SPACE AND PLACE: HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE

L INTRODUCTION

Space and place together define the nature of geography. Spatial analysis or the explanation of spatial organization is at the forefront of geographical research. Geographers appear to be confident of both the meaning of space and the methods suited to its analysis. The interpretation of spatial elements requires an abstract and objective frame of thought, quantifiable data, and ideally the language of mathematics. Place, like space, lies at the core of geographical disciplines. Indeed an Ad Hoc Committee of American geographers (1965, 7) asserted that "the modern science of geography derives its substance from man's sense of place". In the geographical literature, place has been given several meanings (Lukermann, 1964; May, 1970). As location, place is one unit among other units to which it is linked by a circulation net; the analysis of location is subsumed under the geographer's concept and analysis of space. Place, however, has more substance than the word location suggests: it is a unique entity, a 'special ensemble' (Lukermann, 1964, p. 70); it has a history and meaning. Place incarnates the experiences and aspirations of a people. Place is not only a fact to be explained in the broader frame of space, but it is also a reality to be clarified and understood from the perspectives of the people who have given it meaning.
All academic work extends the field of consciousness. Humanistic studies contribute, in addition, towards self-consciousness, towards man's increasing awareness of what is real and of the major disciplines that exists a humanistic subfield which is the philosophy and history of that discipline. Through the subfield, for instance, geography or physics knows itself, that is, the origins of its concepts, presuppositions, and biases in the experience of its proponents in arts and sciences (Wright 1966; Glacken, 1967; Gilbert, 1972). The study of space, from the humanistic perspective, is thus the study of a person's spatial feelings and ideas in the stream of experience. Experience is never complete until one has come to know the world: we know the world through sensation (feeling), perception, and conception (Oakey, 1933; Dardé, 1952; Lowenthal, 1961; Gendlin, 1962). The geographer's understanding of space is abstract, though less so than that of a pure mathematician. The spatial apprehension of the man in the street is abstract, though less so than that of a scientific geographer. Abstract notions of space can be formally taught. Few people know from direct experience that France is bigger than French soil. French cities are arranged in nested hexagons, or even that the size of their own piece of real estate is 1.07 acres. Less abstract, because more closely tied to sense experience, is the space that is conditioned by the fact of my being in it, the space of which I am the center. The space that answers my needs and intentions. A comprehensive study of experiential space would require that we examine successively felt, perceived, and conceptual spaces, noting how the more abstract ideas develop out of those given directly to the body, both from the standpoint of individual growth and from the perspective of history. Such an undertaking is beyond my present purpose. Here I shall attempt to sketch those spaces that are sense-bound, those spaces that respond to existential cues and the urgencies of day-to-day living. A brief discussion of mythical space will serve as a bridge between the sense-bound and the conceptual.

The importance of "place" to cultural and humanistic geography is, or should be, obvious (Jeffer, 1971; Nogues, 1972). As functional nodes in space, places yield to the techniques of spatial analysis. But as unique and complex ensemble—rooted in the past and growing into a future—and as symbol, place calls for humanistic understanding. Within the humanistic traditions places have been studied from the historical and literary-arts perspectives. A town or neighborhood comes alive through the artistry of a scholar who is able to combine detailed narrative with discerning viei-
arbitrarians (Floux, 1971). These are the elements that cause us to pause and pose the question of an objective reality distinct from the one that our needs and imagination call into being.

Visual perception, touch, movement, and thought combine to give us our characteristic sense of space. Biblical vision and dreamy verses equip us physically to perceive reality as a world of objects rather than as kaleidoscopic patterns. Thought greatly enhances our ability to recognize and structure persisting objects among the willing of fleeting impressions. The recognition of objects implies the recognition of mass and size and distance relations among objects, and hence of space. The self is a persisting object which is able to relate to other selves and objects; it can move toward them and carry out its intentions among them (Humphrey, 1962, p. 260). Space is oriented by each centre of consciousness, and primitive consciousness is more a question of 'I can't' than 'I thank'. 'Near' means 'at hand', 'High' means 'too far to reach' (Haldenger, 1962).

II.1. Space and Time

The notion of 'distance' involves not only 'near' and 'far' but also the time notions of past, present and future. Distance is a spatio-temporal intimation. Here is 'now', there is 'then'. And just as here is not merely a point in space, so 'now' is not merely a point in time. Here implies 'there', now implies 'then', and 'then' looks back as the past and in the future. Both space and time are oriented and structured by the purposeful being. Neither the idea of space nor that of time lead me to the level of consciousness when what I want is at hand, such as picking up a pencil on my desk; they are as indispensable part of the experience of arm movement. Units of time are often used to secure the meaning of long distances: It takes so many days to go from here to there. Distant places are also remote in time, lying either in the remote past or future. In non-Western societies, distant places are conceived in the mythical past rather than future, but since time tends to be perceived as cyclical remote past and remote future are seen as the same. In Western society, a distant place can suggest the idea of a distant past: when explorers seek the source of the Nile or the heart of a continent they appear to be moving back in time. But in science fiction distant stars are presented as distant future worlds.

II.1.1. The primacy of time. Though time and space are inseparable in locomotor activity, they are separable in speech and thought (Rooth, 1970). We can talk abstractly about areas and volumes without introducing the concept of time, and we can talk about duration and time without introducing the concept of space, although the latter is much more difficult to achieve in Indo-European languages. Experience in the real world supports both the primacy of time and of space. Confusion arises out of the different ideas that are grouped under these two terms. The time dimension matters more, one may say, because people appear to be more interested in narratives than in static pictures, in events that unfold in time (drama) than in objects deployed in space that can be comprehended simultaneously. That unique endowment of the human species, language, is far better suited to the narration of events than to the depiction of scenes. The apprehension of distance, we know, often rests on measures of time. Nature's periodicities, such as night and day, the changing phases of the moon and the seasonal cycle, provide units for calculating time. But nature, other than the human body itself, doesn't seem to provide convenient yardsticks for the measurement of space. The psychological reason for the inclination to estimate space in time units may be this. Man's ability to negotiate and manipulate the world depends ultimately on his biological energy. That energy is renewable. For each individual, however, it has a limit that is circumscribed by his expectable life-span. Man can amass space with the help of technology but he has little control over his allotted life-span, which remains at the Biblical three scores and ten, and is subject to termination through all manner of contingencies. Man feels vulnerable to events; he is more constrained by time than by the curbs that space may impose. Significantly we say a prisoner of his cell that he is doing time. Fate is event, a temporal category.

In philosophical discourse, with the notable exception of Kantians (May, 1970) time has assumed greater importance than space since Leibniz (Janner, 1969, p. 4), both positivists and phenomenologists believe that time is logically prior to space. Among scientific philosophers the increasing interest in the nature of cause puts the spotlight on time, for the direction of the flow of time is thought to be determined by the causal interconnection of phenomena. Space, in contrast, is only the order of coexisting data. Among phenomenologists time is believed to be more fundamental than space, a belief that seems to rest on their concern with the nature of being, becoming, duration, and experience.

