causal schemes are now interpreted from the standpoint of one pervasive
scheme. Interpretive options are thus inhibited. Consequently,
causal inferences remain constant despite variation in situations. There
is neither equivocation nor negotiation with respect to the cause for the
behavior or event under scrutiny. The cause is known beforehand.
Hence nothing is ambiguous or fortuitous. A master attribution
scheme is thereby substituted for a series of multiple attribution
schemes that were used previously. All this is clearly illustrated by
Arthur Koestler's discussion of his conversion to communism in 1931.
In The God That Failed (Crossman, 1952, p. 19), Koestler writes: "By
the time I had finished with Feuerbach and State and Revolution,
something had clicked in my brain which shook me like a mental
explosion .... The whole universe [fell] into pattern like the stray
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle assembled by magic at one stroke. There [was]
now an answer to every question, doubts and conflicts [were] a matter
of the tortured past."
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Convert as Social Type
This process is similarly represented in the talk and reasoning of
Nichiren Shoshu converts. Consider, for example, the following
statements:
Male, white, married, 28: If you think a woman
has no fortune or a certain man has no fortune, who do
we blame? We look outside and say it's society's fault, or
the woman says it's man's fault. The black man says his
condition is the white man's fault. Russia says it is America's
fault, and we say it's Russia's fault. Somebody at
work told me about a TV program on the correctional
system in California. The criminals say that they've been
in jail too long and that this system doesn't work. So they
blame the system for their problems. In other words,
it's always someone else's fault-the system's fault, the
country's fault, the environment's fault, the spouse's
fault. Actually, the only one or thing at fault is ourself.
Male, black, single, 25: My karma used to be really
bad. It was apparent to most everyone but me. I bounced
from one job to another and was really irresponsible.
Only I didn't know it then. It was always somebody else's
fault, or at least I thought so. It is only recently that I
have come to realize that I was having these problems
because of me. There is no blaming others now.
Apart from illustrating the extent to which conversion involves
a sharpening and generalizing of a single causal scheme, these statements
suggest that the process is frequently accompanied by a shift in
causal locus. Whereas many Nichiren Shoshu converts previously
attributed blame for their preconversion problems to other individuals
or to some structural arrangement, they now internalize causality and
avow personal responsibility. The following testimony of a twentyyear-old
Nichiren Shoshu convert further illustrates this switch:
"Before joining Nichiren Shoshu I blamed any problems I had on
other people or on the environment. It was always my parents, or the
school, or society. But through chanting I discovered the real source of
my difficulties: myself. Chanting has helped me to realize that rather
than running around blaming others, I am the one who needs to
change."
Inspection of the attributional talk of converts to other movements
suggests that a switch in causal locus is probably a frequent
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concomitant of conversion in general. As a well-known television personality
explained when discussing her involvement in est (Erhard
Seminar Training): "I took est training and ... it helped me in terms
of accepting responsibility. I used to spend a lot of time assigning fault
to other people. There is no fault. I'm responsible."
These illustrations have been drawn from the talk of converts to
religious and personal growth movements. In each case the shift in
causal locus has been in the direction of internalizing blame and
responsibility. Since personal transformation constitutes either the
primary goal or the major means of changing the world for most
religious and personal growth movements, effecting a shift from an
external to an internal locus of control seems to be a necessary step in
conversion to such groups. Certainly in the case of such groups as
Nichiren Shoshu and Transcendental Meditation, chanting makes no
sense until such a shift is made. But a shift in the perceived locus of
causality is not unique to religious and personal growth movements. It
is also frequently a constituent element of conversion to movements
that seek change by directly altering sociopolitical structures. In the
case of politically oriented groups, however, the shift involves a change
from an internal to an external locus of control-that is, from selfblaming
to structural-blaming, from victim-blaming to systemblaming.
