

POLITICS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF A NATURAL SCIENTIST

BOHUMIL FIŠER

CONTENTS

Foreword - Assoc. Prof. Zdeněk Koudelka, Ph.D.

Politics from the Viewpoint of a Natural Scientist - Prof. Bohumil Fišer, M.D.

1. Natural and Social Laws
2. Empires and Efficiency
3. The 20th-century German Empire
4. Russia and the Soviet Union
5. War of the Dictatorships
6. The Physiology of Dictatorship
7. Dictatorship Against Democracy: USSR vs. USA
8. Politics and the Czech Republic
9. The End of Politics, or the Clash of Civilizations
10. Summary

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Foreword

I greatly respect Bohumil Fišer. He is a person who reached the height of his career in the field of medical science when he earned the title of professor at Masaryk University in Brno. He was also drawn to politics, and here as well, as a Social Democrat, he achieved a prominent position as minister of health in the cabinet of Miloš Zeman from February 9, 2000 to July 12, 2002. He is a record holder, because no health minister since November of 1989 has remained in office longer. This speaks to the qualities of Bohumil Fišer, as well as to the difficulty of managing this ministry. Bohumil Fišer is a role model and an informal voice of authority for many Social Democrats in Brno and in Moravia. He is a role model for me as well. I admire his ability to correctly identify and capture the essence of complex political events.

I welcome the aim of Jošt Academy to devote itself to political and political science literature, and I consider it fortunate that the newly published *Reflections on Politics* contains Bohumil Fišer's text, "Politics from the Viewpoint of a Natural Scientist." The text brings to readers a non-traditional theory on political processes in a wider historical context from the point of view of a person who is a doctor by profession, and thus a natural scientist. The work itself, however, demonstrates his knowledge of the social sciences. Fišer's work is a readable essay. Bohumil Fišer delivers an interesting and new view on past political events, and extrapolates a possible explanation of current happenings.

Brno, February 9, 2011

Zdeněk Koudelka

Politics from the Viewpoint of a Natural Scientist

Prof. Bohumil Fišer, PhD

1 Natural and Social Laws

The progress of society in the current epoch, just like the standard of living of the greater part of the population of our planet, is determined by the application of natural laws that were discovered by scientific workers in the fields of natural sciences. The generation of energy applies the laws of electromagnetism, thermodynamics, and, in some cases, nuclear physics. Air and ship transportation is the applied laws of aerodynamics and hydromechanics. Particularly illustrative is the case of the development of communications technology. In the 19th century, James Clerk Maxwell formulated four famous theories of electromagnetism. They mathematically reach a conclusion about the existence of electromagnetic waves that propagate through the atmosphere and in a vacuum. Heinrich Hertz attempted to prove the existence of these waves in experiments. Then, all that was needed was to technically perfect Hertz's device for creating electromagnetic waves and his instrument for recording them, and the radio was discovered, followed a few decades later by the invention of the television. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, it was mainly about applying physical laws. It is thus not surprising that the discoverer of the atomic nucleus, Ernest Rutherford, says: "All science is either physics or stamp collecting." But at the beginning of the 20th century, chemistry is connected with tumultuous advancement, and new products resulting from chemical research enter our lives. Mendel's Laws on inheritance, through their revelation of the genetic code in the middle of the 20th century, can be appreciated on the basis of an analysis of chemical processes. Biology, chemistry and physics are ceasing to fundamentally differ in the methods of study used in their individual branches. Their application is currently transforming our agriculture, and thus food production, just as much as medical science. At the outset of the development of individual fields of science, the results of leading scientific workers were not accepted without quarrel.

Galileo Galilei introduced experimentation to physics. Astronomers before him such as Nicholas Copernicus, Jan Kepler and Tycho de Brahe, used only the method of observation to create a mathematical model of the universe at a time when the relatively

precise calculations of the Earth's radius made 1,500 years earlier by the Greek Eratosthenes working in Alexandria had been forgotten. But Galileo Galilei was the first experimenter when he rolled balls along an inclined plane. Later, when he correctly described the universe, he was condemned by the Inquisition and forced under torture to repudiate his ideas. Even today -- more than one hundred years after its discovery -- Darwinian evolution through natural selection is called into question, even though not one fact exists that would overturn it, and even despite the existence of experimentally-derived evidence, such as a bacteria's development of resistance to antibiotics. Objections are raised on the basis of an interpretation of a text written more than two thousand years ago, and they are taken seriously by many individuals in high places. The relationship between science and society is not a simple one in the field of natural sciences. It cannot therefore be expected that the use of an approach common to natural sciences in a field of social science will be without dissent.

Not all the results of natural science experiments are unequivocal. There are also phenomena that we observe and know to be manifestations of physical laws, such as earthquakes or atmospheric phenomena, which we cannot correctly predict. We know, though, that they are the result of the effects of several factors, and we anticipate that, through a detailed study of them, we will come to a deeper understanding.

The question is whether we can uncover any constancy in political evolution. In other words, do several significant factors exist that determine political progression? We shall attempt to find an answer.

The study of politics is reserved for experts in the field of social sciences -- people, on the whole, who are deeply rooted in philosophy. In addition to these philosophers, historians and political scientists, the problem of political decision-making also occupies sociologists who, in the context of Max Weber, are oriented toward analyzing statistical data, and economists who analyze the impact of the state's economic decisions.

The result of this approach is a computation of the factors playing a role in the formation of political judgments. Experts do not agree in their predictions, because each factor has a different effect, and it depends on which of them is weighted more than others. The science of politics is at the stage of Rutherford's stamp collecting. It seldom deviates toward the formulation of fundamental constants determining political evolution. One attempt at determining social evolution was made by Karl Marx in his manuscript A

Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in 1859: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness." In short: Economic existence determines consciousness. The elaboration of this idea brought millions of followers to the Marxist camp. Its results led to dictatorship and a centrally controlled economy. A centrally controlled economy did not ensure a better level of economic existence. On the way to confirming Marx's theory, the communist experiment crashed, taking Marx's other prognoses down with it. Even if we can think that Marx's view on existence and consciousness is correct, today it is not possible to consider Marx an authority in the formulation of constants of social evolution. Perhaps his ideas are a part of the history of social sciences, but nothing more. Let us have a look at other researchers. We shall return to Darwin. His theory on the origin of humankind through the gradual evolution of a common ancestor of humans and primates found repeated confirmation in the anthropological discoveries of missing links and their dating, as well as in the analysis of genomes. It is called into doubt not by scientific facts, but by those who do not wish to abandon their religious notion of human creation by an intelligent creator, and by those who question everything under the slogan that the evidence is not conclusive, and the current state of knowledge does not allow Darwin's theory to be accepted. Such an approach is unscientific, even when someone who declares it has, as a scientific worker in a certain field, obtained the recognition of the international scientific community. The 20th-century theoretical scientist Karl Popper, a British philosopher born in Austria, stresses that science represents the refutation of (phony) scientific hypotheses. We cannot prove any hypothesis; we can only refute its validity by finding facts that do not conform to the hypothesis.

In the case of Darwin's hypothesis on the origin of humans, such a fact does not exist. The alternative hypothesis calls for the intervention of a supernatural being. Science does not concern itself with supernatural phenomena. From the perspective of current scientific knowledge, Darwin's theory is unassailable. Of course, this does not mean that it will not be further expounded upon by additional details as new facts are discovered. The development of civilization long remained without a theory. There was a description of the evolution of civilizations in various parts of the world, mainly on the basis of archeological finds and written archives. It is a worthy scientific effort belonging to the category of stamp collecting as described by Rutherford. It does not answer the question:

Why? Here science was on a level similar to that of biology at the end of the 18th century when it was conceptualized by Carl Lineé, a renowned scientist laid to rest in the cathedral of the Swedish city of Uppsala. He is also known as the father of the biological classification of plants and animals. Contemporary biology is represented, for example, by Richard Dawkins from Oxford and American Edward O. Wilson. On the basis of the evolutionary theory of natural selection, their sociobiology explains animal behavior that is genetically determined, thus enabling a certain type of animal to survive. Direct application to human social behavior remains controversial. That which is not controversial is the logic of the system, which explains the variety of biological species. Here understanding moves from description to a higher form of comprehension -- to explanation.

In the area of the historical evolution of society, a bold step toward explaining the development of civilizations has been taken by American physiologist Jared Diamond in the bestsellers *The Third Chimpanzee*¹, *Guns, Germs and Steel*², and *Collapse*³. Diamond explains the rises and falls of the human race, the fates of human communities, and the ways in which human societies choose between demise and success. He lucidly argues that it is natural conditions (e.g., the abundance of game, the fertility of the soil, sources of raw materials, the presence of animals suitable for domestication) that determine a society's evolution, and not factors such as race or religion. His contribution to the advancement of our understanding has thus far not been fully recognized, even though many indicate that Diamond's work represents an extension of Darwin's Theory of Evolution of species as a theory of evolution of society. Diamond's work explains the evolution of society, but it does not concern itself with the political steps that determine our modern history and political present. This is what I will attempt to do in this work. What is encouraging for an author who is, by profession, a physiologist with a deep interest in practical politics that led him for a time into public office, is the fact that the education of Diamond and that of the author are similar. Even though Diamond is neither a historian nor a political scientist, he presents an analysis of society's evolution that is not naive, and which is fully acceptable for any intelligent reader. The inherent laws of biology differ from those of politics. Clearly, a lack of philosophical, historiographic, political and sociological training must lead to some simplified conclusions. On the

¹ JARED DIAMOND: *The third Chimpanzee*, HarperCollins New York 1993.

² JARED DIAMOND: *Guns, Germs and Steel*, W. W. Norton New York 1997.

³ JARED DIAMOND: *Collapse*, Penquin Group, New York 2005.

other hand, a knowledge of the inherent laws of biology allows a critical point of view from the outside that experts on society are missing. A lack of sociological training will certainly lead to errors in the interpretation of facts, and to inaccuracies, and here the reader is kindly asked to accept an apology. On the other hand, the fundamental ideas must be formulated in a way such that the facts, in the sense of Popper's approach, do not refute them. This is what the author must also attempt.

Nature is governed by natural laws that are formulated by scientists. Are politics also governed by inherent laws? If so, then they differ from the laws of Nature. However, if we do not attempt to formulate them, we remain at Rutherford's stamp collecting, just as with biology at the end of the 18th century.

We will start with a description of the factors that determine political decision-making. But before this, we must linger for a moment on a definition of politics. Politics means the art of governing the state (in Greece, the state was understood to mean the city state, the polis). Political decisions thus lead to the attainment or maintenance of power in the state, and, in the next step, to implementing measures that influence people's lives. Some groups of people will see the change as positive, others as negative. Historians describe an entire series of factors determining political decisions, including a politician's education and his state of health. If these factors were the most significant, it would mean that laws determining political decisions do not exist, and the forecasting ability of the theory would be nil. We shall attempt to show that this is not so.

Every scientific theory presents a simplified model of reality. Science attempts to explain a given phenomenon in the simplest way. In the first half of the 14th century, the Franciscan monk William of Ockham formulated a principle known as Ockham's Razor. If a certain factor is not essential to the explanation of a specific phenomenon, then a scientist should not take its influence into account. In other words, Ockham's Razor slices away everything that is not needed. Albert Einstein greatly prized this principle, even though he did not always adhere to it, as the following episode demonstrates. The simplest solution to Einstein's theory of general relativity was the one assuming an expanding, non-stationary universe, as proposed by Alexander Friedmann. Einstein doubted his approach and introduced a cosmological constant into his theory allowing a solution for a stationary universe. When American Edwin Hubble proved the expanding state of the universe several years later, Einstein branded the introduction of a

cosmological constant as the greatest mistake of his life. I introduce this episode to emphasize that the proper application of Ockham's Razor is not without its difficulties.

If we take into account all of the aforementioned realities and attempt a hypothesis formulating the minimum factors determining political decisions, we arrive at three factors.

In abbreviated form, we can label these factors efficiency, timing, and mathematical error.

What we mean by efficiency is clearly demonstrated by an example from history. Archeological finds from the period of hunter-gatherers do not include the discovery of fortifications, even though, for example, there were fishing villages located in the same place over a long period of time. The reason they were not raided and plundered is simple: there was nothing to plunder. The situation changes with the spread of agriculture. Farmers store their surpluses, and these must be protected against bandits. Thus the need arises to form an armed force. So long as this armed force is protecting the group, the bandits do not attack, and the armed force is fulfilling its function; but it is not being efficiently utilized. The principle of efficiency requires the utilization of this group in its own acts of banditry for the benefit of the group that created it. In the appropriate chapter, we will show how this method of consideration determined the history of the 20th century.

The principle of timing is known from many fields, including medicine or astronomy, for instance. For example, we would not operate on a valvular heart defect while the patient is not impaired, nor would we wait until it is too late. An optimal point in time exists for the operation; or, better stated, an optimal interval during which to perform it. Similarly, in astronomy, there is an optimal interval for sending a space vehicle to Mars, and then this situation does not repeat itself for several years. In political decision-making, an attacker tries to find the point in time when he alone is prepared for an attack, and his opponent is not yet ready to defend. The problem, however, is the frequently incorrect quantitative estimation of the attacker's strength in comparison with that of the defender, thus leading to disaster.

The term mathematical error is very simplified. We should correctly use the term quantitative error of estimation. For example, during the Russian Revolution, peasants

and laborers estimated that, if the property of the landowners and capitalists was divided among them, then everyone would be well off, and this theme was the initial driving force of the revolution. When simple numerical proportions showed this would not be the case -- because, given the number of those who were poor, the divided confiscated property would only slightly alter their wealth -- the revolution was already so far along that, for fear of repression, and as a result of the animosity stemming from envy, it was already impossible to stop it. An inaccurate estimate is followed by inertia, and the process cannot be halted. However, I do not present inertia as a principle of its own. It is the result of the error in estimation and not a factor that determines the original political decision.

Among the factors determining political decision-making, I do not list religion and alternative ideology, racial differences, or morale factors as Kant's Categorical Imperative does, for example. I will attempt to demonstrate that these are always ancillary factors that do not influence political decisions.

2 Empires and Efficiency

A fundamental concept linked to efficiency is that of ownership. Our notion of ownership is probably inborn. We can infer this from the fact that it is perceived even by animals. Dog owners are very well acquainted with the fact that a dog knows that the food that is on a plate on the table is not his. His food is that which his master or mistress places on the ground for him. Obviously, a dog learns this from a person. However, even in the animal kingdom we see behavior respecting ownership. The lioness presents her prey to the lion, and only when the lion has eaten to his satisfaction does the lioness consider the remainder of the food to be her property. Respect for personal property in a human collective is an essential condition for the functioning of a human society. Yet, respect for ownership is at variance with the principle of efficiency. If I want to apply the principle, I must offer justification as to why my neighbor does not have a right to ownership. In exceptional cases, we cite religious differences. In tens of thousands of years of war, however, this argument has been used in only a small number of conflicts, such as the expansion of Emperor Charlemagne's Eastern Frankish Kingdom, Islamic expansion in the first millennium of the Common Era, the Crusades, the conquest of the Americas by Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors, and, with some exceptions, the Thirty Years War in the 17th century. In the vast majority of cases, a historical argument

is employed. In ancient texts, the neighboring people are labeled an enemy, because at some time in the past its members harmed our ancestors. It is the simplest and most dangerous argument, because it can be used anytime. The Egyptians automatically held the Babylonians as their enemies, as indicated in hieroglyphic texts. The war against them was considered a just one, and so long as it was victorious, there was a reason to exalt the ruler. If we move to Central Europe of the 12th century, in the oldest Bohemian chronicle written in Latin, the educated chronicler Cosmas ascribed negative characteristics to the inhabitants of Erfurt (the Thuringians) in neighboring Germany, and the Bohemians' wars against them are seen as fully justifiable. Cosmas was a Catholic priest, and the Thuringians were also Catholics, so religion played no role whatsoever in this conflict. For more than fifty years already, representatives of Arab countries have been arguing against the existence of the State of Israel using the historic fact that the State of Israel is the property of the Palestinian Arabs. Associations of resettled Germans argue similarly against the Czech Republic and Poland, and they seek financial compensation for property confiscated after the Second World War. The argument against Poland is weakened by the great loss of Polish lives in World War II, and the rhetoric against the Czech Republic is intensifying. Historic rationale represents the perfect justification of war, and it is the worst obstacle to a peaceful arrangement. It is always possible to draw from lengthy history a segment when one neighbor did more harm to another. I consider elimination of historic argumentation from negotiation an essential condition for successful reconciliation.

At the moment when we substantiate the right of ownership, efficiency then applies only to the attack and counterattack. It is natural that small nation states located in an area presenting a certain geographic advantage can be wealthy, thus ensuring a high standard of living for all their inhabitants, even in the case of considerable inequities in the distribution of wealth. Kuwait and Singapore are recent examples. However, given their size, small nations have limited means to effectively defend themselves. Then a mere historical argument suffices, and the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi military forces was the result. Without intervention by the USA, this occupation would have been irreversible. Understandably, Saddam Hussein grasped the danger and attempted to reach an agreement with the USA, but his offer was not accepted. The USA's concern stemmed from the fact that Iraq, strengthened by an additional source of crude oil as a source of wealth, would have been too strong an enemy for Israel, and

further protection of its Israeli ally would have meant considerable risk for the USA. It is generally the case that a small state is not independently capable of defense, and the principle of efficiency calls for the rise of large empires. Thus, the existence of the great empires of the Egyptians, the Hittites, the Babylonians, the Greeks of Alexander the Great, and the Romans is not surprising. State entities sufficiently large to carry out defense and attacks come into being. The disadvantage of every large entity is its heterogeneity. As a rule, wealthier and poorer regions must appear within it, and the state entity must move toward redistribution. Moreover, the ruling structures of certain regions cannot act independently, for they must respect the restricting influence of the central authority. Within every large entity, centrifugal tendencies arise that can manifest themselves through internal conflict. Concurrently, there is a struggle between groups to obtain central leadership. Centrifugal tendencies led to the dissolution of the successor of the Spanish empire in the Americas, and to the Civil War of North versus South in the USA in the 19th century. A typical example in the 20th century is the breakup of Yugoslavia. Slovenia was economically the most developed area, and it gained the most economically in becoming independent from more populated, but economically weaker Serbia. Croatia understood that it can profit from tourism on the Adriatic coast, and the separatist effort was thus justified. Independent Bosnia and independent Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are then simply fulfilling the ambitions of local politicians. Montenegro can profit from a short coastline attractive for tourism, and from a small population. The cardinal error of Serbian representatives was waging war. Compared to other countries of former Yugoslavia, the Serbian leadership possessed considerable financial means. It spent them for a pointless war in which neither the European Union nor the USA would have tolerated Serbia's victory. If it had used them for investment, the country's standard of living could be much higher today. Kosovo is a poor country without any comparative advantages, entirely dependent upon the economic assistance of the USA. The American administration is relying too much on historic arguments. It is connecting two issues -- the fact that the Russian-led Soviet Union represented a significant threat to the USA, and the fact that Russia has traditionally good relations with Serbia -- in which it sees a threat to its Balkan interests. Because the interests of the USA are not political, but economic, no one is threatening them. The USA is nonetheless willing to pay for a military base in Kosovo that has no meaning there. It is very strange that no one is investing in tourism in Albania. No political obstacle is blocking the development of tourism in Albania, and, given its small

population, Albania could be a tourist paradise for a number of European countries. It is as if investors are behaving like a herd: for now, no one is leading the herd into Albania.

If we concern ourselves with the collapse of empires, we cannot leave out the fall of the Roman Empire and the break-up of the Soviet Union. The collapse of both empires had differing mechanisms. As the Western Roman Empire, the Roman Empire changed its military policy before the end of its existence. This policy was based on a system of border fortifications. This is an effective method, and is thus used repeatedly throughout history. We know the Great Wall of China, the Maginot Line, the Atlantic Wall, and many others in the course of wartime conflicts. This method makes it possible for a much smaller number of defenders to repel a much larger number of attackers, and to cause them considerable losses. This system becomes practically ineffective, however, if it is not augmented by a counterattack. White Americans used the term “campaign of retribution” in the war against Native Americans. If we look away from the moral aspect of the issue, the Native Americans’ attack on settlers meant certain losses of warriors; but anyone devoted to the martial profession expects this. Each unsuccessful attack is followed by the attacker’s analysis, mainly an analysis of mistakes, and then the attacker carries out a set of measures aimed at eliminating the mistakes during a subsequent attack. A campaign of retribution imposes the gravest losses upon a people: losses of families, of women, and of children. It was this policy that practically led to the extermination of Native Americans in North America. Organization of the counterattack makes a military policy more expensive. There is no economic gain from it, and the loss of lives among fighters carrying out the counterattack is considerable; but mainly, following the repulsion of the attack, the weakened attacker poses no immediate threat. The next attack will not come for a long time. We therefore see the Romans’ lack of enthusiasm for conducting a counterattack. North American settlers overcame this. Their tactics led to their total military victory. The Romans, as the Chinese later against the Mongols, did not employ this strategy, and in both cases it meant the fall of the empire. The Western Roman Empire was undone by barbarians, and the Chinese Empire by Mongols. From a moral standpoint, the tactics of the North American settlers are highly condemnable. Neither the Romans nor the Chinese used these tactics, though by no means for moral reasons; rather, it was pursuant to strategic military deliberation, and based on the analysis I mentioned above. Morally, each war of aggression must be condemned, and such wars were a component of the philosophy upon which both

empires, Roman and Chinese, were built. The end of the Roman Empire is presented here in a very simplified way. Nonetheless, if we compare the policy of Rome at the time of the Punic Wars with that of the period before the end of the empire, there is an evident tendency to tolerate defeats by barbarian neighbors and to conclude treaties that are very unfavorable for Romans from a military standpoint. The deviation from an offensive policy and the inclination toward defense and a stalling retreat is obvious. The rise and fall of the Soviet Union, as the rise and fall of the Third Reich, deserves its own chapter.