II.1.2. The primacy of space. It is possible to argue for the primacy of space on the ground that space can be comprehended more directly than time; that a concept of space can give rise to theoretical science whereas, in Kant's view, one-dimensional time cannot (May, 1970, p. 116); and that spatialisation
is a capacity developed in tandem with the evolution of human speech, utterance directed toward the creations of a public world. From the psychological viewpoint, knowledge of space is much more direct and simpler than knowledge of time. We can perceive the whole of a spatial dimension, such as a straight line, simultaneously, however, no matter how short it is, cannot be apprehended at once. Once we are at the end of it, the beginning can no longer be perceived. In other words, any knowledge of time presupposes a reconstruction on the part of the knower, since the beginning of any duration has always been "in time to find again" (Plaget, 1971, p. 61). Children apprehend space before time. A one-year-old child plays "peek-a-boo" and can ask to be picked up or let down. At eighteen months a child is known how to find his way in the house. But only after some six months later does he acquire a rudimentary knowledge of time, recognizing, for instance, the return of the father as the signal for supper (Bibring, 1970, p. 411). At seven years a child shows an interest in distant events. Is he not thinking about geography in baby: he has some idea concerning the relative size and distance of places. But the appreciation of historical time comes much later. In treating mentally disordered patients, we have noted that they respond more readily to attempts to restore their fragmented spatial world than their fractured past (Mendel, 1961; Inoue, 1965; Camou, 1966). The structure of the present world can be elucidated and envisaged by architectural means spatial coherence can be perceived. But the past is gone and can be recalled only with the help of language. Dreams, when we remember them, centre on a few images. These remain, often with great vividness, while the narrative itself fades (Lange, 1972, p. 284). The causal link of events in dreams has a slender hold on our memory, but certain pictures can make an indelible impress. For some people, not only spatial relationships but the complex flow of events are not clearly understood without the aid of diagrams, this is exploitation in space.

Human speech is unlike animal utterance because it strives to create a stable and public realm to which all who speak the same language have access. Psychologic states find objective correlates that are visible to all in space. Ideas are 'bright' as the sun is bright and souls can be "face like the bodies they inhabit. Sensations, perceptions, and ideas occur under two aspects: the same clear and precise, but impersonal, the other confused, ever changing, and impenetrable to the eye without arresting its flux and making it into public property. "We instinctively try to solidify our impressions in order to express them in language. Hence we

confuse the feeling itself, which is a perpetual state of becoming, with its permanent external object, and especially with the word which expresses this object" (Bergson, 1910, pp. 129-30). Speech creates social reality (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1970). In the social world the private lived-time of individual is mapped onto space, where confined feelings and ideas are made sensible and can be tagged and counted. Pure duration thus becomes homogeneous time, which is reducible to space because its units are not successive but lie side by side. Heterogeneous and changing psychic states become discrete sensations and feelings. Language is suited to the telling of stories and poor at depicting simultaneous order. On the other hand, Benjamin Whorf (1952) has made us aware that a characteristic of Indo-European languages is to spatialize time. Thus time is 'long' or 'short', 'thenafter' is 'thereafter', and 'allways' is 'always'.

European languages lack special words to express duration, intensity and tendency. They use the explicit spatial metaphor of size, number ( plurality), position, shape and motion. It is as though European speech tries to make time and feelings visible, to constrain them to possess spatial dimensions that can be pointed to, if not measured. Not all languages attempt this to the same degree. Hopi speech, for example, catches spatial metaphors. It has ample constructional and lexical means to express duration and intensity, qualities and potentials, directly. Terms descriptive of space have much in common whether Indo-European or Hopi. The experience and apprehension of space is substantially the same irrespective of language (Whorf, 1972, p. 45). In this sense, space is more basic to human experience than time, the meaning of which varies fundamentally from people to people.

II.2. Space, Biology, and Symbolology

Anthropological studies have familiarized us with the idea that people's conceptions of, and behaviour in, space differs widely. At a more exalted level, mathematics appear to pull geometries out of a hat. We need, however, to be reminded of spatial perceptions and values that are grounded on common traits in human biology, and hence transcend the arbitrariness of culture. Although spatial concepts and Behaviour patterns vary enormously, they are all rooted in the original part between body and space. Spatial concepts may indeed soar out of sight from this original part, but spatial behaviour among ordinary objects can never stray very far from it. As C. H. Waddington puts it, "Although in mathematics we are free to choose whether to build up our geometry on Euclidean or non-Euclidean axioms, when we need to deal
with the world of objects of the size of our own bodies, we find that it is the Euclidean axioms which are by far the most appropriate. They are so appropriate, indeed, that we almost certainly have some genetic predisposition to their adoption built into our anatomy, for example the curiosity of the eye to recognize a straight line (1970, 102).

Human beings are more sensitive to vertical and horizontal lines than to oblique lines, more responsive to right angles and symmetrical shapes than to acute or obtuse angles and irregular shapes (Figure 1). An increasing array of evidence supports this view. Thus children aged three to four soon learn to choose \( \square \) from \( \triangle \), but most of them have difficulty learning to choose \( \triangle \) from \( \square \). They can easily discriminate \( \square \) from \( \triangle \) but not \( \square \) from \( \square \) (Howard and Templeton, 1966, p. 182). The direction of gravity has been suggested as the causes of such bias. Furthermore, orientations provide ecological cues for movement, and their invariance is a decided advantage. When we move about, oblique lines are not invariant; left-right differences are similarly low in invariance, but up-down differences are relatively stable (Olso, 1970, p. 177). An angle of 93° is not seen as an angle in its own right but as a "bad" right angle. Streets that join at an angle are recalled as joining at right angles or nearly so. North and South America are not aligned along the same meridians but in memory they tend to do so (Arnheim, 1969, pp. 82, 183). In general, shapes that have their main axes tilted tend to be reproduced in a vertical orientation. Horizontally symmetrical shapes are sometimes reproduced in a vertically symmetrical position whereas vertically symmetrical figures are always recalled in their correct position. Two shapes are best discriminated when they are vertical. The apparent length of a line tends to be maximally exaggerated in the neighbourhood of the vertical, and it tends to be minimized at about the horizontal position (Pollock and Chapman, 1952).

