Detailed Information on Publication Record
2017
A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components
MAVROUDIS, Vasilios, Andrea CERULLI, Petr ŠVENDA, Daniel CVRČEK, Dušan KLINEC et. al.Basic information
Original name
A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components
Authors
MAVROUDIS, Vasilios (300 Greece), Andrea CERULLI (826 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Petr ŠVENDA (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Daniel CVRČEK (203 Czech Republic), Dušan KLINEC (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution) and George DANEZIS (300 Greece)
Edition
Dallas, TX, USA, CCS '17: Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, p. 1583-1600, 18 pp. 2017
Publisher
ACM
Other information
Language
English
Type of outcome
Stať ve sborníku
Field of Study
10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics
Country of publisher
Czech Republic
Confidentiality degree
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Publication form
electronic version available online
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14330/17:00095059
Organization unit
Faculty of Informatics
ISBN
978-1-4503-4946-8
UT WoS
000440307700100
Keywords in English
cryptographic hardware; hardware trojans; backdoor-tolerance; secure architecture
Tags
International impact, Reviewed
Změněno: 30/9/2019 11:03, RNDr. Pavel Šmerk, Ph.D.
Abstract
V originále
The semiconductor industry is fully globalized and integrated circuits (ICs) are commonly defined, designed and fabricated in different premises across the world. This reduces production costs, but also exposes ICs to supply chain attacks, where insiders introduce malicious circuitry into the final products. Additionally, despite extensive post-fabrication testing, it is not uncommon for ICs with subtle fabrication errors to make it into production systems. While many systems may be able to tolerate a few byzantine components, this is not the case for cryptographic hardware, storing and computing on confidential data. For this reason, many error and backdoor detection techniques have been proposed over the years. So far all attempts have been either quickly circumvented, or come with unrealistically high manufacturing costs and complexity. This paper proposes Myst, a practical high-assurance architecture, that uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, and provides strong security guarantees, even in the presence of multiple malicious or faulty components. The key idea is to combine protective-redundancy with modern threshold cryptographic techniques to build a system tolerant to hardware trojans and errors. To evaluate our design, we build a Hardware Security Module that provides the highest level of assurance possible with COTS components. Specifically, we employ more than a hundred COTS secure cryptocoprocessors, verified to FIPS140-2 Level 4 tamper-resistance standards, and use them to realize high-confidentiality random number generation, key derivation, public key decryption and signing. Our experiments show a reasonable computational overhead (less than 1% for both Decryption and Signing) and an exponential increase in backdoor-tolerance as more ICs are added.
Links
| GA16-08565S, research and development project |
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