MÜLLER, Malte, Jens ROMMEL and Christian KIMMICH. Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India. German Economic Review. Wiley, 2018, vol. 19, No 2, p. 119-139. ISSN 1465-6485. doi:10.1111/geer.12117.
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Basic information
Original name Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India
Authors MÜLLER, Malte (276 Germany), Jens ROMMEL (276 Germany) and Christian KIMMICH (276 Germany, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition German Economic Review, Wiley, 2018, 1465-6485.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Article in a journal
Field of Study 50200 5.2 Economics and Business
Country of publisher United States of America
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW URL
Impact factor Impact factor: 0.638
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14230/18:00101962
Organization unit Faculty of Social Studies
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12117
UT WoS 000429543200001
Keywords in English Step-level public goods game; leading by example; group size; framed field experiment
Tags rivok
Tags International impact, Reviewed
Changed by Changed by: Bc. Blanka Farkašová, učo 97333. Changed: 9/7/2018 11:09.
Abstract
Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy-efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step-level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff-superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom-up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.
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