Department of Geological Sciences, Faculty of Sciences
Masaryk University/Brno & Czech Geological Society
September 12-14, 2011
Short Course on Geological HazardsShort Course on Geological Hazards
Day 2Day 2 (Tue PM)(Tue PM), Lecture 4, Lecture 4::
(Topic 4 of Original Announcement)
PSHA forPSHA for Critical FacilitiesCritical Facilities: NPP and NHLW-: NPP and NHLWDGR,
with ExamplesDGR, with Examples
from Japan,from Japan, ENAM (US & CA SCR), CZENAM (US & CA SCR), CZ
Klaus H. JacobKlaus H. Jacob
Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory
of Columbia University, NY
jacob@ldeo.columbia.edu
Fukushima NPP Site, JapanFukushima NPP Site, Japan
20012001
20092009
Public Concern Rekindled since the Japan M9.0 Earthquake:Public Concern Rekindled since the Japan M9.0 Earthquake:
• Is the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Safe from Earthquakes?
• Should Licenses be extended for another 20 years?
• Should both reactors perhaps be shut down now?
Sykes et al., 2008
Indian Point NPP Site isIndian Point NPP Site is located 50kmlocated 50km N of Manhattan, NYC.N of Manhattan, NYC.
TheThe IP Issues:IP Issues:
1. The original 40-yr licenses of IP NPP Units #2 & 3 run out in 2013
and 2015, respectively.
2. Both units were built in the 1960s-70s with Western US ground
motion design spectra underestimating the high-frequency
content of EUS earthquake ground shaking.
3. Using USGS Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessments based
on modern Eastern US (high frequency) Ground Motion
Relations; and combined with Industry’s own Fragility
Assessments of the reactors, the US NRC determined the
earthquake-induced CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY (CDF) to be
~10-4/yr, which is the HIGHEST among all 104 NPPs in the US!
4. The lowest critical elevations of control systems are at
elevations of at most 3.3-5.0m. What is the related risk from
Hurricane storm surges or rare large Atlantic Tsunamis?
5. US NRC made the administrative decision, that new seismic
information will not be allowed for license extension decisions
(nor terrorism or other external events, hurricanes, surges, etc.).
Only “Ageing” of the plants and usage of cooling water from the
Hudson and related environmental effects can be considered.
Independent
Emergency
Experts
Evaluated the
IP - NPP
Evacuation
Plans and
found them
virtually
impossible to
be
implemented
(former FEMA
Director James
Lee Witt)
Original Design
Base Equ.
Spectrum
anchored at
PGA=0.15g
~1998 IPEEE
Spectra
SSE
5%
OBE
5%
NYCDoT
USGS UHS
2% in 50y
Note:Note: This Table is not for the IP NPP but for similar LWR NPP, except that E-W and N-S need to be interchanged for IP NPP.
CAT1=12.3ftCAT1=12.3ft
(4m)(4m);;
CAT2=18.1ftCAT2=18.1ft
(6m);(6m);
CAT3=24.9ftCAT3=24.9ft
(8m)(8m);;
CAT4=31.3CAT4=31.3
ft (10m).ft (10m).
CAT1=7.80ftCAT1=7.80ft
(2.6m);(2.6m);
CAT2=11.8 ftCAT2=11.8 ft
(4m);(4m);
CAT3=16.6 ftCAT3=16.6 ft
(5.5m);(5.5m);
CAT4=22.7 ftCAT4=22.7 ft
(7.5m)(7.5m)
CAT1=2.00ftCAT1=2.00ft
(0.66m);(0.66m);
CAT2=6.6 ftCAT2=6.6 ft
(2.1m);(2.1m);
CAT3=7.8ftCAT3=7.8ft
(2.6m);(2.6m);
CAT4=13.7 ftCAT4=13.7 ft
(4.6m)(4.6m)
Submarine Landslides
cause Tsunamis,
e.g.1929 Grand Banks
Earthquake ~M7
Hurricanes Produce
Coastal Storm Surges.
The Surge moves up
the Hudson River with
about the same speed
[ V=(gh)-1/2
] as the
tides do, i.e. ≥ 17m/h
Indian Point NPP
N
Conclusions from NPP examples:Conclusions from NPP examples:
1.1. Hazard Assessments for Critical Structures mustHazard Assessments for Critical Structures must
strive for the Longest Possible Records to catchstrive for the Longest Possible Records to catch
Low-Probability / High-Consequence Events (thatLow-Probability / High-Consequence Events (that
make up themake up the ““TailsTails”” of Probability Distributions).of Probability Distributions).
