

PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT

- ▣ Botes, L.; van Rensburg, D. [2000]:
- ▣ **Community participation in development: nine plagues and twelve commandments.** *Community Development Journal*, Jan 2000;35, 1; Academy Research Library, pp. 41

Community participation

- ▣ As a concept, **‘community participation’ is one of the most overused, but least understood concepts** in developing countries without a serious attempt to critically analyze the different forms that participation could take” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:41].

Obstacles to participation

- ▣ **“External obstacles suggest the role of development professionals, the broader government orientation towards promoting participation the tendency among development agencies to apply selective participation and their techno-financial.**

Internal, combination

- ▣ **Internal obstacles** refer to conflicting interest groups, gate-keeping by local elites, and alleged of public interest in becoming involves.

combination

- ▣ Some of the obstacles such as excessive pressures to immediate results and techno-financial bias *include both internal and external characteristics* “[Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:42].

External obstacles

- ▣ External obstacles´
- ▣ - those factors outside the end-beneficiary community that inhibit or prevent true community participation taking place.
- ▣ External obstacles suggest the role of development professionals, the broader government agencies to apply selective participation, [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:41].

Externally induced projects

- ▣ The majority of development projects are initiated by outsiders.
- ▣ They are rarely founded spontaneously by the community itself.
- ▣ The paternalistic roles of many '**development experts**' during the past four development decades impeded a lot n participatory development approaches.

- ▣ In this regard Cardio [1994:22] even referred to **Africa as a graveyard of development projects** due to their failures resulting from externally induced development and externally managed processes.
- ▣ The following remarks of community members illustrate their discontent with the paternalistic approaches of development professionals“[Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:42].

- 1) **Paternalistic role of development professionals**
- 2) The inhibiting and prescriptive role of the state
- 3) The over-reporting of development successes
- 4) Selective participation
- 5) Hard-issue bias

- 6) Conflicting interest groups within end-beneficiary communities
- 7) Gate-keeping by local elites
- 8) Excessive pressures for immediate results:
the accentuation of product at the expense of process
- 9) The lack of public interest in becoming involved

1) plague:

Paternalistic role of development professionals

- ▣ **The sole owners of development wisdom**
- ▣ **The monopoly of solutions:**
- ▣ „They (the developers) arrived already knowing everything. They come here and look around, but they see only what is not here“ (Indian Villager)

Expert knowledge (Giddens)

- ▣ “Often, professional experts dominate decision-making and manipulate, instead of facilitate, development processes.
- ▣ The trademark of ‘**development experts**’ is often that they always know best and therefore, their prime function is to transfer knowledge to communities whom by definition ‘know less’.
- ▣ – **developmentalistic pastoral care**

Paternalistic role of development professionals

professionals are predominantly trained in ways that disempower and who tell other people what they should do and think.

This has contributed to professionals (unconsciously or consciously) regarding themselves as the sole owners of development wisdom

Paternalistic role of development professionals

- ▣ and having the monopoly solution which consistently **underrate and under-value the capacities of local people to make their own decisions as well as to determine their own priorities.**
- ▣ It is therefore difficult for development planner to view community needs and opportunities ‘through the eyes of end-beneficiaries’.

Reversed legitimization

- ▣ “In some instances, community participation is not a genuine attempt to empower communities to choose development options freely,
- ▣ but is rather an **attempt to sell preconceived proposals. Participation processes often begin only after projects have already been designed.**

Paternalistic role of development professionals

- ▣ The process is not an attempt to ascertain the outcome and priorities, but rather to **gain acceptance for an already assembled package.**
- ▣ Consultation with the community may simply **be to legitimate existing decision, i.e. to tell people what is going to happen by asking them what they think about it.**

PR exercise

- ▣ Community participation is in these cases nothing more than **attempts to convince beneficiaries what is best for them**“ [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:43].

Development champions

- ▣ any community can easily become dependent on the presence and ideas of such a **development champion** who in turn may hinder participatory development by undervaluation the input and experiences of non-professionals” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:43].