The importance of this switch in relation to political action
is well documented in the annals of movements for sociopolitical
change. In discussing the unemployed workers'movement of the 1930s,
Piven and Cloward (1979, p. 49) emphasize that people did not begin to
demand relief until they realized that "it wasn't they who were to
blame, but 'the system."' Along similar lines, Morrison and Steeves's
(1967, p. 427) study of the differences between National FarmOrganization
(NFO) members and nonparticipating midwestern farmers
revealed that fewer NFO members regarded"their difficulties and those
of other farmers as due to individual inadequacies of effort, talent, or
resources .... Fewer NFO members blame themselves for their difficulties,
and more blame certain featuresof the farm marketing system ....
And just as structural blame rather than self-blame characterizes NFO
members, hope in an organizational structure designed to bring
changes in the features of the larger system perceived as faulty, rather
than self-hope, is their trademark."
Students of the feminist movement have similarly noted that the
mobilization of women has been contingent on the realization that
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their grievances and problems are not personal and idiosyncratic but
systemic and thus political (Deckard, 1979,p. 460). Changing the locus
of blame is one of the main functions of women's consciousnessraising
groups. The primary purpose of such groups, as Bird (1969,
p. 216) has noted, is to get women "to recognize the political nature of
complaints that are conventionally dismissed as personal."
In emphasizing that mobilization for political action frequently
involves a shift in attributional orientation, we do not mean to imply
that participants in politically oriented movements necessarily have
undergone conversion. We would, however, argue that when conversion
does occur, whether the universe of discourse is religious or secular,
it not only involves the adoption of a masterattribution scheme but
may involve a switch in causal locus as well. Hence converts reinterpret
their past by redefining some aspects of it as problematic, but they also
come to discover the "correct" source of blame for these recently
acquired or more acutely defined troubles.
Suspension of Analogical Reasoning. To understand the third
formal property of conversion, we must first consider the logic of metaphor.
A metaphor is a way of describing something in termsof something
else. It "involves a transfer (metaphora: carrying over) of one
term from one level of meaning to another" (Brown, 1977, p. 80). It is
literally an inappropriate application of a concept to a domain. The
unfamiliar is made familiar in terms of the already familiar. Since
metaphors are fundamental linguistic tools for constructing reality and
communicating experience, it is reasonable to expect that metaphor
would occupy a prominent position in the talk of converts. Our observations
suggest, however, that converts rely only sparingly on metaphorical
reasoning. While they may employ iconic metaphors, they
typically suspend use of analogical metaphors when talking about
their beliefs and practices.
Analogical metaphors demonstrate the ways in which one thing
is like another; iconic metaphors portray the uniqueness of a thing. In
Brown's words (1977, p. 115), iconic metaphors "picture what things
are, rather than how things are alike." Recent Christianity, for example,
has embraced as its favorite iconic metaphor "God is love." Similarly,
the iconic metaphor "born again" has become a cliche in the
evangelical movement. Converts have no aversion to this kind of metaphor.
Using iconic metaphors can establish the uniqueness of the
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group or its world view. Analogical metaphors, on the other hand, are
resisted because they violate the convert's position that his or her world
view is incomparable to other world views.
If iconic metaphor affirms the authenticity and sacredness of
conversion, analogical metaphor threatens to invalidate and profane
it.7 Consider the following example of a Nichiren Shoshu recruit's use
of analogical metaphor to understand the movement's recruitment
practice referredto as Shakubuku: "Doing Shakubuku as a follower of
Nichiren Shoshu is just like witnessing as a follower of Jesus Christ.
Shakubuku is just like proselytizing; it's just another word for what the
Hare Krishna and Jesus people do in the streets." Upon hearing this, a
Nichiren Shoshu convert of severalyears turned around and exclaimed:
"Shakubuku and proselytizing aren't the same! Shakubuku is to tell
somebody about Nam-Myoho-Renge-Kyo! It is a great act of mercy and
compassion, whereas to proselytize is to put pressure on people and
force them to come to meetings. The two aren't the same." By denying
the validity of the novice's analogy, the convert laid claim to a certain
incomparability regarding Nichiren Shoshu. She asserted the uniqueness
of Shakubuku. A social scientist might be quick to point out the
functional equivalence between Shakubuku and witnessing. A convert
denies precisely this "carrying over" of the term proselytizing from
other religious contexts to that of Nichiren Shoshu. It is thus that
converts suspend analogical reasoning when describing their world
view.