Relatively little can be added to the principle of timing. Every political decision is connected to it, and it relates mainly to an estimation of consequences. A quantitative estimation is imperative. Everyone knows that losses will be met by both the attacker and the opponent. Quantitative scale, or the ratio of losses, is vital. If the estimate isn't properly made, it leads to catastrophe. I will take this up in a later chapter. At this point I will focus rather more on moral and religious factors in political decision-making.

Only a few political decisions are determined by a moral or religious approach. Lately, elimination of the death penalty is such a moral imperative. A political decision having minimal impact in the land, it does not directly affect any citizen, save for those few who are condemned. From history we know that children were used in one of the Crusades, while other campaigns were governed by reason, with the leaders of the Crusades making sure that their own rights of ownership and those of their fellow warriors were fully respected. The elimination of slavery in Great Britain was steered by a moral imperative. The political decisions accompanying the war of the North versus the South are more complicated. Here for the first time in our interpretation we encounter the error of quantitative estimation as the cause of a catastrophe. Slavery in the 19th century was inexcusable. It could not be supported by churches for whom all people were equal before God, nor by monarchists, because slavery had no traditional place in any European kingdom. It was of course unacceptable for leftists adhering to the traditions of the struggle of the Great French Revolution. The liberal bourgeois condemned violence in economic relations, and this is predominant in the case of slavery. The problem was that of the economy. Agricultural producers presumed that, without slavery, plantations could not be run in America, where production had expanded only as a function of the importation of slaves. In the middle of the 19th century, however, the number of slaves was growing in a natural way. Ownership remained the problem. Simple emancipation of the slaves meant confiscation of the property of their owners without compensation, as

well as a threat to their means of production, the plantation. No one except the socialists accepted this course of action. This was exacerbated by fear of a decline in America's trade, for the most part tied to American export of products produced on the plantations. The decision of the southern states to secede from the Union following the election of Abraham Lincoln as President of the United States stemmed from the conviction that the elimination of slavery would lead to an economic catastrophe in the South. The southerners did not realize that wage laborers were capable of ensuring production on the plantations for practically the same costs as slaves. If they had quantitatively evaluated the situation correctly, they could have acceded to freeing the children of the slaves and to their employment. Freeing the older slaves and the responsibility of their children to support them would have meant gradual elimination of slavery without social and economic upheavals. Lincoln's decision to wage war against the South is understandable. Any responsible representative of a state threatened with dissolution will proceed in this way. These days, the Basque Country, Catalonia, and to some extent even North Ireland are examples of how leaders will not acquiesce to the dissolution of the state. Each breakup is connected with instability, and, if there are not emphatic reasons as there were in former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, or the former Czechoslovakia, the breakup is negative and often associated with violence. The principle of efficiency says that order is better maintained in a larger state. The North Atlantic alliance prevents conflicts between nations in Europe. Small nations in the Middle East are preserved by the military might of the USA. In this way, all small nations become less sovereign. History showed that Lincoln was right. He demonstrated an example of how a U.S. president should behave: Since that time, there has never been an attempted coup d'état in the USA, and the country has shown itself to be one of the most stable on Earth.

3 The German Empire of the 20th Century

In the preceding chapter we pointed out how the quantitatively inaccurate assessment by leaders of the American southern states led to war. In this chapter we will see for ourselves how the same is true of 20th-century Germany and Japan. As late as the 18th century, Germany represented a collection of small states. None of them had sufficient strength to build a colonial empire. This led to an incorrect notion that dominated German public opinion: without colonies and their bases of raw materials, German industry will lag behind the industries of the colonial powers. The fact that this notion is false is demonstrated by post-WWII economic development in the case of both Germany

and Japan; but at the beginning of the 20th century, no alternative to this conviction existed. A second notion is closely linked with this viewpoint: Germany has little agricultural land. If one crosses the Rhine on a journey from Germany to France, he will notice that the population density of France is lower. From a geographic standpoint, however, the vast expanses in the East were much more attractive. The ideal of eastward expansion, *Drang nach Osten*, presented itself. The problems of the European Union's agricultural policy hinge on the fact that there is too much farmland and too many farmers; but no one was thinking of things this way in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. The third incorrect perception -- for which the label of incorrect quantitative estimation is not an entirely apt one -- is the notion that the German economy is controlled by Jews, and that this fact adversely affects the standard of living. This opinion held sway only with a narrow segment of the population. Because a greater percentage of the owners of commercial networks were Jews than what corresponded with the Jewish share of the population, this was interpreted by some to mean that Jews dominated retailing and, to some extent, financing as well. For people unfamiliar with the political economy, Jews were the cause of their poverty. While the idea about Jews will not take hold of Germany's poverty-stricken population until the crisis of the 1920s, the first two notions -- i.e., that a lack of colonies is holding back industry, and that small living space (*Lebensraum*) is a brake on agriculture -- determine the national policy of the German empire at the beginning of the 20th century. The decision-making of Kaiser Wilhelm II incorporates all three of these principles. The unified German nation builds an army not just for its own defense, but for aggression, with the goal of increasing the power of the German empire (the principle of efficiency), and plans an attack at a time when it assumes the French are poorly prepared (the principle of timing), with the doubtful objective (the principle of incorrect quantitative estimation) of gaining colonies and eastern territory. Religious or ethnic tenets have no influence whatsoever on the decision. It is interesting that, as the main (and formally the sole) perpetrator of this tragedy (Austria had a reason, though relatively petty, for declaring war on Serbia following the assassination of the heir to the throne by Serbian nationalists), Wilhelm II, who invaded neutral Belgium without reason and allowed the shelling of civilian populations in British ports by naval guns, as well as the torpedoing of passenger ships, was, unlike Hitler and Stalin (and currently Milošević), never labeled a war criminal. The question is whether his royal origin accounts for this. Even today the public condemns the murder of the Czar's family by the Bolsheviks much more strongly than it does the

murder of children in the Vietnamese village of My Lai by the Americans. Even though aristocrats for the most part obtained their property by inheritance from ancestors who came to it through brigandish military campaigns, they are often accepted respectfully by the public.

Chaos is characteristic for the fate of Germany after the lost World War until the time of Adolf Hitler's rise. The economy was burdened by the necessity of paying reparations, and German governments proved unable to resolve the situation by any means other than the printing of money, thus leading to inflation. Inflation worsened the conditions for offering commercial loans, thus stifling the entire economy. Aside from a relatively thin layer of businessmen who were setting the standard profit margin and modestly earning, the rest of the population was denied certainty about the future. Unemployment, which stems from the inability to conduct business on credit, is not too high; but concern about unemployment and the inability to plan a family, to plan a home (an apartment or a house), and to generally plan for the future affects the majority of people. Two opinions dominate. The communists emphasize the responsibility of the capitalists for starting the war, and they prepare a revolution to be accompanied by the confiscation of property and a loss of social status for members of the middle class. Through coercive acts, strikes, and demonstrations, they attempt to provoke a revolutionary situation and deepen the chaos. Social democracy seems to offer salvation. At this time, German social democracy has no platform. The conception of a socialized state is not defined at this time; Keynes has not yet formulated his approaches to intervention in the economy. Attacked from the right and the left, helpless social democracy fails. The original ideas that led to the declaration of the First World War -- that Germany needs raw materials, thus colonies; that Germany needs living space, thus an eastward crusade -- remain. People must only find an explanation for why Germany lost. The simplest and most effective thing is to declare betrayal the cause of the loss. The betrayer can be found in the cosmopolitan group of people that is the Jews. At first glance, this is a believable idea. In order to maintain their business profits, they joined with the Jews in Western European banks and sold out Germany. Even people who did not share this belief -- because there was not one piece of evidence that would support it -- supported any measure that would eliminate chaos.

The requirement for a government with a strong hand naturally contradicted the platform and tradition of social democracy, and, in subsequent elections, this led to its

loss of the opportunity to lead the nation. In this situation, the way opened up for Adolf Hitler.

Countless treatises have been written about Hitler. All of them have emphasized the situation in Germany after the First World War, and the fact that he was an uneducated criminal. But why is it that never in history had an uneducated criminal stood at the head of a nation the size of Germany -- a nation with such a high level of education in the humanities, and in the natural and technical sciences? I believe that it is appropriate here to ask the question: Why do people enter into politics, and why are they successful?

Many people declare that politics is dirty, therefore they do not want to take part in it. They consider politicians to be psychopaths hungry for power and money. That there are such types is true; but certainly not all of them, nor even the majority. Politicians are linked by something else. It is a talent for politics that is at the inception of every political career. Just as a top-notch soccer player does not start to play soccer in order to become a top-notch professional player, or just as a musician does not learn to play an instrument so that he can ensure himself a top-notch income, likewise no one enters politics with visions of money and power. An athlete more intensively devotes himself to his sport when, by comparing himself with others, he realizes that he has a talent for the sport. Similarly, a musician who becomes aware that he is better than others opts for a professional career. It is the same with a talent for mathematics or literature. Nor is it any different in politics. Many politicians recall that already in high school they gained some political position as a class president, or as students were elected as representatives, or as young workers were chosen for labor union committees. Anyone who has political talent comes to recognize it in the way he is able to gain people's trust. Hitler undoubtedly had political talent. Just as there are hundreds of professional athletes with exceptional talent, all politicians are endowed with a certain level of political talent. However, they generally differ from the type of politician Hitler was. To be successful, a politician needs to gain the support of the majority. As a rule, this leads to considerable flexibility. The politician modifies his ideas according to the majority. Trust thus obtained can easily be lost. In stable political conditions, he is replaced by another politician, and political life goes on. In certain crisis situations, however, politics demands a politician with a vision. Wilhelm II was undoubtedly such a politician. He removed his capable opponent, Bismarck, from power, armed Germany, and militarily attacked neighboring countries with the aim of strengthening Germany. A similar

politician with a vision was Lenin, who planned the Russian Revolution in exile. It has nothing to do with whether the politician is a criminal or not. Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle were politicians with a vision. Among Czech politicians there was certainly T.G. Masaryk. These examples I have presented show that visionary ability is not connected with morality. The vision can be morally acceptable or unacceptable.

What characterizes Hitler as a politician with a vision? It is his publication *My Struggle* (Mein Kampf). Hitler offers the image of a superior people predestined to direct the course of affairs around the world on the basis of characteristics that are inherent in Germans: high intelligence, industriousness, dedication, discipline and courage. Thus far these positive characteristics have not manifested themselves in the standard of living because Western capitalists (plutocrats), communists, and, above all, Jews (Jewish Bolsheviks) have been preventing them from doing so. These ideals inspired superficially reasoning Germans who were experiencing a low standard of living and, as the case might be, an inability to obtain work connected with a shortage of life's basic needs, including food. Hitler's interpretation seemed logical to them. Most people lack the ability of quantitative reasoning, and they are capable of accepting this erroneous quantitative estimation. No one conducted an analysis to calculate what percentage of GDP was spent on Jews, and what percentage of GDP was the result of their work; and, as I mentioned at the outset, a mathematical error in people's thinking was decisive for Hitler's rise. A second factor was the attitude of leading figures in the German economy: top managers of the economically most powerful financial institutions, banks, and industrial concerns. Their flawed assessments accompany us through all of history. Many wealthy people in history, out of concern over losing too large a share of their assets, did not invest in defense, and subsequently they lost all their property after a defeat. An example is the Bohemian Protestant aristocracy that skimmed on its army (but not on noblewomen's toilets at balls held in Prague under the auspices of the queen, wife of King Frederick I) before 1620 and, following the Battle of White Mountain, lost all of its lands through confiscations benefitting the generals of the victorious Hapsburgs. The German businessmen were afraid of the communists, who proclaimed nationalization of property without compensation, and of the social democrats, who were striving for the nationalization of key enterprises with insufficient compensation, and for high taxes to redistribute wealth. Hitler's anticommunism, along with the removal of Jewish competition (though this was secondary), was decisive for them, and they therefore

provided Hitler financial support for a costly election campaign. They viewed the elimination of democracy positively. Strikes were forbidden, managing a business easier; operating costs were lower, and profits higher. We have to realize that this was a time when the state had one main task: to maintain internal order, and to defend the state against external enemies (in other words, to wage war). Bismarck's achievement at the end of the 19th century introducing state-sponsored health and social insurance was an exceptional act aimed at taking wind out of the sails of the social democrats. The state did not interfere in the economy, and so the Great Depression arrived at the end of the 1920s. The drop in the standard of living worked to Hitler's advantage, and he won the elections. A coalition with the bourgeois parties made him chancellor, and allowed him to abolish democracy and deal with the communists and with the social and liberal democrats. Arbitrary arrests made it possible for him to imprison potential criminal offenders and establish order in Germany. Within the Nazi Party, he liquidated his opponents in the four-million-strong, undisciplined, paramilitary SA with the concurrence of military leaders and Reich President Hindenburg, as well as with the support of the industrialists and bankers among whom the SA had created feelings of uncertainty. Hitler then removed Jews from public life. He thus fulfilled the wishes of anti-Semites, a large segment of the German population who, along with Hitler, surmised (entirely without reason as I mentioned above) that Jews were holding back the evolution of the German nation. Hitler thus simultaneously resolved a fundamental problem of every dictatorship: how to reward the faithful. The public is capable of tolerating a dictatorship rather well, so long as it does not harm their economic interests; but the natural desire for freedom means that the dictatorship's supporters do not elicit positive emotions. In exchange for this unpleasant position in society, it is necessary to reward them. Thanks to their higher level of average education, Jews, despite their relatively small share of the population, held a relatively high share of society's significant positions. By confiscating their property and removing Jews from prominent positions, Hitler gained the ability to reward his supporters, and to gain more of them. Hitler implemented his political program just as he presented it in *Mein Kampf*. Those who tolerated him as they allowed him to form a government with a thirty-percent share of the vote often declared that his platform was just a populist philosophy created to gain votes according to the saying, "Once a politician is elected, he forgets his promises." This saying, aside from exceptions proving the rule, is untrue. Every politician tries to implement every bit of his party's platform. If he doesn't succeed, it is always external circumstances that prevent him from doing so,

and not a lack of will. People often repeat this ridiculous saying even today. It is as invalid today as it was invalid in Hitler's time. The fate of the Jews was planned by Hitler, and everyone who supported him shares in the responsibility for the Holocaust. If a dictatorship wants to maintain itself, then rewarding the faithful is a first-priority goal of the dictator. It is not an easy task. As we shall see in the Soviet Union and other socialist dictatorships, it led to the devastation of the economy. Thanks to the Jews, Hitler's work was easier in this direction. The most difficult task, however, was to improve the economy, and thus the standard of living in Germany. Hitler handled this task superbly, better than anyone else in Europe.

Hitler was understandably not a gifted economist; but he handled the Great Depression of the 1930s better than was the case in any other country in the world. If we take industrial output in 1928 as 100%, then the output at the end of 1939 for the USA is 115%, for France 100%, and for the United Kingdom and Germany 130%. At the same time, however, unemployment at the end of 1932 was 32% in the USA, 12% in the United Kingdom, and 18% in Germany. In 1939, unemployment in France remained the same as in 1932 (300 thousand unemployed; between 1932 and 1939 the figure had risen and again dropped, in fact), in the USA it was 25%, in the United Kingdom 10%, and in Germany it had dropped to zero.⁴ Hitler achieved this through spending on armaments and investments in the transportation infrastructure by constructing highways. He managed the crisis by increasing taxes six times.⁵ ⁶ Thanks to the dictatorship, no one protested, and workers whose standard of living had significantly increased while their fear of unemployment vanished, cheered. Today center-right economists insist that state interference is always negative, and that Roosevelt's interventions in the economy delayed its reinvigoration. They insist that high taxes lower business incentive, and that society as a whole suffers as a result. They are unable to explain Hitler's solution. Anyone who publicly points to this success is accused by the center-right media of supporting fascism. Hitler's economic success significantly strengthened his public standing and led to his belief that he could successfully achieve his political goals as well. Hitler's goals were criminal, but they were realistic. They were essentially a continuation of the goals of Wilhelm II, with the addition of anti-Semitism. Hitler wanted to create a German colonial empire in Europe. Nations to the east would deliver unskilled labor, and

⁴ PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET: *Histoire de l'humanité*, Hachette, Paris 1992.

⁵ *Oxford Atlas of Modern World History*, Oxford University Press 1989.

⁶ PAUL JOHNSON: *A History of 20th Century*, 1991.

Germans would be in charge. The functioning model had been tested in preceding centuries by colonial powers. Hitler would soon begin its implementation. The closure of universities in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and in Poland clearly demonstrated what Hitler was preparing.

At the end of this chapter it must be added that the realistic criminal concept was based on an error. The world wars were wars for raw materials. Germany, Japan and Italy lacked raw materials. After the global war which these nations lost, they were again without raw materials. But despite this they quickly and successfully evolved economically. This is proof that the notion that it is not possible to develop without raw materials or without living space is a simply an incorrect estimation. This is my argument for the position that both wars came about on the basis of an erroneous assessment.

As we shall show in the next chapter, the philosophies of Lenin and Stalin were also built on the foundations of erroneous estimations.

4 Russia and The Soviet Union

The Great French Revolution is the cradle of modern European democracy. English democracy is, after all, influenced by the slogan, "No taxation without representation." This implies that those who pay taxes should vote. The English system of democracy -- which, along with a House of Commons, also features a House of Lords whose membership is in some cases hereditary -- to some extent contradicts the "One man, one vote" slogan of modern democracy brought about by the French Revolution. Another motto of the French Revolution is the famous "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," the modern translation of the original *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*. The drafters of the French Constitution, as those of the U.S. Constitution before them, fix the inviolability of private property as a guarantee of the state, meeting with the criticism of those who stress that, without equality of ownership, there is no true equality, and, for want of means, the poor cannot even take advantage of freedoms, such as the freedom to travel. The critics of so-called bourgeois democracy consider calls for their fraternity in building and defending a state immoral. In the latter half of the 19th century, socialist parties wanting to achieve material equality come into being. Because the poor are in the majority, some assumed that it would be sufficient to strengthen the democratic system, and then, on the basis of the principle of "One man, one vote," create a parliamentary majority, pass laws redistributing wealth, and form a government to enact these laws. Another group of

socialists insisted that owners will not willingly give up their assets and will fight for them even at the price of eliminating democracy, thus socialism can only be achieved by revolution. The defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871 supported the arguments of the revolutionary group.

After the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, Parisian Republicans feared that the conservative majority in the National Assembly would restore the monarchy. The National Guard in Paris refused to obey the order to lay down its weapons, and, following local elections won by advocates of revolution, the rule of the Commune was established. Regular troops of the central French government militarily suppressed the Commune. The government lost 750 soldiers, and 20,000 Communards were killed. Later, 38,000 supporters of the Commune were imprisoned, and 7,000 deported.⁷ It was a total victory for the right. It was a Pyrrhic victory. During the Russian Revolution, the suppression of the Paris Commune was a main argument for executing potential class enemies without trial under the watchword, "Before they do it to us, we'll do it to them." Here again, timing is one of the arguments for making a political decision. Through the history of the Paris Commune, Lenin makes his argument for staging a red terror at the time of the Russian Revolution.