Human beings are not alone in their greater sensitivity to vertical cues in their environment. Like the human child, an octopus can readily discriminate vertical from horizontal rectangles, but confuses rectangles oriented obliquely in different directions (Sutherland, 1957). Of course only among human beings do these natural bases acquire symbolic meaning. The direction upward, against gravity, is then not only a feeling that guides movement but a feeling that leads to the inscription of regions in space to which we attach values, such as those expressed by high and low, rise and decline, climbing and falling, superior and inferior, elevated and downcast, looking up in awe and looking down in contempt. Prone we surrender to nature, upright we assert our humanity. In getting up we gain freedom and enjoy it, but at the same time we lose contact with the supporting ground, mother earth, and we miss it. The vertical position stands for that which is instituted, erected, and constructed; it represents human aspirations that risk fall and collapse (Strevus, 1966). To go up is to rise above our earth-bound origin towards the sky, which is either the abode of, or identical with, the supreme being. Horizontal space is secular space; it is accessible to the senses. By contrast, the mental and mythical realm is symbolized by the vertical axis piercing through the heart of things, with its poles of zenith and underground, heaven and hades. The gods live on the mountain peak while mortals are bound to the plain. On medieval T-O maps Jerusalem lies at the centre of the world; this is well known, but in Rabbinical literature Israel is perceived to rise higher above sea-level than any other land, and Temple Hill is taken to be the highest point in Israel (Raven, 1938, p. 66). Centre implies the vertical and vice versa in mythological thinking (Figure 2). The human partiality for the vertical, with its transcendental
message, is manifest in a vast array of architectural features that include megaliths, pyramids, obelisks, totems, arches, domes, columns, terraces, spires, towers, pagodas, Gothic cathedrals and modern skyscrapers (Giedion, 1964). We begin with the biological fact of the animate body in space. Vertical elements in the environment provide relative stable cues for orientation as the body moves. In action vertical and horizontal figures are easier to distinguish than those which are oriented obliquely in different directions. Gravity is the pervasive environment for all living things. Animals, no less than human beings, feel the strain of defying it; to move vertically is to make the maximum effort. From this common biological fundament the human being has elaborated a world of meaning that pervades his every act and accomplishment, from bodily postures to the verticality and horizontality of buildings. In the following sections I shall attempt to clarify further the nature of space as it is grounded in the needs of the human ego and of social groups.

II.3. Spatial References and the Ego

(a) Primitive measures of length are derived from parts of the body. They also depend on the dimensions of commonly used objects, and on the actions that one performs with one's body, such as a day's journey, or with an object, such as the distance of a bow shot. The move from the biologic base, then, is from the body to the object, and to acts performed with the object. Measures of area seem less bound to parts of the human body. They are based on the size of common objects, those which have been made or purely processed by man, and to acts performed with them. Unlike the segmentation of time, nature itself doesn't seem to provide suitable units for the measurement of either distance or area. (See Table 1).

The parts of the human body serve as a model for spatial organization. Central African and South Sea languages, in particular, use nouns (names for parts of body) rather than abstract prepositional terms to express spatial relations, thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body part</th>
<th>Prepositional term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>head</td>
<td>above</td>
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<tr>
<td>mouth</td>
<td>below</td>
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<td>hands</td>
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<td>legs</td>
<td>behind</td>
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In addition, material objects outside the human body can serve as...
would through the possibilities and limitations of our senses. The space that we can perceive spreads out before and around us, and is divisible into regions of differing quality. Farthest removed and covering the largest area is visual space. It is dominated by the broad horizon and small, indistinct objects. This purely visual region seems static even though things move in it. Closer to us is the visual-aural space: objects in it can be seen clearly and their noises are heard. Dynamism characterizes the feel of the visual-aural zone, and this sense of a lively world is the result of sound as much as spatial displacements that can be seen (Knapp, 1948). When we turn from the distant visual space to the visual-aural zone, it is as though a silent movie comes into focus and is provided with sound tracks. Next to our body is the affective zone, which is accessible to the senses of smell and touch besides those of sight and hearing. In fact, the relative importance of sight diminishes in affective space: to appreciate the objects that give it its high emotional tone our eyes may even be closed. We cannot attend to all three zones at the same time. In particular, attention to the purely visual region in the distance excludes awareness of the affective region. Normally we focus on the proximate world, either the intimate affective space or the more public visual-aural space.

Here is an example of how the visual-aural zone can be further subdivided. I am engaged with people and things: they are in focus and lie at the fore- ground of my awareness. Beyond, in the middle ground, is the physical setting for the people and things that engage me fully. The middle ground may be the walls of a room or hall. It is visible but unemphasized. Foreground and middle ground constitute the patent zone. Beyond the patent zone is the latent zone of habituality (the past), which is also the latent zone of potentiality (the future). Although I cannot see through the walls of the hall, the unfocused middle ground, I am subliminally aware of the existence of a world, not just empty space, beyond the walls. That latent zone is the one of one's past experience, what I have seen before coming into the hall, it is also potentiality, what I shall see when I leave the hall. The latent zone is the invisible but necessary frame to the patent zone (Orgeda y Gasset, 1963, p. 67; Ryman and Ryman, 1940). It acts as a bellais to activity, freeing activity from complete dependence on the patent, i.e., visible space and present time.

In characterizing the structure of space, I introduce the terms past, present, and future. The analysis of spatial experience seems to require the usage of time categories. This is because our awareness of the spatial relations of objects is never limited to the perceptions of the objects themselves; present awareness itself is imbued with past experiences of movement and time, with memories of past expenditures of energy, and it is drawn towards the future.
by the perceptual objects' call to action. A tree at the end of the road stretches out in advances, as it were, the steps I have to take in order to reach it. (Brain, 1959). Distance, depth, height, and breadth are not terms necessary to scientific discourse; they are part of common speech and derive their multiple meanings from commonplace experiences (Kochkann, 1964; Strauss, 1963, p. 262). Spatial dimensions are keyed to the human sense of adequacy, purpose, and standing. Certain heights are beyond my reach, given my present position or status. I feel inadequate and the objects around me appear alien, distant, and unapproachable. The window that is near seems very far once I have snuggled into bed. Distance shrinks and stretches in the course of the day and with the seasons as they affect my sense of well-being and advisability (Durand, 1951, p. 13).

A far-sighted person is not necessarily someone with good eyesight. He is a person who has a grasp of the future. Yet the popular image of far-sightedness is someone gazing into the distant and open horizon. Statues of eminent statesmen often overlook sweeping vistas. Their gaze into the distant and far-off is intended to suggest that they have the people's present and future well-being in mind. The open horizon stands for the open future (Minkowski, 1970, pp. 81–90). What is ahead is what is not yet — and beckons. Hope implies the capacity to act and opens up space. However, specific hope or expectation inhibits activity: it is a kind of waiting during which the expected event appears to move towards oneself, and the co-ordinate spatial feeling is one of contraction.

Many of our waking hours are spent in historical or directed space (Strauss, 1966, pp. 3–37). Such space is structured around the spatio-temporal points of here (now) and there (then), and around a system of directions, ahead–behind, over–under, right–left. In walking from here to there, energy and time are consumed to overcome distance. The pedestrian advances by leaving step after step behind him, and by aiming at the destination ahead as though it were at the end of a time-damaged line. This commonplace observation gains interest if we think how radically space-and-time changes when a person is not walking but marching with a band. The marching man still moves, objectively, from A to B; however, in feeling open space displaces the constrained space of linear distance and point locations. Instead of advanced steps leaving steps behind the marching man enters space ahead. The sense of beginning and end weakens as also the articulation of directions. Directed, historical space acquires some of the characteristics of homogeneous space — the space of present time without past or future.