The suspension of analogical reasoning repeatedly manifests
itself in the talk of Nichiren Shoshu converts. Just as converts to other
contemporary religious movements claim that theirs is the One Way,
so Nichiren Shoshu converts insist that only they have The Answer to
enlightenment, peace, and happiness. As one member proclaimed,
"Nichiren Shoshu is unlike any other group in American society. Only
Nichiren Shoshu has the means to change the world." Similarly,
Nichiren Shoshu converts assert the incomparability of the movement's
leadership. Consider these comments extracted from the senior
author's field notes:
While talking with a middle-level leader following
a chanting-conversion meeting, the topic turned to
Daisaki Ikeda, the movement's formal president and
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inspirational leader or "Master," as members refer to
him. Having observed and experienced the highly emotional
response Ikeda's presence elicits from members, I
indicated that he struck me as being a charismatic individual.
In response, the middle-level leader with whom I
was speaking bristled and emphatically stated that
"Ikeda is not a charismatic individual. President Kennedy
and Martin Luther King were charismatic, but President
Ikeda is not. He is an extraordinary man, but he is
not like other major figures and leaders. You can't compare
President Ikeda with them. He's unique."
Sociologically, the suspension of analogical reasoning by convertsshould
come as no surprise. Durkheim ([1915], 1965)has provided
a powerful clue for understanding this property of conversion. For
Durkheim it is nothing less than the radical distinction between the
sacred and profane that defines religion. The sacred is both logically
and emotionally antithetical to the profane. The sacred is, in Otto's
(1973) words, "the wholly other." It does not admit comparison to the
profane; it is ineffable. The sacred is possessed of a uniqueness that
defies all efforts at comparison to the profane. It is literally unknowable
and inaccessible in terms of the profane. This helps explain the
convert's resistance to analogical comparison between his or her religion
and others. For the convert, other meaning systems reside in the
realm of the profane. Therefore, "carrying over" the particular from
another (profane) meaning system in order to explain the particulars of
his or her (sacred) meaning system would be unthinkable. As such,
relying on analogy to other religions to explain one's own conversion
is more than merely inaccurate and imperfect communication. Rather,
it is an affront to the sacred itself. Analogical metaphor is transformed
from a linguistic convenience to utter profanation.
Suspending analogical reasoning thus allows converts to assign
incomparable value to their world view. By removing other belief
systems from the status of eligible competition, a virtually impermeable
boundary is established around the convert's world view. The convert's
sacred commodity is thereby exempted from the pressures of the free
market. Thus the convert is protected from the profaning effects of
analogical comparison.
Embracement of a Master Role. The final property of conversion,
discernible in both the behavior and the rhetoric of converts, is
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constituted by the generalization, ratherthan compartmentalization, of
the convert role and its embracement by the convert. Role compartmentalization
has long been regarded as part and parcel of modernity
(Durkheim [1893], 1964), functional rationality (Mannheim, 1940),and
bureaucratization (Weber, 1947). Nevertheless, not all roles are compartmentalized
or situation-specific. Hughes's (1945) distinction between
master and subordinate statuses suggests that some of our
statuses are more central than others both to our behavior and to the
way we view ourselves and the way others view us. Banton's (1965)
threefold classification of roles based on their differentiation and generality
similarly suggests that basic roles determine the allocation and
performance of other roles in a wide range of situations. Our observations
indicate that the convert role functions in a similar manner but
with several crucial distinctions. First, whereas the assumption of a
basic role or master status is typically a function of ascription (Banton,
1965), altercasting (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1963), or labeling
(Becker, 1963), the convert role is typically volitional and achieved.