2.2. Systematic Monitoring of New Geo-ScienceSystematic Monitoring of New Geo-Science
Findings that can be Relevant to Updating DisasterFindings that can be Relevant to Updating Disaster
Hazards and Risks Is an Essential GovernmentHazards and Risks Is an Essential Government
FunctionFunction
3.3. Decision Makers and Regulators need to haveDecision Makers and Regulators need to have
Protocols in Place, and Prudently Exercise them, toProtocols in Place, and Prudently Exercise them, to
Incorporate these New Findings in a Timely,Incorporate these New Findings in a Timely,
Socially Responsible, and Effective WaySocially Responsible, and Effective Way
GI-199: Implications of Updated
Seismic Hazard Estimates
!!!! North AnnaNorth Anna NPP ca. 20km fromNPP ca. 20km from
recent Aug 2011 M5.8recent Aug 2011 M5.8 Virginia Equ.Virginia Equ.
GI-199: Implications of Updated
Seismic Hazard Estimates
IPEEE-Cumulative SCDF,
Using highest reported SCDF
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.0E-07 1.0E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-04 1.0E-03
Mean Annual SCDF
CumulativeFractionofPlants
SCDF
SCDF =SCDF = SSeismic (Nuclear Reactor-)eismic (Nuclear Reactor-) CCore-ore-DDamageamage FFrequencyrequency
Low PLow P
(Safe)(Safe)
High PHigh P
(Risky)(Risky)
All CEUSAll CEUS NPPsNPPs
Target: <10Target: <10-4-4/y = 1 in/y = 1 in
10,000 per year ??10,000 per year ??
Higher Seismic
Hazard
Higher Seismic CDF
Lower Seismic
Margins
Higher Seismic
Response Uncertainty
1
2
2 2
Hazard Data IPEEE Data
Risk
Assessment
Priority - Identify
& Assess Plants
in 1, then Plants
in 2
Shade Gradients
Imply Uncertainty
Industry Comments
With Regard to Limit of 25 Hz for
Structure Model Adequacy Used for
Development of ISRS
Industry/NRC Meeting
February 13, 2007
Robert P. Kennedy
Based on the Industry white paper and the
sample evaluations performed by
Westinghouse, the Industry position is that
spectral accelerations at frequencies in
excess of 25 Hz are of consequence only for
high frequency (HF) sensitive components
Structure Model Adequacy
• The industry position is that standard structural modeling
has sufficient refinement to generate accurate ISRS up to
at least 25 Hz
• ISRS would be generated beyond the 25 Hz limit (up to
100 Hz) but the computed values might be less accurate
• Thus, the concept of screening of HF sensitive equipment
by test input motions with 25-50 Hz content was proposed
• The 50 Hz upper limit was intended to be a filter where the
amplitudes begin to decrease as a function of frequency
Refined Structural Models
• An alternate approach is to develop highly refined
structural models that can generate ISRS with
accuracy up to 50 Hz or greater
• These ISRS can then be used as a Test Response
Spectrum (TRS) for supplementary testing of HF
sensitive equipment
High Frequency SensitiveHigh Frequency Sensitive
Mechanical & ElectricalMechanical & Electrical
Equipment/ComponentsEquipment/Components
Issue 1:Issue 1: Selection of 50 Hz as an acceptable upper limit for the HFSelection of 50 Hz as an acceptable upper limit for the HF
screening evaluation.screening evaluation.
Staff Guidance:Staff Guidance: The concept of using a set number as an exampleThe concept of using a set number as an example
in industry guidance is acceptable from a generic standpoint.in industry guidance is acceptable from a generic standpoint.
However, if the generic limit is used in an application, it will haveHowever, if the generic limit is used in an application, it will have
to be justified for the specific design in the DCD or a topical report.to be justified for the specific design in the DCD or a topical report.
High Frequency SensitiveHigh Frequency Sensitive
Mechanical & ElectricalMechanical & Electrical
Equipment/ComponentsEquipment/Components
Issue 2:Issue 2: Screening process to identify high frequency sensitiveScreening process to identify high frequency sensitive
equipment/components, and use of existing test data.equipment/components, and use of existing test data.
Staff Guidance:Staff Guidance: The applicantThe applicant’’s procedure is expected to clearlys procedure is expected to clearly
identify the basis and criteria for screening in a manner such thatidentify the basis and criteria for screening in a manner such that
the basis for screened-in or screened-out equipment/componentsthe basis for screened-in or screened-out equipment/components
is documented and the process repeatable.is documented and the process repeatable.
