Since the discussion on the conceptualization of party based Euroscepticism has started, there has been continuous and intensive debate on differences between soft and hard Euroscepticism. Scholars have paid attention particularly to the question whether soft and hard Euroscepticism represent two degrees of one phenomenon and where the cutting line between them lays. Another important issue has dealt with substantial differences between soft and hard Eurosceptics, particularly regarding content of the opposition or its motivation. One of such aspect has always been support/opposition for/towards EU membership. Initially being included (and than left over in the revised version) into first Taggart and Szczerbiak pioneering definition of soft and hard Euroscepticism (2001), it seems to increase its salience after Brexit vote and possibility of other exits. Our paper analyses salience of Brexit – as real scenario for leaving the EU – for soft and hard Eurosceptic parties in CEE countries. We argue that as there is fundamental difference between the former and the later, reactions of both camps substantially vary. While soft Eurosceptics consider Brexit as possibility to reform the EU, hard Eurosceptics translate it as a call to destroy the EU. Our research thus contributes to the understanding of party based Euroscepticism and its clearer conceptualization.