A second and perhaps more significant difference is that the
convert role, unlike most master statuses or basic roles, comprises a
kind of representative role. While Parsons (1951, p. 100), who coined
the term representative role, restricts its usage to leadership roles having
to do with affairs external to the collectivity, any group or movement
role that leads one to act as a functionary in extragroup activities
and relations can be called a representative role. Drawing on this
concept in his discussion of ideology and conflict, Coser (1956,
pp. 113-114) notes that "in the Marxian labor movement ... any active
member, whether or not he had a leadership role in the organization,
was expected 'to represent' the movement to the outside world." In a
similar vein, all Nichiren Shoshu members are expected to act at all
times, in the words of one member, as "representatives of the movement,
as ambassadors of President Ikeda." They are constantly
instructed by their leadersand the movement's newspaper that in whatever
they do, collectively or individually, whether in the context of
family, work, school, or leisure, it is to be done with the interests of the
movement in mind. As a major leader explained before a gathering of
over five thousand members: "The relationship of NSA to the other
people in society with whom we work, live, and meet every day is very
important. We should keep in mind that how we live our daily life is
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an exact image of the entire movement. We should become people of
whom others will say, 'The members of NSA are really great.' To do
that is to advance our cause. Therefore, in everyaction you make and in
every activity you participate, you can be carrying out the movement's
mission."
To be sure, not all religions, causes, or movements are as
"greedy" (Coser, 1967) as Nichiren Shoshu; nor do all members act in
accordance with such demanding expectations and directives. But some
movement members appear to consider their group's interests and
expectations in the construction of their lines of action in nearly all
extragroup activities and domains of life. But unlike many incumbents
of traditional representative roles, converts do not view themselves as
mere functionaries whose commitment is based primarily on instrumental
or extraneous considerations (Becker, 1960).Instead the convert
fully embraces the convert role.8 Not only do converts introject and see
themselves in terms of the convert role, but it governs their orientation
in all situations. Daily activities and routines that were formerly taken
for granted or interpreted from the standpoint of various situationally
specific roles are now interpreted from the standpoint of the convert
role, which is seen as the embodiment of the movement's interests and
mission. Hence the convert does not act merely in termsof self-interest
but in the interest of the cause or mission. Daily routines are infused
with new meaning and added significance. As a Nichiren Shoshu convert,
who aspired to be a nationally ranked tennis player, explained:
"Before I started to chant, I had no concrete purpose in playing tennis.
I used to think of all the troubles other people had and tennis seemed
like a joke. But at those last two tennis tournaments I felt like I was
playing for world peace." In a similar vein, a born-again Christian
who turned down a $400,000 professional basketball contract in favor
of playing for Athletes in Action, the athletic arm of Campus Crusade
for Christ, recounts: "As I stand at midcourt during halftime at the AIA
games, giving my personal testimony to God's love, my heart swells
with the joy of being a Christian.... Most people spend their lives
investing for retirement. I spend mine investing for eternity."
A third distinction between the convert role as a master status
and traditional master statuses, such as race and sex, is that converts
enthusiastically announce their identity in nearly all situations. In fact,
the convert seldom lets others forget this role identity during the course
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of interaction. It is worn like a uniform and is continuously on display
(sometimes literally as in the case of Krishna devotees and sometimes
figuratively as in the case of converts to Nichiren Shoshu and Christianity).
Perhaps this is another reason why conversation with a convert
is often a halting and exasperating affair. As the parents of a
convert to a Jesus commune lamented when discussing their relationship
to their daughter: "It is not so much the fact that she has become
what some people call a Jesus freak that bothers us. At least she's not
into drugs or some crazypolitical group. What is bothersome, though,
is that when we see each other we can't just sit down and talk without
everything being related to Jesus or her communal brothers and sisters."
Or as the parents of a Nichiren Shoshu convert similarly noted:
"In many ways [our son] is more pleasant to be around since he joined
Nichiren Shoshu. He smiles more and he is not so argumentative. But
he has this irritating habit of relating just about everything we say or
do to karma or chanting."
Finally, embracement of the convert role gives rise to what Travisano
(1970, p. 605) calls the ubiquitous utilization of the identity
associated with the convert role. Metaphorically, it is not merely a
mask that is taken off or put on according to the situation. Rather, it is
central to nearly all situations. For the convert, such role identities as
father, mother, brother, sister, student, and so on pale in comparison to
the role identity of the convert. That is because, to paraphrase Hughes
(1945), all role identities are subordinate to the identity that flows from
the master role of the convert.