Botes, van Rensburg

- ▣ Basically, Tau employs a **utilitarian idea of participation in development** which emphasize the **delivery of the development product, come hell or high water.**
- ▣ He predominantly applies community participation as a tool for carrying out a task or as a means to an end..

Tau

community participation as a tool to deliver development products as soon as effectively as possible, to the beneficiary community.

At the end of a multimillion informal settlement upgrading project Tau 's approach paid off resulting in 4000 sites that were serviced, with electricity installed in each site

Tau

- ▣ “He also point out that the **benefits to be derived from participation** depend primarily on **the political interests involved**
- ▣ concludes that participation can be very **dangerous when placed in wrong hands**”
[Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:45].

Tau

- ▣ community leaders - dissatisfaction at the lack of consultation and communication of important issues to them
- ▣ They also complained about not being paid for the time that they had put into organizing community meetings and assisting with a range of tasks that contributed to the successful implementation of the project”
- ▣ [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:43].

Tau

- ▣ Community leaders - **objected of having been misused by Tau** (right or wrongly) for the benefit of Tau and the development agency he represents” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:43].

Kado

- ▣ “Kado, on the other hand, regards **community participation as an end in itself.**
- ▣ For him **continuous communication and dialogue are the key to create a conducive environment** to work as partners with the community and its leader.
- ▣ He argues that **set objectives and tangible products are not less important but the process** of achieving them is of equal importance.

Kado

- ▣ After ending their relationship with Tau the community leaders opted to work with Kado, **Kado facilitated the restructuring of the Community Based Organisation (CBO)** community leaders could receive **remuneration for what is termed community consultancy work.**

Kado is also a firm believer and practitioner of **interactive decision-making processes**” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:43].

Kado

- ▣ **“The ostensibly non-political, non-partisan, character of participation obscured its use as a weapon in the struggle for power.**

Kado

- ▣ Morgan. [1993:7] describes, almost in a **cynical-ironical way, how participation was used as resource and object of political struggle by politicians and health professionals** and officials in the 'noble' field of primary health care in Costa Rica" [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:43].

- 1) Paternalistic role of development professionals
- 2) **The inhibiting and prescriptive role of the state**
- 3) The over-reporting of development successes
- 4) Selective participation
- 5) Hard-issue bias

2) State and participatory development

- ▣ For the state, it appears that the main aim of community participation programs is less about improving conditions for the poor or to modifying forms of decision-making
- ▣ **than maintaining existing power relations in society and ensuring the silence of the poor.**

- ▣ Community participation is often used by governments as a **means of legitimizing the political system and as for form of social control.**
- ▣ The level of commitment by many governments to community participation have not always generated major benefits for local communities [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:45].

- ▣ **“Participation is often constrained at the state level by partisanship, funding limitations, rigidity, the resistance of local and national bureaucrats,**
- ▣ **and the state’s inability to respond effectively to the felt needs of the populace.**
- ▣ **Government bureaucrats as the instruments of nation states are very much in a hierarchical mode of thinking which inhibits participatory development and undermines the people’s own governing abilities” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:45].**

- 1) Paternalistic role of development professionals
- 2) The inhibiting and prescriptive role of the state
- 3) **The over-reporting of development successes**
- 4) Selective participation
- 5) Hard-issue bias

3)The over-reporting of development successes

- ▣ **successes related to development initiatives are quantified, documented and communicated to a greater extent than failures.**
- ▣ **“There is therefore a lack of understanding of lessons learned, and their communication.**

3)The over-reporting of development successes

- ▣ In **theoretical discussion**, development experts will readily agree that failures are important part of the learning process.
- ▣ development experts at all levels in the process **have an interest in presenting a picture of success.**
- ▣ **Success is rewarded, whereas failure, however potentially informative, is not.**

3)The over-reporting of development successes

- ▣ The result of that is that **the knowledge of the nature of the failure**, the very information which could allow intervention policy to be improve, **is lost**” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:46].
- ▣ We need **more studies of what went wrong in development initiatives**, the reasons why they went wrong and some suggestions as to how the same mistakes can be avoided” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:46].