The devoted revolutionary Lenin acted upon Marx. Lenin, with his high intelligence, political talent, and extensive philosophical -- though not economic -- education, adopted all of the economic argumentation from Marx's Theory of Surplus Value. Marx states that the capitalist appropriates a portion of labor output in the form of surplus value. This is obviously true, but the problem is a quantitative one. Though Marx doesn't emphasize it, he gives an example in which the surplus value equals roughly 100% of a worker's labor. He calls this exploitation. This implies that elimination of exploitation will double the worker's income, thus also doubling his standard of living. This is Marx's fundamental error, as all builders of a socialist economy discovered. Surplus value includes rewards for planning and organizing work, and for the marketing of products, i.e., bonuses for managers (who are, in most cases, also owners), a portion of operating costs, expenses for ensuring cash flow through loans, and outlays for losses resulting from poor sales and those caused by defects in the manufacturing process. If a capitalist with a large number of workers appropriates 10-15% of the surplus value of their labor,

⁷ *Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2002.*

he acquires a tremendous sum of money, and by putting aside a portion of this, a tremendous amount of assets over the course of years. We must realize that we need a certain sum of money for life's basic needs, mainly food, clothing and shelter. Every amount, even a small one, above this amount increases our opportunities to purchase goods and services that we do not absolutely need, thus significantly increasing our standard of living. The mathematical error rests in the fact that 10% is not 100%, and even if we take everything from the capitalists, the workers will be left with only a few percent more, while the flaws in organizing the work will multiply. These arguments explain why every socialist method of production failed. Lenin did not realize this while declaring a revolution. At the beginning of the revolution, the saying went: "The elimination of exploitation will significantly increase our standard of living." At the time when aristocratic estates were being looted, total confiscation was taking place; but it brought the revolutionary peasants and laborer practically nothing besides a few stolen pieces of furniture or flatware, or some jewels, and the revolution was being propelled by the argument of fear of a repeat of the results of the Paris Commune. After the victory of the revolution, Lenin realizes his economic mistake. Central planning is leading to economic catastrophe. He therefore adds private initiative in the form of a New Economic Policy. The New Economic Policy (NEP 1921-1928) is successful. The answer as to why, following Lenin's death (1924), Stalin ended it in 1928 is clear. The standard of living rose unevenly during the period of the NEP. The greatest gains were made by independently operating farmers and entrepreneurs, manufacturers and businessmen. Those who gained nothing were those who had risked their lives for the victory of the revolution. The struggle against counterrevolution was waged en masse, because many people had fought on the side of the revolution. I already mentioned that the main task of a dictator is to take care of his faithful. Stalin solved this through a centralized economy with a leading role for the communist party, thus taking care of party operatives at the expense of the economy. Taking land from the peasants and forming collective farms opened up further managerial positions for members of the Bolshevik party and strengthened the dictatorship. The fact that the Soviet dictatorship was crueler than dictatorships at other time and places (e.g., the Napoleonic dictatorship) can be explained by Stalin's personality, which combined the character of a criminal with the cautiousness of a politician. Stalin's cautiousness was already known from his time in the Bolshevik leadership when, in St. Petersburg before the November revolution in 1917, he supported the minority position to put off an armed attack on the Winter Palace for

fear that the uprising might fail. If Stalin judged that a politician among the Bolshevik leadership was capable of carrying out a bold policy and gaining support for it, he had him murdered. He retreated from the plans of global revolution and concentrated on repressing the opposition in his own ranks. The result is the dismissal and later murder of Trotsky, and the executions of Bukharin, Kamenev, Rykov, Yagoda, and Zinoviev following show trials. He was supported in this effort by those party functionaries who feared that they would be among the bold politicians dismissed from their positions for incompetency. This is demonstrated by the execution of Tuchachevsky and the subsequent purge of the Red Army. Tuchachevsky was an officer in the Czar's army, and the Czar's noncommissioned officers Budonyi and Voroshilov were aware of his greater intellect as they worked on a concept for the defense of the Soviet Union, so they asked for Tuchachevsky's removal. Stalin acquiesced when, on the basis of his own suspicions, he came to the conclusion that Tuchachevsky represented a personal threat to him. Stalin only struck when he was certain of a high likelihood of success. At the beginning of the Second World War, he attacked Finland, where the Red Army's advantage was clear. He killed all potential enemies: for example, the Polish officers captured during the combined invasion of Poland by the German and Soviet armies on the basis of a treaty with Hitler at the beginning of the Second World War. He had millions of people murdered in the Soviet Union, with further millions dying in labor camps. In 1948, he blockaded Berlin, because the likelihood of the Western Allies starting WWII over it was minimal; and when an air bridge transporting foodstuffs and other necessities into Berlin functioned, he called off the blockade after eleven months. He incited Korean communists to attack South Korea, because he judged that the country would be difficult to defend. When defeat threatened the Korean communists, he did not intervene with the Red Army, because he did not want a direct confrontation with the USA; but he recommended the help of the Chinese communists, whom he had previously dissuaded from an invasion of Taiwan.

As a dictator he was very successful. Because the desire for freedom is in every person, a dictatorship requires every real or imagined enemy to justify his existence. Some people can be convinced this way, and the rest are repressed through violence. The danger for a dictatorship is in a plurality of opinions in leading organs of the state. An example is the Prague Spring of 1968, which led to the collapse of a dictatorship that was restored with the help of Soviet forces under Brezhnev's leadership in August of the same

year. Stalin harshly suppressed the rise of such pluralities, and if he got the impression that a certain person among the leadership probably did not conform to the opinions of other leaders, he had him executed. Through Soviet advisors, he proceeded this way in all people's democratic countries to suppress every plurality at its inception, and to make the other members of the communist party fearful. He thus prevented the rise of opposition within the Soviet Communist Party, and within the majority of the parties of the so-called people's democratic states. President Tito of Yugoslavia was the exception. Stalin waged a media campaign against him, but Tito's cautiousness kept Stalin from killing him. After Stalin's death, the dictatorship of the Soviet Union passed to Khrushchev, who did not end the dictatorship, but minimized repression so that the dictatorship existed with a minimum of violence. It is no surprise that he was stripped of his leadership by other comrades who were concerned that the dictatorship might not hold itself together, and the sterner Brezhnev appeared on the scene. After his death, leadership passed between the ill and aging Andropov and Chernenko, and after them to Gorbachev. Linked to Gorbachev is the end of dictatorship in the Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union as a state.

We will examine the war between the Soviet Union and Germany in the next chapter.

5 War of the Dictatorships

Every dictatorship must fulfill four conditions to maintain itself: 1. spread an ideology which validates its existence, persuades a portion of the population, and justifies the attitudes of its adherents; 2. reward its supporters for their participation in preserving the dictatorship; 3. declare continuous success (Lenin: The wheels of the revolution must not stop) to convince a segment of the population and prevent the casting of doubt upon its leading position among elites; and, finally, 4. prevent a plurality of ideas among the elites.

Hitler and Stalin fulfilled all of these conditions. A dictatorship is, of course, maintained through violence, and a level of violence in the form of the murder of millions of people was extremely high in both dictatorships. The killing of the First World War and in the civil war in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution certainly contributed to this. Over time the level of violence declines, and repression becomes more subtle. People are continuously watched, and expressions of dissent are punished by the loss of desirable employment and the exclusion of children from opportunities for education, which in turn

limits their ability to find a good job. However, repression under Stalin and Hitler was brutal. Each dictator watched the other, and they mutually learned the art of rulership from each other.

Hitler's initial victory was ensured by the economic growth he launched. On the basis of an analysis of the global economic crisis, J. M. Keynes recommended intervention of the state in the economy; Hitler did so instinctively, with the aim of preparing for German military expansion. Keynes' argument about the prosperity of Egypt arising from the building of the pyramids -- which, despite their lack of utility, stimulated the entire economy⁸ -- explains Hitler's economic success. Like the pharaohs, Hitler did not proceed consciously, but his activity had a positive economic effect. This attuned public opinion toward him positively. In the expanding economy, numerous suitable jobs are found for his supporters. A second source of rewards for his supporters was confiscated Jewish property and relinquished positions in society. The ideology was attractive. By virtue of their talents, the Germans are a nation superior to others, and under Hitler's leadership they will become the most powerful nation on Earth, with the highest standard of living for all Germans at the expense of other nations. His success in preventing a plurality of ideas within the Nazi Party was helped by the liquidation of the SA with the clear support of the military and conservative politicians. Hitler interned other political opponents -- communists, socialists, liberals, and ardent Christians -- in concentration camps. His initial goal was not their liquidation, but their internment until the time of the victory he fully anticipated. According to written instructions, they were to be released one year after the conclusion of a victorious war.⁹ If the preceding plans of Hitler had been carried out, then their influence on German society would have remained insignificant. In the case of the Jews, Hitler considered resettling them in occupied areas in the East. The halt of the advance on the Eastern Front led him to change his mind, and in 1942 he decided they should be physically liquidated. Old people and small children were not productive, and caring for them meant a drain on the German economy. Their murder was decided by this utilitarian way of thinking (as corresponds to the principle of efficiency), not by the sadism of the Nazis, though there were a great number of sadists among the guards in the concentration camps. Because Hitler adhered to all four of the aforementioned rules, his dictatorship lasted until the final days of his military defeat.

⁸ JOHN M. KEYNES: *The general Theory of employment interest and money*, Macmillan, London 1936.

⁹ NANDA HERBERMANN: *The Blessed Abyss*, Wayne State University Press, Detroit 2000.

Even though successes no longer existed toward the end of the war, Hitler convinced the public of miracle weapons whose development was about to be completed, and he promised ultimate victory.

Stalin adhered to these four rules with equal thoroughness. He promised the building of socialism and communism -- where all the needs of the working class would be fulfilled -- though with a delay, caused by the necessity of devoting significant resources to defending the country against Western imperialism, as he stressed. The struggle against plurality within the leadership of the Soviet Union was ensured by show trials and executions, or by internment of all potential enemies of the Bolshevik Party in labor camps. The declaration of successes is simpler under an information embargo. Then it is possible to declare the sufficient production of essential foodstuffs, the electrification of villages, the construction of hydroelectric power plants and the Moscow metro as unparalleled. Rewarding supporters is a dictatorship's greatest problem. The communist dictatorship solves this through central control of the economy, which, unlike a free-market economy, is very ineffective. All communist dictatorships in the world have done things this way, with the same negative result. For Stalin, however, it was important that this system enabled the buildup of an arms industry, and that restraining potential enemies was simplified, because they could not take refuge in the protection of a private economy. A dictatorship that allows private business is therefore often more brutal in its methods, as Franco's Spain demonstrates, for example, in comparison with communist European countries in the 1970s and 80s, because wherever there is a private economy, it's not possible to use loss of employment as a means of coercion.

A comparison of the ideologies of both dictatorships reveals that they are not similar, and the differences bring unavoidable consequences for both dictatorships. Hitler's ideology of the superiority of the German nation and the Germanic race has utility for members of his own nation. This ideology loses its logic when cooperating with other fascist dictatorships. Is the Italian nation also superior because it is led by Mussolini? Is Franco's Spanish nation and Salazar's Portuguese one superior? German Nazis had a practical problem with Czech fascists who wanted to create a nationalist dictatorship, not a state entity in the thrall of Germany. On the other hand, we can judge the ideology from the standpoint of Kant's Categorical Imperative, which we can characterize in simplified fashion through the expression "Do unto others as you would have them do

unto you.” If the goal is the submission of one nation to the suppression of another, this is morally unacceptable according to Kant’s philosophy.

Communist ideology does not have these problems. It advocates extreme equality and absolute equality of wealth. A property owner stripped of his property will be equal to a person who never owned anything. The idea of equality is inherent to humans. We abandon it only in times of threats requiring central control, that is, non-delegable command authority. During a period of war, the Roman Republic abandoned democracy for strictly practical reasons. Hitler pragmatically tolerated Mussolini and the Japanese, while he made use of friendship and cooperation with Slovak nationalists to sunder Czechoslovakia, and even tolerated the Slovak state thereafter, especially when he found support there for his foreign and, in the case of the Jews, his domestic policies. Ukraine was to become the breadbasket of Germany. This prevented Hitler from concluding a treaty of alliance with anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists. He considered Ukraine and Poland to be conquered countries, not liberated territories. Contrarily, communist ideology is internationalist. While Hitler’s every victory increased the demands for an occupier’s administration -- even though the use of cheap labor not only paid for this administration, but also brought immediate profit to the German nation -- each victory by Lenin, and later Stalin, brought a massive influx of communists into the revolutionary army, thus significantly strengthening the position of Russia, and later the Soviet Union. Germany’s military allies, other than the Japanese, were ineffectual and unreliable. The allies of the Soviet Union significantly increased its strength. The slogan “With Red China we are one billion” is an expression of this fact. As a rule, the Soviet Union went on the offensive only in places where it had the support of indigenous communists. This was the case in Korea, Hungary, Vietnam, Cuba, Afghanistan and even in Czechoslovakia in 1968. If the U.S. secretary of defense was worried that the action against Czechoslovakia in 1968 would continue in the form of an attack on the Federal Republic of Germany, it was a naive notion. The Soviet Union made its only attack on Finland in 1939; yet the objective was not to occupy Finland, but simply to achieve an adjustment to the borders near then-Leningrad and strengthen the security of the Soviet Union. Ideology is often associated with war crimes. Even though, in the case of Germany, it seems that war crimes are directly connected with ideology, a series of historical facts indicates that this is not so. Wilhelm II commenced offensive operations as a war for living space and raw materials, even without creating a propaganda apparatus for

spreading an ideology. The Catholic religion as an ideology certainly is not hateful; yet it is associated with the slaughter of the inhabitants of Magdeburg during the Thirty Years War in the 17th century. In a contemporary context, the conclusion that the Islamic religion is not bound to aggression flows from this. We know that, during the Middle Ages, Muslim states existed on the Pyrenean peninsula that were tolerant of both Christians and Jews. If contemporary terrorism employs Muslim ideology, it is not because it is a criminal one. Islamic dictatorships misuse religion for political goals, and we also see that wars occur mainly between Muslims -- for example, Iran versus Iraq, Iraq against Kuwait -- and terrorist attacks kill Muslims most of the time. The disputes between Sunnis and Shiites are similar to those between Catholics and Protestants during the Thirty Years War. If we see how individual actors switched faiths during this period, and how their new allies accepted them, it is absolutely clear that an individual's religious belief was secondary in this political conflict.

Stalin regretted the conflict with Germany. He believed that it was possible to come to an agreement with Hitler on the division of spheres of influence; but Hitler rigorously fulfilled his political agenda, his vision, as he described it in *Mein Kampf*. The political system of the Western democracies had completely failed after the First World War. Conservative politicians feared that the influence of the Bolshevik Revolution would also be transmitted to their laboring classes, and, if their economies made it possible, they focused their attention on this issue. Their fatal political mistake was not working out a plan for implementing the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, including a policy for restricting Germany's rearmament. It is a general weakness of democracy. Politicians plan for four to five years, for one period in office, that is, with the goal of being reelected, and they put off conceptual issues extending beyond this period. After the toleration of his military occupation of the Rhineland, annexation of Austria, and seizure of territory in the border region of Czechoslovakia, Hitler must have justifiably come to the conclusion that the West was weak, and so it was true. He concluded that what is most important is speed (the principle of timing). He must achieve his major goals swiftly before Western Europe consolidates its defense.

Hitler had political talent going for him. Reliability and keeping agreements is fundamental in politics. Hitler adhered to all of his agreements with his allies. He assisted Mussolini militarily even when it meant only disadvantages for German expansion. He concluded a treaty with the Japanese, even when racial purists pointed out

that the Japanese belong to a different race, and prominent Nazis considered Japanese demands for occupying all of Russia's Asian territory after a victorious war excessive. For Hitler, the means of achieving his goals was expansion. Here he relied exclusively on his armed forces and occupation authorities. He did not have a tendency to find allies in occupied countries, and he uncompromisingly subordinated institutions of local government to the occupiers without any negotiation whatsoever. This corresponded to his goals. Germans will rule in all countries; they will organize production, and their high standard of living will result from the labor of subjugated nations.

As I already noted, the Bolshevik approach to expansion was diametrically dissimilar. The foundation was revolution in a particular country. The revolutionary leadership of the communist party would form a government, and the troops of Bolshevik Russia, or later the Soviet Union, would ensure its stabilization. This concept stemmed from Marx's program of global revolution. The governing group is always the communists. Nationality is not important, and their authority to make decisions at the local level is restricted very little. But one-hundred-percent loyalty to Moscow's leadership is required of the most senior communist party representatives of the various individual countries. Lenin created this concept, and his attempt to use units of the Red Army to lend help to a communist revolution in Germany after the First World War document it. Lenin did not succeed, because the units of the Red Army were halted by Polish troops near Warsaw. Trotsky wanted to continue with Lenin's policy, but the cautious Stalin prevented it. He created a model whereby socialism and communism could be built up in one country, and he significantly limited expansion.

Hitler began the Second World War with an invasion of Poland after he agreed with Stalin on its partition. The response was a declaration of war on Germany by France and the United Kingdom. Hitler was quickly victorious on the Western Front.

Historians explain the subsequent course of the war in terms of Hitler's incompetence resulting from his lack of education in military affairs. Some people in Germany would like to place the blame for defeat exclusively upon Hitler and draw attention away from the mistakes committed by the German generals.

Hitler's first mistake is considered to be the Dunkirk miracle. Shortly after the collapse of the defense of France, retreating British units were concentrated near the port of Dunkirk, and they embarked on ships to withdraw to England. Hitler halted the attack

of his ground forces, thus allowing the British to save themselves. Hitler's critics see behind this an attempt on his part to reach an agreement with the United Kingdom. This view lacks logic. Hitler launches an air war several months later. It appears that the main reason for the halt at Dunkirk was the overly swift advance of armored units ahead of their supply convoys. Tanks with insufficient ammunition and fuel would not have helped Hitler much, and an attack by infantry units unsupported by tanks would mean high casualties, which would have dimmed Hitler's triumph in Germany. Hitler's tactics in the Battle of Britain were the same as those of Eisenhower during the 1944 invasion of Normandy: First, to gain absolute air superiority, then, under air cover, to carry out an invasion of England and deliver a decisive blow to the British armed forces. Stalin, when he later evaluated Hitler's policy, considered the fact that Hitler did not attack England immediately to be Hitler's fundamental error. Stalin was willing to come to an agreement with Hitler, and it would have suited him if Hitler had defeated the United Kingdom and gained raw materials and a region for agricultural production at the expense of the British Empire. Hitler wanted to defeat the United Kingdom, but he relied on his air force commander, Göring, who, as an excellent fighter pilot in WWI, had great authority in the German Luftwaffe. I have already mentioned all the mistakes of the British in failing to impose the Versailles Treaty and tolerating German rearmament. The British did one thing well: they established a system of air defense. It was not just about radars, but mainly about a system of communication enabling effective defense. Hitler did not want to take a risk. He knew well that the British did not have forces for an immediate invasion of France, and he decided to quickly invade the Soviet Union. Every bold commander underestimates his enemies. It was true for Napoleon, and also for Hitler. Success in France surprised Hitler. The French and British armed forces were the best in Europe, and Hitler had not expected such easy success. France's entire military strategy had been flawed, however. A proper defensive strategy is predicated on the principle of the shield and sword. The French Maginot Line, a system of fortifications on the German-French border, represented the shield; but the sword, i.e., the plan for a counterattack, was missing. The same had been the case for the Roman Empire in the 5th century, and for China at the time of Genghis Khan. The result was predictable.

The situation was different in the Soviet Union. Although Defense Minister Marshal Tuchachevskij declared that the Red Army would crush the enemy with an immediate counterattack, the strategy was different. The essence was to weaken the enemy during

the course of his attack on Soviet territory, to establish a defensive line deep in the rear, to disrupt supply lines, and, after the enemy was weakened, to switch over to a counterattack. Poorly armed border units and agents and organizers who were already well trained before the war began for acts of sabotage against supply lines in the country spoke for this strategy. For example, such an agent was Zoja Kosmodyemyanska, a partisan and heroine of the anti-fascist underground who was executed by the Germans. Some historians proclaim that Stalin did not believe that Hitler would start a war against the Soviet Union, and that he withdrew to his dacha not far from Moscow after the invasion of German forces. It does not correspond with the character of an extremely suspicious person that he would have trusted Hitler, especially when his intelligence service reported the concentration of forces on the Western border of the Soviet Union. Stalin's behavior can be explained in that he expected an attack against himself by his colleagues along with the attack by Hitler, and he fled the field in keeping with his cautious approach. When he saw that there was no putsch against him, he took up command.

Many military historians explain the tragic course of the war for Germany through Hitler's ignorance of waging war. More detailed scrutiny shows, however, that Hitler always stuck to the advice of his military commanders. He wanted to invade England after the destruction of the British Air Force promised by the Luftwaffe command. He also refused to retreat from Stalingrad when the air force's leaders promised to supply the General Paulus' German units with an air bridge. He halted the attack on Dunkirk because the tanks were without ammunition and fuel, just as he stopped the offensive ahead of Moscow in 1941. Hitler invaded the Soviet Union because German spies had informed him about an increase in the number of tanks being manufactured, and he launched the action at what he thought was the optimum time. Neither Hitler nor the army's leadership could help it that German soldiers were insufficiently outfitted for the Russian winter.

In response to the question of how he, as a military strategist, evaluated Hitler's mistakes, Stalin replied that Hitler should have invaded England immediately after the defeat of France. In my opinion, an invasion without air superiority would have ended in catastrophe for Germany. After the defeat of France, Hitler proceeded, according to classic military strategy, with an uninterrupted continuation of offensive war. At the beginning of the attack on Britain, there was an attempt to crush the British Air Force and

control the skies. In my opinion, Hitler's mistake was that he proceeded like a soldier and not like a politician. If he had not started to bomb English cities, but dropped leaflets on them describing the horrors that British air raids were causing for women and children in German cities, and declared that, just as he was dropping leaflets, he could drop bombs, but that he did not want to wage war against the civilian population, it would have been difficult for Churchill to continue with the air raids in the face of British public opinion. This would have allowed Hitler to commit all of his airpower against the Soviet Union and overturn the slight Soviet advantage in the air. It is difficult to speculate how the war might have unfolded in such a case. What is pertinent is that it was the plans of German military commanders that failed. Göring's Luftwaffe did not defeat the Royal Air Force, and was unable to ensure air superiority in the Soviet Union. Dönitz's submarines were unable to halt the supplying of the British Isles over the Atlantic. Germany's tank army lost against Soviet tanks near Kursk. The Atlantic Wall did not defend occupied France against an Anglo-American invasion. The armored counteroffensive in the Ardennes failed in 1944. Hitler and his generals overestimated their strengths and lost, just as Napoleon did. Here I believe that Hitler's conviction about the inferiority of Slavic peoples played a role. This led him to underestimate the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the war's burdens and also inflicted the great majority of losses upon the German Army.