High Frequency SensitiveHigh Frequency Sensitive
Mechanical & ElectricalMechanical & Electrical
Equipment/ComponentsEquipment/Components
To allow use of existing test data, industry hasTo allow use of existing test data, industry has
to demonstrate that proper frequencyto demonstrate that proper frequency
contents with sufficient energy were used forcontents with sufficient energy were used for
the input to shake table testing.the input to shake table testing.
High Frequency SensitiveHigh Frequency Sensitive
Mechanical & ElectricalMechanical & Electrical
Equipment/ComponentsEquipment/Components
Issue 3:Issue 3: Generic tests of 5 g and 15 gGeneric tests of 5 g and 15 g
spectral accelerations between 25 Hz and 50spectral accelerations between 25 Hz and 50
Hz to demonstrate performance of high-Hz to demonstrate performance of highfrequency
sensitive equipment/components.frequency sensitive equipment/components.
High Frequency SensitiveHigh Frequency Sensitive
Mechanical & ElectricalMechanical & Electrical
Equipment/ComponentsEquipment/Components
Staff Guidance:Staff Guidance: The applicability of genericThe applicability of generic
testing will have to be justified based ontesting will have to be justified based on
design-specific considerations, ensuringdesign-specific considerations, ensuring
adequate consideration of in-structureadequate consideration of in-structure
response or in-cabinet responseresponse or in-cabinet response
amplifications, and that the test responseamplifications, and that the test response
spectra envelop the required response spectraspectra envelop the required response spectra
at the specific locations of theat the specific locations of the
equipment/components.equipment/components.
Questions?
4a NPPs
SHA Issues for Spent/UsedNuclear
Fuel /
HL-Waste
Deep Geological Repositories
Sample Guideline:
Draft of “Road Map” prepared in 2010 for the NWMA of
Canada
1. Site Feasibility Study ~1 to 2y
2. Detailed Site
Characterization ~5y
3. DGR Design &
Construction ~10y
4. DGR Operation ~30 - 100y
5. Post-Closure
Monitoring from 100y to 105y
Return to Natural State
• Seismic Hazard Assessment Methodology
• Seismicity and its Stationarity in Time and
Space
• Global Seismicity Analogues
• Mmin, Mmax
• Earthquake-Depth Distributions
• Seismic Monitoring - Locally / Regionally
• Ground Motion Prediction Equation Updates
• Groundmotion High-Frequency Limits &
Depth Dependence
• Monitoring of Crustal Deformation (GPS)
• Triggered and Induced Earthquakes
• Glaciations: Loads, Stresses, Fluid Flow,
Pore Pressure, Earthquake Trigger Criteria
• DGR Seismic Near-Field Effects (Pore
Pressure,Temperature, Effective Stress)
• Long-term Rock Properties and Cumulative
Aging Effects)
• Others ….
• New and Unforeseen Topics
SEISMIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR USED NUCLEAR FUEL DGRSEISMIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR USED NUCLEAR FUEL DGR
Stages, Data Needs and ActivitiesStages, Data Needs and Activities
DATA NEEDS AND ACTIVITIESASSESSMENT PHASES
NWMA CA: TechnicalNWMA CA: Technical Sequemce & Steps for SHASequemce & Steps for SHA
•• Geologic History and Tectonic SettingGeologic History and Tectonic Setting
•• Seismic Environment and Quantification of SeismicitySeismic Environment and Quantification of Seismicity
•• Choice of Ground Motion Prediction Equations (GMPE)Choice of Ground Motion Prediction Equations (GMPE)
•• PSHA Computations, Hazard Curves, Uncertainty TreatmentPSHA Computations, Hazard Curves, Uncertainty Treatment
•• Uniform Hazard Spectra => Design SpectraUniform Hazard Spectra => Design Spectra
•• Sensitivity StudiesSensitivity Studies
•• Deaggregation of Seismic Hazard for M, d,Deaggregation of Seismic Hazard for M, d, εε
•• Hazard-Consistent Time-Domain Ground Motion RecordsHazard-Consistent Time-Domain Ground Motion Records
•• Ground Motion Linearity and Capping IssuesGround Motion Linearity and Capping Issues
•• Faulting HazardFaulting Hazard
NWMA Canada: Data and Research Needs:NWMA Canada: Data and Research Needs:
• SHA Methodology (Adjust for Below-Ground Conditions & Tr ≥ 100,000 yr)
• Seismicity and its Stationarity in Time and Space
• Global Seismic Analogues (Replace Sampling Time by Space)
• Mmin, Mmax
• Earthquake Depth Distributions
• Seismic Monitoring: Locally/Regionally
• GMPE Updates and Adjustments to Below-Ground.