- 1) Paternalistic role of development professionals
- 2) The inhibiting and prescriptive role of the state
- 3) The over-reporting of development successes
- 4) **Selective participation**
- 5) Hard-issue bias

4) selective participation

- ▣ “Very often it is **most visible and vocal, wealthier, more articulated and educated groups** that are allowed to be partners in development without serious and ongoing attempts to identify less obvious partner”
- ▣ Elite-bias Chamber

4)selective participation - Question of representativeness

Since many community organization **are not democratically elected, the involvement** of local leaders often represents the voice of a group **self-appointed people**, and may not accurately reflect the view and perspectives of the broader community.

This easily runs the risk of the **project being co-opted by certain groups or interests**, leaving development workers with a feeling that the beneficiaries consulted were the wrong ones” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:45].

4) selective participation

- ▣ “It is a well-known social anthropological principle that **often outgoing or most easily approachable members of the community** tend to be those that **are marginal** to their own society.
- ▣ It remains one of the biggest challenges to ensure that the **people who neither have the capacity, nor the desire to participate, are involved in the development process**” [[Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:46].

4) selective participation community renting

- ▣ One of the worst manifestations of selective participation occurs when **the development agency 'buys' the goodwill and support of key interest groups in the community**, which is also referred to as **'community-renting'**.
- ▣ It is often the result where **community involvement exercises are susceptible to manipulation and misappropriation.**
- ▣ Latin America contexts that communities may deliberately buy into co-optation to gain access to resource" [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:46].

selective identification

- ▣ the **developer of donor agency identifies the community partners, instead of the community themselves.**
- ▣ **This selective identification** usually happens when development **workers ask the 'best known' members of the community to serve on a committee.**
- ▣ Since participation for the developer is largely a matter of convenience; **the objective is to find a partner in order to allow the project to continue and the screening of the representativeness of the partner is, at most secondary**" [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:46

- 1) Paternalistic role of development professionals
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5) Hard issue bias

- ▣ “In many development projects the co-called ‘hard’ issues (technological, financial, physical and material) are perceived as being more important for the successful implementation of these projects
- ▣ than the ‘soft’ issues (such as community involvement, decision making procedures, the establishment of efficient social compacts, organizational capacity building and empowerment” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:46-7].

5) Hard-issue bias

- ▣ “This may be the result of the **assumption that social and cultural features (the so called ‘soft issues’)** are ephemeral, intangible and unnecessary time-consuming in comparison to the more easily managed ‘hard issues’.
- ▣ This inevitably **results in a technical bias, which neglects the fact that inappropriate social processes can destroy** the most noble development endeavor” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:46-7].

Institutional components

- ▣ “While **many technologies are available for the ‘hardware’ components** of development projects, this is not the case for the institutional components and socio-cultural parts of these projects (“software”), which in no way are less important for the projects’ ultimate success.
- ▣ **Thus creating and strengthening adequate social organization – the social capital that sustains, uses and maintains the technology**, and involving the users of the technology, is no less important than the technology itself” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:46-7].

5) Hard-issue bias

- ▣ “The majority of professional organizations for development
- ▣ i.e. engineering firms, town and regional planners, quantify surveyors, contractors involved in urban development towards
- ▣ ‘product-related hard issues’ rather than ‘process-related soft issues’.

6) Conflicting interest groups within end-beneficiary communities

7) Gate-keeping by local elites

8) Excessive pressures for immediate results: the accentuation of product at the expense of process

9) The lack of public interest in becoming involved

6) Conflicting interest groups within end-beneficiary communities

- ▣ In the majority of cases, development **introduces marginalized communities to limited scarce resources and opportunities,**
- ▣ **Development is always the result of decisions which require choices about whose needs are to enjoy priority;** often, some interests can be accommodated at the expense of others.