Japan counted on a German victory. If the Soviet Union capitulated, Japan expected that the U.S. and the United Kingdom would eventually conclude a peace with Germany, ensuring Japan territorial gains, including limitless sources of raw materials.

I have tried to show how the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, the two world wars, were started by the erroneous estimation that economic development requires that sources of raw materials be militarily ensured. The fact was that both the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan experienced tremendous economic growth after the Second World War without their own sources of raw materials. The foundation of economic development is a well educated work force and scientific and technological advancement. Nations possessing raw materials have no choice but to sell them, even though in the short run they can use their monopoly on those raw materials as a means of exerting political pressure.

Another lesson results from the battle of dictatorships during World War Two. If the dictatorship is under obvious external military pressure, the condition of declaring success is not a condition for maintaining the dictatorship. During the first two years of the war against the Soviet Union, only Hitler could declare success. The citizens of the Soviet Union, even the very strong critics of Stalin who did not express their criticism out of fear, became loyal. Democracies in ancient Greece and the Roman Republic respected limitations on freedom and the necessity of non-delegable command authority. On the other side of the coin, we see the same thing in the later years of the Second World War. Attempts to carry out a policy eliminating Hitler arose within a narrow group of military officers and did not resonate among the wide masses of the German population.

We will develop these observations from the war of the dictatorships in the next chapter, where we will concern ourselves with the functioning of the dictatorships and with their demise.

6 The Physiology of Dictatorship

A description of the construction of an organism is, in biology, indicated by the term anatomy. The anatomy of a dictatorship allows us to describe the structure of the organs sustaining a dictatorship. In biology, physiology concerns itself with the function of an organism. Physiology is written in Chinese with two characters. The first of them is the character for logic, the second for life. In biology, physiology is a synonym for the logic of life. I have borrowed this term to describe the logic of the workings of a dictatorship.

At the outset I will dispel several myths.

Some people emphasize that a dictatorship is connected with murder and torture, and that the foundation of a dictatorship is a government of brutal terror. Many seek the essence of a dictatorship in the personality of the dictator, and in his perverse appetite for killing.

In reality, murder in dictatorships is mainly related to timing. Lenin's effort to organize the Cheka and eliminate potential enemies was driven by a push to avoid hesitation and the delay associated with it that could have brought the revolutionaries in Russia the fate of their predecessors, the Paris Communards shot in the Père Lachaise Cemetery. Hitler interned his opponents in concentration camps, with the intention of releasing them after a victorious war. Every dictator must behave ruthlessly. He is

driven to this by his closest associates, many of whom have ambitions to take his place. He cannot allow himself to be labeled weak or indecisive. Then his associates would strip him of his supreme leadership. This means that the personality of the dictator plays no role. Stalin's cautiousness caused much greater killing in his own ranks than was the case with Hitler. Unfortunately, the 20th and 21st centuries consider the killing of enemies to be a valid social norm for democracies and dictatorships. The burning of villages and the murder of Native American women and children is a part of the history of the democratic United States, and the murder of women and children in Africa and Asia is a part of the histories of democratic France and the democratic United Kingdom. Even though the airstrikes in Iraq and Afghanistan do not intentionally target women and children, they are ordered when their absence would threaten the lives of allied soldiers and the success of their military operations.

In dictatorships we see that killing is characteristic for their beginnings, when the dictatorship is consolidating its power. An example is the Franco dictatorship in Spain, just like the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile; and, on the other hand, the dictatorships in the communist countries of Europe and Asia, just as in Castro's Cuba. The statistics on executions carried out clearly illustrate this. In fact, it is the wish of every dictator to rule without violence, with the massive support of the country's whole population, who will honor and celebrate him. Only the people's striving for freedom compels him to violence. In a dictatorship we also encounter the murder and torture of prisoners. During the period of consolidating power this contributes to the spreading of fear, thus to the stabilization of the dictatorial regime. However, we encounter it even in a subsequent period when the dictatorship is very strong. It is related to one of the four conditions for the existence of a dictatorship, rewarding the faithful. In every system, in dictatorships and democracies, people with sadistic tendencies are inclined to join the country's security apparatus. Thus we encounter this phenomenon in both systems. In democracies, where government oversight exists through the criticism of independent media, the politician must, whether due to his own moral conviction or out of concern for reelection, order redress. Even in a dictatorship these events are sometimes unpleasant for the leader, and he does not want them to be repeated. Investigations of the use of torture in prisons occurred in communist Czechoslovakia and even in Hitler's Germany, though always without punishment of the violent policemen. The leadership of the dictatorship thus signaled that it did not desire these illegal manifestations, but at the

same time made clear that violent policemen are more important for the leadership than respect for laws giving prisoners limited rights, for example, the right to humane treatment.

Another myth is the notion that people can topple the dictatorship if they demonstrate the courage to do so. This is a very dangerous notion, because, among the silent majority of people who do not support the dictatorship, but do not fight against it, it creates a feeling of guilt. In another way, this notion can be formulated thusly: Every nation has the government it deserves. On the other hand, there are people who oppose the dictatorship by nonviolent means, in communist dictatorships labeled as dissidents, and they figure very prominently in the collapse of the dictatorship. Their role in the fall of the dictatorship is not, however, inciting the silent majority. With their activity they contribute to the formation of a plurality of ideas among the ruling elites, and thus to the elimination of one of the four conditions of a functioning dictatorship.

Ideology is condition number one. Integral to scientific thinking is that each scientist critically analyzes the arguments supporting and refuting his position. What applies to science does not apply to politics. In politics, the politician proclaims that which supports his policy. If he mentions ideas that contradict his political policy, he belittles them. Emphasizing counterarguments is the role of the opposition, if one exists, of course. It is similar to the way things are in the legal practice. A defense lawyer emphasizes only that which is beneficial for his client, while, on the other side, the prosecutor, though he is supposed to be objective, in practice emphasizes the facts speaking against the accused.

At the outset of every major social change there is a violent seizure of power. Revolutions accompany us throughout history. The cause of revolution is the dissatisfaction of certain strata of society with their situation. Often it is an economic situation; frequently the lack of a sense of freedom, for example, religious freedom. People who have political talent, meaning that they feel they can manage the state in accordance with their beliefs better than the current ruling elite, place themselves at the head of the revolution. The revolutions in Britain, France and North America were caused by the discrepancy between the significant economic status of certain strata of the population and their limited political power. "No taxation without representation" is the slogan expressing this ideology. The result of these revolutions (though in France, after a series of reversals) was democracy. It was this way because all of these revolutions

occurred in countries with a tenable economic situation for wide segments of the population -- in places where the precept of these democratic revolutions, i.e., the inviolability of private ownership, was respected. Elected governments would administer the state, and the majority of citizens would confirm or replace governing representatives in periodically repeated elections.

A revolution that culminates in dictatorship usually has one of two causes that in most cases combine themselves. The first is a state of threat from an external enemy. In a state of the threat of war, people prefer dictatorship, because unified management of a defense is accepted as unavoidable. The second cause is a feeling of economic injustice among a wide segment of society. The ideology is therefore based on two theses: the struggle against the external enemy, and the struggle for economic justice. These slogans are understandably modified. Anticommunist dictatorships emphasize the threat to society from chaos, which is the goal of the communists, and the defense of private ownership and religious values. Unpropertied people in a number of countries are religiously oriented, so they support the dictatorship in its effort to suppress the atheistic communists. The propertied support the dictatorship for fear of confiscation of their assets by the communists, and out of fear of a worsening of their economic standing under the socialists. They are afraid that these two groups, the socialists and communists, have a majority in the country, and that free elections would bring them to power. Spain between the world wars is an example.

The fundamental rallying cry of communist dictatorships is the slogan of an ongoing class struggle: The world is divided into two camps, the imperialist camp that wants to destroy us with war, and the socialist camp that yearns for peace and social justice. The struggle between these camps can only be carried out at the price of limited personal freedoms and suppression of alternative ideas about how society should be organized.

Many dictatorships are not economically strong, and the concern of overthrow is great. Thus communist dictatorships sought support from the Soviet Union, and anticommunist dictatorships from the USA. This was evident in the secondary slogans of the dictatorships. The anticommunists emphasize friendship with the USA, and the communists with the Soviet Union.

Ideology allows for a logical answer to all questions, so long as we accept the fundamental thesis of struggle. Any casting of doubt upon the actions of the ruling group

is construed as a betrayal of the struggle. He who criticizes the lack of freedom in anticommunist dictatorships helps the communists; in communist dictatorships, he is on the side of the imperialists who want to destroy them for profit.

The second condition, the declaration of success, is closely linked with ideology. The political method of formulating a declaration means that it is not important to emphasize the unsuccessful, but just success. It happens in democracies, but here there is the opposition on the other side emphasizing the failures. After the Russian communist revolution, electrification was an undeniable success. Hunger was explained as the inimical activity of the kulaks. After World War Two, successes in conquering space were highlighted, and the standard of living in the USSR was declared to be good and ever increasing. The standard of living in the West was portrayed as excellent for the wealthy and catastrophic for the majority of the population. The stores are full of goods, but people do not have money to buy them, the communists said.

On the other hand, people are willing to accept ideological arguments so long as failures are objectively the result of the enemy's actions. Thus, Hitler was widely accepted in Germany up until the end of the war, and Stalin was widely accepted in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

The most important condition for the functioning of a dictatorship is the rewarding of its supporters. This problem is not so pronounced in anticommunist dictatorships. Most of them came into being on the basis of a military coup, and military officers are rewarded as a priority in all countries. The same is true of the members of the police force. Propertied citizens support an anticommunist dictatorship out of fear of the communists; that is, out of concern for their property and their status. Anticommunism aligns them with the USA, thus they gain the support of the most powerful democratic country.

This is also the weakest link of the communist dictatorships. Economic growth is sacrificed to this condition. Incompetent supporters receive leading positions in the economy, and only their loyalty to the dictatorship, not their success at work, determines their status. In democracies, government enterprises are less effective than private ones because management must concern itself not only with the company's purely economic interests, but also with political interests, such as employment or rewards for supporters of the governing party, better still for the opposition as well, so that positions remain

stable even during a change of government. This understandably influences workers' morale and initiative. On the other hand, competition with private enterprises leads to the company's rationalization, though never to the same extent as in a private company. No impetus for rationalization ever existed in the state-owned enterprises of communist countries, and the economic results were catastrophic. Thus communism sacrificed the economy for the dictatorship, with negative outcomes for the existence of the dictatorships themselves.

The final condition, the suppression of the existence of a plurality of ideas within the dictatorship's ruling group, is clear for any dictatorship; yet in most cases it is exactly the failure to do so that is the cause of the demise of the dictatorship. An exception is dictatorships that have lost a war, such as Hitler's. Dictators are not aware of danger for the existence of the dictatorship, but of the danger of losing their own personal power. Thus they suppress other ideas within their own circle throughout their lives. We see this with Hitler (the struggle against the SA), Stalin (the battle against the internal enemy), and in all the purges taking place within the ruling political party or the repressive apparatus of all dictatorships. Those dictatorships that relied on the assistance of the Soviet Union and lessened their efforts in the struggle against members of the ruling group who held opposing views ended their existence simultaneously with the fall of the Soviet Union. Because not respecting this final condition for the existence of a dictatorship is behind the fall of the majority of them, we will take notice of this phenomenon in more detail.

At the beginning of armed conflict in a revolution, fear unites each group fighting against the other. The communists fear they will end up like the Communards after the defeat of the Paris Commune, and the conservatives are afraid they will be like the victims of the Jacobin terror following the French Revolution. The homogenous ruling group begins to differentiate after the victory of the dictatorship. In Russia, the ideas of some leading representatives of the Bolshevik Party lead to a change in Lenin's outlook, and the period of the NEP (New Economic Policy) begins; but the opponents of NEP are not persecuted within the party. This leads to Stalin's turnaround connected with bloody purges. In Italy and Germany, shortly after the victory of the dictatorship, a war begins that solidifies the ruling group. Wartime defeats lead to the removal of Mussolini in Italy in the midst of the Second World War, but not to the removal of Hitler in Germany. Hitler had bloodily repressed the SA beforehand, but it was mainly the shared

participation in war crimes and crimes against the Jews and the fear of reprisal by the Allies that led to a solid cementing of the Nazi elites. Perhaps a certain role was played here as well by a particular trust in miracle weapons that could alter the course of the war. A drowning man will clutch at a straw, so the saying goes. The main role was played here by the attitude of the Allies. They were willing to negotiate with Mussolini's former associates and offered them a compromise. They did not do this in the case of the Nazi Party in Germany.

If a dictator deals decisively with the proponents of diverse opinions within his own group, then his position is unshakable. If he dies, a vacuum occurs, and it is natural that someone must take his place, and the battle for succession is understandably a battle of ideas aimed at gaining the trust of the majority within the group holding power among the dictatorship's leadership. This is how dictatorships ended in Spain and Portugal, and, in a somewhat modified form, even the dictatorship in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union.

Shortly after the victory of the dictatorship, a plurality of ideas within the leading circle arises as a rule in all dictatorships. The leading circle is one of people with political talent, but they are not sadistic criminals. The goal of every dictator is to rule with the trust of all the people in his brilliant capabilities, and without the use of violence. The dictator grasps for violence 1) out of concern for the dictatorship's defeat, and 2) out of fear that he will be robbed of power by members of his ruling group. The red terror after the revolution in Russia and the murder of supporters of the White Guards is an example of the first reason, and Stalin's purges in the Bolshevik Party are an example of the second reason. It is a given that in every ruling group there is competition for the leadership after stabilization of the victory. Each person with a talent for politics knows that, if he wants to be successful in this competition, he must convince the majority of the other members in the leading group that he will be better than the current dictator. In other words, he must begin by criticizing him.

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had the ideology of a global revolution. Lenin's philosophy arose from Marx's precept that revolution cannot be won in a single country. Marx drew from the experiences of the French Revolution, when all the powers of Europe united against France and thus militarily defeated her. Lenin therefore considered the revolution in Russia as a beginning, and, under the rule that the wheels of the revolution must not stop turning, he planned its further progression. Stalin modifies this approach

with the thesis that revolution in one large powerful country such as the Soviet Union is undefeatable, but he continues to plan revolution in other countries. The highest body is the Comintern under the leadership of the Bolsheviks of the Soviet Union, and Moscow provides all other revolutionary communist parties material and military assistance. After the victory of the revolution in other countries, an alternative idea arises that it is not necessary to obey the Soviet Union. The first to come forward with this idea was Josef Tito in Yugoslavia, and he succeeded. Yugoslav communist partisans gained power in Yugoslavia without the assistance of the Soviet Union, and Tito ceased recognizing Stalin's authority. Stalin attacked through the media, but not at all militarily. It cannot be said which was more important: this experience, or the proven model in the Soviet Union of purges accompanied by executions that took place under Stalin's leadership in all communist parties. After Stalin's death, alternative ideas of another type immediately appear. Dictators are faulted for loss of the population's trust. Critics argue successfully that they can gain the confidence of the people through their intelligent approach. The dictators are blamed for unnecessary cruelty, which is the dominant factor in the loss of trust. Thus, in 1956, the majority of the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party rejects the leading role of the Soviet Union, along with the violent methods of the repressive elements of the communist party, i.e., the Hungarian state police, and Imre Nagy, a representative of these ideas, assumes power in Hungary. The Soviet Union crushes the Hungarian revolution, which it labels counterrevolutionary, and Nagy ends up on the scaffold. Shortly thereafter, alternative ideas are declared in the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev halts the purges in the Soviet Communist Party and establishes a certain form of a legal state within the context of communist dictatorship. However, he does not persuade the leading circle of the dictatorship with his actions. He is inscrutable to his comrades. Everyone still remembers Stalin, who was absolutely intelligible: He did not tolerate alternative ideas, and he rewarded loyalty. With Khrushchev they are concerned as to whether he has the situation under control, and whether he will pull them, his associates, down into the abyss of failure and loss of status. The group selects Leonid Brezhnev. He limits cruelty, and political executions end in the Soviet Union, though rigorousness increases. The loyalty of every citizen is examined, and only those who are thus screened receive leading positions. Alternative ideas within the ruling group are suppressed.

We can trace the rise of alternative ideas within the development of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. After 1948, executions occur under a reign of terror, though, for political reasons, they are limited to around 200 executed. Shortly thereafter, under the leadership of the Soviet Union, a purge takes place in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, also accompanied by the execution of leading communist functionaries. Stalin's chosen leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, bears the greatest responsibility. His loyalty to Stalin is determined by his sense of obligation. As an uneducated person without the wider support of Czechoslovak communists, he was chosen by Stalin to be the leader, and Gottwald did not want to disappoint Stalin. He dies shortly after Stalin's death, and the new president, Antonín Zápotocký, a writer from a family of long-time social democrats, immediately minimizes the terror. Political prisoners are released under an amnesty, and executions are halted. After his death, the Soviet Union installed Antonín Novotný, who was uneducated, but adept at managing people. Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, in the mid-1960s, alternative ideas appear. Political discourse must be made possible, and not those who are loyal, but those who are the most capable should be chosen from among the membership of the communist party. In 1968, the slogan "Socialism with a human face" appears, and Alexander Dubček is chosen by the ruling group as its leading representative. The Soviet Union does not tolerate alternative ideas in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, calls for a renewal of repression against those proclaiming alternative ideas, and intervenes militarily. Like Janos Kadar, who is installed in Hungary by the Soviet Union, Gustáv Husák, installed in Czechoslovakia, carries out a policy of moderate repression. A legalistically authoritarian state comes into being, with laws forbidding the promotion of alternative views. This neutralizes popular dissatisfaction, but the greatest weakness of a dictatorship remains: the faithful must be rewarded. They gain well paid management positions in industry, in research institutions, at universities, and in cultural institutions, without consideration of their abilities and regardless of their performance, simply as a reward for loyalty. State-owned companies are generally less effective than private ones, because, in addition to production and the provision of services, they must also take into account employment and the responsibility to employ workers who have political sponsors, and who thus work less and lower the morale of others. In a democratic society, they are subject to the criticism of the media, which stimulates the output of state-owned enterprises. Such was not the case in Husák's Czechoslovakia, nor in Kadar's Hungary. The economic consequences were disastrous.

While Czech industry was in very good condition after the Second World War and meant economic strengthening for the Soviet Union, in the 1980s it lagged behind Western Europe to such an extent that the Russians realized that, in exchange for their quality crude oil and natural gas, they were receiving goods of inferior quality from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. This fact contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in exactly the same way that a contributing factor to the collapse of the colonial empires of Britain and France was the fact that politically managing colonies was economically disadvantageous for them. At the end of the 1980s, there was essentially no communist manager who would have privately considered the communist dictatorship a good thing. Only the evident unrealistic nature of an alternative -- and the seemingly inevitable military intervention of the Soviet Union with all of its negative consequences -- was the reason for continuation of the current policy. The argument that cooperation with the Soviet Union protects us against German revanchists who wish to revise the outcome of the Second World War was spread as communist propaganda by the media, but no one believed it. In communist countries, dictatorship was maintained by fear of Soviet intervention, and this also suppressed alternative ideas.

7 Dictatorship Against Democracy: USSR vs. USA

The politics of the second half of the 20th century are characterized by the Cold War and proxy wars between the USA and the USSR. Never in history did more powerful superpowers stand against each other. Let us attempt to analyze their mutual relations from the beginning to the ultimate victory of democracy. The American Constitution of 1787 is the foundational legal document of the world's first modern democracy. Prior to this, we can speak of democracy in Great Britain, where the freedom of commerce, of movement, and of expression is connected with participation in the administration of the state; however, the existence of two legislative chambers, only one of which is elected, in itself demonstrates that democracy here was not complete.

