Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability
in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court
Presidents and the Ministry of Justice

J 2017

Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court Presidents and the Ministry of Justice

KOSAŘ, David

Basic information

Original name

Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court Presidents and the Ministry of Justice

Authors

KOSAŘ, David (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution)

Edition

European Constitutional Law Review, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 1574-0196

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Field of Study

50501 Law

Country of publisher

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

Open access časopisu

Impact factor

Impact factor: 1.245

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14220/17:00096506

Organization unit

Faculty of Law

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1574019616000419

UT WoS

000395473000005

Keywords (in Czech)

Soudcovská nezávislost; soudcovská odpovědnost; předsedové soudů; Ministerstvo spravedlnosti; Česká republika; střední Evropa; justiční politika; dělba moci; správa soudů; soudní rada; výběr soudců

Keywords in English

Judicial independence; judicial accountability; court presidents; ministry of justice; Czechia; Central Europe; judicial politics; separation of powers; court administration; judicial councils; selection of judges

Abstract

V originále

When the communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe collapsed in the late 1980s, each state in this region was faced with the tasks of restoring judicial independence and reforming the system of the administration of justice. Most countries in the CEE initially returned to the pre-communist model of court administration, in which the executive plays the central role. So did the Czech Republic too. However, this model was subject to the increasing criticism from judges as well as from various international and supranational bodies. The European Commission teamed up with the Council of Europe and eventually came up with the new template, the “EU/CoE Judicial Council Model”. The central feature of this model was a new institution – a judicial council that should be granted most “personal competences” regarding a career in the judiciary. The EU/CoE Judicial Council Model was then endorsed as the only “right” solution that should eradicate the vices of the post-communist judiciaries. As a result of this joint pressure, most countries in CEE adopted the EU/CoE Judicial Council Model. Not the Czech Republic. It became the “outlier case” in the CEE region, the only post-communist country in the process of transition to democracy without a judicial council. Hence, it is particularly interesting to discern how judicial independence and judicial accountability are ensured there. This paper shows that the Czech Ministry of Justice model has underwent significant development and, in doing so, it focuses on the most important phenomenon since the Velvet Revolution – the rise of court presidents to power. It argues that the court presidents step by step eroded the Minister’s sphere of influence and managed to enlarge their own powers. As a result they became the most powerful players in the Czech judiciary with broad powers vis-a-vis individual judges. This development in turn calls for new safeguards of internal independence against the abuse of power by court president.

Links

46943, interní kód MU

Name: JUDI-ARCH - The Rise of Judicial Self-Government in Europe: Changing the Architecture of Separation of Powers without an Architect (Acronym: JUDI-ARCH)

Investor: European Union, ERC (Excellent Science)

Files attached

politics_of_judicial_independence_and_judicial_accountability_in_czechia_bargaining_in_the_shadow_of_the_law_between_court_presidents_and_the_ministry_of_justice.pdf

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Citovat

KOSAŘ, David. Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court Presidents and the Ministry of Justice. European Constitutional Law Review. Cambridge University Press, 2017, vol. 13, No 1, p. 96-123. ISSN 1574-0196. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1574019616000419.

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   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1574019616000419},
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   language = {eng},
   issn = {1574-0196},
   journal = {European Constitutional Law Review},
   title = {Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court Presidents and the Ministry of Justice},
   url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/politics-of-judicial-independence-and-judicial-accountability-in-czechia-bargaining-in-the-shadow-of-the-law-between-court-presidents-and-the-ministry-of-justice/5C61854C0},
   volume = {13},
   year = {2017}
}

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L2  - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/politics-of-judicial-independence-and-judicial-accountability-in-czechia-bargaining-in-the-shadow-of-the-law-between-court-presidents-and-the-ministry-of-justice/5C61854C0
N2  - When the communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe collapsed in the late 1980s, each state in this region was faced with the tasks of restoring judicial independence and reforming the system of the administration of justice. Most countries in the CEE initially returned to the pre-communist model of court administration, in which the executive plays the central role. So did the Czech Republic too. However, this model was subject to the increasing criticism from judges as well as from various international and supranational bodies. The European Commission teamed up with the Council of Europe and eventually came up with the new template, the “EU/CoE Judicial Council Model”. The central feature of this model was a new institution – a judicial council that should be granted most “personal competences” regarding a career in the judiciary. The EU/CoE Judicial Council Model was then endorsed as the only “right” solution that should eradicate the vices of the post-communist judiciaries. As a result of this joint pressure, most countries in CEE adopted the EU/CoE Judicial Council Model. Not the Czech Republic. It became the “outlier case” in the CEE region, the only post-communist country in the process of transition to democracy without a judicial council. Hence, it is particularly interesting to discern how judicial independence and judicial accountability are ensured there. This paper shows that the Czech Ministry of Justice model has underwent significant development and, in doing so, it focuses on the most important phenomenon since the Velvet Revolution – the rise of court presidents to power. It argues that the court presidents step by step eroded the Minister’s sphere of influence and managed to enlarge their own powers. As a result they became the most powerful players in the Czech judiciary with broad powers vis-a-vis individual judges. This development in turn calls for new safeguards of internal independence against the abuse of power by court president.
ER  -

KOSAŘ, David. Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court Presidents and the Ministry of Justice. \textit{European Constitutional Law Review}. Cambridge University Press, 2017, vol.~13, No~1, p.~96-123. ISSN~1574-0196. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1574019616000419.

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