In historical space, moving forwards and moving back may cover the same route, but psychologically they are quite different activities. We move forwards or out to our place of work even if we are driven there and have our back to the direction the car is moving; and we return or move back home even as we drive the car forward on the same road. On a map the two routes are identical and may be shown by the same line with arrows pointing in opposite directions. However, strictly speaking, what is mapped is the route of the car and not that of its human occupant, for whom not only does the scenery change in major ways, depending on whether he is moving in one direction or another, but the route itself acquires different feeling-tones depending on whether the driver is moving forwards (as to dinner party or office) or back home. Distance is asymmetric for reasons more fundamental than the example of the one-way street that Nystuen gives (1963, p. 379). On the scale of moving one's own body, walking backwards is painfully difficult: one is afraid of falling over unseen obstacles or even of plunging into emiptims: in walking backwards the space that cannot be seen does not exist. Physiologically the human person is not built to walk backwards. There seems no need to look beyond this evident fact. Yet, as Erwin Strauss has pointed out, when we dance to music, moving backwards does not feel awkward: we have no fear of it, it does not feel unnatural despite the fact that on a crowded dance floor moving backwards may mean bumping into others. When we dance we are in homogeneous, non-directed "perspective" space (Strauss, 1966, p. 33).

Just as the human bias in favour of the vertical finds expression in the semantics of body posture and in architecture, so the structures of experiential space are manifest in spatial behaviour and in the physical setting. The space of work is essentially directed. A project has a beginning and an end. In mental work it could occur entirely in the brain and leave no trace in the external world. The logic of such work is characterized, however, by the spatial metaphor 'linear'. Physical work requires the physical organisation of space: a manufacturing process, for example, starts here (now) and ends there (then). The space is horizontal and directed; it is elongated. The factory itself, of course may be square in shape for any single work process can be repeated. Individual work spaces can be placed side by side to form a more isometric figure. The horizontal, oriented space par excellence is the highway or railroad. The straight rail tracks leading from one station to the next show a perfect correspondence between single-minded intention, process, and form.
equidimensionality it is the result of the need to compromise eternity in the interest of time-bound human beings who feel more comfortable in directed space. Sacred monuments that are solid and cannot admit people are almost invariably equidimensional in ground plan. Recreational space is essentially homogeneous, ‘present’ space in which means and ends, here and now and then, can be formulated. Gardens are iconic, whereas recreational space is elated. It may well be in response to the demands of the physical environment, such as the bank of a river or a main thoroughfare, it is not required by the inherent character of recreation or the enjoyment of nature. Many modern recreational activities (mountaineering and snow- skiing, for instance) are as oriented as work, and hence require and acquire the elated space of the work line. Race tracks, it is true, are oval-shaped. The starting and terminating points are clearly marked, but in racing the destination itself has no inherent significance; it can indeed be identical with the starting point. What is important is speed — speed in non-directed space. Race tracks in the desert or on the beach, drag-strips for hot-rodders, are linear and yet non-oriented, the sensation of speed itself, within an abstract world, is the essential experience (Jackson, 1957–58).

The type of directed space most familiar to geographers is that in which arrows are drawn on a map and the direction of the point of people, goods, and cultural traits. One map might show the flow of oil out of the Middle East to European ports; another the movement of people from America’s eastern seaboard into the interior. We are used to seeing the one map as a cartographic device summarizing certain economic facts, and the other as a means for representing events in historical geography. But the humanist geographer can read between the lines. From his perspective, the arrows symbolize directed activities that give rise to oriented, directed spaces on a world stage. Instead of a mere short walk from here (now) to there (then), the journey of a tanker over thousands of miles of water, taking several weeks around the Cape of Good Hope, acquires a little of the drama of an odyssey. Home port and destination, to the sailor, are the handy the indifferent points that they appear to be on a map. The arrow symbolizes his lived-space, which is also his lived-time. If, instead of an oil tanker one thinks of a ship embarking on a voyage of discovery, the arrows become the tracks that set the course of a ship. On maps that depict historical movements, the arrows appear to show mere routes in space; but they also represent the temporal dimension. Months, and perhaps years, have lapsed between the stem and the tip of the arrow. For the individual seaman, the journey takes them not only to a place that can be marked on the map, but to a point later in time that can be shown on the calendar, but a place that symbolizes their future.

II.S. Group Experimental Space

Personal experiential space focuses on the experience of space in which the effect of the presence of other persons is taken into account. This does not mean that the structure of the personally experienced space is unique and private to the individual. Though people normally share its essential elements to have an impact on the physical setting. The sharing is made possible through 'intersubjectivity', a concept often explored by phenomenologists, by group experiential space. I mean the spatial experience that is defined by the presence of other people. The point of departure is no longer 'person-space', but 'person-other persons-space' (Bittner, 1969; Claval, 1970; Carusso and Palm, 1973).

Consider the feeling of spatial constraint, the prickly sense that there are too many people. Students of animal behaviour have applied their findings to problems of human space with mixed results (Callan, 1970; Esser, 1971; Lyman and Scott, 1967; Gettin and Booms, 1971). As a feeling, 'crowdedness' is not something that one can easily measure. It is only roughly correlated with the arithmetic expression of density. A phenomenological description of 'crowdedness', applicable to human beings, is needed to complement the folklore of ethological literature based on the observation of animals. The idea that we can best (i.e., scientifically) understand humans by not studying them directly has, perhaps, been carried to undue extremes. As the type of description a humanist geographer might undertake, I shall attempt to illustrate with a brief sketch of one type of sociospatial experience, namely, crowdedness.

Nature is not ordinarily perceived to be crowded. Not only is this true of the great open space but also of forested wilderness. A boulder field is a solitary place however densely it might be packed with boulders; forests and fields are a joy of 'openness' to the city man even though they are certain to strongly with pulsating urban life. Even people do not make a crowd if they seem to be part of the environment, as, for example, when we consider that they appear to be on a map. The arrow symbolizes his lived-space, which is also his lived-time. If, instead of an oil tanker one thinks of a ship embarking on a voyage of discovery, the arrows become the tracks that set the course of a ship. On maps that depict historical movements, the arrows appear to show mere routes in space; but they also represent the temporal dimension. Months, and perhaps years, have lapsed between the stem and the tip of the arrow. For the individual seaman, the journey takes them not only to a place that can be marked on the map, but to a point later in time that can be shown on the calendar, but a place that symbolizes their future.
then is lower than it is later in the stadium itself. The two poets of nature sense each other’s presence as obstruction because each requires, in psychological necessity, the entire field to himself; their purposes conflict despite the fact that they are identical. In the stadium, the eyes of the spectators are all turned to the same event; by focusing on the event the remainder of the visual field, including their neighbours, becomes so unimportant.