American democracy is based on the equality of individuals and on respect for property. All colonists arrived poor in North America, and they acquired property through their labor, or by inheritance from those who earned it through their work. Thus, in America there was no property that one would consider to be unjustly acquired. Each citizen, in accordance with Kant's Categorical Imperative (treat others as you would be treated), respected this status quo. An American did not encounter property about which

he would conclude that it was justified to deprive someone of it because its owner was using it without the right to do so. The idea of the socialists about the unjust distribution of wealth thus never gained mass support in America. This of course did not apply to black slaves, and later to free Americans of African origin; but they always constituted a minority in the USA. If Americans wanted to trade, conclude treaties and otherwise communicate only with democracies, there was only Great Britain, from which they had liberated themselves by a revolution. Thus at the outset they immediately declared the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of foreign countries, with the sole exception being that of protecting citizens of the United States and their property. When, shortly after the creation of the United States, Algeria cast American citizens into slavery, the government of the USA sent warships to free them, and pursued this policy for another 200 years. The policy of the USA has always been absolutely clear. Every form of business was given the green light, with only minimum government involvement, and immigrants with ideas for business were welcome. The founders of the USA also put stock in education, and they supported universities so much that there was not another country where education had greater support. The positive feedback effect of an intake of brains in universities and private enterprises led to growth in the level of qualification of the USA's labor force. Highly qualified professionals established companies requiring highly qualified labor, university graduates easily obtained handsomely paid employment, and, at the same time, there were many well paying jobs left over for intelligent, hard-working immigrants. In the USA, no impediments to development existed: there was enough land, but few people to farm it; enough mineral wealth, and few people who would mine it. The shortage of labor raised wages, and thus the influx of qualified people from Europe did not subside. Nowhere on Earth were there as few obstacles in the path of "idea (business aim) - product - sales - profit" as in the USA. The United States became economically the most developed country in the world. While other major powers gave preference to gobbling up colonies, the USA favored free trade. A conquest of colonies by a covetous Germany in the First World War would have threatened the USA's trade with the United Kingdom and France, upon which the prosperity of the USA was then dependent. Thus the USA engaged militarily on the side of the Western Allies. The confiscation of some property from a few Americans in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution led to military intervention that the USA quickly ceases, because it has no hope of success. What remains is the American aversion to communist dictatorships. The majority of Americans had already declared their opposition to socialist notions of

the necessity to redistribute wealth. American democracy concurs with the association of workers in labor organizations that will collectively bargain for wages and, in the event of a failure to agree, carry out strikes; but it rejects any interference whatsoever into the rights of ownership. This outlook characterizes American policy throughout the entire existence of the USA, and I will attempt to show how it led to some political failures and resulting destabilization throughout the world.

Lenin's revolution, by proclaiming global revolution, threatened established political order around the world. The leadership of the Soviet Bolsheviks organized communist parties everywhere, with the goal of revolutionary confiscation of property and the establishment of communist dictatorships that would militarily safeguard Bolshevik Russia. The USA correctly perceived this as a danger for its own democracy, and from the beginning took up a position against it. It must be added that the USA was threatened relatively little, because the communist ideas about the unjust distribution of wealth were not falling upon fertile soil in this case. This was because, within expanding businesses, capable people who, for a lack of money, did not obtain an education had many opportunities, even without education, to reach top-paying management jobs, and even uneducated people were paid for their work so that they could lead a free life. That is, they had enough money for food, clothing, entertainment and a home with furniture and a garden. Immediately after the First World War, Germany was threatened by communist revolution, but Hitler, with the support of financing, drew off many supporters from the communists. During the period of the NEP, it appeared that Lenin significantly relaxed his international activity, and Stalin with the thesis of socialism's stability in one powerful country further reduced the danger for other countries. At the time of the economic crisis at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, they had other worries in the USA. It seemed that the American dream of prosperity for all had ended, and President Roosevelt with his New Deal policy had to expend great effort to rescue the economy, and with it democracy in his own country.

The greatest danger was Hitler's plans for world domination. It was clear that, if Hitler defeated the Soviet Union, isolated England could not hold on, and the United States would not be able to defend against the combined attack of the Japanese and the Germans. The strategies of an alliance with Stalin and a closer alliance with the United Kingdom were the only possible policy for the United States. Shortly after the Second World War, the United States proceeded correctly. The Marshall Plan, American

assistance to Europe, boosted the economy of Western Europe, thus strengthening democracy in these countries. Conservatives here began to cooperate with democratically-thinking socialists, and they viewed a certain form of central planning and nationalization of major businesses as a compromise solution. Americans did not look favorably upon free education and health care, together with universal social security; but as a bulwark against the communists coming to power, they were approved. Preventing Soviet military intervention around the world was another correct step of the USA's foreign policy. However, the Americans made their mistakes in the details. The fundamental error, as we shall see, was their rigid cleaving to the sacrosanctity of private property.

The Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War as a victor. The leadership of the USSR considered this a victory of the Bolshevik Revolution, however. In all the countries the Red Army occupied, and in some, like Czechoslovakia and Poland that it had even liberated from fascist tyranny, the Soviet Union ushered in a communist dictatorship. Stalin had already informed Churchill of this step ahead of time. In other countries (such as Greece), he did not intervene. The problem was with the eastern portion of Germany. The Allies' agreement with the creation of a Soviet Occupation Zone was, of course, likewise their acquiescence to the establishment of a communist dictatorship. Here there was the problem of Berlin. The USSR played the high roller and sealed off the supply routes, correctly sensing that the USA, the United Kingdom and France would not go to war over this with the nuclear power that the USSR already was. The USSR expected that the Western allies would evacuate those most loyal to them and leave Berlin in the clutches of the communists. An air bridge supplying West Berlin with all its needs had, however, a tremendous psychological effect. The residents of West Berlin knew that they were not abandoned. The Soviet plan had counted on resigned West Berliners. When this aspect did not materialize, the Soviet Union opened the supply routes and thus restored the pre-crisis situation. In doing so, the USSR revealed its tactic. Lenin's wheels of revolution would not stop, but here and there they would roll forward just a bit. If successful, they would stay there; if not, they would roll back again. This approach had special significance for communist dictatorships. As I indicated, a condition of dictatorship is the suppression of alternative ideas. This is completely justifiable in warfare, where non-delegable command authority must apply. This tactic was the reason for its application. The history of the second half of the 20th century is a

history of one crisis subsequent to another. The imperialists are threatening us in Berlin; the imperialists are threatening us in Korea; the imperialists are threatening us in Cuba; the imperialists are threatening us in Vietnam. Any alternative idea whatsoever can be judged as helping the enemy. The USA managed the Berlin crisis. The Korean crisis arrived.

From a geographic standpoint, South Korea is poorly defensible. The government is a right-wing, moderately corrupt dictatorship without popular support. Militarist communist North Korea was clearly dominant. Máo Zédōng pressed for an attack. His ambition was to become the hegemon of revolution in Asia, and the USSR had to make the decision. The North Korean communists received permission for the attack from the USSR, as well as material and ideological assistance. The Chinese People's Army was in reserve. The war ended in three years at a cost of four million victims so that the status quo could remain unchanged.

Thus end American successes. Afterwards, until the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, only American failures followed. None of them was fatal, as a country with such economic and military strengths as the United States cannot even commit an error that would imperil it. Before we take note of Cuba, which is an example of the failure of American political thinking, we will concern ourselves with the attitude of Americans toward dictatorship in general. The citizens of the USA have never lived in a dictatorship. For them, dictatorship is something terrible, for it takes away that which every person values most, freedom. Those who have spent a portion of their lives in a dictatorship know that it does not mean a loss of freedom for everyone. I will be specific, and I will start with the period before the onset of Hitler's dictatorship. A university graduate without work and a laborer who worried that he would lose his job did not have a feeling of freedom in democratic Germany of the 1920s. Although they could vote, few people in a democracy consider this to be the most important perk of democracy. Usually 30%, or sometimes even more citizens do not take part in elections, and only a minority concern themselves with studying campaign platforms. What is essential is freedom of expression, though many perceive this as the bickering of politicians fighting for position in the elections. Many people like the freedom to travel, the freedom to find a nice place to live, the freedom to dress as they like, the freedom to choose their food, the freedom to have fun, and the freedom to pursue their hobbies. All of this requires money that a certain layer of a democratic society does not have. If a worker in Hitler's Germany had

stable work, his sense of freedom grew considerably. Because he was paid and thus gained many of the aforementioned freedoms, he had no reason to fight for political freedom, and he did not encounter the repression of Nazi dictatorship. With the exception of a small number of communists and socialists, there were only a very few German laborers in the concentration camps. The Russian proletarian had his basic foodstuffs guaranteed; the fear of losing his job did not exist; he received free medical care; and, if his children had talent, they could study for free. If they did not want to study, or if they did not have talent, they too became workers, with wages only slightly lower than the pay of school graduates. Most dictatorships bring order to the city streets -- something with which democracies all over the world have problems -- and the freedom to go out into the street safely after dark is also a benefit for some people. I know many decent people from Czechoslovakia who never hurt anyone, and who often helped others, and at the same time they loved Stalin as a liberator of Czechoslovakia. It is difficult to estimate how large a segment of the population supports a dictatorship. Many do not understand the mechanisms of a dictatorship, and they assume that it is necessary to dismantle the repressive apparatus and the restrictions on freedom of expression and travel, and only then will they support the dictatorship. They do not understand that the repressive apparatus and the restrictions on freedom of expression and travel are essential for maintaining the dictatorship.

Americans also do not understand a state where private ownership is not respected. But people in many countries consider the distribution of property to be unjust. For the most part, wealth is not concentrated in the hands of an individual because of his exceptional performance as a professional athlete, artist or inventor, but often as the result of speculation that is barely legal, or illegal when there is no way to prove illegal activity. In occupied countries, after liberation from Hitler's dictatorship -- in Czechoslovakia for example -- many women had lost their husbands who perished in the struggle for freedom, and they and their children received a small amount of compensation. Those who did not collaborate outright, but who took advantage of the opportunity in an occupied country to do business, had a great amount of property. It is therefore no wonder that political parties calling for the nationalization of property gained a majority in the free elections in Czechoslovakia in 1946.

On the basis of their life experience, Americans assume that support for a revolution leading to dictatorship is irrational, based solely on deceptive propaganda. I have

attempted to show that the support of the population for revolution, while not usually a majority, is widespread.

For Americans, a dictatorship that does not respect private ownership is much more appalling. It is true that, in a free business climate, the enemy of the dictatorship can be freer. He is not dependent upon the ruling power for his pay; he can have his children study at private schools, or, as the case may be, let them work in the company they will inherit, or in the business of another enemy of the dictatorship. Because such a dictatorship cannot use the subtler forms of pressure -- such as reduced pay and exclusion from education and better paying employment -- than a dictatorship that does not respect private ownership can, it is often forced to use much more brutal methods for suppressing resistance.

These American prejudices were determinant in the attitude of the government of the USA toward Castro's Cuba. Fidel Castro did not declare himself to be a communist at the beginning. However, so long as he did not want to lose favor with his supporters, he had to accept a certain form of redistribution of wealth. The behavior of the USA could have led to Cuba remaining an authoritarian state (as it also was under Batista) emphasizing a struggle against poverty (which did not interest Batista) and with a more or less neutral attitude toward the USA, just like dozens of countries of the so-called Third World in Asia and Africa. But the USA pushed Cuba into cooperation with the Soviet Union, at significant risk to its own security and that of the entire democratic world.

Americans could not influence Czechoslovakia's Prague Spring of 1968. Alternative ideas in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia led, under the slogan "Socialism with a human face," to a policy of the rule of law, to freedom of expression, and to a loosening of restrictions on traveling abroad. The Soviet communists did not tolerate such a policy out of concern for their leading role in all communist states dependent upon the Soviet Union, and they launched a military invasion. Later media interviews about this period with several leading American officials show that the Americans had not understood the Soviet Union's policy when they concluded that they had sidestepped the danger of an attack upon Western Europe by the Soviet Armed Forces. Though this was the scenario of Soviet military exercises, the Soviet Union had never had such a policy, not even in the time of Stalin's rule. The only country the Soviet Union attacked without reason was Finland at the outset of the Second World War. In all other cases it relied on the

communist party within the country. It thus gained power in all communist countries around the world. According to my unconfirmed information, the USSR had a twenty-year plan prepared for Western Europe in which they expected that, by the end of this time, all of Europe would be communist. Soviet communists expected that, perhaps ten years after the Second World War, an economic crisis would break out in the capitalist world similar to the one that appeared at the end of the 1920s after the First World War. The Academy of Sciences of the USSR was supposed to expeditiously provide top officials relevant information for analyzing capitalist crises. These officials expected that, as a result of a crisis, elections in the capitalist countries of Western Europe would lead to the rise of communist-supported leftist governments in which the communists would gain power and, most importantly, request military assistance from the USSR. Soviet armored troops were prepared for this. No crisis took place, and thus the plan was not carried out. In 1968, there were student demonstrations in some Western European countries, but nothing pointed to an economic crisis. Intervention in Western Europe was therefore never contemplated.

Chile is another American mistake from 1973. Socialist Salvador Allende became president as a result of democratic elections. Although he governed in a coalition with the communists, he remained a democrat. To ease enormous divisions of wealth, he moved toward nationalization, and this is never tolerated by the USA. He turned down the Soviet Union's offer of military assistance, submitted his policy to subsequent elections (in which he was victorious), and the United States supported an illegal, anti-democratic military coup by Pinochet, who toppled Allende. Even though the Americans attempted to appear neutral, no one in Latin America believed them. No future South American president, whether it is Venezuelan Chávez or Bolivian Morales, will trust the USA. The crisis of trust in the USA is complete in South America, and this will mean problems for the USA into the future as well.

The USA's engagement in Southeast Asia was a further American miscalculation. The Americans imagined that they would gain the support of the entire Vietnamese population, but the opposite was true. The communists added a racial subtext to their partisan war by convincing many that the Americans were white colonizers without whom everyone would be better off. (Mathematical error as a driving force in history is at work here as well.) The USSR's material assistance complemented the strategy of the Vietnamese communists. Each military victory by the Americans was a lapse in the

overall aim, each loss of American lives pointless. Neither American military commanders nor government officials had an exit strategy. They assumed the Vietnamese communists would give up the fighting; but for them, every loss meant support from the population, and they correctly supposed: “Why should we stop when we are on our home soil? They can quit much more easily and return to the USA.” Ultimately, that is what happened.

In Afghanistan, the Americans helped bring down the communists and defeat Soviet intervention with the help of their surface-to-air missiles that Afghan fighters used to shoot down Soviet helicopters like partridges. The result was a buildup of al-Qaeda bases, where planning took place for the largest attack on the USA since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The destruction of Saddam Hussein’s army in Iraq had its rational seed. His army threatened Israel, and there was the danger that the USA would be forced to help its ally at a time that would be much less advantageous for the USA and Israel. Neither Iraq nor Afghanistan is easy to resolve after the military victory. I believe it is a mistake that the USA does not cooperate with left-wing political forces. After the fall of the communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union, they cannot be a fifth column, because there is no power for whom they would be a fifth column. But they can be a counterweight to Muslim religious radicals in their appeal to poor people in countries where the middle class is essentially non-existent.

There is practically no one in the USA who doubts that the firm stance of President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher against the Soviet Union is to be credited with the collapse of the communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union. This is a fundamental fallacy. American pressure in the way of anti-ballistic missiles, Star Wars, and other forms of weaponry was trivial. Although the Soviet Union could not attack the USA, and though it never had any intention to do so, the position of nuclear stalemate had of course remained otherwise unchanged since 1948. The thousands of nuclear missiles the Soviet Union had, and which Russia still has, clearly prevent an American attack, even if the Russian Federation had not one tank, nor one airplane, nor a single aircraft carrier. Communism has not collapsed in Cuba, nor in North Korea, and these are comparatively weaker countries than the Soviet Union was. But it is necessary to answer the question as to why the communist Soviet Union collapsed.

The theory of the function of a dictatorship offers us a clear-cut answer. Within the Soviet governing circle, in other words, among communist officials, alternative ideas appeared. Leading economic officials, communists managing companies, wanted a change in the system. That had gained prominent positions in Soviet society, and they wanted to make use of them. A dictatorship that could send them to prison or execute them at any time, or at least fire them, prevented this. Managing state enterprises in the way managers in capitalism run private firms was their goal. Perestroika and glasnost led to this, and they achieved their goal. As evidence that they achieved their goal, we see them today as the wealthy Russian owners of enormous assets around the world.

As far as concerns the Russian empire, i.e., all the communist satellite countries, the explanation is also simple. The British shed their colonies mainly because they ceased to bring them profit. From an economic standpoint, there was more favorable commerce for Britain. The Soviet Union exported quality crude oil and natural gas to its subordinate states and received low-quality consumer goods, because the incompetent but obedient managers of planned industry were unable to make any other kind. A first step of the Soviet Union even before its collapse was to switch to trading crude and natural gas for dollars. The actual collapse of the Soviet Union did not do much damage to the Russian Federation. All of the successor states to the USSR, perhaps with the exception of the Baltic republics that are massively supported by the European Union, have greater economic problems than the Russian Federation. The politicians of the successor states took advantage of their political talent and became independent rulers; but the standard of living of the citizens of these countries in no way benefitted as a result.

There are still politicians today who warn against potential aggressiveness in the style of the Soviet Union. But just as Britain is not making ready to occupy India, the Russian Federation is not preparing an invasion of the countries of Europe's former East Bloc from which it has withdrawn. A Russian diplomat once declared that, when a large country enters into conflict with a small one, the small country is usually at a disadvantage. This certainly applies. The Russian Federation will take advantage of its strengths. Its strength is in its wealth of natural resources. Countries that are too critical of Russian policy can expect that they will have difficulties with the delivery of natural gas and crude oil from the Russian Federation. There are concerns, but these will be overcome, because the Russians want money for their natural gas. All the same, they will sell it at the highest possible price, just like any other capitalist.

It appears the Americans have not grasped that they are not engaged in a clash of civilizations with the Russian Federation, but that they must try to get along with Russia, just as with any other democratic country. In the strategy of war, we must be on the offense when the enemy is weakened. It seems that the Russian Federation is weak, and therefore we are setting up radars on its borders and guided missiles, such as in Poland, and we are arming its neighbors who want to resolve a border conflict militarily, such as Saakashvili's Georgia. These steps will obviously not have much effect on a country with thousands of missiles with nuclear warheads; but within Russia they will support the opinions of those politicians who want to get attention with their strident attitude against America, and the aforementioned steps will serve them as an argument.

Nor did America conduct a reasonable policy in the Balkans. It was not possible to prevent the collapse of Yugoslavia. The most developed region, Slovenia, profited from its independence and from joining the European Union, and Croatia with its beautiful coast can live well from tourism. Tiny Montenegro is considering the same path. Its population can perhaps make a living from its short coastline. The others could be helped by cooperation. The Serbian policy of Milošević was as unfortunate for Serbia as Hitler's policy was for Germany. But the United States could have been more cool-headed. The bombing of Belgrade did not win any friends, and Milošević's days were numbered as it was. Russia had no intention of intervening, neither at the beginning nor at the end of the conflict. An independent Kosovo can only survive on American money. The USA will pay for a base that it does not need there at all, because there is no one there who would threaten its interests. When investors discover that Albania is an optimum tourist destination, the American base will just be excess for the American military when the budget is cut.

A more serious problem is Israel, but it deserves its own detailed analysis.

I have devoted myself to the policy of the USA and the USSR in such detail because decision-making in the Kremlin and in Washington determined world policy for half a century. The mistakes of dictatorships are advantageous for the world, but the mistakes of democracy can be fatal. Americans are aware of this, and so far they have not made any gross mistakes. One danger going into the future is its own flawed decision-making. It is the only superpower, but it must always consider its steps. The future of the planet depends on them in the next half-century.

8 Politics and the Czech Republic

The Czech Republic is the assembly plant for all of Europe, and it is as it is. "Je to jak to je" is the Czech translation of 14th century English King Edward III's "It is as it is," the most important sentence in political thought, in my opinion. It always holds true, unlike the "After us, the deluge" pronouncement of perhaps the most significant female politician in history, Madame de Pompadour, which almost always holds true in politics. "It is as it is" means that we do not know how a certain status quo came about. It tells us only that there is nothing or very little we can do about it. I pointed to the example of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, where, for successful advancement, a country needs top-notch, world-class technology if it is to guarantee the entire nation's standard of living. A worker who assembles a Siemens telephone switchboard does not differ in the nature of his work from an African worker who assembles a wooden bed; but, thanks to the high-quality scientific and technical level of the German product, his income is many times more than that of the African. This is not a remnant of colonialism, but a difference in the tradition of education. For Africa there is no solution here. It can invest into the development of education and reach great successes; but it will never attain the German technical tradition. The Industrial Revolution began in England, and at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century it spread to the East. It came to the Lands of the Bohemian Crown from Germany, and it fell upon fertile soil. Prague's Charles University educated natural scientists and lawyers. The Prague Technical University, later named Polytechnic and founded in 1709, trained engineers. Thus all the experts for organizing industrial manufacturing and trade were in place. It was in Bohemia and Moravia -- which were among the world's several industrialized regions and the most developed parts of the Habsburg monarchy -- where Czechs, Germans and Jews (some considering themselves Czechs, others German) instituted a market economy with economic competition, and with top-notch, world-class technology. The trend continued in an independent Czechoslovakia, where, in addition to corporations with extensive research and development capabilities such as Škoda Pilsen, Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk (ČKD), and Baťa Zlín, there were dozens of manufacturers of technical products, radio receivers, motorcycles, automobiles and airplanes. The state-owned corporation Zbrojovka Brno, manufacturer of top of the line weapons, cannot be overlooked. The German occupation and accompanying closure of Czech universities halted this development, but its short seven-year duration did not mean a catastrophe. Neither did

the communist regime -- which must be condemned for persecution and murder of political opponents -- bring an end to research establishments after 1948. University professors who did not share communist beliefs were transferred to the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, newly opened on the model of the Soviet Union. Professionals with a communist orientation -- of whom there was no shortage, with the communists having received 40% of the vote in free elections after 1945 while Stalin was admired as a victor over fascism -- moved to the universities. In a number of nationalized companies, the scientific research departments were expanded. Despite this, it was the beginning of Czech scientific and technical stagnation. Within the communist bloc, the priority was research in theoretical and applied fields important for the military, such as the physics of aircraft and rocket design, and aerospace physics. Everything was done in the Soviet Union. Other science was not important. Research institutes gradually became places where, in the context of rewarding the faithful, the dictatorship installed its followers in leading positions, and the effectiveness of research work ceased to be important. A manufactured product did not have to be of top technical quality, so long as it more or less served its purpose and could be delivered to the Western market below cost. Although there were several capable people in every lab, the stagnation was enormous. Czechoslovakia lost its scientific competitiveness, as well as its contact with the leading edge of advancements due to the prohibition on travel to the West. After 1990, practically all research and development establishments were shut down. The university labs and those of the Academy of Sciences remained, but these were devoted to basic and not applied research. I think the research and development labs should have been reorganized so that the hangers-on were eliminated, but the labs maintained. It could have been a condition for the owners as the labs were privatized. I think it was a mistake not to do this, but I do not know whether there was still anything to salvage.

