PERILS OF JUDICIAL ■ SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES
Judicial councils and other judicial self-government bodies have become a worldwide phenomenon. Democracies are increasingly turning to them to insulate the judiciary from the daily politics, to enhance independence and ensure judicial accountability. This book investigates the different forms of accountability and the taxonomy of mechanisms of control to determine a best practice methodology. The author expertly provides a meticulous analysis, using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts from 1993 to 2010 and creates a systematic framework that can be applied to future cases.
David Kosaf is currently Head of the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science at Masaryk University Faculty of Law, He clerked for a Justice and then the Vice-President of the Supreme Administrative Court, and for a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments      page xiii Caveats xv
Introduction 1
I. The Puzzle 9
II. The Approach 14
III. Overview of the Argument 16
IV. Plan of the Book 19
part one   Judicial Accountability: Theoretical Framework
1 The Concept of Judicial Accountability 25
I. Unpacking the Notion of Accountability 30
II. Specifics of Judicial Accountability 36
III. The Concept of Judicial Accountability 40
IV. Why Judicial Accountability Matters? 59
V. De Jure versus De Facto Judicial Accountability 65 VI. Accountability Perversions 68
2 Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability 73
I. What Do Judges Maximize? 74
II. What Is "In": Taxonomy of Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability 75
III. What Is "Out": Contingent Circumstances of Judicial Accountability 92
IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Recognition and Career Judiciaries 113
3 Judicial Accountability and Judicial Councils 121
I. The Rise of Judicial Councils and Their Effects 121
II. The Judicial Council Euro-model of Court Administration 126
III. The Impact of the Judicial Council Euro-model on ludicial Accountability 136
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CONTENTS
part Two   Holding Czech and Slovak Judges Accountable
4 Prologue to the Case Studies: Methodology and Data Reporting 145
I. Research Design of My Case Studies 145
II. What Is Measured 149
III. Data Collection 150
IV. Method and Evaluation 152 V Potential Inaccuracies 155
5 The Czech Republic 158
I. The Czech Judiciary in Context 158 II. Court Administration after the Spiit (1993-2010): Two
Decades of Calibrating the Ministry of Justice Model 181
III. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002 187
IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010 215
V. Overall Conclusion on the Czech Case Study 235
6 Slovakia 236
I. The Slovak Judiciary in Context 236 II. Court Administration after the Split (1993-2010): The Road from the Ministry of Justice Model to the Judicial Council Euro-model 254
III. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002 264
IV. Mechanisms of Judicial AccountabHity from 2003 to 2010 299
V. Overall Conclusion on the Slovak Case Study 333
7 Evaluation: The Czech Republic and Slovakia Compared 334
I. Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic
between 1993 and 2002 334 II. Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic
between 2003 and 2010 347 HI. Effects of the Judicial Council Euro-model in Slovakia 361 IV. Alternative Explanations 372
CONTENTS
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PART THREE   Conclusions and Implications
8   Perils of Judicial Self-Government 389
I. Court Presidents: Invisible Masters of Central and Eastern
European Judiciaries 390 II. The Judicial Leadership Theory of Judicial Councils 398
III. The Judicial Council Euro-model: Toward the System of
D ependent Judges within an Independent Judiciary? 406
IV, Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Transitional Societies 411
V. Oversight of Judges: Why Fire Alarms Do Not Work? 422 VI. Judicial Virtues Matter 428
Annex A. Court System of the Czech Republic 433
Annex B. Court System of Slovakia 435
Annex C. The Number of Judges in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia (1993-2010) 437 Bibliography 439 Index 465
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Far more people than I could mention here have helped me to get the manuscript to its present shape, having provided comments and criticisms on its previous drafts, presented at various occasions and some of them published in forms of articles. Instead of risking forgetting someone, I would like to personally thank the three "trios" without whom I would not have been able to "get the job done" at all.
First, I thank the "CEU trio" of judges/academics whom I happened to meet at the CEU, Aharon Barak, Andras Sajo, and the late Roger Errera, for triggering my interest in judicial accountability and shaping my early thoughts on this topic. Second, I am indebted to the "Czech trio," Michal Bobek, Jan Komarek, and Zdenek Kiihn, for having always been on my side and for commenting on various parts of this work as well as the final draft. Their feedback and support cannot be overemphasized. Third, I am immensely grateful to the "New York trio," Stephen Holmes, Tom Ginsburg, and Ran Hirschl, for their ongoing mentorship, encouragement, and trust. Most of all, they believed in the project long before it materialized into a full-length book. Stephen Holmes was a patient mentor who guided me throughout the entire process of writing. Tom Ginsburg and Ran Hirschl provided me with helpful suggestions and also showed me what it means to be an academic. In addition to these three "trios " I would like to thank Robert Zbiral and Hubert Smekal, two most promising Czech political scientists, and two anonymous reviewers for reading the entire manuscript and for their thoughtful suggestions.
The European Commission provided me a generous grant (Marie Curie Actions - Support for training and career development of researcher [CIG], Grant Agreement No.: PCIG10-GA-2011-303933) to conduct the two case studies on the Czech Republic and Slovakia and present their results at conferences on both sides of the Atlantic. I am also grateful to the NYU Summer Writing Program for funding my two-month stay at the NYU Global Research Center in Berlin in summer 2012, to the French Embassy in Prague for supporting my research at the Aix-Marseille
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Universite in September 2013, to the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law for allowing me to access its fantastic library and to discuss the key chapters of this book in summer 2014, and to the Jan Hus Foundation for allowing me to "buy time" to finish this manuscript. However, I owe the greatest debt of gratitude to Pavla for her infinite understanding and constant support.
CAVEATS
7he empirical part of this book (Chapters 4-7) studies the years between 1993 and 2010. The subsequent developments in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are mentioned only if they illuminate the main findings of this book. The remaining parts of this book reflect the state of the art as of June 30,2014. The subsequent developments are discussed only selectively.
Usual caveats apply. All opinions expressed in this book are personal to the author and should not be attributed to any institution he was or has been working with during the writing of this book. Any mistake, of course, remains author's own.
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