6) Conflicting interest groups within end-beneficiary communities

- ▣ A logical consequence of this is the likelihood **that conflict can develop among different interest groups or segments of the community.**
- ▣ Conflict also arises in situations where some **groups may feel neglected in decision affecting their lives.** This in turn may enhance the possibility of different interest groups within a single community opposing each other” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:48].

6) Conflicting interest groups within end-beneficiary communities

- ▣ **“Competition among community based organizations and other popular movements** for access to scarce development resources and power is a major constraint preventing proper participation.
- ▣ Most civic and political movements are well aware that development, for which they can claim responsibility, **will boost their support base;** therefore, they have **an incentive to discourage processes, for which they cannot claim sole credit.**

6) Conflicting interest groups within end-beneficiary communities

- ▣ “Many residents in informal settings are engaged in a struggle for survival in a context of absolute or relative poverty which results in a competition for scarce resources. This is obviously not favourable for community organization.

- ▣ Leaders in informal settlements appear to adapt well in these circumstances; and they frequently monopolize the information channels between the slum residents and the agencies.
- ▣ In this way, and in spite of their sometimes useful role as mediators for the urban poor, they **limit the direct and active participation of low income people in general**

- ▣ In the South African urban development scene there are various examples of **development initiatives being sabotaged, undermined or hi-jacked** ,
- ▣ because specific **interest group believes it was allocated an insufficient role**” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:48].

6) Conflicting interest groups within end-beneficiary communities

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Gate-keeping by local elites

if the community leadership favours a project the chances of success are far greater than where leaders are opposed.

- ▣ local elites may be able to effectively thwart attempts to engage directly with beneficiaries, because this threatens their control” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:49].

Gate-keeping by local elites

- ▣ “There is always the danger that decision-making at community-level may fall into the hands **of a small and self-perpetuation clique, which may act in its own interests with disregard to the wider community.**

Gate-keeping by local elites

- ▣ Friedman [1993:29] term '**positioning for patronage**.
- ▣ In developing countries, South Africa included, the **peculiar dynamic of the informal settlements often lend themselves to an autocratic style of leadership based on patronage**, which reinforce the prevailing inequality of the existing social structure” [Nienied, 1990:45].

8) Excessive pressures for immediate results: the accentuation of product at the expense of process

- ▣ tension between **the imperatives of delivery** (product) and **community participation (process)**, between the cost of time and the value of debate and agreement.
- ▣ Excessive pressures for immediate results, accruing from the products and services delivered, often **undermine attention to institution-building and make it difficult not to address poverty and poverty reduction from a relief and welfare approach.**

8) Excessive pressures for immediate results: the accentuation of product at the expense of process

- ▣ Any pressure on development workers to show results, may for them to take matters out of the hands of community people and complete them themselves” ”[Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:50].

8) Excessive pressures for immediate results: the accentuation of product at the expense of process

- ▣ “Friedman [1993:11] has indicated **that development progress is often measured, not only by developers themselves but also by public opinion-formers and politicians, by the speed with which tangible results are delivered.** However, **pressure to deliver** is not simply a result of impatience from hasty technocrats, potential beneficiaries are often also impatient at **the endless discussions without any sign of delivery.**

- ▣ Lengthy periods spent on process issues are regarded with impatience because action is required rather than social niceties. For many, **participatory development is too time-consuming and not cost-effective**, because participation in practice is always a slow and uncertain process and is likely to involve more paper work and soul-searching” [Botes, van Rensburg; 2000:50].