Theoreticians of the market economy teach us that everything capable of existence is improved by the invisible hand of the market; but it is not that way with research and development in the Czech Republic. With a few exceptions, research and development takes place where the firm's management has its headquarters. At the same time, the firm tries to keep its production at this location as well. I could offer several examples. The Škoda Octavia car, the product of Volkswagen's subsidiary, looks like a Volkswagen Passat, but it has a different chassis and is therefore less stable. The more expensive Passat is produced in Germany, where workers' pay is five times higher, and the cheaper

Octavia is made in the Czech Republic. Both products sell well, but things can only work this way so long as the pay of our Czech workers is lower than in Germany. And thus it not only is as it is, but also as it will be. The governments of countries that have invested in high-technology can, by supporting research and development in their countries, support their countries' economies. For us in the Czech Republic, by supporting basic research we are helping others. What can we do? Attempt to create applied research and development. If this is to be preceded by the reduction, or by the potential elimination of basic research in the institutions of the Academy of Sciences and the universities, it is the wrong course. We will end up, as is usually the case, with elimination. If we orient teams who are successful in basic research toward the problems of applied research, we have hope, not certain success. Among the post-communist countries, success has been had only by Estonia, which is tied to Finland, where there is a national corporation, Nokia, with a high-tech orientation. If we do not succeed, there is nothing that can be done. Today Egypt and Greece are also not the centers of civilization. We can live well this way as the assembly plant of Europe. Here we have some comparative advantages: a qualified workforce (better than in Poland), relative stability (not chaos as in Ukraine), and we are not in an earthquake zone (as is China where, even figuratively speaking, factory owners cannot know when things there will start shaking). A connection to the European Union is important for our economic lifeblood, and at the same time it protects us against political extremism. Restricting ourselves with regard to the EU is absurd. Every politician among our neighbors knows that the EU is more important for us than we are for the EU. Waging a media war against Russia is also absurd. Natural gas flows from them to us, not from us to them. They will always want to sell it at the highest price, and they are not pining to occupy the Czech Republic. For us, picking Tibet as a place where we will fight for human rights and not taking notice of regions that are closer -- we are more cautious with the Kurds, the Basques, and the Palestinians, because we do not know what to do with them -- means economic losses to the detriment of those who fight for human rights in a more circumspect way. And that means basically all of our partners in the EU.

With the EU, the economic growth and stability of the Czech Republic are ensured. Whether we follow the route of a socialized state with high taxes for the wealthy, or the path of liberal capitalism is something we will always be deciding in parliamentary

elections. We do not have any real problems with our neighbors. At the same time, this does not mean that we will not create them in the future through our own ineptitude.

In our country we have one pseudo-problem, the Sudeten German organizations and their efforts at compensation, and one serious problem, the Roma.

Why are the Sudeten German organizations a pseudo-problem? It is because this is an issue that can never be resolved through compromise with the Czech Government. Sudeten Germans came to the territory of the Czech state at the invitation of Bohemian kings, and they lived in the border region for centuries. This region was called the Sudetenland. After Hitler came to power, the German government demanded that the territory inhabited by Germans be annexed to the German Reich. Britain and France agreed to this in the Munich Pact. Prior to this, a secret-ballot referendum was held in this territory, and the clear majority of the German population, at that time citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, opted for joining the Reich. They made a decision between life in a democratic Czechoslovakia, where an integral part of democracy was education in the German language, including at universities (the German part of Charles University in Prague and the German Technical Institute in Brno), and life in the dictatorship of Hitler's Germany. They were thus the only group that, by an overwhelming majority in free elections (only the communists and not many social democrats were opposed), supported Hitler and his aggressive policy. After the defeat of Hitler's Germany, in what was considered reparation for the damages caused to Czechoslovakia in the war started by Germany, President Beneš reached an agreement with the Allies in the war against Hitler for a removal of the Sudeten Germans and a confiscation of their property. Since that time, Sudeten German organizations have sought a return for those who were removed, or for their descendants, and restitution of their property, even though those who were resettled received specific compensation from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. After 1989, President of the Czech Republic Václav Havel apologized for the removal, saying that it was an application of the principle of collective guilt, which is unacceptable in a legal state. That would certainly apply if no elections had taken place; but as it was, it is debatable whether it was about the principle of collective guilt, or about justified retribution.

The point is that, ahead of elections in Germany, Sudeten German organizations are approached by German political parties, some of whose representatives, in an effort to

gain their votes, express vague support. Why can there be no restitution? In my view, what is fundamental is that the basis here is a historical argument. These people lived here for centuries. This argument is the most dangerous one for provoking armed conflict, because it is always possible to find a period in history when this or that territory belonged to some group of people. A historical argument represents a perpetuum mobile of enmity, and no reasonable politician should ever employ it, because it represents a coffin for compromise (as we can see in the disagreement between Palestinian Arabs and Israel). On the basis of this argument, Native Americans could demand payment for land, and someday it is possible that indigenous Australians could bankrupt Australia as such a demand is fulfilled.

The second argument is a practical one. Sudeten Germans were dispossessed of their property after the war, and 300 thousand citizens of Czechoslovakia perished in the Second World War started by Germany. The majority of them were not killed by the Sudeten Germans, but they bear shared responsibility through their voting in the referendum. The bus driver who drives through a railroad crossing against a red light did not kill his passengers, rather it was the train with its engineer; yet despite this he is responsible for their deaths. If the scales were balanced by compensation to the state for the killing of its citizens in the amount that courts now recognize, it is a question as to what the resulting bottom line would be. The German Government could never accede to this method of argumentation. Perhaps it could negotiate a small gain for Germany with the Czech Republic, but then Poland would demand the same approach, and compensation for 4 million dead is unacceptable for Germany from an economic standpoint. It would cause the collapse of the German economy, so demands for reparations for roughly 20 million Russians and Ukrainians could not even be registered. I have pointed out the absurdity of this situation, but its irrationality does not prevent politicians in Germany and even in the Czech Republic from raising this issue. In the introduction I showed how mathematical error is a driving force of politics, and when a descendant of a dispossessed Sudeten German does not add things up correctly, he can, in his misplaced hope, support a politician who promises him compensation on his way to power.

The Roma problem is serious. The Roma are a disadvantaged minority in the Czech Republic, for the most part not integrated into society, and their poor level of education corresponds to a high level of criminality, mainly minor theft, which has a negative

impact on the non-Roma population, who demand the withholding of welfare payments and tough punishments for theft. Guarding and feeding a thief in jail is, however, more expensive than welfare, whose reduction causes a rise in criminality, because there is usually no interest in hiring unskilled labor.

The Roma represented a problem even during communist rule. The government solved it by overpaying for unskilled labor, mandatory employment, and relatively high supplementary payments for children which, in view of the large size of Roma families, represented a significant economic factor. Also, with government-owned apartments assigned on the basis of family size, Roma families were allocated apartments that they often destroyed, because their natural way of living was nomadic, and this had been eliminated by the communist dictatorship. Because the demand for unskilled labor is low, Roma live on welfare payments, and occasionally they manage to get an assigned apartment from local authorities. Given the rate of unemployment, they use their free time for criminal activity.

A solution to the problem is not easy, and nothing has been done during twenty years of democracy in the Czech Republic. Many call for crackdowns, and in the dissatisfied public they find support that enables their political career. But, as I mentioned earlier, repression is not without a price, and the activity ends with them pretending for the benefit of the majority of the public to take a hard line against the Roma, and the criticism of pro-Roma organizations gets them votes in the elections. However, as regular politicians they must continue with the established policy of providing welfare and assigning apartments, because there is no other vision for resolving the Roma issue.

Everyone understands that, when a problem is unresolved after twenty years, its solution will neither be simple nor cheap. It would seem that the only solution is positive discrimination, partially successful in the USA with African-Americans. My recommendation is relatively expensive and time consuming: For about 50 percent of the most intelligent Roma children, establish boarding schools on the model of British boarding schools for the wealthy where they will be taught by highly paid teachers and counselors, with the goal of having the Roma children high school educated (about half of them) and college educated (the other half). The results would take decades, but it is the only reasonable alternative to the current policy of unemployment, welfare, and substandard government housing.

Political life in the Czech Republic corresponds to political life in the rest of Europe. Social democrats emphasizing a socialized state and conservatives seeking a leading role for the private sector initiative of the free market with the smallest possible role for the state compete for the voters' favor. After the Velvet Revolution, the socialized state received priority in the form of free health care, free education, and an egalitarian pension system, even though the country was governed by center-right parties. However, the attempt at the least amount of interference by the state in private sector initiative opened a path to uncontrolled capital speculation, and thus to the creation of a class of individuals with capital whose excessive wealth was not, and still is not, burdened by any kind of taxation. The media -- mainly the distinctly center-right-oriented major electronic media -- evidently prefers political indoctrination to objective reporting, and this markedly influenced public opinion that is, in any historical situation anywhere, inclined toward erroneous quantitative estimation, or rather, to mathematical error. For example, bank managers profited from high incomes, and, after the bankruptcy of banks that the state rescued with taxes, they were left with lavish homes and perhaps even considerable wealth that was essentially indirectly obtained from taxpayers' money. Opinion polls show that they are tolerated by the public as private citizens, but conversely, the salaries of members of Parliament -- which are much lower than in Western European countries -- are judged by the public to be undeserved.

In the game of politics, the size of the national debt has a pronounced role. The significance of the national debt is often misunderstood even by politically oriented citizens, thus even though this issue is an international one, it is worth mentioning here in greater detail. There is perhaps just one kind of expenditure that is negative for the economy of a country, and that is the purchase of weapons from foreign suppliers. Other expenditures stimulate the economy. Investments in infrastructure, in roads or public works, for example, give people work, and social transfers are converted by the poor into goods or services whose sellers convert them into more expensive goods, or into private investments that mean the development of further capacities for manufacturing or providing services. If people do not pay taxes, they consume more goods and services (those who are poorer), or they increase their personal investments (those who are wealthier). Thus it is a good thing when a country has high expenditures and low taxes. The other side of the coin is the necessity to pay interest on debts. These lead to higher taxation and lower expenditures by the state. It is clear that the optimum is somewhere in

between. The question as to where is answered by quantitative analysis, though it is far from exact.

All of economic science is far from exact. People's decisions about whether they will buy, thus boosting the economy, depends on their assessment of the future, which is more influenced by the mood in society than by exact data. Soros provides an excellent explanation for this in his book, *The Alchemy of Finance*.¹⁰ The financial speculator who profits is the one who is the first to correctly sense a change of mood.

Let us return to national debt. If it is 30% of GDP, then a five-percent annual interest rate equals 1.5% of GDP. That is how much less income we all have, but no one recognizes it. If a 5% of annual GDP debt raises the economy by 5% annually, then in ten years we will have, in stable GDP prices, an average income of 162.89%, and the debt will grow to 57% of GDP. Ten years ago we paid 150 crowns in interest out of an average salary of 10,000 crowns, and now we pay three times as much, or 465 crowns. It is better to pay nearly 3% from higher pay than 1.5% from a lower salary. But everything has its limits. To pay 5% of one's salary on interest to foreign bankers is too much. If we continue in this way for several more years, that is where we will end up. Thus a modern economy places emphasis on long-term sustainability, which tells us: debt no higher than 60% of GDP, and budget deficit below 3% of GDP. If we have inflation of 2% and a real GDP growth of 3%, then in a year we will have a debt of 63 units and a GDP of 105 units, and that is once again a debt corresponding to 60% of GDP. The debt will not grow, and the interest will be less than 3%. This is stable, long-term sustainable economic development. The problems arise in an economic crisis when tax revenues decline and a budget deficit below 3% of GDP cannot be maintained. That 5% can be tolerated in a crisis, but then we have to go below 3%. Some of our economists believe that it is better to introduce the euro later, and to stimulate GDP growth in the meantime with a budget deficit above 3% until a critical level is reached at 60% of GDP, which almost all countries in the eurozone have exceeded. I believe, even though my opinion has no place in a policy based on evidence, that the sooner the better. Slovakia is a model for us. Spreading fear of Greece with its high budget deficit can only happen in an environment where the media engages in politics instead of objective reporting. Greece has, even thanks to its deficit, a higher standard of living than the Czech Republic, and

¹⁰ GEORGE SOROS: *The Alchemy of Finance*, John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey 1987.

even after painful cuts, it will have a better standard of living, despite the fact that it is not a country with high-tech production yielding large profits. German and French banks hold Greek bonds, and if Greece declared bankruptcy, the banks would lose money, just as would German manufacturers of the weapons that also contribute to the Greek budget deficit. This explains their approach to financial assistance.

If we return to Czech politics, the budget policy of the Social Democrats has been disappointing. The budget deficit of 2002-2006 was needless, as the growing economy would have sustained an increase in taxes to the level of our neighbors, Germany and Austria. The reduction of social transfers proclaimed by the center right in an effort to demolish the socialized state is unnecessary, and a social crisis looms. Then all that is needed is for public opinion to shift so that the wealth of the well-to-do is perceived as unjust, and a labor leader with vision and a desire to make a name for himself is able to use strikes to create a society of uncertainty in which the rich will remember how good things were under the restrained government of the Social Democrats.

In the Czech Republic, just as in all democracies, only the policy of small steps can be successful. Defeat is always defeat, but every great victory is a Pyrrhic victory that will transform itself into defeat in the next election. If conservatives significantly lower taxes for the rich, the socialists will introduce a tax progression that is just that much sharper when the government changes.

Another major topic is corruption. Everyone speaks negatively about it, but it has its positive aspects as well. When a park or a square in the center of town is nicely spruced up, no one asks how much it cost. There is an opinion that it is only thanks to corruption that cities in developed countries look so good. A battle against corruption using the methods of a war on crime is doomed to failure. It is possible to prosecute only those activities when the gangsters have violated mafia ethics and not divided up the spoils in accordance with the principles that the Caribbean pirates considered fair. Then, the one who is deceived, either on the basis of the Monte Cristo syndrome or the Czech “if not me, then not you either” syndrome, reports the matter to the police. This does not mean that I am skeptical about the battle against corruption. Here there is of course a strong debt to the media. The atmosphere can change if journalists are loudly questioning why a highway on flat land is more expensive than it is somewhere else in the mountains, or why we are buying armored personnel carriers in Austria when we can manufacture them

at home. We still will not find out whether they are any good while the Germans, Slovaks, Poles and Austrians are not attacking us, and if it is about a deployment abroad, then we have to buy in the USA, because they are the only ones who have tested technological advancements in the combat situations of their numerous wars. Another good question is why a hospital room costs more than a studio apartment when it does not have a kitchen or a commission for a real estate agency. Or: Isn't a water park built because it is difficult to estimate how much a stainless steel slide costs, as opposed to a retirement home that could be compared with residential apartments? It is impossible to entirely wipe out corruption, and government projects will always be more expensive than what is sold on the open market; but through transparency and comparability it is possible to reach a point where corruption will raise the price on a worthwhile project by a few percent, and though such an increase is unacceptable from a moral standpoint, it is insignificant from a practical point of view.

The Czech Republic is a country of reserves. We are a nation with low taxes (in the Czech Republic 36% of GDP, in Germany 40%, in France 46%, in Denmark 50%). If it becomes necessary, we can raise our taxes in the style of our richer Western neighbors. We pay less for health care. The Czech Republic places 6.9% of GDP in health care (2006 WHO statistics for 193 countries); we are in 68th place globally; five countries have lower infant mortality rates; and we are in 31st place for female life expectancy. (This indicator for males is more dependent on smoking, alcohol use, and risky activity, and less of function of health care than it is for women.) For little money, great performance. But the price is a financial undervaluation of health care workers that will have to be resolved.

The fate of our country has always been linked to the fate of Europe. The more powerful nations will always be heard more; but there is no threat of destabilization for Europe, nor for the Czech Republic. In the first half of the 20th century, people's fates on our continent were always bound up with politics: two wars and a Holocaust, if I am to name the most serious examples. In the communist dictatorships, it was no longer so much a matter of life and death, but very much one of freedom. We are already living in a time when our fate is decided, and will be decided, much more by chance, relationships, heritage, talent, and the attitude of our children toward school and drugs than by politics. Politics will be managed by people who have a talent for it, while others will observe

them, give or withhold their support in elections, criticize them, and, as with sports, chat about them in their free time.

9 The End of Politics, or the Clash of Civilizations

In the 21st century, two comprehensive views of politics exist that are diametrically opposed to each other. In his book, *The End of History and the Last Man*,¹¹ Francis Fukuyama stresses that, in synchronization with the progress of natural science, humankind has found the optimal arrangement of society -- liberal democracy. And, despite the reverses that may occur in this country or that one, it is this social system that has triumphed in most countries, and therefore we are at the end of history. Samuel Huntington advocates the opposite view as he predicts a clash of civilizations in his book of the same name.¹² Both authors are leading political philosophers, thus they utilize a scientific method of philosophy. From the perspective of a natural scientist who, as a government minister in the Czech Republic, worked for a short time as a professional politician and therefore came into contact with practical politics, this methodology differs from the one he has used all his life, the methodology of the natural scientist. This methodology can lead to different practical political conclusions.

Today there is no notable natural scientist who would not accept Darwin's evolutionary theory. No one doubts that there are such differences between the functions of animals' brains and the human brain that human psychology as a science cannot be advanced by experiments on animals or by observation of their behavior. On the other hand, we can see elements of human behavior in rudimentary form in our closest relatives, chimpanzees, and the study of the behavior of other animals living in groups, such as dogs, can also be instructive.

In all animals we encounter a survival instinct that leads us to avoid potentially fatal danger, a fear of pain and the attendant effort to avoid injury, and hunger forcing us to secure food. Besides this, animals living in groups are, in the form of their neuronal networks, genetically programmed for behavior that makes life in a group possible, and the group itself represents an evolutionary advantage that this genetic pool maintains and passes to further generations. The notion that the mutation of incipient deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) leading to behavior that threatens the group is eliminated from the genetic

¹¹ FRANCIS FUKUYAMA: *The End of History and The Last Man*, Avon Books, New York 1993.

¹² SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON: *The Clash of Civilization*, Touchstone, New York 1997.

pool appears to be correct, because such a group dies out. On the other hand, positive mutations lead to propagation of the group, and a greater number of individuals increases the likelihood of survival. Evolution has therefore ensured that our brains are programmed in such a way that our psychology helps us to survive.

Thus there are several types of behavior reinforced by evolution that are characteristic of life in a group.

1. Respect for property. If human behavior did not include this element, it would mean permanent fighting among member of the group for food, and we do not see this in other groups of animals, for example, dogs in a pack.
2. The sense of freedom. This allows individuals to move freely while seeking food. With dogs as with children, we see that they take pleasure in freedom when it is allowed them. This feeling is the source of our enjoyment of exploration, of moving to other places, of independent decision-making. Advancement is tied to the sense of freedom. Every discovery has resulted from this feeling. Only when we freely decide upon a specific step can we discover new things. No one can give us an order to do this, because he does not know what that step is. We see in chimpanzees that some of them discover new things -- for example, how to fashion a stick for hunting termites -- and others are capable of learning from them.
3. The desire for acceptance by the group. This is closely connected with a feeling of friendship. Among chimpanzees, an individual displays an inclination toward another individual by grooming, patting and hugging. We encounter patting as an expression of a feeling of friendship among humans as well. A person sees from this that he is not alone. The feeling of loneliness is a negative emotion that an individual tries to avoid, and this, coupled with the positive emotion created by interaction resulting in a sense of belonging, strengthens the group's cohesion.
4. A feeling of solidarity. An individual is willing to risk his life in the interest of the group. In a pack of dogs we see that, if one individual is threatened, the others defend him by attacking. This sense is very important for the survival of the group. The survival of peoples and nations has often hinged upon the bravery of warriors. The courage to take a risk in the interest of the group is obviously at

odds with the instinct of self-preservation. Evolution takes care to see that both feelings are balanced in the group. Those who are too courageous perish in the fighting, and they do not transmit genes of heroism (or the courage to take risks) to their descendants. A group in which there are no genes of courage whatsoever is extinguished, because it cannot defend itself. Evolution thus ensures a balance that we see in all human societies, and in communities of animals.