• GM High-Frequency Limits and Depth Dependence
• Monitoring of Crustal Deformations - GPS
• Triggered & Induced Earthquakes
• Glaciations: Loads, Stresses, Fluid Flow, Pore Pressure, Eq. Trigger Criteria.
• DGR Seismic Near-Field Effects: Pore Pr., Temperat., Effective Stress
• Long-term Rock Properties & Non-linear, Cumulative Ageing Effects
• Others ..........
• Allow for New & Unforeseen Ones
•
There will be 5 StagesThere will be 5 Stages during which SHA needs to be conducted:during which SHA needs to be conducted:
1.1. Site Feasibility EvaluationSite Feasibility Evaluation
2.2. Detailed Site CharacterizationDetailed Site Characterization
3.3. Design and Construction PhaseDesign and Construction Phase
4.4. UNF DGR Operational PhaseUNF DGR Operational Phase
5.5. Post-Closure Monitoring PhasePost-Closure Monitoring Phase
During all 5 Phases the following SHA Tasks need to be identified:During all 5 Phases the following SHA Tasks need to be identified:
•• ObjectivesObjectives
•• Process & expected productsProcess & expected products to achieve the objectivesto achieve the objectives
•• Monitoring, data and information collection activitiesMonitoring, data and information collection activities
CZ: Seven Potential Target SitesCZ: Seven Potential Target Sites
Considered for further StudyConsidered for further Study to Assess their Geological Suitability as a DGRto Assess their Geological Suitability as a DGR
Potential SHA Issues for CzechPotential SHA Issues for Czech NPPsNPPs::
1.1. Is PSHA Methodology being considered in CZ and/orIs PSHA Methodology being considered in CZ and/or
EU?EU? (It was in CH, but CH will phase out its NPP(It was in CH, but CH will phase out its NPP
operations as per recent post-Fukushima decisions)operations as per recent post-Fukushima decisions)
2.2. Are the data needed for a PSHA available for CZ?Are the data needed for a PSHA available for CZ?
3.3. Are the seismic vulnerabilities (fragilities) of currentAre the seismic vulnerabilities (fragilities) of current
VVER reactors, and of future designs, sufficiently wellVVER reactors, and of future designs, sufficiently well
understood to allow a seismic CDF to be determinedunderstood to allow a seismic CDF to be determined
with reasonable confidence?with reasonable confidence?
4.4. If not, what Program and Time is needed to collectIf not, what Program and Time is needed to collect
such data?such data?
5.5. Is the Time Frame for collecting the needed dataIs the Time Frame for collecting the needed data
consistent with renewing the Czech NPP fleet?consistent with renewing the Czech NPP fleet?
6.6. Are the communities near the target sites forAre the communities near the target sites for DGRsDGRs
involved in planning and decision making?involved in planning and decision making?
Potential SHA Issues for Czech HLNWPotential SHA Issues for Czech HLNW DGRsDGRs::
1.1. Is PSHA Methodology being considered in CZ and/or EU?Is PSHA Methodology being considered in CZ and/or EU? (Yes(Yes
in CH, but CH will phase out its NPP operations as per recentin CH, but CH will phase out its NPP operations as per recent
post-Fukushima decisions)post-Fukushima decisions)
2.2. Are the data needed for a PSHA available for CZ DGR sites?Are the data needed for a PSHA available for CZ DGR sites?
3.3. If not, what Program and Time is needed to collect such data?If not, what Program and Time is needed to collect such data?
4.4. Is the Time Frame for collecting the needed data consistent withIs the Time Frame for collecting the needed data consistent with
the anticipated schedule for establishing one or more Czechthe anticipated schedule for establishing one or more Czech
DGRsDGRs to accommodate the spent-fuel-HLNW currently storedto accommodate the spent-fuel-HLNW currently stored
(and more accumulating in the future) mostly at the 2 sites of(and more accumulating in the future) mostly at the 2 sites of
operatingoperating NPPsNPPs..
5.5. Are the communities near the target sites forAre the communities near the target sites for DGRsDGRs involved ininvolved in
planning and decision making?planning and decision making?
6.6. Are the 2 alternate sites under military control suitable onAre the 2 alternate sites under military control suitable on
geological grounds? What if not?geological grounds? What if not?
Questions?
4a NPPs