2016
Choice-set effects in dictator game
ĎURINÍK, MichalBasic information
Original name
Choice-set effects in dictator game
Authors
ĎURINÍK, Michal (703 Slovakia, guarantor, belonging to the institution)
Edition
2016 Economic Science Association International Meeting, 2016
Other information
Language
English
Type of outcome
Conference abstract
Field of Study
50200 5.2 Economics and Business
Country of publisher
Israel
Confidentiality degree
is not subject to a state or trade secret
References:
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14560/16:00092882
Organization unit
Faculty of Economics and Administration
Keywords in English
dictator game; context effects; decoy phantom decoy
Tags
International impact, Reviewed
Changed: 14/1/2017 10:21, Ing. Bc. Michal Ďuriník, Ph.D.
Abstract
V originále
In Dictator game it is common to see dictators transfer positive amounts to recipients. When the game is expanded by the opportunity for the dictator to not only give, but also to take from the recipient, many fewer positive transfers occur. There are several possible ways to explain this change in dictators’ behavior. One proposed explanation is via Experimenter Demand Effect: subjects give because in “giving game” that is the proper thing to do, in “taking game” taking is the proper thing to do. Alternative explanation proposes that changes in dictators’ behavior are due to context effects, similar to context effects observed and studied in consumer choice (decoy effect, compromise effect, etc). We design an experiment to investigate the impact of choice set manipulations, similar to those studied in consumer choice, on dictators’ behavior.
Links
| MUNI/A/1021/2015, interní kód MU |
|