5. The desire to be led in the case of risk. Practically all groups are organized hierarchically. This is true of packs of dogs, groups of chimpanzees, and all human societies. In the case of a threat, liberal democracy transfers tremendous authority to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Frightened chimpanzees hide behind the male leader, and free movement in the surrounding area is put aside. Non-delegated command authority increases the group's chance of victory.
6. The feeling of envy. We can observe this in dogs. Dogs in a room are lying about on the couch. We give one of them a treat. In the next moment, the others jump from the couch and beg for one as well. It appears that envy motivates members of the group to act. Most of the time this is positive. An envious individual tries to attain the success of the envied individual through activity -- in the case of humans, by working; in the case of animals, by searching for food even without any feeling of hunger -- which is a positive for the further existence of the group. Envy is a motive for hatred, and that is the negative price for a positive motor of activity.
7. The desire to apply one's own talent. There are endless examples in the case of humans. In the case of chimpanzees, we have evidence of one talent: political talent. I will come back here to the descriptions of Jane Goodall, the greatest expert in the world on the behavior of chimpanzees, from whom I have taken all the information about chimpanzees that I mention here.¹³ Goodall describes how a male chimpanzee, Mike, seized control over a group, and she adds: "Mike had a strong desire to dominate, a characteristic that is pronounced among some individuals, and almost completely lacking among others."

¹³ JANE GOODALL: *In the Shadow of Man*, Houghton Miffling Company, New York 1988.

All the feelings and desires I have mentioned above are most probably a result of the arrangement within the brain of neurons modified by DNA mutations. The process of learning is rudimentary among animals, and all individuals essentially mature in the same environment. If such an arrangement of neurons is evident among chimpanzees, there is no reason to assume that it does not exist among humans. It will understandably modify our behavior, and no one doubts the influence of the psychology of leaders and the psychology of the masses upon political decision-making.

Here it is appropriate to pause and examine the controversy over Fukuyama, with whom, unlike Huntington, I mostly agree. Fukuyama considers, as does Hegel, the motor of social activity to be the yearning for recognition, which he labels with Plato's term, thymus. Thymus is a human attribute. The concept of isothymia is described as the desire to be recognized as the equal of others, and the concept of megalothymie as the desire to be recognized as the leader, the desire for fame.

This philosophy presumes that the fundamental interest of every person is politics; but that is not how it is in reality. People with political talent are actively engaged in politics, and others are only interested peripherally, so long as they are satisfied with their lives. Conversely, they attribute dissatisfaction with their own lives to the political situation. I have already mentioned that politics sometimes determines people's lives, and I offered the Holocaust as an extreme example. In a liberal democratic society, things are not that way, and a person capable of leveraging his political talent becomes a celebrity in the same way as people who are capable of maximizing their talent in sports, music, literature, acting or science. Again, there is no doubt that genetic disposition is responsible for at least some portion of talent; but environmental influences, especially those of childhood, make themselves felt as well.

Not much is written about the existence of talent variation among animals, but this is certainly the way it is. A racing horse is differentiated by his athletic talent, and some animals of the same species learn better than others, for example, dogs that are trained.

To exhort political talent above other talents in a form of megalothymia does not seem right to me. We encounter this because certain people have multiple talents. Their decision about which one to pursue is often not understood even by those closest to them.

In evolution, the existence of diverse talents within a group is desirable when there are changes to the surrounding natural environment. Sometimes the athletic talent of the warriors or hunters is needed; sometimes it is the extensive knowledge that some people accumulate. At other times there is a need to solve a problem, and here is where the talent for science pays off. There are people who are adept at establishing intimate relationships, and others who excel in music or acting. Political talent ranks with other talents. But just as there are many talented athletes, but only some of whom end up as national champions, so only a few of the many people with political talent occupy the highest offices in national government. Here external influences play a major role. If Napoleon had not been an artillerist, he would never have become an emperor. Not every artillerist becomes a Napoleon.

There is no politician without political talent, just as there is no musician without an ear for music. We can divide politicians into those with a vision, and those who are simply attempting to maintain the status quo. But history has not known a politician whose own vision changed the perceptions of society. Hitler's vision of a Third Reich, of Lebensraum and the elimination of Jews from society was already in place before Hitler. Except for the murder of the Jews, it dovetails with the vision of Wilhelm II. Lenin's vision is described in Marx's writings, and Churchill's vision of defeating Germany was attuned to the mood of Britons. The division of politicians into those with a vision and those without is, to some extent, artificial. People with political talent will always be with us, and their approach is similar to that of the chimpanzee Mike, who attains his position as the dominant male in the way described by Jane Goodall.

Mike, as Jane Goodall named him, initially held low status within the hierarchy of male chimpanzees. He was one of the last to get access to bananas, the primary food of chimpanzees, and he was threatened by practically all the other mature males, who even actually attacked him.

Mike's later behavior is reminiscent of a planned advance on the path upward. For his shows of aggression, Mike began to use more frequently than the other males the empty kerosene cans that were strewn about Goodall's camp where the chimpanzees went for bananas. Once, a group of mature males were grooming each other. It lasted for approximately twenty minutes. Mike was about 25 meters from them, often looking in their direction, and occasionally grooming himself. Suddenly he moved toward the

empty kerosene cans and returned with them to the place where he had been sitting beforehand. Armed with these cans, he continued to observe the other males. After a few minutes, he began to sway from side to side. He gradually swayed more vigorously, his hair sticking up, and then, quietly at first, he began a series of screams. As he did so, he stood up, combatively placing himself facing the group of males, and he began to smash the cans against each other over his head. This, along with Mike's screaming, made such noise that the other males ran away. After a few moments there was silence. Some males returned to the group and continued grooming, but some remained further away out of apparent concern.

After a short interval, Mike's screams and the smashing of cans rang out. The other males fled again. Before they could return, Mike aggressively placed himself facing Goliath. Goliath was the leader of the group, and he had not run away like the others. Mike remained in a combative stance. Suddenly, Rudolph came to him, making soft sounds of subordination, and he deeply bowed to Mike and began to groom him. Finally, the male David Graybeard came to Mike, placed his hand on his flank, and began to groom him. Only Goliath remained sitting off to the side, and he looked in Mike's direction. It was clear that Mike had created a serious threat to Goliath's heretofore unchallenged leadership. It took a year before Mike's position was secured and he himself felt secure in it. Tension remained between him and the former leader, Goliath.

Goliath did not give up his position without a fight. He posed combatively in front of the other members of the group, and a confrontation with Mike was unavoidable. The confrontation began with Goliath jumping onto a tree near Mike, and then Goliath remained still. Mike looked momentarily at Goliath, and then he began to put on a show: He shook branches, threw stones, and finally jumped on Goliath's tree and shook the branches. When he stopped, Goliath replied; he shook the tree and the branches. Finally, they both ended up on the ground. There they stopped, sat down and stared at each other.

Then, one after the other, they shook branches and faced off combatively. This lasted for about half an hour. Each subsequent performance was more combative than the last; but, aside from the fact that they occasionally hit each other with the branches they were shaking, they did not attack each other. After a particularly long break, it unexpectedly appeared that Goliath had lost his nerve. He ran toward Mike, bowed before him, and began to groom him intently. For a while Mike completely ignored Goliath. Suddenly he

turned and began to groom his defeated opponent. They sat and continuously groomed each other for about an hour. This was the last actual duel between these two males. Thereafter it seemed that Goliath had accepted Mike's superiority.

However, Mike had to defend his leadership. Once, a chimpanzee male named David ran from Mike and screamed, running toward Goliath, whom he hugged before turning and screaming in Mike's direction. The humans who were observing saw that he was angry. Suddenly, David started to run toward Mike, and Goliath followed him. Meanwhile, Mike was making a combative show in front of another group of males who retreated. When they saw that David and Goliath were running toward Mike, they joined them, and suddenly there were five fully mature males standing against a lone Mike. Mike screamed and jumped on a tree, and the other males pursued him. The observers were certain that Goliath was going to regain his status as the leader. But Mike suddenly turned and started shaking branches, and in the next moment he jumped headlong toward the five males. They were startled and hurriedly jumped from the tree to run away. When Mike sat with his hair standing up, the other males stood cowering at a distance. Mike had defended his status.

This description demonstrates what political talent looks like in a group of chimpanzees. I will relate two more interesting situations. Mike attacked an older female, Flo, grabbed a bunch of bananas from her, and struck her. Two hours later Mike came to Flo and started to play with her fingers. After a few minutes they were tickling each other and playing together. When a chimpanzee leader exerts his status, he usually very quickly calms the subordinate member of the group by touching and hugging.

Chimpanzees often move about in pairs. Some of these pairings are so stable that we can speak of friendship. While he was still in a subordinate position, Mike had a friend, J.B. J.B. was obviously subordinate to Goliath. When Mike became the leader, Goliath did not want to allow J.B. to get at his bananas. J.B. screamed, and after a while Mike arrived. He did not interfere in the squabble, but when Goliath saw him, he allowed J.B. to have some of his bananas. Friendship with the leader ensures higher social standing. These episodes are not intended to show that the politics of people and chimpanzees are the same; but I am writing about chimpanzees only to demonstrate the fact that some individuals have political talent, and some do not.

We see that Mike gained his position by convincing the others in the leading group that he is the right individual for the position of leadership. This is the politician's approach whether in a dictatorship or a democracy. Just as an individual prefers freedom, but when endangered sacrifices it for security, there is no diametrical difference between a politician in a dictatorship and a democratic politician. Thus we are not surprised that communist politicians who helped create or sustain the communist dictatorship became supporters of democracy when they concluded that democratization would benefit society. This is true for Czech politicians who, after actively participating in the seizure of power by the communists in 1948, declared the policy of the Prague Spring in 1968. The same is true for Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Shevardnadze in Russia.

Sometimes Kant's Categorical Imperative which I mentioned earlier is emphasized. Certainly neither German fascism with domination by Germanic races, nor the attitude of American settlers toward Native Americans -- or that of democratically elected politicians in the southern states of the Union toward slavery -- passes the test. On the other hand, the Crusades aimed at spreading Christendom, or the Muslim conquest to spread Islam, just as the communist revolution designed to turn all people into proletarians, are, from this perspective, debatable. The current conflict between the democratic left and the democratic right is also about what the supporters of both directions consider to be just. One group wants the same standard of living, the other the same starting position, augmented by socialized networks for medically impaired citizens. Each group considers its opinion to be fair.

I conclude this discussion of politicians with the observation that they will always be with us to carry out policy that is dictated by three main factors:

1. the factor of efficiency,
2. the factor of timing,
3. erroneous quantitative estimation.

I already addressed these factors in the introductory chapter. Now I will mention them in connection with criticism of Fukuyama and Huntington. Fukuyama cites Hegel's theory about the first person and the beginning of history. According to this theory, there was a conflict between a master and a slave. The master was willing to risk his life, and he valued rulership more than life. The slave preferred life over an equal or ruling status,

and he decided to serve the master. This theory accepts inequality as a result of the victory of courage over cowardice. The last person refuses to accept this arrangement, and the result is liberal democracy and the end of history. I have tried to show that, from the perspective of natural science's view of man, the situation is different. Slaves began as captives in war. The principle of efficiency dictated having an army to defend property, and when an army came into existence, efficiently making use of it to gain more property, including slaves. Democracy has a chance when there is security and safety. This condition existed for millennia after the advent of agriculture and very rare surpluses. Empires must defend themselves, and if they did so successfully, then they attacked so that they would be even more powerful. When a combination of factors weakened them, they were immediately attacked by neighboring empires taking advantage of the second factor, timing the attack for when the opponent is weak. Erroneous quantitative estimation led Napoleon to his campaign in Russia, Hitler to his attacks on all fronts, and Japan to an attack on the USA. The mistaken calculation that, if we redistribute the country's wealth, the majority will attain a good standard of living led the poor into the communist revolution. When, after nationalization, they saw that it was an erroneous quantitative estimate, they continued in a revolution spurred on by hate.

Having criticized Fukuyama, I will move to criticism of Huntington. Huntington says that the divide between us (located in one civilization) and them (located in another) is a constant of human history. He indicates that differences in behavior toward people from the same or from a different civilization result from these causes:

1. from a feeling of superiority (sometimes as well from inferiority) over people considered to be fundamentally different;
2. out of fear and mistrust of these people;
3. from the difficulties accompanying communication with these people as a result of differing languages and norms of social behavior;
4. from a lack of familiarity with the prejudices, motivations, social relationships, and customs of these people.

These factors certainly appear in economic competition. But there is nothing wrong with that, because economic competition is the driving force for improving living

conditions, and all liberal democracies, including the American one, are founded upon it. Armed conflicts arise from entirely different causes.

In the past, wars were exclusively about property. The group that was militarily stronger found an ideology allowing it to be reconciled with inherent respect for the property of others (our enemies do not have any rights, because they worship other gods) and attacked. In agrarian societies, every war ended with territorial gains, or with the confiscation of arable land, the source of all wealth. In the present, I know one example: the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Civil wars are a continuation of revolution, and they are about control over property within the nation.

It is more complicated with wars of liberation. The longing for liberation is connected with the longing for freedom. What is essential is that a group of people with political talent attempts to gain control by convincing the public in their own country of the advantages of independence -- the majority is looting us and outvoting us in the elections is the argument in democracies; or, in dictatorships, we want to rid ourselves of domination -- and obtains the financial means for war. What is more complicated is that, in some cases, the breakaway means economic advantage, and at other times there is only the result of erroneous quantitative estimation. A war for independence is a war to break away from a large state. The breakup means a weakening for both sides, and the state's leaders will naturally try to prevent it. The war of North versus South is a typical case. The southern states mistakenly believed that the abolition of slavery would ruin them economically. Lincoln, by preserving the unity of the nation, created the conditions for the rise of the most powerful country on Earth in the following century.

A similar example is the breakup of Yugoslavia. For three nations the current post-Yugoslavia arrangement is advantageous: Slovenia, the level of whose economy could subsidize the rest of former Yugoslavia; Croatia, which can base its economy on tourism thanks to the Adriatic coast; and Montenegro, which was in no way oppressed by Serbia, but can profit from tourism thanks to a low population and beautiful beaches. Independent Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, and independent Kosovo have no advantages from the breakup. Serbia would have won militarily without the intervention of the USA and the EU. The current situation works thanks only to the EU's economic assistance in Bosnia, and the USA's in Kosovo.

Bosnia could be a powder keg in the future. Kosovo's independence was declared at a time when there was already a democratic government in Serbia willing to guarantee Kosovar Albanians all possible rights. The Americans decided to finance a military base there instead. This resulted from their flawed analysis that they had caused the collapse of the Soviet Union by force, and out of fear that Russia would later intervene militarily on behalf of the Serbs. Not even in Stalin's time did the Russians intervene in Korea; they did not intervene in Vietnam (I will take note of Afghanistan later); and they were not preparing to intervene in Serbia after they had voluntarily departed from Eastern Europe, including the Baltic republics. The USA has a military base for a conflict with no one. If the Americans had created an independent Kosovo without Srpska Mitrovica by changing the borders, they would have gotten rid of the part of the population that does not like them and reduced future tension.

All other wars in the second half of the 20th century were wars under the rubric of "the wheels of the revolution must not stop." These are the war in Korea, the war in Vietnam, the war in Afghanistan, Argentina's war to liberate the Falkland Islands, and the wars of the Arabs against Israel. I will not take up the numerous wars in sub-Saharan Africa, because they are a result of a combination of the aforementioned causes (war for property, war for independence from a large state, and war to confirm the success of dictatorship).

It is worth mentioning two wars, in Vietnam and in Afghanistan. Communist Vietnam came into being as a result of a gross mistake by the French. The battle for the fortress at Dien Bien Phu is a textbook example of faulty strategy. It was not their own error that left the French to be defeated there. It was the strategic success of communist General Giap. The mistake was that the French were there at all. They were supposed to establish the defense of Hanoi, Haiphong, Hue and Saigon (the shield), and, through assaults supported by air cover, to attack communist administrative centers (the sword). That is the military aspect. It is my opinion that they should have formed a government along the lines of Norodom Sihanouk's in Cambodia in a timely manner and departed. The American strategy was even worse. The Americans believed that, if they kill lots of Vietnamese communists, then they will give up the attempt at revolution. During senseless American offensive operations, many American soldiers lost their lives. In a training course for reserve officers one learns that, if both forces are roughly equal, losses to the attacker are higher than losses to the defender. Moreover, the Americans

constantly changed their strategy. If, with air superiority, they had organized the occupation of Hanoi and Haiphong by a South Vietnamese tank army, they could have obtained a better negotiating position. America's engagement cannot, however, be unilaterally condemned. The Soviet Union would have continued in more proxy wars to keep the wheels of revolution from stopping, and to strengthen its own dictatorship.

The war in Afghanistan is proof of this. It began in classic fashion. The communists seized power in the capital, and a civil war broke out. Because Afghanistan was not a country of rich and poor, envy and the hatred resulting from it was not great, so the communist revolutionary army did not have many adherents. The Soviet Union arrived to assist militarily. American surface-to-air missiles destroyed Soviet helicopters, and the Red Army left the country in defeat. It seems that this defeat strengthened alternative ideas in the Soviet leadership and contributed to Gorbachev's succession.

Samuel Huntington predicts dangerous clashes in the future that will apparently arise from Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Chinese assertiveness. He sees three main problems dividing the West and the other societies. The West is trying: 1) to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 2) to promote human rights; 3) to preserve its own culture, and social and ethnic integrity by limiting the number of immigrants or refugees it accepts.

The spread of nuclear weapons can only be prevented with difficulty. The technology was developed over a half century ago, but up to now it has held true that whoever possesses nuclear weapons is more powerful than others. For fifty years the USA and the USSR mutually threatened each other with such a quantity of missiles and bombers with nuclear payloads that it would have been enough to kill two-thirds of the population of both countries. Anyone would wonder about the danger of accidentally starting a nuclear war. Members of the military were all under time pressure, because the advantage of a first strike was obvious, and seconds counted. Nowadays, such danger has passed. All other nations have nuclear weapons more or less for reasons of prestige. The exception is Israel. If there was a threat of the Israeli military's defeat by Arab neighbors with a total population twenty times larger than Israel's, then the threat of the destruction of Cairo or Damascus might dissuade them from a further advance. Like Jordan, Egypt currently does not have offensive goals. Iraq has been pacified after the American intervention,

Iran is far away, and Syria is weak. But Israel correctly takes into consideration that future regime changes in neighboring countries could alter the situation.

North Korea has nuclear weapons for its own defense, but no one is attacking her. After the lessons from the unification of Germany, with money shifting from west to east for twenty years, South Korea does not much long for unification. North Korea itself is not dangerous for anyone, because it knows that a potential conflict would not cease. North Korea is driven only by the effort to maintain its own dictatorship.

Nuclear India and Pakistan are not preparing to wage war over Kashmir with nuclear weapons, and I will discuss China later.

Human rights are not the exclusive province of the West. Authoritarian regimes are focused upon the danger of chaos to which democracy leads. The freedom to vote is one thing, and the freedom to go out for a walk at night without becoming a victim of a criminal street gang is another. I think that the West has some catching up to do.

Immigrants are not a problem of the country from which they departed. Their countries tell them to stay home. Most immigrants are motivated by a yearning for a material well-being that most religions either condemn, or at least do not favor. When they find out that everything in a liberal democratic society must be paid for, that the goods they can purchase are a symbol of status in their country of origin, but not in the country where they have arrived, and that they are on the lowest rung of the social ladder, they begin to envy and hate. This personal problem has no solution; but if the result is an insistence upon rights that contravene the historical rights of the majority of the population, then there must be a discussion. Demonstrations calling for outlawing cartoons of Mohammed are in accordance with the right of free speech; but calls for violence are not. I think that prohibiting women from wearing a veil in public is not in keeping with liberal democracy; but compulsory education, including physical education, with a standardized curriculum is. I think that sufficient use is not made of the “carrot and the stick.” More social services are needed. On the other hand, in the future it will be desirable to establish a region (an island near Africa, or a portion of purchased territory) where those who do not respect the laws -- including even those who have EU citizenship -- will be exiled. Sharia law could be enforced in this territory whose inhabitants would be adequately fed, and who would be able to leave for any other country willing to accept them. I do not think that the countries of the EU will find a way

to do this, so anti-immigration populists will get votes in elections for a long time to come.

According to Huntington, the clash of civilizations is more than just a clash of people of different races and religions. A more detailed analysis reveals that religion was always a secondary factor, though an important one. The Christian Crusades to the Holy Land appear to be a prototype of religious wars; but they culminate in the sack of Constantinople. The religious wars of the 17th century between Protestants and Catholics see participating rulers and military commanders switching sides from one camp to another, and the acceptance of the stricture that subjects will have the same faith as their lord is evidence of the fact that there was no great consistency in relation to faith. Ideology serves as justification for why the enemy has no right to his property. No one doubts that the driving force behind the conquest of the Americas by the Spanish and the Portuguese was not faith, but gold.

One area, however, is a strong argument in favor of the notion of a clash of civilizations: the attacks by Islamists. Some judge that this is connected with the religion of Islam; but there are several arguments indicating that this is not true. The great campaigns of conquest by Islamic armies were always marked by religious tolerance. This is true for the Arabs' conquests in North Africa and on the Pyrenean peninsula, as well as for conquests made by the Turks. In both cases, the rule was: "If you surrender without a fight, you can keep your own religion." In other words, we want your taxes and a portion of your property, but religion is secondary for us. Islamic states on the Pyrenean peninsula tolerated Christians and Jews, and religious tolerance ceased with the victory of the Christians.