Summary and Conclusions
At least since the time of Simmel, the identification of social
types has been regarded as an important objective of sociological analysis.
In keeping with this tradition, we have denoted the convert as a
social type. Identifying the convert as a social type helps to refine
current conceptualizations of conversion, most of which designate little
more than a radical personal change. The precise nature of that
change is rarely specified. We argue that the change pertains to the
universe of discourse. Furthermore, we have identified and described
four properties of conversion observable in the talk and reasoning of
converts: biographical reconstruction, adoption of a master attribution
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scheme, suspension of analogical reasoning, and embracement of a
master role. The display of these rhetorical properties indicates the
displacement of one universe of discourse by another. The convert is
thereby discernible by his or her talk and reasoning.
Several theoretical and methodological implications are suggested
by our analysis. First, it suggests that conversion is best conceptualized
as the process by which a new or formerly peripheral universe
of discourse comes to inform all aspects of a person's life. In short, it
involves the ascendance of a universe of discourse to the status of a
primary authority. The universe of discourse need not be new but can
shift from periphery to center. In the case of religion, for example,
conversion need not be restricted to acknowledging only religious
migration (the Orthodox Jew becomes a fundamentalist Christian) or
the sounding of a religious chord among the previously unreligious
(Madelyn MurrayO'Hair's son is born again). Moreover, the backslider
or prodigal son who reaffirmscommitment to a religion from which he
strayed can qualify as a convert. Similarly, the citizen of a community
of faith may come by a radical redefinition of how God works and
apprehend an old and familiar religious belief with a new intensity and
clarity of vision. Nominal belief thus becomes True Belief. What was
peripheral to consciousness now becomes central.
Second, in arguing that this transformation of consciousness is
indicated by the talk and reasoning of those who experience it, our
analysis provides the researcherwith empirical guidelines for locating
the convert. To identify with confidence a transformation of consciousness
is an elusive matter indeed. It is in this regardthat a focus on
language becomes invaluable. Inasmuch as language is practical consciousness,
it stands to reason that transformations of consciousness
necessitate transformations of language. Thus, by noting the presence
of the four rhetorical features discussed here, we mark the occasion of
conversion. It is thereby no longer incumbent on the researcher to
guess who has undergone the consciousness transformation that typifies
him or her as a convert.
Third, our analysis refines the distinction between converts and
other members. While a few scholars such as Nock (1933) have emphasized
that adhesion to a religious group is no guarantee of conversion,
rarely have such distinctions been noted or pursued. Following Nock,
we argue that membership avowal, actual membership status, and par-
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ticipation are inadequate indicators of conversion. Instead, our observations
suggest that it is the rhetoric of converts that sets them apart
from fellow group members. It is their talk and reasoning that is symptomatic
of the consciousness transformation that makes them unique
among their peers.
Fourth, our observations raise serious questions about much of
the research concerned with the causes of conversion. The bulk of this
work has relied largely on converts themselves for data. If conversion is
the process through which a universe of discourse comes to function as
a primary authority, and if biographical reconstruction is a crucial
feature of this process, then converts' accounts of their life and motivation
prior to conversion become immediately suspect. Since observations
about the past are always refracted by the prism of one's universe
of discourse, a change in universe of discourse provides a different
vantage point from which to view one's life. Thus the medium through
which the convert's retrospective vision passes is far from transparent.
Rather, it is colored by the spectrum of understandings and meanings
that attend conversion. Far from being trusted sources of information
about their past, converts are uniquely denied impartial knowledge
about the factors that might have precipitated conversion. Hence studies
that rely only on converts as sources of background information
about conversion are faced with the peculiar paradox of being unable
to explain a phenomenon because of a fundamental characteristic of
the phenomenon itself.
Finally, we suggest that this portrayal of the convert as a social
type is by no means restricted to religion. It is neither institutional
context nor ideological content that denotes the convert as a social
type. Some of the examples of conversion presented in this essay
pertain to politics; others could be found, with equal justification,
in the social realms of occupation, psychotherapy, and life-style. It
is the form, not the content, of claims to truth that betrays the convert
as a social type.
