Detailed Information on Publication Record
2015
Konflikt v hlasování Poslanecké sněmovny PČR (1993–2013)
DVOŘÁK, PetrBasic information
Original name
Konflikt v hlasování Poslanecké sněmovny PČR (1993–2013)
Name (in English)
Adversary Voting in the Czech Chamber of Deputies (1993–2013)
Authors
DVOŘÁK, Petr (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution)
Edition
Středoevropské politické studie, Brno, Masarykova univerzita, 2015, 1212-7817
Other information
Language
Czech
Type of outcome
Článek v odborném periodiku
Field of Study
50601 Political science
Country of publisher
Czech Republic
Confidentiality degree
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
References:
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14230/15:00083390
Organization unit
Faculty of Social Studies
Keywords in English
Government-opposition Relations; Party Government; Government Dominance; Parliament Voting; Coalition Unity; Czech Republic
Tags
Reviewed
Změněno: 29/7/2015 14:47, Mgr. Lucie Pospíšilová
V originále
Studie se snaží uchopit a systematizovat základní vývoj vztahu mezi vládou a opozicí na půdě Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu České republiky. Kritériem srovnání je míra konkurence (konfliktní interakce v porovnání s konsensuální) při hlasování mezi těmito dvěma bloky.
In English
The paper explores the legislative unity of government and opposition blocs in the Czech Chamber of Deputies over a period of twenty years. As voting unity is usually rather low in the Czech Republic, temporarily high concentrations of the respective blocks’ votes are linked to higher rates of conflict between the government and opposition. I use the Rice and UNITY indices to compare average unity scores of individual cabinets and also explorative time series of unity vectors in order to analyse bloc concentration, success rate, and increased conflict. The outcomes are relevant as both a case study and a methodological observation: (1) Broad differences in the logic of interaction are confirmed (e.g. caretaker cabinets show less conflict than standard cabinets). Although no universal trend (e.g. a transition from consensual to conflictual practice) is found, the Czech opposition became more concentrated and resorted to the tactics of serial blocking in the second decade; thus, a major change of behaviour occurred after all. (2) The Rice and UNITY indices correlate considerably; UNITY’s discrimination capacity is not distorted significantly despite the nature of equilibria in the Chamber. Moreover; the UNITY index is able easily to distinguish contested votes which are not detectable by the Rice index alone.
Links
| MUNI/A/1342/2014, interní kód MU |
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