A well-attended ball game and a mass political or religious rally see alike in that the crowds do not detract, but enhance the significance of the event: vast numbers of people do not necessarily generate the feeling of spatial oppressiveness. On the other hand, a large classroom packed with students may well create a sense of overcrowding, even though — as in the ball game or political rally — the students’ eyes are all focused on a performance occurring beyond the space they themselves occupy. Superficially and objectively the situations are alike — crowd on the one side and an event of narrow focus on the other — but psychologically they are worlds apart. The student feels that ideally learning is a mutually dialogue between the teacher and himself; the more packed the classroom the further it deviates from the perceived ideal, and hence the more urgent the sense of crowding.

Where peasant farmers are barely able to eke out a livelihood on limited land, one might think that the sense of crowding would be prevalent. Yet it is possible that the half-starved peasants do not see it that way. Foremost in their minds are too many mouth to feed and not enough food to go around, but these facts do not add up to the sensation of crowding. To see the farmyard bustling with the activities of one’s own half-starved children is to feel oppressed by fate and a sense of inadequacy rather than that there are too many people. Crowding, in this situation, would be the result of rational calculation, not a direct perception. The direct perception of crowding occurs when, for example, a person, desperately in need of a job, pushes open the door of the employment office and finds long lines of people waiting.

II.6. Mythical-conceptual Space

In distinction to the types of felt space described thus far, the space that I call ‘mythical-conceptual’ (see Figures 3 and 4) is more the product of the preverbal mind. On the scale of historical experience, it occupies a position between the space of sense perception and the space of pure cognition (geometrical). Mythical-conceptual space is still bound to the ego and to direct experience but it extrapolates beyond sensory evidence and immediate needs to a more abstract structure of the world. The defect of distance from immediate needs is more than compensated by the ability of mythical-conceptual space to satisfy the stable and recurrent needs of a large community.

Different types of mythical-conceptual space exist. One type is of outstanding importance because it is both sophisticated and widespread: this is the space that is focused on the centre (the place of men) and partitioned by a system of cardinal directions (Durkheim and Mauss, 1947; Marcus, 1973; Miller, 1961; Whithney, 1971). Among the scattered tribes and nations in the New World, and among the disparate peoples in the ancient civilized centres of the Orient, we find space organized according to the same broad principles of centre, cardinal directions and the four quarters. The spatial co-ordinates are but a part of a total world view that embraces the cyclical rounds of nature, the constituent elements of the world, animals, people and social institutions. Spatial co-ordinates provide the extensive frame to which the less tangible experiences in nature and society can relate. The centre of the universe is the human order. Mythical-conceptual space is egregiously anthropo-centric. It differs from personal experiential space, not only in conceptual complexity, but also in the enormous scale of its anthropocentrism. Instead of subsuming a sector of perceived space to the needs of the moment, the entire universe is conceptually organized around the world of man. The system thus conceived is so large and elaborate that, paradoxically, the human king-pin — from a certain perspective — appears only as one gear in the total mechanism. However, only from one certain perspective can the people of non-literate and traditional societies claim that their world view recognizes the necessity for human beings to submit and adapt to the forces of nature; from the standpoint of their world view’s organizing principle, it is the universe that is adapting to man. The pueblo Indians of the American Southwest, for example, believe that people should not attempt to dominate nature. Yet their world view is conceptually highly anthropocentric. As Leslie White describes it, “Earth is the center and principal object of the cosmos. Sun, moon, stars, Milky Way ends ascenders to the earth. Their function is to make the earth habitable for mankind” (1942, p. 80).

A central theme in this survey of space is the bond between space and the human existential body: implicates space; spatial measures are derived from the dimensions of the body; spatial qualities are characterized as static, dynamic and attractive, and spatial and horizontal, low and high, near and far are sharply cined to being by the human possessive; depth and distance are a function of the human sense of purpose and adequacy; ‘knowledge’ is less an expression of density than a psychological condition. Mythical space is a sophisticated product of
the mind answering the needs of the communal group. Conceptualisation pro-
gressively removes spatial structures from the unstable requirements of the
individual ego and, even from the times of culture, so that in their most
ethereal form they appear in the maps of thought, webs, creations of the disembodied intelligence, maps of the mind — and hence, maps of nature insofar as
mind is a part of nature.

Fig. 3. Epic and ethnocentric orientations of space (I) and (II), illustrating increasing
cartographic sophistication at the service of prevalent self-centered viewpoints, necessity
to practical life: A: personal processes and spatial demonstration; (B): More socio-spatial
categories (after Ewen-Prainard, 1940); (C): the world of Heavens (l. 320 BC); (D):
religious cosmography in East Asia; (E): Venus (California Indian) idea of the world (after
Mitterman, 1920); (F): T-O map, after Eilmer, Bishop of Seville (AD 570-636); (G): Land
and wave hemispheres centred on northern France; (H): Map with azimuthal logarithmic
distance scale, centred on central Sweden (after Huygens, 1652).
III.2. Meaning of Place

III.2.1. Spirit and Personality. A key to the meaning of place lies in the expressions that people use when they want to give it a sense carrying greater emotional charge than location or functional role. People talk of the 'spirit', the 'personality' and the 'sense' of place. We can take 'spirit' in the literal sense: space is físicamente and profane except for the site that 'stands out' because spirits are believed to dwell in them. These are the sacred places. They command sê. 'Personality' suggests the unique: places, like human beings, acquire unique signatures in the course of time. A human personality is a fusion of natural disposition and acquired traits. Loosely speaking, the personality of place is a composite of natural endowment (the physique of the land) and the modifications wrought by successive generations of human beings. France, according to Vital de la Blache (1903), Britain, according to Cyril Fox (1922), and Mexico, according to Carl Buer (1941), have 'personality'. These regions have acquired unique 'faces' through the prolonged interaction between nature and man. Despite the accretion of experience the child
is recognisable in the overall; and so too the structural lineaments of a region—its division into highland, and earth, and south—remain visible through the successive phases of change.

Personality has two aspects: one commands awe, the other evokes affec-
tion. The personality that commands awe appears as something sublime and objective, existing independently of things and aspirations. Such is the
personality of monumental art and holy places. Powerful manifestations of
nature, like the Grand Canyon and the Matterhorn, are also commanding personali-
ties. But in plain, place-like affections has personality in the
same sense that an old rainbow can be said to have character. The character
of the rainbow is imparted by the person who wears it and grows fond of it.
The rainbow is for us, and yet in time it acquires a personality, a certain
warped' shape and smell that is uniquely its own. So too a place, through
long association with human beings, take on the familiar contours of an
old but still nurturing memory. When the geographer talks of the personality of
a region, he may have both aspects in mind. The region can be both cozy and
sublime: it is deeply humanised and yet the physical fundament is fundamen-
tally indifferent to human purpose.

III.2. A sense of place. Place may be said to have 'spirit' or 'personality',
but only human beings can have a sense of place. People decorate their
sense of place when they apply their moral and aesthetic dispositions to sites
and locations. Modern man, it is often claimed, has lost this sensitivity. He
transgresses against the genius loci because he fails to recognise it; and he fails
to recognise it because the blandness of much modern environment combined
with the ethos of human dominance has stunted the cultivation of place
awareness.