Process versus product	Decision-making dynamics	Underlying assumptions	Emphasis
Process <i>less</i> important than product	Developer-centered approach: characterized by top-down decisions taken by development elite	Rely on formal know-how and expertise to resolve development problems in the shortest possible time	Time and product
Process <i>more</i> important than product	People-centered approach: characterized by bottom-up decisions taken by community members or their legitimate leaders	The immediate resolution of a development problem is less important than the way in which the process of problem-solving is taking place – even if it requires a longer time. Build on the saying 'it is the approach rather than the outcome of the message that spells success'	Participation, consultation and process

Fig. 1. Process versus product in community participation

A lack of willingness to participate may result also from **past experiences of involvement where expectations were not fulfilled.**

Paul [1987] says that the World Bank has learned the difficulties for beneficiaries to be active in community participation **when the country does not have a social tradition supportive participation;**

- ▣ Factors such as **culture, history, government policy and social, political** and economic structures influence community participation.
- ▣ Individual and group motivations appear to be **context-specific and locality-bound** rather than universally definable.

Whoever wants to get involve in participatory development should:

- ▣ *Demonstrate an awareness of their status as outsiders to the beneficiary community and the potential impact of their involvement.*
- ▣ Respect the community's indigenous contribution as manifested in their knowledge, skills and potential
- ▣ Become good facilitators and catalysts of development that assist and stimulate community based initiatives and challenge practices which hinders people releasing their won initiatives and realize their own ideas.

- ▣ Promote *co-decision-making in defining needs, goal-setting, and formulation policies* and plans in the implementation of these decisions. Selective participatory practices can be avoided when development workers seek out various sets of interest, rather than listening only to a few community leaders and prominent figures.
- ▣ Communicate both program/project success and failures – sometimes failure are more informative.
- ▣ Believe in the spirit of 'Ubuntu' a –south African concept encompassing key values such as solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity and collective unity.

- ▣ **Guard against the domination of come interest groups or a small unrepresentative leadership clique.**
- ▣ **Involve a cross-section of interest groups to collaborate as partners**
- ▣ **acknowledge that process-related soft issues** are as important as product-related hard issues.
Multidisciplinary approach
- ▣ **aim at releasing** the energy within a community without exploiting or exhausting them
- ▣ **empower community to share equitably in the fruits of development** through active processes whereby beneficiaries influence the direction of development initiatives

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ The series of Working Papers draws on the findings of **Linking Rights and Participation**
- ▣ **IDS Participation Group and Just Associates;** partners Brazil, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe
- ▣ Project sought **to contextualize the rights based approach** through deepening understanding of how different actors in different countries frame the links between rights and participation

- ▣ Nyamu-Musembi, C.; Cornwall, A.:

- ▣ *What is the 'rights-based approach' all about: Perspectives from international development agencies,*

- ▣ IDS Working Paper 234, November 2004, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.

- ▣ Gready, P.; Ensor, J. [2005]: **Reinventing Development, Zed Books, London,**

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ “In recent years **human rights** have **assumed a central position** in the discourse surrounding international development,
- ▣ **the fundamental** links between **rights denial, impoverishment, vulnerability and** conflict has led to the incorporation of rights-based approaches in the funding strategies,
- ▣ policy formulations and practice of a diverse range of actors,

actors

- ▣ including United Nations agencies (UNDP, UNICEF), major donors (the UK' Department for International Development DFID, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA, international NGOs, (ActionAid, CARE, Oxfam) and local grassroots NGOs, and social movements [Gready, Ensor, 2005:1] .

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ What difference a rights-based approach makes in practice
- ▣ What is the 'value added' by this approach
- ▣ How does rights-based approach alter development work and programming
- ▣ Repackaging existing best development practice?

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ Implications of rights for development in an era of neo-liberalism and good-governance
- ▣ Relationship between rights and culture
- ▣ And aid politicization and the 'war against terror' [Gready, Ensor, 2005:2].

sources of law/rights

- ▣ There are basically two sources of law/rights: 1) **derived from the religion**, a person endowed with the God nature and thus bearer of sparkles of divinity;
- ▣ 2) **naturalist account** whereby each an every person is endowed with the capacity to reason and thus bearer of undeniable rights regardless of the belonging to a particular group.