Notes
1. Nichiren Shoshu of America (NSA) is a noncommunal,
proselytizing Buddhist movement that seeks to change the world by
changing individuals. It was introduced into the United States in 1960
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as a foreign extension of Sokagakkai-a Japanese Buddhist movement
that emerged as a significant religious and political force in postWorld
War II Japan. At the time of its establishment in 1960, NSA
claimed fewer than five hundred followers, nearly all of whom were
Japanese brides of American G.I.s. By 1975 the movement claimed
more than 200,000 variously committed adherents, over 90 percent of
whom are Occidental and most of whom have joined since 1966. For a
detailed examination of the movement's ideology, goals, and operation
in America, see Snow (1976, 1979).
2. The role of participant observer demanded the devotion of
considerable time and energy to the movement-receiving daily phone
calls (at all hours) from members, attending meetings on the average of
three nights per week for over a year, accompanying members on
recruiting missions in public places, visiting other members in their
homes, even giving "an experience" (testimony) when called upon
during recruitment/conversion meetings. Although the senior author
attempted to be as honest as possible about his sociological identity,
neither this identity nor the purposes of the research were announced
in every situation. The senior author's association with the movement
was thus participatory and intense, and overt and covert, at one and the
same time. For further discussion of this research, see Snow (1976,
pp. 1-38; 1979).
3. Nock (1933, pp. 6-7) coined the term adhesion to denote participation
in religious group activities and rituals without taking a
new way of life. Unlike conversion, adhesion is characterized not by a
crossing of religious frontiers but by "having a foot on each side of the
fence." Adhesion involves an acceptance of new worships as "useful
supplements and not as substitutes."
4. Demonstration events may function even more importantly
as commitment-building activities (Gerlach and Hine, 1970; Kanter,
1972;Shaffir, 1978;Toch, 1965).A public profession of faith, for example,
brings into play powerful social forces that help anchor the individual's
identities and overall self-conception in the group. As Turner
and Killian (1972, p. 33) have noted in this regard: "When the individual
goes on record in support of a movement, he becomes committed
because persons around him are inclined to treat him as an adherent
and to expect continued adherence from him."
5. Gordon (1974, pp. 165-166) refersto these less radical types of
identity change as alteration and consolidation. Thus we have Berger
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and Luckmann (1967, pp. 157-158) proposing alternation in lieu of
conversion; Travisano (1970) contrasting alternation and conversion;
and Gordon distinguishing alternation (conversion) from alteration
and consolidation. One is left wondering if, as Berger (1967, p. 177)
once observed, definitions can amount to more than matters of taste.
6. Travisano (1970) too employs the concept of a universe of
discourse in his thoughtful discussion of conversion. He found that
concept to be useful because it "emphasizes that meanings are established
and exist in symbolic interaction" (pp. 594-595). Mead's expression
appeals to us for a different reason. It is less the symbolic
interactionist qualities of the term and more the concern with language
that makes it attractive for our purposes. For much the same reason, we
prefer the concept of a universe of discourse over similar terms such as
meaning system (Berger, 1963, 1967), informing point of view (Burke,
1965), and sacred cosmos (Luckmann, 1967).
7. We do not mean to suggest that some converts never employ
analogical metaphors. Close inspection reveals, however, that occasional
reliance by converts on analogical metaphor finds them avoiding
other meaning systems (particularly if institutionalized) as the
points of analogical reference. Rather, naturalistic phenomena such as
a birth, panoramic views, and explosions are the points of comparison.
Physical sensations such as sudden warmth, a sense of energy, or the
perception of sudden illumination are frequently used in analogical
comparison. In most instances, naturalistic phenomena and physical
sensations are not serious competitors of religious meaning systems.
8. "To embrace a role is to disappear completely into the virtual
self available in the situation, to be fully seen in terms of the image,
and to confirm expressively one's acceptance of it" (Goffman, 1961,
p. 106).
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