Sense, as in a sense of place, has two meanings. One is visual or aesthetic.
The eye needs to be trained so that it can distinguish beauty where it exists; on
the other hand beautiful places need to be created to please the eye. From
one limited pool of view, places are locations that have visual impact. On
a flat plain, the Buttes and sloss are places; in a rugged rock landscape, the flat
pikes are places. However, other than the all-important eye, the world is
known through and by the senses of hearing, smell, taste, and touch. These senses
unlike the visual, require close contact and long association with the environ-
ment. It is possible to appreciate the visual qualities of a town in an after-
noon's tour, but to know the town's characteristic odour and sounds, the
textures of its streets, requires a far longer period of contact.

To sense is to know: so we say 'he senses it', or 'she catches the sense of it'.

To see an object is to have it at the focus of one's vision; it is explicit know-
ing. I see the church on the hill, I know it is there, and it is a place for me.
But one can have a sense of place, in perhaps the deeper meaning of the term,
without any attempt at explicit formulation. We can know a place subcon-
sciously, through touch and remembered fragrances, unaided by the discrimi-
ating eye. While the eye takes in a lovely street scene and intelligence categor-
ises it, our hand feels the iron of the school fence and stores subliminally its
eoarrays and resistance in our memory (Santmyer, 1962, p. 50). Through
such modest means we can acquire in time a profound sense of place. Yet it is
possible to be fully aware of our attachment to a place only when we have
left it and can see it as a whole from a distance.

III.3. Stability and Place

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T.S. Eliot, The Four Quartets

An argument in favour of travel is that it increases awareness, not of exotic
places but of home as a place. To identify wholly with the ambience of
a place is to lose the sense of its unique identity, which is revealed only when
one can also see it from the outside. To be always on the move is, of course,
to lose place, to be meaningless and have, instead, merely scenes and images. A
scene may be of a place but the scene itself is not a place. It lacks stability; it
is in the nature of a scene to shift with every change of perspective. A scene is
defined by its perspective whereas this is not true of place: it is in the nature
of place to appear to have a stable existence independent of the perceiver.

A place is the compelling focus of a field: it is a small world, the node
at which activities converge. Hence, a street is not commonly called a place,
however sharp its visual identity. L'Etiole (Place of Charles de Gaulle) is a
place but the Champs-Elysees is not: one is a node, the other is a thoroughway.
A street corner is a place but the street itself is not. As we have noted earlier,
an street is directed, historical space: on the horizontal plane, only non-directed
homogeneous spaces can be place. When a street is transformed into a centre
of festivities, with people milling around in no particular direction, it becomes
non-directed space—and a place. A great ocean liner is certainly a small world,
but it is not rooted in location; hence it is not a place. These are not arbitrary
judgments. They are supported by the common use and understanding of
language. It is a great wit who asks: "When is this place (the Queen Mary) going to New York?"

III.A. Types of Place

In the discussion on the personality and sense of place, I distinguished between places that yield their meaning to the eye, and places that are known only after prolonged experience. I shall call the one type 'public symbols', and the other 'fields of care' (Wild, 1963, p. 47). Public symbols tend to have high imaginability because they often enter to the eye. Fields of care do not seek to protect an image to outsiders; they are inconspicuous visually. Public symbols command attention and even awe; fields of care evoke affection. It is relatively easy to identify places that are public symbols; it is difficult to identify fields of care for they are not easily identifiable by external criteria, such as formal structure, physical appearance, and articulate opinion (see Table II).

Obviously, many — perhaps most — places are both public symbols and fields of care in varying degrees. The Arch of Triumph is exclusively a symbol, the secluded farmhouse, the focus of bustling rural activities, is exclusively a field of care. But the city may be a public (national) symbol as well as a field of care, and the neighbourhood may be a field of care and a public symbol, a place that tourists want to see. What do the Arch of Triumph and the secluded farmhouse have in common so that both may be called places? I believe the answer to that is, in its own way, a small world, i.e., a centre of power and meaning relative to its environs. With a monument the question that arises is how a lifeless object can seem to be a vital centre of meaning. With a field of care the question is one of maintenance, that is, what forces its experience, function, and religion can sustain coherent meaning in a field of care that does not depend on external visual symbols?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Places as public symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(high imaginability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sacred place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal garden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monument</td>
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<tr>
<td>monumental architecture</td>
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<td>public square</td>
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III.5. Public Symbols

In the ancient world, as well as among many non-literate peoples, the landscape was rich in sacred places (White, 1907). Let a thunderbolt strike the ground and the Romans regarded it as holy, a spot that emitted power and should be fouched off (Fowler, 1911, pp. 36-7; Wisnow, 1912, 467-8, 477, 515). In ancient Greece Sirâbo's description suggests that one could hardly step out of doors without meeting a shrine, a sacred enclosure, an image, a sacred stone or a tree (Book 8, p. 12). Spirits populated the mountains and forests of China. Some were endowed with human pedigrees and carried official rank (Be Grove, 1892, p. 225). Although an entire landscape could embody power (Scilly, 1962, p. 3), yet it was often the case that spirits lent number to particular localities at which they received periodic homage. Examples of the holy place can be multiplied endlessly from all parts of the world. The essential point is that location, not necessarily remarkable in itself, nonetheless acquires high visibility and meaning because it harbours, or embodies, spirit. (Ellide, 1963, pp. 367-8; Van der Leeu, 1963, pp. 393-402). The belief system of many cultures encourages one to speak, literally, of the spirit of place. Modern secular society discourages belief in a spirit, whether of nature or of the illustrious dead, but traces of it still linger in people's attitude toward burial places, particularly those of national importance, and of course in the attitudes of ancient preservationists who tend to view wilderness areas, nature's cathedrals, as sacred. Wilderness areas in the United States are sacred places with well-defined boundaries, into which one enters with, metaphorically speaking, unholy feet.

Public monuments create places by giving prominence and an air of singularity to localities (Figure 5). Monument building is a characteristic activity of all high civilizations (Johnson, 1968). Since the nineteenth century, however, monument building has declined and with it the effort to generate focus of interest (places) that promote local and national pride. Most monuments of modern times commemorate heroes, but there are important exceptions. St. Louis' Gateway Arch (St. Louis, United States), for example, commemorates a pregnant period in the city's, and nation's, history. Public squares often display monuments and they are also a type of 'sacred area', in the sense that they may be dedicated to heroic figures and transposed purely utilitarian ends. Certain public buildings are also symbolic: the Houses of Parliament, Chartres Cathedral, the Empire State Building, and, in the United States, the palatial railway stations. To modern geographers, it may seem lax usage to call monum ent s and buildings 'places', just like streets and cities, but this reflects our
parochialism and distance from phenomenological reality. Eighteenth-century geographers of the early seventeenth century did not labour under such constraints and freely described towns and buildings at the same level of concreteness (Robinson, 1973). Cities are of course places, and ideal cities are also monuments and symbols. In the second world war, Coventry and Hiroshima were destroyed but Oxford and Kyoto were spared from serial destruction (Lifton, 1967, p. 16). Thus the cultural and historical significance (the symbolic value) of Oxford and Kyoto was recognized even by the enemy. This recognition by the outsider is characteristic of places that are public symbols.