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ “The declarations **had a common foundation in natural law and rights.**
- ▣ **In natural law/rights, foundations and justifications are located in God and religion, nature (the ‘state of nature’, given or inspired by nature), in the nature of ‘man’, and /or through a share capacity for reason.**
- ▣ Rights are **potentially universal** in all these guises – individuals, for example, can be seen as having rights simply by virtue of their common humanity and shared characteristics – in the ‘state of nature’ outside and before the formation of any social grouping, political arrangements or legal dispensation.

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ But rights are also **simply a matter of faith. Not surprisingly, such a theory of rights, once secularized and stripped of religious justification, has come under sustained criticism from philosophers, political theorists and lawyers [Gready, Ensor, 2005:2].**

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ **conception of rights has enduring and cross-cultural significance** because it speaks to the idealism and activist agenda of human rights.
- ▣ To claim that **we are all free and equal, that we have original rights**, is arguably a moral fiction, but it can be a **very empowering fiction** and has had profound **political impact**” [Gready, Enson; 2005:3].

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ **Hobbes, who alongside Rousseau, is most closely identified with social contract theory, famously believed that life in the 'state of nature',**
- ▣ **without rules or accepted enforcement mechanisms, would be a state of constant war.**
- ▣ **To escape this condition, the individual joins in voluntary association with others to form rules to govern social relations and to establish an agency – the state- with the power to enforce the rule”**
[Gready, Enson; 2005:3].

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ **Certain rights are sacrificed** in exchange for an agency to enforce and protect those rights that remain.
- ▣ **we exchange unconditional freedom** in return for **the advantages of social living**, as a balance is sought between our rights and the rights of others, and between rights and responsibilities.
- ▣ Under such a set of rules a society can develop in which **everybody is better off** and in which we can **afford to become moral agents** [Gready, Ensor, 2005:3].

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ “The social **contract is therefore rational**, and the rationale for rights is located in relationships, **reciprocity and mutual benefit rather than in religious, or increasingly secular**, belief.
- ▣ The idea of social contract, which entrenched the notion that there is no divine or absolute right to rule, but on the contrary, a right to government by consent, was truly revolutionary” [Gready, Ensor, 2005:3].

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ US and French revolutions are truly revolutionary in the sense that they sought a **radical transformation of the accepted principles of social organization,**
- ▣ rather than a mere seizure of power within the existing order [Evans, 2001:17].
- ▣ The relationship **between the individual and the state was transformed.**

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ Nature rights are philosophically contested, but undeniably real.
- ▣ They are real in the sense that history is littered with examples, **from the suffragettes and the anti-slavery movement to opposition to apartheid and the communist regimes of the former Eastern Europe**, of occasions when individual and groups have acted on a powerful moral sense of injustice” [Gready, Ensor, 2005:2-3].

The first human rights revolutions

- ▣ If the Enlightenment heralded the first human rights revolution, conceptually and ultimately politically,
- ▣ the current era of globalization contains and demands a **second revolutionary break with the past**” [Gready, Ensor, 2005:5]

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ What does rights talk offer development?
- ▣ The various justifications for the value of rights in development can be classified into three broad categories: **normative, pragmatic and ethical.**
- ▣ **The normative justification** is that rights put **values and politics** at the very heart of development practice.
- ▣ Hausermann [1998] **HRA it works by setting out vision of what ought to be:** that is provides a powerful **normative framework** to orient development cooperation

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ It brings an **ethical and moral dimension to development assistance,**
- ▣ By stipulation an **internationally agreed set of norms,** backed by international law,
- ▣ it provides a **stronger basis for citizens to make claims** on their states and for holding states to account for their duties to enhance the access of their citizens to the realization of their rights.

RIGHT-BASED APPROACH

- ▣ Draft Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies UN OHCHR
- ▣ Perhaps the most important source of added value – **the emphasis on the accountability of policymakers and other actors** whose actions have and impact on the rights of people. Rights imply duties, and duties demand accountability” [UN OHCHR 2002, paragraph 23]