The goal of this study is to examine the behaviour of electoral stakeholders that has influenced the quality of parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic since the 1998 elections. The text attempts to answer these questions: ‘What kinds of strategies do political actors use in electoral processes that decrease the quality of elections?’ ‘Do these tactics vary over time?’ ‘Are they efficient?’ ‘Who are the actors?’ The Czech Republic, as a newly established democracy, features comparably very high electoral integrity, while neighbouring countries experience (from time to time) electoral problems. This work aims to describe the behaviour of electoral stakeholders in order to understand whether they behave in a manner which maintains a high level of electoral integrity. The framework for analysis is constructed on the background of Andreas Schedler’s work (2002; 2013) with respect to influencing the level of institutional rules or the game within those rules. The analysis consists of different kinds of data sources. Among these, election observation mission reports, parties’ strategic documents (party manifestos), secondary analyses (providing the explanation of behaviour), and news (offering information about behaviour on a daily basis) are most important. The results will provide a description of primary electoral stakeholder behaviour, which then allows us to better understand how they affect electoral integrity.