Monuments, artworks, buildings and cities are places because they can organize space into centres of meaning. People project meaning and are the centres of their own worlds, but how can things made of stone, brick, and metal appear to possess life, wrap (so to speak) space around them and become places, centres of value and significance (Norberg-Schulz, 1975)? The answer is not difficult with buildings and cities for these are primarily fields of care, habitats for people who endow them with meaning in the course of time. Buildings and cities can, however, also be considered as works of art, as piles of stones that create places. How they are able to do this is the problem for philosophers of art: that they have this power is a matter for experience. A single immaculate object, useless in itself, can appear to be the focus of a world. As the poet Wallace Stevens (1965, p. 76) put it:

I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.
It made the slowness wilderness
Surround that hill.
The wilderness rose up to it,
And sprawled around, no longer wild.
The jar was round upon the ground
And tall and of a port in air.
It took dominion everywhere.
The jar was gray and bare.
It did not go of bird or bush,
Like nothing else in Tennessee.

Only the human person can command a world. The art object can seem to do so because tax form, as Susanne Langer (1953, p. 40) would say, is symbolic of human feeling. Perhaps this can be put more strongly; personhood is incar-

ate in a piece of sculpture; and by virtue of this fact it seems to be the

centre of its own world. Though a statue is an object in our perceptual space, we see it as the centre of a space all its own. If sculpture is personal feeling,
made visible, then a building is an entire functional realm made visible, tangible, and sensible: it is the embodiment of the life of a culture. Thus monuments and buildings can be said to have vitality and spirit. The spirit of place is applicable to them, but in a sense different from holy places in which spirits are believed to dwell literally.

Some symbols transcend the bounds of a particular culture: for example, such large architectural forms as the square and the circle, used to define ideal (cosmic) cities, and such smaller architectural elements as the spire, the arch, and the dome, used in buildings with cosmic pretensions (Moholy-Nagy, 1968). Certain structures persist as places through ages of time; they appear to defy the paternity of particular cultures. Perhaps any overpowering texture in the landscape creates its own world, which may expand or contract with the passing moods of the people, but which never completely loses its identity. Ayer’s Rock in the heart of Australia, for example, dominated the mythical and perceptual field of the aborigines who lived there, but it remains a place for modern Australians who are drawn to visit the monolith by its awe-inspiring image. Stonehenge is an architectural example. No doubt it is less a place for British tourists than for its original builders: time has caused its decay, no less than its stones, to erode, but nonetheless Stonehenge is still very much a place (Dubos, 1972, pp. 113-34; Newcomb, 1967). What happens is that a large monument like Stonehenge carries both general and specific import: the specific import changes in time whereas the general import remains. The Gateway Arch of St Louis, for example, has the general import of “hallowed dome” and “gate” that transcends American history (Smith, 1950), but it also has the specific import of a unique period in American history, namely, the opening of the West to settlement. Enduring places, of which there are very few in the world, speak to humanity. Most public symbols cannot survive the decay of their particular cultural matrix, from the departure of Britain from Egypt, the statues of Queen Victoria no longer command worlds but merely stand in the way of traffic. In the course of time, most public symbols lose their status in places and merely clutter up space.

III.6. Fields of Care

Public symbols can be seen and known from the outside: indeed, with monuments there is no inside view. Fields of care, by contrast, carry few signs that declare their nature: they can be known in essence only from within. Human beings establish fields of care, networks of interpersonal concerns, in sympathy

setting (Wagner, 1972). From the viewpoint that they are places, two questions arise. One is, to what degree is the field of care emotionally tied to the physical setting? The other is, are the people aware of the identity and limits of their world? The field of care is indubitably also a place if the people are emotionally bound to their material environment, and if, further, they are conscious of its identity and spatial limits.

Human relationships require material objects for sustenance and deepening. Personality itself depends on a minimum of material possessions, including the possession of intimate space. Even the most humble object can serve to objectify feelings: like words — only more permanent — they are exchanged as tokens of affective bond. The sharing of intimate space is another such expression. But these myriad objects and intimate spaces do not necessarily add up to place. The nature of the relationship between interpersonal ties on the one hand and the space over which they extend on the other is far from simple. Youth gangs have strong interpersonal ties, and they have a strong sense of the limits of space; gang members know well where their “turf” ends and that of another begins. Yet they have no sense of affection for the space they are willing to defend. When better opportunity calls from the outside world, the local turf — known to the gang members themselves for its shoddiness — is abandoned without regret (Eisental, 1949; Suttles, 1968). Strong interpersonal ties require objects: English gypsies, for example, are ardent collectors of coins and old family photographs (Lynch, 1972, p. 40). But the resilience of the gypsies shows that the net of human concern does not require emotional anchoring in a particular locality for its strength. Home is wherever we happen to be, as all carefree young lovers know. Place is position in society as well as location in space: gypsies and young lovers are placers in both senses of the word and they do not much care.

The emotion felt among human beings finds expression and anchorage in things and places. It can be said to create things and places to the extent that, in its glow, they acquire extra meaning. The dissolution of the human bond can cause the loss of meaning in the material environment. St Augustine left his birthplace, Thagaste, for Carthage when his closest friend died in young manhood. “My heart was now darkness by grief, and everywhere I looked I saw death. My native haunts became a scene of torture to me, and my own home a misery. Without him everything we had done together turned into a crucifying ordeal. My eyes kept looking for him without finding him. I hated all the places where we used to meet, because they could no longer say to me, ‘Look, here he comes’, as they once did’” (Confessions, Book 4: pp. 4-9). On the other hand, it is well known that the dissolution of a human
bond can cause a heightening of sentimental attachment to material objects and places because they then seem the only means through which the dead can still speak. Sense of place turns morbid when it depends wholly on the memory of past human relationships.