The second argument is also from history. Terrorist attacks are not a Muslim invention. We know more about this from the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany in the 1970s than from 19th-century anarchists. Under the banner of urban revolution, this group of young intelligent people terrorized German society for several years. A group had formed whose members were people inclined to risk their lives in the interest of the group. This is, as I indicated, a very important inherent characteristic in human evolution. The group in this case was neither an extended family nor a nation, but an armed cell. They were successfully defeated by crime-fighting methods, though they found a number of sympathizers around the world. We know the same about al-Qaeda. Religion is

secondary, and what is primary is the group and its victory in the form of spectacular terror. It carries out a series of attacks against citizens of its own faith and is entirely undisturbed by this. The problem in destroying al-Qaeda is not the USA or Europe where there are highly capable security forces, but countries where government efficiency is low. As happens everywhere in the world where there is not thorough oversight by the organs of a legal state, an authoritarian police force will certainly infringe upon human rights; but it seems that this is the only effective way of dealing with terrorism in these countries. Neither America nor Europe is threatened by a massive attack. On the other hand, murdering thousands of people in a shopping mall is not difficult now, just as it was not difficult in the past. Losses must be expected; but there is no alternative to detailed and deliberate police work.

Let us answer the question as to whether the USA and Europe are threatened by a clash of civilizations with China and Russia. After the enormous communist Chinese military swept Chiang Kai-shek from mainland China to Taiwan, it waged a war in Korea against the USA (operating with UN forces) that ended in a stalemate and many times higher losses for China, and later conducted a senseless and short war against Vietnam. However, China's communist leader Máo Zédōng made a most important decision that positively affects life on this planet more than most people realize. He decreed the "One Child Policy" for Chinese families. Even in a poor family, one child will generally not go hungry, and the parents can usually invest money in its education. Mao wanted to prevent famine with his decree. Not only did he succeed, but at the same time he opened a path to prosperity for China. If we compare India and China, China achieves better economic results mainly because the rate of its population growth is slower than India's. For example, in 1961 India's population numbered 452 million, China's 673 million. By 1977 the rate of population growth was the same percentage-wise (143% over 1961), but in 2001 India's population had grown by 226% over 1961, and China's by 192%. The annual per capita production of rice in India was 33 kg, just as in China. In 2001, the respective numbers were 76 kg for India and 115 kg for China. Similarly for wheat: in 1961, 28 kg for India, 22 kg for China; but in 2001, 57 kg for India and 78 kg for China. The production of meat in 1961 was 3.7 kg for India, the same as China's 3.8 kg. In 2001, the production is 4.5 kg for India, and China's is ten times greater -- 50.1 kg. China has ever more resources to devote to research and education, and prospects for

high-tech advancement that, as I have already shown, determines a country's economy and the standard of living of its population as a whole.

Once child per family has one important psychological effect, however: The parents are worried for the child's safety, and they do not want to lose him in a war. China is a communist dictatorship with a ruling group at its head. And all members of this group do not want to lose their only child in a war. China will thus not embark upon military adventures, even if its economy allows it to arm its military at a high technological level. The USA and Europe can feel secure in the face of the Chinese armed forces -- but not in the face of Chinese economic competition. Thus far, China is competing with low salaries for its workers, just as Japan did in the 1950s. China expects a destiny similar to Japan's, the destiny of a wealthy country with a high level of technological advancement and a high standard of living. On the other hand, the vast Chinese market can consume high-tech products from the USA and Europe.

As far as democracy is concerned, it appears to be a long way off. The ruling group is in favor with the people when prosperity grows, and there is no pressure from the public for a change of policy. Advocates of a hard-line communist dictatorship still exist within the ruling group, however. The West must not make mistakes giving them the opportunity to gain greater influence. This means accepting the formal One China Policy. If Western politicians say that Hong Kong is a part of China and that they are satisfied with this state of affairs -- and, when there is the occasional tension between Hong Kong's municipal authorities and those of China, if they do not highlight the disagreement -- everything will be in order. If Taiwan accepted the notion of a One China Policy, stressing its autonomy and allowing for the possibility of full reunification in the 22nd century, it would help the economically-minded leadership of China in its struggle with the militaristic police-state wing of the Communist Party of China. Pressure to respect human rights is correct; but the release of a dissident from jail must be explained as the correct move of strong leadership, not as a retreat under pressure. The problem of Tibet is not entirely clear-cut. The suppression of human rights is connected with a rise in Tibetans' standard of living resulting from Chinese economic assistance. I think that recognition of Chinese accomplishments must accompany the pressure for greater human rights, including religious freedom; but the demand for an independent Tibet damages relations with China. No one in China is flying the flags of Native American tribes and demanding that the United States abandon its territory and pay

reparations to Native Americans. The same is true in Europe. China does not interfere in the affairs of the Basques and the Irish in Northern Ireland. The outlook for cooperation with China in the future appears optimistic.

Under economic pressure, Russia has been carrying out a one child policy for a long time already. Russia did not leave Eastern Europe so that it could again try to occupy it. Non-Russian peoples in the Russian Federation should make demands for the economic development of their regions and investments in education and culture; but an attempt at independence is out of the question. None of these nations would subsequently be truly independent, but under the influence of another power, and the Russian Federation will not allow this. Cooperation between Europe and the USA and Russia in reducing international tension should be expanded, because both sides will profit from it. When the Americans put Patriot missiles in Poland, these missiles will not shoot down a single Russian missile, because Russia will not launch any missiles into Poland; but Russia will, under any pretext whatsoever, limit natural gas exports to Poland as a way of saying, "If you make problems for us, we will do so for you." There will be no war, but it will be an argument for those politicians who are anti-American in their orientation, which could negatively impact cooperation between the USA and Russia in other parts of the world. It is a shame, because the USA, Europe and Russia all face the danger of Islamist terrorists, and therefore have common interests.

Conflict with the Arab world appears most serious. All Arab nations are authoritarian; rather, with the exception of Tunisia and Egypt and perhaps Yemen, they are dictatorships. Sometimes the ruling group is composed of military officers, in other places it is a classic monarchy. Dictatorships need an ideology with the threat of an enemy to justify their existence. For the Muslim world, the enemy is the State of Israel. Israel came into being on the basis of a historical argument: It was the original homeland of the Jews. Israel should never have come into existence. If the status of the Jews in the countries of Europe had corresponded to their education, industriousness and skills -- and if they had not lived under the threat of anti-Semitism -- they would never have emigrated to the Holy Land. Hitler excluded them from German society, and Western European democracies acted as if it was not their business. Here the quote cited earlier applies: "It is what it is." Israel exists within territory where the Palestinian Arabs once lived. Israel has a most powerful friend in the USA, and is therefore indestructible. The dictators are able to foist upon their people the mathematical error that Israel is responsible for their

relative poverty. All presidents of Muslim countries in the region have been visible in the struggle against Israel, from Egypt's Nasir to Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Libya's Qaddafi, Syria's Assad, and the presidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Israel and the USA complete a picture of friendship: they are wealthy, and they do not recognize Allah. Petroleum producing countries conduct a policy whereby they are protected by the USA from their poorer, yet better armed and warlike Muslim neighbors so they can get the best price for their oil. The domestic policies of all of these countries are, with a few exceptions, the worst on the entire planet. They use their oil riches to finance social policies, but investments in education are relatively low. There is no widespread education oriented toward the natural sciences, despite the fact that it could be the foundation for the high technology that these countries need to develop a modern economy. This separates them from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, China and India. Only Tunisia and Egypt focus on the tourist industry. The ideology of Muslim dictatorships contains religious elements condemning birth control. The result is large uneducated families, and uneducated women are the main factor in the population explosion. The intervention of the USA in Iraq, where the army of Saddam Hussein represented a permanent threat to Israel (with the danger that, when it least needed to be, the USA would be drawn into a war resulting in high American casualties) was certainly the right thing. The destruction of al-Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan was similarly warranted. After the military victory, however, the Americans made a mistake when they naively assumed that establishing democracy would solve the situation. The greatest danger of democracy after the violent overthrow of a dictatorship is chaos. This is what happened in Germany after the First World War, and much of the population supported Hitler's rise because he guaranteed the elimination of the chaos and rampant crime that the government could not handle. Czech politicians were aware of this danger after 1918, and in democratic Czechoslovakia they assumed control over the entire repressive apparatus represented by the Austro-Hungarian police and gendarmerie. It must be added that Austro-Hungary was an authoritarian legal state before the First World War, where the repressive apparatus was under the oversight of judicial authorities. The fact that the Americans underestimated the role of repression did not matter with the Kurds, who received the Americans as liberators; but, by not utilizing some of the elements of Hussein's repressive apparatus (after removing Hussein's fanatical supporters, of course), the Americans ended up harming democracy itself. People cannot feel free in a country where bombs explode daily, even if they have the

right to vote and freedom of speech. Another error of the Americans is their distaste for cooperation (meaning financial support) with socialists. They confuse them with communists, but even communists are not dangerous for America after the fall of the USSR. Their agitation in the same poor regions where the Islamists recruit most of their fighters would gain the support of many unpropertied citizens against the Islamists. The same applies for Afghanistan. Here there are groups from the time of the communist dictatorship that loath the Taliban, and the Americans could make use of these groups in the battle against them. It applies here as well that police work and a network of informers can yield positive results, mainly without the loss of American soldiers. The most powerful enemy of the USA in the region is Iran. The policy of sanctions can delay armament, but it strengthens the leadership of the Islamic republic. Under pressure from the USA, the leadership's order is to close ranks and not produce any alternative ideas that lead to the self-destruction of the regime. In my opinion, an optimum strategy for Iran should recognize that it is an authoritarian state with elements of democracy such as multi-party elections, which automatically means an election campaign with the free dissemination of ideas. A major theme for the upper middle class could be "My home is my castle," meaning a prohibition against the Revolutionary Guard entering someone's home without the permission of a court, which would allow young people from these wealthier classes to live in the American lifestyle they crave. If politicians received financial support from these people, then these alternative ideas would spread. For addressing the poorer classes, financial support to socialist parties is important. Their platform of social welfare would gain the support of many, and would lead to pressure to limit militarization. Perhaps the leadership of the Islamic republic would react by restricting the democratic elements of the state. But this would radicalize the socialists for a revolutionary struggle against the Islamic dictatorship, and lead to a certain lessening of international tension.

Israel is behaving correctly when it limits risk by building a protective wall between Israel and Palestine, and it is unfairly criticized for it. However, it is not reasonable to make irreversible decisions about the access of Palestinians to a mosque in Jerusalem. Within the framework of a definitive peace settlement, the supporters of peace in the Palestinian state will have to demonstrate a certain symbolic success, and leaving the Temple Mount under Palestinian control does not impair the authority of the State of

Israel, just as the authority of the Italian state is not impinged by the fact that security in St. Peter's Cathedral in Rome is handled by the Vatican.

I consider investment in Palestine by the wealthy oil nations -- for example, the establishment of modern firms -- to be an important element of stability. The USA would ensure that these enterprises do not become the target of Israeli reprisals for terrorist attacks on Israel. Palestine's economic prosperity would automatically lead to an attempt to normalize relations with Israel, in similar fashion to China's normalization of its relations with Taiwan. Peace in this region is possible, but the USA must rid itself of its incorrect notion that we are on the verge of a clash of civilizations. When it places Patriot missiles and radars on the border of the Russian Federation, it shows that it has not yet learned to do so.

I have tried to show that there will be no clash of civilizations. This does not mean that history has ended, and that liberal democracy is a kind of arrangement in which anyone who has tasted it will desire nothing else. There are great differences between liberal democracies. They are not just differences of per capita GDP. This is not too important for internal stability. People understand that there are wealthier nations; but they consider it to be unjust when some citizens possess enormous wealth, and others have trouble taking care of their basic needs. It is economists who consider the socialized state incapable of being financed, and therefore unacceptable. Statistics show that this is not so. The differences in the incomes of the rich and the poor are best shown by the Gini coefficient, named for the Italian economist who introduced it. His mathematical explanation is somewhat complicated, so I will content myself with a substitute solution offered by a calculation of the ratio between the average income of the 20% best educated and the 20% least educated. In some countries this ratio is around 3, in others 8 (e.g., 8 in the USA, 7 in the United Kingdom, 4 in Germany, Denmark, Austria, Finland and Sweden, 3.5 in the Czech Republic, and 3.4 in Japan). If it is 8 in a specific country, transfers can lead to the doubling of the income of the 20% poorest, while the wealthier will still have three times as much, which is just simple arithmetic. High taxes reduce business initiative, and we pay for this with a lower tempo of economic growth. Statistical data do not support this idea, however. They show that high taxes are not a curse, because a society that is more egalitarian enjoys more solidarity, and is thus more stable. Significant social stress does not occur. Simple calculation demonstrates that, if the 20% most poor are to have the same standard of living, then a country with a ratio of

8 must double its GDP, with all of the negative consequences for energy consumption and the resulting pollution of the environment. In the USA in 1966, the income of the 20% lowest-income households was 7,000 dollars, for the next 20% it was 20,000 dollars, for the next 20% 31,000 dollars, for the next 20% 44,000 dollars, and for the 20% highest-income households 79,000 dollars (with the income of the top 5% at 79,000 dollars). In 1998, for households with the lowest incomes it was 9,000, for the next group 22,000, for the next 37,000, for the next 58,000, and for the highest-earning 20% 123,000 (215,000 for the top 5%). This shows that thirty years of economic growth had a practically negligible impact on 60% of American households (the data are in dollars adjusted for inflation to reflect the same buying power). The highest tax rate in the USA around 1960 was 90% of one's income; in 2010, it was 30%, which sheds more light on the aforementioned distribution of household incomes. The Cold War was at its height in the 1960s, however, and the rich did not protest against high taxes, because they realized that the money was going to armaments, and, if they lost against the Soviet Union, they would lose all of their property.

If the socialized state focuses on health care, education, and benefits for the elderly -- without interference in the private economy, and by financing its programs with higher taxes -- it brings no danger. (Data from 2009 show that tax revenues in the USA are 28% of GDP, but in the United Kingdom 39%, in Belgium 47%, in Austria 43%, in Denmark 50%, in Finland 44%, in France 46%, in Germany 40%, and in Sweden 49%.) In view of the environment, population growth, and limited energy resources, emphasis on economic growth is not without controversy. The relationship between the amount of income and the satisfaction index in the USA in 1973 rose sharply up through an income of 10,000 dollars annually per capita, and then stagnated. The differences between an income of 10,000 dollars and 25,000 dollars were minimal.¹⁴ Much more important is a sense of safety and security. Income is definitely an engine of progress, but not the only one. People whose creative works have contributed most to the advancement of society have not been among the poorest; but, with few exceptions, neither have they belonged to the wealthiest groups.

Some poorer nations in South America have gotten into trouble, however, because they have placed emphasis on state enterprises, on protectionist policies of high customs

¹⁴ WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN: *The Birth of Plenty*, The McGraw-Hill Companies, New York 2004.

duties, and on intervention in the financial sector. The result was stagflation: high inflation with imperceptible growth. This is a disadvantageous approach. The right thing is for the state to just collect taxes and intervene against speculators. If companies are producing to obtain a profit, there is no need for economic interference by the state, though the participation of labor unions in the management of the companies -- as we know it, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany -- is desirable. If, however, the owners attempt to influence government policy in their favor -- for example, before elections they halt the delivery of medicine to harm the socialist government -- the state has a responsibility to intervene on behalf of its citizens by imposing temporary receivership. Moreover, the state should not relent in its intervention against speculators. The American crisis of 2008 was caused by a crisis in the mortgage market. This crisis would never have occurred if the government had reacted to the fact that the price of real estate was rising so high that the difference between investment costs and sale prices were reaching tens of percentage points. A proper reaction for communities in this situation is to start developing and selling real estate for a profit of about 10%. The home building industry can only react by reducing its prices as well to an acceptable level in relation to the builders' costs. The state should intervene as little as possible; but in some cases intervention is its responsibility. The proposal I offer is, for now, from the realm of science fiction. On the other hand, I am familiar with a practical case with which I became acquainted during my first trip to Sweden in 1964. At that time, the largest Swedish labor organization owned a chain of shopping centers and a number of industrial firms that supplied them. This was when the use of household automatic washing machines was getting started, and they needed new powder detergent. Foreign firms were selling the detergents in Sweden at a high markup, though it could not be proven that there was a price-fixing agreement. The labor unions established their own industrial firm that began to manufacture the detergents and sell them at a much lower price. The foreign firms reacted by setting their prices even lower, and the labor unions' firm went bankrupt. This loss was compensated, however, by a savings for all Swedish households.

The socialized state, as it occurs in various forms in developed European countries, has three main tasks: to ensure quality, modern health care to meet the needs of all, regardless of income; to ensure education for all, regardless of income, who have skill and determination to apply themselves; and to ensure a dignified life for the elderly, and for those with medical problems. The rest will be taken care of by the market economy

that, through taxation, is a source of financing for the state's tasks. As for other interventions in the economy -- for example, support for research, infrastructure improvements, agricultural subsidies, subsidies for culture, for urban renewal and for environmental cleanup -- a democratic discourse must occur to select the path of compromise which leaves all participants equally dissatisfied. Everyone wants security and rights; everyone knows that these areas must be financially covered by taxes; but each person wants those taxes to be paid by others.

If nations select American liberal democracy as their model, it will lead to ecological catastrophe. The planet does not have energy resources for everyone on the scale that they are consumed per capita in the USA. On the other hand, if the model is the Swedish socialized state, where the 50% poorest inhabitants -- more than three times lower GDP per capita than in the USA -- have a higher standard of living than the 50% poorest Americans, then the victory of liberal democracy on our planet is possible.

My conclusion is thus a conditional end of history.

10 Summary

From the perspective of the natural sciences, humans are animals living in a group. Thus, in addition to forms of behavior common to all animals -- obtaining food, fear of death and pain, sexual behavior -- we find with humans those forms of behavior allowing us to live in a group, and which facilitate the success of the group in the struggle for survival. These are: respect for property that prevents constant fighting between members of the group over food; the desire for freedom that makes it possible for individuals to search for food and relocate to new areas; the need to take refuge under authority in the case of danger; the attempt to be accepted by the group; the willingness to risk one's life in the interest of defending the group; envy that motivates individuals to activity beyond that which is essential for simply staying alive; and the effort to develop one's own talent. Because talent varies among different members of the group, the development of talent is a positive when there are changes in life's circumstances and a different situation calls for different skills. All of these forms of behavior have been observed in animals living in groups, with chimpanzees being closest to humans. All of the aforementioned forms of behavior have developed over the course of millions of years of evolution through natural selection of mutations that influenced the arrangement of neurons in the brain. At the same time, all of these methods of behavior are applied in

politics. Respect for ownership requires an ideology that established reasons for confiscating property (e.g., religious ideology, or the ideology of class struggle). The desire for freedom leads to a preference for liberal democracy, the desire for protection to dictatorship. The effort to be accepted by the group leads to reactions of the masses. The willingness to risk for the group leads to heroic deeds, and to suicidal terrorist attacks. Envy and the hatred that flows from it are the driving engine of the proletarian revolution. One talent, political talent, is a talent also observed among some chimpanzees. Individuals with this talent take advantage of it to persuade the group of their abilities to lead, whether in a dictatorship or a democracy.

A dictatorship is justified by the existence of a threat, and for its survival there are four essential conditions. There must be an ideology emphasizing the need for ownership transfers and for protection against real or imaginary enemies. The declaration of successes is necessary for justifying the individual actions of the leading group in the dictatorship (Lenin's wheels of the revolution that must not stop). Rewarding followers is an essential condition, because without it the supporters of the dictatorship would become the advocates of freedom. The last condition is the suppression of alternative ideas in the ruling group. The formulation of alternative ideas always occurs upon the death of the dictator, because the struggle for the leading position in the ruling group is conducted as arguments about alternative ideas. The fall of a dictatorship is only possible militarily (the fall of fascism in Germany) or when the condition of suppressing alternative ideas is not respected (the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, and also the Prague Spring of 1968). Thus, from the outside, the fall of a dictatorship can be orchestrated militarily, or by clandestine support for alternative ideas in the ruling group (promoting the American way of life in films and books).

Political decisions are determined by three principles. The principle of efficiency has been applied since the onset of agriculture, when surpluses had to be protected. Armed forces are most efficiently used for attack, and for the seizure of property from neighboring groups. The result is the rise of empires. The principle of timing is used by the ruling group when a judgment is made that an opponent is temporarily weak (campaigns into neighboring empires, such those of the Egyptians, the Persians, the Macedonians or the Romans, predated today's quick-strike warfare). The principle of erroneous quantitative estimation explains the failure of a number of political steps (assuming weakness of the enemy in the case of Napoleon's and Hitler's campaigns; the

inability to develop without living space and without raw materials in the case of Germany and Japan at the end of the first half of the 20th century; the assumption that the redistribution of the wealth of the rich will lead to wealth for all as a basis for the communist revolution).

In the future, it is possible that there will be a world without wars if there is a halt to rapid population growth, and if there is support for a system of liberal democracy allowing more equality in the distribution of pensions.