What are the means by which affective bond reaches beyond human beings to place? One is repeated experience: the feel of place gets under our skin in the course of day-to-day contact (Rasmussen, 1962). The feel of the pavement, the smell of the morning air, and the color of patterns foliage becomes, through long acquaintance, extension of ourselves—not just a backdrop but supporting actors in the human drama. Repetition is of the essence: home is "a place where every day is multiplied by days before it" (Stark, 1948, p. 55). The functional pattern of our lives is capable of establishing a sense of place. In carrying out the daily routines we go regularly from one point to another, following established paths, so that in time a web of nodes and their links is imprinted in our perceptual systems and affects our bodily expectations. A "habitat field", not necessarily one that we can picture, is thus established: in it we move comfortably with the minimal challenge of choice. But the strongest bond to place is of a religious nature. The tie is one of kinship, reaching back in time from proximate ancestors to distant semi-divine heroes, to the gods of the family hearth and of the city divinities. A mysterious community exists between the soil and the gods: so break it would be an act of impiety. This religious tie to place has almost completely disappeared from the modern world. traces of it are left in the rhetoric of nationalism in which the state itself, rather than particular places, is addressed as 'fatherland' or 'mother land' (Gellner, 1975; Dobb, 1966). Religion is maintained by rites and celebrations; these, in turn, strengthen the emotional links between people and sacred places. Ceremonies as such demarcate time, that is, stages in the human life cycle, seasons in the year, and major events in the life of a nation; but notwithstanding this temporal priority celebrations, wherever they occur, lend character to place. The progressive decline in the sense of place, then, is the result of various factors, among them being the denigration of the gods; the looseness of local networks of human concern, with their intense emotional involvements that could have extended to place; the loss of intimate contact with the physical setting in an age when people seldom meet and almost never loiter; and the decline of meaningful celebrations, that is, those that are tinged with religious sentiment and tied to localities (James, 1981).

Unlike public symbols, fields of ease lack visual identity. Outsiders find it difficult to recognise and delimit, for example, neighbourhoods which are a type of the field of care (Keller, 1968). Planners may believe an area to be a neighbourhood, and label it as such on the ground that it is the same kind of physical environment and people come from a similar socio-economic class, only to discover that the local residents do not recognise the area as a neighbourhood: the parts with which they identify may be much smaller, for instance, a single street or an intersection (Gann, 1962, p. 11). Moreover, although the residents of an area may have a simple sense of place, this sense is not necessarily self-conscious. Awareness is not self-awareness. Total immersion in an environment means to open one's eyes, as it were, to all its qualities, but it also means ignorance of the fact that one's place as a whole has a personality distinct from that of all other places. As Dandoni puts it (1952, p. 47):

La réalité géographique exige une sélection et toute la vie affective, son corps, ses habitudes, qu'il y ait autre de l'habitat, comme il peut oublier une pierre vivante. Elle est protégée, cachée, et une nouvelle. L'homogénéité, l'individualité, l'environnement de l'habitat et le sont aussi par le milieu de la population, de la population, de la population, de la population, de la population. La nostalgie fait apparaître le pays comme absolu, sur le fond d'un dépôt, une continuité possible. Cf. etc. le géographique comme intériorité, comme pays, et le géographique tout externe du matériel.

The sense of place is perhaps never more acute than when one is homesick, and one can only be homesick when one is no longer at home (Starobinski, 1966). However, the loss of place need not be literal. The threat of loss is sufficient. Residents not only sense but know that their world has an identity and a boundary when they feel threatened, as when people of another race wants to move in, so where the area is the target of highway construction or urban renewal (Sutinen, 1972). Identity is defined in competition and in conflict with others: this seems true of both individuals and communities (Figure 6). We owe our sense of being not only to supportive forces but also to those that pose a threat. Being has a centre and an edge: supportive forces encircle the centre while threatening forces strengthen the edge. In geographical language, hell hovers with places that have sharply drawn—indeed fortified—boundaries but no centre worthy of defence; heaven is full of glowing centres with the vaguest boundaries; earth is a treasy compromise of the two realms.

III.7. What is a Place?

The infant's place is in the crib, and the place of the crawling child is under the grand piano. Place can be as small as the corner of a room or large as the
earth itself: that earth is our place in the universe is a simple fact of obser-
vation to hominid astronauts. Location can become place overnight, so to
speak, through the ingenuity of architects and engineers. A striking monu-
mental creates place; a carnival transforms temporarily an abandoned stock-
yard or cosalfied into place; Disneyland is permanent carnivals, places
created out of wholecloth. On the other hand, places are locations in which
people have long memories, reaching back beyond the indelible impressions
of their own individual childhoods to the common lore of bygone gener-
ations. One may argue that engineers create localities but time is needed to
create place (Lorenz, 1966; Lynch, 1972). It is obvious that most defi-
nitions of place are quite arbitrary. Geographers tend to think of place as hav-
ing the size of a settlement: the places within it may be counted a place, but
usually not the individual houses, and certainly not that old rocking chair by
the fireplace. Architects think on a smaller scale. To many of them places are
homes, shopping centers, and public squares that can be taken from the draw-
ing board and planted on earth; time, far from creating place, is a threat to
the pristine design of their handiworks. To poets, moralists, and historians,
places are not only the highly visible public symbols but also the fields of care
in which time is of the essence, since time is needed to accumulate experience
and build up care. All places are small worlds: the sense of a world, however,
may be called forth by art (the jar placed on the hill) as much as by the
intangible net of human relations. Places may be public symbols or fields of
care, but the power of the symbols to create place depends ultimately on the
human emotions that vibrate in a field of care. Disneyland, to take one
example, draws on the capital of sentiments that has accumulated in incon-
spicuous small worlds elsewhere and in other times.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Space and place tie at the core of our discipline. From the positivist perspec-
tive, geography is the analysis of spatial organization. From the humanist per-
spective, space and place take on rather different characteristics. Showing
what these are in a coherent structure is the humanist's task. It is true that
"The modern science of geography derives from man's sense of place", then
the humanist geographer would ask, "What is this sense of place on which
we have not only erected a spatial geography of considerable elegance
but, more important, on which we still depend for the decisions and acts in
our daily lives?" Unlike the spatial analyst, who must begin by making

Fig. 6. The 'we-they' syndrome in the definition of space. Among people of the lower
middle socio-economic class: A: the 'we-they' distinctions tend to be clearly recognized
at the local and national (superiority) levels. The suspicion of strangers and foreigners
extends to their lands. Among the cosmopolitans and highly educated types: B: the home
base is broadened beyond the local neighborhood to a region, and nationalism (national
boundary) is transcendent by familiarity with the international life style.
simplifying assumptions concerning man, the humanist begins with a deep commitment to the understanding of human nature in all its intricacy. The relevance of positivist and humanist geography to each other appears to be this. To the humanist, positivist concepts are themselves material for further thought because they represent for him an extra-critical example of the universal human tendency toward abstraction. It is not only the social scientist but the man in the street who constantly shuns direct experience and its implications in favour of the abstract typologies of space, place, and people (Schutz, 1970, p. 90). The broad aim of the humanist geographer must be: Given human nature and the direct experience of space and place in the ordinary world, how can men have conceived different worlds, more or less abstract, among which being the maps of utopias and the geographer's own concepts of location? As distinct from the concepts, the conclusions of the positivist geographer are of primary interest to the humanist because, like the findings of other scientists, they show him the limits to human freedom that he cannot otherwise know. Do the works of the humanist have any value for the positivist? I suggest that they do for two reasons. One is that they draw attention to, and clarify, certain kinds of human experience, at least some of which may be amenable to the positivist's own methods of research. The second reason is that humanist findings bring about a new self-knowledge. The promotion of self-knowledge is perhaps the ultimate value of the humanist; and we are told on good authority that the unexamined life is not worth living.

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NOTES

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


